
FASCISM IN ENGLAND



1928 - 1940



FASCISM IN ENGLAND 1928 - 1940 is the first volume in the **BLACK BOOK** series. These are historical books and booklets designed to promote an interest in, and an understanding of, historical 'Nationalist' organisations and figures.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The short study that you are about to read was written over 15 years ago. It was **not** written for a Nationalist audience, but for a British educational establishment. This explains *why* a certain literary style is employed, and *why* the work is heavily referenced. Although written for the purposes of examination, it nonetheless tried to put the case clearly and objectively, and without any concessions to Establishment opinion. Whether or not, it succeeded in that direction is for the reader to decide.

This work is being printed, along with an article by A.K. Chesterton entitled The Enigma of William Joyce, so that young nationalists can become more aware of the nationalist traditions of their own country. It is not presented as a definitive work, but simply as a contribution to a debate that has still not run its course. It should also be pointed out that the motivating force behind publication was not the author, but a number of young nationalists who found the text interesting and helpful, and thought that others would likewise benefit. Again, whether or not it succeeds in this direction is down to the reader.

Throughout the essay, the term "anti-Semitism" is used. In our day, the word is one almost exclusively used by our enemies to attack any person or any group who is not prepared to remain uncritical of Israel, Zionism or international Jewish power. Thus, at first sight, it might seem that using the word "anti-Semitism" was a concession - and perhaps an unnecessary one - to the prevailing liberal-left ethos of university life. However, the reader's attention is drawn to the fact that the term "anti-Semitism" was used in a different way in the Twenties and Thirties of this century. It was used not only as a term of reproach - a reproach which was less stinging in the Europe before World War II and the 'Holocaust' - but also as a term of praise or pride. People like Arnold Leese did not see the word as something to be avoided, but as something to be embraced. Thus, he was not only attacked as an anti-Semite, he also called himself an anti-Semite.

Now, in calling themselves anti-Semite, it must be understood that the patriots of the day were not attacking the Arab peoples - who are, in fact, the real Semites of our time - but simply the Jews. Anti-Semitism and Anti-Jewishness were one and the same thing.

It must not be forgotten that most Nationalists of the period were pro-Arab, for a number of reasons. Firstly, because they were appalled at the treatment suffered by the Arabs in their own country, at the hands of Zionist Jewry, as a consequence of the iniquitous *Balfour Declaration*, which sought to give Jewry territorial rights in land that had belonged to the Arabs for over a

thousand years. Secondly, the more thoughtful patriot understood that the Arab peoples would be useful allies in the future. Thirdly, because men like Arnold Leese, who was the world's foremost camel doctor, had spent a good part of their lives in that region of the world, and thus were well acquainted with the Arab way of life and appreciated its richness and diversity.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Arab world was overwhelmingly favourable to the rise of the Axis Powers. This is hardly surprising, as the latter were seen as possible supporters in the struggle to remove the Zionist settlers that were to become the basis of the fledgling Jewish 'State'. Indeed, the Arab world was so anti-liberal democratic that in a number of places, fascist formations came into being - for example, the Lebanese Maronite **Phalange** and the Egyptian **Blueshirts**.

The current and deepening crisis in the world is leading to a world-wide revision of past events, in all fields of enquiry. The superficial and one-sided judgements of the post-war period are increasingly seen for what they are: superficial and one-sided. The fact that the Fascist period is now truly history means that a more balanced assessment can be made than was ever possible in the emotion-filled period that followed a massive and bloody world war. Every week and every month brings new information to light from official files, personal testimonies, hidden collections and so forth, which add new colour and contrast to our view of the past. We are entering a period where the good and the bad that existed in the Fascist period, and the proportions of the two, can be looked at calmly.

The purpose of this booklet is **not** to forward a propaganda cause, but simply to advance the Truth, for the future Nationalism of this country **must** be founded upon Truth and not Propaganda. We must know about the good and the bad, objectively speaking, about our past, if we are to build a better Movement, a better Structure, a better Spirit in the twenty-first century.

History is not really for bookworms, but for Militants. This is because it is the Militants who *make* History, whilst the bookworms only *read* about History. Read and understand. Then ACT! Your Country needs you as much as you need your Country.

The Author. Plymouth 1997.



INTRODUCTION.

It is a curious phenomenon, and one particularly associated with the twentieth century, that there exists on the so-called fringe of politics, both "Left" and "Right", a multitude of political parties and organizations which, although they are regarded as being synonymous in the public mind at large, nonetheless maintain and justify their continued, separate existence.

This determination to resist the assimilative process is most interesting, and inevitably begs the question as to why this should be the case. It becomes clear, with even a cursory analysis of any specific example, that the evinced political differentiation is the product of a multiplicity of interacting factors.

The aim of this study is to examine some of the factors which may have engendered the division of the *British Union of Fascists* and the *Imperial Fascist League*.

It must be here emphasized that although the latter is historically regarded as the 'junior' partner of pre-war British Fascism, it was, nonetheless, founded several years before the former, and had established something of a pre-eminence amongst the myriad fascist and semi-fascist organizations that were extant in the mid and late 1920s.

In the light of this, and in order to explicate the founding and development of the British Union, the present writer has chosen to assess critically, three important factors which he believes were instrumental in determining this situation, although he concedes that other factors excluded from this study such as religious affiliation - may have exercised some significant rôle.

The factors to be analyzed may be enumerated as the influence of personality, the nature and influence of ideology, and the social composition of the respective movements. We are thus logically progressing from the Man, to his Ideas, to the Recruit.

These various factors have not been chosen at random, but rather because they have been the foremost areas of analysis in studies of East and West European fascist variants for professional historians and political scientists, such as Adrian Lyttelton, Stanley Payne and Bela Vago.

In regard to the Hitler phenomenon, Professor Bracher raised the question of what the rôle of the individual was in the politico-historical process, and concluded that "National Socialism can indeed be called Hitlerism. This man and his intentions and actions will always be in the very centre of Nazi history." Directly counterpoised to this view is the belief of Professor Reich, who argues that this is not the case, that "Hitler's personal structure and his

life history are of no importance whatever for an understanding of National Socialism".²

The factor of social background has been included because a voluminous literature has grown up in this connection, particularly in regard to National Socialism and Italian Fascism. Professors Fromm, Nolte, Reich and Lipset³, amongst many, have argued that Fascism is an outgrowth of middle class discontent, the latter stating: "Data from a number of countries demonstrate that classic Fascism is a movement of the propertied middle classes." On the other hand, we find people like Hayes, Hurst and Germani⁵ rejecting such an analysis, in favour of a theory that regards the rise of Fascism as the work of an admixture of classes.

Finally, there is the question of Ideology and its pertinence to the phenomenon of Fascism. Sternhell notes in this connection that "there were interpretations of Fascism which chose to argue, not that Fascism or National Socialism were lacking in ideology, but that the ideology was purely incidental and unimportant". He continued by pointing out that the past two decades has seen a decline in popularity of such a viewpoint, and a commensurate rise in study and analysis of fascist ideology, as an element of political motivation for both individuals and social groups.

We may appreciate, therefore, that whatever conclusions are reached by the academics in this field, there is an *implicit* acceptance of the fact that these factors provide a fruitful line of enquiry. With this brief outline of research tradition, we come to realize that the analyzing of the aforementioned factors is consonant with the current direction of historical research method.



Oswald Mosley

FASCIST LEADERS IN THE MAKING.

Defining the parameters and substance of fascist doctrine has proven a fertile field of study for both academics and historians in the decades following the war.⁷

However, the present writer makes the contentious a priori assumption that the hallmark of this political philosophy was the concept of the Führerprinzip.⁸ It is because of the exaggerated emphasis placed on the notion of "the Leader" that this study commences with a brief resumé of both Leaders political careers, and correlates this with their respective personal temperaments, in order that we may ascertain their reasons for opting for political Fascism.

