

The Third Rome

About the Book and Author

Soviet Russia manifested a fervent revolutionary nationalism, even messianism, immediately after the October revolution in 1917. The old concept of Russia as the Third Rome now acquired a new ideological dimension: that world revolution would emanate only from Russia and only as Russia dictated. At the same time, leaders of the European revolutionary movement, led originally by Marx and Engels in the mid-1800s, feared that a Russian revolution would bring Russian influence into the heart of Europe. The social revolution, both in Europe and in Russia, therefore acquired a nationalist context: To whom does the leading role belong?

This book presents an entirely new interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution by examining its geopolitical context in addition to its domestic aspect. Dr. Agursky argues that in the early 1900s Lenin's revolutionary strategy was to outpace the "competitive" German revolution; German social democracy had its own formula to bring social revolution to Russia, and Lenin wanted to consolidate Bolshevik power in order to bring "his" revolution to Germany. The author concludes that by 1917 Russian intellectuals well understood the deep-rootedness of Bolshevik nationalism, and, although Bolshevism had ostensibly been loyal to Marxism, on a political level it was now in fact a rebellion against it.

The author makes wide use of many entirely new Russian, German, and Jewish sources and also suggests a new interpretation of a number of historical figures, including Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, and Bogdanov.

Mikhail Agursky earned a Ph.D. in cybernetics in 1969 in Moscow and a second doctorate, in Slavic studies, in 1983 in Paris. He has been a scientific adviser to the Soviet military industry and is currently a political analyst for the Israeli media and senior lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Among his many publications are *From Under the Rubble* (with Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others, 1975), *Soviet Golem* (in Russian, 1982), and *Gorky: From the Literary Heritage* (with Margarite Shklovskaya, in Russian, 1986) as well as chapters in *The Many Faces of Communism* (edited by Morton Kaplan; 1978) and *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Relations* (edited by Nissan Oren; 1984).

אָ, מאַסקױע-שטאָט!
דער שענסטער טרוים
פון אַלטע בלינד-פאַרליבטע זין פון דיינע
איצט ווערט באַוואָרט!
אָ, מאַסקױע-שטאָט, אָ, דריטער רוים!

○ city of Moscow!
The most beautiful dream of your blindly adoring sons
is now accomplished,
○ city of Moscow, ○ Third Rome!

—David Hofshstein (1889–1952)
Af likhtige ruinen (Moscow, 1927)

The Third Rome National Bolshevism in the USSR

Mikhail Agursky

Foreword by Leonard Schapiro

Westview Press / Boulder and London

To the memory of my parents,
Shmuel and Bunya Aguraky,
and to a world destroyed by the developments
this book attempts to interpret

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Foreword to the First Russian Edition

The author of this book is one of the most vigorous and original representatives of the intelligentsia to have left the Soviet Union in the last few years. Even before his departure, Mikhail Agursky won a reputation for his articles on religious and social subjects, including his participation in the collection *From Under the Rubble*. In the West, he has consolidated his reputation by his participation in international symposia and conferences.

This is his first book, and it demonstrates all the qualities we could legitimately expect from its author. It is also the first detailed examination of National Bolshevism, particularly in its display of Smenovekhism. Agursky follows the emergence of a unique left-wing nationalist trend just after the revolution, and then he investigates Smenovekhism in Russia itself. In one of the most innovative and valuable chapters of the book, the author demonstrates how the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward Smenovekhism is interwoven with interparty struggle. Agursky believes that National Bolshevism paved the way for the Stalinist slogan, Socialism in one country.

There is no doubt that Agursky's book will provoke lively discussion. But that is good. It is useful for historical science when there is discussion on such a serious research background. The early history of Soviet Russia is far from having been covered thoroughly. It is possible to make a serious assessment of the more recent period, particularly of the meaning of nationalist elements in the time of Stalin, only if based on meticulous research into the early years. Agursky's work therefore sheds light on current events as well.

Let us hope that Agursky's book will receive a wide response and will be translated into various languages.

