

Martin Heidegger

**Phenomenological  
Interpretations of  
Aristotle**

*Initiation into Phenomenological Research*

TRANSLATED BY RICHARD ROJCEWICZ



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## Translator's Foreword

This book is a translation of the text of a lecture course Martin Heidegger offered in the winter semester 1921–22 at the University of Freiburg. The German original appeared posthumously in 1985 (with a second, revised, edition in 1994) as volume 61 of Heidegger's "Collected Works" (*Gesamtausgabe*).

The book appeared within the section of the *Gesamtausgabe* devoted to the "Early Freiburg Lectures." That is to say, it stems from Heidegger's first period of teaching at Freiburg (in the capacity of what we would call a "teaching assistant"), prior to his appointment to a regular faculty position at the University of Marburg in 1923 and his subsequent return to Freiburg as a full professor in 1928.

In October 1922, in support of his candidacy at Marburg, Heidegger composed an essay which bears the same main title as this lecture course, though the subtitle differs: "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation)."<sup>1</sup> The essay is clearly related to the precedent lecture courses, and in a sense Heidegger was, in the essay, as he said, "excerpting himself."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the present text must not be confused with the essay and is in no way superseded by it. On the contrary, despite the sameness in title, the lecture course is an original treatment of themes that do not figure at all in the essay.

As will be obvious even from a cursory glance at the table of contents, the lecture course departed widely from the proposed interpretation of Aristotle. Instead, the main theme of the lectures is human life as such, "factual life," and it is for the most part in regard to this theme that the secondary literature discusses the book. Indeed, Heidegger does not carry out any interpretations of Aristotle here but merely prepares for such, and that is the sense in which the entire lecture course is an "Introduction." (According to the table of contents, the book consists exclusively of an introduction, followed by two appendices.) Presumably, Heidegger meant to employ this text as an introduction to a larger work on Aristotle, though that project was eventually abandoned. Yet,

1. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, published posthumously in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 6 (1989), pp. 237–274.

2. *Ibid.*, editor's epilogue, p. 271.

as Heidegger himself says, the actual interpretation of Aristotle would not simply be a "historical" illustration or application of the "systematic" studies of the introduction.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, the introductory, systematic part would receive its full sense only in light of the supposedly "mere" application. Thus this book, as it now stands, is by its own admission radically incomplete and must be interpreted with great circumspection. That does not mean the text is unimportant or unrewarding, though it certainly does not lend itself to an easy, superficial reading.

Likewise, it is in no facile sense that the lectures constitute an "initiation into phenomenological research." The book does not straightforwardly expound a theory of phenomenological research but instead presents an instance of phenomenology in practice. It is an initiation through the actual engagement in the work of phenomenology and not through an abstract consideration of standpoint and method. It is precisely an *invitation* to phenomenology and not an indoctrination. Thus it is an initiation that makes demands on the one who would be initiated. The demands include, in the first place, a reading that is fully attentive to what might be said—in the book's own terms—merely by way of "formal indication."

The early date of this lecture course places it at a time in which Heidegger was still seeking his proper philosophical voice. Much of the vocabulary is therefore provisional. In particular, Heidegger here proposes a number of neologisms, some of which he later let fall away and some of which he eventually developed in new directions. To assist the reader in these *termini technici*, I have translated them consistently throughout and have appended to the text German-English and English-German glossaries, which also provide the Greek and Latin roots of the more obscure coinages.

At times, when I thought it necessary to indicate that the translation fails to capture some important nuance, I have interpolated Heidegger's German words directly into the text, placing them within square brackets ([ ]). These brackets have been reserved throughout the book for translator's insertions, and the few footnotes stemming from the translator are marked "Trans." The use of braces ({} ) is explained by the editors in their afterword. For the convenience of those wishing to correlate passages in this translation with the original, the running heads indicate the *Gesamtausgabe* pagination.

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3. See below, pp. 11, 82.

# PART I

## Aristotle and the Reception of His Philosophy

### A. What Are Studies in the History of Philosophy?

We call research into a past philosophy—e.g., Aristotle's—a study in the history of philosophy.

I. The history of philosophy was always seen and investigated in and out of a determinate cultural consciousness. Today what dominates is typifying history of the spirit. ["Types"—formed on what basis?] This history looks upon itself as strict factual research, within a determinate mode of positing and understanding facts. For this "exact" research, everything else counts as empty prattle, even the attempt to bring it itself to clarity in its own conditionality and standpoint. Philosophy is thereby grouped together with science, art, religion, and the like. In that way, philosophy is preconceptually determined, in regard to its content, as part of Objective [*objektiv*] history, as having Objective and Object-like relations and properties.

II. The historiological aspect of philosophy is visible only in the very act of philosophizing. It is graspable only as existence and is accessible only out of purely factual life and, accordingly, with and through history (I.) This entails, however, the demands of reaching clarity of principle with regard to: 1. the sense of the actualization of philosophizing, and 2. the nexus of the actualization and of the Being of philosophizing in relation to the historiological *and* to history.

These questions cannot be skirted, nor can one suppose—which would be counter to their inner problematic—that they can be, as it were, settled in advance by themselves (without historiology and history), i.e., by our rummaging about in some purified content. On the contrary, the taking seriously of the task of the history of philosophy is actualized precisely in philosophizing (without compromises in relation to I.), since the decisive problematic of II., 1. and 2., presents itself as one that is concrete, definite, and radical. Philosophy is historiological cognition of factual life (i.e., it understands in terms of actualized history). We must attain a categorial (*existentiell*) understanding and articulation (i.e., an actualizing knowledge), wherein what is separable is not interpreted as an ensemble and an origin, on the basis of what is traditionally separated, but is interpreted positively—on the basis of the fundamental comportment toward factual life, life as such.

Now, insofar as ruinance and questionability are experienced and philosophy decides to explicate radically that which is in each case factual about it, philosophy then renounces the possibility of having recourse to revelation, recourse to some sort of certification of its possessions

or possessive possibilities. That is not because philosophy is trying to be presuppositionless but because it stands originally within a pre-possession — of the factual. Questionability and questioning sharpen the comportment toward history — the “how” of the historiological.

In principle, everything is posed upon a confrontation, upon an understanding in and out of this confrontation. This existentially determined way of understanding through confrontation is “one-sided” — namely, from the outside — and it is a misunderstanding to maintain that we would come to an understanding if we do justice to history in (we know not which) calmness and Objectivity. Those are instances of weakness and indolence. The intention to confront has its own radical power of disclosing and illuminating.

As the term is usually employed, the history of philosophy comprises the convoluted succession of philosophical opinions, theories, systems, and maxims in the time frame from the seventh century B.C. to the present moment. That is to say, it concerns specifically the philosophies which have taken form in the life-nexus of the development of the Greek people in the history of the spirit, which development for its part debouched into the history of Christianity. Therefore it includes the further philosophies which in the course of the history of the Christian West (Middle Ages and modernity) have undergone various transformations and, at times, new formations.

It is with this spatial and temporal restriction that we here mean the term “history of philosophy.” And that is indeed not only because for the most part the treatment of other philosophies is a more or less acknowledged dilettantism and an opportunity for all sorts of intellectual mischief, but because this restriction arises out of the very sense of philosophy.

For any epoch, the history of philosophy comes into view as clearly, is understood as deeply, is appropriated as strongly, and on that basis is critiqued as decisively, as philosophy, for which and in which history is present and in which anyone is related to history in a living way, is actually philosophy, and that means: 1. becomes a questioning, and specifically a fundamental questioning, and 2. becomes a concrete seeking after answers: research. That is to say, what is decisive is the radical and clear formation of the hermeneutical situation as the maturation of the philosophical problematic itself.

There are established, in every generation, or in a succession of generations, determinate possibilities of access to history as such, determinate basic conceptions of the totality of history, determinate evaluations of individual epochs, and determinate *predilections* for individual philosophies.

The comportment of the present age toward Aristotle is well defined in a threefold respect. In addition, however, Aristotle has had a *underlying* influence on our ways of seeing and, above all, speaking, “articulations”: *logic*. (Predelineation of the radical and central problematic.)

## B. The Reception of Aristotle's Philosophy

### a) Middle Ages and modernity

Aristotle undergoes a definite positive evaluation, founded on the high scholasticism of the Christian Middle Ages, in the view of life and of culture determined by the Catholic confession and its Church.

The renewal of Kant's philosophy in the 1860s, along with the growing influence of this renewal on the philosophizing of the subsequent decades, led to a position opposed in principle to the positive evaluation just mentioned. Neo-Kantianism was essentially determined, in its opposition to Aristotle, by the type and the mode of its renewal of Kant. The renewal was a specifically "epistemological" one. More precisely, it was such that it itself led to the formation of the philosophical discipline now known as "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge." For this "epistemological" interpretation of Kant, his *Critique* was seen essentially as the ground-laying of the mathematical natural sciences, as theory of science. At the same time, Kant was understood as the "shatterer" of the old metaphysics and of empty speculation.

Based on Kant's philosophy, as so interpreted, namely, as a decidedly "critical" philosophy, the ensuing consideration of the history of philosophy relegated Aristotle to the position of a specifically uncritical philosopher: an exponent of naive metaphysics. This interpretation was mediated by a facile glance at the fact that, according to the general opinion, the old uncritical metaphysics had its perfect archetype in the Middle Ages, and there Aristotle was esteemed as "the philosopher." In this way, the first great and radically scientific man was relegated to the series of presumed obscurantists.

Kant and Aristotle have this in common, that for both of them the external world exists. For Aristotle, knowledge of that world is not a problem. He treated knowledge quite differently, as a clarification of the surrounding world. He can be called a realist only inasmuch as he never questions the existence of the external world.

For Kant, steeped in Aristotelian conceptuality and settled in Descartes' basic position, knowledge is a problem in a quite different respect (that of science especially), and the problem is then solved in a particular way. On that basis, however, one cannot brand Aristotle a realist or produce him as a star witness for realism, quite apart from the fact that thereby even Kant is understood awry. The confusion of the most heterogeneous motives, of questions and answers, and of methods in the problem of knowledge reaches its zenith with Nicolai Hartmann. He retains the problematic and the old terms and then still appeals to the idea of metaphysics for help.

For its part, the most superficial opposition to Kantianism was now pressed into an apologetic for Aristotle, an apologetic that had to run in the same direction as Neo-Kantianism. Thus Aristotle, in turn, became

an “epistemologist” and at the same time the star witness for the epistemological trend called “realism.”

The polemical position toward Aristotle, introduced by Neo-Kantianism, has entrenched itself in many ways in our modern cultural consciousness. Our present age, even in its position toward Aristotle, belies its own peculiar fickleness that has no roots. Philosophers, who only five years ago turned up their superior noses at the name of Aristotle, now—in order to keep up with the latest—speak like sages about the long-unknown greatness and even the “depth” of the Aristotelian philosophy—and both now and then remain without any serious knowledge of it.

The polemically negative attitude of Neo-Kantianism in relation to Aristotle had fallen victim to the erroneous presupposition that Aristotle has anything at all to do with the Middle Ages or with Kant. In fact, just the opposite is the case. It will have to be said, however, that these effective nexuses, decisive for the history of the spirit and more pressing for the present spiritual situation than is commonly thought, have not yet been grasped in their basic lineaments. And what is lacking for that task is the decisive posing of the problem. Indeed, the work of philological-historiological research is fruitful for exhibiting (doxographic) literary filiations, and this work of necessity bears—and is otherwise impossible—a definite interpretation of the content of the relevant literature.

#### b) Antecedent Greekanizing of the Christian life-consciousness

The Christian life-consciousness of the early and high scholastic eras, the consciousness in which was carried out the genuine reception of Aristotle and thus a quite definite interpretation of Aristotle, had already passed through a “Greekanizing.” The life-nexuses of the original Christianity had already matured within a surrounding world whose life was co-determined, in regard to its way of expressing itself, through the specifically Greek interpretation of existence and through Greek conceptuality (terminology). Through Paul and in the apostolic epoch, and especially in the patristic age, an incorporation into the Greek life-world was carried out.

Despite the accomplishments—quite unchallengeable as regards their scholarly significance—of the research into the history of dogma, the just-mentioned decisive process in the history of the spirit has not been grasped in its ultimate, highly meaningful interconnections and thus is not yet ripe for a philosophical problematic and discussion. The grounds for this are manifold (the state of theology, the directionality of research into the history of dogma itself, the state of research into Greek philosophy). The main reason lies in the lack of a problematic regarding principles, for it is in this problematic that the processes at issue must be set (existence, factual life—immanent interpretation; cf. the following).



Against the scholasticism which was consolidated through the reception of Aristotle, had passed through further transformations in Scotus and Ockham, and was simultaneously freed up in its vivacity of experience by Tauler's mysticism, Luther carried out his religious and theological counter-stroke. In the assimilation and development, as well as, in some cases, the dismissal of the new motives of Lutheran theology, Protestant scholasticism came to be formed. It was immediately nourished, through Melancthon, by Aristotelian motives as interpreted in a certain way. These dogmatics, bearing essentially Aristotelian directions, constitute the root soil of German Idealism.

In that philosophical epoch, the decisive conceptual structures and the leading nexuses with regard to the apprehension and interpretation of existence are, so to speak, laden with the just-characterized history of the spirit. Every serious investigation into German Idealism and, above all, every fundamental grasp of its historical genesis must set out from the theological situation of the time. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were theologians, and Kant can be understood only in terms of theology, unless we would make of him the mere rattling skeleton of a so-called epistemologist. For any interpretation, we must remain conscious of the methodological significance of these nexuses, at least as admonitions to prudence. Here, and everywhere in the investigation of our spiritual history, Dilthey possessed a sure instinct, but he had to work with insufficient methodological and conceptual means, and these precisely blocked his path to a radical formulation of the problems. Such nexuses in the history of the spirit must not now seduce us to further considerations. We need to pass on to what is decisive.

#### c) Philological-historiological research

Alongside the two opposite tendencies of a positive estimation and a rejection of Aristotle, there runs, fortunately very little touched by either, starting in the nineteenth century and continuing today, a fruitful line of philological-historiological research into Aristotle's writings. This research had its starting point in Schleiermacher's instigation of a critical edition of Aristotle. It was the Berlin Academy of the Sciences that undertook the task, and Aristotle is now commonly cited according to the Academy edition. This work is the foundation but is far from the final solution of the difficult task of establishing the text of the Aristotelian corpus. Later, the same Academy completed, after several unsuccessful attempts, an edition of the *Greek Commentaries* on Aristotle (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 1882-1909, followed by *Supplementum Aristotelicum*). That created a broad and secure basis for effective philosophical research into Aristotle.

From this philological research, a branch line was struck by Trendelenburg, and one of his students, Brentano, was of decisive significance for contemporary philosophy in its main streams (the Marburg School

excepted). This claim will immediately cease to seem an exaggeration if we do not look upon the development of modern philosophy from the outside and do not thereby limit ourselves to external sequences of schools and trends and to their nexuses of provenance (as if their affiliations and articulations were decisive) but if, instead, we attend to the genuinely effective problems, forces, and motives.

Husserl saw in Brentano what is decisive and was thereby able to surpass him in radicality, whereas the others who were influenced by Brentano merely took over single interpretations, which they reflected on but did not bring to the level of genuine understanding, i.e., to a level that promoted advancement in the genuine problems.<sup>1</sup>

1. F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* [*Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*] (Vienna, 1874). E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* [*Logical Investigations*] (Halle, 1913). W. Windelband, *Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil* [*Contributions to the Theory of Negative Judgment*] (Freiburg, 1884). H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* [*The Object of Knowledge*] (Freiburg, 1892). W. Dilthey, *Ideen zu einer beschreibenden and zergliedernden Psychologie* [*Ideas toward a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*] (Berlin, 1894). W. James, *Principles of Psychology* (1890). M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und transzendente Wertphilosophie* [*Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Values*], lecture course, summer semester, 1919.

## PART II

## What is philosophy?

The following investigations, however, are not aimed at putting in train a philosophical rehabilitation and defense of Aristotle, nor is their goal to renew Aristotle by paving the way for an Aristotelianism interwoven with the results of modern science. Those are not serious aims of philosophical research, whether they relate to Aristotle or Kant or Hegel. Our interpretations of Aristotle's treatises and lectures spring, rather, from a concrete philosophical problematic, so much so that this investigation into the Aristotelian philosophy does not in any way present a mere accidental surplus, a "supplement" or an elucidation "from the historiological side," but, instead, itself constitutes a basic part of this problematic. The latter alone gives weight and decisiveness to the approach, the method, and the scope of our investigations.

Those who wish to acquaint themselves for the first time with such a problematic need a preliminary rough indication of the direction the investigation will take, just in order to carry out the first step in a definite, even if unsteady, light.

Moreover, those who have already acquired a certain fixed position—and, a fortiori, those who believe they are secure in their grasp of the task and in their way of dealing with it—must ever again, out of concrete work, undertake a methodological examination of conscience with regard to the originality and the genuineness of their goal and the true appropriateness of their method.

Corresponding to the level of the problematic reached at any time, a presentification of the goal and of the method of the investigation is an indispensable propaedeutic, because it is a necessity of principle.

The two questions asked in philosophy are, in plain terms: 1. What is it that really matters? 2. Which way of posing questions is genuinely directed to what really matters? What is discourse about when it is discourse in the most proper sense? About what should and will and must discourse in philosophy, as a matter of principle, be uncompromising?

If it is genuine, a concretely determined problematic of philosophical research will run in its own directedness to the end, an end philosophy as such must have made fast for itself. *What is philosophy?* That question must be posed with sufficient clarity, sufficient for the situation and the problematic in which the question is posed, if indeed every concrete investigation is to have a secure direction, a corresponding methodological integrity, and a genuine pertinence.

CHAPTER ONE  
The Task of Definition

What is philosophy? This question, as so formulated and within the present context, i.e., at the inception and for the inception of a properly philosophical investigation, gives rise for the most part to a manifold discomfiture, which people will try to avoid under various pretexts and, ultimately, by some sort of compromise. That is a sign the task has not been brought to purity and the sense of the question has not been clarified at the level of principle.

The errors in treating the just-mentioned question, as so formulated, and in carrying out the task of definition in such a context (a context which indeed recurs for the philosopher more repeatedly and more urgently than for others, since the philosopher is precisely the genuine and constant "beginner") are of two kinds. The question and its resolution may be underestimated and, precisely as such, taken with too little seriousness. Then again, the question and its resolution may be overestimated; people may lose themselves in very lengthy endeavors, and the tarrying with the question may become, ultimately, so protracted that concern deteriorates into stagnation, and the question itself gets transformed overnight. Now, the truth does not at all lie in the middle, in a compromise that would reduce both errors to good, middle-class common ground. If there is one thing that does not exist in philosophy, that is compromising as a way of attaining to the heart of an issue. A brief discussion of the two sorts of errors may prepare a genuine understanding of the question and of the answer.

The underestimations themselves are, for their part, twofold, differing according to their motives. On the one hand, people say that discussions about the concept of philosophy are unfruitful, mere logical-methodological play. It would be better to follow the example of the sciences, which do not engage in extensive reflections on their own concept before beginning but, instead, begin straightaway. The mathematician and the philologist expect little profit for their proper tasks from such empty speculations, and the more authentically they live in their science, the less will they have a "taste" for such questions. Therefore philosophers, too, are advised and energetically urged to set to concrete work and to distance themselves from the sterile occupation of worry over a universally valid, secure definition of philosophy in advance. Subsequently one might undertake a certain division into disciplines, for the sake of a synoptic order, and might find a formula embracing philosophy in its totality. But those are extrinsic concerns.

This refusal of the question of definition is grounded in the view that the concept and the task of philosophy are to be determined according

to the model of any of the individual concrete sciences: that is to say, not determined in advance carefully and sharply but more or less instinctively. Thereby what prevails (speaking in terms of the individual sciences and in terms of their own determinate situation) is a fundamental estrangement and insensitivity. It is not thought necessary to overcome these, and, if they are genuine, not only do they *not* impede concrete research, but they actually make possible a development beyond the starting point and a preservation of the science.

The second underestimation of the question, i.e., the second way of objecting to an explicit discussion of the question of the definition, stems from a directedness that is exactly counter to the first, specifically scientific, tendency. Precisely because philosophy is in actuality more than a science, something "deeper" and "higher," it cannot be constrained into a pedantic definition. To indulge in such questions of definition is the mark of a soul like that of Wagner's [in Goethe's *Faust*], which is "happy to find earthworms." Philosophy cannot be defined and ought not be defined; philosophy can only be "lived," and that is the end of the story.

The overestimation of the question is likewise twofold. On the one hand, the overestimation is concerned with gaining the *most general* definition, the definition which would embrace every concrete form of philosophy that has emerged in the course of history. There is then immediately a further concern that the definition be proper and *rigorous*, one which completely satisfies the requirements fixed by academic logic for any definition.

The establishing of the definition, as intended in the overestimation, must be carried out before all else. To do so, what must be drawn in is a comparative consideration of the entire history of philosophy and thereby at the same time research into how and to what extent the definition allows for the so-called philosophical disciplines: logic, ethics, and the like. Then delimiting considerations are added: how philosophy comports itself to the individual sciences—how to art, how to religion. On this path, a sufficient definition will be acquired, on whose basis the individual disciplines could then be worked out.

The following may serve to clarify the sense of the double overestimation of the task of definition.<sup>2</sup>

Both errors, the underestimation as well as the overestimation of the task of definition, insofar as we manage to speak of them meaningfully and rightfully, will have to manifest something of a genuine intention toward the sense of philosophy and its possible ways of being appropriated. The latter indeed can be seen and brought into relief only out of a

2. The following discussion of the errors is presented in a new order, namely: A.) the overestimation, and specifically a) the rigorous definition and b) the general definition; B.) the underestimation.

full and radical intention to philosophy. The converse does not hold. That is, we cannot patch together something “correct” here by appropriately delimiting the errors, since the delimitation would already require a direction.

A genuine intention resides in the overestimation insofar as it stresses the necessity of philosophy to take its orientation from a principle. Starting with the very first step, philosophy must be clear about what it is actually trying to accomplish. In philosophy, principles play a different and more decisive role than in the individual sciences. The overestimation manifests a more or less strong and secure “instinct” for that fact.

A genuine intention resides in the underestimation insofar as it stresses, though in two fundamentally different ways, the necessity of actually concrete philosophizing. Accordingly, our knowledge of a secure definition of philosophy and our capacity to hold forth on the articulation of its disciplines and on the outline of its system in no way guarantee that we have put ourselves in a position to actually philosophize or even that we have understood the sense of philosophy.

Now, the error of the two positions concerning the task of definition would not at all be clarified by saying that the fault of the one consists in overlooking the merit and the genuineness of the other. Rather, in each case we need to clarify the error as a positive tendency, i.e., how each misconstrues “definition,” “the task of defining,” and “philosophy.” In that way it might be possible to work out, from various sides, an understanding of the question.

### A. The Twofold Error in the Overestimation

#### a) The uncritical idea of definition

Two different errors can lead to overestimation. The one error is to accept uncritically as a norm the *idea of definition* which develops out of a certain formal logic. To this norm a universally valid determination of the sense of philosophy has to comply. Defining then takes its direction from the conceptual structures of the object which are pre-given in the very idea of definition: *definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*. [“Definition is made through the nearest genus and the specific difference.”] Insofar as we accept this idea of definition, in some way or another, as the guideline—which we also do if we declare resignedly that it could (unfortunately) never be satisfied with regard to ultimate objects without our falling into the circle strictly forbidden by the same logic which is the origin of that idea of definition—insofar as we accept this norm of definition, we take philosophy as an object of the same character as the objects the just-named concept of definition is meant to fit and whose mode of apprehension justifies it: the rose is

a plant, a plant is an organism, etc. For quite definite regions of objects and for objects intended in one particular cognitive context, this norm of definition is meaningful. Philosophy is something; formally speaking, it is an object. But is it an object of the character of a rose, i.e., a thing, an article? Can philosophy be understood as such an object, i.e., understood in advance and implicitly as an object included in the purview of the just-named norm of definition?

It is important, right at the beginning of our consideration, to grasp the original sense of definition, from which the usual idea of definition is but a particular derivative. *Definitio: decisio, determinatio alicuius dicitur, quod tenendum et credendum declaratur, manifestatur et indicatur.* ["Definition is said to be a decision about or a determination of something, which determination is declared, manifested, and indicated as having to be *held and believed.*"] The genuine bearing of the definition! The full definition is not merely its content, the proposition!

Within its own realm of validity, the usual idea of definition has this peculiarity that, with respect to the normative way of grasping things in such a realm, the definition determines the object properly and securely. And although we can indeed always add illustrating cases, these contribute nothing fundamental.

This moment, however, does not pertain to every definition; indeed, there are definitions which present the object indeterminately, though in such a way that the actualization of the understanding of the particular definition leads to correct possibilities of more precise determination. There are definitions which merely *introduce* the concomitant full determination. They do provide a first impetus, but—if a misplaced image be allowed—alignment and troop strength must still be surveyed, munitions prepared, and the position of the object reconnoitered.

If we were asked to define, in the usual way, phenomenology, for example, then we would have to say that there is no definition of it in the usual sense, and there are in philosophy in general no definitions of that kind. The one who asked, and who, no doubt, went into retirement long ago on an uncritical and unclear idea of definition, will turn with a disdainful gesture from philosophy, which cannot even define what it itself is, and will turn all the more from a philosophy which regrettably struts about in the world claiming to be able to intuit "the essence of all things."

As an object, philosophy, like every object, has its mode of genuinely *being possessed*; there is a suitable, determinate way of accessing any particular object, adhering to it, and *losing* it. (In general we do not see these latter modes, and still less do we ever appropriately include them in the problematic. But they are precisely the ones in which we "usually" move; they constitute the "usual." They will acquire a fundamental significance in the problematic of facticity we are about to develop.)



In these respective modes, which can be indicated formally as modes of possession (losing is a certain way of possessing), there are immanently co-functioning, according to the character of the possession or, respectively, according to the “what” and the “how” of the object (its “Being”), definite forms of cognitive grasping and determining, specific forms of the clarification of each experience.

These forms are not subsequently pasted on; they are not mere extrinsic accompaniments of the modes of possession. On the contrary, it is in these forms that we possess the object itself as such; it is in them that we *claim* the object.

In every mode of possession as such, the object is, in one way or another, “under discussion.” The appropriate genuine possession can then in itself require an explicit discussion: the task can become that of bringing the discussion around to, and of speaking explicitly about, the “what” of the object in the “how” of its being possessed. This task is itself such that in each case it arises out of and in a situation of possessing objects, in a situation of factual experience and existence. (Grasped existentially and radically: origin of phenomenological research into categories!) This task, that of claiming the object in speech in such a way and of bringing it into a possession determined by discourse, is the task of definition: pre-possession.

The formal sense of definition is therefore: a determination of the object in its “what” and in its “how,” in a way appropriate to the situation and to the preconception of it, in a way, furthermore, that grasps the object out of the basic experience that is to be acquired, and in a way that claims the object in speech. (This is not the time for literary niceties and for constructing “beautiful” formulas. In the determination itself there are already assumed “expressions” which later will have to be clarified.)

Given at first is an idea of definition. It grows out of the phenomenologically radical interpretation of knowledge and has a different sense in each case, according to the various cognitive and experiential contexts. Precisely as it is determined in the formulation above, it signifies in principle more than the definition treated in formalistic logic.

In terms of the formal idea of definition, the task is now to acquire the idea of *philosophical definition*, i.e., the idea of the definition of philosophical objects. The proper order of derivation, however, is actually such that the philosophical definition is the original one and the formal idea of definition arises out of it through formalization. The character of definition in the various sciences takes its origin in a comparable way—though to be sure differently—out of the philosophical definition.

A philosophical definition is one of principle, so that philosophy is indeed not a “matter of fact” [*Sache*]; “possessing in principle.” Therefore this definition must be one that “indicates”: what is at issue; that is

only a more precise explication of the specific character of a principle. The philosophical definition occasions a pre-“turning” to the object, such that I do indeed not “turn” to the content. The definition is “*formally*” indicative—the “way,” the “approach.” What is pre-given is a bond that is indeterminate as to content but determinate as to the way of actualization.

The phenomenological definition is this kind of specifically existentiell maturation; with it, in a decisive sense, the actualization of the understanding is such that, out of a basic experience, the way, just as it is indicated, is traversed “backward.” In other words, the way is properly such that the claim is now made explicit for the first time and the task (category research), including the idea of the situation and of the preconception, is posed as the problematic. Then the basic existentiell experience can be taken up into concrete concern as what is factually decisive.

What is important at first is only this: the idea of determination, the logic of the grasp of the object, and the conceptuality of the object in the respective definitory determination must be drawn out of the mode *in which the object is originally accessible*. Also decisive for the definition are the situation of life in which the object comes to be experienced and, further, the basic intention in which the experience from the outset aims at the object (how the sense of the situation and of the anticipatory intentional grasp (the preconception) is “given its due”).

The idea of definition in “formal” logic is thereby invalidated, and that is so already because this idea of definition, as well as “formal” logic itself, are not at all “formal” but always essentially spring from a “logical” problematic oriented toward a material region of objects (things, living beings, meanings) and toward the determinate way of cognitively intending and grasping the respective objects (by ordering and totalizing).

The erroneous tendency thus resides in the fact that with respect to the object and its possible possession a norm of determination is uncritically introduced, i.e., always accepted in the traditional way as if it were self-evident. Yet this norm actually distorts the intentional grasp right from the beginning. The unquestioned use of this norm of determination and the resultant unreflective slipping into a tendency to grasp things in a certain way are possible because they lack the basic experience in which philosophizing “comes to language.” It is then thought that we can compensate for this lack by collecting various opinions and pronouncements about what philosophy is supposed to be, among which we choose, in the end, according to use, taste, need, convenience, or fashion.

The absence of the full basic experience, i.e., of the one that would involve an immanent explication of the task, represses the radical

problematic of logic, so that philosophy, after Aristotle, no longer understands the problem of genuine logic. And precisely Kant, who claimed (thereby betraying the fact that he understood logic in the narrow sense of academic logic) that logic had not taken one step since Aristotle, either backward or forward, is more firmly ensnared in a pseudo-Aristotelian logic than he could realize.

b) The mistaking of the sense of “principle”

The overestimation harbors a further erroneous tendency, which springs from the same uncritical, rash, and yet indeed genuine concern with definition. It is consciousness of something genuine to maintain that we must, in a sense, be clear and certain about what we want, what philosophy is supposed to be, what it is. It is the consciousness: that everything else in some way depends on the definition; that, consequently, the determination of the concept of philosophy must express something *at the level of principle* (principle: that on the basis of which something “is” in its own proper way, that on which everything depends); that the object is therefore to be given in the definition in such a way that “all the rest” depends on what has been determined; and that the object is to be given in the definition such that it is possessed precisely at the level of principle or can be possessed at that level in the continuation of the genuine appropriation.

The sense of “principle” and “at the level of principle” is here mistaken, or assumed thoughtlessly, just as is the normative idea of definition. Here the principle is the *universal*, the most general, that which holds “for” everything, “in every case,” that on which all the particular instances depend, whence they receive their essential determination. {Determination understood here according to a determinate idea of determinateness.} The individual cases fall “under” the principle, which is the “highest,” that which encompasses all its particularizations. The definition of philosophy must be one of principle, and that which it determines must be determined as a principle, as the most general, such that the determination applies to every individual domain of philosophy, i.e., to every individual philosophical discipline, for which it is the highest, with the result that the disciplines actually do fall “under a universal concept.” Accordingly, the definition is to make sense of the variegated manifold handed down in the history of philosophy, and indeed this precisely applies both to the extant manifold of philosophical disciplines and to the manifold of historical forms of philosophy.

The endeavor to resolve the (supposedly urgent) task of definition is driven by a care which demands, first and foremost, that, with respect to the just-mentioned norm of definition, so also with respect to the presumed idea of a principle, everything “accord” with what has been handed down in the tradition, precisely as it has been handed down,

with no detectable contradictions or vicious circles. The possibility that the tradition, to which we would adhere—again, through a basically genuine tendency—and to which the definition is supposed to be appropriate, might perhaps be under discussion here in an interpretation which is just as superficial as is the concern with definition—that never disturbs anyone. This concern for definition is passed down from generation to generation in the philosophical literature, and we take it as purely “unscientific” to suspect that this concern might be erroneous. Certainly we are not simply to define philosophy *privatim*, arbitrarily brushing aside its entire rich history!

Just as every object has its own way of being possessed, its mode of being accessed and preserved, and its mode of becoming lost, so at the same time, in this possession and for it, it is always in some sense a principle, something which is at issue and which, with respect to and for something, has “something to say.” How it is that the object attains this level, i.e., whence springs its character as a principle, is different with each object.