Veterinary surgeon, Arnold Spencer Leese, being 45 years old, was clearly a late entrant into British political life. This delayed interest had developed primarily because he was strongly individualist, and full of admiration for what Mussolini was achieving in Fascist Italy.

In consequence, he joined the *British Fascisti* in 1924, but departed two years later believing this organization to be nothing but "Conservatives with knobs on". ¹⁰ Eager to give practical substance in Britain to the radical nature of Fascism, he wrote a tract entitled: "Fascism for Old England", outlining what he believed necessity demanded.

In 1924, he fought a Stamford Borough Council election on the *ad hoc Fascist League* platform and, along with H.L. Simpson, became one of the first constitutionally elected Fascist candidates in British history.

Concurrent with this political development was his first encounter with Arthur Kitson, the celebrated monetary reformer. The latter taught Leese the financial reform case in some detail, causing Leese to write at a later date: "I saw that control of the issue of Money was Power". 11

It was through Kitson that Leese came to meet Henry Hamilton Beamish, the founder of *The Britons Society*, who was to introduce Leese to what were to become his political passions: the primacy of Race and the destruction, by exposure, of the World Jewish Conspiracy as outlined in *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. He came quickly to subscribe to Beamish's maxim that one could not be a patriot without being anti-Semitic.¹²

In 1928, at Chandos House, London, Leese founded the Imperial Fascist League as his chosen instrument for achieving his now clearly perceived political rôle.

He stated: "I have been conducting a research on the Jew Menace; and I wish here to emphasize that I have done it in the same scientific spirit as when I was investigating camel diseases. I have been after Truth, not propaganda. In fact, I investigated the diseases of the body politic". 13

By comparison, Sir Oswald Mosley was precociously politically active. In 1918, at the tender age of 22 years, he was elected Tory MP for Harrow. However, he quickly became disillusioned with Toryism, and to such an extent that he fought the same constituency in 1922 as an Independent and won.

The turbulent, post-war depression environment forced him to recognize that an efficient Party machinery was a prerequisite to substantial and meaningful change in British society, and to this end he joined the Labour Party in 1924 - becoming its MP for Smethwick in 1926.

He rapidly established himself as a leading proponent of radical economic reform, and in pursuit of this goal, he published the pamphlet: *Revolution by Reason.* ¹⁴ However, despite his intensive lobbying of the Government and its supporters to implement his proposals, the document was rejected.

He remained for the next six years within the Labour Party, but a combination of growing disillusionment with ineffective government, and a continuing economic depression caused him to depart in March 1931, with the simultaneous publication of *A National Policy*. He rallied support from all parts of the House and founded the *New Party*, only for it to be completely routed in the General Election of that same year.

This event, acting as a political catalyst, caused Mosley to reject the values and customs of the political establishment in their entirety, and to move decisively towards Fascism. He founded the British Union of Fascists in October 1932, it being a coalition of New Party remnants and the bulk of the memberships of the majority of pre-existing British Fascist organizations; the only major exception being the "notoriously and sickeningly anti-Semitic IFL". 15

Referring to his perceived rôle on switching to the Fascist platform, Mosley later wrote: "My duty was to awaken the will to live and to live greatly, to dedicate myself to a national renaissance". 16



A. S. LEESE

Leader of the Imperial Fascist League
30 Craven Street, W.C.2

ARNOLD SPENCER LEESE.

The present writer believes that it was this radically divergent political evolution which greatly and inevitably determined what was to be the precise nature of their respective movements.

In accordance with the notion of the Führerprinzip, the differing fascist personalities were reflected in their chosen modes of propaganda expression and dissemination, and this inevitably influenced the number and type of people that were respectively recruited.

Arguably, the extent of Leese's personality on the IFL was greater than that of Mosley's upon the BUF, and there are two principal reasons which appear to substantiate this belief. Firstly, we are confronted by the fact of the widely differing sizes of the organizations, and secondly by the nature of the chief lieutenants surrounding the Leaders.

That the IFL was a small-time political affair is beyond reasonable doubt. This belief is bolstered, firstly, by the nature of the non-publishing activities engaged in by the IFL; these were primarily confined to debating with numerous societies and to the holding of an occasional public meeting, although a march to the Cenotaph was held in 1929 which drew 10 uniformed guards. Such affairs pale into insignificance when one considers that a 1934 BUF rally at the Albert Hall drew some 10,000 fascists, and the 1939 Earls Court rally attracted some 30,000 supporters. Secondly, diverse political sources have estimated that membership of the IFL was between 200 - 1,000, the bulk of such opinion showing a marked preference for 500 - 600; such a figure was confirmed for the present writer by a leading IFL backer.

However, in spite of the fierce competition that the IFL undoubtedly faced from the BUF with its vastly greater resources, the available evidence clearly indicates that the League was at its peak on the outbreak of World War Two. As Leese put it: "I could have more, but I want them to represent aristocracy of Character". 21

As regards lieutenants for Leese, they are conspicuous either by their absence, or more likely, by the submergence of their personalities to that of Leese. Apart from the faithful P.C. Ridout and H.L. Lockwood, any impartial observer would undoubtedly conclude that Leese was an extremely diligent one-man political bandwagon. It was this Leesian pervasiveness which lent the IFL a unitary façade, devoid of personality clashes or ideological bones of contention.; Griffiths stated: "In this sense, it was less a bower to public concerns than a vehicle for the extreme and often crazed views of its founder". 22

The accurate description of any personality is a task which by its very nature is wrought with pitfalls, and this is greatly exacerbated when one is dealing with so individualistic a person as Arnold Leese.

From his written works, and from conversations with those who knew him, he emerges as a stern but fair man, given to a wry, indeed zany sense of humour.

His innate fairness is perhaps best illustrated by the attitude he adopted towards the chameleon-like figure of William Joyce, a man who he had berated throughout the 1930s as "a kosher fascist", but of whom he later wrote: "I had only actually met him once; there can be no doubt that he took the wrong action in the war, but he believed himself justified in what he did and he died like a hero". ²³

Needless to say, IFL literature was replete with Leesian humour. For example, he wrote: "Definition of a Bad Jew - July 2nd 1939, Philip Sassoon; Definition of a Good Jew - July 4th 1939, the late Philip Sassoon". 24

We may thus sum up Leese as a blunt, principled, anti-Jewish activist who, usually in a lecture-room atmosphere, argued his case in coherent if not somewhat simplistic terms, and who gave rise to immense personal devotion as well as to the most intense hatred.

Wilton described him as "the most honest and straightforward person I have ever met", ²⁵ whilst Hamm described him as "a pygmy" and "a despicable, little liar". ²⁶

And I think it constructive to record the Nazi view of Leese and the IFL, given his fervour for National Socialism. Lothar Streicher wrote: "The year before (1937) I had been in London where I made a speech for the proper English Fascist movement of Arnold Leese. He was a straightforward anti-Semite and I wanted to experience it". 2

The BUF provides a stark contrast to the IFL in a multitude of ways, and not least in its size and diversity of activities.

Apart from huge, orchestrated public rallies, it regularly and continuously held impressive marches throughout the length and breadth of England. It coordinated with this, appeals to sectional interests which were strategically poignant at any one time; perhaps the best known of these campaigns were those directed at the Lancashire textile workers who were being heavily hit by imported manufactures, and also those people associated with the 1934 East Anglia Tithes War.

Whilst the IFL had only *The Fascist* to propagate its views, the BUF possessed *Action, Blackshirt, Fascist Week* and *Fascist Quarterly*, which covered most adequately the intellectual spectrum of British society in a way that *The Fascist* by itself could not do. Inevitably, this British Union superiority had an immense impact on recruitment.