Leonard Schapiro
London School of Economics
and Political Science
1979

Preface

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1930:

In every instance of historical camouflage we have two realities superimposed; one genuine and substantial, underneath; the other apparent and accidental, on the surface. So, in Moscow, there is a screen of European ideas—Marxism—thought out in Europe in view of European realities and problems. . . . That Marxism should triumph in Russia, where there is no industry, would be the greatest contradiction that Marxism could undergo. But there is no such contradiction, for there is no such triumph. Russia is Marxist more or less as the Germans of the Holy Roman Empire were Romans. . . . I am waiting for the book in which Stalin's Marxism will appear translated into Russian history. For it is this which is Russia's strength, what it has of Russian, not what it has of Communist. [*The Revolt of the Masses* (London, 1972), p. 105]

I have no ambition to say that this book is the first and only one devoted to the generous wish to satisfy the request of the great Ortega; the Bibliography is sufficient demonstration of the abundance of such attempts. History is inexhaustible, since every historian—and especially a historian of modern times—is able to extract new historical material from the stock unused by previous historians. He or she is also able to suggest a new interpretation for known historical facts, or to fit the subject into a larger historical or geographical framework. What may have seemed insignificant before may acquire a new and vital meaning for a new generation of historians.

As philosophers, especially Raymond Aron, have said, the present depends on the future. We do not yet know the ends of many great historical events and cannot therefore pass final judgment upon them: The processes launched by the first appearances of great religions such as Christianity or Islam are not yet complete. Do we know all the implications of events such as the discovery of nuclear energy, or more generally, are we now capable of making a final judgment as to whether rapid technical progress and industrial revolutions are a blessing or a curse? Indeed, we also do not know the end of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It is not yet finished, and one cannot yet tell whether it was a success or a failure.

The Marxist and socialist components of the great historical process launched by the Bolshevik revolution seemed dominant to the people who

believed that Marxism had triumphed in Russia. Such historians, regardless of their attitude toward Marxism, positive or negative, tried to ignore the non-Marxist elements of Soviet history as marginal. They accepted the official Soviet statements at face value. Many historians were virtually trapped by these official declarations, and sometimes they transformed Western Soviet studies into a branch of official Soviet historiography—the main difference being that these studies were abundantly supplied with footnotes, as is academically accepted in the West.

The more time separates us from the Bolshevik revolution, the more clearly one can see that the Marxist (theoretical!) and socialist components of Bolshevism were indeed a "historical camouflage," to quote Ortega, for deeper historical and geopolitical processes—as was true in the aftermath of the French Revolution. There were serious politicians who came to this realization early on, but historians disregarded their opinion, in spite of the fact that it served as a background for many far-reaching political decisions that led to international recognition of Soviet Russia.

New Soviet developments demonstrate more and more that one can no longer ignore what was previously mistakenly regarded as marginal: for example, the political and cultural events connected with Russian emigration after 1917; the problem of the so-called fellow travelers in Soviet Russia in the 1920s; the formative period of Soviet leadership, which exposed it to various non-Marxist influences; the merging of Bolshevism with other Russian political movements on the eve of the revolution; Russian religious thought and the history of religion in Russia, and so on. What is necessary is a new reading of what was said by Bolshevik leaders, especially Lenin and Stalin, which badly needs a system of interpretation. In this way, one can easily discover how, for example, Lenin, who never took issue with Marx and Engels publicly, in fact rebelled against them in a very important subject: the attitude toward the Russian revolutionary tradition. As is well known, Marx and Engels were extremely hostile to Alexander Herzen; they called him a Pan-Slavist "landlord" and did not regard him as a revolutionary. The reason for their hostility was Herzen's rejection of the West en bloc, including its revolutionary movement, and his appeal for a Slavic (Russian) invasion of Europe.

When Lenin published his famous eulogy of Herzen in 1912, in which he declared that Herzen was the main founding father of Russian socialism and the predecessor of Bolshevism, without even mentioning Marx and Engels' hostility toward him, Lenin was in fact openly rebelling against the former in his own quest for world revolutionary leadership, a quest that was rooted in Herzen's position. In his writings, Lenin never disclosed his real intentions, which were far from his declared goals. He wanted to be the absolute world political leader who would open up a new era of human history, and Russia was the "electoral constituency" that would aid him in achieving this objective. He was ready to make any political concessions, even give up his declared theoretical principles, to carry out his *grande desigine*. His absolute value was power—power on a world scale, as quickly as possible, and in his life span.

