

THE EMPIRE AND THE FUTURE

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THE EMPIRE AND THE FUTURE

A SERIES OF IMPERIAL STUDIES LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KING'S COLLEGE

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PREFATORY NOTE

In pursuance of the aims of the Imperial Studies Committee of the University of London and the Royal Colonial Institute for enlightenment of public opinion on Imperial problems, the course of lectures on "The Empire and the Future" was planned and the lectures delivered before overflowing audiences in the Great Hall of King's College in the Autumn Term of 1915. The chair was taken at the first lecture of the course by Mr. Steel-Maitland, and Dr. Sadler devoted himself to a setting forth of the important work to be done by the Universities by means of public lectures such as these. Circumstances have changed so rapidly in the educational world that what needed saying in October 1915 has to some extent ceased to be apposite to the conditions of August 1916, and in place of the lecture he gave last autumn Dr. Sadler has therefore contributed to our volume a specially written article. The remaining lectures are printed almost in the form in which they were delivered under the chairmanship of Lord Bryce, Lord Milner, Lord Selborne, the late Earl St. Aldwyn, and Lord Sumner respectively.

ARTHUR PERCIVAL NEWTON.

University of London, King's College,
August 1916.

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INTRODUCTION

THE War is so much with us late and soon that it may seem an inopportune moment for the publication of a series of studies on Imperial subjects. Past lack of foresight of the varied problems that would arise in war has resulted in present improvisation alike of measures and of the staff to devise and administer them. Concentration, therefore, on the needs of the War, though late, is all the more important, and wisdom dictates that everything else should be put off till the morrow if it need not absolutely be done to-day. But the Imperial problem, or to call it by its better name, the problem of the British Commonwealth, is like that of the War itself, at once in its vital character, its complex nature, and in the need for early prevision. How great are the complexities can be gathered from the succeeding pages: territories far-flung throughout the world; races not only of different European stocks but of different colours, and those races themselves in diverse phases of rapid transition. At the same time, the development of the whole question has been so quickened by the circumstances of the War that the country and its rulers may at any moment be faced with the need for taking final decisions or, still more difficult, for action on seemingly small matters that may yet lead to decisive results. The problem, therefore, and the need for careful study are alike urgent. Not

only so, but in this, as in other respects, old prejudices have been molten in the crucible of war, and men's minds are plastic. The greater the need then that the new mould be rightly designed.

Of the whole nexus of questions discussed in the pages of this book, one of the first that suggests itself is summed up in the sentence—" Can a Democracy govern an Empire ? " The phrase itself, with its classical allusions, sounds artificial. As Sir Charles Lucas points out, the whole problem is changed by the existence of a representative system and of a permanent civil service, necessitated by the complexities of modern life. Even the introduction of the initiative would not bring back legislation like that in the market-place at Athens. But it is important, even so, to note the merits and limitations of rule by a Democracy as contrasted with that of an Autocracy like Germany. From individual blunders it will often be saved by its civil service. Fundamental movements are less likely to cause violent trouble, since it is its own safety-valve. It is in policies and actions intermediate between these two that the danger consists. Up till now the advantage of an Autocracy like the German has been a clear perception of the middle distance. Witness her preparation for the present War. If, however, the British Democracy surmounts the present peril, its problems for the next decade will be domestic. Can it rule itself wisely during a difficult period of democratic evolution ? Can it, at the same time, order matters aright with the sister British Democracies ? Can it still successfully administer a dependent Empire ? Let the motto be " Education, education, and always education," and the answer " Yes " should be given with increasing certainty.

The response given by the self-governing Dominions in

the present War has been the astonishment, alike of Germany, of the Allies, and of Great Britain herself. But what, in truth, has been still more astonishing has been the self-restraint shown in the matter of open criticism. A Democracy, if liable itself to error, is not, therefore, a more lenient critic of the faults of others, yet the same restraint has, with few exceptions, been shown by Canada, by South Africa, by Australia, and New Zealand. It is most amazing, perhaps, in the case of the last two, when the gallantry and the losses in Gallipoli are remembered, and when Dominions possess Prime Ministers of the natural courage, vigour, and outspokenness, say, of Mr. Hughes. But as clear as the self-repression are the indications that a repetition of the present system of administration will not be tolerated. The future, in other words, cannot be as the past, and it is no answer to say—"Let well alone." At the same time, there is little in the outlook to support the pessimists. For years past it has been recognised that distance is what distance does: that for conveyance of goods London is to-day as near Sydney as it was to Yorkshire a century ago: for conveyance of news as near as it was to Yorkshire not sixty years since. Even so, however, the immediate day-to-day intercourse, the touch of the hand, and the sound of the voice have been wanting, and this absence has been the chief cause of the suspicious care for their local autonomy which has been so characteristic a phenomenon in the Dominions. Not long ago a party of Canadians saw no illogicality in a Canadian Parliament passing a resolution which dealt with the question of Home Rule for Ireland, yet they were indignant at the possibility of "English interference" in any domestic Canadian matter. To-day the subject is still open to misconception, but the distinctions are growing clearer between what are

in truth domestic matters and those which are really (for want of a better word) Imperial, and in which rights will carry obligations, and a share in Government a share also in being governed. The lectures of this series do not pretend to go on to deal with the form which any closer union should take.[1] To face the practical problem, however, is equally necessary and urgent. It needs that rare combination of gifts, imagination adequate to keep the end in view, and sanity in devising the practical steps to be followed to reach that end. The more important, therefore, is it that the public mind should appreciate the principles of the subject and demand that in this case at least forethought should be shown in devising the practical measures by which the wished-for object can be attained.

The white self-governing Dominions dominate the public imagination so largely that the problem of the dependent Empire is often apt not to receive the attention which it deserves. The more welcome is the consideration here paid to it. The world will judge of the value of the British Empire just as much, perhaps, from the way in which it will have dealt with the coloured races, as from its success in uniting the scattered democracies of European descent. As regards the machinery of Government, the mistake should be avoided of underrating its great importance, and indeed it is at once so vast and so intricate as to be a question of the first magnitude. Mr. Fisher deals with it principally in connection with India. But the same difficulties present themselves in such Colonies and Protectorates as Ceylon, East Africa, or Nigeria. As regards the way in which they are met, the dependent British Empire is probably the least

[1] A most able study of the practical issues involved is given in *The Problem of the Commonwealth* (price 1s. 6d.), published by Messrs. Macmillan & Co.

symmetrical of any, but knowledge gained in one Colony is brought to bear on another, and, this being so, adaptation to individual needs is probably a greater virtue than would be any strait-waistcoat of an administrative symmetry.

To pass from the machinery, however important, to the spirit of government, justice, even-handed justice, between man and man is the first requisite. Possibly in England it is not easy to appreciate the anxieties and suspicions that beset a small white population surrounded by dark races, as for instance in Rhodesia. But even so, with a lapse or a falling away from grace here or there, it may be truly claimed that in giving justice at least British rule has not failed. Justice, however, forms but the groundwork on which the real structure is founded. Thus two further problems emerge. How far does British rule deal not only justly but sympathetically with the civilisation of races of a different colour? In India one difficulty has lain in the fact that British rule there dates from a time when these problems were not consciously formulated. Another, that if any official, however able, is kept too hard at work, especially if that work be at his desk, it is difficult, amid all the trees that he is hewing, to see the wood and to act in the light of that understanding. All this Mr. Fisher points out as regards India. But there is another country where British rule has been established so recently that conscious effort has been possible from the beginning. In Northern Nigeria the deliberate attempt is being made, not to graft white ideas on a black stock, but rather to take the native civilisation and help it to develop along its own lines. The danger is that a desire for premature "efficiency" or material development may intervene and wreck the attempt. But if it be continued with such patience and sympathy that it achieves success, it will be one of the

finest justifications of British rule. What, however, is to be the ultimate development of the states of the dependent Empire, and first and foremost of India? Are they to progress toward self-government and ultimately to a share in governing the Empire? It is no good blinking the difficulties, and some of them hitherto have been due in part to the lack of co-ordination of the self-governing Dominions. Some of the Dominions have felt their standard of civilisation threatened by the competition of cheaper forms of coloured labour. It is not surprising that they have been willing to oppose any increase of status which might intensify that competition. That the United Kingdom has not shown such opposition is because it has not, as yet, felt the danger. On the other hand, it *has* felt the burden of rule of the dependent Empire, and for that reason, if no other, it will be an advantage for the self-governing Dominions to share that responsibility, and to gain with the responsibility the new outlook and the appreciation of the problems that are the natural consequence. Here, as in other respects, the War is causing old subjects to be seen from new angles. But, in any case, the fact confronts us that India has responded, as well as the Dominions, sparing neither blood nor treasure, and that Indian soldiers have, with us, faced and held the finest regiments of the German Army. Following on their action comes the Resolution passed unanimously by the Legislative Council of India.[1]

> This Council recommends to the Governor-General in Council that a representation be sent, through the Right Hon. the Secretary of State, to His Majesty's Government, urging that India should in future be officially represented in the Imperial Conference.

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[1] September 22, 1915.

What shall be the answer ?

The words "Empire," "Imperialism" have been so loosely and so falsely used that they have acquired with many people a bad connotation. Mr. Kerr, therefore, in one of the later lectures, does a service in emphasising the untrustworthiness of labels, and in showing that the better, as the truer, word to use is not "Empire" but "Commonwealth." The first savours of command, the second of service: the one of servitude, the other of freedom. Once again, it may be that the War with all its lamentable results, serving as a satire on twenty centuries of Christian civilisation, will have brought good in its train if it removes misunderstanding as to what is the true ideal of a British Empire or Commonwealth. That Commonwealth is no object of desire because of its mere size. Better a small work of art than a large daub, hardly "εὐσύνοπτος" or comprehensible in one view, as the old critic would say. Yet even so, if the other qualities are not wanting, size itself combined with variety contributes something as in a picture of Tintoretto's where huge as is the canvas each figure has its place and its value in the composition. It stirs the imagination to think of men coming freely alike from the Arctic and Antarctic, from Labrador and the Falkland Islands, as from the heats of the Equator, to defend a common civilisation: or of a union which could own the willing allegiance alike of Indian pomp and splendour as of a Togoland Chief who gave to the Red Cross of his poverty, in gratitude on his restoration from German to British rule.

All this is true, but greater than this is the value given by the unity in diversity that such a Commonwealth can present. The whole essence of such a Union is not to force each part into a similar mould, however fair the pattern.

Let each state pursue its own characteristic development. It is thus that in real truth, freedom of a part is not only compatible with, but finds its highest development as a member of the whole. He would be a poor Scotsman and a bad student of his country's history who could now affirm that his country's best interests could have been attained in isolation. So, too, General Smuts could say in a recent speech—" We shall try to do our duty to South Africa at the same time that we try to do our duty to the Empire. It is quite possible to reconcile the fulfilment of our duty in both respects." [1] But while each state will then be free, yet they will act and react upon each other. The United Kingdom will learn from the experiments, industrial and legislative, of some of the younger Dominions, and at the same time in accumulated experience contribute much in return, and thus progress will be rendered at once more certain and more secure from mistake. Again, in any question that arises, if one Democracy is likely to go astray, perhaps because of its very interest in the point at issue, the view of the others may well serve as a corrective. It may be that a civilisation of any one hue, whether the Prussian or another, may possess qualities that it would be folly to despise, but it is by the free interplay of different civilisations that the highest development will be reached. In this lies the true promise of worth possessed by a British Commonwealth, a common ideal which with a common heritage of tradition, ever increasing, should indeed be enough to animate its citizens and inspire its statesmen. Each of the moral qualities has value; each colour of the prism its beauty, but it is when all those colours combine that the white light is born which transcends them all. So it is with civilisation in this world.

[1] Banquet to Mr. Merriman at Stellenbosch, November 27, 1915.

The problem is urgent and difficult, yet the circumstances are propitious. So much is true alike of men in the Dominions as of many at home. But there is a real need that matters should not be allowed to drift. Mr. Smith in his lecture has said that "the masses will take the broad view." The statement is true, but not the whole truth. There need be little doubt that they will do so at whatever sacrifice, when the broad view is presented, as in a great crisis, stripped bare of unessentials and unmistakable. But in calmer times, when trivialities loom large, the broad view, once more overlaid by them, may be jettisoned because unrecognised, for men slip back into old grooves more easily than is often imagined. Let us therefore make ready, and know the time of our visitation. Five years ago, the writer, when challenged, stated his conviction that there was a potential energy and expansion in this country, greater than had existed for generations. That conviction is still stronger to-day. Foresight, courage, and understanding are needed to set it free and to guide it, but not even the spacious days of great Elizabeth will match it if the freedom and the guidance are forthcoming.

A. D. STEEL-MAITLAND.

THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE WAR

By Michael E. Sadler, C.B., LL.D.,
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds.

It has been a great privilege to serve in a British University during the War. Speaking in the House of Commons as President of the Board of Education, Mr. Arthur Henderson, in words all the more impressive because restrained, bore testimony to the help which the nation has received through the Universities in its hour of trial. When I lectured at King's College, the part which the Universities of the Empire were taking in the struggle had not yet become generally known. At that time, therefore, it was suitable to dwell on this aspect of the situation. But there is no need to do so now. What should be said at this juncture can be uttered in two sentences. We older men have learnt what good reason lies behind the adage that we owe reverence to the young. The young men (and, in their field of service, the young women) have proved themselves heroes and heroines, and are saving the freedom of the world.

In these pages, therefore, written in August 1916, I propose to omit much of what was said in my lecture last year—not that events have falsified it in any way, but because a good deal of it need not be repeated now. It will, I believe, be more interesting to the reader if I touch

upon other matters which are pressing upon the thoughts of those who are still engaged in University work after two years of war.

I write in college rooms at Cambridge. Last week I was a guest in an Oxford College. In both Universities many of the quadrangles ring from time to time with the crisp cries of the drill sergeants and with the tramp of marching men. But these sounds no longer seem in discord with the spirit of the place. The Universities, like every other part of the national life, are in the War. Far more than in the seventeenth century, military sounds seem appropriate to-day at Oxford and Cambridge. Then, we were a nation divided. Now, when the operations of war are upon a far greater scale, we are at one. And the Universities, old and new, have taken their place quite naturally in the new duties of a united people.

But I feel that, changed as they are from the old days of peace, the old Universities are now perhaps even more characteristically like their old selves than during the rather hectic years before the War. These summer days, when nearly all the undergraduates are under arms in France, may be almost the last in which we shall see the old Oxford and the old Cambridge. It is a great future which lies before them. After the War they will become of far greater importance as world-centres of study and training than in former days. From every continent students will press to our ancient Universities, and in due measure to their younger sisters also. A heavy task, inspiring because so difficult, is about to fall upon the British Universities. They will have to plan their work upon a scale which fits the world, and not Great Britain only. For these new duties preparation is already being made. The leaders of University life see things in a new pattern and with a larger

horizon. The French and British Universities (including those of the British Empire), to some extent the Universities of Russia and of Italy, perhaps also the Universities of Belgium, will vie in the numbers of their students with the Universities of the United States and of Japan. It will be seen, I think, that the old foundations are strong enough to bear the weight of the new duties. Some old customs will have to be given up. Certain habits of social intercourse and some standards of comfort will be changed. But the Universities are rich in the élan of life and will adapt themselves readily to the new calls upon their service. The Universities of the allied nations may become the intellectual centres of the world. The War has given us a new ideal.

In England, more perhaps than in Scotland or in the Dominions, this was needed. Who among us during the ten years before the War did not feel that a veil hung over the future? Who had not at times the sense of enjoying a St. Martin's summer before an autumn and winter whose storms he could not but imagine gathering ahead? Even in Oxford and Cambridge, men and women could not predict the order of society towards which the nation was moving, with an outward prosperity so brilliant but with such deeply felt unrest of heart and mind. Heedlessness and discussion, political agitation and philanthropy, happy acceptance of the present and bold conjectures for the future—all these things were mingled in the life of the older English Universities before the War. And in their younger sisters there was the same division of mind, though showing itself in other forms. Corporate unity was growing fast. Standards of attainment were rising. But plans of life were too self-centred; snarling discords of class feeling, too great absorption in individual careers, and a sense of the social order being askew with private aspirations

for disinterested service to the common good were inhibiting the growth of the patriotism for which, as events have proved, all were ready. Then the War broke upon us like a high sea through Dutch dykes. We felt as Mr. Britling felt in Mr. H. G. Wells's description of those days of sudden flood. Month by month, in common with all our fellow-citizens, we felt the growth within us of a new purpose. It was the gestation of a new social ideal.

But the ideal is not yet born. That cannot be until after the War. We cannot foresee the new order. We can only prepare ourselves to bear part in it, trying to clean our minds of prejudice, of personal ambition, of class-selfishness, so that we may see things honestly and with courage. When the new social ideal reveals itself more clearly, it may for a time cause angry conflict. But the Universities should be among the reconcilers. And, perhaps more peacefully than some fear, the new order of society will establish itself, linking itself on, as new things do in England, to old traditions and to the institutions of an earlier time. When at length the change has been accomplished, we may find that the central idea which has been at the heart of it is the conviction that every man, woman, and child, whatever his or her station or colour, should be respected, guarded, and allowed to unfold as a human personality, and never thought of, or educated, or treated, as a mere "hand" or economic tool. In themselves acting upon this conviction, and in helping others to understand its implications, the men and women of the Universities will find their duty. The strongest force in education is a social ideal.

But, in some of its aspects, the new social ideal will not be uncontroversial. It will touch disputed matters in politics, in ethics, and in economics. A chief duty of the Universities will lie in assuaging controversy without

concealing the true issues. A brave fair-mindedness, a candour which is at once scientific in its impartiality and considerate in its sympathy, may (though not without pain and misunderstanding) carry the Universities through the many dangers which are likely to beset them. To face these perils, which are moral as well as intellectual, and to mediate (without dishonest compromise) between opposing parties neither of which fully understands the other's point of view, may be the chief task of the Universities after the War. But such a task cannot be undertaken by societies of men and women, so full of individuality and of various temperaments and ages as are the Universities, without conflict in opinion or without many mishaps in expression. May I plead, therefore, with the great local authorities, and especially with those of England and Wales ; with the Lord Mayors and Councils of our cities ; and with the Education Committees of our counties, that they will have patience with us University people, and with other teachers, and will not, in their natural desire for smoothness, endeavour to force us to repress unpopular opinions or to expel those among us who have unusual thoughts or sharp, unwary tongues ? Truth, the truth as regards human life and human institutions, has as many shades of colour in it as the spectrum. In hours of great excitement some eager eyes " see red," and red alone. But a University, if you give it freedom, does not all " see red " at the same time.