It was always Mosley's policy not to divulge membership figures for tactical reasons, and it is a consequence of this that the opinions ventured by various sources have markedly differed.²⁸ In the current phase of historical revisionism, Skidelsky's *Mosley* has been widely acclaimed as an authoritative work, and since this author inclines towards those figures suggested by Cross, the present writer believes it wholly acceptable to utilize such evidence. It is recorded, however, that Skidelsky dissents from Cross's view that BUF membership declined from a 1934 peak, and instead asserts that the 1934 decline was completely reversed by 1939, to the extent that it had achieved a new, peak membership.

Cross cites the membership of the BUF as being at minimum 5,000 and at maximum 35,000,²⁹ and certainly this seems to correlate well with Chesterton's assertion that by 1938 some 100,000 people had passed through the Movement.³⁰

The distinguishing feature of a small family business, which the IFL undoubtedly was, is its ability to convey the impression of the "personal touch". As an organization is augmented in size, so we find that this touch diminishes proportionately and this fact has important ramifications for any analysis of the British Union.

Utilization of even the most conservative membership estimates indicates that there is strong probability that Mosley's influence within the British Union was not as all pervading as that of Leese in the Imperial Fascists. It is not being suggested that Mosley had little influence in the Movement, far from it. The range and depth of his personality clearly fathomed vast areas of the organization, but man of talent though he was, he was, nonetheless, only one man with a finite ability to control or centralize Party activity about himself. He implicitly accepted this fact of life when he deliberately distanced himself from things such as financial affairs by constitutional directive.

A natural consequence of this situation was that other lesser, but still influential, figures arose in the British Union and gave certain organizational spheres their own personal stamp. This assertion will become clearer when we deal with the ideological tendencies, which emerged in the Party at various times in its history, and which were insensibly linked to officers such as Joyce, Chesterton and McNab.

Studies concerned with Mosley and the British Union are extremely numerous and have engendered great contradictions of opinion vis à vis Mosley's personal attributes. To give some idea of the difficulties one encounters when dealing with this sphere, one has only to record that adjectives such as vain, arrogant, impatient, creative, powerful, intelligent, wilful and deluded, as well as a host of others, have been offered and yet still the debate continues. In order that one may précis this element of the

discourse, it is intended that three opinions of widely differing political orientation be proffered as an objective sampling.

Jewish academic, W.F. Mandle, wrote: "In the 20s and 30s, he displayed great intellectual gifts, displays that indicated an almost excessive concern with rationality and with economic commonsense". 32

Whilst revisionist historian, Robert Skidelsky, stated: "His life is littered with political miscalculations, the most crucial being his remarkable overestimation of the potential for Fascism in this country".³³

That Mosley was intellectually far superior to Leese is something that few could or would wish to contest, for it is unquestionably this aspect of his person, coupled with a fluent, almost charismatic eloquence, that proved a positive boon to the Fascist Cause in the conversion of large, heterogeneous audiences.

It is, indeed, a testimony to the magnetism that he radiated that he could draw unto himself not only intellectuals of the calibre of Raven-Thomson, Williamson, Chesterton and Joyce, but also the serried ranks of the Party faithful; the latter being epitomized by the likes of Hamm who could still write 50 years on: "No-one can compare with Mosley in quality of intellect, courage, leadership etc". 34

Blake ventures the opinion, however, that it was a defect of Mosley's personality, which could not cope with this potentially corrupting devotion, that undermined his ability as a leader. Concurring with this, Bleach states: "His mystique of leadership made him susceptible to flattery, and he therefore favoured sycophants rather than competent lieutenants".

This writer finds no little truth in such viewpoints given that Mosley wrote to Beaverbrook: "If by any chance the normal, political system does not endure, it is perhaps better from the nation's point of view that Fascism be built by me than by some worse kind of lunatic".

Having reviewed the histories and personalities of both Leese and Mosley, how far can we say that organizational disunity was the result of personal animosity?

It has been argued that Leese's rejection of Mosley was purely pragmatic in that he saw the latter edging him out of his self-conceived rôle as Supreme Fascist Chief. Given the nature of human psychology, it seems very likely that Leese's ego was somehow tied in with this chosen stance, but how far it was a determining factor is beyond satisfactory resolution given the impossibility of measuring ego-motivation.

We must also take note of the significant fact that Leese was not the only Fascist openly to reject Mosley's leadership. *Rotha Linton-Orman* ³⁸ had so done, albeit for different reasons. Conservatives in general were fearful of contemporary developments in the 1920s, mainly because of the proximity of the Soviet socialo-bolshevist upheaval, and the manifest inadequacy of postwar liberal democratic government.

The intensity of such fear is, retrospectively, difficult for us to recognize in its full implications, and hence prevents our adequate appreciation of the spectre of Mosley, the man of democrat and socialist background, sallying forth into the limelight as the self-proclaimed Fascist Saviour of Britain.

Whilst Leese probably shared these fears, the present writer believes that these and pragmatism were *not* his principal motives in rejecting Mosley.

Firstly, he manifested such an eager willingness to co-operate closely with other organizations and individuals that were genuinely fascist that it strongly suggests he was not organizationally chauvinistic at the expense of the Cause.³⁹

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Leese's intense dislike of Mosley and Mosley-pragmatism dates not from the latter's espousal of the Fascist creed, but rather from his New Party days.⁴⁰

Thus, Mosley viewed his move from the New Party to the British Union as a reasoned, ideological progression, whilst Leese detected only the stench of pragmatism. Leese maintained that such pragmatic reasoning inevitably went hand in glove with the Kosher Fascism of the "British Jewnion of Fascists". The term 'kosher Fascism' signified the utilization by Mosley of fascistic rhetoric, without a sincere adherence to the totality of Fascist doctrine.

A superficial argument, to the effect that Leese's so-called "ideological" rejection of Mosley was merely a ploy to disguise an essentially personal antipathy, must be here answered.

Leese's contention that "Mosley's advent was a disaster for Fascist development in Britain" is supported, indirectly, by two Jewish adversaries.

Firstly, John Strachey, formerly a Mosley intime, denounced his adoption of Fascism as "100% insincere", ⁴³ whilst Lord Melchett stated: "I might honour a genuine anti-Semite, but I don't like a sham one. Sir Oswald Mosley might reflect in Germany his own children would be denied the rights of citizenship because they had a Jewish grand-parent". ⁴⁴

It was this explosive atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust that was, finally, ignited in 1932 - 3 by Leese, when he "proved", using Jewish

documentation, that Mosley was necessarily a kosher Fascist given that

Cynthia Curzon, his first wife, had a Jewish ancestry.

In seeming consequence, an IFL public meeting⁴⁵ was violently assaulted by a gang of BUF members, largely Jewish according to an eve-witness⁴⁶. resulting in Leese being beaten up and Brigadier-General Blakeney receiving serious injury. Such "unofficial action" 47 was uncommon. Mosley preferring to take the Olympian stance of a blissful indifference towards the IFL, a capability that his organization's size allowed him to do with considerable ease. In a rare statement concerning the IFL. Mosley referred to it as "one of those little crank societies which is obsessed with Jews and which is a ridiculous and futile body". 48

As stated earlier, the size of the BUF gave a degree of flexibility to Mosley's chief lieutenants vis à vis policy and strategy within the movement. The result was that a dichotomy of viewpoints co-existed, for example, on such matters as the official position of the BUF towards the World Jewish Conspiracy.

Both Mosley and Hamm⁴⁹ deny that the Party ever subscribed to the conspiratorial approach to History, yet perusal of Blackshirt literature after 1934 seems to belie this assertion, with Messrs Joyce, Chesterton and Beckett

et al regularly plugging this line in the official fascist press.