This goal is why Lenin's writings were part of a consistent public relations campaign in order to justify his tactical moves. He was a lawyer by education, and he used his professional skills very efficiently—for example, in the rapid change of his dramatic appeal to save the imminent German revolution in order to justify the October revolution, to the claim a few months later during the Brest-Litovsk debates that the German revolution was not yet ripe and the peace treaty with imperial Germany must be signed as soon as possible.

Therefore, the people who look at Lenin's writings as genuine expressions of his views are grossly mistaken. This statement does not mean that his writings have no cognitive value, only that they need interpretation. The real Lenin, the real Stalin, cannot be discovered only from the face value of their declared statements. The history of Bolshevism cannot be studied only through the Bolsheviks' own documents, as is sometimes done by historians. Bolshevism developed an esoteric political culture that is still terra incognita to many people who regard themselves as experts in Soviet affairs. Soviet studies need deep and bold revisionism, but not of the kind that tries to treat the Soviet system simply as the result of an evil ideological creation *ex nihilo*. Soviet Russia was not created *ex nihilo* only according to utopian rules.

Another important aspect of this book is my attempt to regard the Bolshevik revolution as an event caused by geopolitical development, and I must stress that the use of the term *geopolitical* differs in the present work from that of Halford Mackinder or Karl Haushofer. Not only geography is taken into consideration but also all the natural factors of this or that country, including anthropological, demographical, and so on. In spite of the personal ambitions of this or that leader, the revolution was largely tempered by the Russian-German geopolitical confrontation.

The Bolshevik revolution had immensely disastrous consequences, causing untold human suffering and swallowing tens, if not hundreds, of millions of lives in many countries as a result of wars, political tyranny, and extraordinary inefficiency. But it would be difficult to pinpoint the main historical villain, and it is rather misleading to speak in such terms at all. However, if one would like to entertain such intellectual games, he or she should first of all investigate many suspicious cases, including not only Russian political leaders (Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik) but primarily German leaders.

Contemporary humanity and world politics are far from perfect. They are a battleground of unbridled human selfishness, which is why any human quest for social justice and progress quickly becomes a powerful instrument in the mortal geopolitical struggles between great powers. I do not believe in historical determinism, in spite of all geopolitical pressures that might dictate it. The Bolshevik revolution was only a historical option: The same geopolitical situation might have been solved in many different ways. It is difficult to say what Russian and world history would have been like without Lenin's unique political genius and his extraordinary political boldness and quick reactions.

Throughout the book I use extensively the term *National Bolshevism*. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like to explain my definition of this term. National Bolshevism is the Russian etatist ideology that legitimizes the Soviet political system from the Russian etatist point of view, contrary to its exclusive Marxist legitimacy. Etatism can be distinguished from cultural nationalism, as Lev Kopelev insists in his book *Derzhava i narod*. Nevertheless, I would like to define etatism as a powerful form of nationalism. Contrary to Kopelev's claim, National Bolshevism does not reject Communist ideology, though it strives to minimize its importance to the level necessary for legitimacy. However, its objectives are different from those of Communist ideology. National Bolshevism in its original form strove for world domination, conceived as the universal Russian empire cemented by Communist ideology. It is not excluded that in some circumstances National Bolshevism might limit itself to the etatist concept of a Russian superpower.

The concept of the Third Rome as such does not play a significant role in this work, since it is merely the most expressive manifestation of the very old Russian geopolitical quest for world centrality and domination. Nevertheless, this idea was publicly expressed at top levels of Soviet Russia. In 1945, a month and a half after victory over Nazi Germany, the Russian minister for education and a favorite of Stalin, Vladimir Potemkin (1874–1946), referred to "the haughty idea of Moscow as the Third Rome" in the official newspaper *Izvestia*. Potemkin did not conceal his opinion that this idea was not an intellectual conception only of the spiritual centrality of Russia. He linked it to the territorial expansion of the Russian state.