And when the British Government discovers what a once sagacious tradition of political caution has for nearly three centuries made it loth to see, namely that in the educational system of the country there lies ready to its hand an instrument of influence in forming opinion, I hope that its great officials will not feel in duty constrained to tune the academic pulpit, and to forbid dissonant notes in

University teaching or in student discourse. Inevitably, whether we like it or not, the relations between the Government and the Universities will become more intimate. Public funds will be given, upon a much larger scale than heretofore, for the development of University work, especially upon its scientific and technological sides. Public paymasters often feel it a duty to call the tune. But the wisdom of our administrators will be shown not least in their knowing when to forbear from that interference with University opinion upon controversial questions of economics or politics which has been a plague in Prussia. And (an even harder task for British administrators) our leaders in the State may perhaps even refrain from thinking that silence upon all controversial matters should be imposed by "good form," or by hints of self-interest, upon all teachers who, directly or indirectly, draw part of their salaries from public funds. There will no doubt be many inducements to the view that University and other teachers should feel themselves under obligation to keep silence upon questions of controversy, especially as regards politics and the distribution of power or wealth. Funds, to which all citizens are compelled to contribute through their rates and taxes, should (it may be argued) not be used, even indirectly, for propaganda or for the support of men and women teachers who utter opinions distasteful to some. But, though a few will be indiscreet and some may be partisan in their utterances, the great majority of teachers will feel the obligations of their professional duty all the more strongly in proportion to the freedom which is allowed to them to think their own thoughts and to utter their convictions. The nation will gain from teachers who are trusted with freedom, more than it would receive from teachers who were compelled on pain of dismissal or disgrace

to keep silent upon controversial matters. Trust in the teachers' good feeling and sense of responsibility will be repaid by a general habit of discretion. Those who are not left free to speak generally suffer from gradual atrophy in their thought. Most men and women are their own critics. Even prophets seem to educate themselves by uttering their own prophecies.

The men of the German Universities became great when their fellow-citizens were wise enough to grant them *Lehrfreiheit*—freedom to teach what each investigator honestly believed. This freedom was granted in the eighteenth century even in respect of those theological studies which, then more than now, were like a network of sensitive nerves. But the German Universities fell from their high estate when the logical bureaucracy of Prussia thought it expedient to limit freedom of teaching on those economic and political problems which to men and women of to-day are as urgent as were theological questions to our grandfathers' great-grandfathers. It has been disastrous to Germany to restrict freedom in University thought and teaching on topics of political and economic controversy. I do not suggest anarchy as an alternative to repression. England has an instinct for the middle way. Given freedom, English men and women will not as a rule abuse it.

It is a new social ideal which will form the background of some of the chief studies of our Universities during the next generation. Even technology, which at first sight seems neutral in political and economic controversy, finds itself implicated in it. To-day, for example, the scientific student of English agriculture finds himself compelled to form an opinion as to the methods of our organisation of country life, and to seek a way of kindling a new spirit of co-operation and of syndicated effort. The colour chemist has to balance

the claims of trade secrecy and those of open contributions to knowledge—a dilemma which springs from a state of industrial organisation over which as an individual he has no control. The textile investigator knows that his work is conditioned by a state of mind among employers and workmen which, in the woollen and worsted industry at all events, has not hitherto been as favourable to new experiments as we may perhaps hope that it will become. And if in agricultural studies, in colour chemistry, and in textile researches scientific advance is thus implicated with questions of economic policy and even with some of social ethics, how much more is it true that the study of educational methods and organisation brings one face to face with controversial questions in applied psychology and of morals, the study of history with problems of national duty, and the study of economics with the urgencies of a new social ideal ?

In some branches of industry there are faint signs of the growth of a guild-spirit, mediæval in certain aspects but modern in its temper. It is no accident that the minds most sensitive to this new tendency are found in those Universities which retain under later accretions something of the Gothic guild. But a change in the temper of thought on industrial questions is found in all countries, not in Great Britain alone. Under many local disguises, these new doctrines, and the states of mind congenial to them, are showing themselves throughout Europe. It is not scientific research alone which is international. International also are psychological states. Differences of administrative organisation and the results of various stages of political experience or development give diverse shades of colour to these states of mind. But intelligent Frenchmen, Russians, and English, when they get below the surface of things, find that their thoughts are sensitive to the same

problems. This is the mental basis of the Alliance. It may prove to be the basis of an alliance in intellectual matters also, and a cause of fellow-feeling between Universities. Before the War, it was obvious that modern developments (primarily psychological, but also mechanical) were reviving in new forms the intellectual comradeship which linked together the Universities of the Middle Ages. It will be found, I think, that the War has not reversed this current, though it has turned it in a new direction.

Possibly, therefore, the political alliance between the British Empire, France, and Russia (not to speak of other Powers) may slowly find its counterpart in an intellectual alliance. Students may pass from the Universities of one of the allied countries to those of another. Teachers may be interchanged. The " nations " of a mediæval University may have their analogue in the modern. For such developments, the form of which we cannot as yet clearly foresee, the British Universities should be prepared. And not least the ancient Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, illustrious in prestige and in resources and now invited to a more than national task. At this crisis in the history of European civilisation, Great Britain (and especially England) stands for a synthesis which attempts to combine what is good in two, sometimes polarised, views of national duty and of personal obligation. Of all bodies of truth, this synthesis the most stubbornly resists definition in formula or code. It discloses itself in a mode of judgment and in a way of life rather than in sharply minted doctrines or in abstract generalisation. It is found as the flavour of a fine human tradition, operative on conduct but halting in self-expression. And therefore it has a home in those Universities in which teaching is integrated with life.

EMPIRE AND DEMOCRACY

By Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
Chairman of the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute.

So far as the ultimate issues of the present War are concerned, apart from the actual fighting, the two protagonists are Germany and Great Britain : the one a Power whose basis is military despotism and which desires to extend that basis ; the other a Power which holds an Empire upon a Democratic basis, and wishes to retain that basis.

On the one side there is the strange phenomenon of a whole people, highly educated in all classes, in the first rank in science and thought, instinct to an admirable degree with the sense of citizenship and service to the State, contributing learning, science, patriotism to the cause of military domination in its crudest form, to Empire, as Empire was understood in past ages. On the other side there is the strange phenomenon of an Empire fighting for liberty and the independence of small peoples, its army being composed partly of troops from outlying provinces which are more democratic than the dominant country ; partly of troops from outlying provinces where Democracy, in the commonly received meaning of the term, has never existed ; partly of troops from the dominant country itself, where the more advanced members of the Democracy in ordinary times

look to class rather than State, and care little at all about Empire.

Two things seem certain. The first is that the future of the world is either for the German system and German ideals, or for the system or want of system of which Great Britain is the chief exponent. The world is not wide enough for both to live and grow side by side. The second is that British Empire and British Democracy stand or fall together. The British Empire means an independent Great Britain. The loss of the Empire means a dependent Great Britain, a British Democracy existing on sufferance, if it continues to exist at all.

No one can speak on Empire and Democracy without quoting once more the much-quoted words of the Greek democrat, "I have remarked again and again that a Democracy cannot manage an Empire." This is the authorised version of the well-known passage, as given in Professor Jowett's translation of Thucydides; but the literal rendering of the Greek words is, "I have remarked again and again that a Democracy cannot rule others." For Englishmen of the present day, to manage an Empire is one thing, to rule others is another. If Great Britain lost India and all the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, but retained the Self-governing Dominions, there would still be a great British Empire to be managed; but where would the ruling of others come in, seeing that the others rule themselves?

However, in all times, until these latter days, to manage an Empire and to rule others meant one and the same thing; and the history of ancient States proved abundantly that a Democracy could not manage an Empire. The one great abiding Empire of old times, possibly it will be found the longest lived of all times, was the Roman Empire, and in

making their Empire the Romans substituted for democracy a military despotism.

And yet there was much more in the Roman Empire than mere military despotism. In the sphere of local self-government, in admission to citizenship, Roman policy was liberal to a degree, when compared with that of all ancient and not a few modern States. "You will say," writes Bacon in his Essay on "The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," "that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans, and that was the sure way of greatness." Contrast with this the German ideal that the Germans shall spread upon the world, that the world shall be Germanised. In breadth of view, in practical statesmanship, the Romans, with all their shortcomings, must be placed in front of the most highly educated people of the present day.

But the Romans were not a Democracy: the Germans are not a Democracy: we are a Democracy: and the old question faces us, Can a Democracy manage an Empire? The answer surely is that it depends upon the kind of Empire and upon the kind of Democracy. The question for us is, Can the New Democracy manage the New Empire?

In what sense is the British Empire a new Empire? It is at once a new type of Empire, and it is to a great extent a newly acquired Empire. We all know that the loss of the old North American colonies closed a chapter in the history of the British Empire; that, with the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign and Lord Durham's mission to Canada a new chapter opened, in which self-government for those colonies which are now styled Dominions became a leading feature in British colonial policy, a wholly new type of Empire being thereby created. But it is not so generally recognised that another new era began at

a much later date; that, since men were born who are hardly yet of middle age, an area of some three million of square miles, nearly twice the size of the old Roman Empire in its greatest extent, has been, directly or indirectly, added to the British Empire; that, while Democracy at home and overseas has waxed stronger and stronger, territorial expansion has gone forward at a greater rate than ever before in British history.

The new movement gathered force about the year 1880. That happened to be the date when the most democratic Government which Great Britain had as yet known came into power, brought into power by a strong wave of popular revulsion against what was called Jingoism—a word coined at the time—and led by the great British statesman who of all others was most opposed to domination of other lands and peoples. His tenure of office began with withdrawal from Afghanistan and retrocession of the Transvaal. Yet, by force of circumstances, it was at this time that England went into Egypt, and at this time that she became involved in what was called the scramble for Africa and the Pacific, and gained a new footing in the Far East—in Borneo.

Of the forces which were at work I take two only. The first was a recrudescence of foreign competition. A new European competitor for overseas possessions appeared upon the scene, and this was Germany. The war of 1870 consolidated Germany, and, as in the case of other nations, colonial expansion followed, more or less in the course of nature. It was equally in the course of nature that the new element of competition acted as a stimulus to the peoples which had long been at work beyond the seas. But the interesting point to notice is the contrast between German and English methods. Germany, which Democracy had signally failed to unite, was consolidated swiftly,

definitely, deliberately by three wars within less than ten years, between 1864 and 1871. The German colonial possessions were acquired with equal swiftness, most of them between 1880 and 1890. The British nation and the British Empire grew up together through the centuries, slowly till Germany appeared upon the scene, with no well-defined steps, with no evidence whatever of any distinct or continuous State policy. In the case of Germany, on the other hand, there was no slow broadening out, no acquisition of an Empire in a fit of unconsciousness. A military empire was created at home, and appendages to the Empire were promptly acquired beyond the seas.

The second force at work was the pressure of the Self-governing Colonies upon the Motherland. German intrusion into the Pacific was most distasteful to the Australians, and Queensland tried to forestall Germany by annexing New Guinea. No doubt, Australian feeling and action were largely dictated by geographical considerations, but the fact remains that the most democratic provinces of the British Empire were the most zealous for extending the Empire.

Thus in time of peace German competition and pressure from the Dominions combined to extend the British Empire, to compel most reluctant British Governments to move forward. The present War is only the terrible climax of this competition; and, unless Germany secures a decided victory, the British Empire is likely to grow again, indeed, is growing already.

This new Empire is the most variegated Empire that has been seen or heard of in the whole history of the world. It is a Curiosity Shop, the contents of which are of the most diverse kinds. You may find in it every sample of climate, product, race, colour, language, religion, law, constitution,

If you want uniformity, go to Germany: it is made in Germany. If you want diversity, go to the British Empire: it grows there of itself.

The Empire is divided, and rightly divided, into the two categories of Self-governing Dominions, on the one hand, and Crown Colonies and Protectorates on the other: into provinces the ultimate power over which is in the province, and provinces the ultimate power over which is in Great Britain. There are border-line provinces. India approximates, or did approximate, to a glorified Crown Colony: some of the West Indian colonies possess no little self-government. But the main dividing line is between self-governing dominions and dependencies. The former are more democratic than the mother country; the latter, in outward appearance and institutions, know little or nothing of Democracy.

But is it, in fact, true to say that the Malay Peninsula, to take a concrete instance, under British Protectorate, knows nothing of Democracy? Abraham Lincoln defined Democracy in the memorable words, "Government of the people by the people for the people." In the Malay States under British control, there is now government of the people where formerly there was anarchy. There is government for the people, in that the interests of the peasant classes are studied and protected as they never were before. There is not government by the people, if government by the people means a wide franchise and a House of Commons. But all modern Democracies imply representative government. If it were conceivable that the Malay peasants could, without being tutored by public speakers, cast their votes, according to their present knowledge and according to their liking, would they not choose to be represented by the best men on the lines to which they have always been accustomed?

Would they not vote for sultans and headmen, moulded, as they have been moulded, by British guidance? The system is at least government of the people for the people with the willing assent of the people, which comes somewhat near Democracy.

It is more democratic to leave to alien races their native forms, their accustomed machinery, while leavening them with the spirit of Democracy, than to impose with a high hand from without the particular kind of democratic machinery which commends itself to the dominant race. It is more democratic to train up blessings from the soil below than to order them down ready-made from above.

For even those who do not love the English will admit that they have the high merit of leaving alone when they can leave alone, of not importing new machinery so much as improving the machinery which the people of the soil have evolved from the soil. The Romans had the same quality; but they were passively indifferent where we are actively interested. "If it be a question of words and names and of your law, look ye to it, for I will be no judge of such matters," said Gallio to the Jews, and, when the Greeks beat the ruler of the Synagogue before his judgment-seat, he cared for none of these things. A British District Commissioner, trained in the East, would assuredly have been concerned with words and names and native law; and most assuredly he would have given damages to the ruler of the Synagogue and have committed his opponents at once for assault and for contempt of Court. The maintenance of freedom, as freedom can be understood by the human beings who inhabit each particular niche in the British Empire, is characteristic of the whole Empire. Freedom wears one dress in Canada, another—a rather cooler dress—in the tropical dependencies; but it is one

and the same freedom still, not only wherever the British flag flies, but also wherever British influence sails under native colours.

This is the New Empire, unprecedented in kind, newly aggrandised, still being aggrandised. It is like a gigantic jig-saw puzzle, in which new pieces are being constantly inserted. The pieces are of all sizes, shapes, and colours, but they fit in somehow, and make an intelligible whole, one large map of liberty.

The Empire seems to me to be a notable illustration of the Bible words, "Strength is made perfect in weakness." It is in its diversity, its apparent weakness, that the real strength of the Empire consists. Diversity means that all the component parts are developing each on its own lines, which must result in fuller life and greater vigour than if their development was prescribed on a rigid, uniform system. It means that the members supplement instead of multiplying one another, that the one gives what the other lacks, the sum total being proportionately enriched. Once more, though it may seem a paradox to say so, diversity means continuity, which is above all things necessary to an Empire. A uniform system cannot be produced without much breaking and uprooting in the process, without violent changes. These violent changes do not and cannot occur when diversity is the law of life.

In the history of our Empire we have failed most, on the one hand, when we have attempted to impose uniformity beyond the seas; on the other hand, when there has been want of continuity in policy at home. The War of American Independence may fairly be described as the outcome of a disastrous attempt to apply uniform treatment to diverse conditions, to treat as dependencies colonies which were not dependencies.

The evils arising from want of continuity in policy at home are pitiably illustrated in the past record of British dealings in and with South Africa. Want of continuity is largely the result of the party system, which seems to be inseparable from Democracy. I should say that British colonial policy has in the past been the result of a compromise between the few who have been trained by the Empire, and the few who speak for the many in the House of Commons; the former standing for continuity, the latter sitting in virtue of a temporary party majority; the former the result of Empire, the latter the outcome of Democracy. Empire is wholly a matter of doing. Speaking is a great feature of Democracy; and British colonial policy may be summed up as an effort to harmonise what ought to be done with what has been said. Or, to put the same point rather differently, the highest ideal of Empire is good government, the highest ideal of Democracy is self-government, and the task of British colonial policy has been and is to find the Greatest Common Measure of the two.

Having looked at the New Empire, let us look at the New Democracy. In theory, Democracy is the rule of the many. So it was defined by Greek philosophers. So it was in practice, to an imperfect extent, for brief intervals, in small Greek city states. Its characteristic was said to be ruling and being ruled in turns: all were to have a share in the ruling. Greek Democracy was imperfect, for the many excluded the slaves, who formed the larger proportion of the artisans, and also a number of residents who were neither slaves nor citizens. All that can be said of the rule of the many, when it was tried, is that the many were in a very small area, that they were a many not far removed from a few, that they could not manage themselves for any

long time together, and that they certainly could not manage an Empire.

Modern Democracy differs from ancient Democracy in two main respects. In the first place, slavery is extinct, in other words the many are really the many. In the second place, the representative system, unknown in ancient times, is of the essence of every modern Democracy. In other words, in modern Democracy the few govern the many. It is true that the many choose the few who shall govern them ; but none the less it is the few, not the many, who make and administer the laws of the State. The referendum is a device for partially reasserting the power of the many over the few.

This is modern Democracy ; but I have used the term New Democracy and have put the question, Can the New Democracy manage the New Empire ? What is the New Democracy ? It is represented by the rise of the Labour party, which grows in strength in Great Britain, and is at this moment governing the British Commonwealth of Australia. The New Democracy means the rule of the manual workers. It is avowedly class rule. It comes into being in virtue of the numerical preponderance of the class, but its basis is, as its name implies, not so much numbers as kind. In this class rule, again, the few govern the many. However much representatives are reduced to the position of delegates, in the intervals between the general elections the power is in the hands of the few.

Can a Democracy manage an Empire ? " How in conjunction with inevitable democracy indispensable sovereignty is to exist, certainly it is the hugest question ever heretofore propounded to mankind." That is the way Carlyle puts the problem. The answer comes back. The French Republic is managing an Empire. The British

Democracy is managing an Empire and managing it successfully at the present moment. But on the other hand it will be urged that the French Empire is far less complex than the British, that it contains no element answering to our self-governing dominions ; and, as regards the British Empire, that Democracy is not yet full blown in the United Kingdom : that adult franchise is even now not yet the law of the land : that the New Democracy, the rule of labour, is still some distance away : that we are still reaping the benefit of the principles, the traditions, and the practice of the old régime, which is only by slow degrees being diluted.

Let us then ask again, When the New Democracy comes to its own, or to what at present, rightly or wrongly, belongs to other people, will it be able to manage an Empire ? Yes, say enthusiasts for the New Democracy, if a Labour Government can effectively rule the Australian continent, what reason is there to doubt that a Labour Government could manage an Empire ?

My answer is that it is not safe to argue from the political conditions of a new country to those of older and far more complex communities. The question shapes itself to me, Can a class government permanently manage an Empire ? I do not for a moment believe that it can. On the contrary, I do not believe that class government can stand for any long time in British communities, when fully developed. It never has stood against time in Great Britain. It has always yielded to slow broadening out. It never has stood, because class is the enemy of the State : the basis is radically unsound.