If an object is to be grasped at the level of principle, if the task is to give a *definition of principle* of the object, then its “what” and its “how” must be determined in *that* precise regard. This means the definition of principle must make the object accessible in such a way that the “how” is genuinely determined in its Being as a principle; more precisely, there must be a first indication of the “how” in which the object functions as a principle. This function as a principle, which the definition of principle has to grasp, this “how” of the object, is, in a definition of principle, the determination of the object’s own proper “what.” Yet, in such a definition, the “how” is given genuinely, i.e., the functioning as a principle is as such properly present, only if the genuine understanding of the definition can (as it must) draw out of the definition itself a reference to the “wherefore,” to that for which the object is a principle. The reference to the “wherefore” first makes intelligible the “how” of the principle. The definitory content is such that it gives direction to what is at issue in possessing it (the object). {Access, appropriation, preservation. Philosophy as full phenomenon! Sense-genesis of the principle.}

A definition of principle presents the object *as* a principle. It is a principle only in the Being of the “wherefore”; i.e., it is possessed as a principle only if the object is not the theme and neither is the principle. Instead, the definition must be such that the object is possessed as a principle or the possession is launched in such a way that a tendency in this direction of actualization is awake and the understanding thus takes this direction. Then the possession is one of principle, adhering to the principle *qua* principle. {The formal statement of the genuine correlation implies at the same time that the object is a principle, can be a principle. Formal correlation: the possibility of functioning as a principle

is indicated. Thereby to be noted that the statement itself is an “abstraction,” an ex-traction of a phenomenological meaning. Relation and thereby content.)

The genuine principle is to be acquired existentially-philosophically only in the basic experience of passion. There it is unclarified. “Away from principles” means from the outside, “without suffering,” in reflection, having become lost. In principle, no “retention.” “Away from principles,” we can be and have everything (Kierkegaard).

Therefore, precisely a consideration (and research) of principle must radically know what it wants to accomplish. It is not enough to emphasize the principle (thereby we do not at all adhere to the principle as such; we simply speak of it, take and pass along cognizance of it); on the contrary, we must “possess” the principle *qua* principle. Insensitivity to principles can mean either:

1. We have no concern whatsoever for principles.
2. We are concerned, but not “as a matter of principle.”

“As a matter of principle” means: to possess the principle genuinely. But that in turn means to bring it to maturation and clarification within unclarified passion, to take it up and “retain” it; i.e., for us: to acquire this basic experience for the first time. The way is long for philosophy as research.

The definition of principle of an object is again different according to the object’s own “how” and “what,” according to the genuine mode of possession, and according to whether the object is or is not decisive for the mode of possession. There can be principles which are to be acquired quite differently at different times, and indeed in such a way that at first a mere reference is given, a peculiar reversion to the basic experience, and only from there does the principle genuinely arise. This mode of appropriation is itself an essential characteristic of a spiritual situation.

The overestimation genuinely seeks an orientation of principle in the definition of philosophy. But the mistaking of the character of the object is united to a mistaking of the problematic functioning of the principle and a mistaking of the fact that this function of the principle (to refer to that for which it is a principle) is decisive in a definition of principle. Instead, the defintory determinations themselves become the theme and the object of proof; the “wherefore” and, consequently, the genuine character of the principle become subsidiary. That is why the way is long.

What counts for us is not simply to identify the mistake but to understand the erroneous tendency in a positive sense. The defintory endeavor proceeds toward the determinative formation of a general, encompassing concept that is fitting to all the cases. But where a comprehensive universal resides in the grasping tendency precisely *qua* universal, functioning as a principle, there that for which the intended

principle can be a principle is necessarily a *matter of fact*, and that toward which the principle points is a particular case.

Should a matter of fact be grasped in principle *qua* matter of fact, then it must be grasped in that which is at issue in it as something to be grasped, i.e., in the way it is present in correspondence to the peculiarly proper way of approaching it. In terms of the determinate objective logic of the Greeks, it is grasped therefore as seen within its particular way of coming into being as something that has come forth by being made, produced, fabricated, etc., i.e., seen within its genus or, ultimately, within its highest genus and region. With respect to philosophy as an object and with respect to the definitory tendency toward something general, this means, however, that *philosophy is posited in the pre-conception as a matter of fact*. In other words, the preconception guiding the definitory tendency is, with respect to the properly intended object, a mistake.

Therefore the same erroneous tendency is operative here as in the acceptance of the entirely determinate idea of definition tailored to matters of fact and things and to their determinate mode of being grasped. And manifest here is the same defect of an uncritical acceptance of the entire problematic of principles. The character of a principle and the function of a principle, the "wherefore," become subsidiary within the ordering, totalizing, typifying tendency to classify. They come to be seen as arbitrary, and the access to them becomes an access precisely to something subsidiary. Should they indeed again become genuine issues, then a concealment is already in place, and the way to a proper understanding is already obstructed. All talking is then of no help, and the call to praxis and action is, seen philosophically, merely a renunciation of the task of radical research into categories, a flight, and a genuine philosophical blunder (Jaspers!).

This way of argumentation takes hold very readily today, given the notorious superficiality of thinking and the growing indifference toward rigorous problematics. We could say that never was there such an "unphilosophical" epoch as the present one, and the reason is precisely the current proliferation of metaphysical needs. The talk of decline and technization (Bergson, Spengler) will be confused as long as no positive problem is made out of the phenomena in which and for which and about which the decline is actualized. But that would precisely constitute an intention toward the radical problematic.

It can only be made clear later where this erroneous tendency to overestimation, to a rash preconception and acceptance of philosophy as a matter of fact, has its motives in chronological history and in the history of the spirit and where these motives, in turn, are properly grounded (facticity, becoming lost, becoming a matter of fact, presenting itself as a matter of fact).

Accordingly, only a genuine access to and possession of the sense of philosophy as an object can bring into relief, originally and evidently, the error in the understanding of philosophy as a mere matter of fact. These endeavors to define philosophy are lacking in the decisive categories. And these categories do not find expression in speech, because philosophy itself is never intended in the appearances in which it can be addressed radically, i.e., in the experiences in which and through which it is in accord with its own mode of Being. (Which is the fundamental objective manifold of that which is properly to be called philosophy? Clarification, clarification of factual life, clarification that understands, clarification that understands at the level of principle.)

### B. The Underestimation of the Task of Definition

Our discussion of the underestimations of the task of definition will uncover the same basic defects. Now the concrete is emphasized versus empty, merely logical considerations and versus formalistic compulsions. The concrete is emphasized inasmuch as it is in the concrete that actual work takes place. For the sake of simplicity we must here devise a fiction, which will do no harm and will not be inappropriate to the matters at issue, the fiction, namely, that this concrete work is in fact what it is claimed to be, thus that in some way it furthers the issue. This fiction is grounded in the first underestimation already mentioned; in the second one, it is pure fiction. To begin, we will discuss, as more crucial, the first underestimation.

#### a) The decision in favor of “concrete work”

Insofar as we decide in favor of and take up concrete work, we have decided in favor of a definite way of doing such work, whether the sense of such concretion is presentified explicitly or not. We choose definite regions of objects (e.g., the field of psychology), we grasp the objects in a definite way, move in definite conceptual structures, make definite claims with regard to grounding and clarity, and see work in a definite global horizon of knowledge and in a definite relation to history. We are conscious of all that more or less clearly.

Concrete work indeed signifies: to approach the object in its concrete form. What does “concrete” mean? To clarify the sense we must intentionally free ourselves from the determinations of “formal” logic, where “abstract,” *abstractum*, is understood in the quite definite sense of general material logic and in relation to which the sense of *concretum* and “concrete” is established. Instead, we will adhere to the word. The concrete or, more precisely, that which is said to exist “concretely” is that which is condensed and originates out of compression, compaction. Insofar as an object is possessed concretely, the possession is related to

the object in such a way that it grasps the determinations of the object fully and in their full jointure and compaction, i.e., properly grasps the (ultimate) structural sense of the full object in the richness that determines what and how it is.

But what is intended as the concreteness of an object depends on how we have represented the object, what it mainly concerns, what is at issue in it, what it properly is trying to say. The concrete depends on how the object is taken “in principle.” Insofar as we dispense ourselves from a consideration at the level of principle, i.e., from a consideration that properly corresponds, in approach, method, and execution, to the character of a principle, or—which amounts not merely to the same misunderstanding but to a still more fatal one—insofar as we enter into such a consideration half-heartedly, then we must let arise from elsewhere the sense of “concrete” and the “how” of concrete research, to the extent that the tendency toward concrete research in general is supposed to have a meaningful direction. And this is in fact what we do in the case of the two modes of underestimating a consideration of principle. Just as the overestimation merely aims at attaining, in some way or other, a universally applicable concept of philosophy, so the underestimation merely aims at pursuing research, in whatever manner, without a more precise determination of the task and matter, just as long as there is indeed some (substantial!) matter and manifoldness to investigate and not simply some “abstract logical stuff.”

We will follow the underestimation first named above<sup>3</sup> and positively characterize its tendency and direction. It takes its ideal of concrete research from the *sciences*. How? On the basis and by way of a definite evaluation: the style of the sciences, their “operation,” enjoins them to bring to light constantly something new and, preferably, difficult; to pour forth constantly an abundance of new cognitions; to influence decisively and promote the development of mankind; to show man to himself thereby as a wonderful creature, if he can discover all these things; etc. We see the sciences in terms of their current usage and style, and the decisive insight is that these precisely dispense with considerations of principle and nevertheless attain rich results. What arises then is this: an insight concerning a certain attunement, predilection, and direction of interest and, at the same time, an evaluation which favors such concrete research and which loses all taste for logically methodological discussions on the grounds that with them we cannot “do” (!) very much. (Thereby we fail to see that with them we can “do” what is most important!) The decision in favor of the concrete is carried out in this type of half-clear situation with respect to the sciences and their radically appropriate sense of Being.

3. P. 12 f.



If the sciences were not seen in this way from the outside and in terms of their progress and results, i.e., according to a merely apparently proper but in fact wrongheaded theory of science, then it would have to become clear that every science, at its birth, has made a decision of principle and now lives on that basis, and, conversely, from there each science also derives its characteristic way of going astray. It is never asked whether the sciences, either in general and in terms of a global impression, or in particular and in terms of the current state of an individual science, can actually furnish the idea of concrete research. Quite apart from that, we have forgotten to ask whether in general what counts for philosophy is indeed *derived* from what matters for the sciences, or whether the relation is not reversed, even if progress and results are not then so easy to lay hold of.

The following pages are to show that the radical question has been posed just as little with respect to philosophy as with respect to the sciences, the question of exactly what sort of objects these are. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of our present question: what are they and how must we intend them, so that we may read off from them the sense of concrete research (presupposing this concept does have sense and legitimacy)?

Insofar as we allow an impressionistic, half-clear, and external representation of the accidental state of the sciences “in general” to supply the normative idea for concrete research in philosophy, we are dwelling in a specific insensitivity toward matters of principle and do thereby become more and more obtuse to these matters. What is lacking is the possibility of an access to principles, and where these are spoken of, we mistake them and see in them merely a “program,” versus rich, actual results, merely a “matrix” or a “lattice,” versus the fullness of the concrete.

On account of this blindness for matters of principle, it is not surprising that the opposition to them falls into and shares the same error, insofar as we do not see, in the principle itself, something genuine but instead emphasize its concretion in an equally uncritical way. The opposition shares the erroneous tendency with respect to the task of a determination at the level of principle and thereby places itself outside the possibility of attaining, radically and genuinely, the sense of the corresponding concretion. That means it gives up the possibility of working out the genuine tendency to the concrete in an appropriate and original way, in the way that corresponds to the sense of philosophy, and of understanding radically, with respect to this genuine sense-moment of philosophizing, the task of definition. The opposition does not realize that the defect lies not in the problematic of principles as such but in the uncritical acceptance of a determinate idea of and fixing of principles, an idea the opposition itself uncritically assumes in mistaking concrete work as clever and inspired mastery of the material,

and synthesis of it, on the basis of well-collected information from all possible sources.

If philosophy is something in which the concrete is, in one sense or another, decisively at issue, then the definition of philosophy at the level of principle must be such that this definition bears in itself a reference to the concrete, and indeed in such a way that the understanding of the definition, according to the very actualization and maturation of this understanding, leads to the concrete. But this is simply an explication of the task of a definition of principle, and we have already encountered this task.

Our discussion of the first mode of underestimation now merely directs our attention to the fact that that for which the principle is a principle carries great weight, decisive weight. By way of an indication: the concrete must be appropriated as that for which the principle “is.” We are to pursue that!—About the “how,” still nothing. Our attention has merely been directed to it, without our seeing clearly the necessary way in which this insight arises. Negatively, it is already clear: not by taking the sciences as the model; but that also means: not at all by way of the negative delimitation to the effect that the sciences represent what philosophy is not.

The discussion of the underestimation does not provide us with a positive reference, but we may take it as a preparatory illustration of the moments at issue in the definition of the object called “philosophy.” In this indirect way, what is genuine in the mistakes receives its proper sense and is posed in its proper “place.” Just as there is destruction in phenomenological research, so too, unified with the destruction, there is phenomenological-existential composition.

The definition of principle (in the formally established sense) of the object called “philosophy,” and thereby the definition of principle of all “philosophical objects,” must be such that the determination of the “what” and the “how” of the object (maturation, approach, access, appropriation, retention, renewal) decisively emphasizes the ontological function of the “what” and the “how” at the level of principle, indeed, so that the definitory content “indicates” the genuine concretion, the one it is necessary to appropriate. In other words, the definition of principle is an *indicative* one, which means that what is said in the definition, the definitory content, must be comprehended “as indicative.” My comprehension must be such that I precisely posit the definitory content in relation to . . . Accordingly, the content, the determinations given of the object, must, as such, precisely *not become the theme*. Instead, the grasping comprehension has to follow the indicated direction of sense. (In its manner of access, the comprehension does understand how the way of following (directed toward appropriation) is given “formally.”)

{The concept and the role of the definition in philosophy; cf. the formal sense of definition, and then the philosophical (complete) definition; the existentiell formal-indicative definition of principle. *Indicative*: fends off the actualization in general from a tempting and facile attitudinal decline: "pre-cautions" taken! Definition such that it precisely keeps at arm's length this tendency toward its content, or, respectively, if it is said that the definition of philosophy is an indicative one, then this implies a quite definite task for the understanding of the content; though undetermined as to the "how" of the method.)<sup>4</sup>

It is characteristic of an indicative definition that it precisely does not present fully and properly the object which is to be determined. Indeed, it merely indicates, but, as genuinely indicative, it does give in advance the principle of the object. An indicative definition includes the sense that concretion is not to be possessed there without further ado but that the concrete instead presents a task of its own kind and a peculiarly constituted task of actualization. Accordingly, the definitory content must be gained along the lines of this approach. The positive reference to it is provided by the further character of the definition, namely, that it is "formally" indicative. (Seen from what is proper, that which is given in advance is precisely of a genuine origination; explicitly, however, it is first and necessarily already declined, though indeed genuinely held fast in the decline.)

The term, "formally indicated," does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. "Indicated" here means that that which is said is of the character of the "formal," and so is admittedly improper. Yet precisely in this "im-" there resides at the same time a positive reference. The empty content in its sense-structure is at the same time that which provides direction toward the actualization.

There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper, namely, by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly indicated, by following the indication. An exhausting, a drawing out: precisely not such a one that the more it grasps, the less it leaves behind (by way of removal) to be acquired, but the reverse: the more radical and formal is the understanding of what is empty, the richer it becomes, because it leads to the concrete.

Therefore we must not make illegitimate demands on the indication! With respect to an indicational or referential characteristic, the determination "formal" signifies something decisive! Object "emptily" meant: and yet decisively! Not arbitrarily and without a sound approach, but precisely "emptily" and determinative of direction: indicative, binding.

#### 4. Recapitulation.

In order to grasp the sense fully, what is needed is a radical interpretation of the "formal" itself: existentiell sense of the formal. The opposite is not the "material," the accidental content. Nor is formal the same as the eidetic, and the use of that term, in the sense of "universal generality," is altogether problematic in phenomenology. "Formal" refers to a way of "approach" toward actualizing the maturation of an original fulfillment of what was indicated.

The definitory content is such that it refers to the "how" of a genuine encounter, determination, constitution, formation. These lie in the actualized in-forming [*Ein-bildung*] of the full phenomenon. The content delimits itself "extensively," however, above all only because, tending "intensively" and genuinely toward actualization, the genuine phenomena are determined in a decisive way. The understanding that follows the genuine way of approach is not in the full sense a grasp of the ontological meaning but is precisely determined by the approach—only by that but precisely by that. To be on the point of departure; to set out resolutely!

"Formally," the "formal" is a content which refers to or indicates the direction, i.e., predelineates the way. "Formal-indicative" is a unified, inseparable concept in philosophy. The formal is not the "form," and the indication its content; on the contrary, "formal" means "approach toward the determination," approach-character.

The object itself, determined in the "how" of its being a principle, is inauthentically there, "formally indicated." We live in an inauthentic mode of possession, which takes a specific direction of actualization toward the maturation of the authentic mode of possession, and the latter is determined as authentic precisely through this taking of direction. The authentic mode of possession is, with respect to many objects, in a radical sense a Being, i.e., the specific Being of the respective actualization, of the maturation of existence.

From this it is evident that the approach-situation in which the definition (or the understanding of the definition) takes its approach is not one whereby the object presents itself fully and properly. On the contrary, it is precisely the decisive *departure-situation* for the actualizing movement in the direction of the full appropriation of the object, i.e., in the direction of a complete possession of the object. Yet in order to function so decisively, the approach must be actualized radically and critically. (It is therefore not enough to speak arbitrarily and in general. Strictness in every fiber!)

It is further implied here that the evidence with regard to the appropriateness of the definition, i.e., its appropriateness to the object, is not authentic and original; rather, this appropriateness is absolutely *questionable*, and the definition must be understood precisely within this questionableness and lack of evidence. But that means that just as it is a misunderstanding of the definitory content to make it the theme and to demonstrate it in a comprehensive way, instead of following up its

indication, so it is wrongheaded to take the questionableness of the approach as a basis for demonstrating the meaninglessness and arbitrariness of the definition.

The authentic foundation of philosophy is a radical, existentiell grasp of and maturation of questionableness; to pose in questionableness oneself and life and the decisive actualizations is the basic stance of all—including the most radical—clarification. Skepticism, so understood, is the beginning of philosophy, and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of philosophy. (This implies no romantically tragic self-conceit or self-indulgence!)

In philosophical research it is important not only to be clear about how to demonstrate and what sort of demonstrability is appropriate but also to understand “when” the moment is ripe for genuine discussion. Such a discussion can be ventured only if we have understood what the definition says, i.e., only if the access to the original evidence-situation has been actualized. There it will be decided whether the demands of proof we placed upon the definition have any sense at all within the approach. As a situation of the original access to the proper “what” and “how” of philosophy, this is the situation of the primal decision on the actualizations of philosophizing (existence).

{To be still more precise and cautious! The definition is formally indicative; thence to draw out the sense of “proof,” “question,” “research,” method, etc. I may therefore not introduce just any objects and prattle on emptily.}

#### b) Philosophy as “lived experience”

This evidence-situation of the primal decision, this experience (the basic experience) in which the object presents itself properly in its “what” and in its “how,” or, more precisely, the specific nexus of actualization directed at attaining this situation, is ultimately what the second mode of overestimation is referring to in its confused assertion that philosophy as such can only be “lived.” What is intended here is utterly unclear and confused, and it is no accident that fanaticism always in some way attaches to decisive issues, even if in quite impossible forms, for only in that way can it corrupt everything in philosophy from the ground up.

The fanatical spirit looks upon the “great” philosophies from the outside and admires their “depths.” In a misguided attempt to imitate them, we become victims of the disastrous confusion that fails to distinguish between fanaticism for “depths” and the radical, methodological intention to approach the problematic on the level of principle. Where “lived experience” is so emphasized, there philosophy must either remain closed in on itself, a completely private matter, and it would then make no sense to talk and write about it, or else it must be of the opinion that the shared world can be made accessible to lived experi-

ence through some artistic means or other. That is why books are to be beautifully appointed, the style of discourse “wonderful,” and the manner of expression appropriate to the needs of the time, which means, today, as religious and metaphysical as possible.

Then again, the declaration of a shared world, the communication of a philosophy with others, the appeal made to others through this indicative anticipation (apart from the specific responsibility of the person who should do the appealing) must have an intelligibility, precisely one that submits itself to a decision in a determinate situation within the shared world. Communication, insofar as it concerns — and is — a matter of principle, must have intelligibility and demonstrability and, even as an anticipation, must itself be ultimately radical and rigorous.

The fanatical intention toward a primal decision is seductive (we seek what philosophy is supposed to “give,” as a perverse historical “salvation”) even where we see the problematic of the access itself and see anew the positively productive relevance of the situation of the basic experience. It is easy for us to believe that this situation is something fixed, located somewhere in space and time, and that we can (and should) enter into it, that we can betake ourselves to it just as would climb the tower of the Feldberg. We thereby overlook the fact that precisely with the maturation of the access itself, the “how” of the decision indeed enters into experience, but that with the actualization, e.g., with the grasping of the concern over existence, the basic difficulties are only beginning.

The situation in question does not correspond to a safe harbor but to a leap into a drifting boat, and it all depends on getting the mainsheet in hand and looking to the wind. It is precisely the difficulties that we must see; clarification in that regard first discloses the proper horizon toward factual life. Only in appropriating this correspondingly structured possession of the decision, only in realizing that our vision depends precisely on this possession, does there reside the basic motivation for the maturation of philosophizing.

If genuine science is always questionable and indeed problematic, should philosophy have it any easier? The heirs have gambled away their inheritance. To grasp philosophy authentically means to encounter absolute questionability and to possess this questionability in full awareness. The fixed ground (ground is something that always needs to mature, just as an appropriation does) lies in grasping the questionability; i.e., it lies in the radical maturation of questioning. “Grasping” is being concerned: to bring oneself radically and concretely to a decision within an explicit acceptance of the task of research.

This (actual) “passion” as the unique way of philosophizing is no longer known. We believe we have accomplished something if we represent and interpret the world “deeply” and stand in some sort of relation to this idol.

Thus the underestimation, too, actually fails on account of a lack of radical questioning. The underestimation tends toward "fanaticism" for fanatically viewed scientific research and for fanatically felt "depths" of life. Both tendencies have nothing to do with philosophy, because they are not motivated out of the decisive situation of the basic experience and because they do not present the idea of the clarification which must correspond to the proper tendency toward fulfillment, the one that is merely appropriated and followed in a confused way. This clarification can come to lucidity about itself only through a lucid delimitation of the field of the object.

It is only on the basis of their ambiguous character that both mistakes, the overestimation and the underestimation, are at all possible, prolong their existence, and indeed have today a firm footing. The overestimation simulates logical determinateness, rigor, and the radicalism of genuine questioning; the underestimation feigns rich lived experiences, "depth," and the genuine originality of the basic experiences. Both ambiguities, tied together, are enough to mark our epoch, and whoever cannot unify them adheres to one, according to taste and aptitude. Accordingly, we find attempts at reciprocal delimitation and at unification. The one error misunderstands the rigor of genuine "logic"; the other, the originality of full concreteness. And, a fortiori, both misunderstand the nexus of these misconceived determinations of philosophy.

The misunderstandings are possible on the basis of the one fundamental defect: there is no appropriation of the situation of the understanding as appertains to philosophy. More precisely, the fault lies in the opinion that this situation is simply there, without further ado. That is blindness to one's own spiritual situation, and it is distinguished from every other blindness in the previous history of the spirit by the fact that it is more removed than ever from the situation of the understanding. It is removed in such a way, however, that there lives in it precisely a specific direction of determination, and it has raised this to the genuine superficiality decisive for the appropriation of the situation of the understanding. This "decline" characterizes a leveled-down apprehension and experience, namely, "historiological consciousness."

Thus the distinction between scientific philosophy and prophetic philosophy is a fanatical one in all aspects. Science—philosophy—forming of a worldview—scientific worldview philosophy—worldview-oriented philosophy as rigorous science—all these are misbegotten from this unclarified situation.

#### c) Concept of philosophy<sup>5</sup>

There is no such thing as a revelation of what philosophy is and what it is supposed to be. Is it "invented"? It is demonstrable that there "can" be something of the sort. Where? For what? For factual life. What does

5. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

that mean? Must there be philosophy? In a sense, yes, if life and existence are supposed to be. "Supposed"? — They are factually there. Is there a tendency toward fleeing away? The ruinous flight into the world; away from the object; positive sense of Husserl's "re-reduction."

There remains only the one way: to examine relentlessly and with a level gaze; to "examine": problem of interpretation—to be *in* philosophy! The question cannot be pursued in a doctrinaire way and with methodological purity, which is but a dream and does not perceive the ground (facticity); not to appeal lamely to authorities, but to understand them radically! The task is to examine what is actually historical, what this name actually names (what we understand today of the sense of philosophy, i.e., how we comport ourselves in philosophy, is a matter of unclarity, conveniences, unverifiable traditions, and preferences of taste), not in order to take over the historical but to have a clear possibility and a clear opposition, i.e., to acquire the genuine direction of a meditation. The purpose is not to concoct definitions and empty toy with them; on the contrary, it is philosophy itself as such that concerns us.

In philosophy, there is no justification for a vague calling and for work based on dispositions and mere fashions, as long as there is no determination, according to its capacity for decisions (positing of goals), of the motive force of that which is never recognized clearly as a definite tradition (but is instead taken as a priori and clear "in itself," e.g., philosophical tendencies in Husserl's alloy of British empiricism), i.e., as long as we do not explicitly say that we are simply recapitulating this philosophical ideal.

For such a meditation, a tabular, encyclopedic, and typifying overview of opinions concerning philosophy accomplishes nothing. This covers over even more the twofold origin of such definitions and readily lets them appear as absolute, timeless maxims, which we follow according to the way that suits us.



## The Appropriation of the Situation in Which Understanding Is Rooted

The first task is therefore the appropriation of the situation in which understanding is rooted; the full, concrete appropriation is by itself a task that will perhaps exceed the powers of the present generation. The appropriation thus needs to be secured in its approach and its starting point. Our critical considerations have taught us that the issue is the motivated direction of interest. No preparation for it resides in un genuine knowledge of facts and results; that constitutes misguided curiosity. The interest should not aim at acquiring cognition of some matter of fact and should not await results in an extrinsic sense, such as the outline of a system, the marking of great perspectives, the brilliant description of a standpoint, the gaining of something "other," new, unusual. All that is the inappropriate tendency to certainty and safety, the wish to be reassured.

Genuine preparation amounts to following positively the *idea of definition*, specifically the idea of philosophical definition. It is genuine readiness to understand, appropriate first of all to the situation and to the preconception. [To question and to ground chairologically-critically "in good time"!]

We will begin by fixing the *preconception*: philosophy is intended as something we want to appropriate originally, namely, by acquiring the basic relation to it, the relation in which it is authentically present. This is not the same as obtaining "knowledge" of philosophy, orienting ourselves toward it, mastering it, being erudite in it. That is primarily and only the mere appropriation of certain information about what philosophy was and is, i.e., about what philosophy has influenced or should influence. Philosophy is therefore not intended in the preconception as a cultural object, as something that has manifested itself in a quite definite literature or the like, and thus not primarily as it is manifested in objectively historiological experience, in objectively historiological categories. In short, philosophy is not intended here as an instrument of culture but as something to which we relate originally, such that we can claim our relation to the object is "philosophizing."

We have philosophy in this preconception. And in which *situation*? The idea of philosophical definition already makes it evident (in principle, indicatively, formally; out of the determination that grasps the basic experience that is to be acquired; genuine situation of evidence) that we will be occupied extensively with the problematic of the situation, i.e., with the radical interpretation of our own concrete situation, an interpretation which itself relates to and provides the preconception.

We then need to proceed all the more critically in our approach to the interpretation of the situation.

#### A. Preconception From a Turn of Speech

We will bring the situation to an initial interpretive clarity by proffering a certain turn of speech. It cannot be shown here to what extent this procedure is itself of fundamental methodological significance for the philosophical problematic.

A turn of speech comes to us out of a history and has in every case grown out of a definite experience. History can fall into oblivion; the tradition behind an expression can come to an end. Slipping into a turn of speech implies a peculiar confidence in the history of the spirit, an assuming of a “tradition” and indeed of the quite special tradition of actualized history. At the same time, however, the slipping into involves the possibility of sliding out of. Yet that primarily characterizes only the questionability of the procedure.

We will transplant ourselves into a turn of speech, one that is available to us and is in some sense intelligible. The introduction of this turn of speech actualizes a situation in which understanding might arise. It is clear that the understanding—even if indeterminate, though indeed fixed in its indicative tendency—of the turn of speech indicates a situation. The progressing interpretation remains in the situation. Out of it, interpreting it, there arises for us the formally indicative definition of philosophy.

We want to pursue the turn of speech itself, its immanent expressive tendency, rather than open up a discussion about whether it is justified, attempt to decide whether it is clear enough, or track down where it leads in terms of objective history. As we follow the expressive tendency of the turn of speech, we will set in relief a theme that points in the direction of our preconception and that says something about it, a theme that brings us, who have the turn of speech, provided we appropriate it genuinely, into a relation—even if vague—with the object intended in correspondence to the preconception. Following the turn of speech as an index of our situation and adhering to the tendency that resides in the preconception, we will seek to determine the object, philosophy.

##### a) Philosophy is philosophizing

In discussing the question, “What is philosophy?”, we are accustomed to say: the question should not be posed in this form; we can only state what “philosophizing” is. We cannot teach and learn philosophy but only “philosophizing.” The customary talk then goes further, or, rather, it has already at the very outset reached its goal: “science” has nothing

to do with philosophizing, except incidentally, by offering support. Yet we should indeed take our bearings from science, consider its results, and, in light of the sciences, busy ourselves with logic and epistemology. What is decisive for philosophizing is the formation of a “worldview,” one that should be as comprehensive and certain as possible. “Worldview” thereby has a manifold sense; the term refers to a system as the synoptic order and ordering characterization of the various domains and values of life, along with a designation of their context, together with the “subordinate” thought that certainty and determinateness are thereby provided for the proper orientation of one’s own practical life.

Then worldview signifies the ordering and determination of the principles governing the taking of a position in regard to humans, values, and things. In a special sense it means the regulation of the relation and of the comportment to a so-called absolute. To occupy oneself with such tasks, so that they are resolved in due time (for at the end of life it is too late), is to philosophize. It requires a broad and comprehensive view, the mastery of all cognitive regions, of the arts, religions, social and economic domains of life, etc. The legitimate philosopher must first and always be an encyclopedic individual.

Plato and Aristotle did not have the term “worldview” or the nexus of experiences and attitudes announced in it. They had to see how to deal with philosophy and lay hold of the problems without taking facile recourse in the swaggering pomposity of this term and in the attitudes and tendencies it implies. The term—fully understood—expresses at bottom the disaster of our present spiritual condition. Philosophy participates in this disaster and even aggravates it, precisely by the fact that it orients its problematic to worldview, whether this means that we philosophize “in a worldview” just as we might travel “in rough clothes or in Belgian lace,” whether we strive for a scientific (founded and developed) worldview, or whether we oppose to worldview philosophy a scientific philosophy. Precisely this last opposition to worldview philosophy participates in the disaster insofar as, in the attempt to oppose it, we implicitly determine science on the basis of worldview. And thus worldview remains posited as the ultimate, even if distant, goal, one that we have indeed not yet attained but will attain in the foreseeable future! The disaster represented by this term will be overcome or, at least, which is in fact our main concern, will be radically known for the first time, only if we once and for all set aside the term and the nexus of attitudes it signifies.

Note concerning the only possible use of the expression “scientific philosophy” in these considerations.<sup>6</sup>

6. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

(Important, because it is precisely phenomenological research that stands in opposition to this expression.)

It must be observed that the expression “scientific philosophy” for the most part merely covers over the problem. The question is not how philosophy stands in relation to the sciences, how it uses the sciences and their results, or how it comports itself to the sciences as pre-givens, taking philosophy in the sense of a determinately grasped epistemology (factum: science—condition of possibility; nexus of judgment—synthesis). Nor is the question how philosophy (as one of the sciences, the prototype) is supposed to measure up to them in rigor and concept-formation.

The expression harbors a task, a problem (indication!): to determine the idea of knowledge, research, and method predelineated for the sense of philosophy itself and as such, predelineated out of philosophy itself and from its basic experience.

The question is to be posed so concretely and determinately (cf. the following) that there will be no need for other standards and normative orientations toward the sciences and no uncritical surrender to a variegated idea of worldview, formation of worldviews, or the like. The treatment of the problem gives rise then of itself to the result that in a definite sense the sciences all have their origin in philosophy, are its “heirs” (even where this origination is not yet evident, where the “tradition” has been lost, to the detriment of the sciences, and where the “activity” of science proceeds on its own), and as “heirs” have it essentially easier: they work in and with a legacy (memory), a *tradition* (philosophy is formative of tradition), and do not have the strictness of philosophy.