If one accepts the belief that ideological divergency is essentially and insensibly correlated with both personality and received political experience, then it becomes self-evident that prior to 1934, the British Union was composed of both pro-Semitic and anti-Semitic elements.

The departure in large measure of the former, at the time of the Rothermere crisis, led to a substantial shift towards the latter viewpoint, 50 and marked a commensurate rise in power and popularity of two, strong, ideologically committed personalities: William Joyce and A.K. Chesterton.

Joyce was a man of immense contradiction; at times he was the brilliant orator and lecturer possessed of great political talent, whilst at other times he was crass to the point of fatuity. The most striking aspects of his character were his obsession with all things Germanic, and his unfathomable detestation of World Jewry. Prior to his execution, he defiantly proclaimed: "In death, as in life, I defy the Jews who caused this last war; and I defy the power of Darkness which they represent".51

Described by Mrs John Beckett as "the most violent anti-Semite I had ever met", 52 and by Chesterton as "a pernicious influence", 53 Joyce saw his world-historical destiny clearly defined.

"For three years, I was Mosley's propaganda chief. These were marvellous times and I shall never forget them. I used all my influence in the Movement to give the Party a strongly anti-Semitic direction - and I may say that I succeeded in that direction". 54

A.K. Chesterton was as fervently anti-Jewish, but he was not beguiled by either Hitler or the Nazi Party to the same degree as Joyce, or indeed Mosley. He advocated the evolution of a genuinely British Fascist tradition, which took sufficient account of our Imperial heritage. The coming of the Second World War saw him faithfully follow his ideological inclinations and his recruitment to the British Army in North Africa.

It is also interesting to note in this connection that Mandle finds it no coincidence that the departure of Joyce and Chesterton, in 1937 and 1938 respectively, saw a commensurate decline in the British Union's anti-Semitism.⁵⁵

Such ideological cleavages within British Union have been here emphasized because they were decidedly not a feature of the IFL; Leese alone who it was that determined policy and strategy.



A.K. Chesterton in 1936 photo, wearing the Blackshirt uniform with his First World War decorations.

THE FASCIST IDEOLOGICAL DICHOTOMY.

Fascism, Mosley's "steel creed of the Iron Age", was, according to A.K. Chesterton, "a creed of universal validity but of purely national application". 56

A consequence of this fact was that the Fascism of the Imperial Fascists and the British Union was immensely similar, both being national and antisectional, authoritarian and anti-Parliamentarian, and protagonists of the Corporate State.

The striking similarity of the economic policies is principally due to the fact that Leese and Mosley drew their essential inspiration in this field from Arthur Kitson, although in-depth articulation of these ideas was the prerogative of Mosley. Skidelsky notes: "In essence, although his positive ideas were more sophisticated than Arthur Kitson's, the roots of Mosley's ideas were similar". ³⁷

However, such similarities only serve to illustrate the fact that the ideological differences that were extant were fundamental in perpetuating division and animosity. It is also pointed out at this time that the term "ideological" is being used in a very loose sense, because the meaning varies considerably according to which movement is being examined.

The IFL was not truly ideological, rather it was principled. Leese never attempted to develop an all-encapsulating fascist philosophy, preferring to combine his belief that "Race is the basis of all Politics" with a strong anti-Semitism that coloured his view of the world. From this, we can readily appreciate that IFL policy-strategy was more a matter of shifting emphasis rather than of changing substance.

The BUF, by contrast, had a well developed and articulate ideology, but it suffered gravely from its transient nature, being the play-thing of the prevailing personalities. For this reason, the early period stressed the concepts of Patriotism and the economic proposals of Mosley, because the British Union's largely middle class membership in a sense so willed it. However, the post-1934 Party, devoid of Rothermere-style middle class sensibilities, injected large doses of racialism and anti-Semitism into its propaganda as a palliative for its changing membership composition.

There were three general areas of fascist ideological contention, and these may be enumerated as:

- 1. The Jew as an entity.
- 2. The Judeao-Masonic Conspiracy.
- 3. Democracy as a Governmental Form.

1. "All for the State, none against the State" ⁵⁹ was a popular Imperial Fascist slogan, and it was taken as read that the State was only composed of citizens of proven fidelity.

A consequence of this was that the Jew, either as an individual or as part of an ethnic whole, was denied the rights of citizenship and hence was considered beyond the protection of the British State.

The IFL had arrived at this stance because Jewry was loyal **not** to Britain, but to the Diaspora, and also because the penetration of the Jew into the very fibre of the British way of life was having deleterious results.


The League believed that such facts of life were self-evident and morally justified any action aimed at eliminating Jewish influence. In this connection, Leese never ran away from the epithet 'Anti-Semitism', rather he proclaimed it positive virtue.

In writing "The Jew is treachery in human disguise", 60 Leese expressed his conviction that Jewry had to be considered as a totality; the notion of "good" and "bad" Jews was an abstraction to which he did not subscribe.

It was this notion of Jewish totality which enabled him to create a truly systematic anti-Semitism, the parameters of which incorporated everything from Sadism and Ritual Murder, to the Jewish penchant for homosexuality. Gorman in reference to the Jewish Question wrote: "Mosley never approached the crackpot fanaticism of Leese". 61

It was undoubtedly this Leesian Weltanschuung which provoked the President of the Oxford Union's Jewish Society to state: "Our greatest supporters in the fight against the Imperial Fascists are the Mosley Fascists themselves". 62

Clearly, this Jew recognized a distinction between the two Fascist organizations which made him much more fearful of Leese than of Mosley. It is highly probable that part of this Jew's reasoning was based upon the fact that the British Union were not openly anti-Jewish at that time. *The Blackshirt* still maintained that Jew-baiting was forbidden by *Standing Orders* 63 and that, as Mosley later claimed, the British Union itself had Jewish members. 64



SIR OSWALD MOSLEY.

It must be stressed, however, that the time was of crucial importance for by the end of 1934, the BUF was openly anti-Semitic, Fascist Week proclaiming "No Jews!" 65

In the post-war period, Mosley has asserted: "Anti-Semitism was not our policy", ⁶⁶ but the present writer believes this untenable when we find Mosley charging: "Our quarrel with the Jewish interests is that they have set the interests of their co-racialists at home and abroad above the interests of the British State.

An outstanding example of this conduct is the persistent attempt of many Jewish interests to provoke the world disaster of another war between Germany and Britain, not this time in any British quarrel, but purely in a Jewish quarrel". 67

It may well be that Mosley was not an obsessional anti-Semite, distinguishing as he did between Big Jews and Little Jews, and it may be that the BUF did not strive to develop a unitary view of the Jew in the same way as the IFL, but it is an altogether different matter to assert that there was no anti-Semitism whatsoever.

Skidelsky posits the theory that the British Union's anti-Semitism was a derivative of the radical nineteenth century anti-Semitism of the *British Brothers League*, and that in conjunction with Holmes' belief that the British Union's platform, "*Britain for the British*", was integrally and necessarily anti-Jewish, was therefore susceptible to a socio-economic catalyst. 68

As History has shown, this catalyst was provided and, as Mandle demonstrates, ⁶⁹ it gave rise to the gradual, open espousal of anti-Semitism. In 1937, Counsel for Action Press Ltd had stated: "No political party outside of a lunatic asylum would ask for votes to deport all their Jews"; ⁰ yet by 1939, Jewish deportation was official British Union policy.

Needless to say, all this appeared to Leese, not as the organic evolution of a Fascist movement, but rather as the same old sickening pragmatism and corrupt demagoguery, the *leitmotif* of Oswald Mosley. For Leese, Julius Streicher's statement: "Mosley is the tool of the Jews" had about it the universal certainty and validity of any Law of Nature.