I have laid stress upon the diversity in our Empire as being the result and the symbol of freedom. Uniformity, as seen in the case of Germany, is a most powerful and

effective weapon of offence, but it is the enemy of freedom. Uniformity, rigid rule, is characteristic of the New Democracy, as it fights its way up, but it is a two-edged tool. Democracy and Uniformity cannot go hand in hand in permanence; they are mutually destructive, if Democracy means freedom. Democracy runs no little danger of hanging itself with red tape.

Salvation will, it seems to me, come from the slow broadening out, which has always marked English history and English character, and which will have the practical result of slowly narrowing in. I mean that the more the eyes of the Democracy are opened, the wider their view becomes, the more they will trust and apply the principle which alone makes Democracy in any form possible, that the few shall rule the many. The New Democracy will manage an Empire, in proportion as the Empire moulds the New Democracy. In the Book of Proverbs it is written, "Where there is no vision the people perish." It is vision that the Empire can give. Empire, I have reminded you, is a matter of deeds not of words: the New Democracy prides itself on being a Democracy of workers. If rightly understood, because honestly and clearly presented, Empire should have much affinity for the New Democracy.

In more ways than one the Indispensable vision is likely to be promoted by the present War. The defects of Democracy stand out at a time of crisis—want of organisation, want of unity of purpose, party suspicion and recrimination. Class Democracy cuts the worst figure of all. Even when the navel of the State is touched, it divides its allegiance between class and state. But, as a crisis shows the weak and ugly side of Democracy, so also it points the remedies. "To learn obeying," says Carlyle, "is the fundamental art of governing." The most widespread evil in Great

Britain is, or was until the War came upon us, the decline of the habit of obedience, impatience of discipline in all phases of life, in all grades of society. The many choose the few, but will not obey the few when they have chosen them. War is teaching the lesson that obedience is necessary to existence. Never before have so many British citizens placed themselves under military discipline; and, when peace comes again, the ex-soldiers will bring back the habit of obedience into ordinary civil life, valuing it the more for having of their own free will submitted to it. They will be slow

> to live with such as cannot rule
> Nor ever will be ruled.

Outside the ranks of those who are actually on military service, the necessity of obedience is slowly coming home to the mass of the nation. The great majority of British men and women are asking the question how they can serve, which is the first stage towards answering the question how they can rule.

In Plato's *Republic* Socrates traces how the rule of the poor many becomes substituted for the rule of the rich few, and he tells us that the change is brought about at a time of crisis, in the following words: "When they are witnesses of one another's behaviour in moments of danger, in which the poor can by no possibility be despised by the rich, because it often happens that a rich man, nursed in luxury and surfeited with abundance, finds himself posted in battle by the side of some lean and sunburnt poor man, to whom by his laboured breathing he betrays his sore distress. When . . . all this takes place, do you imagine that these poor men . . . can refrain from repeating to one another, when they meet in private, our governors are

naught." Let me transpose and rewrite this passage in the light of what we have learnt from the trenches in Flanders and in the Gallipoli peninsula. "When they are witnesses of one another's behaviour in moments of danger, in which the poor can by no possibility despise the rich, seeing that the rich men, nursed in luxury and surfeited with abundance, become as lean and sunburnt as the poor and keep their wind no less than the poor. When all this takes place, do you imagine that these poor men can refrain from repeating to one another, when they meet in private, 'The governor is worth something after all'?"

One of the brightest features of the War has been the obvious respect and affection which British officers and soldiers have for each other. The officers cannot say too much of their men, the men of their officers. The few and the many have fitted in admirably under intelligent and sympathetic discipline in the close-packed brotherhood of the trenches. "My heart is towards the governors of Israel, that offered themselves willingly among the people," sang the prophetess Deborah after the overthrow of Sisera with his chariots of iron; and the words apply to the present War. Two points seem to me specially worthy of notice, as bearing on the leadership of the few. Those who have been styled the idle rich have been conspicuous for voluntary service and self-sacrifice, notably the sons of the country gentry, belonging to the landlord class, who have inherited wealth and position. In other words, the few who formerly led the political life of this country, who have inherited traditions of public service and are still engaged in unpaid public service, have answered very especially to the call of duty and of leadership. On the other hand the officers, that is the leading few, have been, and are being, as the War goes on, of necessity more and more

replenished from the ranks of the many. Thus the training in leadership is being more widely extended, and the many, having learnt to obey, are giving new blood to the few. However you put it, the effect of the War cannot be other than to strengthen the principle of rule by the few over the many.

But the War is having a still wider and greater result. Nothing that has happened in all the centuries of our national existence can have brought home so vividly to the Democracy in the United Kingdom what the British Empire really means. I am sure that I am not exaggerating when I say that, before the War, to the average working man in Great Britain the Empire represented the perquisite or the luxury of the few, something in which he was not consulted, something which he was taxed to maintain, but which brought him no advantage of any kind. I am sure again that it is no exaggeration to say that this impression has been strengthened by the partisan attitude of mind which has discouraged teaching about the Empire, on the assumption that such teaching must imply Jingoism, Imperialism, militarism, all the various isms, which popular speakers set up as so many Aunt Sallies, in order to have the pleasure of knocking them down again. What has the War done? Canadians and Newfoundlanders have a base in England. Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, wounded fighting men from every province of the Empire, are brought back to English hospitals. In the trenches home-grown men and overseas men are fighting side by side, maybe a Gurkha by a Cockney, a New Zealand Maori by a territorial from Lancashire or Kent. The Empire is in evidence, as never before, under the eyes of all. Its usefulness is patent to all. It is safeguarding Great Britain and British Democracy. For every home

born and bred Englishman who came into contact with British subjects from beyond the seas before the war, ten are coming into contact now as fellow-workers and fellow-sufferers in a common cause, that cause being Empire and Democracy. The War is the latest and greatest of Imperial studies, the people are lifting up their eyes to a vision which is no "baseless fabric."

The colour question has not affected us in the home country, because our islands are too thickly populated for serious danger from intrusion, and because they are far from the lands of coloured races; but it has been the most difficult and dangerous problem as between the self-governing dominions and India. Little or no distinction has been made by the overseas Democracies between coloured men who are fellow British citizens and coloured men of foreign nationality; and coloured prejudice has allied itself to class interest in that the coloured men work for lower wages than the white, and have a lower standard of living. It seems to me that in this important matter the War must be productive of good results. I do not look to the sweeping away of colour restrictions. I hold that, where it is possible, it is better that lands should be peopled either by white or by coloured citizens, and not take on a parti-coloured hue. But colour restrictions need not necessarily imply superiority and inferiority: they are compatible with partnership and mutual respect. This, I hope, will be one outcome of the War. Men who are fighting under the same colours lose count of each other's skins, and comradeship in war means a legacy of friendliness when the war is over. The colour question should, as the result of the War, be raised to a higher basis of political and social expediency from the lower basis of race prejudice and class selfishness.

I look to the War, then, as likely to counteract the weak-

nesses of the New Democracy, and to enable it to manage the New Empire, by a general widening of view, by giving to the working classes of England first-hand practical knowledge of the Empire, and by strengthening the machinery which alone makes Democracy possible, the leadership of the few.

I have noted that the colour question does not directly concern the Democracy in the United Kingdom, but that it does concern vitally the overseas Democracies. This suggests that our question is even more complicated and difficult than I have so far stated it to be. It is not, Can a Democracy manage an Empire? but, Can several not homogeneous Democracies combine to manage an Empire? This at least is likely to be the form which the question will take at the conclusion of the War if the Empire survives, for it is certain that the overseas Dominions, which have given their most and their best for the Empire, must be accorded more voice than hitherto in managing it. Indeed, if we further consider what place will have to be assigned to India, our problem becomes almost impossible to state in any intelligible terms. Yet I believe that the very complexity and size of the Empire will prove its salvation. Gibbon tells us "the decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable result of immoderate greatness." The Roman Empire was an Empire on the old model. It seems to me that the natural and inevitable result of the size and the incongruities of the new British Empire, combined with the widening influence of Empire upon Democracy, and the widening influences of the various Democracies upon one another, as they compare, contrast, and try to harmonise the different shades of Democracy, will be and must be, from the simple instinct of self-preservation, to increase public confidence in the leadership of the few. The process

is going on already, for, *pari passu* with the growth of Democracy in the United Kingdom, there has been a growing tendency to withdraw foreign policy and Imperial questions more and more from ordinary party politics. We have seen that it was only in very small areas that the rule of the multitude by the multitude was ever even tried : the larger the area the more impossible it is found to be. The more complex questions become, and the more enlightened the many become, the more clearly they must see the necessity for the guidance of the few. If this is the case when one Democracy is concerned, much more so when more than one. Whatever machinery may be devised to meet the needs of the coming time, it is certain that each territorial addition to the Empire, and every new Democracy within the Empire means adding to the necessity for entrusting the management of the Empire to the trained and chosen few.

In what I have said I may appear to have spoken somewhat slightingly of Democracy; but I never forget, and wish to insist with all the strength I have, that to British Democracy, that is to freedom as the British race has interpreted freedom, we owe the new great type of Empire. What I have been concerned to try to point out is that Empire is repaying its debt to Democracy, that it is finding salvation for Democracy by giving it a wider horizon, by illustrating that the law of democratic life, without which Democracy degenerates into nothingness, is that the many must choose, trust, and follow the few. And if Empire is moulding the many, it is moulding and has for generations moulded the few ; for never since the beginning of time has there been such a training-ground for rulers as the British Empire.

Ladies and gentlemen, having patiently listened to this lecture, you will probably say, now that I have come to the end of it, that I have been playing with words, with the

terms Empire and Democracy. I think I have, and have proved myself a democrat in so doing. Words and phrases are the current coin of Democracy, a token coinage, which may or may not have a reserve of gold behind it. The simple truth is that we have been talking about machinery, and what matters is not so much the machinery as the hands which use and the brains which guide it. Empire and Democracy mean something or nothing according to the character of the race which professes Empire or professes Democracy. I cannot tell you whether the New Democracy will manage the New Empire, but I can tell you what will manage it, and that is invincible British common sense.

THE PEOPLE AND THE DUTIES OF EMPIRE

By A. L. Smith, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford.

The particular aspect of the Empire which is laid down for me is the people and the duties of Empire; and on this I will endeavour to put before you the results of my experiences during the last fourteen months. May I begin with a story? In the early days of August 1914, two professors were walking by the shores of Lough Swilly; they were told by a sentry that a captured ship there was an Australian ship with Germans on board. "Australian!" said one of them indignantly (he was an Australian professor). "Yes," said the man, "they're as thick as thieves and talk the same lingo." "You mean Austrian?" "Well, it's all the same."

I do not say that this fairly represents the average Englishman's amount of information; but another man, and this an able man, confessed to me his surprise at finding that Canadians and Australians spoke, dressed, even ate and drank so like ourselves. Two years ago, in our Summer School at Oxford for working-class students, Mr. Lionel Curtis came down and gave a lecture on the Empire, which so took hold upon them that in the summer of 1914 we held a fortnight's conference, addressed by members of the Round Table group and others, on Imperial and Foreign

Problems. The outcome was a scheme for a regular campaign to bring these questions before the groups of students in the one hundred and ten industrial centres which had Tutorial Classes. The scheme was completed on the evening of July 30, 1914, the day after that fateful council at Potsdam, which was followed by the German Chancellor's proposals to Sir E. Goschen, which Mr. Asquith trenchantly characterised as " infamous." The War has prevented all but the first part alone of the scheme from being carried out. This part was the book on *The War and Democracy,* which has been sold in thousands. Of the general result I can speak from personal experience. In Lancashire, Yorkshire, the Potteries, Kent and Oxfordshire, at Birmingham, Swindon, and Bournemouth, there is an eager desire for real study of the Empire—what it means, how it has come about, what are its problems. To take one example: two of these students going back to their own homes have started over thirty study groups on this subject in the mining villages about the Potteries. Mr. Steel-Maitland addressed an evening conference at Oxford with some thirty of these working men; he said how much he was struck by their eager interest and their good sense in the questions they put, and I have heard them on their side say " it was a revelation " to them.

Believe me, there is a wonderful field open here for the education of Democracy in the great Imperial problem that has suddenly been evoked into urgency by this War, and will demand practical attention immediately the War ends. For the last nine years some of us have seen much of this matter of education of the workers, education in the true sense. We are not so foolish as to be blind to the dangers that beset Democracy on this side. One danger is simply ignorance. The mass of men are always in ignorance.

They start without the background of historical and geographical knowledge that the more fortunate classes possess, or are supposed to possess. They are rather vague as to where exactly lies the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, or what exactly is meant by Kultur, or by Jugoslavism, which all of us, of course, know all about, at any rate since August of last year. This ignorance makes them easy victims to "shibboleths"; I borrow the term advisedly from a working man who said to me last August after a month's course at Oxford, "I have come to the conclusion that I have wasted the last ten years of my life talking shibboleths at the street corner; I did not know what I meant by them, and my hearers did not know; I am now going back to examine into my views." This ignorance leads to an alarming contempt for the past, an impatient desire for short cuts to the millennium; but it also makes them extraordinarily susceptible to new light, and they have an almost pathetic respect for knowledge when it is put before them.

Another danger about Democracy is its tendency to a sort of idealism, a readiness to take dreams for realities, and to believe in the efficacy of good intentions. The workers (to use a short term) are conscious of their own pacific disposition, of their sense of fair play and desire for justice, and are too ready to trust these as the motive forces of the world. They talk too readily of the equality of races, the common interest of industrialism, the brotherhood of man. A speaker at a meeting of railway men ten days ago said, "The British working man has no quarrel with the German working man; if they could meet, they would be friends." It is true another speaker answered pointedly, "They are meeting—in the trenches." A third danger is their jealousy of their own leaders, drawn from their own ranks; they

seem to throw over their own official representatives, and to feel not only that one man is as good as another, but, as the Irishman said, a good deal better too. They are in fact suffering from the excessive and anarchical individualism which has been stamped upon English character by the course of our political history in its long struggle for "rights," by the course of our economic development with its "gospel of self-interest," and by the whole drift of our thinking and training for two centuries, till within the last twenty or thirty years.

But these very defects supply corresponding advantages and opportunities. Their very ignorance of technical or intricate detail makes them lean to the broad view of great questions, the idealist view. The classical example is the behaviour of Lancashire in the American Civil War. As we know, the war began on the rights of a minority of States, interpretations of the Constitution, definitions of Sovereignty, and such subjects; only gradually did it come to turn on Slavery. As soon as Lincoln's proclamation made this clear, the cotton operatives came out for him with a unanimity and a resoluteness that faced a cotton famine and prevented our Government from going in on the wrong side and so making the greatest blunder since George III. and Lord North. Now in most questions the broad ground is the moral ground. At the outbreak of this War, what turned public opinion among the masses was the case of Belgium, involving the faith of treaties and the existence of small nations; it left no other way in honour than to stand by her. The I.L.P. tried to controvert this view, and lost half its members as a result. This idealism comes out very markedly when you are appealing to a mass of men. An appeal to their material interests does not carry you far, for the simple reason that their material interests

soon begin to diverge in all manner of ways; whereas the one thing they have in common is their humanness (so to speak), and the expression of that is the sense of justice and fair play. It is a helpful thing in studying Democracy to notice that in the modern world it had a religious origin. Its advent was in that extraordinary army which gathered round Oliver Cromwell; extraordinary indeed, being an army where every soldier carried a pocket Bible, and where an oath was punished by a fine. The manifesto of that army was the Agreement of the People, first drawn up in October 1647.

This document laid down, as the first of our natural rights, freedom of conscience; it claimed that men were born free because each is the image of God, and men had equal rights because each had an immortal soul. The Democratic idea was thus in essence a means to secure spiritual freedom; something of this spiritual conception must be present in Democracy if it is to be a permanent success in the modern world. The potentiality of it is already present. Nothing is stronger in working men than their sense of comradeship; nothing appeals to them so much as disinterestedness. When our Committee at Oxford, finding the high quality of work done for years in our Tutorial Classes throughout the country, offered for competition exhibitions which would bring them up to the University, the Rochdale class took the lead in refusal; they would not, they said, spoil the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation by introducing the spirit of competition, "we see enough of that accursed thing in our ordinary life." I have said that our masses were still deeply impregnated with Individualism as a doctrine; but this Individualism has only been foisted on them by a narrow teaching, a teaching now outworn, thank Heaven. It yields at once to the

conception of brotherhood, of a great body of which we are all members, in Burke's fine phrase. Their clubs and Trade Unions, their strong family sense, their local patriotism have prepared their minds for the idea of greater communities of which also they are members, the nation, the Empire itself. There is a great field here waiting to be tilled and harvested.

That the field is untilled is our fault and a grievous omission, and one of which we had ample warning. Nearly fifty years ago, on the enfranchisement of the artisan class, Robert Lowe remarked, with what was taken for cynicism but was plain fact, "Now we have to educate our masters." Well, did we not pass the Education Act of 1870? The answer is, the three R's, even if they are education in any sense, are not education in that sense, in the sense of citizenship of an Empire. No! We left our new masters uneducated, in that we failed to teach them anything of what it stood for; of the vast possibilities, the romance implied in it, even of the bare history of its building up; and yet it is easy to fascinate men, and boys too, with the story of British India, or the story of Canada, with good maps and pictures.

"We have no stake in England" was said to me over and over again up to 1915. "How should we be worse off under German rule?" was a common question in Lancashire, Tyneside, and Yorkshire. "What could Germany take from us? we have nothing but our hands." Still more did they think it of the Empire; what was their stake in that?

Even the obvious facts were not realised by the mass of working men, even the more intelligent. But the change is coming fast; out of a group of thirty-five the other day only one wanted to ask what we gained economically by the Colonies; the others all took it on the wider ground.

In part this past apathy was due to unfavourable associations of the term "Empire" connected with the shoddy Empire of Napoleon III., reactionary Russia, militarist Germany, and our own Jingoes. Imperialism seemed to mean only increase of the navy, development of militarism, postponement of social reforms, and shelving of the real economic issues between capital and labour, between unionism and non-unionism, between syndicalism and socialism. It was deemed a red herring drawn across the track of the reformer. All the while there was this splendid material in the workers, material on which to build a true Democratic empire, a great Imperial commonwealth, or a federation of Democratic commonwealths, based on community of moral, social, and political ideas. In fact, till such a basis is further developed the Empire has had no real basis but sentiment, as German critics said. It professed to be begun on identity of economic interests and of constitutional methods, but it had really diverged far away from such identity; in their economic interests the Dominions had become Protectionist; in their constitutional development, a government by Labour; while England remained Free Trade and middle class. Yet between England and the Dominions there has remained a real though undeveloped basis of community. But it needs development, and the time is ripe for it. Whenever such subjects are put before a working-class audience, they invariably ask, Why weren't we told? Of course it is proper to answer them with grave reproof, "You were told, in Hansard, *The Times*, the *Quarterly Review*, but you would not read them."