While we have just characterized the breaking off of the tradition as detrimental, our meaning is not that the damage could be repaired by an acquisition, on the part of representatives of the sciences, of a so-called philosophical formation out of the compass of contemporary philosophy; that could only impede the sciences. The detriment is more covert. Philosophy itself is guilty of the breaking off of the tradition; insofar as philosophy still “is,” it can give its heirs, precisely its heirs, nothing further. Instead, philosophy runs about blindly in its own history, finds its validity affirmed in literature, and lets itself be employed for the propagation of a pseudo-religiosity.

The expression “scientific philosophy” is a pleonasm; with respect to its meaning, it is overfull. Yet what is “excessive” in it, the word “scientific,” is, in another sense, too little. That predicate does not at all suffice to determine the cognitive, research, and methodological characters of philosophy. “Does not suffice” means: “needs supplementation,” “must be extended,” or, as we say in ordinary life, requires “tinkering.”

“Science” can be taken in a formal sense, whereby it signifies “passion”—but then the sciences are not as “scientific” as philosophy. The expression

“scientific philosophy” may therefore rightfully be understood as a mere expedient and taken (negatively) as a proscription against fanaticism, superficiality, and literary pretensions. In a positive sense, *today*, it precisely indicates a task, *the* task. It is a “transient expression,” just as is “worldview,” and must pass away. To understand the task indicated in the expression, it is important to see that, for the sake of the very scientificity of philosophy, we precisely need to throw off the orientation toward the sciences, in order to uncover “scientificity” all the more originally.

[The concept of scientific philosophy is different in the Marburg School (epistemology: *factum—*a priori), in Rickert (system of values, open), and in Husserl. In Husserl various themes converge. 1. Brentano: description of psychic phenomena, not to fictionalize and frame bad hypotheses! 2. Ideal of mathematical evidence and rigor. 3. Neo-Kantian research into transcendental consciousness: a priori (Kant) of consciousness (Brentano), and specifically a genetic, constitutive a priori. Idealism—Bergson).]<sup>7</sup>

We will not now pursue further the just-named expressive tendency of the word “philosophize,” i.e., its tendency toward the formation of worldview and the like. We will take the turn of speech introduced above precisely in its usual sense, that of playing “philosophizing” off against “philosophy” (i.e., to learn philosophy, etc.). We will not at first investigate the possible ground of the claim to privilege inherent in the expression “philosophize,” but we will attempt to bring into relief what the characteristic turn of speech expresses as such, what motive lies at its basis. We will pursue the sense of the turn of speech itself more closely. Thereby we will clarify in what tendency of understanding we ourselves genuinely live (in decline), insofar as we employ it.

A contrast may help here. With regard to biology, we can speak of “pursuing biology,” but we have no corresponding word “biologize.” Nor is there a word “philologize” to correspond with “philology.” We can form such words, but we recognize immediately that the term “philosophize” expresses “more.” It does not merely mean “to pursue philosophy,” “to busy oneself with philosophy.” We say, though it is not well expressed, “to pursue poetry,” “to make poetry” (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*). It is better to say “poetize” (to place in order, *τάξις*!). One who actually poetizes, a genuine poet, of whom we say, in an original sense, “He poetizes,” is one who is precisely what he is in and with poetizing. To poetize is here not a mere compartment to a possible “occupation,” the mastery of a technique.<sup>8</sup>

7. End of the note.

8. Heidegger actually refers here not to poetry but to music. The German word he offers as analogous to *philosophieren* is *musizieren*. Since English does not have the word “musicize,” I have substituted “poetize.” —Trans.

Thus there is between “philosophize” and “poetize,” as we say, an “analogy.” If we had a radical and sharp sense of “analogy” and “analogous”—the full sense of λέγειν, which to this day awaits its proper philosophical interpretation—then we could easily make progress in discussing this analogy.

As it is, we must renounce this and must do so all the more earnestly today, since it is incumbent on us to avoid from the very outset the opinion that this analogy implies a kinship between philosophy and art. At most, the converse is the case, though not in the sense that artistic creating and shaping would constitute a “part” of philosophy, but only in the sense that what philosophizing brings to the most radical expression and to the most relentless self-clarification in the highest passion is, in art, formed into a determinately concrete mode of possible experience and possible being. There is a formal correspondence here, as in the sciences, except that in this case everything is stratified differently and is different again in each of the various sciences. All this is merely a negative injunction and a warning against taking the relation between philosophy and art as a mere theme for the superficial prattle of dilettantes and fools at cocktail parties.

#### b) Plato on philosophizing

We will seek a historical grounding, in Plato. Thereby we need to note at the outset that the words, in the situation in which Plato spoke and wrote them, did not have the highly charged significance they have today. In their expressive tendency they signified something which was not as strictly laid down and formed as an object but rather expressed precisely something that was not set out in strict contours, something accessible to everyone. The concepts were specifically tailored to *factual life*, and yet at the same time they are underway to a complete formation and thereby occur within a decisive process. Our interpretation needs to set forth both these aspects and accord them equal weight. Yet this means, at the same time, that the Greek way of speaking cannot be coordinated with ours. The following references should bring that out.

#### I. φιλοσοφία [philosophy]

τοῦτο δὴ (the genesis of those who guide the πόλις [city]), ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγῆ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινοῦς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν, τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον ἦν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι. Plato, *Republic*, VII (Z), 521c5–8. What we properly call philosophy, the ascent up to Being as such, would not, it seems to me, be (as easy and inconsequential) as the spinning of a shell but is the conversion of the soul from a day that resembles night to the genuine day.

## II. φιλόσοφος [the philosopher]

Τοὺς . . . ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ibid., V (E), 480a11 ff. Then should not those who take in (appropriate) each being as Being (according to its Being) be called philosophers, rather than those who speak in circles? To be sure, yes.

## III. φιλοσοφεῖν [to philosophize]

. . . , ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. . . Plato, *Apology* 28e4. Cf. *Apology* 28d6 ff. Socrates explains why he does not abandon his dangerous vocation: “Where a person has placed himself (what he has decided in favor of) in the conviction that it is best, or where he has been placed by a superior, there he must, it seems to me, constantly hold out in danger, remain steadfast in the face of danger, and not let death or anything else have any say (any consideration) if it means dishonor (the opposite comportment). And here I would act in a way utterly worthy of condemnation if I now, having been commissioned by god, as I believe and take for a certainty, commissioned to live philosophically, questioning and examining myself and others, if I now, from fear of death or of any other ridiculous thing, wanted to abandon this direction, the direction of the actualization of my life.”

## IV. φιλοσοφία μουσική [musical philosophy]

ὡς φιλοσοφίας οὐσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς. Plato, *Phaedo* 61a3f. Cf. *Sophist* 216c ff.! Μουσική, rhythmical “formation,” which adheres to an inner order and is actualized in it. Title for “education,” εὐκύκλιον παιδείας [well-rounded education]. To set in relief the basic sense! What is at issue here: philosophy is *a mode of self-comportment*. (Plato would never determine philosophy as τέχνη [technique]!)

The preceding is a first explication of the expressive tendency inherent in the turn of speech about “philosophy.”

We say, “To study philology,” “To study philosophy.” “Philosophy” must thereby be taken in the modern sense, where it signifies a cognitive nexus, similar to “science,” objectified, fixed, to which there is an “access”—a cultural object, an object of learning. “Philosophy” designates at the same time, and in the first instance, a fully developed doctrine and therefore concerns the form that has been lost, just as we see it today, as it presents itself in universities.

Yet “philosophy” also can—and, in the following, must—be understood genuinely and clearly once again: as a full phenomenon with a determinate archontic. The term “philosophize” indicates the archontic sense.

That is why “philosophize” itself attains a corresponding tendency of expression and at once receives a stronger, if not very clear, emphasis. Φιλοσοφία and comparable terms, on the contrary, belong to a submerged—or perhaps emerging—expressive nexus of the Greek language. Contemporary linguistic usage resides on a different expressive level, such that, even if genuinely understood, it cannot rival the Greek, where the homonymous intransitive expresses an essentially different basic mode of existentiell actualization: σοφῶ [I act wisely] has no transitive sense.

- γεωμετρέω — to measure the land, to pursue the art of surveying;  
but, on the contrary, μετρέω, I reckon, I measure up.  
σοφιστεύω — I act and teach like a sophist; I conceal . . .  
ἀληθεύω — I am truthful, sincere, *verifieri* . . . [able to be verified]  
ιατρεύω — I am a doctor, I heal, I doctor—someone, going over to  
(transitive) someone, “for” someone.  
δημιουργέω — I am a handworker.

The turn of speech, the playing off of “philosophizing” versus pursuing “philosophy,” shows something of the peculiarity of the object (philosophy). Therein a determinate moment of philosophy, the comportment to . . . , and that in an independent sense, is brought to validity, and there is in it, in this expressive tendency, an echo of the peculiar philosophical life of a former age.

This comportment is expressed in a special manner when we say that “studying philosophy” must be a real “philosophizing.” That means: what we relate to or, formally put, the object to which . . . is such that it determines, from its own character, the comportment toward it. The object gives the comportment a name; i.e., the comportment to . . . — namely, to philosophy—is properly expressed as an intransitive in an eminent sense, using the stem of the word which designates the object. The object of the comportment lends this to the expression, such that the latter precisely expresses the independence of the comportment and such that what is decisive in this case is not the comportment to . . . but the comportment as such, the being-in-this-comportment.

The comportment to . . . is authentic precisely if it is originally and only a comportment, and that means, in today’s way of speaking, if it is an indication that the genuinely appropriate comportment to . . . arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization and that this actualization in turn has weight precisely for the explication of the content of that to which philosophizing comports itself as its object. (To the Greeks, to their way of thinking, this was self-evident. Their ontological sense of comportment is not ours; nevertheless, a genuine understanding of the Greeks will see in them this main point!)



## B. Comportment

The following determinations are utterly formal indications, in principle of the same methodological and expressive character as the philosophical definition. Therefore they are neither nominal definitions (in the sense of the old logic, where that concept is riddled with unclari- ties), nor a priori essential laws, nor determinations which genuinely present their object.

Versus the formal expression, "possessing," the term "comporting" designates something determinate. (Self-)comportment has a double sense, which we can delineate as follows:

1. To comport oneself, to behave
2. To comport oneself to . . . , to stand in relation to . . . , to have a relation.

The second meaning is more original as regards the genesis of sense; the first is the surplus of sense over and against possession. The first is by itself actualization in a broad sense and is, "together" with the second, maturation, existence. The second is relation and indeed separated relation, intentionality objectivated.

What we call a comportment can be determined in different respects simultaneously, or predominately in one respect, or exclusively in one. Self-comportment is determinable as comportment to something; the comportment in itself is, in itself bears, a relation to something. It is graspable in view of the relation and is to be interrogated, according to its sense, in the direction of the relation: *sense of relation*.

The self-comportment, however, is also determinable as a mode of formal occurrence, a mode of procedure, with respect to the manner in which it takes place, i.e., is actualized, as actualization, according to its *sense of actualization*. And that, furthermore, is especially to be determined in the way the actualization becomes actualization in and for its situation, in the way it "matures." The maturation is to be interpreted according to the *sense of maturation*. {And, from there, according to facticity, factual life, and existence; situation, preconception, basic experience.}

The relation of the comportment is a relation to something; the comportment to . . . holds on to something, i.e., in each case according to the sense of relation, the "something," to which the comportment is related, is that which the relation holds in itself, what is held by it and in it, what it "holds" on to "of" the object. The "on to which" and "toward which" of the relation is its *holdings* [*Gehalt*]. (This formally indicative phenomenological category, the mode of the "on to which" of the relation, does not have the sense of "inner contents" [*Inhalt*], filling; that concept is to be employed differently.)

Every object has its specific *sense of holdings*, which for its part can be interpreted genuinely only out of the full sense in which it is what it is. Full sense = phenomenon; presupposing that at the same time the

objectivity in the full sense is fixed by interpreting it radically and existentially. (This statement is to be interpreted more genuinely as follows: everything experienced in the sense of its respective holdings is to be grasped formally-ontologically as an object as such; in the latter itself as such there is no motive or ground to determine the holdings over and above their own, formalized ontic determination.)

- a) Philosophizing, according to its sense of relation,  
is cognitive comportment.

Philosophizing (formally indicated) is a comportment. We will attempt, first of all, by way of a formal indication, to grasp more sharply the *sense of relation* of the comportment: what is the relation to . . . , what does it aim at?

Philosophizing, according to its sense of relation, i.e., the comportment to the object in philosophy, is a *cognitive comportment*. (To call it "clarifying" comportment would be formally more original—cf. Plato, allegory of the cave; yet we will not here pursue this reference, lest we weigh down the explication unduly.) Cognition is a grasping of the object "as" object and so is a determining of the object by way of grasping it. The grasping determination "says" that, what, and how the object is. The comportment therefore, as a grasping determination, holds onto the object, saying it, co-responding to it, insofar as the object "is," in one way or another, something. The relation holds on to something as a being, just as a being and as a definite sort of being.

We will already be more clear about this comportment as a grasping determination if we bring forward what was said about definition. The idea of definition is nothing other than the formal *interpretation of the full sense of cognition*. According to the respective peculiarity of a sense-moment, the facticity and the accomplishment of the definition are different, and the idea of cognition is determined. Not every cognition, however, is an explicit definition; the cognition might prepare the definition, form it, amplify it (explication), fit it into broader cognitive nexuses, or interpret it. The latter is a philosophical cognition at the level of principle. But every cognition that precedes, accompanies, or follows the definition has a place in the basic tendency of cognition, and at every level and in every situation the object is addressed as to content [*Gehalt*]. That means the object is investigated (questioning as addressing; the only determinative and appropriate concept of speaking!) as the object it is, in its "what" and its "how," precisely as a being. A being: an object, this object, in what and how it is.

The sciences, e.g., as nexuses of actualization of cognitive comportment, are, with respect to content, determined in such a way that the objects a determinate science relates to precisely as beings, as belonging in their own nexus of beings, are more or less sharply delimited.

This nexus of beings, in each case delimited through the cognitive sense of a science, as what is of concern in the relevant science, is

called the *region* of that science. The phenomenological category, "region," refers back formally, and in terms of the genesis of sense, to the "content-sense" and is a categorial concretion of that. {Sense of the categorial, as an existentiell concretion, to be interpreted in terms of historical actualization!}

Every science, insofar as it is a cognitive comportment of the type characteristic of the sciences, has its region of beings, where the sense of "region" itself is still manifold and is also different in the various sciences. The regional character of the science of history is different from that of zoology, e.g., or of theology, and the difference is not merely in the subject matter or the ordering principles.

These considerations are purely formal indications; they say nothing about the genuine sense (or even about the relation) of scientific cognition, about philosophical cognition, about non-scientific and pre-scientific cognition, or about pre-philosophical cognition. In the formally indicative orientation all this must be interpreted, case by case, out of the corresponding nexuses of basic experience.

Accordingly, it seems that "philosophizing," too, can be indicated only as a "cognitive comportment to . . . ," whereby the object, as a cognitive object, is taken precisely as a being. If we understand the task of the determination of the sense of philosophizing, as a cognitive comportment, from the outside and as something to be arbitrarily snatched up and discussed, then it might seem that even our method could provide no more than capricious observations and that, for the sake of a certain order and consistency in the whole, we must proceed "logically" and deductively from a basic constatation to further determinations.

But such is not the case. We are not speaking about philosophy arbitrarily and according to taste. On the contrary, with the appropriation of the idea of definition, which itself is indeed questionable, though not arbitrary, we stand in a determinate situation of understanding, in which quite definite motives, arising out of the idea of definition, call forth the actualization of the interpretation. Those who attempt something else mistake in principle precisely what should be their aim within the entirety of philosophy: the pure cognition of the original questionability, i.e., at the same time, the pure cognition of the labyrinthine basic character of human existence. Philosophy is an existentiell phenomenon (the preeminent one).

b) The definition of philosophy at the level of principle

The determination of the idea of philosophical definition has introduced us to the moment of the principle.<sup>9</sup> Philosophy is to be defined at the level of principle; such a definition would involve a precedent

9. See above, p. 18 ff.

exposition of what the main issue is, what really matters, so that we might then be able to direct a radical questioning at this issue.

Efforts to determine securely the sense of philosophy come alive again and again, only to turn into circumstantial and isolated considerations. What is the reason for that? Why do we ever anew seek the foundation of philosophy? Why the ever new efforts to raise philosophy finally to the rank of a secure, absolute science?

If there were a clear and delimited *region* here — in philosophy — then it would not be possible to stray from it, and it would not constantly be necessary to seek the genuine region. As it is, we must ever and again project and newly grasp that to which philosophy, as cognitive comportment, is directed, with the result that we end up seeking in all sorts of directions. A region would simply be there, one region in delimitation against other cognitive regions, e.g., those of the sciences. Their regions are cut out from the domain of beings as a whole — nature, “history,” pure space, etc.

The search for the foundation seeks its region in the previous convictions and opinions of philosophy. Presupposing that philosophy has a region at all, it does not reside within the total domain of the sciences. Insofar as philosophy delimits itself, its limits do not occur within the region of Being which the sciences divide up among themselves (and it remains questionable whether this dividing up is worth anything!).

Philosophy knows, it is said, what is common to these cognitive regions, what lies in advance of them, at their foundation. Philosophy is not particular knowledge, not a special science; it is the “basic science.” Philosophical cognition aims at something ultimate and universal, the highest. Because it does not have a region which fits under some other one, and its region is not delimitable against other ones, philosophy must seek and re-seek its object out of its own resources, on its own account. Philosophy is the cognitive comportment of something that has subsistence in itself and that can come into consideration for something else only as *principle*. Philosophy is cognitive comportment *κατ’ ἐξοχήν* [par excellence], i.e., at the level of principle. The determinative grasp of philosophy then must itself be a matter of principle, a *definition of principle*.

We have already seen that the sense of “principle” is not clear without further ado; there are principles of various characters precisely as principles. Knowledge of principles does not have to be knowledge at the level of principle; and for us it is precisely a problem to grasp radically the formally indicative determination with respect to philosophizing as cognitive comportment at the level of principle and to determine fully the sense of cognition as one of principle. The phrase “attitudinal cognitive comportment toward principles” does not suffice; philosophical cognition itself, according to its own character as actualized, must be one of principle. Thus it is at once the most radical attitude, the most

original sense of grasping an object as such, and the most radical determination, i.e., existentiell interpretation.

Philosophy is cognitive comportment toward beings, at the level of principle. Therefore that to which it comports itself must be given in its proper and ultimate character at the level of principle: beings, ultimately considered, not in relation to other beings, but by themselves and as such (possibly on that basis then "in relation to . . .," but not merely as something that can be "extracted" from an engulfing order). And what is the principle for such beings in themselves? What is ultimately at issue in beings as such? Being or, more determinately, in respect to the way such "Being" is graspable, the *sense of Being*. We need to keep in mind explicitly that Being, the sense of Being, is, philosophically, the principle of every being. Being is not, however, the "universal" of all beings, the highest genus, that which beings would fall under as particular instances. Being is not the most comprehensive domain for each and every being, the "highest region."

The object of the definition of philosophy is therefore determined as follows: *cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being*. It still remains open whether philosophy is comportment to each and every being, to all "regions," or, on the contrary, to no region at all, *as* region. Furthermore, we have not determined precisely what "as" or "in terms of" signifies here, in what sense that is to be understood.

It is already evident from this first determination that philosophy, as "cognitive comportment," is not comparable to a thing, some factual matter. Thereby the object of the definition is determined. We need to keep apart the object of the definition and the object of philosophy. The object of philosophy is co-intended in the object of the definition of philosophy, philosophizing. But it is not, and does not exhaust, and this as a matter of principle (not merely in practice), the object of the definition.

We now stand in relation to this object of the definition in our pre-conception of the original and proper appropriation: bringing "something" into the mode of possession that genuinely corresponds to it. And indeed in the definition of principle, the object must be pre-given such that it comes in its character as a principle and in its function as a principle to a first understanding, and, at the same time, so does the genuine principle-character, the sense of Being. This sense is what is at issue, namely, the *cognitive comportment to it* as the principle of beings.

In the defintory content (object of definition) resides something of principle; the content is itself a relation to . . . The principle in it is the "toward which" of the comportment: the sense of Being. The object of cognitive comportment is for this sense itself in its own way a principle. Possessing the object of the definition, in its content, means cognizing (possessing *in this way*, by understanding at the level of principle) that,

toward which, and how the principle is a principle for its own being possessed.

The object in its character as principle with respect to content [*gehaltlich*] (principle for that which holds on to [*sich hält an*] it, the cognitive comportment [*Verhalten*]; not “only” the object of the cognitive comportment as philosophical comportment), and according to its proper character as a principle and corresponding to this, must become decisive for possessing the object itself. The object of the definition is itself a comportment to . . . ; the principle in it is the “toward which” of the comportment, the sense of Being. {Interpretive postulate at the current level of the consideration.} The definitory object in its character as principle indicates what is at issue in possessing it itself (the possession of the comportment to the object, Being *qua* Being).

If the possessing is to be one of principle, then the object of the philosophical definition must come to understanding as formally indicative. The principle is to be grasped in such a way that it is seized in its function as a principle, pre-understood in “that for which” and “how” it is a principle. The “for which,” however, is itself indicated only formally. The “for which” requires a proper, factual concretion, a proper appropriation, in which appropriation itself the principle can first be given as fully functioning in the manner appropriate to a principle.

A definition of principle must be understood at the level of principle. That means: its content is properly possessed and understood when the principle is relevant as a principle for the possessing and understanding of the content. The content of the definition is determined as cognitive comportment to . . . ; the principle is Being (sense of Being) as the Being of beings. What is at issue in the understanding of the definition is the possession (understanding) of a comportment; and *how* the possession of the comportment is at issue—that is signified by the principle of the definitory content. What the principle signifies “is” what is at issue in the possession of the comportment.

Thus if the possession is to be one of principle, if it is to contain in itself that which is at issue in it, i.e., in respect to the principle (as cognition and indeed precisely as one of principle), then this is indicated as decisive for the possession of the object (of the definition): namely, the Being of the possessing and indeed the Being of the possessing of the cognitive comportment to beings in terms of Being.

The proper possessing of a comportment *qua* comportment, however, is a mode of its actualization. Therefore what is decisive is the *Being of the actualization* (maturation, the historiological). But that is only the more precise determination of the tendency which is always pressing itself forward in the previously named turn of speech. The object to which we comport ourselves defines, with its own proper name, the comportment itself. To pursue philosophy is supposed to be

to pursue something, to comport oneself to something (transitively): to philosophize (intransitively). This is the sense of actualization of that which this sense itself signifies as to content.

Thus there results as a formally indicative definition of philosophy at the level of principle (cf. p. 26 and Appendix I, "Presupposition," pp. 120 and 121): *philosophy is cognitive comportment, at the level of principle, toward beings in terms of Being (sense of Being), specifically such that what is decisively at issue in the comportment and for it is the respective Being (sense of Being) of the possessing of the comportment.*

Philosophy is "ontology," indeed, is radical ontology, and as such is phenomenological (existentiell, historiological, spiritual-historical) ontology or *ontological phenomenology* (with the emphasis falling on one side or the other, depending on the polemical orientation). The object of philosophy, beings in their Being, co-determines from out of itself (function of principle) the comportment. As a comportment at the level of principle, what is at issue in it is its Being. The cognitive comportment has a quite original and radical relation of principle to beings in their Being (not a mere attitude toward grasping, a mere discussion, but a relation that even and precisely through the grasping "is" what it grasps and grasps what it "is").

The understanding of this definition must take it as an indicative one. The content is such that its appropriation is a proper *concrete task of actualization*. To follow the indication means to bring into view this concrete task: to recognize that something is thereby at issue and to pursue what is at issue. This "toward which" is itself already indicated: the sense of Being of the possession of the comportment. Insofar as this sense of Being is at issue, that whose sense of Being is at issue is to be taken as a being, to be taken genuinely into possession as a being, and then to be grasped. (Formal indication: "Being" is what is indicated formally and emptily, and yet it strictly determines the direction of the understanding; toward the possession of the comportment as a being!)

At issue is Being, i.e., that it "is," the *sense of Being*, that Being "is," i.e., is there as Being genuinely and according to its import (in the phenomenon). Phenomenon: existentiell. At issue is that it comes into "being," that it strives, although not for consideration and bad reflection. It is indeed the Being of the comportment, i.e., here (phenomenologically) through the comportment; the maturation of the comportment. Comportment, however, is what it is only in full concretion; i.e., the *concrete problematic*.

The sense of Being which stands as the task is not that of a thing and a factual matter, not that of something effected from the outside, through external arrangement. Yet in order for the issue to be the sense of Being of the possession of the comportment, it itself must be *possessed* as a being; that means, however: the question and the determination

relate to what it means and can mean. At issue is the sense of Being of the possessing of the cognitive comportment to . . . , an issue which, for the time being, is to be deferred.

### C. The Situation of Access: the University

The possession of the comportment as a being, in its "what" and "how," is to be taken up into the grasp of the understanding and specifically in the sense of the idea of definition, according to the genuine understanding of definition, and as appropriate to the situation and to the preconception. These strictures of the definition cannot be met or even sufficiently clarified upon a first approach. Yet they become more pressing as we progress toward authenticity in the understanding of the definition. They become ever more insistent, and, in their unity and increasing urgency, they bring to maturity precisely the *appropriation of the concrete*. Thereby the peculiar binding which resides in the idea of definition comes to be expressed properly, and, at the same time, we can see clearly the *situation* to which the understanding must be appropriate in its actualization. What is at issue must come to light, must be manifest and transparent in genuine daylight. This problematic preys upon our consciences ever more acutely and relentlessly.

The preconception itself requires what is appropriate to it; we need to press on toward the genuine comportment to the object of philosophy, and we need to pursue the comportment in a way that understands it. The possession of the comportment as a being *is*, and at the same time *is through*, the concrete appropriation of the object itself. That which, in the idea of definition, is emphatically separate in the formation is, in the actualizing maturation, originally "one."

It remains quite undetermined *how* the sense of Being of the cognitive comportment is at issue. The indicative definition expresses only *that* it is at issue. The understanding therefore follows this "at issue": it is equally undetermined that we live in the cognitive comportment or that we possess it. The possession is still not properly alive, it "is" not yet. Nevertheless, it is already: in the approach, in the approaching motion toward it, in the nexus of actualization in which we now presently move. We need to get this approaching motion in view as a being, in its "what" and "how." In some way or other it is present: in the situation, which now, at first, is all that is available, in the orientation of the nexus of actualization, and in the efforts aimed at access to the possession of the comportment.

The gaze of research is to be fixed on that, as on a being in how it is a being; thereby the understanding takes the direction pre-given to it by the indication, and it takes this in a fixed preconceptual orientation. Only in this way is the understanding of the definition appropriate to



the idea of definition itself. The more radically and rigorously it pursues this appropriateness and the less it makes room for untimely tendencies of reflection and for inopportune considerations (whether or not anything emerges from these abstractions, and even if they arise from the only up-to-date philosophy), the stronger must press forward the character of the situation of the current efforts at access. Therewith the possession of the comportment as a being, whose sense of Being is at issue, must also advance.

The efforts at access are not actualized at just any time or in just any place, or by just anyone; on the contrary, we live in them here and now and specifically in this place, in this lecture hall: you in front of me, I in front of you, and we together. This situation of an individual's world, which is immediately determinable as a situation of a shared world and a surrounding world, i.e., the life-nexus dominant in this situation and properly alive in it, is what we designate with the title: *university*.

The comportment of access to the cognitive comportment, to philosophizing, is to be determined in its concretion in the way it concerns us, who are doing the comporting, and, obviously, in the way the comportment relates to philosophy itself. That is not and, according to its very sense, cannot be an arbitrary worry, barely and ungenerously oriented, and it is not mere busywork on traditional problems snatched up at random. Rather, and this resides in the sense of the formally indicative definition of philosophy, the more genuinely the basic sense of the factual situation of comportment is appropriated, the more originally and genuinely is actualized the clarification of the formally indicated sense of philosophy.

In an anticipatory interpretation of the formal sense of philosophy, such as is pre-given by the definition, we can say that for the concrete problematic of philosophy—wherein lies enclosed the problem of access to it (not an access to some Object or material thing, but instead access to the existentially basic phenomenon)—what is co-determinative in each case is the nexus of facticity of the life-situation in which the problems reside and out of which and for which they press toward resolution. Thereby, however, nothing is yet decided about the proper archontic which must be attributed, in radical philosophical research, to the existentiell nexus of maturation within the history of the spirit.

If philosophizing is supposed to exist, here and now, then it can be determined only in the direction of the factual nexus of life we designated with the title, *university*. And the first task of access, following the understanding of the definition, i.e., at the same time, according to the proper concrete appropriation of philosophizing itself, is to determine this just-designated situation of life as a being, in its “what” and “how.” This is indeed the formally indicated task of the possession of the comportment or, rather, (reduced to the level of our current state) the task of access to the possession as a being.

But already in this preliminary task lie difficulties enough, the pure mastery of which can be effected only in the concrete nexus of the problems of philosophy. One difficulty is just to see the situation itself as such and then to grasp it genuinely as a being (i.e., to see the university as that in which and out of which philosophizing is actualized).

The task is for us today made especially difficult insofar as we do have precisely the possibility of a quite proper and original existentiell-phenomenological view of this "Being," so that only for us has *this* ontological problematic become possible and necessary—though absolutely ambiguous. At the same time, we have the "habit" of taking the situation in terms of Objective history, in terms of the history of what is Objectively present. The result is both ambiguity and a tendency toward research in the mode of historiological consciousness. Other eras had the same possibilities but were not motivated in the same direction. Then the task was less of a burden, and carrying it out was easier, for the life-situation was different.

Our era is, nonetheless, in a particular sense, explicitly unified with the previous ones, and we share with earlier times the same way of seeing and possessing, i.e., the same mode of expression.

[Insofar as the task of access to the situation in its proper sense of Being is to be understood radically, i.e., such that its clarification keeps pace with the access (or, better, precisely matures it), the point is to overcome the past radically, in order, by way of this overcoming, to be in a position to appropriate the past genuinely for the first time; and that is indispensable, insofar as we "exist" in the past, and Being itself, our Being, is not set in relief.]<sup>10</sup>

The indicated determination of the sense of philosophy or, more generally, the tendencies expressed in such a determination immediately rouse up misgivings. We will look at two of them more closely, in such a way that our main considerations will themselves also advance forward thereby.

a) First objection: is philosophy university-philosophy?

It could be objected that the indicated approach to a concrete explication of the sense of philosophy places an undue restriction on the sense and task of philosophy. This approach seeks nothing less than an identification of philosophy with university-philosophy. It seeks to support or even to ground the pretentious opinion that actual philosophy could exist only in the universities. This presumption must seem all the more problematic inasmuch as our age has often and loudly reviled the notorious sterility and "cultural" uselessness of the ossified professional philosophy of the universities.

10. Annotation by Heidegger: "Later."

In this regard it is not at all necessary to lend an ear to the famous, resentment-laden, and often cheap invectives of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. For these two have perhaps misunderstood what they were really trying to accomplish. It is easy to run away from the university. But the university does not thereby change, and we ourselves, along with our affairs, are then—Nietzsche is a typical example—sacrificed on the altar of literature. In other words, what then develops is an intellectually unhealthy atmosphere.

To meet this objection, the formally indicative definition of philosophy must be interrogated as to whether it includes—or can include—the presumed identification of philosophy with university-philosophy. The opposite is in fact the case. The formally indicative definition precisely *excludes* the sense-possibility of the objectionable identification of philosophy with university-philosophy and does so in two respects.

1. The indicative emphasis on the decisiveness of the sense of Being of the respective cognitive comportment does (negatively) preclude the possibility of speaking in such a general and indeterminate way about philosophy (even if within the conceptually sharp delimitation of the formal indication). It precisely enjoins proclamations about philosophy from the standpoint of some superior, though basically indeterminable, place, and it prohibits us from taking philosophy as the guarantee of the future periods of culture and destinies of mankind, without our knowing who speaks for whom and for what, or knowing what is the sense of these prophecies and schools of wisdom, or knowing who conferred on them their cultural mission. *The* philosophy—in this way in general, fixed and atemporal, represented in some vague manner—does not exist.

2. At the same time, however, we are directed (positively) to develop the problematic with a view to the basic sense of the situation of the respective comportment. The definition, by its very sense, leaves open various possibilities but also explicitly directs us toward “seeing” the things that are genuinely in question at any time. Or, rather, it directs us first of all toward *seeking* these things, and, since we are now so far removed from them, that alone is the task of the day. In this, the principle manifests its character as a principle. The definition is essentially a task and cannot simply hand over to us easy knowledge, for that would precisely prevent us from ever coming to philosophy itself.