2. According to Leese, the Jew, "a combination of all the worst racial qualities", ⁷³ had initiated a global life and death struggle with the Aryan, the ultimate objective being "world domination by the Jew". ⁷⁴

In order to instruct neophytes into the mysteries of "Jewology", the League disseminated the evergreen Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion; with this

blueprint acting as a guide to the overall Plan, Leese sought to expose the machinations of the Conspirators at every possible juncture.

This total perspective conspiracy, with the Jew as the common denominator, encompassed not only Socialo-Bolshevism and Usury Capitalism, but also Freemasonry, Liberalism and Democracy.

By guile and deception, the Jews had over the centuries built up vast political and economic power. They now "had control over the Gentile by the sheer weight of Money Power, a control used for purposes not Gentile". ⁷⁵

This pervasive power was fulcrumed upon control of the Media, which Jewry utilized to propagate disinformation. This was clearly the case, for was it not true that the fact that Bolshevism was Jewish, or that Usury was worked by and for the Jew, was *never* made public? The final self-evident proof of this conspiracy was the fact that the Media relentlessly assailed each and every genuine Fascist party, by direct or indirect means, and this was epitomised in Britain in their treatment of the IFL. ⁷⁶

Mosley also possessed a chiliastic world view, but for him the essential cleavage was the conflict between the Christian and Nietzchean conceptions⁷⁷ of Man. The Leesian global conflict would only terminate with the utter annihilation of one of the combatants, but Mosley believed that the resolution of the conflict lay in a synthesis: the creation of Fascist Man.

Retrospectively, however, Mosley denies that he or the BUF ever officially subscribed to the conspiratorial view of History, rather that he merely adhered to Spengler's idea of a Faustian-Magian culture clash.

Many writers, however, both friendly and hostile, ⁷⁸ have taken it as an obvious fact of life that the BUF believed in and actively propagated the notion of the Jewish Conspiracy. It is true that little direct reference was ever made to *The Protocols*, but it is equally and abundantly clear that the themes outlined therein were presented to the membership via the Fascist Press.

Jewish conspiracy articulation, for the benefit of the rank and file, reached its highpoint between 1934 - 37 when Chesterton, Joyce and McNab held the foremost propaganda offices in the movement. Their accession had occurred in part because the relative easing of the Depression had made Mosley's economic formulations something of a temporary dead-letter.

This anti-Jewish tide was also indirectly aided by the IFL, which deliberately infiltrated anti-Jewish literature into the BUF at grassroots level, ⁷⁹ achieving some degree of success, given the absence of the "Rothermere Fascists". Adoption of anti-Jewish sentiment permeated all levels of the British Union, including Mosley himself.

Skidelsky dubbed Mosley as a political anti-Semite, because of the latter's use in both articles and speeches of conspiratorial rhetoric, and even the later departure of the *prominenti* of the anti-Semitic faction did not prevent *Action*

from declaring that the political parties were "the flunkeys of Finance and the Jackals of Judah".80

3. From the outset of his political career, Leese was implacably opposed to democracy in toto. Symbolically, he wrote an article in 1929 entitled: "Making Britain Safe From Democracy".81

This detestation was founded upon his belief that democracy was not equipped to deal with crises. How could it possibly be effective, when democracy was but the Nation divided against itself into Party political formations?

Leese did at least have the virtue of being consistent. Of his winning a local government seat, he wrote: "What utter humbug the democratic vote really is; many people I knew voted for me because I had cured their pigs or pets and without the slightest idea of what I stood for beyond that".

Leese saw democracy, not as being useful when it favoured him and useless when it favoured the Jew, but rather as an intrinsically defective and insidious 'mis'-governmental form.

The Leesian Zeitgeist was the necessity of synthesizing revolutionary creed, which would be truly effective in government, but would yet operate with the common consent of the British people. Fascism was that creed, because it alone sought the creation of "a strong executive team of selected men of Character and Service". This creed, Leese declared, was a beneficial and ameliorative one, working both for the Nation and the People; it is "a response to the failure of democracy". ***

Nazi Germany, he believed, was a shining example of this verity, and allowed him to state: "Democratic politicians in general make a drab contrast to Hitler". 85

Mosley's approach to democracy was characteristically equivocal, in that he sought not the elimination of democracy, but rather that perversion of it, financial democracy, which governed the people without scruple and left them devoid of any means of seeking redress.

In this matter, he was greatly influenced by Oswald Spengler. The talented German philosopher wrote: "The coming of Caesarism breaks the dictature of Money and its political weapon, Democracy". 87

Mosley believed that the Zeitgeist was the union of Caesarism and Science, in order that Fascist Man, the Thought-Deed Man, could arise to blaze the forward trail.

The aforementioned "ideological" differences have prompted Gorman, amongst others, ⁸⁸ to make a clear distinction between what he identifies as two contending creeds.

The IFL was, he believes, the first genuinely *Racial Fascist* organization in Britain, which successfully combined Fascism with a clearly defined Racialism. Leese managed to fuse scientific racialism with popular racial sentiment, and then incorporate the result within an anti-Semitic framework.

By contrast, the BUF was an orthodox Fascist party, but one without a racial raison d'être. It built its Fascism upon the economic proposals of Mosley, although a fairly free rein, following in the wake of the Rothermere Fascists desertion, was given to the racial anti-Semites like Chesterton and Joyce, in order that Mosley could retain his active forces.



Sir Oswald Mosley walks with his supporters to Trafalgar Square for a 1961 rally. On Mosley's left is a top aide, Jeffrey Hamm.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF THE FASCIST RECRUIT.

The preceding chapters clearly demonstrate that Personality and Ideological Perspective were instrumental in determining, through a process of interaction, two differing approaches to Fascist politics. Such approaches inevitably contributed in some measure to the number and type of person that was respectively recruited.

For those who were ideologically or instinctively anti-Jewish, and placed straight-talk and integrity above manifestations of strength, the IFL was a perfect, political home; it is a natural corollary that such people were very few numerically, and this in itself restricted the League's potential.

For the majority of people attracted to Fascist politics, the IFL, with its constricted horizon, would have appeared a less than serious political vehicle for attaining governmental power. In consequence, they opted for the British Union which proffered an apparently more cogent and comprehensive platform. This fact must have been an important determinant, given that even Nugent regarded the platform as "extremely thorough, well developed and logical" Of course, the attraction of the BUF platform is only applicable to those who exercised the rationality of choice; that is to say, discussions with ex-Blackshirts indicated that they had not opted for the British Union in preference to the IFL, but rather because they had never heard of the latter.

The diversity of activities and publications spanned an enormous potential cross-section of British society, from manual worker to intellectual, and rapidly engendered a large, flourishing and indeed flamboyant organization.

In discussing the membership composition of the BUF, Rawnsley identifies "a belief that the BUF attracted one particular class of people or a particular type of personality". 90

Today, this class is generally deemed to be the lower middle class, ⁹¹ whose susceptibility to Fascist arguments is augmented commensurately with their societal dispossession.

The present writer, like Dr. Hayes, ⁹² rejects such an analysis for two principal reasons. Firstly, insufficient evidence has been furnished which adequately bolsters such an assertion, and at the same time demolishes the Fascist claim to have a wide trans-party appeal. Secondly, and more importantly, the most accurate knowledge concerning recruitment would have been possessed by those who made up the leadership of the Fascist

organizations, thus giving them the pre-eminent right to claim that the bulk of their support came from such and such a class.

In regard to the British Union, however, we find that there were radically divergent conceptions as to who was being recruited to the movement. This fact seriously threatens the legitimacy of regarding Fascist Revolution as being the handiwork of the middle classes.