In sober fact, we, the educated propertied classes, were to blame; we did not educate our new rulers in problems of the world, we lived in a fatuous complacency that they would always leave the big things, especially foreign policy

and the Imperial problem, to their pastors and masters, *i.e.* us. But when I asked one of the very ablest working men two years ago whether there would be anything like a revolution in this country, his answer was, "When I look at the British working man I should say No; but when I look at the incredible blindness and want of imagination of the well-to-do and the educated I am inclined to say Yes!"

An objector perhaps will say, Can you then put seven million voters through a course of geography and blue-books? No; but we can and must see that the essential factors are not left for them to find out for themselves, but are *brought* to them, at least to the thoughtful, studious men among them, not the professional politicians nor the Trade Union officials, but the thoughtful, studious men who can form and lead working-class opinion, and who exist in growing numbers. "Educate our masters."

When Mr. Shackleton was Chairman of the Labour Party and of the Trades Congress he made a striking appeal to the University of Oxford. "There is a wonderful stir among our workers, a movement for our own higher education. We know we are on the eve of real Democratic government, but we feel we have not the requisite knowledge either of social laws or of foreign and Imperial problems. Help us to acquire this knowledge. Without it we must make a terrible failure. The movement may die down if it is left unhelped for ten years." That was said nearly nine years ago.

It has often been asked, "Can a Democracy hold an Empire?" Can Democracy rise to the wonderful possibilities implied in a union of one-quarter of the human race, and a *Pax Britannica* over one-quarter of the area of the world?

Yes, for you can appeal to a Democracy on these big

ideas ; it is not idealism that it lacks, but rather the qualities required to translate ideas into facts, the patience, the study, the power to choose the right leaders. Once chosen, will it be loyal to them ? One of the least sentimental of observers, Machiavelli, pronounced it a falsity to charge Democracy with fickleness. " He who builds on the people builds on the rock," are his words. But the people can't be expected to give trust blindfold. The popular imagination is only too ready to grasp at the great idea, and to be impatient of technical difficulties or of slow development. But it *is* free from officialism, the thing which galled the Colonies—" the subjection of Australia to Downing Street," they called it. The ordinary working man is much more hopeful and instructable on this Imperial question (barring the actual term "Empire") than on foreign policy, which he often persists in viewing in the light of catchwords such as " the Balance of Power," " Secret Diplomacy," "Armament rings," "Capitalistic exploitation," and so on. He is far less able to imagine foreign conditions and the entanglements of foreign policy ; he has no conception of continental problems ; here insularity hampers his view. But a great voluntary Commonwealth, based on the sea as the uniting, not now the estranging element, is more within the grasp of the mass of men ; it only needs putting before them ; and here a big aim is desirable, for, given good will and a practical start, the genius of the race will work out the solution. But in foreign questions good will to have international peace is not enough ; indeed, by itself is a danger, because the good will is not on the other side too ; whereas in Imperial questions there is the good will, or more, the deep determination, of the Colonies to hold on to their Imperial citizenship.

It is noticeable that for a long period in our history the

people were much better Imperialists than either their rulers or their mentors; politicians and economists were talking of the desirability of "cutting the cable," describing the American Revolution as "the best thing which ever happened," comparing colonies to "fruit which should fall off when ripe"; but these were theories never accepted by the people. The people persisted in feeling the colonists to be our kinsmen, in holding blood to be thicker than water, and in not resenting Colonial tariffs; and, on the other side, the colonials persisted in speaking of going "Home," in refusing to provide for themselves as States on the brink of separation, and in regarding their Protection as quite compatible with our Free Trade, and regarding their patriotism as a part of, not a substitute for, wider Imperial patriotism. Even now the instantaneous and universal response to the war-call from the Dominions came as more of a surprise to the statesmen and officials than to the people themselves; the former were aware that neither Colonies nor the Home Government had faced in their own minds the real question, that is, the control of war and peace by the British electorate without any consultation with the Colonial electorates.

Hence it was a sudden revelation both to us and them by their unanimous resolve in August 1914 to be part of the whole Empire, and this date will prove to have been a real turning-point in the world's history.

Yet signs had been given, as at the Russian threat in 1895; then the South African War five years later, and the Japanese War in 1905, brought Defence questions to the front; and for all their local feeling, they accepted that their navies should be part of the British Navy and fly the white ensign as His Majesty's Australian Navy and His Majesty's Canadian Navy.

One very strong reason for the people being in the best sense Imperialist is that our industrial Democracy is profoundly desirous of world-peace, and actively hopeful of it; our people, we may say, are pacific without being pacifist, and anti-militarist without being unmilitary. They are attracted, therefore, by the vision of a world-peace based on a world-wide Empire, as the *Pax Romana* was based on the Roman Empire. It was the proud boast of Rome's greatest poet that the mission of Rome was peace, "*regere imperio populos . . . pacisque imponere morem.*" After four centuries the last of the Roman poets could justly say of Rome that she alone had made her subjects her sons. It was indeed a noble conception by which the whole of the ancient world was trained up by stages into full Roman citizenship; but once the conception was started, its carrying out was mainly a matter of administration. For after all, Rome had to conquer the world before she could unify it. The *Pax Romana* rested on the Roman legions. It was a military and an autocratic Government, exercised over races often superior in real civilisation, maintained by common fear of the menacing outer world of the barbarians, and by community of economic interests; but with it there was much cruelty and spoliation; there was the canker of slavery; and there was growing internal demoralisation by the introduction of passive instead of active citizenship, the avoidance of political, military, and social duties.

The *Pax Britannica* which we hope for will rest on an Empire which began with sons, not subjects, which has grown stronger as those sons have grown up, which now rests on affection and on community of ideals far more than on economic interests. It will, we hope, show that, as Bismarck himself put it, the imponderables are the things

that count; that these ties, in Burke's words, light as silk, may be strong as iron, strong as the iron of Rome, stronger than the blood and iron of Prussia.

But the problem is far more complex and more novel, a novel experiment in federation, an experiment in sea-power, an experiment in democracy, a far harder problem than that set before Rome. But we have also the advantage of starting with a much deeper moral and spiritual unity, *e.g.* unity in language and in law, in literature, even in religious forms.

And if it succeeds, it constitutes a possible exemplar to the world of a new form and type of State union. To set this going and make the thing work, we have to get not merely the passive acquiescence of the people but their active and intelligent co-operation, their minds and hearts as well as their votes.

Sir Charles Lucas has said with much force and perfect justice that a Democracy cannot actually administer an Empire, that the many must leave that to the few. But this desirable result will not come of itself; the few must instruct the many, must bring home to them the magnitude of the problems, must explain the general policy, must make it a thing of living interest, not of Colonial Office pigeon-holes; we have lost confidence in pigeon-holes these fifteen months. We must educate our masters. Without an instructed public opinion, even the wisest experts and the best machinery can do little for want of sufficient steam power behind the machinery.

Moreover, the experts are themselves in the hands of the party politicians, and are therefore subjected to the oscillations of party politics. If we are to have stability and continuity either in foreign policy or Imperial policy, it must be by a general national agreement on the main

issues of the policy; and such agreement needs an instructed public opinion; we must educate our masters. At Birmingham after a discourse on the German idea of the State compared with the English, a man in the audience asked, "But I say, Mister, isn't the State *us*?" Well, we want them to say, "The Empire is us"; or if you prefer grammar to idiom, "*We* are the Empire."

After all, under the decorous make-believe which in this country enfolds and protects the Government, we are well aware that the politician, even when we politely call him a statesman, cannot go much beyond public opinion, and often lags behind it; we might indeed in our political system define a leader as one who waits for a lead. So the best way to get a thing done is to create a popular demand that it shall be done. The Government are our masters, but here again we have to educate our masters.

The moral of this lecture has been inflicted on you so many times during its course that I am sure every one is ready to cry out, "Enough; we admit we must educate our masters—but how?" Well, I have a number of proposals which I think practical. But to invest practical proposals with literary and artistic merit is a lengthy business. So I will put them crudely. Send out parties of working-class students to the Dominions, and from the Dominions to the Home Country, freely, regularly, as a recognised branch of education.—Stir up local education authorities to this work and many other forms of education in the duties of Empire; I say duties, that they may not dwell too much on the commercial side of such instruction. —Establish a system of exchange professors with the Dominions, and especially exchange the teachers in working-class centres and Tutorial Classes.—Make ample provision of books, books by the thousand, cheap, but by the best writers

(Sir Charles Lucas) and up-to-date; "Our men pick up their authorities from the second-hand bookstall, and therefore think of Australia as a land of convicts and kangaroos." —Deal frankly and boldly with the demands of India before working-class audiences.—Let Universities make the Empire a leading feature in their Extension Lectures and Tutorial Classes; it will be popular, for they told me in the Potteries, "If there can only be one lecture, let it be on the British Empire."—Let the Public Schools introduce courses on the Empire; it will be popular there too; one school has already led the way.—Let the same be done for the secondary and the elementary schools by the aid of maps and pictures.—Have Colonial exhibitions in the populous centres, and expositions given on the spot.—Above all, enlist many voluntary helpers in this educational work, this Crusade of Empire, helpers who (though I say it) must not be too academic, but must be prepared to learn as well as to teach, to study the mind and heart of the people beforehand. This same study may, though "with bated breath and whispering humbleness," be commended to officials and experts even in Whitehall. It may then possibly filter upwards to Cabinet Ministers themselves. *Sed quo Musa ruis? Quae te dementia cepit?* It is evidently time to stop.

I am aware that discussions at this moment on anything but men, munitions, and money, are apt to provoke the warning, Don't sell the skin till you have killed the bear; wait till the War is over. But there are things which will not wait, even in war time. This Imperial sense is a thing which is growing under our very eyes; both the need and the opportunity to instruct and guide our people in it are already urgent upon us. Workmen, business men, the student class, are all eager for a lead. It is the politicians

about whom doubt is expressed, and sometimes more than doubt. It is they who are thought to be in need of bold ideas, or of the boldness to execute them. Let us in a euphemistic phrase strengthen their hands, and be careful not to call it forcing their hands.

Of a great part of our population it may be said they are not spiritually dead, only unawakened. We need to go to them more boldly with such an appeal as Burke's "Can you think of the British Empire without a *Sursum corda*?" Take an illustration from the Chief Inspector's report on Reformatory Schools; 4000 enlisted, 530 killed, 56 won distinctions from V.C. downwards; he sums up, "The War has shown that thousands of boys hastily termed bad, or even criminal, have just the qualities that make our finest soldiers of France or the Dardanelles." We have much more call to be afraid of mental inertia or cheap cynicism from the elder members of our well-to-do and professedly educated classes.

But it will be asked, can Democracy be educated thus? can artisans be at home in the abstractions of Political Philosophy? Well, they do excellently in Political Economy, and that is abstract enough. In fact, working men make excellent students; they make up in grasp of realities what they lack in range of books; after some preliminary training they can hold their own beside the ablest public-school product.

And we can't do without them; we can't carry any scheme of Imperial Federation without a background of popular interest, such as the War is rapidly creating. War is indeed a mighty creator. It is an intellectual awakener and a moral tonic. It stirs men to think, and thinking is what we most lack in England. It creates a conscious unity of feeling which is the atmosphere needed for a new

start. It purges away old strifes and sectional aims, and raises us a while into a higher and purer air. It helps us to recapture some of the lofty and intense patriotism of the ancient world. It reveals to us what constitutes a modern nation, the partnership between the living, the dead, and the yet unborn. Look at what our Civil War produced in the seventeenth century, the outburst of religion and literature, of science and philosophy associated with the names of Bunyan, Milton, Newton, Locke. A great national war means the creation of a mighty spiritual force; we shall need it all to solve our problems.

The moment the War stops, there will arise the question of emigration. For thousands of men will refuse to go back to the confinement of the mine and the office, or to the old terms of agricultural labour. If we do not handle the land-question at home more boldly and expeditiously than we are ever likely to do, much of our best material with all its recent training in efficiency will stream away to the Dominions. We shall have to consider emigration as a national concern; whom can we spare? whom will the Dominions accept? what about the million and a half superfluous women in the country? There is no fear of the people not taking an interest in questions like these. The Australian Labour Parliament has already taken several measures to deal with immigration and land-settlement. It was surely a great mistake that emigration, instead of being studied and supervised as a prime factor of our growing Empire, has been left to what used to be called glibly "the natural laws which govern society." If we look back at some of the material we sent out to build up Australia, we must admit that Nature, ever covering up man's blunders, has been kinder than we deserved. The whole land of the Empire, and the best use to which it can

be put to build up an Imperial race, is surely the concern of the whole people of the Empire, and all the more so from the remorseless figures of the three last census returns, showing that our population will be stationary by 1941, unless social conditions are profoundly altered for the better. Will not this "interest the people"?

In all this subject we may be of good courage. Two years ago the word Empire had but an ill sound to the ordinary workman; fifteen months ago it suddenly acquired a new note, and already his attitude to it is transformed. Yet the whole meaning of it was there all the time, latent. The bond with the Dominions was growing ever closer; few working-class families had not a close blood tie with them through some near relative; few localities had not had an industrial crisis at some time or other, relieved by an overflow to homes oversea. That bond has suddenly proved itself of unsuspected strength; half a million Canadians, 300,000 Australians—who could have imagined such figures two years ago? That meaning latent in the term Empire is now made manifest as by a revelation. It is not merely the splendid physique, the splendid courage and initiative of the men from overseas, that impress our people, but still more the deep feeling for Britain and British ideals that brings these men across the oceans. Yet we are not unduly elated ourselves by witnessing this self-sacrificing loyalty, for we know it is a sacrifice not so much for us as for what we represent—the history, traditions, and standards of the English race. Not elation, therefore, so much as the sense of our responsibility, is what is foremost in our minds, and a growing resolve that we will prove ourselves and make our people not unworthy trustees of this great heritage.

IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATION

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I have undertaken to address you this afternoon upon the administrative system of the British Empire, but in truth the British Empire does not possess an administrative system. Rather it may be compared to a league of states, each separately equipped with its own body of administrative agents, and, save for the office of Colonial Governor, and a common but undefined obedience to the Parliament and Cabinet of Great Britain, bound, one to another, by no bureaucratic tie. It would, no doubt, be possible, even with no radical change in the constitution of the Empire, to create the rudiments of an imperial administration. Thus, if (to take a long stretch of fancy), after consultation with the Governments of India and the Dominions, a Zollverein were established for the whole Empire, it would be necessary to create an Imperial customs service, and it is probable that the members of that service would be recruited on a common plan, paid at a common rate, and made amenable to a common discipline. Diplomatic agreements might similarly be made with respect to other spheres of Imperial policy, such as naval defence, which might similarly involve the appointment of administrative agents

common to the whole Empire and responsible to the control of the Parliament of Great Britain. Such agreements, however, would last only so long as they were agreeable to the temper of the Dominion Governments who had entered into them, and the administrations founded on them would share the same uncertainty. An Imperial administrative system in the true sense of the term could only be created as the result of the prior creation of a true Imperial legislature, of a legislature, that is to say, composed of representatives from all parts of the Empire, and charged with the duty of legislating upon all matters of Imperial concern.

How far it is desirable to create such an organ is a question which falls outside my present scope. I will merely remark upon the fact that the Parliament of Great Britain is singular in being without representatives from the Colonies and outlying parts of the Empire. I do not know whether a Turkish Parliament continues to deliberate in Constantinople, but, if it does, representatives from Basra in the Persian Gulf, who have voyaged to the capital *via* Bombay, Aden, and Port Said, are participating in the work of the assembly.

My object to-day is to direct your attention to the machinery which actually exists, to comment upon its leading characteristics, and to explain in bare outline some of the gravest among the many problems of administrative mechanism which are occupying the minds of our statesmen beyond the seas.

Administrations fall, in the main, into two types, those which are and those which are not responsible to immediate parliamentary control. For the purposes of clearness, though the phraseology is far from being accurate, we will designate them as responsible and irresponsible administrations. The Civil Services of Canada and Australia are

responsible because they are under the immediate eye of a democratic Parliament. The Civil Service of India is irresponsible because, although ultimately subject to the Parliament of Great Britain, it is exempt from interference from any popularly constituted body in India, and possesses therefore a liberty of action considerably in excess of that enjoyed by the administrative agents in our self-governing Dominions. Then, again, an important distinction may be drawn between two types of responsible administration. There is the permanent Civil Service, and there is the party Civil Service. The Civil Service of Great Britain is permanent. Once appointed, the Civil servant, although his tenure is technically "during pleasure," practically retains his office until his appointed time of retirement, unless disqualified by misconduct. But the Civil Service of America is not permanent. The whole personnel of the administration changes with each swing of the electoral pendulum, and all the experience gained in public work is immediately lost to the country. In other words, in America the Civil Service is the creation of a party. It is born when the party comes into power. It dies when the party is beaten at the polls. It is the creature of an electoral victory, the sport of electoral chances, the spoils of a successful electoral campaign. Whereas a permanent Civil Service tends to correct the native inexperience of democratic Government, a party Civil Service tends to confirm it.

The Dominions of the British Empire, enjoying the benefits of responsible government, have not been exempt from the most insidious danger liable to beset the public service of a democratic and parliamentary state. The Canadian Civil Service, in particular, bore a particularly bad reputation for political jobbery until the great cleansing of 1908, a result to be attributed partly to the infection

of American example, but even more to the economic situation of the country, to the ease with which large fortunes were made in business, and to the comparative unattractiveness of the public service as a career for able and highly educated men. To those who travelled in Canada before the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1908, and even in the years immediately succeeding that great and necessary measure, nothing was more surprising than the universal belief that every government servant had been jobbed into a post the duties of which he was incompetent to perform. I well remember how at a dinner-party in Quebec a lady expended in my hearing much compassionate vocabulary upon the lot of the passengers on board a certain vessel which, having developed a case of smallpox during its passage across the Atlantic, had been put in quarantine in the St. Lawrence. My hostess was not thinking of the delay. Her pity was solely aroused by the fact that the passengers would be inspected not by a proper doctor, but by a medical officer in Government service who, though she was careful to add that she knew nothing of him personally, would certainly be rough, ignorant, and wholly unequal to his task.

Experience has shown that in other communities besides Canada it has been necessary to take special precautions to prevent party leaders from using the Civil Service as a means of scattering small rewards among their humbler political adherents. In the Commonwealth of Australia elaborate precautions are taken under the Act No. 5 of 1902 to secure that the control of the Civil Service shall be withdrawn from the politicians and placed in the hands of a Commissioner who can only be removed on an address from both Houses of Parliament. But though Australia and Canada have thus shown themselves alive to the necessity

of protecting the public services from political jobbery, it cannot be said that the Canadian and Australian bureaucracies have as yet been able to command a very high measure of general respect. This is due partly to the absence of any provision for recruiting men of superior education into the public services, partly to the lack of a pension scheme, but partly also, as I have already explained, to the greater attractions of a business career in a young country. Youth, however, is a fault which Time itself will remedy.