Neither is there *the* philosophy in general as a living philosophy, nor is there only one single situation, along with its one basic sense, out of which the comportment of philosophizing could be actualized. The indication emphasizes precisely that it should remain open, that other nexuses of life can provide access to philosophy and can bring to maturity the actualization of philosophizing. It could be, however, that the situation indicated with the title, “university,” is such that, insofar as it is granted the possibility of becoming radically relevant and free, it not

only permits but absolutely compels the unconditionally most radical possibility of actualizing philosophy.

To what extent, in what way, and whether at all the philosophy that properly springs from the life-nexus of the university has to take into account other philosophies, originating in other situations, and what "taking into account" means here, along with the question of how in general the sense and extent of the specifically philosophical "polemic" is to be determined in its genuine sense—these issues cannot now be discussed, since the moment is not ripe for them, due to the fact that we are still unclear about the concrete tasks themselves. The formal sense of philosophy and of the comportment toward it does admittedly imply that philosophy is, in an eminent and not at all extrinsic sense, polemical (venturing forth into the light of "day"), insofar as the formative appropriation of the concrete situation of the actualization of philosophizing is carried out in the manner of a destruction. The way in which a situation becomes relevant is in itself polemical. (The word does not here mean "contentious," in the sense of the "wrangling" that is so widespread in philosophy and science. Polemic rather as such through ex-istence.)

- b) Second objection: can the accidental situation of the university be normative for philosophy?

It will be retorted, however, that this does not redress the one-sided and arbitrary character of the restriction of philosophy to the life-nexus of the university. Perhaps this character does disappear for those who live from and in the university, who have staked their existence on the university, i.e., for the researchers and teachers, but it is not so for those who come to the university and want something from it. It is not so precisely because the latter cannot or do not want to live their entire lives at the university. For the students, who co-constitute the life-nexus of the university and for whom the university exists at all, it is but a passageway. Philosophy can precisely not tie the life-consciousness of the students to a "situation of passage" but instead should all the more genuinely point the way to their future lives, the lives they will actually and effectively lead.

This new difficulty should come to be resolved as we discuss the second objection. It will be said "in general" that those who, in passing through the university, stand on the threshold of their actual lives do indeed have demands to make upon the university. But we cannot reasonably hold the opinion that actually continuing life is to take direction from the obsolete ideals of an accidentally historical<sup>11</sup> institution

11. *Historisch*. In this section on the university, Heidegger's usual distinction between *Historie* (historiology) and *Geschichte* (history) seems not to be consistently in play, and my translation could not strictly follow his terms and still express the apparent sense. — Trans.

such as the university. Thus the second objection may be formulated as follows: in principle, can a philosophizing still be genuine and original if it entrusts the situation of its basic experience to an accidental institution that arose historically and that has perhaps now reached the end of its existence? And this institution is supposed to bring philosophy to maturity! A maturity which in principle overgrows and undermines the circumstances and conditions and first gives them, insofar as they strive "to be," facticity!

Therefore, even conceding the possibility of other philosophies, outside the university, the positive situation within the university is still in principle weak, since it is delivered over to a historical contingency that is ever changing. If the nexus for the actualization of the appropriation of philosophy is referred back to such an institution, then the idea of philosophy itself and of its concretion is threatened by the atrophy of relativism and by a flattening that is historically bound and inescapable.

However matters may be settled as regards theoretical relativism, and even if the sense of philosophy may run counter to latent needs, we are primarily constrained to determine how (as what sort of beings) our situation of understanding and our situation of approach, the ones in which we ourselves live, should be interpreted. The task can thereby be formulated appropriately, with respect to the objection as well as in reference to the concrete development of the problem, as follows: does the "historical" character of our universities prohibit them from becoming, as such, determinative, determinative in the manner of a concrete situation of basic experience, in which, out of which, and for which the approach to and the appropriation of philosophy are supposed to be actualized; or, on the contrary, is it precisely the "historical" character and only this which provides a ground for a determinate life-nexus and which demands, in the most radical sense, that philosophy play a decisive role?

These considerations must be understood entirely within the context of the stated problematic. Therefore, insofar as they concern the university, they are in principle unrelated to discussions about the goal and methods, necessity or superfluousness, of a so-called reform of the university.

The discussions about reform, for which a principle, a basic orientation, may be taken from that which is to be developed, an orientation which would, to be sure, direct the reform movement in an essentially different way than expected—those discussions are all uncritical. They overlook the question of competency and are oblivious to the question of the suitable time. For us here, the task is to see philosophically the genuine situation, without recourse to propheticism and the allure of a prophetic leader. (People today are writing about the leader-problem!)

The question is whether the university should be further tailored

toward needs and modeled upon the annually lower level of a spiritual-intellectual preparation that is already only half sufficient. It is the question of whether demands ought to be posed from that standpoint, whether degenerate dispositions, even if they band together and obtain a majority vote, can provide criteria for the determination of something which of itself demands to be appropriated—even if with the pledge of a life—prior to making speeches about it and writing pamphlets.

Today we have become so cunning, so richly gratified by dainty literary morsels and glossy magazines, and so enervated by “religious” whining that we cry down such a pledge of life as stupidity and rate these cries as evidence of superiority and of the possession of “spirituality.”

We face a decision of principle between these alternatives:

*either* we live, work, and do research relative to unexamined needs and artificially induced dispositions,

*or* we are prepared to grasp concretely a radical idea and to gain our existence in it.

Whether we are thereby “foundering,” culturally considered, or are ascending and progressing is of secondary importance, insofar as the aim here is indeed not cultural profits and dividends. And if we are “foundering,” then we again face a decision between

*either* an actual change of facticity, in genuine loss, a letting oneself be diverted from facticity, a diversion which, if defended, constitutes existence (which is precisely a radical existentiell worry),

*or* degeneration in the embellishment of mythical and theosophical metaphysics and mysticism and in the trance of a preoccupation with piety, which goes by the name of religiosity.

A *premature*, passionate position-taking, pro and con, merely betrays the lack of the genuine passion (which alone can be normative here) pertaining to the resoluteness of the understanding. This resoluteness is all the more certainly present the less it breaks out in speech and, instead, is silent and can wait. Because we are no longer able, in relation to life, to lie in wait and to watch, in the genuine sense (not in the manner of a detective or one who snoops on the soul), and because, instead, we want all things to be brought into purity with uproarious haste, we fall prey to the surrogates of the spirit that assail us in advertising or to an apparent Objectivity that actually dims our eyesight and is constantly fleeing from the issues.

These *fundamental guidelines*, which precisely reject—and set forth a position against—the pretended decisiveness of the dispositions and tendencies alive and dominant today, must have already manifested sufficiently their obvious incompatibility with what we had brought out

and especially emphasized earlier concerning the idea of the definition of philosophy at the level of principle. It might easily be pointed out that the guidelines do contradict, and could not more sharply contradict, the requirement that we expressly placed in the very first position, namely, that the definition must be *appropriate to the situation*. It seems that the situation indicated by the title, "university," has now been concretely determined, in terms of the guidelines, as something negative, as something to be rejected, as non-original.

Insofar as no one is inclined to grant me, after all that has been said, that such an obvious conflict between the understanding of the definition and the already established idea of definition, or, more precisely, that the simple neglect of this idea, could occur so readily, and insofar as it is with the least credit that someone will concede to me that such an error, precisely in this context of the principle, can so readily slip in, then the difficulty with respect to the compatibility of the guidelines with the requirement of appropriateness to the situation, as stated in the definition, must lie elsewhere.

It lies in the fact that we form an overly "facile" representation of the sense of the situation and of the manner of its appropriation. The situation has its own peculiarities and its own mystery. That is already evident in the fact that the situation is to be *relevant* for and in a definition of principle. And insofar as we understand that factual life is actually always in flight from matters of principle, then it is no wonder that the appropriating turn toward those matters does not happen readily and without further ado. The frequent appearance of one who, it is claimed, "champions principles" is not evidence against what we have just said, but rather supports it, insofar as such a person's loud invocation of principles on every occasion is actually a sure announcement of the flight in question.

We have already emphasized, explicitly and excessively, that the actualization of the understanding and thus the access to, and explication of, the genuine situation of understanding present special difficulties. To actualize the understanding of the formally indicative definition is precisely to *work one's way toward the situation*; this situation is not something that leaps out at us or lies there already prepared such that we would only need to let ourselves fall into it. It is not something in which we exist simply on account of our circumstances, nor is it momentary, and it does not amount to blissful unconcern and tranquility.

The understanding of the formally indicative definition, in actualizing the process of working one's way toward the concrete situation, passes by way of the approach that lies closest at hand. This approach is thrust aside as the understanding progresses, and it is then canceled in the appropriation of the genuine situation.

The question of whether the university in its current historical state—for this state is indeed the issue {"current"—at the time of Ger-

man Idealism, humanism, the Reformation, high Scholasticism (Paris, Cologne, Bologna, Naples), generation of Alexandrine research, Aristotle's Lyceum, Plato's Academy)—can be suited to “form” [*“bilden”*] (ambiguous!) the basic experiences for the indicative explication of the sense of philosophy, for the access to this sense and for its actualization, or whether this suitability must be denied the university is a question that will be settled in such a way that the condition of the university today is first of all intuited *Objectively* and is determined in Objective comparisons: how it relates to the past, what and how it is, viewed in relation to its historical origin. These things can be exhibited in Objective findings, and from the determination of the beginning, development, rise, and evolution of the university, we can draw directives and lessons that would be of the greatest importance today.

Methodologically, the way to decide the question is as follows: whatever can be known, and is worth knowing, about the reality of the university in its Objective history should be laid out orderly, and therefrom we should read off the criteria and goals of an evaluation of its current state and of its suitability with regard to the question we have posed. The current state of the university stands in Objective connection with its history and thus stands Objectively there, open to an Objective consideration and an Objectively comparative evaluation.

This method is for us today the closest, most practicable, and richest in results, since for us and for our historiological consciousness, secure and sufficiently ample historiological knowledge is available. The decision about the university, as a historical formation, will be made in an Objectively and historiologically comparative consideration. The history of the university pronounces on its current state and indicates to us the method.

#### c) The tradition

This method presumes that history, as what Objectively has been, the actual past as such, can indeed furnish the goal and the norm and is justified in doing so. What is the ground of this possibility and of the claim it motivates? Can the Objectively historical past (which is indeed the most brilliant in examples, the most venerable in age and duration, and the most powerful in efficacy and in radiating out into the history of the spirit) serve as the decisive criterion for determining what and how the present is and should be?

We are today, in our existence, different from all previous generations simply by the fact (not to mention, at first, how we differ in principle) that we are the successors of forebears in a way no previous generation was. We are so in a quite peculiar sense, insofar as we possess a marked *historiological consciousness* (with the corresponding methodological possibilities) of our relation to the past, live in this consciousness, see ourselves in it, and see (await) the future with it and out of it. By entering



into the general consciousness of our time, the specifically scientific consciousness to be found in history, taken as a science, has brought to maturity a peculiar historiological consciousness which is present even where it sets itself against adept historical considerations.

Spengler is the most consistent and reliable spokesman for this historiological consciousness. He has actually put it into effect, precisely in the style of the current "spirit of the times." That is to say, this consciousness is something we have to take seriously as well, and that includes completely disregarding, at first, the accidental inconsistencies, the amendments, and the like, which are inevitable in such an enormous undertaking. The basic sense of this undertaking is genuinely and decisively present in its expressive tendency, which is perhaps not as obvious as is imagined by so many cultural agents, and writers on culture, who lack a sense of history. To take seriously, however, does not mean to vow allegiance, to strike out in a new direction, and, for the rest, to exempt oneself from a grasp of the genuine problems (which were in fact concealed to Spengler himself).

Out of sheer preoccupation with problems that relate to history, no philosophy of history has seen, let alone understood, the problem of the historiological. Spengler's basic error: philosophy of history without the historiological, *lucus a non lucendo* [light from something that does not shine]. Spengler does not understand what he is trying to accomplish, which is manifest in the fact that he becomes afraid of his own position, sounds the retreat, tones everything down, and to those who took to heart his outlook of decline, even if they did so only in the sense of an "as if," he offers reassurance: indeed, everything was not meant in such a bad sense, and we can tranquilly return to business as usual (expression of the soul of the times).

Yet it is an odd undertaking, the attempt to refute Spengler by pointing out to him his inaccuracies. That we cling to such attempts, and base on them a threadbare, and pseudo-scientific, superiority, proves that we do not understand what is at issue. Above all, we do not understand that the consciousness of an era, an era itself, cannot be "refuted" by means of theoretical-scientific arguments and cannot be disposed of like some erroneous theory. (Which is not to say that scientific research has no role to play in the overcoming of an era.)

Therefore, can the Objective past, which, as such, in itself never was and never could be, provide decisive direction for a situation in the history of the spirit? Is the appeal to the venerableness and splendor of the tradition not, viewed radically, sheer blind sentimentality? What about the claims made by the tradition? And what is tradition itself?

Whether we make room for the misgivings and declare that the university, as a historically transmitted institution, cannot be normative for the "formation" of a basic situation of philosophizing, or whether we take up the opposite position and grant that the historical past is

justified in claiming to be normative, in either case it is unavoidably necessary, if indeed the question is to be decided radically (and such a decision must occur in relation to and in the context of the already-characterized problematic of principles), to clarify the sense and rights of the tradition.

Whether we speak for or against the tradition, we apprehend it in a particular way, namely in an uncritical, unclarified way, and that is how we take it up in our argumentation. In the objection itself and in the proposed method of settling the issue, there lies hidden a further unresolved moment. [Resolution of a sense (resolution of a phenomenon): to let it be free, to set it absolutely free in the interpretation, to let it function as absolutely decisive for the understanding.]

The tradition should be normative, or else it should not. For what? For the university of today, for the determination of it in its current state, for what it is and perhaps should be in measuring up to a great tradition. The question concerns what actually it is whose norms are uncertain; which "part" of the university, which of its determinative components, is genuinely the focus of the entire problematic? What is at issue, in regard to the university itself? We said that the university is a life-nexus, i.e., something in which life goes on. What about this "life" at and in the university? Is it the way the university is taken up and experienced? Indeed, the question must be posed concretely: how do we here, now, today, take it; how do we live it? We live it the way we ourselves are, namely in and out of our factual existence.

The questions of the sense and rights of the tradition, and of the historical character of the university, will get deferred and will not manifest themselves as the first ones in the temporal order of the problems, as long as the ontological character of the university itself and its current state for us, with respect to its ontological structure, remain covered over. For so long it will not be evident to us in what way the university itself is inadequate as a situation of basic experience. Nor will it then be manifest in what respect and how the university is to learn, out of its history, what history and tradition can signify to it and what history and tradition mean at all.

As a life-nexus, the university *is* in factual life; the facticity of life, existence, is in itself historical and possesses, as historical, a relation (as compartment) to the Objective, historical world of former times. The question of the sense and the right of the tradition—itself a phenomenon within the basic phenomenon of the historical—is reassumed into the problematic of the historical itself, and the sense of the historical is, in turn, rooted in the facticity of factual life. The problem of the relation of Objective history to the historical is included in the aforementioned problematic. Yet insofar as the historical receives its sense from *facticity*, it is appropriate to bring this latter itself into sharper focus and make it the focus of our discussion.

Recapitulation<sup>12</sup>

The issue, with regard to the understanding of the definition of philosophy at the level of principle, is the sense of Being of the understanding itself. The comportment of understanding is to be appropriated concretely; first of all: access-tendency and access-comportment as beings, in their "what" and "how," here and now; title: university. University: accidental circumstance, historically changeable; unsuited for a decision of principle or for its maturation.

The Objective method toward a decision on its normative suitability is decline and flight; it is not at all necessary to tread that path. The decision need not be sought in terms of Objective history, supplemented by data pro and con. The method resolves itself on its own. Indeed, it is of decisive importance to see that it is resolved precisely in the genuine basic problematic of philosophy and, more specifically, in that which is properly at issue in the "pro" and "con."

The objection is not accidental but is instead a genuine expression of the decadent situation. As long as we take up the objection and desire to resolve it in its own style, we are moving further downward.

Unresolved moments of the Objective method: 1. Sense and right of the tradition in its normative claim. 2. What the university itself is as a nexus of factual life, what is properly relevant in this nexus, what constitutes it as a life-nexus. Then further: how Objective history comports itself in and to the historical facticity of a life-nexus of factual life.

What factual life is—that needs to be indicated. The pursuit of the objection concerning the accidental character of the institution has resulted in a sharper delineation of the direction of the problem with regard to the question of the "what" and the "how" of the access-comportment as a being. {Need more precision concerning the nexus which leads to the preliminary explication of factual life!}

Our problematic (determination of the access-situation according to its sense of Being) has already become noticeably more precise, and the basic outline and the basic nexuses have come into clearer relief. We are asking about the university as a life-nexus, and this nexus is itself part of our own factually historical life.

Thus what is primarily at issue is not the portrayal of an Objective, accidental state of the university today but the delineation and understanding of its specific sense of existence, a sense which perhaps lives and takes effect in a completely hidden and obstructed way. This sense is not beyond time but is radically temporal and historical—as we will still see, since it is so in a way we can grasp and must grasp.

12. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

## PART III

## Factual Life

The interpretation we have been expounding, and presenting directly, has led us indirectly to the *situation of the genuine primal decision*. (The possibility having opened up, say no more!) That this is the situation is something each person has to understand for himself, and then he will be able to proceed to the immediately adjacent explication of the task of philosophy. It is only later, if some occasion requires, that one might turn to the objections and to the external modes of access; the objections have resolved themselves on their own, properly, through actualization. Even if the problem of the historiological still exists, we have now been given for the first time the "intuition" of it, the necessary means, and the sense-moments of this objectivity and of its explication. (To question, cognize, interpret, etc.)

The following indications of the sense of the basic phenomenological categories and of their categorial nexus will only be as extensive as is necessary for the purposes of our forthcoming investigations. Their proper interpretation and original acquisition, at least as concerns the part (problem of actualization and of maturation—facticity) that is inseparably connected to the interpretation of the sense of the categorial, will demand of us an extensive interpretation of Aristotle.

Accordingly, what counts in full for these categories and for the relevant objective nexus is what we said in explicating the idea of a definition of principle (idea of philosophical definition). And it applies not in the sense of a mere accident, as if ultimately when we (?) had progressed far enough, we could understand the meaning on some other path. Quite to the contrary, these categories are as such already exceptionally and incomparably characterized through the proper way of access to them.

"Factual life": "life" expresses a basic phenomenological category; it signifies a basic phenomenon. If the term, "life," can be taken, with demonstrable justification, as the indication of a basic phenomenon, then what is given along with that is the possibility of delineating certain directions of sense, and this applies, in the case of a basic phenomenon, in a preeminent way.

Certain moments of sense that will stand out in the following discussions came forth already in modern life-philosophy, which I understand to be no mere fashionable philosophy but, for its time, an actual attempt to come to philosophy rather than babble idly over academic frivolities; Dilthey, Bergson. This "coming forth" was in itself unclear, and that gave litterateurs, and those philosophers who would rather gush with enthusiasm than think, an opportunity to take the matter up effortlessly. Yet we should not consider and criticize the problematic of

life-philosophy in the form of today's usual decadent productions. Instead, we need to read Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey and compare their orientation to that of Scheler, *Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens* [*Attempts at a Philosophy of Life*], *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze* (1919), vol. II, p. 164 ff.

On the other hand, Rickert: "We should finally stop seeing in the philosophizing about life a mere repetition of life and stop measuring the value of a philosophy by its vivacity. To philosophize means to create (is that not to live?), and the insight into the distance separating what is created from the mere living of a life . . . must then serve to benefit both life as well as philosophy." Rickert, *Die Philosophie des Lebens* [*The Philosophy of Life*] (1920), p. 194.

"Repetition": everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode of life itself, in such a way that it authentically "brings back," i.e., brings life back from its downward fall into decadence, and this "bringing back" [or re-petition, "re-seeking"], as radical re-search, is life itself. Cognition is for Rickert what he calls "concept," and that is a "pure phantasm."

The term, "life," is remarkably vague today. It is used to refer to a comprehensive, ultimate, and meaningful reality: "life itself." At the same time, the word is employed ambiguously: "political life," a "wretched life," "to bear a hard life," "to lose one's life on a sailing trip." (Biological concepts of life are to be set aside from the very outset: unnecessary burdens, even if certain motives might spring from these concepts, which is possible, however, only if the intended grasp of human existence as life remains open, preconceptually, to an understanding of life which is essentially older than that of modern biology.)

The vagueness and ambiguity exist together with a predominant sense of this term, and that sense amounts to a specific emphasis on something named and manifest in expressions such as: life-experience, life-enhancing, originality of life, a consummated life, etc. These occurrences of the term "life" in turns of speech, especially in philosophical, popularized philosophical, religious, and literary-"artistic" speech, grant, on the one hand, the possibility of saying, in an unclear way, anything and everything about "life" and of moving in a frivolous dialectic where, according to the need of the moment, the term can abruptly change its meaning. Nevertheless, since "life" signifies something ultimate, and since that is what we aim at in employing the word, our very use of it in each case always places us where we want to be and claim to be. Thereby we feel no obligation to seek the fundamental and rigorous sense, and we merely play with the term—or, rather, it is this term that plays with the philosopher.

It is not that we play with the word intentionally, but, instead, we play with it out of a fascination with it and out of a certain genuine and

reliable feeling for "life." All the more fatal are the illusions; we are constantly dissuaded, by the very possibilities of the term, from disturbing it in its reputed fecundity and from investigating relentlessly its basic sense and its explication.

On the other hand, we might let the vagueness and ambiguity stand, acquiesce in the predominant sense of the term, and thereby, for example, emphasize in philosophy a so-called philosophy of life. In this, our refusal to acknowledge the unclarities in the use of the term is just as quick. We do not pursue the tendencies in the expression, and we do not ask of the relevant nexuses of expression how it happens that the same word breaks out in them and whether this word and its use might not give voice to certain basic tendencies of existence.

We will never, along this path, succeed in appropriating and delineating the positive tendencies of modern life-philosophy. Instead, we believe we have done enough by conceding that a philosophy of life is indeed necessary, though at a certain "distance" from life. Yet this expresses a mere theoretical sanctioning of the significance of life in philosophy, and the sense of the concept of distance remains determined by a wrongheaded theorizing with regard to cognition and, above all, with regard to the "concept."

To sketch the structures of the sense of the term, "life," let us start with the verb, "to live." Here, as everywhere, there is a concrete experience to be presentified, even if at first the explication of the sense is purely and simply a matter of "feeling." 1. To live, in an intransitive sense: "to be alive," "to really live" (= to live intensely), "to live recklessly, dissolutely," "to live in seclusion," "to live half alive," "to live by hook or crook." 2. To live, in a transitive sense: "to live life," "to live one's mission in life"; here for the most part we find compounds: "to live through [*durchleben*] something," "to live out [*verleben*] one's years idly," and, especially, "to have a lived experience [*erleben*] of something."

These meanings of the verb are nominalized in the term, *life*, which thereby already has a definite transitive-intransitive ambiguity. We do not intend to eliminate this ambiguity but to let it remain and to seize hold of it.

These are not mere grammatical considerations, nor will the following considerations be such, for the categories of grammar in fact originate in those of living speech, in those of the immanent speaking of life itself (which are not the categories of logic, to be sure!). The grammatical categories originate, in great part, historiologically, which explains how the explication of life itself fell very early on into the hands of a determinate theoretical explication and articulation of life; cf. the development of grammar by the Greeks.

## The Basic Categories of Life

The noun, "life," has a rich and autonomous meaning, which we can briefly articulate into three senses:

1. Life in the sense of the *unity of succession and maturation* of the two previously named modes of "to live"; this unity in its extension over the totality of a life or over any delimited portion, in its full or partial manifold of actualization, and in its respective originality or lack of originality (aversion and direct hostility to the origin).

2. Life, grasped as such a delimited unity of succession: now in the sense of something that specifically bears *possibilities*, ones matured partially in life itself and for it. Life of which we say that it can bring all things, that it is incalculable; and it is itself something which bears possibilities and *is* its possibilities, itself as a possibility (a category which can be grasped in a phenomenologically rigorous way; from the very outset it has nothing to do with logical or a priori possibility).

3. Life understood in a sense in which 1. and 2. intertwine: the unity of extension in possibility and as possibility—lapsed possibilities, laden with possibilities and laden with itself, forming possibilities—and this whole taken as reality, indeed as reality in its specific opacity as power, *fate*.

These three senses of the noun contain the following structural indications, which are connected together categorially: the characters of extension, unity of succession, and manifold of actualization; the articulation as possibility, delivered over to possibility, developing possibility; furthermore, as reality, power in its opacity, fate.

In the just specified senses of the noun, "life," and the verb, "to live," i.e., in the circuit of the indicated expressive directions, a peculiar prevailing sense now resounds: life = existence, "*being*" in and through life. It is characteristic of this sense that for the most part it precisely does only "sound," weak and forlorn, and is not genuinely heard. Derivatively, we can understand that its appropriation and philosophical interpretation remain fragmentary or else are settled by way of a construction.

This sense in the aforementioned nexuses of meaning should be brought into relief—to the extent that the sense itself permits this, at the current methodological level of our considerations—in such a way that this bringing into relief is accomplished in union with a more precise basic articulation of the phenomenon, "life," i.e., along with a directing of the gaze toward something that is co-present in the phenomenon, "life," as such and is co-grasped in the very sense of life.



## A. Life and World

The intransitive sense of the verb "to live," if presentified concretely, always takes explicit form in phrases such as to live "in" something, to live "out of" something, to live "for" something, to live "with" something, to live "against" something, to live "following" something, to live "from" something. The "something," whose manifold relations to "living" are indicated in these prepositional expressions (which, to all appearances, have been casually heaped together), is what we call "world."

To understand this concept, we need to keep in view our way of approaching its determination. Our approach springs from the phenomenological interpretation of the phenomenon, "life," and is articulated through the intransitive and transitive senses of being in, out of, for, with, and against a world. What we have here, then, is not the proposal and designation of some incidentally chosen particular reality (e.g., the cosmos of nature) as world, i.e., as a place wherein living beings happen to be found. On the contrary, we are determining the concept of world precisely by beginning with the phenomenon indicated in the verb, "to live," a phenomenon we can determinately intuit as our life, the living of our own life. The phenomenological category, "world," immediately names—and this is crucial—*what* is lived, the content aimed at in living, that which life holds to.

Accordingly, if the noun, "life," is understood in its relational sense, which is in itself rich and of a manifold referentiality, then the corresponding content can be characterized as "world."

In a formal (and easily misleading) way, we could say that life is in itself world-related; "life" and "world" are not two separate self-subsistent Objects, such as a table and the chair which stands before it in a spatial relation. The relatedness at issue is, instead, one of referentiality; i.e., it is actualized, lived, and, as lived, preconceptually intended for the interpretation. Thus it is to be explicated in the way it is held and appropriated in the preconception. The nexus of sense joining "life" and "world" is precisely expressed in the fact that, in characteristic contexts of expression in speech, the one word can stand in for the other: e.g., "to go out into life," "out into the world"; "to live totally in one's world," "totally in one's life." World is the basic category of the content-sense in the phenomenon, life.

In this context, the term "category" refers to something which, according to its sense, interprets a phenomenon in a direction of sense, in a determinate way, at the level of principle, and brings the phenomenon to intelligibility as the interpretatum. In one manner or another, that can only later be shown precisely, which applies also to the original sense of interpretation. We do well to keep the concept of "form" distinct from the concept of "category," especially as long as the sense of the latter concept is

not exhausted in its originality. Category is interpretive and is interpretive (specifically of factual life) only if appropriated in existentiell concern.

If the basic category, "world," is determined more precisely in some respect, then this determination is carried out categorially, in new categories which arise and can be experienced in the actualization of the interpretation executed in, for, and out of factual life. Categories can be understood only insofar as factual life itself is compelled to interpretation.

What this means (that it does not mean simply to reflect on life, or something similar) will become manifest later, above all in the deduction, the derivation of the phenomenological interpretation out of the facticity of life itself. This facticity is something life is, and whereby it is, in its highest authenticity. It is not something forced upon it capriciously or for the sake of acquiring a novel sphere of knowledge (the existentiell genesis of reflection). This compulsion is not an unwarranted forcing, with the violence and arbitrariness of a rootless, foreign, and ordering systematization, typologization, or the like; on the contrary, it is demanded by factual life itself, "still in privation" (tendency and motive to fall into decline), and is that which properly constitutes it.

The preconception of the interpretation arises out of the respective level of the appropriation of life itself. In this regard, i.e., with regard to factual life, there are no theoretical possibilities to be chosen through caprice. On the other hand, a mis-take can be manifest only from a radical taking and grasping; to brood in advance on appropriateness and validity, on universal validity, is to misconstrue the basic sense of facticity. As long as we allow universal validity to be relevant and primarily philosophize about that, we are speaking within a worldly care, and are even doing so to the highest degree, and we are explicitly bearing the burden of "the other" and trying to sanction some before others. As long as facticity, the basic sense of the Being of life, is closed off, the decline will defend itself with the public outcry: The universal validity of knowledge is in danger! Skepticism!

The categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata as such, "lattices"; on the contrary, they are *alive in life itself* in an original way: alive in order to "form" life on themselves. They have their own modes of access, which are not foreign to life itself, as if they pounced down upon life from the outside, but instead are precisely the preeminent way in which *life comes to itself*. Yet insofar as life in every case does possess itself as factual in some manner or other, no matter how dispersed this may be, then the interpretive characters and categories can remain visible and to some degree intelligible, even when the original mode of access is no longer available (as is the case at the present level of our problematic). Inasmuch as, for the time being, a genuine understanding is not at all to be acquired, our vision is bound to be defective. Just as life is in itself circuitous, it is also "hazy." Genuine vision first

needs to be developed. (The haziness is indebted to life itself; the facticity of life consists precisely in holding to this debt, ever falling into it anew. That is not metaphysics, nor is it an image!)

Accordingly, the categorial interpretation that is now to be pursued further must essentially be *repeated*, even when it has already become intelligible. Its evidence matures precisely in its genuine and ever more rigorous repeatability. In concrete repetition, the interpretation itself becomes ever simpler; the circuitousness, as complex as it is, becomes straighter and becomes more original in its appropriation and existentiell maturation, although that also means “more serious” and “more difficult.” When simplified, the circuitousness comes to be understood a *fortiori* as something that is not to be eliminated but precisely appropriated, whereas the complex circuitousness always suggests that at the end there are to be no detours of any kind. All this is simply a preamble to the existentiell-categorial interpretation.

In what follows, therefore, the term, “life,” encompasses at least the just-indicated structures and is to that extent not entirely vague; the progressive interpretation and determination of these structures will work out a rigorous and philosophically precise concept. It corresponds merely to the indolence of factual life if the intention to grasp it is abandoned, and this abandonment is justified on the grounds that life is ambiguous and therefore impossible to understand clearly and precisely. Yet the height of indolence, and the bankruptcy of philosophy, consists in the plea that the term is not to be used at all. We thereby avoid a troublesome admonition—and write a system. In philosophy we have too facile an idea of what it actually means to abolish a term.

Here, as in the following, i.e., in every explicitly interpreted clarification directed by a sense (in the present case, the sense of relationality), the clarification must always be understood within the phenomenon as a whole and as the direction of a full sense. A category is interpretive in relation to life in its entirety. Precisely the categories and prestructures that are still to be exhibited will show how in every direction of sense there are others present in various ways—explicitly, non-explicitly; the “non-explicit” is itself a specifically phenomenological character, one that precisely co-constitutes facticity.

### B. Relational Sense of Life: Caring

{Caring, indicated formally, and so without laying claim to it: *the* basic relational sense of life in itself (contrary to [*sic*] the intention of the entire consideration). At the same time, out of the approach to the concrete in the presentation of the phenomena, having arrived from the beginning at such a dimension of the phenomenal realm that a concrete approach to the categorial explication becomes possible.}

a) Character of the world in caring: meaningfulness

Living, in its verbal meaning, is to be interpreted according to its rela-

world of factual life) is neither as easy as transcendental theory of knowledge imagines nor so self-evident and unproblematic as realism believes. From this objective, primary sense of content, we can first determine, in any particular case, the character and sense of existence, actuality, and reality.

Therefore it is not the case that objects are at first present as bare realities, as objects in some sort of natural state, and that they then in the course of our experience receive the garb of a value-character, so they do not have to run around naked. This is the case neither in the direction of the experience of the surrounding world nor in the direction of the approach and the sequence of the interpretation, as if the constitution of nature could, even to the smallest extent, supply the foundation for higher types of objects. On the contrary, the objectivity, "nature," first arises out of the basic sense of the Being of the objects of the lived, experienced, encountered world. (Cf. history of the concept, "*natura*.")