Consider W.E.D. Allen who stated: "Fascism appeals to those elements among the younger minded middle class who are conservative by temperament and strongly nationalist in spirit, and to those rarer and more dynamic individuals who, naturally revolutionary in their outlook, have been disappointed and exasperated by the failure of all leadership from the Left to approach any fulfilment of their aspiration". 93

Whilst Angus McNab argued: "Although Fascism draws its support from patriots of every class, it can only succeed as a national mass movement, and on that account the bulk of our membership is and always has been drawn from that section which has been constantly betrayed by every party - the British working class".

Incongruent though these sources appear to be, we may say that what is being contended in essence, is not what class was recruited, rather what proportion of the various classes constituted BUF membership.

Recruitment to any political organization is influenced by a range of variable and interacting factors. Two important such factors in this connection were:

- 1. Period of Recruitment.
- 2. Region of Recruitment.
- 1. Despite the short history of the BUF, the time-period clearly defines within it, differing patterns of recruitment. During the first two years or so, the BUF undoubtedly had a heavily middle class membership. We may support such an assertion by reference to three features of the early British Union.

Firstly, it was a coalition of two major components, the New Party and the British Fascisti. The former was an all-party formation incorporating even Left Labour intellectuals, like Forgan and Beckett, whilst the latter was "a middle class, semi-fascist organization". This latter statement is quite tenable, given its declared platform and the number of its members who came to congregate in the BUF's inner leadership. 96

Secondly, Mandle⁹⁷ points out the striking incidence of officer exservicemen membership, and this certainly correlates well with the belief of a middle class predominance.

Finally, such a composition, or belief in such a composition, was clearly a factor in Lord Rothermere's placing his Press Empire at the behest of the BUF, for he indicated with his departure that he conceived the British Union as the action arm of the Tory Party.

A period of decline set into the BUF with the departure of the Rothermere Fascists, but this was brought to an end when predominantly working class regions, such as South Lancashire, the West Midlands and East London began responding to the Fascist message.

2. It is in this connection that we see the emergence of the second component, that of the geographic and its close inter-dependence with the time period.

The shift away from a middle class predominance in the party naturally led to a corresponding move away from the suburban and rural areas, generally associated with such classes, and to a rise in popularity in industrial, urban areas, the traditional home of the working classes.

The infusion and growth of this working class element within the movement does not signify that the middle class component fell away, but merely that political strategy, reacting to changed conditions, necessitated shift of emphasis. We find corroborative evidence of this in the period 1938 - 39, when there was a sharp rise in BUF support in areas generally deemed to be middle class. This surge of activity was most pronounced in East Anglia because British Union policy was specifically aimed at alleviating the problems that landowners and farmers faced - due to the continued effects of the agricultural depression. It would thus appear to be largely true that the BUF was at its height as a movement, representing all sections of society, just prior to the outbreak of war.

In attempting to make valid, worthwhile generalizations about the social composition of the BUF, we are greatly hindered by both the high turnover rate that the British Union experienced, and a lack of truly solid research.

As a starting point, Mandle's work 100 is quite valuable, but its limited objectives - that of assessing the leadership corps of the BUF - are not adequately achieved as Rawnsley 101 pointed out, because they contain both error and omission. Nonetheless, bearing in mind its inherent limitations, it becomes clear that the inner core of leaders was predominantly middle class. One only encounters difficulties with this type of research, when one seeks to extrapolate the adduced results beyond their terms of reference; that is to say, any attempt to prove that the BUF as an entity was middle class

phenomenon by reference to Mandle's work would be intellectually dishonest.

If we accept that research on the leadership is of limited application, it makes it even clearer that assessment of the rank and file provides us with an even greater headache. Although comparatively little work has been done in this field, it is substantial enough for us to query the validity of the middle class theory.

Rawnsley's study¹⁰² is restricted to the regions of Northern England, and his research strongly suggests that the majority of branches in this part of the country, Nelson, Manchester, Leeds etc were cosmopolitan in membership. Some branches like Blackburn and Middleton were predominantly working class, whilst a few like Harrogate were distinctly middle class.

We conclude that within regions and across regions, membership was heterogeneous, and this is similarly found to be the case by Griffin in his study of the British Union in Suffolk.

He found, as was expected, that there was a substantial middle class element composed of landowners, farmers and doctors, but that other classes from the fishing, labouring and engineering industries were liberally represented.

Finally, the BUF had representatives of one class which was absent from the ranks of the IFL: the Aristocracy. Hamm¹⁰⁴ estimates that there were a couple of dozen aristocrats in the BUF, including Viscountess Dorne, Viscountess Downe, the Earl of Erroll and Baroness Van Heeinstra, although clearly their chief value was one of prestige and "respectability" rather than of fervent, political activity.

We may reasonably conclude from such available evidence that there is more than a *soupçon* of truth in the Mosley-Fascist claim to have been an all-class movement.

As Blake¹⁰⁵ acknowledges, the problems facing us in attempting to make a sociological breakdown of the IFL are infinitely greater than those faced vis à vis the British Union.

This is largely because there have been no comparable studies carried out on the membership-composition of the League, and also because the organization was so small that even in 1939 *The Fascist* had but a circulation of 3,000 copies. ¹⁰⁶

To talk even of the leadership of the IFL is quite meaningless, since Arnold Leese was it, to all intents and purposes. Consequently, we have recourse to the Fascist press itself for illumination of a dimly-lit area.

From *The Fascist*, we can estimate that there were some 50 or so branches dotted around the country, but there appears to be no easily identified pattern of preference for rural or urban areas. The largest cluster of branches naturally occurred in North and East London, which were sufficiently strong to enable them to produce a duplicated broadsheet, *Weekly Angles*, from 1938 - 40, and which eventually went into German translation. This area of London was largely working class, although there were a considerable number of small businessmen in the vicinity. It is highly likely that the working class, as well as some Gentile small businessmen, faced with concentrated Jewish competition, gave support to the IFL, though the respective proportions are only to be guessed at.

Leese himself gave an indication of the nature of the support the IFL attracted when he wrote: "Our best support came from the most independent sections of the community, professional men, unmarried people and those with no families. These would not be afraid of publicity and would give time and money to the Cause". 108

This would seem to suggest that there was a middle class orientation in the IFL, for the working class could hardly be deemed independent in any meaningful sense.

Perusal of League literature also evinces the significant fact that, just as with the BUF, there are a considerable number of officer ex-servicemen contributors, such as Lt. Colonel Lane and Capt. Howard; evidence yet again of a strong, middle class tendency.

Interestingly, British Union Parliamentary candidate, Ronald Creasy, who had

great many friends in the IFL, wrote of the organization: "It had about it the old snobbery of middle class democracy". ¹⁰⁹

Indeed, the theory of middle class bias is, apparently, only controverted by Carsten, who referring to Leese states: "His followers did not come from the upper and middle classes" However, the present writer feels justified in rejecting such a statement, since it is not supported by one jot of evidence.

Hesitantly, therefore, we may consider the IFL to have been a lower middle class fascist organization, whose main working class support was concentrated in London; though it is stressed that this claim is far from conclusive.

CONCLUSIONS.

It can be argued that the personality and temperament of an individual has far-reaching implications for all aspects of his life, and that this is particularly so in the field of politics, where people of diverse nature are thrown together by circumstance or by design to work for a common objective. This factor becomes even more important when one studies the Fascist political spectrum, because of the exaggerated emphasis placed upon personal leadership and personal responsibility.

The two Fascist organizations herein analyzed were clearly, in the first instance, reflections of their Leader's personality, and that the intensity of the reflection was influenced by both the given time-period as well as the varying composition.

I believe it reasonable to suggest that the IFL remained thoroughly Leesian in orientation for its entire history, whilst the British Union's Mosley orientation waxed and waned with the accession to prominence of lesser, but nonetheless still talented, Fascists.