We shall be the less inclined to wonder at the somewhat rudimentary administration of our Dominions across the sea if we reflect upon the fact that until the middle of the nineteenth century the bureaucratic element in our own Government was small and unobtrusive. In the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain was supreme at sea, but the proceedings in the impeachment of Lord Melville show that there was at that time no permanent civil staff of the Admiralty, and that such clerical work as was required was provided at the expense of the First Lord. Even as late as the Crimean War, the Duke of Newcastle, who was Secretary at War, worked in a small room in the Prime Minister's house, and it was not until the reforms ensuing on the close of the campaign that we can properly date the beginnings of the modern civil staff of the War Office. The story of the rise of the British Civil Service has yet to be written; and is indeed one of the most important unwritten chapters of our history. The bureaucracy has grown with the sudden swiftness and luxuriance of tropical vegetation after tropical rains, and the country has been covered by a forest of officials almost before it has observed that there has been any change at all in the constitutional landscape.

This late emergence and swift development of a paid

bureaucracy is due partly to the long survival of a great and wholesome political tradition, and partly to the complex results of industrial revolution and Imperial policy. All through the eighteenth century, and, indeed, even up to the establishment of County Councils in 1889, the bulk of the administrative and judicial work of the counties devolved upon the shoulders of the unpaid magistracy, upon the Justices of the Peace, who represented the rough common sense, the class prejudice, and the high standard of personal honour which characterise the rural aristocracy of these islands. Their services were rendered cheaply, honestly, and on the whole industriously, but though they had adequately supplied the needs of a comparatively simple rural society, they were unequal to the severer and more elaborate conditions of a densely populated industrial empire. Indeed modern industry, coupled with Imperial policy, created new tasks for Government, requiring specialised ability and accumulated experience. Government by experts gradually succeeded Government by amateurs as the sphere of State action extended itself. And in the grant-in-aid an instrument was discovered which rendered the closest inspection of the central bureaucracy an endurable and even a welcome necessity to its beneficiaries. The powerful and permanent bureaucracy which has now become so important a feature in our system functions under a quadruple safeguard. It is recruited in the main by open competition, a safeguard against jobbery and the grosser forms of incompetence. It is divided into a superior service drawn from the best men at our Universities and an inferior service drawn from men of good but average education. It is brought into continual contact with parliamentary life and parliamentary criticism by the questions addressed to ministers in Parliament. And, lastly, it works under the

direction of parliamentary chiefs. The Civil Service of Great Britain is never permitted to forget that it is in a true and literal sense a body of servants whose work is liable at any moment to be brought under the master's eye. That it has escaped or can entirely escape the characteristic vice of all bureaucracies cannot perhaps be confidently affirmed, but if it is comparatively free from that senseless surplusage of reglementation which is common in autocratic countries, the cause is to be found in the last two of the four safeguards which have been mentioned, the parliamentary critic in the House, and the parliamentary chief in the office. In other words, administrative questions cannot be considered in a purely dry light; they must be viewed in a political light. And it is an essential part of the skill of an experienced civil servant to feel how a measure will represent itself to the vision of Parliament, and with what modifications it may be made acceptable. The machine is continually up against the living forces of opinion, which, despite all party discipline, make themselves felt in the House of Commons, and since the members of the Civil Service are obliged to furnish answers to parliamentary questions and apologies for departmental action to their parliamentary chiefs, they acquire a wide kind of political education, tending perhaps towards a certain spirit of caution or even timidity, but based upon a close apprehension of the views, prejudices, and aspirations of the country.

In the Crown Colonies, and more particularly in India, the spirit of the administration is widely different. Here the administration is the Government, and nothing else particularly matters. Questions, indeed, may be asked in London about Indian affairs, but nobody is particularly interested in them, and the Indian Budget night is notori-

ously regarded as one of the least interesting occasions of the session. The affairs of India are in the hands of the Government of India; they are managed by the Viceroy and his Council, and by the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors of the several provinces acting through the various branches of the Indian Public Services. Proposals may come from the Indian Government to London, and be vetoed by the Imperial Government. The large lines of Indian policy may be shaped by a Secretary of State in the India Office; and a powerful Secretary of State may make his influence felt very strongly on the direction of Indian affairs, if he encounters no serious opposition from the Government of India. But, in reality, the last word lies with Indian official opinion, in the sense that a measure would not be forced upon India against the united opposition of the Indian bureaucracy, the Indian Viceroy, or the Indian Governors and Lieutenant-Governors. The Secretary of State exercises a useful and important function. He supervises, he suggests, he sometimes initiates. He is the most important conduit through which English parliamentary opinion reaches and affects the Government of India; and for every change which needs an Act of the Imperial Parliament, he must be consulted and his consent secured. But the work of administering India is not done in London. It is done in India itself. It is for this reason that the organisation of the Public Services of India is a matter of such great importance. There are, it is true, since Lord Morley's rule at the India Office, legislative councils, composed both of an official and of a non-official element, and even in the smaller executive councils it is now usual to include a non-official Indian member, but, great as is the political value of these institutions as establishing a connection between the British Government on the one

hand, and the Indian intellectual class on the other, they are debarred from one of the principal functions of a Western Parliament. The Indian councils cannot turn out a Government, and cannot make a Government. The Indian Civil Service is the Government. It may accept amendments, it may withdraw a measure in face of criticism which it judges to be well founded, it may profit by the suggestions of non-official members, but it is master in its own house. Cabinet Councils, Government majorities, diplomatic agencies in the Native States, administrative agencies in British India—all are provided by the Indian Civil Service, that wonderful bureaucracy recruited by a competitive examination in London, which is expected to turn out judges, revenue officers, heads of administrative departments, pro-consuls, legislators, political officers or diplomatists, and under the new régime, parliamentarians as well.

The supremacy of the Indian Civil Service among the public services of India is one of the leading facts which every student of Indian administration has to take into account. The Civil Service is the political, the governing service of the country. The members draw larger salaries and higher pensions than the members of any other branch of the public service. In the Table of Precedence, an Indian civilian will always rank above a member of any other Indian service of similar age and standing. The other services are excrescences, later developments due to the increase of specialisation, grafts upon the parent tree, which is the Civil Service of John Company, now for many years taken over by the Imperial Government. The Indian Medical Service, the Indian Forest Service, the Public Works Department, the Education Department, the Police Service, have in every generation possessed officers of

ability and distinction, but however distinguished an officer of these services may be, he is always subordinate to the head of the district, who is a civilian.

This pre-eminence enjoyed by the Indian Civil Service in India is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the position of the Secretariat. In view of the fact that parliamentary government does not exist in India, it might have been expected that the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor of an Indian province would rule with the assistance of a Cabinet composed of the administrative heads of the different departments, that the Education Service would supply him with a Minister of Education, the Public Works Department with a Minister of Public Works, the Forest or Agriculture Department with a Minister of Agriculture. This, however, is not the case. These departments indeed do possess official heads, but they are not part of the Provincial Government. Their work comes up, in the first place, before a Secretary to the Government, who is always a member of the Indian Civil Service, and no large proposal can be carried into effect without the imprimatur of the premier service. Some day, with the growth of specialisation and complexity, this hegemony may be broken down. At present it is practically unimpaired. So far as there is an attack upon the position of the Indian Civil Service, it comes not from the specialist services of later origin, but from the Indian bar. There is a very wide demand that the Indian Civil Servant shall no longer rise to the judicial posts of District, Sessions and High Court Judge, or exercise magisterial functions, and that the Indian judiciary should be filled by a separate form of recruitment. When the Public Services Commission toured round India, the cry for a separation of the executive and judicial functions was heard, most loudly indeed in the province of Bengal, where

there is a powerful Indian bar, but whenever and wherever Indian evidence was taken. It was argued that under the present system of union of functions, the judge came to his work with an administrative bias, that it was anomalous that the head of the police who brings the criminal to trial should also be the judge who sends him to prison, and that the justice of a civilian judge is amateur justice, good enough in barbarous times, but increasingly unsuitable to present conditions. On the other side it was contended that unless the district officer was also magistrate, his prestige would be gravely diminished in the eyes of the native population, that a substantial British element in the judiciary was essential, otherwise the administration might in times of racial tension be gravely hampered, and that though a civilian judge might know less law than a barrister imported from England, he would, through his administrative experience, know a good deal more about the Indians.

On all sides it would be admitted that the union of the executive and judicial functions is unsuited to highly developed communities, and in India the functions are already separated in the Presidency towns. On the other hand, the system of patriarchal justice possesses the advantages of cogency, economy, and simplicity in rude and primitive districts where public opinion gives very little support to the suppression of crime, and the amount of intricate civil jurisdiction is comparatively small. For this reason, the union of functions is likely to continue for a considerable time to come in the undeveloped parts of India, as also in Nigeria. On the other hand, it is likely, owing to the growing pressure of the barrister class, to disappear by degrees, and in places even before the time is ripe.

The relation of the political to the specialist services is another problem which is already discussed and is likely to

come into greater prominence, as the technical side of administration develops. In India the Civil Servant is, as has been said, the most highly paid agent of the Government. In Nigeria the civil engineer commands a higher rate than the head of the district. If an administrative system had to be created for India for the first time to-day, it is very unlikely that it would assume the shape which a long train of historical circumstances has given to the present system. There would be a single Civil Service of India, divided into a number of branches, executive, judicial, medical, agricultural, and the like, each recruited at the rate at which work of the type required can be supplied. There would be no one service so prominent among the other services as is the Indian Civil Service, or so exclusively entrusted with the central functions of advice at the headquarters of Government. The executive head of the Government would have a wider choice of secretaries and advisers. There would be more equality in pay and prospects between the different branches of the public service, more interchangeability, a less rigid system of administrative caste.

One of the necessary features of British administration in the tropics is that it is difficult to get any public work performed except upon the service system. Ordinarily speaking, you cannot get an Englishman to come out to India to do a particular piece of work lasting one, two, or three years, however highly you tempt him, for if he comes he loses his connection at home and may not be able to recover it. A University Lecturer may be brought out to teach in an Indian University for the cold weather, but hardly for any longer period short of a working lifetime. Consequently the best chance of obtaining good European service in a tropical country is to devise a system which will catch men young, train them for tropical service, and

keep them in work until the age of retirement is reached. It is on this system that the Government of India obtains its doctors, its college teachers, its bacteriologists, its forest officers. And no other system is possible. If a new branch of public work is opened, the first ambition of the officers employed is to be formed into a regular service, with fixed expectations of emolument and a recognised place in the official Table of Precedence.

The critics have not been slow to descry the dangers, temptations, and anomalies incidental to the working of this highly disciplined professional hierarchy. If a Professor of History goes on leave from a Government college, the State may name a Professor of Mathematics belonging to the Imperial Branch of the Education Service to officiate in his place, and the same Professor of Mathematics may shortly be transferred elsewhere to teach Geography or English Literature almost irrespective of his qualifications. Again the system has developed a very close and jealously guarded doctrine of vested interests—the higher posts in each service being regarded as the perquisite of the Service, as a prize against which recruitment has been made, and, consequently, not to be abolished until the vested interests of every person recruited against them have been satisfied. *Esprit de corps* is no doubt a valuable feature of public life, and there is no *esprit de corps* so strong as that of the Indian Public Services. The Indians themselves not unnaturally regard these services as manifestations of the European spirit of caste.

One of the outstanding features of the employment of a European agency in a tropical country is its costliness. A European will not serve in India or in other tropical countries at the rate for which he will render the same service at home. He must be remunerated for exile, for

the journey to and from, for the expense of keeping up two establishments, in which, if married, he is almost necessarily involved. He is a very costly article to import, and since he requires a pension on retirement, he is a charge on the revenues of the country long after he has ceased to render it any active service. Consequently the British administration in India is the costliest in the world, and a not unnatural mark for Indian critics, who complain of the heavy financial drain which it involves, and, in particular, of the large sums devoted to the payment of pensions.

The answer to these financial complaints is that if the administration of India requires a European leaven, the Indian taxpayers must be prepared to pay the price, without which the leaven cannot be procured. At the same time, the costliness of the European agency is a very powerful argument in favour of reducing it to the lowest possible figure consistent with continued efficiency, and this has for long been an acknowledged maxim of British policy.

A whole series of very difficult problems has arisen out of the costliness of the European. A European and an Indian are employed to do the same work. Should they receive the same pay? If they do, then the Indian is greatly overpaid, and the Indian taxpayers proportionately overburdened. If, on the other hand, the Indian is paid on a lower scale than the European, he feels aggrieved by the inequality of reward, since he is adjudged capable of doing the same work. The difficulty has become more acute owing to the fact that no uniform principle has hitherto been observed. Indian High Court Judges are paid the same salaries as their English brothers on the Bench, Indians who gain a place in the Civil Service competition in London are paid the same salaries as their English colleagues, but in most services the Indian receives

two-thirds of the European rate of pay, and the vernacular press protests against the injustice of rewarding the same work by different rates of pay. It is not a very big question, save when measured by the friction which it generates.

Another problem which occupies a large part in all Indian discussions is the Indian proportion in the higher branches of the Public Service. In general, the Indians contend that the time has arrived when they may be safely admitted in very much larger numbers to the higher branches of all the Public Services, and one of the matters submitted to the recent Commission was the extent to which this desire could be gratified without injury to the efficiency of the Government. It would not be proper to me to divulge the conclusions to which the Commission has arrived, since they have not been given to the public, but I may at least indicate the principal factors which enter into the consideration of the problem, since they are extremely familiar to the Anglo-Indian and Indian world. They are three in number, first the extent to which a particular service may be regarded as "a security service," *i.e.* as contributing to the security of the country; secondly, the extent to which for educational reasons it may be desirable that a service should possess a substantial European element; and, thirdly, the measure of the facilities provided for the training of Indians to enter those services in which it is desirable that they should be employed in greater numbers. One thing is certain. A man in the higher branches of the Indian Public Services is a marked man. He is seen, he is criticised, he is generally doing notable and noteworthy things. It is necessary that he should be efficient, and it is to the interest of India that authority should be given only to hands which can rightly wield it.

The questions to which I have been alluding are so

continually discussed in Indian newspapers that any treatment of them, however brief and perfunctory, will sound odious to the ear of the weary Anglo-Indian. Another question, undiscussed as yet, but likely to become prominent, is whether the scheme of Indian bureaucracy is likely to provide a sufficient stock of political talent in the generations to come. It is not without interest to notice that there is a good deal of weighty opinion to the effect that a peer brought out from England governs a province better than a Lieutenant-Governor who has risen through the bureaucracy of the Civil Service. There have indeed been idle and ineffective Governors, and very brilliant and effective Lieutenant-Governors—but the weight of opinion seems to incline to the Governor. He is not so experienced in the particulars of Indian government. He is, in general, not so able or industrious a man. Of oriental languages and literature he knows nothing, whereas the Lieutenant-Governor generally knows a great deal. But he brings a fresh eye; his mind is full of Western improvements and analogies; he is not encumbered by too much knowledge of detail. His outlook is apt to be broader. He is often more conciliatory in his bearing to Indians, having less experience of the difficulty of governing them, and, in general, a good Governor will possess more of the distinctive political talent of handling masses of opinion and party groups than the man whose whole life has been divided between district administration and the secretariat. It may indeed be questioned whether a life spent in the Indian Civil Service is calculated, except in rare cases, to stimulate that part of political talent which consists in the study and guidance of political opinion, or in the framing of the large legislative proposals which are from time to time needed in actively thinking political communities. Until

quite recently there was little need for such forms of talent in India, for if there was active thought among the Indians, it certainly did not revolve round the theme of politics. But the immemorial tranquillity of the East has now been disturbed, perhaps only for a time, perhaps never to be resumed, and we must make our account to meet an age of political discussion and criticism among men educated on the Western model, and using the Western philosophy to obtain their Eastern ends. Will that famous Indian Civil Service, which sends its sons upon their first arrival in India to five years of administrative work among the peasantry in some lonely district, the mother of so many strong and kindly fathers of the poor, rise to the occasion, and throw up men capable of guiding and inspiring the new India? It is a mistake to suppose that the oriental world is best governed by a policy of perpetual silence. Human nature is the same everywhere, and Indians, like Englishmen, are easily won by oratory, and seduced by the sweets of persuasion.

The problem of discovering and improving the political talent of the Government of India is made all the more urgent by reason of the rift which has sprung up between the British administration and the intellectual class of India. It is difficult to see how some such antagonism could have been averted once the decision had been arrived at to educate Indians in Western knowledge. From that moment it became clear that the governing bureaucracy would find itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, the Government Colleges would be providing an education in the philosophy, literature, and history of the democratic societies of the West; on the other hand, the political liberties which were the outcome of those intellectual conditions would be withheld. The paradox of the situation

was illustrated very clearly a few years ago when Lord Sydenham's Government removed English history from the list of subjects necessary to be offered for the matriculation examination of the Bombay University amid a storm of protest from the Indian leaders of public opinion in the province, who found in English history a long lesson of successful resistance to authority. Nor is it to be wondered at if the rising tide of Indian nationalism, with its unpleasant accompaniment of bombs, dacoities, and other spasmodic deeds of violence, should have helped to involve the whole Indian educated class in a certain atmosphere of suspicion with those on whose shoulders the responsibility for the maintenance of order primarily rests. The bigger men on both sides can shake themselves free from the pervading feeling of racial distrust, and are anxious to promote the harmonious co-operation of the two races. But the Indian Civil Servant, partly because he is a representative of the official class *par excellence,* and partly by reason of his absorption in the exacting routine of his official work, is, in general (though there are many noteworthy exceptions), less fortunately placed than the lawyer or the missionary for making real friends in the circle of educated India. Many civilians regret this, and would welcome fuller opportunities of free and friendly intercourse with intellectual Indians. Others find an insuperable difficulty in establishing relations with men whose political outlook is so radically different from their own.

The new Indian Councils, by bringing the leaders of Indian public opinion into connection with the official class, do, no doubt, afford valuable opportunities of ascertaining the drift and quality of the educated Indian mind. Government measures have to be defended against criticism ; and in the course of debate the characters of the critics divulge

themselves. One man shows himself to be steadfast and trustworthy, another to be slippery and fitful. A strong and skilful critic, like the late Mr. Gokhale, inspired general respect, for it was manifest that his conduct was guided by disinterested motives. And nowhere was there a more cordial recognition of Mr. Gokhale's fine qualities than among the members of the Anglo-Indian community. Again the great difficulty of social intercourse between Englishmen and Indians in India consists in the absence of common topics, and the debates in Council provide common topics. They are not, it is true, so useful in bringing the races together, as joint work at the Bar or on the Bench, for in the Councils the Indian element is mainly in opposition, and the opposition is often a source of irritation to the Government. But the Councils are a good deal better than nothing, and, though you may often hear them condemned as involving a serious waste of public time, no time is really wasted which contributes to amend the principal defect in the present political education of the Indian Civil Service, its failure to secure for the Civil Servant easy opportunities for an understanding of educated India. A little sympathy goes a very long way in India, and the finest district officer may fail when he comes to deal with a Legislative Council, by reason of the fact that he has expended all his available stock of sympathy on the peasants, and has none to spare for the journalists and lawyers.