For the rest, meaningfulness is to be taken as broadly as possible and not constrained within any determinate domain of objects. Meaningfulness must not be identified with value. The latter is a category which also, for its part, can be set in relief only through a determinate formation and only out of concrete experience of the world. Then from there it is fixed, rightfully or not, in its own sphere of Being and represented, with regard to its genesis, in analogy with nature, as the basic actuality, the fundamental reality.

We should note that hereby the confusing intrusion of a commonly held theory becomes recognizable for the first time. The overcoming of this theory is a task at the level of principle and must grasp the theory at its roots and judge it on its fundamental claim to be founding and to be the ultimate reference of the problematic. This theory is therefore to be invalidated only from the problematic of philosophy at the level of principle, and philosophically there is nothing yet accomplished by the mere remark that the genesis of sense actually runs in the opposite direction.

It still remains to be heeded: the theory in question is not specific to today; it has its spiritual and historical roots in Greek philosophy, so much so that therein are alive both characteristic themes (original-experiential explication and categorial-theoretical explication). It is simply that one of these was lost in the process of leveling down what is original. (Cf. οὐσία, "possessions," "household goods," "wealth.") At the same time this theory has gone through fundamentally important interweavings in the course of the history of the spirit, and these have left their traces partially in the problematic of today's theory of knowledge as such. Here these references serve merely to keep us from narrowing the sense of meaningfulness and from presuming it is of a founded character. Otherwise, an understanding of the following discussions would be severely hampered.

The category of meaningfulness indicates how objects are in life according to the basic sense of their content and how they hold themselves and comport themselves in a world and under what guise they do so. (Reference to the original interpretive approach.)

Life, as caring, lives in a world and, in the manifold ways of the corresponding relations, actualizations, and maturations, cares for the objects encountered in experience at any particular time and cares for the encounters themselves. The object of the care is not the meaningfulness as a categorial characteristic but, instead, is in each case something worldly which finds its corresponding objective expression and which life itself forms. Meaningfulness is not experienced as such, explicitly; yet it can be experienced. The "can" possesses its own specific categorial sense; the transition from explicitness to non-explicitness is, in an eminent way, "categorial" (interpretation of the categories!). Meaningfulness becomes explicit in the proper interpretation of life with respect to itself, and thence we can first fully understand what it "is" and means to live factually "in" meaningfulness. The abbreviated expression, "to live in meaningfulness," means to live in, out of, and from objects whose content is of the categorial character of the meaningful.

In caring, life experiences its world, and this basic sense of being experienced provides the preconceptual sense, anticipating the full sense, of all interpretation of objectivity—including even the formal-logical interpretation.

{The movedness [*Bewegtheit*] of factual life can be provisionally interpreted and described as *unrest*. The "how" of this unrest, in its fullness as a phenomenon, determines facticity. On life and unrest, cf. Pascal, *Pens.* I-VII; the description valuable, but not the theory and the project; above all: soul-body, *le voyage éternel* [the eternal voyage], for existentiell philosophy not accessible in that form. The clarification of unrest, clarified unrest; un-rest and questionability; powers of maturation; unrest and the "toward which." The restive aspect of unrest. What cannot be set in relief, the undecidable "between" of the aspect of factual life: between surrounding world, shared world, individual world, previous world, future world; something positive. The seeping through of unrest everywhere, its forms and masks. Rest-unrest; phenomenon and movement (cf. the phenomenon of movement in Aristotle).}

#### b) Directions of caring

This caring always exists in a determinate or indeterminate, secure or wavering, *direction*. Life finds direction, takes up a direction, grows into a direction, gives to itself or lives in a direction, and even if the direction is lost to sight, it nevertheless remains present. The whole of life, in every case in a world, can be actualized in markedly distinct directions. The distinctive directions of caring set into relief respective specific

*worlds of care*. That toward which a factual life is directed in caring, the world in which it lives, is, however, always one that stands out from the basic worlds, which we designate as the surrounding world, the shared world, and one's own world.

These worlds must not be set in order beside one another as three domains of reality absolutely delimited in advance, which quantitatively increase or decrease in content according to how many objects, things, or people "exist" in them. On the contrary, the sense of their distinctiveness lies in the respective prominence (the character of the possibilities and of the maturation) of the mode of caring, which itself can be motivated in various ways. Furthermore, the sequence in which these worlds are now to be briefly characterized must not be identified with the sequence in which their articulation and explicit experienceability matures and can mature.

In the first place, *one's own world* must not be identified with the "Ego." The "Ego" is a category with a complex form, and I do not at all need to encounter it as such in my care over my own world, over "myself" in the factual, concrete sense. In one's own world, the "myself," for which I care, is experienced in determinate kinds of meaningfulness, which emerge in the full life-world, where, along with one's own world, the shared world and the surrounding world are always present. The life-world is in each case experienced in one of these prominences, explicitly or not. Prominence is a mode of facticity.

In terms of prominence or explicitness, none of the worlds has a necessarily privileged position; indeed, it is precisely characteristic of the mode of maturation of factual life to live the world in a specific indistinction of worlds. This indistinction is not privative, a lack of setting distinctly apart, but is instead a proper positive character, which we will interpret more precisely, in what follows, within an interpretation of relationality.

A fortiori, every setting into distinct relief, whether carried out explicitly or not, is determinative for the way life then lives [*das Leben lebt*] as actualized in that distinct world. And such settings into distinct relief are themselves actualized again in facticity and conform to its sense. The setting into relief is not a mere explicit paying of attention but is instead primarily a taking of direction on the part of the entire life. This means that, e.g., the setting into relief of one's own world is not a denial of the others, but, quite to the contrary, the setting into relief of one's own world co-actualizes, and determines the sense of, an appropriation of the shared world and the surrounding world—and the same for each of the others.

Living and caring in one's own world are not themselves, and do not rest on, self-reflection, in the usual acceptation of the word "reflection," i.e., in a subjectivistically ego-less isolation. Such interpretations

of experience in one's own world mistake the problematic from the ground up. I encounter myself in the world, in that which I live and in that which engages me, in my successes and failures, in my environment, in my surrounding world, in my shared world. I encounter myself in a world which acquires and takes its determinate meaningfulness from my own self, but in which the self "is" not there *qua* self, and where the "from my own self" is neither reflectively given nor explicitly placed on stage within this reflection.

Experience in one's own world therefore has nothing to do with psychological or even theoretical-psychological reflection; it has nothing to do with the inner perception of psychic lived experiences, processes, and acts. One's own world is the world in which a person encounters himself in a worldly manner, in which a person is involved and taken up in one way or another, in which something "happens" to him, in which he is active. This mode of concomitant experiencing and caring is the "customary" one—where "customary" and "custom" are basic categories of life in its facticity. One's own world does not need to step out in some way from the full life-world, any more than do the worlds which, as regards their sense, stand out in relief as surrounding world and shared world. When this does occur, it is so only in the facticity of life.

The shared world is encountered in "part" in one's own world, insofar as a person lives with other people, is related to them in some mode of care, and finds himself in *their* world of care. The shared world that is apart from one's own world is not delimited from it by way of a precise ordering. There are no strict boundaries here; the "partitions" can shift at any moment, on account of the character of life, namely, that it experiences by way of encounter. In every factual life, encounters in the shared world have their own possibilities, inasmuch as life itself is laden with, and formative of, possibilities.

In life-experience, within one's own world as partaking of the shared world, there is immediately co-present the *surrounding world*, a circuit of objects which are, as regards content, of quite different characters of meaningfulness. These objects impose the category of "surrounding world" insofar as they do not possess the ontological character and the "what" of that which pertains to the shared world, namely, human beings, i.e., objects that can take in care, and have in care, a world. [Note the destruction in terms of the history of the spirit: how the theoretical-psychological definition of *homo animal rationale* [man the rational animal] propels the problematic of existence into wrongheaded preconceptions and subjugates it.]

The surrounding world has no set boundaries. The "surrounding" character is determined in each case from the sense of actualization and sense of relation of caring and of its dominant directions, from the care



for what is round about, from the scope and originality of what is round about. What still, more or less, belongs in the surrounding world is modified constantly, according to whether meaningfulness itself addresses facticity more precisely and continuously or merely does so on occasion and in a scarcely noticeable way. These blurred edges of the life-world, the uninterrupted—because always sense-determined—shifting of its extent (not to be taken quantitatively), is grounded in the maturation of each life, which as such (factically) is related to a world. For the problematic of the surrounding world, we need to take into account: the factically “concomitant,” the “accouterments,” the entourage; a field of stimulation, whence “allurements” and the like press upon us. The “things that press upon us from there” (facticity), encountered in a caring, are constitutive of the ontological sense of this “there.”

The mode of being related to the world, and the world itself, exist in factual maturation, which we should not represent, however, “idealistically” or in any other epistemological way as an isolated producing of the world. In maturation, the being-encountered of a world, of a worldly object, is just as relevant as the encountering itself.

We would do well here to learn to prescind from all further interpretations and tendencies of representation and apprehension the *theory of knowledge* has inculcated in us. The mere mention of the debate between idealism and realism already arouses the suspicion that we believe an actual philosophical problem resides here—which is not the case and will be denied as soon as we appropriate a genuine understanding of philosophy. That Kant, as is commonly said, pursued epistemology is one of the beautiful inventions of the nineteenth century. An authentic motive may indeed be operative in this debate, but it is precisely not an “epistemological” motive and therefore cannot genuinely bring to maturity a “theory of knowledge,” especially not as the fundamental philosophical science.

These worlds (the surrounding world, the shared world, and one’s own world) can be encountered in various ways in the factual living of a concrete life-world, and, in these respective encounters, historical meaningfulness becomes factically decisive in different manners and thereby brings one’s own world to its respective determinate nexus of actualization.

What we have initially acquired: the basic character of the relational sense of “life” as caring; the basic character of the content of life as “world,” categorially determined as meaningfulness; at the same time, with respect to the possible prominence or setting into relief of the respective world of care, three characteristic possible directions life can “possess”; this “possessing” to be taken in an indefinite way, insofar as nothing has been settled about the concomitants; for the most part, life is not explicitly in one of these prominent directions, life does not

explicitly place itself in one of them. Life need never take up these directions in an explicit way.

Yet we need to notice from the very first that life incidentally receives a basic direction in every case and grows into it. The direction can be taken up explicitly (e.g., with regard to the shared world) but does not have to be. The directions devolve upon us, bring themselves home to us (slip in!). The surrounding world is determined by our dealings with things; the character of the surrounding world penetrates the others more, however. Yet life can return again from an explicit direction-taking to an indolent "life" in the respective world, where, to be sure, the character of the actualization is different from that of a non-explicitly directed mode of life which has *never* explicitly taken up a direction. The non-explicit directedness and factual maturation of an explicit taking of a direction in the surrounding world, in the shared world, and in one's own world first become interpretable out of the nexus we are about to discuss.

{Caring is the fundamental sense of the relationality of life. The sense of relationality is in each case, in its own way, an adverting [*Weisen*] and contains in itself a direction [*Weisung*] which life gives itself, which it undergoes: in-struction [*Unterweisung*]. Full sense of *intentionality* in its originality! Theoretical attitude faded. Not to establish a wrongheaded universal as a formalized theoretical view of the sense of relation, but to fix the genuinely existential-formal sense—caring its formally indicated full sense of relation!}

No matter how opaquely we may represent a whole whose significance is easily overestimated in philosophy, no matter how obscure many things may still be for a properly actualized explication, it must become clear from the course of the approach and from the nexuses of the problems that it is out of the question to take philosophy as a distortion of the spirit, as a fantastic view, elevated to the level of a principle, of life and of thinking. Instead, the fundamental stage of philosophizing involves understanding (and doing so precisely in the context of the following explication of the sense of relation) that these categorial nexuses are *alive in genuinely concrete life* and are not merely trivial and arbitrary observations, such as the statement that "the thing there is red." Furthermore, it must be understood that they are alive *in facticity*; i.e., they include factual possibilities, from which they are (thank God) never to be freed. Therefore a philosophical interpretation which has seen the main issue in philosophy, namely, facticity, is (insofar as it is genuine) factual and specifically philosophical-factual, such that it radically anticipates the decisive possibilities and thereby itself as well. It can do all this, however, only if it is present in the proper mode of its existence.

Everyone is certainly free to criticize this interpretation from extrin-

sic positions, ones that have absolutely no contact with the problematic of facticity, but such a procedure would be ludicrous. As regards philo-

This proclivity impels life into its world, rigidifies it, and brings to maturation a petrification of the directionality of life. Life genuinely finds itself where its own proper proclivity fixes it; life takes from there its direction with regard to itself, i.e., with regard to its dealings with its world, and also takes from there the "representation" it develops in itself of itself (i.e., of the world). In its proclivity toward its world, life "possesses itself" and experiences itself always only in the form of its "world." In proclivity, life itself is experienced essentially as world; i.e., life itself, in facticity, exists always in the form of its world, its surrounding world, its shared world, its own world; every life is in the form of my, your, his, her, their world; our life, our world.

{(Factual) visibility of inclination and distance in a factual possession of the being-transported from one realm of meaningfulness to others. Here the "relation to" something slackens and is possessed "freely." Concrete occasion?}

In this inclination of the relationality, in proclivity as a mode of the actualization of caring, the world, in which life lives, has weight for life, specifically such that life, in its facticity, admixes constantly new sorts of weight. The realms of significance which are encountered in the course of the maturation of life, and which become different as its world changes, transport life. In its proclivity, life thereby arrives at the mode of *being transported*. Life abandons itself to a certain pressure exerted by its world. It is not now the time to discuss whether this occurs explicitly or not, freely or in a culpable entanglement; yet these questions must be placed in the problematic as a matter of principle and must not be deferred indefinitely with the facile pretext that they "belong to metaphysics."

It would not be unimportant, for a daring philosophy, to explicate once and for all the idea people have of metaphysics: an appeal to unclarity as a refuge, nebulous exhalation of unhealthy, arrogant, and delusory "cosmic feelings."

The relationality of care, i.e., life in a world, becomes *disperse*, and newly awakened proclivities keep life within its dispersions. The proclivities will allow precisely nothing to escape dispersion, and thereby they increase it. Life becomes played out in its world at random, following whatever comes "out of the blue." The "claims" of life, which arise in caring and are covered up in it (how life in its world still addresses itself as life in a worldly mode and puts forward a claim), are contested by this dispersion in and out of its *world*; there comes to be formed what we can designate as the *self-satisfaction* of life, a mode of caring in self-dispersing life, life transported by its world. {The sources of the preconception of declining factual life, whence it forms, if it ever does, the "representation" of itself.}

The more incisive interpretation of the relationality of caring has thus disclosed and set in relief the following correlated categories (*inter-*

*pretata*) of life: inclination, proclivity, being-transported, dispersion, and self-satisfaction. Those are the phenomena which must be interpreted first of all, in order to work out the preconception for a radical grasp of the basic sense of "movement" ("process," "stream," "flow," life-occurrence, nexus of actualization, maturation), insofar as we are resolved for once to take seriously the basic operative concepts, to face squarely up to the sheer infernal conditionality of the approach to every interpretation, and to confront the issues directly.

#### b) Distance

The task is now to set in relief a further structure of the relationality of life (caring), one which is equiprimordial with the category of inclination but is of particular relevance precisely for the character of life we are now about to discuss. To be actualized equiprimordially with inclination means here that this character is precisely covered over by the inclination, thrust aside, and drawn into dispersion. Having been thrust aside, this character is encountered as dispersed in the world, and it is precisely there that life finds it at any time. Let us call this category of relationality *distance* (or, respectively, abolition of distance—relevant to the actualization!—its genuine sense: "to be" in ruinance).

Distance, which contributes to the possibility of inclination, is precisely carried along by it. In the caring relationality of life to its world, life has its world, its respective concrete meaningful things, *before* itself. This having of something "before" oneself, which is a categorial articulation of the relation to something or other, is now, precisely in caring, suppressed; the "before," the "distance," is precisely not present in the caring upsurge toward the meaningful things. "Caring upsurge toward" means precisely abolition of ["is" ruinous of] the "before." Living in proclivity and dispersion, life does not maintain distance; it commits an oversight. In the dispersed thrusting aside of the "before," distance is not explicitly there as such. In proclivity, it becomes even less explicit; in the actualization of experience, life passes over it. In oversight with regard to distance, life mis-measures itself; it does not grasp itself in the measure appropriate to it ("measure" not to be understood quantitatively).

The distance is not simply eradicated; indeed, it exists in the very Being of the relation of care. But in life it is transported into dispersion. It arises, and is encountered, where proclivity lives, in the world and specifically in its "sense" as a mode of meaningfulness. The character of distance is present insofar as life mis-measures itself in its care for meaningful things, expands them, and is, in its proclivity, intent on a calculation and a distantiation *within* the meaningful world: intent on rank, success, position in life (position in the world), superiority, advantage, calculation, bustle, clamor, and ostentation, whether these be sought by thrusting oneself forward crudely and noisily or with

refinement and grandiloquence, in the manner of one who "cuts a wide swath" (a characteristic expression!). These are ways life lets itself be transported by the distantiations soliciting it in its world; they are modes in which life cares to establish distance.

Life takes the broadest possible and most important measures and thereby facilitates that toward which and in which it comports itself, namely, its dispersion; in its proclivity and in its care for distantiation, the dispersion finds ever new nourishment. The possibilities of being transported, the ways of gratification, multiply and run on endlessly. Life, in its inclination to disperse its relationality into self-distantiation, is *hyperbolic*. Life seeks to distance itself and to distinguish itself in that whereby it lives, in meaningful things. (Genesis of science; attitude in facticity!) The multiplicity itself becomes a mode of meaningfulness, an object of care: care that this multiplicity is always available, does not run out, is present in ever new modes. The being-transported by the world is "pull-like": life drawn away from itself in its own world.

In the case of this category as well, an intricate categorial structure arises immediately: distance, abolition of distance, oversight, mis-measuring, distantiation in proclivity, the hyperbolic (a mode of the actualization of factual life).

The less explicitly a categorial character pertaining to the basic phenomenon, "life," is accessible and determinable as phenomenologically nearest at hand (which can precisely indicate its decisive importance for facticity), the more originally can it be bound to, and be interpretive of, the basic categorial structure of the facticity of life and all the more tenaciously does it live in the maturation of factual life. The categorial interpretation of facticity must in principle take this nexus into account, precisely as characteristic of the object of the interpretation itself; this is not a merely incidental (technical-methodological) difficulty. The co-interpretive character of the mode of the respective *actualization* of the interpretation is in every case decisive in principle for the phenomenological interpretation. The interpretive access to such categories must genuinely proceed by way of their specifically phenomenological self-offering. Only in that way does there arise the concrete possibility of a genuine interpretation of the nexus of life.

### c) Sequestration

We are now to exhibit the third character of the relationality of caring. It is of the same kind; i.e., it must be explicated by taking up, understanding, and passing through the two previously named characters, "inclination" and "distance." Only in that way will our grasp of it be adequate to the intention and approach of our current interpretation. Nevertheless, if distance, on account of surrendering itself to the mode of actualization for which it has a proclivity, was already thrust aside

into dispersion, then this will happen all the more with the third character, “sequestration.” Thus this character is in itself even less clear.

The differences in explicitness and accessibility do not derive simply or primarily from the phenomenological grasp of these characters; on the contrary, there are differences in the way we grasp them *because* of the characters themselves and their own respective lives. It is precisely in terms of differences in explicitness, which pertain to them intrinsically, that we are to interpret the characters categorially and understand them as constitutive of facticity.

With regard to inclination, in its distance-abolishing dispersion, what is it that becomes and remains lost? That in which I live my life of caring, that toward which I comport myself in care, is something that can stand explicitly “before” me, taking “before” in the phenomenological rather than spatial sense. The “before” means: I comport myself explicitly to something in care, I live explicitly on the basis of something, and, in the “explicitly before” me, the “me,” the “I myself” (factically speaking, my own world) is *thereby experienced*. In caring, this “before” can be set in relief and explicitly appropriated. The “before” merely articulates more precisely what was already designated as “distance.”

Yet insofar as caring lives factically in the basic mode of its actualization, i.e., in proclivity, and then becomes set in this proclivity, the appropriation of the “before” is deferred—e.g., in being transported from one realm of meaningfulness to another, in an abolition or slackening of the relationality. Nonetheless, the relationality is now factically visible. What is happening; what is actually the matter here? In this obscurity, “life” speaks.

The appropriation of the “before” is deferred all the more, insofar as, in dispersion, the distance itself and the care to establish distance, the care for distantiations as meaningful (care for precedence; care to be the first, the closest, the highest, the most; care to compare favorably in all spheres of meaningfulness in which life takes a care), have been transferred into the world and, as encountered there, do not fail and are not missing. (Ambiguity of becoming lost—larvant.)

Insofar as care is actualized in this way, a possibility of life has become lost: the tendency toward the possible appropriation of the “before” and consequently of that which life genuinely holds before itself by living in the “before,” in distance; life as caring, inasmuch as it factically has a care in its world. (Relucence of the “before,” by “living” in the “before” [“vor”]; maturation of a genuine occurrence [Vor-kommen] of life.) Caring life indeed finds itself precisely in the mode of inclination in the world and has no inducement to seek itself in some other way. Yet we see that this possible occurrence is to be appropriated in the actualization of the “before”! The possibilities of the appropriation of the “before,” of the explicit possession of distance in the actualization of

life, are co-determined in each case from the character of the world in which and before which life exists and from the originality and sense of



maturation that characterizes the *elliptical*. In its taking of directions, factual life places itself on a certain track and does so specifically by inclining, suppressing distance, sequestering itself within a directionality toward the easy.

On this, cf. Aristotle.

d) The "easy"

Τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾶδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥᾶδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)- καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης. *Nicomachean Ethics* B 5, 1106b28 ff. "Furthermore, there are many ways to be mistaken (for evil pertains to the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans judge, but the good to the limited) yet only *one* way to act rightly. (Therefore the first is easy, the latter difficult. It is easy to miss the mark, difficult to hit it.) Accordingly, excess and deficiency pertain to vice, and the middle course to virtue."<sup>13</sup> Cf. Plato, *Republic* 285 B; *Protagoras* 356 A.

Factual life is always seeking the easy way; inclination follows the direction in which it is pulled and does so by itself, readily. Proclivity contains something which corresponds to the pull and rushes toward it, "without further ado." The "further ado" does simply not reside in the field of proclivity. Mundane difficulties are actually ways to take our ease. Along with convenience, life at the same time seeks the assurance that nothing can be closed off to it. (The larvant, spectral character of life or of its world. Disguising still more tenacious and "easier.")

Living is caring and indeed is so in the inclination toward making things easy for oneself, in the inclination toward flight. Thereby arise a directionality toward possible mistakes as such, mistakability, decline, making things easy, fooling oneself, fanaticism, and exuberance.

Life, as determined by inclination, is to be grasped more precisely as determined by guilt and haziness. Life seeks to assure itself by looking away from itself. This looking is primary and provides the basic view, the way life sees itself. Life thereby develops its own self-searching, which, in falling, changes into carefreeness (*securitas*). Carefreeness is a mode of care, a mode of the concern of life for itself.

Carefreeness then shapes the world and, in order to be satisfying, must increase; it becomes hyperbolic and grants an easier concern and fulfillment, i.e., the conserving and preserving of existence. At the same time hyperbolic existence proves to be elliptical: it eludes that which is difficult, that which can be attained only *μοναχῶς*, in only one way (not haphazardly), it recognizes no fixed limits, and it is unwilling to be posed *upon* a primal decision and *in* it (repeating it).

13. [German] translation by the editors.

The relationality of caring now already reveals, simply from the three basic categories we have discussed, a manifold categorial structure and does so all the more if we consider as well their respective cat-

tionable.” Otherwise put, they both derive from the neglect of a radical determination of the sense of a knowledge of principles.

Yet this does not mean that a knowledge of principles is a newly invented ideal of philosophy, an Objective ideal that would be worth our while to follow up sooner or later. On the contrary, this knowledge itself indicates, in its very sense, something that claims to be decisive in principle. It claims to be inescapable and rigorously binding. Over and against it, the ideal of values (or of anything else bruited about as super-temporal and presumed to be eternally valid) will float way like a phantom.

In the appropriation of the knowledge of principles, a false ideal of exactitude pales before the urgency and rigor of an unswerving questionability in which there collapses, visibly and definitively, every possibility of concocting or inventing something by philosophizing. Philosophy, as knowledge of principles, must thereby learn to renounce the swindle of an aesthetical befogging of itself and of its confederates.

The Being of the (historiologically) historical and the sense of the historiological arise for the first time and *exist* in the actualization of the knowledge of principles. In philosophizing there is no history of philosophy; and in the historiology of factual (philosophizing) life, there is no super-temporal problematic in itself and no system of philosophical questioning.

Philosophizing, as knowledge of principles, is nothing other than the radical actualization of the historiology of the facticity of life, such that in this actualization, and for it, the historical and the systematic are equally foreign and their separation is, a fortiori, superfluous.

The sphere of tasks with regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is not different from that dealt with in the introduction, and the mode of explication of the latter is not more systematic than the one to be pursued in the former sphere; on the contrary, it is less genuine. In terms of content, the same three groups of problems we have discussed, more or less determinately, up to now in the introduction will also occupy us in our interpretation of Aristotle: the knowledge of principles which, in its actualization, concerns its own facticity. For the sake of a schematic orientation, we can lay out the following:

1. The problem of the principle and of what is a matter of principle (ἀρχή-αἴτιον) [*arche—aition*, “principle—cause”].

2. The problem of the grasp, the determination, and the conceptual articulation (λόγος [*logos*, “discourse”]).

3. The problem of beings and the sense of Being (ὄν—οὐσία—κίνησις—φύσις) [*on—ousia—kinesis—phusis*, “beings—Being—movement—nature”].

The task, of course, is not merely to assemble the relevant passages, in which these words occur, nor to compile a comprehensive *catalogue raisonné* of the citations. On the contrary, the task is to interpret, and

every interpretation—this applies in a unique way to a phenomenological interpretation—depends on the preconception which guides it. That is to say, it depends on the mode of the first approach to the *interpretandum*. Therefore our approach must be examined and determined in some comprehensible and appropriate way.

Accordingly, this introduction, if taken and used on its own (which would be counter to its proclaimed sense), is not one self-subsistent half of a concrete interpretation of Aristotle, which would stand alongside another half, but is, without the latter, in itself nothing, at most a misunderstanding of philosophy.

Therefore it is all the more urgent, from the very beginning and continuously, to examine with ever greater acuity and certainty the genuine immanent goal of the previous and the forthcoming explications, i.e., to master the context with ever greater rigor.

It is important to see that the explication of the sense of a knowledge of principles can be actualized, for its part, only in this direction; in other words, the actualization of the explication co-posit, in the manner of an actualization, the same knowledge of principles in its levels of approach and thereby makes it available to a possible appropriation.

The difficulty of the conceptual expression and the obstacles in the path of understanding do not derive from the intricacy of the objects, which are basically simple enough, but from the inflexibility of traditional thinking in philosophy and from the factually historiological binding of all philosophizing—especially the one in the vanguard—to its surroundings and tradition.

The specific way of making things easy, which, however, is today—and, in fact, is always—a difficulty, resides in the circumstance that the proofs do not need to be sought far and wide but can be found within each person, in the way one lives one's life. There only remains the concern that, with the pomposity which is in general more visible in philosophy than anywhere else, the preparation for a genuine access to the object of philosophy will deteriorate further and that, instead of letting ourselves be led through philosophizing to its own proper concrete object, we might busy ourselves with philosophy as an Object itself and then ramble on, fatuously discussing philosophical opinions and the history of those opinions, all the while supposing this to be actual learning. The tenacity with which factual life clings to this temptation cannot dispense us from trying to break free of it with ever new exertions.

Precisely because the actualization of the access and of the appropriation constitutes the main component of philosophy, with respect to its object, there is required, already in our way of approach, a corresponding formal indication of this object—as the object of knowledge at the level of principle. The indicative understanding, already in the approach and general bearing of the philosophizing, must be one of principle. Formally

speaking, the understanding and possession of the sense of the Being of beings must be at the level of principle, specifically such that thereby and therein this possession is in play by principle, as a being according to its

their sense of facticity and in the possibilities included therein for an original reappropriation.

Sciences are not intended here with respect to their logical structure and their respective character in the total system of sciences and disciplines. Such typologizing chicanery might be entertaining and, in the absence of the genuine problematic, might not be ineffective as a stop-gap, but the interpretation of a science, in its own respective concrete logic, i.e., a science of a concrete region extracted out of a life-world in the way appropriate to that life-world, bears philosophical fruit only if inserted preconceptually into the problematic of facticity and into a discussion of the living historiological situation. Otherwise, all theory of science becomes a naive perpetuation of the historical contingencies of scientific methods and techniques.

Furthermore, we will need to determine what is to be understood at the level of principle (philosophically) by the knowledge of principles which arises out of and returns to such facticity, i.e., how this knowledge of principles stands in relation to the facticity of the aforementioned factual life-nexus, and how the interpretation of Aristotle arises as a genuine, concrete task of research within this nexus. In other words, we need to determine the knowledge of principles in the requirements it itself posits for its own concrete actualization. Finally, it must be shown how this philosophical problematic returns the intention of *phenomenological* research to its own proper originality and how—i.e., in what sense—the interpretation of Aristotle qualifies as phenomenological.

Before all else, we must once again see the interpretive access to and the explication of facticity as the fundamental problems. These are not theoretical questions of method or of conceptuality but are, on the contrary, ones whose grasp or neglect determines whether or not philosophy is intended in such a way that, in its current spiritual situation, it can attain its full integrity and can be secure in the ground of its actualization and in the scope and originality of its goals, i.e., secure in the factual relevance of its research in every case.

Our consideration will then be in position to bring to experience life, as factual life, in its objectivity and Being and, accordingly, to make possible a genuinely explicative grasp of life. This consideration, according to its factual, methodological sense, is an intermediate one;<sup>14</sup> it lies “in between” with regard to determinate, concrete interpretations in the history of the spirit. These provide the rule for what is to be communicated here explicatively concerning the phenomena, namely, the way they touch the fundamental objective nexuses.

As a fundamental determination of the object in question (factual life), *movedness* is already at issue here. In adherence to a direction of the phe-

14. Cf. Appendix II, page 2.

nomenon of life (relationality of caring) and in reference to the basic categories of this relationality (inclination, distance, sequestration), we may

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and we will see how in every instance—i.e., concretely, here and now—we are to assume the direction of the appropriation and its mode of actualization.

means that inclination shows itself as something which moves itself toward itself. Life, caring for itself in this relationality, reflects light back on itself, which produces a clarification of the surroundings of the currently immediate nexus of care. As so characterized, the *movement of life toward itself within every encounter* is what we call *relucence*. That which factual life cares about in its thrust into its world at any time is encountered as stemming from life as care. (The specific larvance in the ambiguity of the linguistic expression of the categories of facticity is not accidental. Dispersion: 1. to self-disperse (prestructively), 2. that which disperses (reluently).)

Through its world and with it, life is relucent in itself, i.e., relucent of itself as a life of caring. From the mode in which things offer themselves to be encountered, the life of care fulfills its need for directives to guide the care; from the relucent world life makes its claims and measures itself. Life begins to build out from this world and for it. Life establishes itself following the sense of its projection and of its appropriated *pre-possession*. It assures itself with a pre-possession and cares for itself in explicit or implicit reference to it. In caring, life is always projecting, beginning to build; in being relucent, life is at the same time *prestructive*. The assurance, protection, acquisition, and relinquishment of the pre-possession (which in any give case may serve to guide or disperse, but nevertheless fulfills in one way or another) can be attended to explicitly, set up as a task, and organized socially, i.e., within the shared world. This task is then one of a life of care for cultural assets, for the producing and finishing of cultural objects, and for the appropriate ways and means. These are actualized partly in an explicit, efficacious knowledge regarding the relevant cultural values and goals. The result is *cultural life* as the prestructively organized proclivity of the worldly relucence of the life of care.

The tendency to security in this prestruction (which is itself grounded in relucence) can be quite suppressed, so much so that cultural activity and cultural life (active comportment toward values) are interpreted on the basis of self-satisfied life as closed off in themselves, autonomous and positive. This means that the tendency to security, which has been elevated relucently to the mode of a positively creative work, can, as such, become lost (whereby a basic peculiarity of the movedness of life expresses itself: ruinance, ossification). Along with it is lost the possibility of a vital encounter with that against which the tendency to security sets itself, namely, an *insecurity* resident in factual life. From here, the philosophical interpretation is one step away from determining life itself, in its entirety, encompassing its worlds, as something Objective and, in that sense, the fundamental reality. This reality would build out from itself (and flow into) all forms of life, and the sense of these forms would be seen in the working of such infinite processes of building and



producing. Then what is encountered in the experience of life and in the preconception of the grasp of life is nothing that could specifically lead the grasping intention toward facticity.