We have seen how *within* the movements, personality was crucial in moulding both direction and composition, and it would, therefore, be fatuous to deny the import of this factor in causing division and antipathy *between* the parties.

Leese's rejection of Mosley's leadership was essentially twofold: personal and ideological. He had an instinctive dislike of political pragmatism, a trait he clearly identified as being the outgrowth of democracy. Mosley's pragmatism was doubly repellent because it was injected, like a deadly virus, into the healthy body of Fascism, which had arisen to destroy such a virus in contemporary society; the only outcome that Leese could envisage was the subordination of Fascist doctrine to the whims and caprices of the time. Needless to say, this bastardization of a pure creed by an interloper generated something of a personal animosity towards the contaminator.

For Mosley, the reverse is essentially the case. Leese was nothing more than a posturing political pygmy, who posed no serious threat to the fortunes of the BUF in real terms, but he did possess a particularly virulent form of invective which he utilized with deadly accuracy. There can be little doubt that the Curzon Affair was Mosley's springboard to action, and that this was the true reason for the separate existence of the organizations.

Initially, the IFL and the BUF were ideologically poles apart in certain, crucial areas - primarily as a consequence of the presence in the BUF of the Rothermere Fascists. However, with the removal of these "Kosher Fascists",

the upper hand quickly and decisively fell to the radical, anti-Jewish wing of the movement, and this engendered something of an ideological *rapprochement*. This meant that the differences that then existed were now more a question of emphasis than of substance.

That this did not promote organizational *rapprochement* is something that must be clearly placed at the door of the personality factor, at least as far as the *prominenti* of the anti-Jewish faction are concerned.

This corps, originating as they did from more or less the same social background as the bulk of the League's membership, and also possessing a similar world-view, nonetheless maintained their distance. Their reasoning for this stance can only have been that they believed that Mosley's power, person and prestige would have a better chance of achieving the desired Fascist Victory. No doubt, as Joyce explicitly stated, they thought that they could mould the official ideology of the BUF to their own liking as they traversed the road to power.

However, there is evidence that suggests that the rank and file of this faction were a good deal less pragmatic in their approach. It would seem that a continuing decline in Britain's fortunes, coupled with a convergency of the two Fascist organizations viewpoints, caused some to be so repelled by the blatant opportunism of Joyce *et al* that they went over to the IFL. 111

A valuable nuance is also afforded us in this connection, when we analyze the *National Socialist League's* schism from the BUF in 1937. Led by Joyce, Beckett and McNab, it was ideologically and socially very similar to the IFL, perhaps even closer than that of the BUF taken as a whole. That these individuals chose to go it alone can only be explained, I believe, by recourse to the influence of personality. It was either due to personal vanity vis à vis their own political capabilities, or from their dislike of Leese built up over years of experience, that made them believe that unity of organization was not desirable.

The influence of class in determining or maintaining this division between the IFL and the BUF is quite minimal. Certainly, there are grounds which support the British Union's claim to have been a trans-class political force, given the diversity of support that they attracted over the years, and that this was in no way matched by the IFL. Nonetheless, even if it could be demonstrated that both parties drew the same type of support, it would only serve to confirm that Personality and Ideology were the keys which determined the immense gulf that existed between them in terms of size and influence.

We may conclude, therefore, that the division of the Fascist forces in Britain were determined by the three factors analyzed in this study, but that their relative importance declined from the Man, to the Idea, to the Recruit.

A CLARIFICATION.

At several points in this text, there is a reference to the "Rothermere Fascists". As this may be a little obscure, a few lines are appended here for the reader.

In 1934, Lord Rothermere, one of Britain's most powerful Press barons, decided that he wanted to throw in his lot with Mosley's British Union. No doubt after consultation with Mosley himself, *The Daily Mail* printed on its front page: *Hurrah for the Blackshirts!* The response, both positive and negative, was immediate. Thousands of *Daily Mail* readers poured into the recently founded BUF, and brought with them a large portion of their Conservative Party baggage, thus confusing the ideological direction of what was supposed to be a radical movement.

The Daily Mail pushed the BUF heavily for a period of about six months, and can only have brought the BUF to a much wider audience than it could have otherwise expected. However, there were other interests in the country who were **not** at all happy with this development. The most influential of these was the Jewish community.

Although Lord Rothermere claimed that he was withdrawing his support from the BUF because he had conceived of it as a kind of street-active Tory Party, the real truth is that he had been threatened by large Jewish interests. Look at any daily newspaper and you will see that a good proportion of it is made up of advertizing; without the revenue that comes from such advertizing most newspapers could not stay in business. Thus, it was made plain to Lord Rothermere that if he continued in his support of the BUF, large advertizing contracts from Jewish and non-Jewish concerns would be withdrawn. It does not take a genius to work out what would have happened to Rothermere's Press Empire if such a threat had been carried through.

The departure of the "Rothermere Fascists", of course, permitted a drastic change of direction for the BUF - a change that allowed the BUF to move from being a conservative body to a revolutionary force.



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World War I

A.K. CHESTERTON.

The Enigma of William Joyce.

One evening in September, 1939, while awaiting a summons to the Army, I twirled the knob of our wireless set to hear what the world was saying about the drama of those times. Almost at once the room was filled with a voice: "Jairmany calling! Jairmany calling! Jairmany calling!" We stiffened in our chairs and exchanged horrified glances. There was so little doubt about it that we did not even mention the man's name. My wife, who is not given to invective, made a comment more bitter than I have ever heard from her. My own anger, although mixed with bewilderment, was not less intense than hers. for I had been associated with William Joyce in a cause which never for a moment had I supposed could produce a situation such as this. Apart from the injury to the country in which he had been received and educated I realized, almost within the instant, that an association innocent of any vestige of treasonable intent was now made to suspect that the taint of it upon all concerned, no matter how loyal, might be ineradicable. My bewilderment was as great as my anger. What could have induced the man to do this appalling thing?

There came to my mind the recollection of the passage with which he had brought his book, *National Socialism Now!*, to an end. It had seemed to me queer when I first read it. I took down the book from my shelves and found the passage:

"If it ever happens to us to see the chalk cliffs receding for the last time as the water widens between us and our homeland, then the memories will come in a choking flood, and we shall know our land when it is too late. This is the land for which better than we have died. For it, we are asked not to die but to live; it is ours, it belongs to us in every spiritual and sensuous sense; it must be ours in every other way, completely and utterly ours".

Joyce was writing not of Germany but of Britain. There is no doubt that he was sincere. But why should he have looked upon the land he loved through the eyes of an exile leaving never to return? War was then only a remote possibility and it is not credible that he had already made up his mind how he would act in that contingency. There is lodged in certain men and women a spirit of prophecy which uses them as more or less unconscious mediums. Joyce seems to have been one of them. He was fey.

MOSLEYITE IDEALS.

To understand how grossly out of character his defection appeared, it is necessary briefly to state the objects of the cause which he and his associates in the Mosley movement served. It can now be done calmly and with historical objectivity because, controversial though the cause was at the time, it is now dead beyond possibility of resurrection. The Mosley Fascists believed that other nations were becoming streamlined in the struggle for survival, while their own was drifting towards dissolution under the leadership of Baldwin and MacDonald. They believed that their Empire policy was the answer to the economic problem; that they could resolve the ferocious class war within the framework of the Corporate State; and that by means of a strong government, responsible to a Parliament elected by occupational franchise, they could release the national will from the paralysis which beset it. They were sure that the Fascism they were to build would differ from continental brands as radically as the Reform Acts differed from the French Revolution.

Whether or not these beliefs were naive, those who held them had no thought other than to serve Britain. This was as true of Joyce as it was of anybody else: indeed, the fire of patriotism flamed in him like a beacon. When he left Mosley and formed his own organization, he wrote: "We deal with National Socialism for Britain, for we are British. Our League is entirely British". Two years later he joined the enemies of the country he had sincerely loved. How does one account for so extraordinary a volte face?