In speaking of Indian administration, however, we should always bear in mind that in India, as throughout the Empire, we practise no uniform system. Our administration in India belongs, in fact, to two main types. There is the direct British administration of British India, and there is the indirect British administration of the Indian

States, just as in Nigeria, besides the portion of the colony directly administered by Sir Frederick Lugard, there are the Moslem Emirates, in which the British influence percolates through native channels. Now the Native State in India is one of our most successful achievements; and my impression (but please remember that it is merely the impression of a superficial and hasty observer) is that the inhabitants of a well-governed Native State are on the whole happier and more contented than the inhabitants of British India. They are more lightly taxed; the pace of the administration is less urgent and exacting; their sentiment is gratified by the splendour of a native Indian Court, and by the dominion of an Indian Government. They feel that they do things for themselves instead of having everything done for them by a cold and alien benevolence. And yet they obtain the advantages of the *Pax Britannica*, are protected against the caprices of a cruel despot, and derive benefit not only from the help of the British Resident, but also from the presence of Indian administrators who have received their early training in British India. A Native Indian State is, in fact, the most perfect experiment so far, devised for bringing West and East together in a natural, pleasant, and wholesome way. The old oriental forms are preserved, the princely house, the princely court, the Durbar of splendidly robed oriental councillors, the princely bodyguard. The ordinary Indian seems to be more comfortable in a Native State, wears brighter colours, and goes more at his ease. And among modern Indian princes there is no little emulation in the matter of good works, such as the provision of schools and hospitals, so that these Western improvements come to be regarded there as popular possessions rather than as intrusive novelties, and are often, indeed, demanded by the public voice.

The success of these Native States depends upon the fact that they are encompassed by the atmosphere and institutions of British India. Remove the British Raj and it is only too certain that the princes would quarrel, that their subjects would be ground down with taxation, and that the revenues now devoted to objects of public utility would be squandered in guns and rifles. At the same time it is a question worth considering whether it might not be possible to extend the area of India now governed by this indirect method. In the public discussions as to the future of India, reference to the Native States, which occupy a third of the continent, is generally omitted, and it seems to be assumed that political development will take the form of an extension of self-government upon a Western rather than upon an Eastern plan. But the other alternative is at least worth considering, for it is possible that by the creation of new principalities in great tracts of country, such as Bengal, the devolution of authority might proceed in a manner at once more intimately congenial to oriental ways of thought and more advantageous to the maintenance of the British connection.

Such a proposal, however, would meet with no support from the Indian leaders of political thought, who are apt to view the Native States as backward, if not as reactionary. They wish for a fuller share of power in British India, and have no interest in promoting a plan by which the area of British India would be curtailed. Nor in their ideals for the distant future do they entertain the project of a federation in which British India would be the predominant, and the Native States the less important partners. Yet the facts of the situation would seem to indicate that if ever India is removed from the category of dependencies into the category of dominions, the constitutional pattern of

the new State must be a federation in which hereditary monarchies and principalities are included as constituent parts.

Upon the most important matter of all, upon the spirit which informs the British administration of that ancient oriental society where clashing creeds, long-inherited customs, and delicate sensibilities put our powers of governance to their most arduous test, a brief concluding word may be spoken. "There is but one way," said General Gordon, "to govern men, and it is eternal truth. Get into their skins. Try to realise their feelings. That is the true secret of government." In India the secret has been known of old. In the instructions issued to the supervisors by the Council of Calcutta in 1769 we read as follows:

> Your commission entrusts you with the superintendence and charge of a province whose rise and fall must considerably affect the public welfare of the whole. The exposing and eradicating numberless oppressions which are as grievous to the poor as they are injurious to the Government; the displaying of those national principles of honour, faith, rectitude, and humility which should ever characterise the name of an Englishman; the impressing the lowest individual with these ideas and raising the heart of the Ryot from oppression and despondency to security and joy are the valuable results which must result to our nation from a prudent and wise behaviour on your part. Versed as you are in the language depend on none when you yourself can possibly hear and determine. Let access to you be easy, and be careful of the conduct of your dependants. Aim at no undue influence yourself, and check it in all others. Great share of integrity, disinterestedness, assiduity, and watchfulness is necessary not only for your own guidance, but as an example to all others.

Nearly a hundred and fifty years have passed since these directions, containing the heart of all true political magnanimity and wisdom, were issued by the Council of Calcutta to the Agents charged with the task of supervising the adminis-

tration of Bengal. A very different theory of government in tropical and semi-tropical countries had been practised by other colonising nations, but it is to the credit of the British administration of India that within the first decade of its exercise of political authority, it viewed the problem before it, not as the merciless exploitation of a lucrative estate, but as a responsibility for the lot of an oppressed and impoverished peasantry. In that spirit of paternal guidance and sympathy, the Government of India and of our dependencies has ever since proceeded. A slow Government, cautious to the point of timidity, suspicious of all new ideas outside the sphere of administrative improvement, but within that sphere swift, resolute, and enterprising, a Government unused to external criticism, and somewhat distrustful of external critics, but spotlessly pure, ceaselessly vigilant, studiously respectful of the religious and social traditions of the people, and single-minded in its devotion to the material and moral welfare of 315 million souls.

COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE

By Philip H. Kerr, M.A., Editor of *The Round Table.*

Most of the controversies which sunder men derive half their bitterness from misunderstandings about words. Words are but labels for ideas, and as people's grasp of ideas is ever changing, so does the meaning they attach to the words by which they represent them. How many of us here in this room would agree about the precise meaning of the term "liberty." The Germans talk about liberty, but as an American newspaper observed, their idea of liberty is that of the free fox in the free hen-roost. Young people are also fond of talking of liberty, by which they mean going their own way without much regard to what anybody else thinks, or to the consequences of their action. Democrats love the term, but in their mouths it is often synonymous with the right to vote. Mazzini, on the other hand, though one of the greatest of democrats, declared that the only kind of liberty a man was entitled to was the right to be free from the obstacles that prevent the unimpeded fulfilment of his duties. Luther said much the same thing when he said that liberty was necessary because only in freedom could a Christian man serve his neighbour as he should. Mr. Balfour, therefore, gave good advice when, during one of those bitter controversies which preceded the war, and

which are now fortunately hushed, he urged people not to be misled by labels. It is the first principle of useful controversy that the parties to the debate should agree about the meaning of the terms they use.

There is no word more misused, or about which there is a wider divergence of interpretation in the popular mind than the word "Empire," or rather, the word "Imperialism." You cannot read a book nor listen to a discussion on the subject without becoming aware that its opponents and its supporters are at hopeless cross purposes. To one side Imperialism implies the worst kind of Prussianism. To the other it represents the loftiest ideals of chivalry, with which are associated the abolition of such evils as the slave trade, the stamping out of famine and plague in India, and the gift of peace, order, and education to oppressed peoples. In one of its aspects this paper is an attempt to attach certain more precise meanings to words which are bound to be greatly used in political discussion in the next few years.

There have always been two schools of opinion about empire. The two schools have been known by many names, none of them very apposite. They have been called the Imperialists and the little Englanders, the jingoes and the pro-Boers or pro-Germans, the militarists and the pacifists, the forward school and the school of *laissez-faire*. Perhaps the simplest way of arriving at clear ideas on the subject and also about the proper terms to use in discussing it, will be to examine in a thoroughly critical manner the views of these two parties. By realising the falsity of the extreme views we may be able to arrive at the common ground of truth.

The first extreme school may be conveniently labelled as the jingo-Imperialists. They are represented exactly by

the latter-day Prussians. Their notion of government is dominion—the ascendancy of their own race, the subservience of all others. They are resentful of the expansion of any other nation. They are jealous even of the liberty and progress of other peoples. Their idea of colonies is that they should be replicas of the parent state, and obedient to it. Their conception of the role of dependent peoples is that they should serve as labour for the production of raw materials which they will afterwards buy from their rulers in the form of finished products. In their eyes both colonies and dependencies are of value only in so far as they add to the power and strength of the parent state, and their development is moulded to that end. And the purpose of the whole national development, of the founding of colonies, and of the acquisition of dependencies, is that the parent state itself may prevail in a struggle for ascendancy and power over its neighbours.

Imperialism of this kind is based on racial pride. It is indifferent to the sufferings of others so long as they serve its own ends. It is the natural child of autocracy. If we would find it in the robes of a philosopher we may consult Herr von Treitschke. If we would prefer it in the uniform of the soldier we must turn to von Bernhardi. If we would find it in the creed of the statesman we have only to look to Bismarck. Modern Germany not only manifests Imperialism of this kind, but is the product of it. At the beginning of his career Bismarck declared, "We all wish the same. We all wish that the Prussian eagle should spread out his wings as guardian and ruler from the Memel to the Donnersberg, but free will we have him, not bound by a new Regensburg diet. Prussians we are, and Prussians will we remain." At the same time he defined with his own unerring clearness the doctrine of blind and implicit obedience to authority,

on which this evil Imperialism rests. "The strife of principles," he said, in 1848, "which during this year has shattered Europe to its foundations, is one in which no compromise is possible. They rest upon opposite bases. The one draws its law from what is called the will of the people, in truth, however, from the law of the strongest on the barricades. The other rests on authority created by God, an authority by the grace of God, and seeks its development in organic connection with the existing and constitutional legal status . . . the decision on these principles will come not by Parliamentary debate, not by majorities of eleven votes; sooner or later the God who directs the battle will cast his iron dice."

The German people were eventually united by Bismarck on Prussian lines. Germany became Prussia-Germany, an ultra-Imperialist state.

At any other time than this it might be necessary to explain the evils to which jingo-Imperialism is bound to lead. It can hardly be necessary to-day. We are all familiar with the denial of political rights, the oppression of subject races, the disregard of treaties, the justification of frightfulness, the glorification of terrorism, conquest, and war to which it leads. If we would understand alike the glamour and the pure negation of the Imperialist creed we shall find them in Nietzsche. The last aphorism from his Will to Power sets forth in his own matchless language the subtle appeal of the terrible gospel of dominion and power.

> And do ye know what "the universe" is to my mind? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity of energy which grows neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and without sources of revenue,

surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier. It is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity; but is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space, and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves at the same time one and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling back over incalculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen material, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying yea into itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for ever blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,—a becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:—this, my Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my "Beyond Good and Evil," without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the circle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to itself,—would you have a name for my world? A *solution* of all your riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and most undaunted men of the blackest midnight? *This world is the Will to Power—and nothing else!* And even ye yourselves are this will to power—and nothing besides!

In these words lies all the empty glamour of Empire, the barren panoply of war. It is easy to see how it can capture the imagination and wreck the conscience by its spell. Had Nietzsche, with all his spirit and courage, preached not the will to power, with its banquet of lust and carnage and agony, but the steadfast will to love and truth, he might have been one of the greatest of human benefactors instead of the inspiration to the greatest infamy ever perpetrated by man.

It comes as rather a shock to us in these days to read some of our Imperialist literature in the past and see how

perilously near some of us have been to preaching the Prussian brand of Imperialism. This is a quotation from a book published by a well-known English professor some fifteen years ago. It is to the interest, he says, of a vigorous race to be "kept up to a high pitch of external efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with inferior races, and with equal races by the struggle for trade routes and for the sources of raw material and of food supply." "This," he adds, "is the natural history view of mankind, and I do not think you can in its main features subvert it." "In the history of man," he goes on, "as throughout nature, stronger races have continually trampled down, enslaved, and exterminated other races." "This is so rooted in nature, including human nature, that it must go on." "It has been the prime condition and mode of progress in the past, therefore it is desirable that it should go on. It must go on, it ought to go on." We see the logical significance of these sentiments now. When they were written they probably passed almost unchallenged because neither their author nor the public appreciated what they led to. Take another quotation from the writings of a well-known and most democratic Imperialist. "Probably every one would agree that an Englishman would be right in considering his way of looking at the world and at life better than that of the Maori or the Hottentot, and no one would object in the abstract to England doing her best to impose her better and higher view on those savages. But the same idea will carry you much further. In so far as an Englishman differs in essentials from a Swede or a Belgian he believes that he represents a more perfectly developed standard of excellence. Yes, and even those nations nearest to us in mind and sentiment—German and Scandinavian—we regard on the whole as not so excellent as ourselves, comparing their typical

characteristics with ours. Were this not so, our energies would be directed to becoming what they are. Without doing this, however, we may well endeavour to pick out their best qualities, and add them to ours, believing that our compound will be superior to the foreign stock. It is the mark of an independent nation that it should feel this. How far such a feeling is, in any particular case, justified history alone decides. But it is essential that each claimant for the first place should put forward his whole energy to prove his right. This is the moral justification for international strife and for war, and a great change must come over the world and over men's minds before there can be any question of everlasting universal peace, or the settlement of all international differences by arbitration." This is almost the gospel of Kultur, and if one quoted it to the author to-day he would probably repudiate it with emphasis as being contrary to the modern spirit of the Empire.

There can be no doubt that the language of Imperialism in the past has at times shown a bias towards what we now see to be the Prussian heresy. Mr. J. A. Hobson quotes a conversation in which a vigorous Imperialist in reply to the question, "Why, I suppose you imagine we could undertake to govern France better than Frenchmen can govern her?" answered with conviction, "Why, of course I do." After the muddling of the last year, and the spectacle of what other nations can do, we have lost a little of our insular conceit, but no one who remembers the tone of ten or fifteen years ago will deny that, if exaggerated, the quotation has a familiar ring about it. That the spirit of Prussia has brooded over this land is proved by the shortest examination of the history of Ireland. "Of a population reckoned at 1,466,000 when Cromwell's wars began, over 616,000, or close on half, are estimated to have perished before its close

in 1652. Slave dealers were then let loose on the land, who shipped the destitute children of the dead to Barbadoes. The abuses became such that the Puritan Government which had for some time cordially supported the system made vain efforts to stop it." All this happened long ago, and in recent times we have never, despite the language of some of our Imperialists, inclined in practice far towards the Prussian view. But it is well to remember at times the sins as well as the virtues of our forebears, lest we should become too proud. This War, if it has done nothing else, has burnt out of our national consciousness any taint it may have had of militarism or Prussian Imperialism.

Let us look now at the other side of the picture and examine the views of the anti-Imperialists—the little Englanders. Their typical representatives may be seen in the old Manchester school with its war-cry that the welfare of men was to be attained by buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest. The doctrine of *laissez-faire*, or "every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost," professes a certain robust confidence in both the vigour and justice of the average man, and on the strength of it would interfere as little as possible with his absolute freedom to do as he chooses. It lays stress on the rights, rather than on the duties of man, and believes that society will be most happy and prosperous in which there is the least interference with what it describes as natural laws.

The outcome of these doctrines in their extreme form has been only less disastrous than the doctrines of an excessive Imperialism. Their effect within the British Isles has been proverbial. The evils of the industrial revolution remained long unchecked because interference with private enterprise was the unpardonable sin. The stories of the long

hours worked by women and children in the factories, of their hopeless and stunted lives, all justified by the inhuman policy of *laissez-faire*, are familiar to all. No one was more fervent in the denunciation of slavery than John Bright, no one was more vehement in his opposition to Lord Ashley's ten hours' bill, for mitigating the worst horrors of factory labour. It was the same with Ireland in the famine years from 1847 to 1853. The doctrinaire belief in leaving people to save themselves, and forbidding interference with so-called economic laws, impeded the work of relief at every turn. The sufferings of industrial England and of Ireland under this régime were hardly less than those of peoples groaning under the deadening oppression of tyrannical rule.

We are concerned, however, not with the internal history of the United Kingdom, but with the outer empire, and here the evils of little Englandism are not less apparent. On the plea of liberty it amounts as often as not to the practical advice to stand on one side and watch cruelty and oppression rage unchecked. It is not possible to understand why this is so without some consideration of the conditions among backward communities, when they first come into contact with civilisation. The forms of contact are numerous, through missionaries, students, explorers, but in modern times, since the opening of the seas and the development of railway, steamboat, and telegraph, the most characteristic form of contact has been commercial intercourse. Unfortunately, unregulated commercial contact between peoples widely differing in civilisation has invariably been disastrous to the backward race. In some cases, traders, freed from the restraints of their own civilisation and demoralised by climate and association with a backward people, take full advantage of their superior

knowledge and strength to exploit and oppress these people for their own profit. History records countless instances of the process. The slave trade is the conspicuous instance, but the Congo atrocities, the Putumayo horrors, the abominations in the New Hebrides, show that the process is rampant where opportunities offer, in our own day. The following is an extract from a report by Mr. D. Campbell on the situation in the Congo between 1891 and 1898, and quoted by Mr. E. D. Morel in *Red Rubber* :

After that Katoro, another very large chief living near the apex of the western and eastern Lualaba, was attacked. The crowds were fired into promiscuously, and fifteen were killed, including four women and a babe on its mother's breast. The heads were cut off and brought to the officer in charge, who then sent men to cut off the hands also, and these were pierced, strung and dried over the camp fire. The heads, with many others, I saw myself. The town, prosperous once, was burnt, and what they could not carry off was destroyed. Crowds of people were caught, mostly old women and young women, and three fresh rope gangs were added. These poor "prisoner" gangs were mere skeletons of skin and bone, and their bodies cut frightfully with the *chicotte* when I saw them. Chiyombo's very large town was next attacked. A lot of people were killed, and heads and hands cut off and taken back to the officers. . . . Shortly after the State caravans, with flags flying and bugles blowing, entered the mission station at Luanza, on Lake Mweru, where I was then alone, and I shall not soon forget the sickening sight of deep baskets of human heads. These baskets of "war trophies" were used . . . for a big war-dance, to which was added the State quota of powder and percussion-caps. . . . I made a journey myself to the copper hills in the west, to the caves, to Ntenke's, Katanga's, Makaka's, and Kateke's, all in South Lamba, and found the sentries everywhere living like kings, plundering, killing, and burning villages in the name of the State. I append a list of the villages and chiefs at "Sentry Posts" known to me, and each manned by two black soldiers. (Here follow twenty villages, with their localities, etc.) Each of these posts was manned, as stated, by two black soldiers to look after State

interests, chiefs, and ivory. . . . Perhaps you will say, "Why did you not speak out and report all this?" My first experience in Katanga was Captain X's threat to imprison my colleague for denouncing these doings. Every time I made representations they were declared impossible, or the answer was, "Will ask my head sentry to make inquiries," the head sentry being one of the worst blackguards in the country. Nothing was ever proved. He would not believe his soldiers could be guilty of such misconduct, or, "Well, they must have *carte blanche*, or the natives would not respect the State." Sometimes "Might is right" would be the curt reply. What could one say? There were no judges or courts of appeal, and the officer, often at his wits' end, would say, "What can I do? I MUST get ivory. I have no law or regulation book. I am the only law and only God in Katanga."

In other cases the results are not less disastrous through no fault of the traders themselves. The backward people is unable to resist, not the virtues, but the vices of civilisation. Drink, money, firearms corrupt their own society and its feeble restraints, and dissolution sets in, which they are incapable of setting right. Instances of this kind are even commoner than of the first. The process is a commonplace in Africa. It is to be seen in the Central American republics. It is destroying Persia and Mexico, as it destroyed in earlier times Egypt and India. It has gone some way to dismember China. And in all cases it precedes any armed intervention or attempt at Empire-building.