We need to see how, on the basis of Greek philosophy (though not in this philosophy itself, i.e., not for the Greeks) and through Greek conceptuality, these possibilities operate quiescently in our mixed consciousness of life. We have to learn from the Greeks, not in the sense of simply accepting what they achieved but, instead, in the sense of authentically understanding it!

The peculiar inseparability, noted earlier, of the three basic categories of the relationality of care (in general, their coexistence rather than their succession in order) as well as, at the same time, the possibility of their cohering together in a reciprocal movement that would serve to interpret them and determine their sense—both of these now become visible in the fact that, as is the case with inclination, so also the abolition of distance, no less than sequestration, can all be characterized as reluctant and prestructive in their movedness, each for itself and all together. We must go further and see that this movedness itself, precisely in and through the aforementioned categorial expressions, is reluctant and prestructive in itself and toward itself. Indeed, we must see that this movedness itself occurs in the mode of reluctance and prestruction. (Ruinance—the genuine character of the collapse of factual life.)

b) The categories of movement in the abolition of distance

The distantiation included in the relationality of life, i.e., the possibility of an explicitly appropriated “before” and of an actualization of life in such an explicitly decisive “pre-possession,” does not come to nothing in the mode of care we have called “abolition of distance” but, instead, turns back and is encountered—though only, to be sure, in a worldly way. As actualized, the relationality of care is not in itself distantiated. On the contrary, it reluctantly comes toward itself in the form of *worldly distantiation* and in this form takes itself into care, such that this caring is directed toward success, rank, advantage, position, advancement. Moreover, this distantiation is positively and autonomously prestructive in the hyperbolic building up of distances and possibilities of pursuing distance. The hyperbolic is a mode in which the specific prestructive movedness of factual life expresses itself. The worldly distantiations, which are not encountered as set out in relief reluctantly, are grasped (as prestructively formed) in the factual actualization of caring.

We arrive at the building up of particular modes of securing such inner-worldly distantiations and arrangements. Within culture and in connection to it, sciences can have this specific origin, or they may come to be assigned to a subsequent situation in the history of the spirit. That is their specifically worldly, Objective genesis, primarily

immanent to a region of the world. Yet an existentially factual genesis is also possible! In that case their problematic character would not be removed but actually increased, inasmuch as they would then be seen in terms of the possibility of an existentiell appropriation and preformed for such an appropriation. (Cf. the following on science and attitude. Organized distantiation and ruinance, in philosophy as Platonism.)

The "before" of the theoretical attitude thereby turns back to life reluctantly and presents itself as the highest value in the form of Objectivity, scientificity, free intellectual honesty and impartiality, and as the tribunal of a theoretical reason whose demonstrations are ever correct. This theoretical reason fixes boundaries, and thanks to them the irrational exists and can deck itself out, in view of its origination, as something absolute. Intellectual, scientific culture and its negative counterpart have the same origin. Anti-intellectualism, anti-science, by accepting and blindly maintaining the traditional situation, is one level further in decline, since it is the same as that situation but merely suggests inauthentically that it is "better," "more original." This is the insidious situation of the history of the spirit as encountered in the world.

c) The categories of movement in sequestration

In the case of inclination, prestruction thrusts itself into the foreground, steps forth with particular clarity, and assumes a priority as regards the movement (i.e., the "toward which" of inclination presses toward domination); now, in a comparable way, in the case of sequestration, it is relucence that especially determines the movement. Sequestration is interested only in flight away from the life of encounter, away from the life that announces itself as insistent. Sequestration is, as such, pre-structively indeterminate (although it is factually predeterminative of the factual prestruction), since it is uninterested in that regard; with respect to itself, it is concerned only with the "away from." Here we have the sharpest expression of a fundamental sense of facticity and of its movedness, whereby it must be noted that precisely this movedness of sequestration with respect to the character of its factual maturation is, in a special way, concealed. (Categorial connection between the concealed (the unclarified) and that which, in facticity, is properly determinative of movedness.)

Caring, in the relational character of sequestration, is relucent in a peculiarly imposing and pressing way: while emerging, through care, in its world, life (as present in the character of the world *qua* encountered) makes itself look away from itself. Precisely thereby, however, in a peculiar movement, life lets itself approach itself and encounter itself. That is, in, so to speak, shrinking away from itself, life yet possesses a tendency to confront itself.

This reluctance thus displays—for the categorial interpretation of caring, i.e., of life—a basic sense of relationality relevant to the categorial structure of facticity: the “away from itself” in the “outside of itself.” The power of reluctance in the movedness of sequestration expresses itself precisely in the fact that in this “away from itself” of life, life itself builds up a “toward itself” and “exists” in and through this structure (in movedness, in its basic sense of Being: facticity), and factual life, as caring, directs itself precisely in this “away from it.” Specifically from this mode of movedness, life takes the directionality of its prestructions. Out of this flight before itself, life acquires the modes in which it deals with its world and with itself.

The mode of pre-building, extracting, and seizing the pre-possession (the mode guided by the reluctance matured in sequestration) intends to miss, or be able to miss, factual life itself in an “authentic” way. (On the “authentic,” as an existential, cf. facticity.) Life itself takes into care the building, making ready, and keeping open of the possibilities of missing itself, possibilities which in every case fill a need (privation-related!). Care insists that an occasion never arises (on the category of “occasion,” cf. facticity as historical “situation”), that it never finds itself in a predicament, such that it has to gaze directly and concernfully at life, the life which presses itself to the fore even in the tendency to sequestration. Factual life, in every one of its concrete situations, cares that it always be able to take easy refuge in some pressing mundane task or other and that the supposedly indispensable resolution of that task can become reluctant. In such maturations of available “ways out” (modes in which factual life lives outside of itself), in meeting and taking up “important things,” the elliptical, a specifically prestructive way of movedness, is factually relative to the reluctance which is directly (historically-historiologically) characteristic of sequestration.

The interpretation of life with respect to its relationality in caring, or, more exactly, the interpretation of the movedness of care (life), aims at coming explicatively and categorially closer to the sense of movement, as factual movement, in order thereby to make facticity itself available in a certain way and thus to appropriate it categorially.

#### F. Connections

The factual sense of movedness will become clearer (i.e., more fully appropriated in the interpretation) by our grasping the relations, with respect to movement, between the reluctant-prestructive movedness expressed in any *one* category of relationality and the movedness involved in the others. The last-characterized prestructive movedness, that of sequestration, i.e., the elliptical, makes it evident how much this latter, and so sequestration in general, abets inclination in various

ways. This abetting, in the form of the incitement, encouragement, support, reassuring justification, stimulation, or awakening of inclination, is itself a character of movedness and expresses the relation between two characters of relationality, namely, inclination and sequestration.

The inclination which is thus affected and stimulated by sequestration is itself, in turn, reluctant in regard to abolition of distance. Inclination opens up and provides, from its world, meaningful things as possibilities for the development of worldly distantiations. Proclivities, in which factual life becomes set in its ways, offer nutriment and opportunity for an exaggerated, preferential judgment as to what is important. These proclivities thereby enable the formation of differences in the distantiation. (Note the relation with regard to movement: an enticement that rearranges, upholds, assures.)

In turn, the hyperbolic element of the abolition of distance pursues (pursuit: ruinance of the hyperbolic) prestructively the reluctant possibilities of dispersion that are matured by sequestration "with the help" of inclination (abetting as a character of movement!) and is itself thereby reluctant toward sequestration, offering an opportunity to look away. These peculiar relations indicate the movedness of care itself, how it actualizes itself, its *sense of actualization*. Here we see the special quality of the connection of sense, the connection between the sense of relation and the sense of actualization. (A caution and not an a priori rule.)

At the same time, actualization is to be taken as a formally indicative concept: it is itself a difficult concept, since it derives from a conceptual and grasping tendency that is not appropriate here and that has a different preconceptual character. (Insertional, transitional concept.) "Actualization" is a convenient, universally formal category which, however, can easily come to say nothing and can cut research off from every concrete grasp—with the reassurance that something has already been won simply by being able to shove everything onto the main track of "actualization."

Here and in other cases of attempting to fix meaning, it is easy to see that experience of phenomena and determinate, phenomenologically motivated tendencies toward the explication of the phenomena confer meaning on the terminologically fixed linguistic expression. They do so in such a way that, from the explication, a determinate sense attaches to the meanings employed in the specifically leveled-down discourse of factual life. It is not that, starting from words snatched up at random, something concocted and invented is laid down as objectively demonstrable and secure. Though it may seem harsh, it must be said that nowhere is it easier for the dangers of a groundless word-mysticism to spread than in philosophical explication, and these dangers can never be entirely circumvented.

By heeding the directionality in the origin and progress of our interpretation, we can see, with reference to the next item to be interpreted, movedness, how its sense becomes clearer and simpler as the categorial complexity increases.

At first, the sense of the movedness of caring was undetermined. We said merely that caring is actualized, factual life *exists* in the actualization of caring. At first, the categories of relationality (inclination, abolition of distance, and sequestration) changed nothing in this regard, even if they already clarify a manifold of caring relations and thereby make the actualization more concrete.

The articulation of prestruction and reluctance, however, introduced for the first time a sense of movedness into the respective movedness of each relational category viewed in isolation. Thereby the "how" of the movement in question was clarified in a certain respect, a "how" characteristic of *self*-movement, movedness in itself.

Precisely at this point, however, the determinations of movedness acquired with prestruction and reluctance, determinations which, as such, are apparently formal, offered a completely empty structure that seemed insufficient to determine the sense of factual life in its movedness, i.e., insufficient to determine facticity.

Nevertheless, the genuine investigation of prestruction and reluctance in the relational connections of the movements indicated by the respective category of relationality, taking these movements both in themselves and in their interconnections, has taught something else. We saw that the sense of movedness of prestruction and reluctance is itself determined—and, as it were, nourished—relationally and that only an *oblique* interpretive approach hit the mark. There emerged peculiar characters of movedness, ones not yet explicitly determined in their categorial sense, such as abetting, incitement, reassuring support, encouraging arousal, and provoking (releasing) stimulation; then again, rearranging, upholding, assuring enticement; and also pursuit, taking opportunities, being on the lookout for opportunities, being watchful (for the most part, not explicitly); and then mistaking, development of possibilities of mistaking, movedness of the categorial characters of care in themselves, i.e., articulation of the actualization of care.

It is easy to see how, on this basis, the previous formal emptiness of the characterization of prestruction and reluctance in isolated determinations of relationality now becomes *concrete* in terms of movement. With respect to the reluctant-prestructive movedness within the movedness indicated by an isolated category of relationality, the aforementioned characters are determinative of movedness.

With regard to the connections among these characters of movedness, it is important to grasp the further determination, namely, that in them factual life becomes *set in its ways* of living in and caring for its

world. This is a directionality, but it is not that of an orderly progression along a row of stars.

belongs somewhere, and is "seen" and "heard" in one way or another, such that the encountered world, taken as factually relative to care, is a *surrounding world*.

The term "surround" does not express an Objectively ordered nexus of objects ranged in order around another one of the same objective and ontological character. Even where the surrounding world, in its content, comprises, e.g., spatial objects, ones which have a definite, explicit order, even there the sense of "surround" is primarily determined from the character of the world. The Being of the "surround" arises out of the categorial structure of the world (above all, out of its fundamental connection with and in facticity). It is not the reverse; the world is not built up from isolated, objective "surround-relations" of ordered and to-be-ordered objects in relation to another, one which is preeminent among them, like the surrounding world of one's dwelling, in which are ordered the various rooms, and in them the furniture. (Thereby the ontological character of the respective surrounding world is not yet interpreted.)

To "surround" is the categorial determination of the world in which caring life lives. This life, possessing relucence in care, is precisely intent on having something *surrounding itself*, having the world in such a way that this world makes up the surroundings for the activity of life, surroundings we can respond to, or at least listen to, gaze upon, and talk about. The world is such that relucence is factually possible, and that makes the world a surrounding world. (The ontological sense of the "world" as existence, *reality*, is determinable only in connection with the interpretation of facticity.) From here it is understandable why our considerations can characterize even the shared world and one's own world as a surrounding world.

Relucence is thus, in caring itself, an object of pre-building and pre-arranging; i.e., prestruction touches it in terms of movement. Yet all pre-building "exists" in the sense of caring, i.e., constitutes the movedness of factual life, only if it obtains relucence possibilities and matures in the structure and in the sense of worldly encounters. Caring is such that it seeks to have every prestructive movedness be given in a worldly relucence.

Thus in the connection, with regard to movement, between relucence and prestruction, the movedness of life expresses itself in the fact that this movedness is such that factual life cares, in even the most varied ways, to become set in its ways of living in its world. Each of the movements, in itself and in relation to the others, is intent on living factually (historiologically-factually?) this life that is set in its ways as it emerges in its world of care. Seen Objectively-historically, it is intent on "maintaining" this life. In the categorial structure of movedness, as it is exhibited here, the movedness of factual life now has the character of a

special autonomy, an auto-motion, which is precisely its *own* in the fact that life *lives outside of itself*.

The movedness is such that, as a movement in itself, it procures itself for itself. It is the movedness of factual life which makes this very life; indeed, factual life, as it lives in the world, does not itself properly (!) produce the movement. Instead, factual life lives the world as the “in which” and “toward which” and “for which” of life.



## CHAPTER TWO

### **Distance**

tion philosophical. It is a peculiarity of phenomenological interpretation to revert back to itself, in its own actualization, ever again. That is nothing other than an expression of a basic movedness of facticity, and so it demonstrates that the interpretation itself is factual and therefore appropriate to its object.

Phenomenological interpretation, as existentiell, manifests by its very essence a “counter”-movedness. Indeed, it is not clear without further ado that the caring upsurge is a movement of life “against” itself. That claim supposes that life is “also” something else and that this “something else” is indeed present in ruinance, though in the mode of being thrust aside. The indeterminateness of life in a surrounding world is a positive phenomenological character of life; life is encountered in that mode.

This categorial interpretation already stands on the ground of a still-undeveloped presupposition. Yet we can determine something about the (ruinant) “against,” or (formally) the “against-which,” as a genuine factual property of life, only insofar as we take seriously the phenomenological task of encountering the ruinant counter-movedness and the “against-which” in the factual modes of access to their actualization. This encounter is possible only if factual ways of access, i.e., ways of movedness in facticity, have been appropriated interpretively or, in other words, if facticity, with respect to the grasping and the possibility of verifying the aforementioned presupposition, has at least been made sufficiently explicit.<sup>16</sup>

It is the interpretation of ruinance itself that must decide to what extent it can be called a basic categorial determination of facticity.

#### A. Tracing Back and Repeating the Interpretation

The current level of the interpretation allows us to trace the categorial—i.e., expressive—character back through the previous explications of caring. In the first place we can consider how ruinance categorially determines the character of the movedness of reluctance and prestruction, each for itself and in itself and also in relation to the other.

The tracing back of the “effective power” of an interpretation (this also holds already for the above!) is not a merely supplementary and arbitrarily posited verification but, on the contrary, pertains to the proper factual actualization of the interpretation itself. The interpretation is fully appropriated and actualized only when we understand, by tracing back over the course of its own progression, that it itself interpretively in-forms what was “left behind” and incorporates this into the

16. At this point the first part of the “Presupposition” (Appendix I, pp. 119-122) was inserted into the manuscript of the lecture.

highest-attained level of the interpretation. It is an in-forming in the precise sense of bringing it about that something left behind and left aside can come to maturation for the interpretation. This re-forming and in-forming (not a re-interpretation) is nothing other than a back-tracking incorporation of the *interpretata* into the increasing strictness and simplicity of the interpretive nexus or of its object. (Greater simplicity despite—or precisely on account of—an expansion in the Objective number and diversity of the categories.)

Insofar as everything is clarified in factual life, stands in some implicit discourse or other, and “is” in an undelineated and factually ruinant interpretation, there then reside in this life the possibility and the factual necessity (or proof of genuineness) of *formal indication* as the method of approach of the existentiell-categorical interpretation. (Leaving the retracing to the individual.)

Ruinance itself is now to be articulated more precisely in its own sense, such that the peculiar character of collapse can be understood, specifically as a categorial moment of a sense of Being (facticity).

From the previous explication and from the mode of understanding which it requires, it is already clear that caring is not intended as an event or occurrence whose presence at hand would be graspable in a simple act of constitution which would need no further determination in its own horizon since it would be related to a reality of leveled-down experience.

Caring is not a factually occurring *struggle for existence*, understood as elapsing and “taking place” within so-called Objective unities of life. That preconception toward grasping the objectivity of life would never lead to the proper sense of something like “caring” and to its categorial determinations.

It is purely a matter of methodological unclarity at the level of principle if, in various considerations and directions, such determinations arise and pretend to be derived authentically. What is actually in play here is merely the residue of an unobtrusive, natural tendency of interpretation. An indication of this is the fact that the actualization of the interpretation, as well as the various modes of determining and ordering objects, in each case present determinately motivated formations and expressions of an unobtrusive, factual clarification of life. To allow specifically interpretive determinations to go together with a positing of ordered factualities is characteristic of *pragmatism*. (But not of its relativism, which can appear only to a specifically epistemological line of sight.)

Positively, the explication of movedness was already carried out far enough that two categories of movedness, prestruction and reluctance, came to be understood as involving movement themselves. These (objective) relations (of facticity) are another autonomous mode of expressing something we noted earlier with regard to the categorial

determinations, namely, that the categories are self-interpretive among themselves. The interpretive nexus and the one of movedness are factually and properly the same. (Movedness an actualization of clarification; clarifiedness in the nexus of movement.) They are different categorial modes of determining a being whose ontological sense is determined as facticity. The difference in the mode of determination is not accidental. On the contrary, as such, and as the specific nexus of the "different," it expresses precisely and categorially that which alone, according to its ontological sense, admits of being determined in these various ways.

a) Heightened care: apprehension

In caring itself, prestruction therefore affects the movedness of reluctance; i.e., the caring is such that it itself takes the modes of movedness up into living care. This means that what caring aims at in its actualization (in the movedness of this latter and thereby in the full sense and ontological character of caring) is it itself. "It" itself [*"es" selbst*], although not necessarily "as itself" [*"sich" selbst*]. The "it" is supposed to indicate that here, where caring takes itself up into care, this care, taken up into caring, is encountered in a worldly way [*wo das Sorgen sich selbst in die Sorge nimmt, diese ins Sorgen genommene Sorge welthaft begegnet*]. Taking up into care can indeed be carried out explicitly, and then this relation is expressed as follows: the caring takes itself into care *as itself*. Yet it must be noted that this "as itself" is not original but, instead, has passed through the "it," through an encounter with the "it." Caring is by itself contained in care; it is "be-cared" for [*be-sorgt*], itself assumed by caring, ap-prehended by caring.

This caring [*Sorgen*], as apprehended by care [*als Besorgtsein*], can be determined as *apprehension* [*Besorgnis*]. In apprehension the full movedness of caring applies itself, as it were, to itself; i.e., its own movedness is moved by itself. Thus, in apprehension, something occurs in the actualization of the caring that can be determined in a (formally) Objective way as a "heightening" of the movedness of care. We have already, in the preceding, dwelled on such "moments of the heightening" of care, namely, in the discussion of the relations of movedness among the categories of care (abetting, enticement, pursuit, etc.; cf. above, p. 94). For these, as for the movedness of apprehension, the basic categorial sense is fixed in ruinance. Interpretively and methodologically, the focus on the moments of heightening was intended to characterize the specific character of this movedness as one of collapse.

It is easy to see how, in apprehension (where the ways of movedness expressed in the categories of the relationality of caring are now pulled down into collapse by caring itself, whereas inclination, abolition of distance, and sequestration, in their own respective ways, become genuinely

heightened) and in collapse, something that was previously mentioned only in brief and remained uninterpreted, namely, clarification, is affected, and ambiguity is thereby heightened. The result is, for example, that in the sequestration brought to its maturation by apprehension, life (in the semblance of the highest actuality, activity, and apprehension, taken as indications of seriousness) becomes set in its ways of caring for its world and thereby no longer knows itself in itself and before itself. Factual life, as ruinant, covers itself up, so to speak, in apprehension! (The character of *larvance* as collapse.)

The involvement with the world of care is apparently, in apprehension, a seriously adopted task, one which allows no rest, day or night, and to which life has supposedly committed itself in full, and yet actually (for apprehension itself, "still at times") it is a mere letting oneself be pulled along, letting oneself be transported, such that thereby every clarification is renounced in the manner of ruinance and consigned to ruinance itself.

#### b) Chairiological characters

We have already referred more than once to this phenomenon: in the actualization of caring, life occurs, encounters itself, even if for the most part in a worldly way, yet such that, in this worldliness, life appears in its genuineness (in its Being and as a certain sort of object: that it is and what it is). According to everything explicated hitherto, this occurrence should not be thought of as an Objective, factual event, a mere coming onto the scene, but is, instead, a mode of the very actualization of caring. (We are speaking here by way of a formal indication.) Now, every mode of occurrence has, as such, its determinate (factual) chairiological character (*χαιρός* [*chairios*]—time), its determinate relation to time, i.e., to *its* time, and this relation lies in the sense of the nexus of actualization of facticity. The chairiological therefore includes categorial determinations that concern (formal) temporal relations in and for the factual. In the present context, we introduce the chairiological (which, according to our considerations, is incorporated into a genuine sphere of problems, relating, in principle, to facticity) only to show in it the specific ruinance of caring, i.e., of factual life. The question is how, from a chairiological point of view, life as such can and does announce itself (how it occurs) in apprehension.<sup>17</sup>

When factual life is completely apprehensive, then it can factually experience something like torment (agony), affliction, vexation. It would be insufficient, i.e., it would be following a false trail with respect to the interpretive categories, to conceive of these (formal) characters simply as

17. Heidegger inserted here a further portion of the "Presupposition": Appendix I, pp. 122-127.

"feelings." "Feeling" is a psychological category whose categorial structure is confused and certainly not definite enough to signify anything for the current interpretation.

We will leave these characters of the factual movedness of life terminologically indeterminate (a mode of Being and itself an existentially factual expression—the "Being-to-me" [*Mir-Sein*]); cf. horrescence!) until they are interpreted for themselves. Here we need only expose their peculiarity of possessing a special ability to *announce*, although this ability does not mediate or even intend any cognition. They are phenomena of their own (factual) emergence in facticity and serve to determine, from their specific relationality, their factual life (in which they are encountered) in its actualization and according to its ontological sense.

The character of announcing is not to be taken in the sense of an exhibiting or referring that would lead to cognition; i.e., it is not an indication but is instead a mode (in the Being-to-me of the tormenting) of the desire to claim factual life from out of itself. In torment, something announces itself as eating away at life. Therefore torment announces an *occurrence* in facticity (the "eating away," rankling) in which the object of the eating away also comes to the fore: "life itself." This latter appears in a way appropriate to the surrounding world—in a certain sense not as worldly but also precisely not *otherwise*, in terms of categorial content. It appears precisely in this being-announced in facticity as tormenting.

Insofar as this (factual) emergence of such announcing characters stands in a connection of actualization with the occurrence of life in the surrounding world, this life shows itself as *the historiological*. Thereby the emergence itself, on the basis of relations not yet set in relief, is historiological. The historiology of the emergence is thus co-constitutive of every encounter: how something like the tormenting ventured forth for the first time; how something weighs upon a person's soul for the first time as tormenting; how the tormenting withdraws for the first time, as if by itself; how, in historiological succession, in the following "time," it makes new demands; how, at first, factual life defends itself against them; how the emergence itself then establishes itself quite properly in the horizon of historiological expectation; how it occurs "less often," "still at times," "from time to time"; how, finally, factual life has "no more time" for it. "Time" is to be understood here neither as a framework for ordering things, a dimension of order, nor as the (specifically formal) character of the connections among historical events, but as a specific *mode of movedness* in the sense of a character that not only makes movedness possible, releasing it from within, but co-constitutes it as itself moving in an autonomously factual way.

[The chairological—"time." To sit still, be able to wait, i.e., "to give time," in the world and in its history. Factual life *has its time*; "time"

which is entrusted to it, which it can "have" in various ways: to remain in expectation, in safekeeping. "How I have time." Time not a framework; that is a mere construct. Not to possess time but to allow oneself to be possessed by it—that is the historical, the "with time." Distantiated decision on what is important—"history"; *variatio delectat!*) ["Variation is delightful."]

These are the chairological ways in which apprehensive life announces itself and *still* does so. For factual life, for it in its more or less explicit horizon of expectation directed at the aforementioned event, the "less often" or the "only still at times" is, so to speak, not something less but a "more." "Less often" and "still at times" are expressions of an increasing worldly security, an unconcern over such things. These chairological characters express a heightened ruinance, precisely on account of their imperceptibility, which is connected to their proper temporal character and does not vary historically, except to increase more and more.

Factual, ruinant life, "has no time," because its basic movedness, ruinance itself, takes away "time." That is a time which can be taken away, and factually ruinant life, for itself and in itself, does take it away. Ruinance takes time away; i.e., it seeks to abolish the historiological from facticity. The ruinance of factual life possesses this sense of actualization: *abolition of time*. In this peculiar mode the historiological is always still present in life; it is always factually present in all ruinance (the historiological as *constitutivum* of facticity.)<sup>18</sup>

Ruinance takes time away; or, conversely, "to have no time," as a mode of factual life, expresses its ruinance. The various chairological characters are determinate *interpretata* of the heightening of the ruinance, categorical *interpretata* of the character of collapse.

In apprehension, whereby factual caring takes itself into care, ruinant life becomes caught up in itself. Care, understood in terms of its actualization, devotes itself to life more and more and ultimately reposes on it; i.e., factual life desires to bear itself—in its factually ruinant way—and becomes in the end, openly or not, frantic over itself and confused.

#### B. Four Formal-Indicational Characters of Ruinance

With an interpretive gaze directed toward apprehension, and indeed taking it in its full movedness, we can establish, in regard to ruinance, these four formal-indicational characters: 1. the seducing (temptative), 2. the soothing (quietive), 3. the estranging (alienative), 4. the annihilating (negative—in an active, transitive sense).

18. Here followed a further part, but not all, of the "Presupposition": Appendix I, p. 127 ff.

## a) Prohibiting function of the formal indication

These characters are formal-indicational; i.e., they receive their concrete, factual, categorial determinateness from the respective direction of experience and of interpretation. At the same time, they factually "say" nothing with regard to the concrete movedness of factual life but, instead, merely give direction to the regard, insofar as a categorial interpretation of the ontological sense of life resides in the pre-possession. In that case, however, we must already encounter these formal-indicational determinations of ruinance, as a basic movedness of factual life, in the interpretation of the movedness of caring, indeed in such a way that the categories exposed in this interpretive nexus are de-formalized in a determinate respect in relation to the categories now at issue, namely, with respect to a determinate interpretive direction toward the relationality of caring.

The formal indication (on that concept, cf. p. 25 f.) possesses, along with its referential character, a prohibiting (detering, preventing) one at the same time. As the basic sense of the methodological approach of phenomenological interpretation at all levels of actualization, the formal indication functions both (always "at the same time") to guide as well as to deter in various ways. (Concretely, the formal indication is to be clarified partially where it comes into play in each case but more fundamentally in connection with phenomenological destruction as a basic element of the interpretation of the history of the spirit from a phenomenological standpoint.)

Our reference to the preventing character of a formal indication is motivated here by the fact that the aforementioned characters of ruinance could easily be taken as fixed basic properties of a being, and thus, posing as fundamental determinations of the existence of life, they could be used to launch an ontological metaphysics of life—e.g., in Bergson's or Scheler's sense.

That would be a convenient misunderstanding and an idle misuse of the explicated characters of ruinance, already and simply because such an isolated and dogmatic understanding of "life" is cast adrift from the interpretive nexus and from its presuppositions and thereby from the peculiar, characteristic "validity" of the interpretation. The formal indication prevents every drifting off into autonomous, blind, dogmatic attempts to fix the categorial sense, attempts which would be detached from the presupposition of the interpretation, from its preconception, its nexus, and its time, and which would then purport to determine an objectivity in itself, apart from a thorough discussion of its ontological sense.

Accordingly, at this point of the interpretation, besides the demonstrative enumeration of the characters, we can at the same time appropriately do no more than refer formally to their sense-connections among themselves. Thereby indeed it will become clear that their



enumeration—i.e., their sequence—does not follow some arbitrary order but is itself indicative of the object to be interpreted categorially in

*Four Formal-Indicational Characters of Ruinance [143-145]* 107

must exhibit the fundamental significance of the interpretive task with respect to the explication of the sense of the actualization of philosophy.

movedness; in other words, there is here, as a matter of principle, nothing that could possibly receive the collapse, which means that the collapse is purely and simply collapse. This movedness as such cannot come to rest in anything whose objective or ontological character would be different from its own. This "purely and simply" in the determination of the movedness of factually ruinant life, which alone is a possible answer to the question of the direction of the collapse, the "purely and simply" means that the "whereto" of the collapse is not something foreign to it but is itself of the character of factual life and indeed is "*the nothingness of factual life.*"

Not every nothingness is identical with every other one, although we might say in a formal argument that "nothingness" is everywhere and always precisely "nothing" and "nothing" else! Formally, we could indicate the line of interpretation for the respective categorial determination of nothingness as follows: "nothingness" – not – no –, whereby neither does this formal sequence coincide, in every interpretive nexus, with the de-formalized ontological nexus, nor may we grasp the "no," as what founds originally and in principle, in terms of the one of the theoretical attitude.

In the interpretation of the constitution of formal-ontological objectivity, we encounter *formal nothingness*, which, as formal, takes over the possibility and the function of a formal indication and thus harbors the possibility of a formalizing relation (to be encountered by way of a formal indication) with every concrete, de-formalized nothingness. To that extent, it can easily be taken for that which should interpret every such nothingness originally and finally.

The formal nothingness, precisely in its proper objective sense, is, as formal, a "something," which is why a concrete interpretation can say, "This nothingness is something." It has its genuine, objectively motivated sense and cannot be dismissed by the superficial argument that there is a contradiction here: nothingness is precisely not something, but nothing. Such arguments say "nothing" and on that account are extraordinarily well suited to "philosophical discussions."

It is precisely the investigation of such categorial nexuses that brings out the danger of every dialectic, whether one that is clear and critical about its own interpretive origin and interpretive significance (which would actually run counter to its genuine sense) or whether (which is the usual case) the dialectic works mechanically with propositions snatched out of the blue (blind to themselves and not open to discussion) and yet, as far as results are concerned, brings to light an abundance of conclusions.

An enumeration of the meanings of "nothingness" could include the nothingness of uneventful history, the nothingness of failure, the nothingness of futility, the nothingness of hopelessness—and all this in fac-

tical, historiological-historical situations, nexuses, and life-worlds. The nothingness that is "closest" and most easily available for interpretation is the one applicable to being-present-at-hand and being-available. The fact that this sense is the closest, however, does not prove that it is the original one or that its approach as such, simply on the basis of its particular sort of immediacy, is incontestably legitimate.

Analogously, various modes of "no-saying," their motives and tendencies, also become interpretable: the "no" in the assertion expressive of a cognitive attitude that is determinative of things as such; the "no" in the factually ruinant, inexplicit discourse of the self-understanding of factually caring life; the "no" in, e.g., the factually interpretive, and indeed counter-ruinant, tendency toward clarification in philosophical cognition of the categorial movedness of factual life.

In the context of certain objects, the term "nothingness" may be rephrased as "the empty," "emptiness": e.g., in the experiential field of the surrounding world, the environment, whereby what is intended first of all is not explicitly the space of the world and a fortiori not natural scientific, geometrical space. We sometimes say: there is "nothing going on" here or there, "no activity"—there is nothing there. If, instead of "nothing," we were simply to substitute "not anything," then we would gain very little, since where there is nothing, in the aforementioned sense, there might indeed be a rich manifold of objects present at hand. We see thus that "nothingness" must be interpreted in every case on the very basis of the respective sense of Being it negates. Negation is manifold, and on account of this (formal) foundedness of "nothingness" in the sense of Being of the thing negated in the respective case, nothing at all can be determined about the possibly autonomous ontological sense of nothingness.

When we say, speaking specifically within an experiential tendency oriented toward the space of the surrounding world, "There is nothing there," what we are referring to is "the empty" as a possibility that gives place and relationality for the accommodation and ordering of encounterable, placeable objects. The environment is "empty"; it presents itself as "emptiness." The environment itself, which provides a place for something to stand, shows itself as the empty.