Part of the explanation may be that William Joyce generated a political passion more intense than either his body or his mind could cope with. That it was physically too much for him was apparent in his frequently frazzled nerves. That it was mentally too much for him - formidable as was his mind-could be detected in political behaviour that was sometimes quite outrageous, even before the series of events which led to his tragic end. National Socialism was intended to be adapted to the needs of the nation. That it should have become in Joyce's mind more important than the nation itself shows the immensity of his intellectual aberration. It was as though a man were to proclaim himself an exponent of the principle "My country, right or wrong" and then go in search of a country which he considered to be right.

There was always, it is true, something unpredictable about Joyce. One of my most vivid memories of the old Fascist days was meeting which he addressed at Evesham. It had been a bad year for the fruit growers, and farmers from far and near had come to hear what Fascism would do to help them market their produce. Joyce was in no mood to tell them. Instead, he set out upon verbal marathon to describe the virtues of the Hindu panchayet

system and worked himself into a fury of passion which left his audience quite unmoved. They sat there stolidly, interested only in how long he would keep up his performance. He beat all records by speaking for four hours. Finally, although the night was dark, he insisted on falling in the Blackshirt stewards outside the hall and inspecting them. The stolidity of the good people of Evesham broke down. They gathered round to hoot their derision and shout mocking orders to the parade. Some lunatic sidled up to inform Joyce that there was an Italian quarter in the town. "Then we shall march through the quarter and rejoice their hearts by singing 'Giovenezza' " he announced. This was the Italian Fascist marching song. Column of route was formed, and since nobody knew where the Italian quarter lay, Joyce decided to march his singing cohorts through the entire town to make sure it was not missed. The march had not progressed far, however, when out of the night loomed a portly police-sergeant, taking an immovable stance in the middle of the road. "Hey, young Hop-o'-my-Thumb. What do you think you are doing?" Joyce pulled himself up to his full, though still not appreciable, height. "I would inform you, Officer", he replied ponderously, "that we are Englishmen exercising the privilege of every Englishman to use the King's highway". The sergeant was not impressed. "There's no privilege entitling you to shout your silly heads off and keep decent citizens awake. Run along home to bed, little man - and take your circus with you". In shocked silence the midnight serenade melted towards the waiting charabancs.

PARADOX OF CHARACTER.

Although many such stories can be told of his eccentricity and flamboyance, nothing in Joyce's history explains his final desertion of all that he held dear. As a diminutive boy in an Ireland which had grown antagonistic to Britain, he walked the dangerous streets wearing a British Scout's uniform to proclaim his loyalty. He joined the British Army when still a child, and was hauled out of it only because his physique could not stand the strain. He was slashed with a razor, and scarred from ear to mouth, while defending a Conservative speaker against Communist attacks in the Battersea Town Hall. Believing the British world system to be the most beneficent ever known, he inveighed against the Irish for their separation because he thought it might be the beginning of the end of the British Empire. He taxed the patience of audiences from Land's End to John O'Groats by interminable dissertations upon the iniquity of the projected surrender of India. Anything that threatened to weaken the might of Britain or detract from her fair name enraged him. He was not putting on an act. He meant every blistering word he spoke.

Yet, in Britain's most critical hour, he left to join her enemies. The very enormity of that action impels one to try and understand its underlying motives. What was he like, this very strange man whose life had been so erratic and whose death was so terrible and so brave?

More confused and pretentious balderdash has been written about Joyce than about any other personality of our day. Consider some of the confusion. A popular work dealing mainly with him concedes on one page the possibility that he was "a person of real and potent charm", and on the next page declares that "it would be impossible to exaggerate his lack of any attractive distinction". The book refers to him as an instigator and lover of street fights, and yet insists that his excellent relationship with the police was because of the orderly way he and his followers comported themselves on the streets.

Inaccuracies about Joyce abound. One writer who has given him much attention suggests that his father, an Irishman who became a naturalized American, had been caught up in the underworld of espionage, which is totally untrue. She refers to his own marriage to a Protestant girl as "striking the Pope of Rome across the face", whereas he had left the Catholic Church at the age of sixteen. She writes of him as having to make a home for himself and his second wife, and pay alimony to his first wife, despite the fact that he was the plaintiff in the divorce action and therefore could not be called upon to pay alimony. She declares that he had a shop in Bristol which sold daggers, rubber truncheons and knuckle-dusters, which is the sheerest invention. She insinuates that he accepted German money while still in England, mainly on the ground that he moved to a more expensive flat. That he did so in partnership with a friend who had some private means is a matter she did not trouble to investigate. Joyce was certainly not then in German pay. He was not a mercenary.

More difficult to refute are statements such as that he was "obviously odious", "pushing", "vulgar" and that he "yearned for executive power". Although they are not true, there was much in his conduct to give colour to them. On one occasion, when speaking to the January Club, member of an old English family, who happened to have a foreign name, ventured to ask a question. Joyce's reply was to dwell at length upon the impertinence of people with foreign names interfering in British politics. Incidents of this kind were frequent. Yet Joyce was not the vulgarian which such behaviour might lead people to suppose. He had the sympathetic insight and the ability to distinguish between nuances of thought and feeling which mark man of taste. Only when the demon of political passion - and sometimes some other frenetic imp - was active within him did he behave like man possessed. He then disregarded everything except the urge to knock out by whatever verbal means he could muster anybody who attempted to question his beloved cause.

For the same reason he indulged in rather fatuous intrigues. His purpose was not to advance himself, but to confound colleagues whom he suspected of wishing to dilute or pollute the pure white milk of the Fascist gospel. The idea that he was in search of personal power over men's lives is entirely untrue. Power over audiences - yes, that he did desire. He was happy, although not always felicitous, on the public platform. He was at his best on the lecturer's rostrum, and he loved talking to selected companions over a cup of coffee or a glass of beer. But he had neither desire nor capacity to exercise any other kind of power. When he was given high administrative responsibilities by Mosley he had no notion how to discharge them, and was completely without malice when they were taken away from him. He asked nothing more than the opportunity to talk.

Joyce was not

pushing bounder, in search of personal political conquests. The man was an idolater, but he did not idolize himself. Instead, at first he worshipped Mosley, declaring him to be a man of infinitely greater capacity than either Hitler or Mussolini. When he became disillusioned about Mosley, he transferred the whole of his hero-worship to Adolf Hitler. Hence his plunge into the abyss. As long as his political demon remained inactive, Joyce was a quiet, grave, cautious and discreet person. Relaxed, he could be a very pleasant, even lovable companion. Instead of dominating a conversation, he would often intervene only to make a joke, his eyes popping with a mischievous gleam of relish. When at his best there was a pellucid quality in him which enabled one to discern - what so much of the rest of him shouted to deny - a very real humility. At other times he was pompous, pedantic, insufferable, rasping in voice and cruel in humour. Then sometimes again he was a little mad. A secretary once staggered out of his office in hysterics. She had sat watching him use his arm as a pin-cushion. The one thing he had no thought to be was a dictator.

A pointer to his real ambition may well be that when recruits to the Mosley movement in 1933 expressed a desire to become public speakers they were directed to attend classes conducted by "Professor Joyce". They would duly present themselves to a rather cherubic-looking young man who answered to that title. He continued to answer to it until the newspapers began to enquire what Chair the "Professor" held. If Hitler had wished really to reward William Joyce for his service he would have made him not a gauleiter or anything in that line, but a Herr Doktor. That was the direction in which Joyce's vanity and capacity lay. He wanted to be a savant.

A.K. CHESTERTON.



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
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
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
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