These then are the practical facts of the modern world which civilised governments have to deal with. How are these evils, very similar to those of the industrial revolution, to be mitigated? Reason and experience alike prove that only one course is possible, and that is that some stable and civilised authority should intervene to protect the backward peoples from the effects of contact with the evils of civilisation until they can learn to maintain a civilised government for themselves. The one thing you cannot do, if you are a

human being, is to do nothing. Civilisation cannot stand on one side and see native tribes destroyed by so-called civilised looters or marauders, or as the result of the free introduction of firearms, drink, and other instruments of vice. It cannot, and ought not if it could, maintain an impassable ring-fence of sentries and warships round their territories, and so shut them out from all contact with the outside world. It has therefore to step in and regulate intercommunication in the interests of all concerned. And that in the worst cases means the assumption of responsibility for government of foreigner and native alike.

These conditions are the real reasons for what is sometimes attacked as Empire-building. This is not to say that civilised governments have never acquired dependencies wrongfully. They have, repeatedly. But that does not alter the fact that the government of dependencies is a necessity in the modern world, for it is the only method of putting an end to intolerable sufferings among backward peoples. It is necessary in the extreme cases already mentioned. It is necessary where, through no direct fault of civilised man, backward peoples fall under the control of some savage despot, who oppresses his own dependants, or murders missionaries or innocuous travellers. Intervention is also the only method of providing for the orderly progress towards self-government in the case of those more advanced peoples, who, as in India, have developed a vigorous civilisation of their own, but who, through the size of their country, or through racial and religious animosities or social customs, have proved unable to maintain a stable government for themselves once they have been subjected to the demoralising influences of the Western world.

It is precisely this conclusion, to which the little Englander and the anti-Imperialist, like the Manchester

economist before him, refuses to assent. If the jingo-Imperialist is blinded by the glamour of power and the panoply of war, and would inflict useless suffering for the sake of dominion, his opponent is intoxicated by theories and phrases about liberty, and would cause not less suffering in order that he himself may not be bothered by responsibility. He has an infinite stock of arguments about the right of every people to govern itself, which, true and admirable in their right place, amount, when applied in these cases, to a justification of the right of the strong to oppress and exploit the weak, and his own right to repeat the words of Cain, " Am I my brother's keeper ? "

It is not contended that all anti-Imperialists are consciously animated by these callous motives, any more than that all Imperialists are governed by tyrannical motives. In fact it is the anti-Imperialists who are, to the credit of their hearts, often the loudest in their cries for intervention in Armenia, or the Congo, when atrocities occur, just as it is the Imperialists who are most insistent on not abandoning an oppressed people once intervention has taken place. But what the little Englanders will not admit, to the discredit of their heads, is that massacre and barbarism will not be put an end to by phrases. As in the case of any other social evil, the process of eradicating an established wrong is slow, and must have permanently behind it, if it is not to reappear, the sanction of civilised law. When the inhabitants are clearly unable either to create sound law or to enforce it for themselves, when in consequence they are condemned to chaos and suffering largely caused by adventurers from civilised lands, it is the clear duty of their neighbours to step in and set things in order until they are sufficiently educated to maintain a good government for themselves.

The *laissez-faire* attitude is the special disease of democracy as jingo-Imperialism is the special disease of autocracy. Being still in their infancy, and having come into being as the outcome of a struggle for the rights of the individual, modern democracies are weak in their sense of responsibility for others. They are solicitous for the equality and welfare of their own members, but they are easily misled by the catchwords of their own history into thinking that they have nothing to do with the rest of the world, that the welfare of mankind will be achieved by each nation minding its own business and leaving its neighbours to get on as best they can for themselves. This fatal view has been the cause of much needless suffering in the past. It led to those repudiations of responsibility which eventually had to be put right at the terrible cost of the Sudan campaign and the South African War. It was the desertion of Gordon which rendered inevitable the untold horrors of the later Mahdi and Khalifa régime, and led to the Nile expedition. It was the refusal of the British Government to assume any responsibility for law and order in the Transvaal and Orange Free State in the middle of the nineteenth century which led to that tragic chapter of history which included Majuba and the Boer War. This same spirit has condemned Macedonia and Armenia to the ever-recurring horror of massacre. It has been the governing principle in the attitude of America to Belgium and Armenia to-day. It was the chief reason why the Western nations failed to combine to take, as they might have taken, those steps which would probably have prevented the outbreak of the present war. The truth is that mankind is one family. It cannot prosper so long as its members either seek dominion over one another, or are indifferent to one another. Its happiness depends upon their learning to help one another and to work together.

Now it is easy enough to exaggerate the defects both of the jingo-Imperialists and the little Englanders. It is not suggested that there are many in Britain who consciously belong to either school as herein depicted. But this examination serves to show up the root error in both views. The Imperialists, solicitous for good government, anxious to put an end to infamous abuses, conscious that mere *laissez-faire* can only cause suffering all round, are prone to interfere unnecessarily with others, to impose their own civilisation on an unwilling people, to lay too much stress on mere good government, to despotic methods. The opposite school, in their anxiety not to destroy that liberty of initiative and independence of judgment which is the taproot of progress, are prone to forget that liberty can only flourish where civilised law exists, and that the first condition of securing that self-development and self-government by which they rightly lay such store, is to ensure a condition of law and order in which the individual is free to reap what he has sown, and make his own way upwards. Between the two extremes, of the creation of empires for the sake of Empire, and acquiescence in anarchy or tyranny, because the task of saving the victims is troublesome, there is a wide margin. Within that margin there is room for profound differences of opinion. People are never likely to agree upon the precise moment when all chance of the restoration of good government by internal forces has gone, and outside intervention must take place. Nor are they likely to see eye to eye on the best methods of teaching a backward people the arts of self-government.

Nevertheless, the true course lies between the two extremes. And I am bold enough to believe that, on the whole, with many lapses and failures, this course is the one which has been followed by those who have guided

the destinies of the British Empire. Further, I submit, that in having thus avoided the worst evils of Imperialism on the one hand, and of the policy of selfish isolation on the other, they have created, not an Empire, but a Commonwealth.

It is not easy to define wherein a Commonwealth consists. A Commonwealth cannot exist among a people whose government depends upon unquestioning obedience to authority, whether it is secured by terrorism inspired by armed force, or by the sedulous inculcation into the subjects that disobedience is impious and wicked. Nor can it exist among people organised on the principle of limited liability, on the basis that society is merely a makeshift for controlling the otherwise destructive propensities of its members. A Commonwealth bases its communal life squarely on the principle that every citizen has an unlimited duty of helping every other citizen, that it exists to maintain or promote self-government among its peoples, and that the society it fosters will be healthy only in so far as its members are governed not by the calculations of intelligent selfishness, but by the law of love.

It is easier, indeed, to define the spirit than the nature of a Commonwealth, and its spirit can be defined in no better way than to say that it is the spirit of the second great Christian commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This spirit, the spirit of love and service, is an infallible guide in all the perplexities which we have discussed. It avoids the perils of national ambition as surely as it does the allurements of a selfish disregard of the needs of others. On the one hand, it is the parent of liberty. It is essentially tolerant. It imposes no orthodoxies. It will interfere with no man's beliefs so long as they do not lead him to injure others.

From it have sprung our political rights, Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the Press. From it also has sprung democracy, in so far as it has freed the people from the duty of blindly obeying kings or autocrats, however infamous and unjust their commands. It is, too, the very negation of that racial exclusiveness and pride, which is the root of false Imperialism. It is the spirit of the missionary, the educationalist, the physician, rather than of the mere governor. It aspires to help and guide, not to impose. On the other hand, it lays not less emphasis on responsibility than on liberty. It will not tolerate oppression and cruelty or any wickedness which inflicts injury on others. It is the very opposite of *laissez-faire*. In its eyes there can be no justification for injustice, and in its zeal to help the weak and suffering it manifests that crusading fire which has put an end to all the worst cruelties and slaveries of history. No official assurances or explanations can persuade it to acquiesce in wrong-doing to the least of our fellow-beings. It is thus the inspiration of that other principle which is essential to democracy if it is to meet human needs—the principle that political power is not so much a right as a duty, not a privilege merely, but a responsibility, a responsibility which self-respecting citizens should assume, not as a means of getting things for themselves, but because only so can they make the fullest contribution within their power to the better ordering of the society in which they live.

The British Empire is a Commonwealth because, for the last hundred years, its policy has been modelled more or less on these lines. There have been lamentable failures and lapses, but none the less, its directing peoples have never capitulated to the errors of Prussianism on the one hand, or to the errors of pure self-concentration on the other. The

British Commonwealth, indeed, has come into being, not through any consciously Imperial design, not, as Seeley said, in a fit of absence of mind, or by accident, but because it has supplied the needs of the people within it. Where chaos, or tyranny, or callous exploitation, or perpetual war and robbery reigned before, it has established peace, order, and justice. Under the protection of its laws one quarter of the people of the earth live in peace and unity. It guarantees to every individual, of whatever race or colour, an equal liberty before the law. It protects them from devastation from without, and from disorder within. It bridges, in its laws and its institutions, the gulf between East and West, between white and black, between race and race. It is even able to give full liberty to nationalism and yet combine it with loyalty to a greater Commonwealth. To all it promises not good government only, but eventual self-government. Its whole purpose is to ensure that every citizen may lead the freest and fullest life, consistent with the acknowledgment and discharge of his duties to the rest of the four hundred million human beings who are his fellow-citizens. It is easy to point to defects in its administration and its institutions. The room for improvement and progress is infinite. None the less it does, in its imperfect human way, meet an essential human need, and that is why it exists, and why it must continue to exist. If we wish for further testimony to this fact we have only to look at the spectacle of unity and enthusiasm for its defence which all its peoples have manifested in the past year.

In conclusion, we may take a brief glance at the problems which confront us in the future. The first concerns the relations to one another of the self-governing nations of the Commonwealth. After the War is over, the peoples of the Dominions will refuse to acquiesce in a con-

stitutional position, which while giving them autonomy in local affairs, leaves the issues of war and peace, that is their own national destinies, entirely in the hands of a Foreign Minister who enters office as the result of the domestic party scramble of the British Isles. The War has revealed the fact that autonomy is not full self-government. If, therefore, they are to be true to the political principles of the British Commonwealth they are bound to be driven to a choice between independence on the one side, and an equal sharing of power and responsibility with the inhabitants of these islands on the other. The decision, while in one sense it will rest entirely with the Dominions, in another will rest equally with ourselves. For there can be no true union of the self-governing nations unless the House of Commons is ready to surrender its control of purely Imperial affairs to a new and representative Imperial body. Can there be any question of our carrying out our part of an arrangement necessary to the continued unity and stability of the Commonwealth?

The second concerns our attitude to the dependencies. The peoples of the dependencies, and especially of India, will certainly ask for some formal definition of their status within the Commonwealth, and for some further advance towards self-government. Indeed, they have already done so. And they will urge in support that they have taken their share in defending the integrity of our common state, and have shown that they appreciate and understand the principles which give it life. This is true. Things can never be after the War what they were before. We need not hazard exact prophecies as to what ought and what can be done. But we can say that whatever steps are taken must be in the direction of helping the peoples of the dependencies to govern themselves as rapidly as possible.

Nothing else is consonant with the principles to which we subscribe. This is not to solve the problem. The question of how to adjust a continuous progress towards self-government with the welfare of all the peoples not only in India itself, but of the rest of the Commonwealth, is perhaps the most difficult of all the problems which confront us. The solution of it will be found only in so far as we keep resolutely in front of our eyes the welfare of the whole. If the Indian peoples continue to remember the responsibilities as well as the rights which liberty carries in its train, and if the self-governing peoples remember that the purpose of the Commonwealth is to promote the development of all its members, and are able to fire the imagination of the non-self-governing peoples with their own ideals, a way will be found.

Finally, one word about foreign affairs. We cannot appreciate the full significance of the British Commonwealth or the full importance of the closer unity of its peoples, until we consider their relations with the outside world. The British Commonwealth is the standing denial of the twin doctrines which have caused the devastation of Europe in this war. It is a living proof that unity comes not of force, but of justice and law, not of self-concentration, but of mutual service. It proves no less that peace is the fruit, not of jealousy and selfishness, but of a brotherhood which can transcend the narrower claims of race and nationality and colour. If it were to break up, it would be the greatest calamity which could befall mankind. Indeed, the full fruition of the principles on which it rests will not be realised until through voluntary association with other Commonwealths it has come to include all the peoples of the earth. All hopes of human unity and of universal peace, therefore, depend upon its surviving not only the shocks of this

colossal war, but the subtler dissensions which may endanger it afterwards. If it does so, the secret springs of its strength cannot fail to impress the minds of other men searching, after the harvest of carnage, for the principles that will give them freedom, justice, peace. What those principles are we have seen. If we are to save ourselves, still more, if we are to help others, we must see to it that we are not less faithful to them in the future than we have been in the past.

THE DUTY OF THE EMPIRE TO THE WORLD

By G. R. Parkin, C.M.G., M.A., D.C.L.

The word "Duty" has played a great part in the upbuilding of our British Empire. In the past it has inspired our greatest statesmen, sailors, and soldiers; the pursuit of it has given them their most enduring fame; it has been the trumpet call to which the rank and file of our people have responded most certainly and most heartily in times of national emergency or prolonged strain.

Against the passion for "Glory" which Napoleon used to inflame his legions for the conquest of the world, our national heroes—Nelson and Wellington—invoked in the struggle of a century ago the simple call of "Duty." And now again this same "Duty" must face the dream of world "Domination" which has intoxicated the German mind.

Duty has been the touchstone which determined the true relation of the individual to the State. It is perhaps the most effective safeguard that we know against those excesses of party spirit which from time to time lead men astray and threaten the peace of the Commonwealth. When the spirit of faction had done its worst, we have ourselves seen how the call of Duty restored statesmen to sanity and gave a new unity to a distracted nation.

We see the loud call which it makes to-day filling the

ranks of the army with men ready at its bidding to face the great issues of life and death; inspiring also with a new energy our vast armies of industry. We see it bracing up our people to bear financial burdens such as never have been thought of before: to bear them, too, for other nations less able to make contributions of money to the common cause. Our failures, and they are not a few, have come when this sense was lacking or inadequate. It is to the sense of duty that we must chiefly appeal in the struggle against idleness, frivolity, indifference, extravagance, and other evils which weaken the body politic.

If personal duty of the citizen to the community is our main reliance for winning our way successfully through this greatest crisis of our national existence, it is a deepened sense of national duty to other communities which will enable us to reap the noblest and most enduring fruits of the victory, which, however much delayed, we anticipate.

It will be our surest guarantee for the maintenance of the Empire.

Out of the Armageddon into which we have been plunged, the nations of Europe, victors and vanquished alike, will emerge exhausted and chastened beyond precedent, bereaved in their homes, burdened with debt, confronted with problems of utmost difficulty in fixing penalties, reconciling race interests, arranging new boundaries, healing the wounds that industry has received, and generally reconstructing the dislocated machinery of ordinary life. Above all, for each one of them a revision of national outlook is inevitable: a review of the spiritual forces which give impulse and guidance to all powerful nationality. New values will be given to national ideals, to national pledges, to the true limits of national ambition, to the right direction of national energy. It is the nation which gets these new

ideals and values most truly fixed that will gain most from the War, not the nation which secures an indemnity or the largest increment of territory.

We know that when the War is over we shall be infinitely poorer through the wastage of precious lives. Shall we find compensation in a new and grander outlook of national purpose, a reconsecration of all we have to the service of the world—the most worthy of all memorials to the men who have given their lives for the maintenance of the Empire? Shall we find the moral moorings of the nation strengthened for the new strain which is sure to be put upon it in the years to come?

This is the interrogation we must answer at the bar of history.

What the individual owes to the nation, the nation, with its larger outlook, owes to the world. If we British people are to measure this debt of duty, as we certainly ought to do, by what has been given to us, we shall find it great indeed.

In following our race instincts, and in the course of our national development, we have gained a position and accepted responsibilities without any precedent in the whole course of human history.

Let us try to put before ourselves as briefly as may be what this position is, and what these responsibilities mean. Only thus can we grasp the wide reach of national obligation.

For the last three hundred years there has poured out from these small islands a steady and constantly increasing stream of the people of our race who have gone forth to find homes in the most habitable parts of those continents which were opened up to Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They carried with them a social system, ideas

of liberty, and principles of government which have given an extraordinary vitality to the communities which they founded. The result of that migration has been so great that it may fairly be looked upon as the central and most impressive feature of modern history. It seems likely to affect the future of mankind more than any other single fact or group of circumstances with which we are acquainted. That this is no exaggerated view is shown by one fact alone. In little more than a century a single group of these colonial off-shoots, separated from the Motherland, but holding to the same fundamental principles of national life, has grown into one of the mightiest States of modern times.

But the part that still remains under the national flag is equally impressive even for the present, and more suggestive of future possibilities. First, there is Canada, covering the other half of the Continent of North America, and with an area equal to that of Europe, already consolidated into a powerful State of eight million people, with every prospect of a future as great as that of the United States, and with the assured vigour of a Northern race.

Next, in Australia we hold a whole continent—once more the size of Europe—now politically united, and with its wonderful sunshine and extraordinary natural resources attracting from every quarter of the globe a population to which it gives a stamp of almost unequalled energy and enterprise.

Farther out in the Pacific is New Zealand, with about the same area as the Motherland and the same maritime outlook, with a climate, a fertility of soil, and a variety of production which make it one of the most desirable homes and nurseries of our British races that have anywhere been found.

Next, South Africa, in extent equal to the combined

areas of several European countries, and endowed with some of Nature's greatest storehouses of wealth.

These Dominions—Canada resting on the Atlantic and Pacific, Australasia upon the Pacific and Indian Oceans, South Africa upon the Indian and Atlantic—form, with the Motherland itself, a quadrilateral of maritime position and potential growth which it is difficult for the imagination to grasp.

Smaller colonies and naval stations in the East and West Indies, and scattered over the oceans, link together these greater units.

There still remain the great dependencies—India, with more than three hundred millions of people who look to us for wise and just administration, security from the anarchy in which we found them plunged, and for gradual training in the principles and practice of self-government; with East, West, and Central Africa, where twenty or thirty millions of more backward races depend on us for guidance into the paths of civilisation.

It takes a vivid imagination to fill up the details of a picture thus roughly outlined. Only those who have traversed every ocean, visited every port, studied every continent can form more than a vague idea of what it means. Such a burden of responsibility was never laid upon any nation before in the long course of human history. But responsibility, deliberately assumed, furnishes the true and only adequate measure of duty. And this responsibility will now be still further increased.

Consider for one moment what our relation to the world will be should this War terminate, as we believe it will, in the success of the allied arms. Great as our outlook was before, as I have tried to picture it, the War will leave it greater still.