Originally, the "nothingness" here in question, the "nothingness" of factual life, does not in the least share the sense of the "empty," since that nothingness is a possibility which precisely does *not* give a place for something to stand, does not offer accommodation and shelter, does not break the fall of the collapse, does not bring it to an end. On the contrary, the nothingness of factual life is something that factually *contributes* to the maturation of the collapse; thus it is an emptiness which is precisely *disastrous* for the collapse itself. The collapse takes form, therefore, in a peculiar way, on the basis of its "whereto," which for its

part comes to maturation in apprehension. We can call this character of collapse "nullification." This term sounds generally and vaguely metaphysical and might mistakenly suggest morbid ideas and philosophical horror stories about "life." But its meaning is to be drawn purely out of the context of the explication: nullification, nihilation—the nothingness of life as brought to maturation in a determinate nihilation, in a clandestine "no-saying," and in an actualization of movedness. Thus the formal definition runs: the nothingness of factual life is life's own proper *non-occurrence of itself in ruinant existence*, a non-occurrence brought to maturation by and for factual life itself, within life and within the surrounding world (facticity).

{No—not—nothingness—as existentialia. This "not" resides in the very structure of facticity. Intentionality—mode of actualization—such movedness of the "not" itself, thus in itself a maturation, and indeed precisely a ruinantly existentiell maturation. Because existence and facticity are posited upon the "not"—privation.}

The more factual life lives in its ruinant mode of caring, the more urgently and yet at the same time less explicitly does it care about the non-occurrence of itself for itself. The "non-occurrence" is not thereby equivalent to its absence at its proper place in an order, such that this place is now empty and the non-existence in it could be observed in Objective cognition. On the contrary, this "non-occurrence" has to do with movement and expresses a mode in which life, within the surrounding world, "still exists." In this way, it is factually "still" there; the "still" is, once again, a characteristic determination of the temporality operative here. Life in the surrounding world still announces itself, even in its potentiality for non-occurrence, indeed in such a way that it does not expressly bring itself to the fore but is nevertheless encountered, precisely as unobtrusive, *along with* the lived world and as such a world. The result is that the world thereby acquires the character of opacity and, despite all its immediacy, remains an enigma, at least in its existence itself and in the way it is encountered.

#### c) Objectivity

The aforementioned potentiality for the non-occurrence of life in the surrounding world, as a mode in which it is still there to be encountered, indeed in a worldly way, is constitutive of the specific *character of resistance* experienced in the objectivity (reality) of the lived world. More particularly, the aforementioned character of life in the surrounding world, that it exists *still*, a character fused into the modes in which the world is encountered, is constitutive of the specific objectivity of that which, at the outset of our interpretation of the objective sense of the lived world, presented itself as *meaningfulness*.

The interpretive pursuit and investigation of the directionality of

ruinance as a moment of its own self-movedness—i.e., as itself contributing to the collapse—leads into a nexus of sense out of which the objectivity and the ontological sense of the world become graspable categorially, in and for factual life.

Methodologically, we acquired a standpoint from which to determine something about the “immediacy” of the givenness of the lived world and indeed to show: 1. that this immediacy is not a beginning and not a paradigm case but is, instead, precisely a maturation in factually ruinant life; 2. that, on the other hand, the immediacy of the given world, formally speaking, is *mediated*, although this mediation is not the mere one of “thinking” over and against a representation; i.e., neither immediacy nor mediation, if taken in an epistemological sense, can determine anything about the objective and ontological sense of the world.

The untrammelled, explosive rushing at and into the world by way of care, the plunging into things, seizing, laying hands on things that appear to be urgent—all this makes the world be experienced, in care, as what is closest, the first to be considered in the series of objects of apprehension. These non-theoretical modes of the relationality of caring, ones that bring to maturation a *direct* possession of the world, exist factually, however, only in the ontological sense of the movedness of ruinance. Consequently, it remains undetermined whether that which can be experienced and given in the mode of such immediacy is thereby grasped in the way *it itself* would claim to be genuine.

For life in the surrounding world and for the interpretation of itself included in its tendency toward grasping, this means we cannot presume, without further discussion, that the immediacy of the world of care, as what is most directly over and against, constitutes the paradigm case of self-givenness. On the other hand, it must be noted, as a matter of principle, that, on account of the occurrence of life in its own facticity (as life directed toward the surrounding world), the possibility of access can be acquired on the basis of the aforementioned modes of movedness of factual life.

As blind as is the adherence to this immediacy, that is how overly facile and therefore unproductive is the schematic counter-attempt to bring this object, life, to its properly genuine givenness without discussing its ontological sense and its sense as an object but basing oneself, instead, on the traces of a particular immediacy, considered in one of its aspects, and then following, in opposition to this immediacy, the path of some invented *dialectical mediations*. What is decisive here is the fact of not adhering to the immediacy but, instead, accepting the maxim that the apparatus of mediation should be allowed to play out, as it were, automatically, so that every stagnation that had set in through reification might be loosened.

It has not at all been determined, however, that life in the surrounding

world, as authentic, does not have its proper immediacy, namely, the one of a quite genuine *questionability*, as was already indicated. Thus, e.g., Hegel, with his sure instincts, battles against an immediacy which is admittedly a transcendental-philosophical one but is specifically meant to be approached and interpreted epistemologically, and so he is driven to say: Therefore we must have mediation. This seems to be radically critical, and it seems to loosen, in principle, all rigidity. Yet it is only the critical rigor of a method that has taken refuge in its own autonomy, that is unbothered by its origins, and that merely has a feel for science. There is nothing here of the specifically philosophical critique, which does not become genuine by attacking some random non-philosophy but by putting itself, insofar it claims to be authentic philosophy, all the more into question and thus by being prepared to take up modes of access to its object which are not simply invented but, instead, do encounter the object concretely and factually.

This now means, however, that our interpretation of the immediacy of encountering the world, namely, that it is an immediacy brought to maturation in the ruinance of caring (in other words, our disruption of the tendency to take this immediacy as the paradigm case of the self-giving of an object), is for its part grounded in the fact that this ruinant maturation itself—i.e., the specific movedness of caring; i.e., this basic aspect of the relationality of life; i.e., this approach to life as the fundamental phenomenon (with the directionalities of the relation to, actualization of, and maturation of the object)—does come to be experienced, specifically in such a way that these concrete experiences serve at the same time to motivate the preconception for a knowledge of principles.

Can we not see, and do we not factually see today, in the immediacy of life in the world, the beginning and end of vital comportment? Does factual life not thereby have precisely its well-rounded closure as well as a vitality which is unsurpassable in its ever newly filled abundance of structures that can be developed and carried out?

From where, however, does such surging life acquire the proof that its immediacy is not in some way derivative? Is that incontestably certain? In other words, does not such immediate life also live in an understanding of itself, even if factual life is only incidentally aware of it? Is not precisely enjoyment, e.g., as well as the lively tendency to enjoyment, an instance of the care of factual life for itself, namely that it wants to and can fulfill itself thereby?

#### d) Questionability

Precisely insofar as it is factual, the factually interpretive dialogue residing within the factual actualization of life is a breach in the coherence of immediate life. Thereby "life" is not a momentarily clarified thing but an objectivity whose temporality is extended factually. The

dialogue carried out by factual life can be a flight from confrontation and can be actualized in the mode of a superior unconcern for strains of questioning and understanding that might hamper enjoyment. Immediate life itself, however, *can* (but does not need to) question the insular and uncontested certainty of its immediacy and can inquire into the possible guarantee of that certainty.

The certainty is questionable by reason of principle, inasmuch as factual life in a surrounding world possesses, as such, a general tendency toward clarification and even demands such clarification. The philosophical interpretation of facticity puts this *questionability* into effect, indeed not in such a way that it pretends to be able to find, from its own resources, an absolute and eternal decision, but simply such that it concretely brings the questionability to maturation and maintains it in concretely available directions. Thereby, however, it precisely keeps alive the actualization of the access to factual life.

The *validity* claimed by philosophical interpretation is then already satisfied, and already in a proper and decisive way—i.e., on the part of and for an acceptance in the understanding—when such factual, immediate life becomes questionable in itself or even when this life in itself refuses every tendency to make itself questionable, as long as the fundamental motives for that can be brought alive in factual dialogue. Wherever these motives are lacking, there is no incentive to question the demonstrability of the proffered philosophical interpretations. The possible incentives and their temporally historiological characters are constitutive of the philosophical problematic and are not merely accidental, such that they would simply need to be cataloged in their vicissitudes.

In this way, the interpretation of the directionality of ruinance leads to the interpretation of the objectivity and of the ontological sense of the world, and only thereby does the nexus of movedness become more precisely determinate as one in which something like a counter-movement possesses its sense of actualization as a movement.

A counter-ruinant movedness is the one of the actualization of philosophical interpretation, and indeed it is actualized in the appropriation of the mode of access to questionability. It is precisely in questioning that factual life attains its genuinely developed self-giveness. Here self-giveness must not be identified with the mode of givenness of the immediacy of the world. And just as little is it equivalent to the mode of givenness corresponding to the specifically theoretical attitude. This latter givenness takes form as fulfilling intuition in the various regions of objects corresponding to the intention to attain cognition and to explicate. Accordingly, this givenness has its own theoretical ways of claiming evidence, justification, and validity. The cognitive ideals and paradigms of givenness to be found in that context must be excluded, inflexibly and as a matter of principle, in the acquisition and development of the actualization

of philosophical knowledge and in the methodological securing of that knowledge.

This exclusion is not accomplished, however, once and for all by a methodological dictate. On the contrary, it is the constant *struggle* of factual, philosophical interpretation *against its own factual ruinance*, a struggle that always accompanies the process of the actualization of philosophizing. This means that maintaining oneself in genuine questioning does not consist in reacting mechanically, as it were, according to an empty maxim that requires nothing but questioning at all times, on every possible occasion, and in any way whatsoever. On the contrary, genuine questioning arises from motives that have been clarified in the respective factual situation and that receive direction from factual life. Likewise, genuine questioning consists in living in the answer itself in a searching way, such that the answering maintains a constant relation to the questioning, i.e., such that the latter remains alive, or, in other words, such that the basic experiences retain a factually historiological vitality in factual life and in its ontological sense.

The ruinant character of the *negative* consists precisely in bringing to maturation the nothingness of factual life as the proper factual possibility of ruinance itself, with the result that this matured possibility, in its very maturation, is reluctant toward the collapse which is approaching it itself. That is an aggravation of the collapse, which occurs in such a way that it is actualized in the collapse itself, in the proper counter-direction of the collapse, and, in passing through the movedness of the collapse, constantly encounters nothingness and thereby takes form in the collapse. (The not-letting-occur becomes effective, as regards movement, in, e.g., the confrontation of factual life with its past. Of this past, only a certain amount can be experienced, and, likewise, only a certain part can motivate expectations.)

This passing through, on the part of the negative, i.e., through the movedness of factual ruinance, indicates that the ruinant characters do not mark in a stationary way, or in the manner of properties, determinate levels and fixed waypoints of a movement proceeding everywhere in the same direction. These characters are not determinate phases and stages that would come to maturation within a univocal series. On the contrary, each of the characters exists factually in the movedness in such a way that each one also moves in the modes of movement of the others.

I will pass over the difficult interpretation of the temptative (the most difficult) and of the other two ruinant characters.

{The temptative—not in a religious sense; for the experience of it to be alive, there is not required a basis in religious experience. To be sure, the temptative, as a character of movedness, first becomes visible through Christianity; visible: experienceable in factual life, able for *me*



to experience it. This means, at the same time: the temptative not something in itself but a *mode* of the concrete—as something rejected, indifferently accepted, taken or grasped in terms of some interest; in one way or another it is present in today's "unchristian" life.)

Here we should still pay heed to the interpretive task that issues from our consideration of ruinance. The first interpretive task has to do with the ontological sense of ruinance itself. What is it that comes to validity in ruinance: in what guise is this factually valid, how is it factually present in ruinance, and how is its existence categorially constitutive of the categorial structure of facticity?

In ruinance, as a basic movedness of caring, what becomes validated is the fact that somehow or other something is constantly lacking in factual life itself and indeed in such a way that at the same time there is also lacking a determination of that which properly is lacking. What comes to validity in ruinance is a state (not to say *the* state), and we call this state "privation"—factually privative life.

The questioning of this state of privation in its ontological sense is a decisive test of our phenomenological (unbiased) interpretation. What shows itself here is a resistance that lives and exists, in its own way, within the very movedness of factual life. It would be easy to circumvent this resistance by arguing formally that to introduce the concept of "state" is to fall into *Objectification*. But does every state have to be conceived, without further ado, in an Objective sense? Above all, has philosophy somehow received a written legacy guaranteeing it the permanent assurance that the objective and ontological sense of its object, to which it is supposed to relate by way of knowledge at the level of principles, possesses in each case the character of ontological purity and serene uniformity?

Or is not the objective and ontological sense of factual life, to which we gain genuine access by living in the actualization of questioning, precisely non-uniform in its categorial structure? Does this sense not, as a matter of principle, reject a thorough and pure functionality in the relationships among its determinations? Thus is this sense not, as such, fractured?

within a theoretical context of grounding. "Sup-posing" is then theoretical positing, formulable in an "if" of the ground; ὑπόθεσις [*hypothesis*, "placing under"] — to posit the ground under, at or as the ground.

2. The "pre-": temporally in the sense of the "beforehand," "in the first place," and also as "in anticipation"; in a series of posings connected among themselves by way of grounding (though not logically); connected in a non-logical series, order, sequence of the actualization and of the maturation of factual life. The "temporal" itself is indeterminate here. "Sup-posing" then has various senses as non-theoretical grasping, position-taking, and the like.

### 3. Philosophical presupposition

The first concept, as isolated, autonomous, and general, does not enter into question here. The second is undetermined; nevertheless, the possible determinations of the "temporal" provide a basis for clarifying, in this way, by means of a formal indication, the sense of philosophical presupposition. In this connection we can determine what is posed and what "posing" might mean.

The field of problems in which these determinations are carried out is the one to which we give the title, "facticity." Facticity: the historical, the historiological; temporal senses, "pre-" (before and after); ontological sense of factual life, thus exhibition of the object of philosophy: knowledge, at the level of principle, of a being in its sense of Being, such that this sense becomes decisive in principle for the ontological character of the actualization of knowledge. The sense of the actualization of knowledge is the "how" of the posing.

Connection between preconception and presupposition: the preconception originates in a pre-sup-posing. "Posited," "posing" — improper expressions; actually not a posing but a historical-historiological pre-existence.

## 1. How "Sciences" Have Their Presupposition<sup>20</sup>

It pertains to the sense of theoretical presuppositions (i.e., those on which the theoretical attitude as such stands, from which it takes its life) that they are precisely not grasped or graspable in the theoretical attitude itself and that this attitude is actualized all the more originally the less it itself in its proper way, i.e., as an attitude, bothers about its presupposition.

It is "presupposed" thereby that the attitude arises concretely out of a genuine presupposition and lives originally on its basis (this is the way in which the attitude genuinely possesses its presupposition). The gen-

20. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

uine possession can become lost; the attitude then becomes actualized as autonomous.

The actualization of scientific research, in its historical conditions, has developed into such autonomous forms. Every new attempt to appropriate its presuppositions is rejected as barren philosophizing—and with good reason, insofar as the sciences realize they would in this way come into a new state. That is a sound instinct. But no one goes beyond this rejection; no one sees that the appropriation of the presupposition must be accomplished in the manner of a revision of the basic experiences, which is a project that cannot be carried out on the basis of “methodological” or “theoretical” reflections on science. To be sure, this is a revision to which, in the end, philosophical research, a research that allows itself, “off and on,” to question what it itself is all about, has to contribute.

The way in which the individual sciences possess, develop, and appropriate their presuppositions is different in each case, and in all of them it is in principle different than in philosophy. Yet, as in the latter case, it is determined in terms of how the factual in facticity, according to its respective sense of facticity, comes to be encountered, appropriated, and “retained.”

## 2. Sense of Movedness in the Phenomenological Interpretation of Philosophizing<sup>21</sup>

Philosophizing is existentiell by way of being counter-ruinant; i.e., it factually appropriates the presupposition ever more radically and indeed in such a way that the presupposition becomes visible—as not able to be abolished (privation). This vision is not mere cognition; on the contrary, it grasps life in the surrounding world as counter-ruinant. The presupposition is included in the sense of the existence of ruinance, in the existence and history of facticity.

On the way in which the formal definition of philosophy indicates the problematic of the specifically philosophical presupposition, cf. p. 45 ff. A basic and decisive preconception with regard to the formation of principles is carried out in the “pre-existence,” back upon it and through it (in—upon—through: facticity!).

The ontological sense of beings, for which the principle is a principle, is to be appropriated by way of understanding. We said earlier (p. 45): “The ‘for which’ requires a proper, factual concretion, a proper appropriation, in which appropriation itself the principle can first be given as fully functioning in the manner appropriate to a principle.” Seen in this way, philosophical knowledge (cf. the formal definition of definition)<sup>22</sup>

21. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

22. P. 16.

is especially appropriate to the *situation*, indeed, such that it precisely presses on toward the appropriation of a situation. The situation itself, however, is a mode of factual life, and the latter lives in its experiences and in its maturations in such a way that these exist in, and have their movedness in, the historical movedness of nexuses of effects (generation). This historical movedness in its own way is factually “present” and encountered—according to it, in each case factual life develops and retains, by itself and for itself, its factual tendencies toward expectations and preconceptions.

The situation in the history of the spirit is not something which simply lies there in the open, and it is a crude illusion to think that we live in it or have grasped it just because we take an interest in the latest poetry, or adopt the most recent sociological theory, or recommend that our friends “read,” because of its pressing importance, the newest and thickest book on religion and Christianity. It is not grasped any better, however, by reporting on what has gone before and by identifying the historical forces that have determined the present times.

The difficulty lies in the acquisition of a factually radical sense of “situation,” with which we might see the temporal-historical condition as such and thereby develop it into an appropriated historiological situation. Insofar as philosophizing is actualized in and back upon this situation, such philosophizing, according to its ontological sense, is then itself within something factual which contains in various respects the pre-existence required for that very actualization.<sup>23</sup>

### 3. The Conditionality of the Interpretation

This consideration of the presupposition is meant to call attention to the *conditionality* of the interpretation; i.e., it is meant to prevent taking the interpretations *dogmatically*, as if they were expounded from some sort of dogmatic tendency.

The rejection of such claims to validity brings us, especially in philosophy, under the rubric of “relativism”—“skepticism.” Such labels are not only apt to *permit* today’s lazy thinking, effete questioning, and flight from questioning, but they even endorse and abet these as moral advancements, and so they still have the effect today of a denunciation or proscription, i.e., a refutation of principle. Yet we must mention that labels such as relativism and skepticism, as well as the opposite, absolutism, are ones that concern knowledge, its possibility and validity, and so they are labels that involve, in the first place, a previous consideration of knowledge and, furthermore, the positing of a determinate ideal of knowledge and truth, as well as an ensuing characterization of

23. Here resumes the main text of the lectures, pp. 99–102.

other determinations with regard to knowledge. The latter and, a fortiori, the former spring from a determinate, basic preconception with regard to knowledge (a determinate, as well as a thoroughly ungentle, traditional position). Knowledge is here understood in a determinate sense as knowledge of the Objective order; this knowledge is then formalized even more. (The law of non-contradiction originates in a quite determinate logic and ontology.)

Insofar as we take the aforementioned labels—relativism, skepticism, absolutism—to refer to philosophical knowledge, we are immediately required to prove that they can be at all relevant to this knowledge. And that in turn requires a decisive determination of philosophical knowledge and of the object of philosophy. Otherwise, it is disgraceful superficiality to traffic in such labels within the context of a knowledge of principles, for then they are more like lawyers' tricks rather than elaborations of a genuine understanding, at the level of principles, of the problems that are so pressing here.

We must then pursue a further consideration at the level of principles: has it been determined, and can it be determined, that philosophy itself, in every field of its knowledge, is supposed to attain (or has already attained) absolutely valid truth? Indeed, that could appear to be so only if we ourselves foist upon philosophy its object, do not at all see its proper and fundamental object, and then attempt to speak of knowledge and even of philosophical knowledge. As long as philosophy cannot provide this certification, as long as we do not childishly close our eyes to the *changes* to which even the strongest philosophical positions are subject (half-measures can always be reconciled to each other, are of admirable duration, and are assured of bi-lateral approval and support), then we have, as a matter of principle, no right to assign philosophy the standard of absolute truth. In other words, there is, as a matter of principle, no justification for characterizing philosophical knowledge in general as skeptical or relativistic. {What is the existentiell meaning of this reference to history?}

{Philosophy takes up in principle, and puts into effect, the rights of the life of encounter and its mode of encountering. Absolute knowledge: is the position taken up against absolute knowledge, and against the "in itself," motivated by the unattainability and changeability of the object? No! 1. Right is on the side of life in its dispositions! 2. Thus basically the ideal possibility of absolute knowledge is but a dream. As historiological knowledge, philosophy not only *can* not, but also *must* not, entertain any such dream.}

We would certainly not be willing to believe seriously that that old chestnut, the law of non-contradiction (according to which, whoever denies absolute truth contradicts himself), determines anything about the possibility of philosophical knowledge, provided we see clearly that

here we have a formal-logical argument which in itself is completely empty of determinations of the sense of the actualization of philosophical knowledge and empty of determinations of the sense of the relation of this knowledge to its object. Furthermore, this formal-logical argument, which draws upon the law of non-contradiction for a normative principle, has its own conditioned origination (as can be fully demonstrated) in a logic of a determinate order.

Therefore insofar as philosophical knowledge lacks such certification, and insofar as absolute truth thus has no claim to be taken as the norm and the goal, while its contraries, relativism and skepticism, cannot be considered valid labels, then the result is simply this, that such determinations completely bypass what they are attempting to characterize, that they do not have the least to say about philosophical knowledge, and that, furthermore, we should be wary of any further use of the idea of absolute truth as a lulling narcotic.

Someone could devise an absolute system of morality, a system of ethical values and value-relations that are valid in themselves, and yet in so doing still be—I do not say: a bad person. That argument is out of place here. But precisely with and through these absolutely valid relations and laws, one could indeed remain blind to objects and relationships which actually appear regularly in living morality, i.e., in facticity as the mode of their possible actualization and existence. Someone might say, “Once,” and mean to exaggerate; man is indeed basically a sorry subject—but, by the same token, that does not refute the philosophers.

In measuring up to the relations of absolute value, it is clear that we seldom or never realize them completely. We modestly acknowledge that we fall short of the ideal. Yet that is basically without importance and is soon forgotten. Why make allowances (and do so even at the level of principle) for such imperfections and difficulties, as if they said something about the determination of the ontological sense of factual life? The main point remains: we are undisturbed in our advocacy of an absolute ethics.

The fact that daily and even hourly we move within and encounter half-truths, lies, and even worse things (indeed at times we seem to encounter nothing else) is well known, too well known to be used as an occasion for proclaiming to our contemporaries a new philosophy. Furthermore, these are matters better left to the preacher, inasmuch as scolding is certainly not part of philosophy.

In view of these imperfections, why have anything to do with this thing called “man,” and why make it a matter of principle to take him into account for philosophizing? With this suspect being there would also be implicated, in the end, his pretended absolutes, i.e., our ability to grasp them, or our ready belief in them. But then philosophy would have lost its proper theme, and a philosophy in love with itself will certainly not expose itself to this predicament.

Prior to every easy calculation of what is valid and Objective for humanity, there stands the reflection on that which we can and do properly pre-possess and on the available ways of actualizing the pre-possession. Furthermore, there is the requirement that we keep ourselves free from all expansive exaggerations, with whose novelty one could possibly master a particular paragraph in Überweg-Heinze<sup>24</sup> but nothing else.

It is not only the use of these particular characterizations of knowledge, such as that of relativism, etc., but, in principle, all reflections on the validity of philosophical knowledge pretending to establish something about philosophy do actually tear philosophical knowledge away from its own tendency toward actualization.

The question in philosophy is not whether its propositions can be shown to have universal validity, or whether the approval of very many or even all people can be exacted, as if these matters determined in the least the sense and sense-intention of a philosophical explication. What is in question is not the Objective demonstrability to the whole world but whether the intended binding force of the interpretation is a *living* one—i.e., whether the actualization of philosophical knowledge is so rigorous in approach, preconception, and method that it can by itself bring to maturation the envitalizing of the genuine binding force of the object and thereby bring about a genuine grasp of the object. This binding force itself has various modes of Being and occurrence, according to the respective factual situation and the circumstances in the history of the spirit. Thus the issue is the possible factual envitalizing of the binding force of philosophical knowledge. In other words, the object is to be seen as that which is encountered within such a binding and as that wherein occurs that for which the binding force exists, that which has come to terms with the binding force.

From here it is visible that the problem of the binding and orientation of philosophical interpretation and knowledge can be developed only in the genuine field of the philosophical problematic itself. At the same time, we come to understand how and to what extent the “sense of Objectivity” of philosophy is determined.

Insofar as we are dealing here with the living appropriation and elaboration of the basic phenomenological stance, it all comes down to this: not to allow the imposition of a traditional opinion and representation of the Objective validity of knowledge, i.e., not to move and argue therein unreflectively and without clarity, but, instead, to let arise the character of the objective appropriateness and objective binding of philosophical research from a disclosedness of the sense of objectivity

24. Heidegger must be alluding to a compendium of the history of philosophy by Friedrich Überweg, edited by Max Heinze: *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin: Mittler, 1880-). —Trans.

that springs out of the actualization of philosophical questioning itself, and out of the objectivity intended therein, i.e., to bring the character of this binding to a leap, a “jumping-out,” and at the same time to take and retain this character in such a way that it does not contradict the actualization of philosophizing but rather contributes to the constitution of a moment of the actualization of the maturation of philosophizing itself.

In all this, however, there resides the basic task of gaining clarity of principle regarding the object of philosophy. But here it is not as if we were choosing among red, green, and yellow objects and had to take up just one. Neither are we to treat with the same dullness that which the past professors of the tradition already treated and then merely freshen it up with more up-to-date trappings. Nor are we to boil down a distillate out of the entire history of philosophy, even throwing eastern thought into the batch. On the contrary, with respect to problems of validity and Objectivity, we must attempt to pay heed to a *way*, one which perhaps, provided we traverse it in its proper actualization, in the end might at least lead to the clarification and the paving of a path that is more appropriate to the object.

#### 4. A Way to the Object of Philosophy

Then what should philosophy deal with; i.e., which objectivity is to be taken up—how so, and why—in the preconception and then grasped and retained as a vital preconception?

Philosophy should deal with

- I. either: human productions (culture and nexuses of life) and the research on them that arises out of curiosity;

or: man himself *in his own mode of Being*—as the origin of his productions.

{Whence, and how, and with what primordial justification can this distinction be made at all? Man himself: does he not exist in the mode of the world (“life”)? Dealings with and apprehension over his own productions and those handed down; “productions” in a broad sense; man: the mode of seizing the world. Interpretation: decisive problematic of the pre-possession.}

If man himself, then

- II. either: man himself in a worldly way, as the object of curiosity, psychological analysis, and historical narrative;

or: man insofar as he is grasped and interrogated with regard to what he is and how he is, with regard to that which constitutes the *sense of his Being*.



{Existence (facticity) *comes to be* in the growing radicality of the interrogation of life; not reflection on the "I" in an egoic, egological sense. This interrogation a concrete interpretation of facticity. The more precise, more radically matured decision originates from a quite different sense of Being and is not an object of reflection: more slow in actualization, more indeterminate.}

If the latter, man as the object to be investigated with regard to the sense of his Being, then

III. either: by way of a portrait that reports on what man could have been and can be and that enumerates these possibilities in a non-committal order, so as to present the most encompassing combination of the possible correlations among the various life-possibilities, even if this portrait itself is unclear about its own presuppositions and its determinations of the sense of Being and never allows itself to become problematic (in principle and as factual-historiological) in its own sense of Being and in the origin of its preconception;

or: in the tendency to appropriate factually the spiritual situation, in the conviction that an object of the character of factual life—and the sense of Being of this object—can be disclosed only in the proper access to it, i.e., in the attempt and venture of a factual approach; in the tendency to pay heed in this situation to the sense of Being of factual life and thereby to bring to life the binding force of the object of philosophy—a tendency to grasping which is concerned to pay heed to what is primordially proper to the sense of Being of factual life and, in the actualization of such appropriating interpretation, to bring alive the particular objectivity in its binding character. Philosophical research is genuine, and is thereby completely factual, only if it itself, in its actualization, develops the specific existence appropriate to the Being of concrete research and questioning.<sup>25</sup>

The actualization of the passage through these levels of decision as regards the determination of the object of philosophy is not an arbitrary and free-floating awareness of possibilities. On the contrary, it is factual understanding in the face of the factual nexuses of caring and concern with regard to one's own life, its past, and its future. It is a preparation and the pre-appropriation of the preconceptions which have to be able to determine the actualization of every step of a philosophizing that would become actualized. It is a consideration which cannot be carried

25. Here the main text of the lecture course resumes once more, pp. 102-104.

through in colorless and indifferent arbitrariness and thus in empty generality; on the contrary, it is to be understood as penetrating to the roots of the proper facticity of *one's own concrete life*. It is a consideration that is not [*sic*] open to further discussion, once it has been understood, but, instead, exists insofar as it takes effect concretely in facticity, although this taking effect cannot be measured by the rise and fall of culture.

It is very easy and pleasant to absolve oneself of the (never superfluous) reflection on the current state of one's resoluteness for philosophical knowledge and to consign such considerations to the beloved sphere of standpoints, of what is not open to discussion. What is dispensed with in this way is the very first *beginning*, i.e., the accounting for one's own past, the historiological past in the history of the spirit. This accounting is not an allocating of truth and falsity, criticizing with an air of superiority (for which, in relation to the Greeks, we have not the least justification), but is the radical intention to understand *how* that which became Greek philosophy was begun and was preconceived and, as such, through its various transformations and concealments, still makes itself felt, whether explicitly or not, in today's spiritual existence. It could be that, in this settlement of accounts, as much as we have progressed in the last two thousand years, we still come up short (and even fail to achieve real understanding), that we are so constituted as to take pains to understand the beginning, and that we have to employ all available living facticities in order to hold onto the beginning by understanding it radically and, while remaining within the beginning, to grasp and retain it, in its own mode, on the basis of our own concrete situation.

Thus we can see that the binding which arises in the grasping of facticity, the binding of the factically actualized binding force, possesses a proper immanent power to repulse every idle arbitrariness and worn-out notion. At the same time, it has its own entangled difficulty in appropriating its relationality—nothing here of the easy appeasement and comfort that come from trust in absolutes and from placing one's cares in the good Lord.

Within our passage through the decisional possibilities, we need to free the first set of alternatives (factual life—world) from the misunderstandings which are urged upon us by the traditional and usual attitudes. To do so, it is necessary to see that the weight of the problematic that relates to the grasping of objectivities, i.e., the mode of questioning, rests on the *ontological sense* of the objectivity at issue. In other words, it is a basic task to acquire a genuine access to this objectivity, which therefore is not to be posited from the outset, through definite ontological concepts, in a characterization that is not discussed and is in principle not open to discussion.

Hence it is important to indicate determinately the intention of the questioning of the ontological sense with respect to this objectivity, factual life, whereby the actualization of the passage through the decisional possibilities receives a more precise direction.

### 5. The Direction of Philosophical Questioning

Therefore we are asking: in philosophy, which objectivity is to be taken up—how so, and why—in the preconception and then grasped and retained as a vital preconception? The “how” was already indicated in *one* respect in the formal-indicational definition of the objectivity in relation to its sense of Being. Thereby it is stated in which preconception stands the objectivity that is grasped in the actualization of the passage through the three sets of alternatives, provided the “or,” rather than the “either,” is chosen in each case.

Through the grasping (and grasping as such-and-such) of the objectivity at issue, the “why” is answered. In other words, the grasping is itself nothing else than the explicit, factually genuine actualization (formed and appropriated in correspondence to the situation within scientific research and knowledge) of a tendency which is not itself set in relief in the object at issue (factual life) but is factually there in various modes of movedness: i.e., the tendency of factual life to “be” in the mode of *bringing-itself-to-possession*.

The way life (to indicate it formally) is something whose “other” is in every case *its* “other,” as its world—that is the way it is itself something that “is” in the mode of possessing the tendency to “be” in the actualization of the possession of “self” (possession of self: formally in the basic modes of appropriation and becoming lost). Here the “self” does not express a specifically and obtrusively “egoic” relational direction of this possessing, nor is it to be understood as a sort of self-observation or reflectedness. On the contrary, the self-possession and Being are determined in each case, according to their own sense, out of the concrete situation, i.e., from the lived life-world. Accordingly, in principle no decision is made in favor of Ego-metaphysics or the like when, in the actualization of the passage through the decisional indications, what is chosen is the objectivity, man, factual life, and life in its historiological-historical concretion.

The question of the sense of Being, specifically the sense of Being of this peculiar objectivity, is one of principle in the philosophical sense. The indication of this is the fact that at issue here is not a decision of alternatives, one that has to do with the question of whether cultural creations, works in the life-world and for the life-world, should be given preference over an interest in personal, individual life. Instead, the problematic in whose service the alternativity stands is precisely the

one of exposing categorially, before all else, the genuine objective and ontological sense of life, in which and for which we should be able to arrive at a possible, factual Being in the various directions of the possible life-worlds.

Yet in order to make at all intelligible today the problematic of the ontological sense of this objectivity (factual life), it is necessary to bring the expression here into a formal indication of very sharp form. From this first access, it is possible to make one's way back step by step in the appropriation.

The question of the ontological sense of factual life or, concretely, of the respective single concrete life can be grasped, by way of a formal indication, as the question of the sense of the "I am." But in the course of setting the fundamental problem, which concerns the sense of Being of factual life, it would be a misunderstanding whose superficiality could hardly be surpassed if the weight of the question were placed—without motivation and simply following the traditional attitude—on the "I" (whereby the sense of the "I" would remain essentially undetermined) rather than on the sense of the "am."

What this questioning intends to understand is precisely that which Ego-metaphysics and egoic idealism of the most varied gradations cannot let appear, on account of their preconception: the question of the sense of the "am"—not of the "I" as source and agent of a determinately grasped problematic of constitution, whether of a transcendental-relative or absolute-idealistic kind. The idea of constitution, specifically the idea of phenomenological constitution, is not necessarily bound to a transcendental questioning in which the positing and unfolding of the world are seen to arise constitutively out of the Ego, i.e., out of and in consciousness. If, in the sense of Kantian epistemology and its modifications in the direction of an absolute idealism, we are permitted this illustration from history, then the issue is precisely that of pursuing the sense of the *sum* ["(I) am"] of the *cogito—sum* ["(I) am thinking—(I) am"] of Descartes in an original problematic and an original acquisition of the interpretive categories.

The *sum* is indeed the first, even for Descartes. Yet, precisely here, a mistake already arises: Descartes does not dwell on the *sum* but already has a preconception of the sense of Being in the mode of mere ascertainability or, more specifically, indubitability. The fact that Descartes could deviate into epistemological questioning—or, rather, could inaugurate this sort of questioning in the history of the spirit—merely expresses the more basic fact that to him the *sum*, its Being and its categorical structure, were in no way problematic. On the contrary, he intends the word *sum* in an indifferent, formally objective, uncritical, and unclarified sense, one that has no genuine relation to the *ego*.

Just as it is not to be decided whether work in the world precedes

personal interest or vice versa, so here, too, the problem is not whether the world is supposed to be clarified on the basis of the Ego, the Object on the basis of the subject, or vice versa. And the same applies to many other ambiguous and empty correlations. Therefore the proposal of the "I am" to orient the categorial interpretation is not a matter of centering the philosophical problematic in the "problem of the I" in any of the possible denominations of that problem. To put it sharply, what is decisive in the peculiar ontological character of the "I am" is the "am," not the "I." This approach is intended as a formal indication, one which points toward a radically different problematic, that of bringing life to show itself.

That none of these other questions are now at issue must already be evident on the basis of what was explicitly indicated earlier, namely: life *exists* precisely as factual; it lives in its world and encounters itself as world; consequently, in the problematic of the sense of objectivity with respect to life, life cannot be understood as one determinate region, cut off from the world as a separate part; and a separation of life from world, whether in the manner of regions or otherwise, if it is not determinately related to the problematic of the sense of Being, lies outside of the present considerations.

We can but insist again and again that the interpretation is to be understood as a phenomenological one, i.e., understood on its own terms and from the directionality of its actualization, without the least admixture of facile schemata and concepts (as formally thematic) and conventional representations.

The formal indication of the "I am," which is the indication that plays the leading role in the problematic of the sense of the Being of life, becomes methodologically effective by being brought into its genuine factual actualization, i.e., by becoming actualized in the demonstrable character of the *questionability* ("restlessness") of factual life as the concretely historiological question, "Am I?" Here the "I" is to be taken purely in the sense of a reference to my concrete factual life in its concrete world, in its historiological circumstances, and possible situation, within the history of the spirit. It is actually appropriate to the objective sense of factually ruinant life if the genuine meaning of "I" and "my" in this factual life and for it remains indefinite, questionable, and labile. Even here, specific levels of actualization and maturation exist, and they are relevant to and participatory in the disclosure of factual objectivity as such.

Above all, in the actualization of this formal-indicational question, there must not come into play, regarding the "I" or the "self," theoretical-conceptual prejudices and predeterminations formed on the basis of just any theory and taken over from just any philosophical position. Methodologically, this indeterminateness of the object, "my life," is not a defect.

On the contrary, it is precisely what guarantees the required freedom of the possibility of an ever new access within the progress of the matura-

At the same time the interpretation of the phenomena of the movedness of life intends to develop in this way the possibility of genuinely clarified basic experiences in which factual life can be encountered *qua* life (and, specifically, within a concrete situation). In these very modes of movedness, the objective sense of what is encountered can be interpreted categorially, and so can—on the basis of this object, in the particular character of the factual actualization of its encounter—the ontological sense of life itself.

Since—in the actualization of the concrete questioning of something as such-and-such—the ontological sense of factual life discloses itself at any time in its facticity, its genuine situation, and its temporality, and since in that way the access to the object of philosophy and thereby this object itself first come to take form, we can therefore see that this object itself (factual life), in a way that is entirely proper to it, exists *in the character of its temporality*. In other words, this genuine temporality of factual life is what is necessarily and primarily involved in the attempt to acquire—for this object (factual life) and its ontological sense—the genuine sense of (formal) permanence and the possibility and mode of binding of a tendency to grasping that is directed to this object.

We thereby encounter an objectivity whose own proper resistance cannot, as a matter of principle, be surpassed or matched in its vehemence and in its retroactive possibilities. This is visible in the fact that what is genuinely relevant to the actualization of this objectivity is not an isolated direction of actualization and an isolated attitude of grasping, i.e., a mode of access that becomes prominent in a determinately isolated way—as if this objectivity were *one* region within a total domain of objects formed by caring, insofar as the latter is primarily what is to be considered and worked out. On the contrary, it is an objectivity of such a kind that it *itself* (in its own way as factual life in facticity, i.e., in the full operative tendency of the available possibilities of being and possessing, which it opens to new questioning) *lets itself run up against itself*. Thereby, in the nexus of the concrete actualization of such “running up against” and of its specifically factual-historiological temporality, the objectivity experiences resistance. In this, there genuinely comes to expression a properly binding character, one which can be drawn only from the experiential nexus itself. This character is already distorted if it is placed together with any other objective or ontological sense in an order of simple comparison. (Proof in the theoretical sense not present—originally.)

On the other hand, however, this objectivity is such that the term “absolute” is unimaginably inappropriate for its proper mode of being grasped and for the determinative validity of the nexuses of grasping in which the objectivity becomes manifest. If we would still take the trouble to clarify even the mere formal sense of the term “absolute,” distinguishing

it from its apparently self-evident use, then it means *released*, detached, autonomous, and thus inviolably *immutable*.

The objectivity in question here, however, precisely in its unsurpass-

*Appendix I [179-180]*

sions concerning life-philosophies—and made into a genuine problem. In other words, the traditional points of view are not only inadequate but keep us suspended in the void. Nevertheless, granting all this, it is



To follow, by way of a formal indication, the movedness of facticity, opening up its structures at each stage, tending toward a decisive basic situation. Thereby the movedness of philosophizing and the phenomenological interpretation get worked out. In such a way that each respective level interprets the other (thereby concrete incorporation into the actualization of the interpretation).

After that, a formal-indicational, methodologically interpretive *counter-movement* back to the factual starting point, specifically such that now the *methodological*, i.e., the element that pertains explicitly to the actualization, comes to be appropriated as something genuine.

Thus arises the *historiological*, which, on the way of the entire preceding interpretation, is brought into occurrence as strongly reflected but also as all the more genuinely autonomous.

From this point, the radical motivation of the existentiell *preconception* is visible, the genuine concrete choice explicit, and the concrete preconception necessary.

### Page 3

#### Connection<sup>31</sup>

Movedness—categories—relationality; a basic sense: ruinance. Character of collapse.

1. Caring itself taken up in care: apprehension.
2. Chairiological character of factual apprehension (as expression, mode of Being of facticity).
3. The four formal characters of ruinance.

Character of collapse as expression of Being, mode of Being; privation. The "being-to-me," the "being-to-someone" of factual life as in principle contributing to the categoriality of this sense of Being. From here in one respect the Being of care, the sense of actualization, is graspable; in a fully categorial way, but only in what is properly factual (the situation).

### Page 4

#### Caring—waiting<sup>32</sup>

Caring—waiting; the "not." Facticity.

In the explicit resumption of the starting point for the interpretive delineation of caring as relational, to investigate explicitly the sense of actualization: the mode of actualization in a waiting upon something;

31. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript. It refers to the "Introduction," p. 99 ff.

32. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

itself in caring as relational: the waiting upon something; “constantly” in a “waiting upon” — explicitly or not.

comfortably into the new kingdom. Existentially it becomes more difficult: because ruinance is perceived. That fact is visible only in the actualization of an originally different “knowledge of principles.”

2. All this is not so in an arbitrary way and as a mere direction and with regard to the whole of culture, but in each case concretely, in a situation. With the maturation of the other understanding, at the same time an eradication of the mistake of taking and treating even this understanding in terms of worldly curiosity. “Eradication”? Facticity?

Page 7

The genuine beginning

No compromising in philosophy. One thing certain: not toward an end; thus to begin, *to begin genuinely*, to proceed toward the beginning, provided the beginning must first be sought, i.e., provided the *access* to it has been lost.

Radical endeavor with regard to the possibility of access, then the genuine beginning will place itself before us. Concern over anything else otiose. Beginning has its “time.” To begin on behalf of another time is senseless. The genuine beginning in its own time makes possible a genuinely reflective thought. If what is cared about is what has been lost, then the latter is present with the endeavor itself (in an access); every such endeavor brings to maturation a becoming lost.

Page 8

Way of interpretation<sup>35</sup>

Interpretation of facticity; acquisition of the pre-possession: not life, not world, but Being, existence. To be worked out destructively. The acquisition of the pre-possession interpretively, namely: circumstances—to articulate the contours of the circumstances from the very outset, in and as factually determined circumstances, i.e., what they lack in relation to facticity, what they conceal. To make visible the circumstances as *in this way* lacking, concealing, declining.

University: to develop the circumstances into a *situation*: circumstances for and as a mode of possible grasping. Which mode? That of “philosophical” life, i.e., of the existence of a being. Formative of Being: research, the full, factual, ontological character of research. (“Theory of science” of the old style not even to be mentioned!)

Existence: to attend lectures, do exercises, have an interest in education; what Being thereby, which possibilities and failures?

35. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

No grand reformatory plans, claims, loud demands, prior to actually “being there,” “having been there”—accomplishments! Not to raise empty demands of radicality and genuineness *prior* to “nothingness.”

Page 9

Introduction to phenomenological research<sup>36</sup>

[To contain indirectly: prototype, not a professorial controversy!]  
Not an individual discipline of philosophy, not a special self-contained philosophy, but to see research in a fundamentally different way, on the basis of facticity.

Sense of the Being of the sciences—*phenomenological hermeneutics*; concretely in each case, which always means, however, in the field of motivation and lines of intention of phenomenological hermeneutics. This latter, as genuine research, as radical, has a distinctive structure. Not an application of philosophy, taking cognizance of philosophical tenets; instead, such research as radical, so that its way of understanding, for the university, in each case makes itself ready in the chosen concrete task, i.e., prepares this choice, makes it lucid; not empty possibilities of grasping, but, on the contrary, as ontologically appropriate.

People move in the “externalities” of philosophy, in its “concepts” (cf. Introduction: concept of phenomenology), and extract from them philosophical problems, instead of proceeding from the decisive issues and investigating them, unconcerned with a system or with possible results. People give a hearing to unverifiable and therefore suspect claims, currently circulating demands. The perversity extends so far that such empty mental labor is extolled as a sign of the priority and superiority of philosophy over and against the sciences, a sign of the radicality of philosophy. Thus decline is announced as an excellence and is turned into a basic task, one that cannot even be surpassed.

*Circumstances* thus: many opinions and trends, demands, directions—and yet no serious question, i.e., no objective field; we do not “exist” in such an ambience.

Factions, cliques, circles, societies—what do they not stir up; misplaced seriousness!—have provoked a determinate circumscription of the interpretation of life. Which one? Aesthetically—relieved of responsibility. What does that mean? Regard and consideration diverted from the Being of life: unwillingness to take it up. Surrogates, attendants, posing as superiors; the meretricious appeal of the now uninhibited demands: interiority—“psychic realm”—psychic technology—non-science—control—support, etc.

36. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

The relevant theory is already in place: solidarity, sociology, cultural economics; mankind is invoked without men, history without historiography, life without what is proper to it, as a mode of Being. How science and anti-scientificity appear herein. The remedies sought from these circumstances: extrinsic discussion!

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Initiation into phenomenological research<sup>37</sup>

Maturation of the concrete access to the object: that is already a genuine way of dealing with the object, a mode of apprehensiveness that questions. *Genuine* dealing with the object! "Genuineness"—drawn from the being. Decision over the genuineness of the ontological character of the access, categories. Indication of the being in the proximity of the dealings. The proximal: life. Indication of an ontological character: life as Being. Genuineness of the dealings: Being! Mode of Being!

Life (especially restricted: subjectivistic! "Ego," self) is unfamiliar or too well known; life-philosophy, trivial! Must be both! The object is consumed in "proximity" and decline! Not genuine; not as "Being" and the questionability of Being, as worthy of the question of the Being.

Why "*life*"? Taken extrinsically, we have here a mere allegation. In the sense of the task, however, a directive: to investigate what is meant thereby, "what it is." Must be thus: the object would not be the one it is within philosophizing, if it were genuinely known. But is not so unknown that it is inaccessible in the natural attitude and precisely in this attitude, as if there would be necessary, in order to possess the object, artificially concocted methodological gyrations of constructive thinking! As if the object of philosophy were the *private property* of philosophy. Quite to the contrary.

Research—a questioning search in and as the maturation of a factual life and nexus of life. "Questioning" is: asking "further," asking "back," asking "by way of repetition"; it is to become more question-worthy *in the questioning!* Questioning is fore-running, is in the "answering"; is genuinely determined on the basis of its object, i.e., from the character of the Being of the object.

Circumstances (inter al.): to draw out the existentiell factual movedness! Especially in science!! Existence!

The circumstances: sentimentality—tearfulness as a reaction against science (moreover, apparent rationalism: "science"! ). Interpreted, discussed in professional meetings; esteemed as metaphysical, religious "life," psychic needs!

37. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

1. Cowardice; cowardice for it within a misunderstanding, i.e., within a lack of understanding altogether.

2. Delivered over to every cheap temptation; docility.

3. Convenience; compendia, surveys, extracts, syntheses, translations, anthologies.

Apparent abundance—and everything at second- or thirdhand in the most unverified interpretations; everything swallowed whole.

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Phenomenological research, “university-philosophy,” and “doctrine of worldviews”<sup>38</sup>

To whom the text is addressed, and how it can be criticized decisively.

This text concerns phenomenology alone and is a meditation on its task; thus it concerns only that university in which something of the kind is seriously underway. About the other universities and their philosophy I have no judgment, since I have never studied at any other university but this one.

The text is addressed only to those philosophers and researchers who are convinced that it is of prime importance in philosophy to see to it that one’s own house is in order before traveling around the world. It concerns those who are, in the genuine sense, pre-Socratics, those who seriously want to come up to Socrates, who take a school of “wisdom” to be something for which there is neither a Socratic nor a “geometrical” definition.<sup>39</sup>

*Preface.* The preface would serve as a direct preparation for a possible and indeed decisive *critique*. The preface therefore must stress, in a positive way, concrete research. The text will be expressed as a “program.” The decisive substantiation will thus be lacking, as long as such research is not at hand. It is at hand: Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas*. These books are often quoted and emulated, but they are not understood. Otherwise, people would stop quoting and would genuinely imitate them—by carrying on the actual research opened up therein. People nowadays are very far from the level and title, “phenomenology.” And the degeneracy of the litterateurs, which is greater in philosophy than anywhere else (in literature and in the history of art, this is self-evident today), and which adheres to everything, should be met merely with silence, even at the risk of seeming to consent to the notorious view that no judgments are possible.

Should concrete results be demanded of the one who is submitting

38. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

39. Cf. Heinrich Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition* [*On the Theory of Definition*] (1888; 2nd. ed., 1915).

this “program,” then his answer is first and foremost the plea to let lie the remarks contained in this installment until the genuine investigations “arrive.” Anyone who is willing to wait so long and to defer the discussion, yet without personally entering into the issues, has not understood what is properly at stake. For, with regard to the “what is at issue,” I must step back and explain that as a matter of principle, even if I had been given the greatest capacity for research, I could not carry out *for someone else* the disclosure of “what is at issue.” Anyone who defers a public discussion is doing well, since too much is already being written as it is. Yet if someone does defer this on account of being uncommitted either pro or con, then he does not at all know what he wants or what he is supposed to be doing here on God’s good earth.

Ultimately it will become clear that this work does not at all offer a “program” but merely points to principles and refers to the direction, at the end of which are attached the threads that have been guiding our “path.” Whoever actually “possesses” the rigor, i.e., whoever has understood and has personally appropriated this understanding, such a person is already “more than half-way there.” (Assuming we have time here for division and calculation.) *δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.* [“For it is apparent that the beginning is more than half of the whole, and in it itself many of the things that are to be investigated become manifest.”] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, A 7, 1098b6 ff.

Whoever is blind to principles and insensitive to the radical motivation—at the level of principle and accessible in facticity—of human existence, such a person should be left undisturbed as he strolls about in his relations with the world, the soul, and God.

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Disputation

Those who are aware of the main defect here and who justifiably maintain that this consideration of principles, precisely in view of its own intention, should not show itself publicly to others while the concrete results are not yet available—such ones are requested not to take these matters seriously until the research is complete.

It might be much better for these people, however, if they do not simply wait for *my* possibly forthcoming efforts but, instead, bring their own concrete investigations to bear on what has been said. Their own investigations will also be more familiar to them, and I myself will concede to each one the authorship and the discovery of the self-evident truths he submits. That is a better way of filling the time while waiting for the appearance of my work, provided anyone finds it important to wait for that, which I do not believe.

I am certainly willing to participate in materially productive disputes. It would be better for people to ignore this book than to talk and write about it in the usual vacuous way that has been rampant for so long. The last person to have written scientific-philosophical reviews of a very high rank was, I believe, Hegel.<sup>40</sup> Where is the possibility and the medium? Let us call these things by name: literature; and where there is indeed serious work, each author puts on his own little circus, admitting others simply as spectators who can do no more than look on from the outside.

Phenomenological research—the positive is decisive; also to be put forth in that way. Defend against what is improper in phenomenology: naive views, the reform of philosophy, the minute analysis of concepts (from the outside). Improper in phenomenology: idle talk about religion and worldviews, which drags things in out of the blue and degrades phenomenology practically to the opposite of that which it genuinely is and that whereby it is—*knowledge!*

Against wrongheaded and semi-scientific philosophy, Rickert and the like. Against pretended concrete research in philosophy (Jaspers). Against the disfiguration of university-philosophy (the little ones, Fichte and Hegel [*die kleinen Fichte und Hegel*]). To take *Ideas* seriously! For the first time. Positive phenomenology and research in the human sciences (phenomenological philosophy and the sciences). *Positive problematic!*

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For philosophy to say what is new

It cannot be the aim of philosophy to say what is new, even if, and precisely if, it understands itself as radical research. Philosophy is the appropriation and understanding of what is old (the historiological) in its proper sense; philosophy is nothing else. Yet this does not mean that the best thing would be the most modernized renewal of a truly old philosophy—on the contrary, that would precisely amount to the desire to say what is “new.”

The situation is all the more difficult today, now that everyone says everything, now that philosophy is so shrewd, so deep, and so comprehensive that everyone can take comfort and be assured of his own superiority in having already said this or that, which can be found in some book or other. As if it were a real accomplishment just to say something; especially today when anyone with a little cleverness and a capacity to speak and write, along with a convenient medium for the propagation and digestion of the newest in literature, can publish anything and even have it taken seriously! In such a time—or at any time

40. Cf. *Werke I* (Berlin, 1832).



whatsoever—can it really be someone’s ambition to have already said something?

If someone, while “reading,” should acquire the “impression” that this book was not dashed off yesterday evening on the basis of the “relevant” background literature and the circulating gossip, and if he should thereby direct his comportment toward real understanding, then the main purpose will be achieved; anything further is beyond my power.

The guidelines<sup>41</sup> are not a fixed framework; precisely not a framework but something much more decisive, out of which the problematic is first actualized in its proper form and is so “ever anew”—on the contrary, guidelines of *maturation*, the mode of actualization, the mode of existence, because this threatens to become lost and because it is not a personal, irrelevant moment of life, having nothing to do with science and research—instead, it is that which philosophy has to bring to maturation, precisely as concrete (and every science is genuine only insofar as it is capable of this), which means that the problematic of philosophy is such that this spring wells up, i.e., maintains itself, and is maintained, in the living state of constantly welling up, and the decline is forced back!

To assist science from the outside. What is proper to man (intentionality) is renounced; the way to faith is much longer than is supposed by modern apostles and those converted out of weakness.

All the talk about intentionality can conceal the lack of direction toward the Object. But even where, instead of talking, there is actual work based on intuition, it is still not more certain that a correct direction is present. Mere making “is” factually no more of an accomplishment than is “talking”!

Problem of facticity—most radical phenomenology, which *begins* “from below” in the genuine sense. To “move” radically, in oneself; doings in the world, as well as genuine accomplishments there, come “from oneself,” *from* the “self.”

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Questionability<sup>42</sup>

The “questionable”—questionableness, as content of wonder—of surprised curiosity. *Two basic phenomenological compartments*; one the genuine, the other a misunderstanding, insofar as philosophy is at issue and not some other aspirations. The questionable—questionableness (of “anxiety”) of historiological expectation, undelineated and radically matured; and of the empty “whence and whither” of forsakenness. This latter can be brought to maturation only in a destructive way!

41. See p. 53.

42. Heading in Heidegger’s manuscript.

Flight in the face of that is "curiosity." This type of questioning, a questioning and an interrogating of that which is not properly "questionable," is but the ruinant expression of "inner" helplessness.

In questioning, a concern with determinations, with making determinate and salient. The comportment of not-questioning; unscientificity. In pre-questioning, in the sense of the fulfillment and the capacity to be fulfilled of the latter, what is at issue is the interrogation of the possibility of the most radical determination.

Basic decision and basic task: whether to question (the "what" and the Being of life) and where to achieve clarity! Atheism as a matter of principle; disputation as a matter of principle; precisely because Being is recognized as "Objective."

Devoted trust—and the pledge of the ultimate questionableness.

Page 15

Skepticism<sup>43</sup>

That there is insight, that I can have cognizance, is to be conceded. The skeptic is the genuine absolutist; he takes formal lawfulness in a radically serious way; i.e., he does not play with it and make out of it a beautiful and convenient world.

Why does Lotze speak about "human thinking"? Skepticism can make sense precisely because there are formal laws! Skepticism is precisely a matter of knowledge! and, ultimately, of the knowledge of what is decisive. And what is decisive? The acquisition and appropriation of the genuine pre-possession and the actualization of the genuine pre-conception. Is it guaranteed on the basis of the validity of a formal, objective relation that man has even the mere possibility of access to a region of knowledge? In what could a trust in this possibility be grounded? If it is not trust based on revelation, then what?

To deny (or, conversely, to refute this denial formally, in isolated cases) formal lawfulness (empty, uncommitted pre-possession) is just as senseless as desiring to bypass the problem of the pre-possession. Which idea of absolute, absolutely valid knowledge? Drawn from where? Where and how to acquire, for every region of knowledge, the genuine knowledge and the genuine claim to knowledge? Does this make any sense at all? Is what is decisive here merely the wager?

"Skepticism": ambiguous! Formal thinking, empirical thinking, scientific thinking, philosophical thinking; corresponding, fundamental "pre-possession." Which opponent is a serious one? In relation to which opponent does disputation make sense? In relation to which other one (and why) does it not make sense?

43. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

## Page 16

On the introduction<sup>44</sup>

Not theoretical skepsis within the theoretical, as skeptical assertion regarding theory (indolent and effete skepsis, empty skepsis, which never actually begins but only talks; genuine expression for this skepsis: mere, empty gazing. Not suitable for genuine questioning!); on the contrary, precisely a proper stance within questioning itself, in the actualization of questionability.

Questionability is not religious, although it alone might lead to a situation of religious decision. My comportment in philosophizing is not religious, even if as a philosopher I can also be a religious person. "The art resides precisely in that": to philosophize and, in so doing, to be genuinely religious; i.e., to take up factually one's worldly, historiological-historical task in philosophy, in action and in a concrete word of action, though not in religious ideology and fantasy.

Philosophy, in its radical, self-posing questionability, must be *a-theistic* as a matter of principle. Precisely on account of its basic intention, philosophy must not presume to possess or determine God. The more radical philosophy is, the more determinately is it on a path away from God; yet, precisely in the radical actualization of the "away," it has its own difficult proximity to God. For the rest, philosophy must not overly speculate because of that but has, instead, its own task to fulfill.

The pure actualization of science, as factual actualization, is itself precisely the task of the man of science. In and for this task, the entire man is appointed, specifically such that, in the living actualization, the man who has prepared himself for it must step back and renounce it; the specific factual "asceticism" of scientific life.

The difficulty of mathematical life, on account of the ease of the actualization; difficulty of the easy loss of life, therefore of the easy taking of a life. A historiological convenience from the other side: there is indeed human life!

## Page 17

Clarification and facticity<sup>45</sup>

Ebbinghaus, *Grundlagen der Hegelschen Philosophie* [*Fundamentals of Hegel's Philosophy*] (Printer's proof).<sup>46</sup>

What can be meant by "critique of theoretical consciousness" (Ebbinghaus, p. 1f.)? "Theoretical consciousness" itself? What does he mean

44. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

45. Heading in Heidegger's manuscript.

46. Habilitation thesis, Freiburg, 1921. (Never actually published. —Eds.)

by “the inner lawfulness, independent of scientific theory, of ethical-religious life” (p. 3)? “Concepts of ethical lived experience” — “concepts of theoretical Objects” (p. 8) to be split apart? Is anything gained thereby? They are both isolations of “powers,” capacities, attitudes, acts, which should not be made objective in this way. Instead, objectivity itself must be made visible in its categorial structure and at the level of principle.

Thus philosophy is precisely a matter of the most radical clarification — philosophical, categorial-untheoretical opening. Thus there indeed remains a juxtaposition. The understanding is thrown outward, without grasping, on the basis of its full facticity and in its sense of Being and sense of maturation, the “how” and the “why”; thus without its factual rehabilitation!

On p. 19 he simply assumes a new problematization. The questioning of reification, or of its avoidance, “is” indeed still basically epistemological; i.e., what is missing is the decisive motivation: *why* not reify, *why otherwise* and *to what end*? Simply in order to study consciousness — as domain, system? Or to make factually, existentially transparent the problematic of existence?

Page 28: philosophy *itself* is, as such, atheistic, if it understands itself radically; cf. concept of life.

## EDITORS' AFTERWORD

This book is the text of a previously unpublished lecture course Martin Heidegger offered in the winter semester 1921–22 at the University of Freiburg. The course met for two hours each week and was conducted by Heidegger in the capacity of an unsalaried lecturer [*Privatdozent*]. The course bore the same double title which is also to be found in Heidegger's manuscript: "Phenomenological Interpretations. Initiation into Phenomenological Research." The university's catalog of courses listed it simply as "Phenomenological Interpretations (Aristotle)."

The text is based on a photocopy of Heidegger's manuscript and on a typed transcription prepared by Hartmut Tietjen. The editors were able to correct some errors in Tietjen's deciphering of the manuscript and fill in a few lacunae. Yet that should in no way detract from the admiration due Tietjen for his superlative work on Heidegger's very difficult handwriting.

The manuscript includes, first, the text of the lectures themselves. Underneath the double title already mentioned, the original longhand copy bears the designation "Introduction," and it is as such that Heidegger subsequently referred to this work. Included, second, is a sheaf Heidegger entitled "Presupposition" and, third, a file of unnumbered loose pages. These loose pages show that Heidegger had tried to develop the lectures into a book. Unfortunately, it cannot be decided with certainty which of these pages were written prior to the completion of the course and which afterwards.

The manuscript of the lectures, the "Introduction," consists of forty-three quarto pages, oriented widthwise. The main text is on the left, and the right side is reserved for supplements, mostly written in columns and presumably composed, in part at least, some time after the lectures themselves.

At the beginning of each marginal supplement, there is often—though not always—a mark referring over to a corresponding one in the main text. The marks usually indicate the place where the supplement is to be inserted. At times they refer instead to a single word in the main text and provide a clarification of that particular term.

Some of these marginalia are very sketchy. They include objections Heidegger does not follow up here, suggestions for the eventual development of the train of thought, and references to later passages. They may also employ terms that had not yet been introduced into the main text. The marginalia were no doubt composed as afterthoughts, and they are occasionally almost illegible. Heidegger wrote a few of them in pencil. A small number of brief marginal remarks are in Gabelsberger shorthand and could not be deciphered by the transcriber or by the editors. In many

cases, the marginalia are simply strings of keywords and could not be expanded into complete sentences. Marginalia of this kind were left unaltered and were inserted into the text within braces: { }. The introduction of parentheses and other punctuation marks within a sentence is the work of the editors; Heidegger, almost exclusively, uses short dashes.

The sheaf entitled "Presupposition" consists of twelve quarto pages, oriented lengthwise. Each page is numbered by Heidegger, and the writing is only on the obverse. It is a unitary text and refers back to p. 99 ff. of the "Introduction." From a transcription prepared by the editor W. B., it transpired that Heidegger did not insert at that place the whole sheaf but only a part of it. Further portions were incorporated into the main text at subsequent passages. (The precise details are provided in the footnotes.) The transcription by W. B. is not a gloss and does not otherwise serve to improve the text.

Now is perhaps the most favorable time to provide the "Recapitulation" Heidegger inserted at one place in the "Presupposition":

On the occasion of a methodological remark concerning the conditionality of every interpretation, a reflection on the "Presupposition" was incorporated. Although it would indeed disturb the strict coherence, and although it was anticipated by the subsequent deliberations, I consider it to be of fundamental importance in this context. It underwent a more rigorous treatment in later chapters.

The editors provided all the articulations of the text, the corresponding table of contents, and all the headings, except those otherwise indicated in footnotes.

Not everything mentioned in the table of contents appears as a heading in the text. Since it is more detailed, the table of contents can, in accord with Heidegger's wishes, substitute for an index, and yet the flow of thought will not be disturbed for the reader on account of overly many headings in the text.

Every possible effort was made to avoid the danger that the headings supplied by the editors might interpret Heidegger's text prior to the reader's actual encounter with it.

Finally, it was the editors' responsibility to decide what should be accentuated and placed in italics. The underlinings in Heidegger's manuscript were meant to serve only for oral delivery. Heidegger directed that they should be disregarded when preparing the text for publication.

Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns

## GLOSSARIES



## English-German Glossary

- to abet: *entgegenkommen*  
 abolition of distance: *die Abstandstilgung*  
 access: *der Zugang*  
 actualization: *der Vollzug*  
 aggravation (of ruinance): *die Steigerung*  
 apprehension: *die Besorgnis*  
 approach: *der Ansatz*  
 appropriation: *die Aneignung*  
 Being-to-me: *das Mir-Sein*  
 care: *die Sorge*  
 carefreeness: *die Sorglosigkeit*  
 caring: *das Sorgen*  
 chairological: *kairologisch* [cf. *καιρός*, "the proper time"]  
 circuitousness: *die Umwegigkeit*  
 collapse: *der Sturz*  
 comportment: *das Verhalten*  
 decline: *der Abfall*  
 destruction: *die Destruktion*  
 diffusion: *die Diffusion*  
 disguising: *die Maskierung*  
 dispersion: *die Zerstreuung*  
 distance: *der Abstand*  
 easy: *leicht*  
     making things easy: *die Erleichterung*  
 Ego: *Ich*  
 elliptical: *elliptisch*  
 to encounter: *begegnen*  
 envitalizing: *die Verlebendigung*  
 existence: *das Dasein*  
 existential: *existenzial*  
 existentiell: *existenziell*  
 factual: *faktisch*  
 factual life: *das faktische Leben*  
 facticity: *die Faktizität*  
 formal indication: *die formale Anzeige*  
 Greekanizing: *die Gräzisierung*  
 haziness: *die Diesigkeit*  
 heightening (of care): *die Steigerung*  
 historiology: *die Historie*  
 history: *die Geschichte*  
 horrescence: *die Horrescenz* [cf. Latin *horresco*, "shudder"]

Zanotowano minusy 126, 129, 121,2,4,5 149,116,117,151,2