German South-West Africa has been incorporated in the Empire by the South African Union; German New Guinea by Australia; German Samoa by New Zealand. Little as we wish to possess these countries, I do not believe, seeing what the German menace of intrigue has proved itself to be, that we can ask these young nations to risk their future by restoring them under any terms of peace. The Dominions would never consent to it.

We have ourselves been compelled to take fuller control of Egypt with its dependent hinterland, and of Cyprus.

The net result of all these changes will be, that under our flag or dependent upon it will be found, if success crown our arms, fully one quarter of the whole area of the world, and very nearly one-quarter of its population.

Add to this the fact that we shall apparently have established a maritime supremacy quite without parallel, since our Navy has swept every enemy ship from the surface, at least, of the open oceans of the world.

Add the further fact, entirely new in our history, opposed to our inclinations, and only forced upon us by dire necessity, that we shall possess a trained military force, distributed through all parts of the Empire, on a level in numbers and efficiency with the greatest military powers of the Continent.

Our right to hold this astonishing and unprecedented position in the world has been openly challenged. Our power to hold it is now being tested by the tremendous arbitrament of war. In the mere contest of strength and endurance we believe that we shall succeed. But something more than superior strength and material success is required to establish our right conclusively. The very essence of the claim made by ourselves and our allies on the sympathy of other nations in this struggle is our denial of the right of force alone to control the destinies of the world. What

substitute shall we find for force? Or how shall we use the force we wield in such a way as to disarm hostility and jealousy? How shall we avoid that envy of our place in the world which has been one of the chief impulses which drove Germany forward in her career of violence, and which is sure to recur in other forms and in other directions? I know of only one way; by the acceptance of national duty to other peoples on a scale commensurate with our immense position and responsibilities.

We must give convincing proof that we hold the place we have gained in trust for the good of the world, and not merely to satisfy our own selfish interests. To give that convincing proof will be no easy task. The path of highest duty is ever a difficult one to travel. It is often said that a change of heart in the German people is the only thing that will bring ultimate peace to Europe. It may be said with absolute confidence and equal truth that some change of heart in ourselves will be required to fit us fully for the work of that new world upon which mankind will enter when the present struggle is over.

An intense consciousness of nationality has been one of the characteristics of our British people. It has been deepened by the desperate struggles we have carried on with other nations—Spain, Holland, France, Russia—at various stages of our history. Even in later years many of us have been assiduously engaged in strengthening this consciousness with a view to influencing policy in the direction of national unity. This has been done with absolute sincerity and with a profound conviction of the truth of a belief once expressed by Lord Rosebery on a notable occasion when he said that "with all its mistakes and shortcomings the British Empire is the greatest secular agency for good that exists in the world."

In that conviction lies the explanation of the wonderful rally of every remotest colony of the Empire to the support of the flag which represents our British ideals.

But this War has produced other results which may well give us pause in putting our trust solely in ideals peculiar to our own people.

We find ourselves fighting side by side with two nations—France and Russia; each devoted to its own conceptions of national life; each ready to suffer and sacrifice anything for their maintenance. In the past these nations have been our stoutest rivals and at times our deadliest foes.

To-day, while each is fighting in defence of what it considers its own highest interest, all are lifted into a higher atmosphere of co-operation in guarding the larger interests of civilisation and humanity. All are pledged to act together in giving security to those interests when the final settlement comes.

It seems to me that this situation presents an opportunity that has never occurred before, that may never occur again, for our peoples to escape from the tyranny of that excessive, suspicious, and touchy nationalism which has caused most of the great wars of history.

In seizing this opportunity our own nation must take the lead. Our wider outlook on the world, our contact with almost every civilised and uncivilised people, our settled institutions, the fact that we have already successfully absorbed other nationalities into our system, that we can if we choose throw open the markets of so large a part of the world, and give an equality of opportunity there to all civilised men who come to us and accept our principles of life and government: all these things give us an unequalled advantage for leadership in effecting this great change of national attitude.

We may place such a change first among the duties which we owe to that new and reorganised world into which we are about to enter.

I do not for a moment underrate how much sacrifice of preconceptions this involves. History shows us that the sentiment or rather the passion of nationality is one of the most powerful of the instruments used by Providence in the development of mankind. Recall what this passion meant to the Greek, the Roman, the Hebrew—to mention only three classical instances—and consider what a stamp it has left through them on the literature, the laws, and the ethics of the world.

Even in comparatively small and insignificant States it has stimulated effort to an extraordinary degree, and added fulness and richness to the total achievement of mankind. Whether any cosmopolitan spirit can ever quite take its place as a driving force is indeed very doubtful, involving as it would a radical change in human nature as we know it.

On the other hand, we must remember also the further teaching of history that when pressed to excess in selfish pride of power or exclusiveness that same spirit of nationality has led to the ruin of the very greatness that it had built up. There is no need to uproot this instinct which has carried our nation so far, but we are bound to keep it in control. We must see to it that what has given us the constructive energy for Empire-building does not bear within it the seeds of decay and overthrow. To the national enthusiasm for race development and expansion we must link an ever-increasing strength of moral purpose, and a sense of duty to the rest of the world.

Nor need we fear that the driving force of the national spirit will thus be weakened. It will be lifted to a higher

plane, and there it will have vast tasks on which to spend its energy.

Foremost among these tasks I am inclined to put the political organisation of the Empire. We owe this duty to the world as well as to ourselves. The course of the War has made it fairly evident that the Empire, even in its loosely organised condition, is the rock upon which the wild dreams of German ambition have been shattered. Without the intervention of our fleet, and without the command of the sea which that fleet has secured, to say nothing of our military contribution, it looks as if the German programme for dominating continental Europe would have been carried out. The vials of hate poured out upon us indicate that this is also the German view.

The barrier against aggressive force which has served this temporary purpose must be strengthened and made permanent. The War has made this possible. It has cleared the path of statesmanship to an Empire united in fact as well as name; linked together by common interests; controlled by common policy; inspired by common democratic aims.

The problem before us is clear and definite. It is to reconcile autonomy in the control of the interests peculiar to each self-governing unit of the Empire with common responsibility for what concerns them all. If that problem is not solved the fault will lie either with incapacity and want of vision in statesmen, or with the ignorance and indifference of that public opinion which gives policy its motive power.

The German, judging us by his own standards, pictures our British Empire as a greedy monster which has as a settled policy for some centuries seized every part of the world on which it can lay its hands, and clings tenaciously

to it in the sheer lust of imperial power. It would perhaps be difficult to convince him in his present attitude of mind how false this picture is. But that it is false can be amply proved. It is not much more than fifty years since the leading statesmen of this country, backed up by what then seemed predominant public opinion, were willing and almost anxious that those colonies, which have since grown into the Great Dominions, should separate themselves as independent states. It was deemed an honour to have given birth to free communities : it was considered a disadvantage and weakness to hold them in unwilling bonds.

I have in my possession a Bill drawn up in the early 'sixties of the last century by one of the most distinguished law-makers of England, in consultation with prominent statesmen of the time—a Bill prepared in every detail for submission to Parliament, providing for the gradual but resolute separation of the great self-governing colonies from the Motherland. The framer of that Bill told me that it fairly represented the political thought of his time. This does not look as if greed of territory and lust of world power had been the permanent policy of the Empire.

Many here will know what a determined effort was required, what years of strenuous teaching was needed to resist this tendency and make British people both here and in the colonies understand the higher destiny that might be achieved by continued union.

The argument by which that change of national purpose was effected was not based on ideas of aggression, on plans for world dominance, or for thrusting our British culture on unwilling nations, small or great. It aimed at peace ; at keeping safe the channels of commerce for the whole world ; at giving security for the free development on their

own lines of the younger nations that we had founded; at warding off the great dangers—now only too apparent—which threatened these islands, whose people had learned to depend on the ends of the earth for the greater part of their food and much of the raw materials of industry.

What that change of purpose has meant to the nation we are only now beginning to understand.

Under the policy of sixty years ago the Dominions would have become separate states, exposed to separate attack without the power to resist, or neutral as the United States are to-day, and so paralysed as that nation is from combating the greatest and most subtly planned attack on human liberty that history records.

Instead of that we see Canada sending more than a quarter of a million of her sons to join in the great struggle; Australia and New Zealand contributing even a greater number in proportion to their population; South Africa striking mighty blows against the enemy that had tried to compromise her honour and loyalty; every smallest colony sending the best it has to give in men and material.

Yet all of these are countries whose highest interests are those of peace. The arrogant aggressiveness of the German menace has crystallised the will of all their peoples into a united purpose more effectually than a century of ordinary political evolution could have done. It is now the business of statesmen to give constitutional form to that common will, as a safeguard for the future.

I have said that we can, if we choose, throw open to the world the markets of all those vast regions that are under our flag. We have already done so to a greater extent than any other of the great powers. For the last sixty or seventy years trade has been freer within the bounds of the British Empire than in any European country, or in the United

States. Even German industry has found with us its largest field for expansion. Every nation has the undoubted right to determine the commercial policy which best suits its circumstances, and in ordinary cases the sense of duty to other nations could not be expected to influence it. One wonders if our own case is not exceptional, considering the extraordinary proportion of the productive areas of the world which is in our hands. If after the War is over we still have to brace ourselves up to the greatest height of national power to withstand aggression, the argument for using all the machinery of inter-imperial preference would be a strong one. But with the menace of aggression removed, my own reflections incline me to think that the most generous commercial policy will in the end prove the wisest. The three great powers with which we are allied, the smaller ones whose industries have been ground to powder under the German heel, will be struggling with financial, commercial, and industrial difficulties greater than they have ever faced before. The same will be true of the neutral countries as well, with the one exception of the United States. Under such circumstances the greatest freedom that can possibly be given to the wings of commerce will prove of untold good to the world. We are in a better position than any other people to take a large view of the question, and point out the way of escape from mere nationalism in this particular. To do so would in my judgment go farther than most things to ratify in the world's opinion our unique position.

The use made by Germany of the powers of peaceful penetration which we have given to her as well as to other nations presents a great difficulty. Our duty in this matter will be among the most serious of the questions that must be considered when the great settlement comes.

For the purposes of our argument let me now delay you for a moment to take stock of those ideals which are at the basis of our English life.

Some one may perhaps ask, "Why talk about ideals for the future when the nation is instantly engaged in a life and death struggle on which every thought and energy should be bent?" The answer is simple. It is at the crisis of such a struggle that the combatant most needs the support of the clearest purpose and the highest ideal that his spirit can conceive.

At such a time a definite conception of the things for which we stand, the goal at which we aim, is of supreme consequence. To think nobly of the future arms us doubly to act greatly in the present.

In the first place, I think it may confidently be said that we have stood for the liberty of the individual. In this more than anything else lies the ultimate secret of our strength.

Among the nations ours was the first to pronounce by judicial decree that a slave cannot breathe on English soil. Since 1830 that principle for strong and weak alike has prevailed wherever the English flag floats. To-day personal freedom guaranteed by law and guarded by all the power of the State stands as a central feature of our race ideals. No soil in the world offers greater opportunity for the free growth of the individual man than that of Britain and of the new countries in which her people have found a home. They welcome the people of all other civilised nations to share this boon, that gives dignity to the meanest soul.

Again, we have stood for free self-government by the people—by the community as a whole—wherever self-government is possible. The statesmen and thinkers of

Germany contend that for great achievement their people require to be ruled ; to give themselves up to the guidance of some ruling House or some superior will. They go farther, and say that the individual exists for the State, which stands above and beyond him, and to it he is bound to give a more or less blind obedience.

Our ideal is in sharp contrast : that the State is organised for the protection of the individual, and is itself the creation of the collective individual will. It is our proud democratic claim that we can rule ourselves. Under the influence of this ideal the bounds of political freedom have been steadily widened through the whole long course of British history. The end has for the most part been gained, not as in many countries amid the fierce throes of revolution, but by the persistent operation of a profound race instinct under which—

> Freedom slowly broadens down
> From precedent to precedent.

Even temporary aberrations from this prevailing purpose, such as that which happened in the case of our first group of American colonies, have only accentuated the race tendency and contributed to the final result. No one can deny that the self-government enjoyed by the great Dominions of the Empire, acquired in the process of political Evolution, is as complete in essentials as that which America or France gained as a result of Revolution.

And what we have gained for ourselves we have desired for others — Italy, Greece, Hungary, Poland, in their struggles for liberty, have known how the heart of England instinctively beats. She has given a safe refuge to more political exiles than any other land.

We have stood for tolerance in religious belief. Not only all denominations of those who bear the Christian

name, but Jew, Mussulman, Hindoo, or Buddhist is free within the Empire to worship undisturbed in the form that satisfies the craving of his own soul. But while tolerant of the beliefs of others, our British people stand themselves as representatives of Christianity, its principles and morals, to more non-Christian races than any other nation. The Roman name gave protection to St. Paul in preaching among the 40,000,000 people of that ancient Empire; the British name gives like protection in countries that embrace a population of 400,000,000.

Once more, we have stood for justice and honest government. On this point the supreme test has been in the management of countries like India and Egypt, where self-government is as yet impossible. The temptation to rule them for our own advantage has been great, and has not always been resisted. To-day we can say with some confidence that the higher principle has prevailed, and the welfare of the people themselves is the primary aim of our administration—our more selfish interests take a second place.

Finally, the general trend of national development has been towards Democracy and equality of opportunity for all classes. The goal may still be far off, but the fundamental movement is assured.

Such, briefly stated, are the ideals which have shaped the British mind—such the ends towards which, with more or less clear consciousness, our race has moved. That they are worth living for, worth working for, worth, if need be, dying for in the interests of humanity, we may be assured. The stars that guide us are fixed stars. They will lead us safely on if we keep our eyes undimmed to see them clearly.

But in moving forward toward the full realisation of our ideals we have often failed, often been irresolute,

often discovered weaknesses which defeat our aspiration. We owe it to the world to find some remedy for these failures.

In our devotion to personal liberty we have forgotten the value of that discipline which makes individual power most effective, and collective action for great ends possible. In the assertion of individual rights we too often lose the sense of public duty. This general objection to discipline on a national scale, the failure to recognise the equal responsibilities of citizenship, are among those aspects of the national mind which have encouraged our opponents to look upon us as a decadent race, unfit for the government and unequal to the maintenance of a great Empire.

Again, in working out the problems of democratic self-government, we have given so free a play and so large a place to party spirit that it threatens at times to shake the very foundations of the State. Any one who recalls the gulf of civil discord into which we were all hopelessly gazing in the early months of 1914, that situation of acute internal danger which almost made external war seem a lesser anxiety, will understand the peril that this canker in our political system represents.

It is the same party spirit which shattered the greatness of Greece and wrecked the freedom of the old Roman Republic. At the present moment, in the midst of the Titanic struggle which unites our people as never before, it may seem impossible that ever again can we be so dangerously divided on the minor issues of national life. But the danger is there ; it is the standing threat to all systems of free government, and not least to our own. The same resolution will be required to find some remedy for the tyranny of party that has been needed to overthrow other

despotisms. It is a subtle despotism, the only cure for which lies in the mastery of our own passions, the cultivation of our own sanity.

In the other great sphere of our national activity, the government of various races, we have not always shown sufficient sympathy with points of view other than our own. Take, for instance, our Christian religion, which has come down to us based on Oriental history, bathed in Oriental poetry, rich in Oriental metaphor, steeped in Oriental spirituality. Yet when we carry it back to the East clothed in a dress of Western ideas and Western forms, we have not been able to make it appeal to the Eastern mind as might have been expected. May not the fault lie in ourselves, in our lack of sympathy with depths of Eastern thought as profound as our own? And what is true of religion may be true of other things.

The splendid loyalty of India, the valour of her soldiers fighting on the plains of France side by side with the men of Britain and the Dominions, have made more imperative than ever the duty of finding for her a place in the Empire equal to her deserts; of giving full and generous recognition to every advance in the art of self-government that her people can achieve.

Think once more of the reaction on the internal life of this centre of the Empire that could come from a full realisation of national duty and responsibility.

Britain is the Mother of Nations. Every emigrant ship that leaves our shores carries with it the seed of new nations whose moral, social, and political standards will be raised or lowered according to the tested quality of that seed. What a stimulus such a thought should be to the efforts of those who are striving to keep pure the springs of our national life, to fight the ignorance, drunkenness, and vice

which haunt alike the slums of our great cities and neglected villages.

Every year half a million of British sailors drawn from these same cities and villages visit every port in the world, and they are looked upon as the representatives of our British civilisation and Christianity. How inspiring the thought of striving to make them really representative of all that is best in us.

Seventy-five thousand soldiers, seventy-five thousand civilians of our race, stand in the same representative way among the three hundred millions of India. The character of each one, from the Viceroy at the head of the State to the common soldier on guard, means everything to the influence and prestige of the Empire. Nothing but a constantly deepening sense of national duty will ever carry us through the great task we have assumed there, made more difficult at every stage of the process by which those vast populations are guided along the paths that lead to self-government. We have made ourselves responsible for a large part of the African continent with its many millions of the most backward races. The very genius of patience, wisdom, and moral purpose will alone enable us to carry forward the duties that we have deliberately assumed in that quarter of the Empire.

Nor is the sense of duty less needed in the great self-governing offshoots of the Empire, the duty of upholding the best British traditions, of building up intelligent democracies, of willingness to assume a fair share of the white man's burden.

The splendid response which they have made to the supreme call of the present is the happiest augury of what it will be in the future. All round our vast Empire the heart of the nation beats true in this hour of emergency.

Let us see to it that the inspiration to highest effort and personal sacrifice does not pass with the passing of danger. Thousands of our bravest and best have proved their faith in British ideals by dying for them. It is by living and working for them that we can best justify their noble sacrifice.

I am closing this afternoon a course of lectures which has carried us over a wide field of Imperial thought.

The bearing of University life on that of the nation and its relation to this War have been explained to us by one of the foremost educational thinkers of our time.

The Chairman of the Royal Colonial Institute has brought his ripe experience in the management and study of Colonial affairs to confirm our hope that a Democracy may, under right conditions, govern an Empire, and to indicate what those conditions are.

Balliol College, which has trained so many brilliant men to fill the greatest offices of the State, has sent us one of its most distinguished teachers to urge the necessity and explain the opportunity we now have of giving the working man the knowledge that will enable him also to take a larger and more intelligent part in the work of government.

The Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University has shown us how Dependencies are and ought to be administered.

The Editor of *The Round Table*, a publication upon which we have learned to depend for the soundest and most penetrating studies of national affairs to be met with in all our current literature, has interpreted for us the new significance which the word "Empire" has gained for itself in our great British Commonwealth.

All who have followed these lectures have learned from them lessons of the deepest moment. We may fairly expect that many of you will try to pass on to others the

gospel to which you have listened. In doing this you will find that nothing has such magic power to win attention from men and women of British blood as the simple word "Duty." And so long as a compelling sense of national duty controls the purpose of our people, this Empire will endure.

THE END

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