"The Russian people," Potemkin said, "not only waged a defensive struggle, securing their freedom and independence and also guarding Western civilization from Asian barbarians. In its mighty growth it expanded the boundaries of the Russian state, bringing to it new, vitally necessary lands with the nations that populated them." (V. Potemkin, *Stat'i i retchi* [Moscow 1947], p. 237).

Methodologically, the present work does not belong to the history of ideas. I believe in the power of ideas, but ideas become powerful only in favorable circumstances. Circumstances, therefore, select successful ideas. I subscribe to what was said by the German historian Dieter Groh about his own excellent book, that it belonged to the history of ideas in a specific sense since it did not follow the innate development of ideas but placed historical-philosophical concepts in actual political and social contexts (*Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas*, p. 15). In the same way, this book is an interrelation between the history of ideas and political and social history, with a special accent on geopolitics and demography.

My first comprehensive attempt to treat this problem is to be found in my book, *Ideologia natsional-bolshevizma* [The ideology of National Bolshevism], finished at the beginning of 1979 and published in 1980 in Russian. The book received several favorable reviews, and in 1981 I prepared a new version of it as my doctoral thesis in French for the *École des Hautes*

Études in Paris. It was accepted in 1983. Conceptually, the French version does not differ from the Russian, though it uses more historical material.

The present work includes the major part of the first Russian version and some new material from the French version, though these are only part of a larger concept since the problem of National Bolshevism is regarded here from a geopolitical point of view. Nevertheless, some material used in the Russian and French versions is not included in this present version, and those versions might serve as additional sources for readers interested in more information. For example, I decided to exclude a chapter on Eurasianism since this ideology did not have a direct impact on Soviet society in its first formative period. I also excluded the history of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox church and the Soviet state.

I have made extensive use of secondary sources, not in order to prove my conclusions, but in order to show how this or that issue was perceived by those historians who have already worked in this field, if they formulated such an issue more ably than I. By using the best formulations of my predecessors, I may permit myself the feeling that I belong to world historical thought and am not making a precarious pretense to create my own historical interpretation by relying only on basic historical facts.

The book was written by me in English—including translations of quotations into English—and I should like to acknowledge the help given me by Susanna Shabbetai, who also typed the manuscript. Many people contributed at different stages to the elaboration of the conceptual framework of the book by offering practical help and advice. I deeply acknowledge the late George Haupt, Michel Heller, Nikita Struve (Paris); Galina Kellerman (Jerusalem); Michael Kliaver (Tel Aviv); the late Leonard Schapiro (London); Frederick Barghoorn (Yale); Robert Tucker (Princeton); and Alexander Solzhenitsyn for their help and advice during my work on the Russian version of this book. I also deeply acknowledge the help of Alain Besançon, my scientific supervisor during my work on the French version. He also chaired the jury, which included Michel Heller and Annie Kriegel, that accepted it for my Ph.D.

When the Russian version appeared, several scholars commented upon it, and I am deeply thankful to Ilia Serman (Jerusalem), Darrell Hammer (Bloomington), Anthony D'Agostino (San Francisco), Richard Pipes (Harvard), the late Nikolai Andreev (Cambridge), and Hermann Andreev (Mainz). I am also very thankful to Nissan Oren and Tuvia Ben Moshe (Jerusalem) for very fruitful discussions of geopolitical aspects of the Bolshevik revolution. Here, too, I must express my thanks to Gabriel Sheffer (Jerusalem), whose aid was crucial in the preparation of the present work.

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Mikhail Agursky

The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest Before 1871

Russian Geopolitics

After the short-lived French continental domination under Napoleon Bonaparte, a new balance of European power was established. Several of Europe's great powers contributed, but only in 1871 was the final constellation of forces achieved. (That year has been called by Nissan Oren the year of pivotal change in world history due to "the imposition of Prussian hegemony over the Germanies under Bismarck.")¹ Indeed, instead of the loose German Confederation, consisting of almost 300 monarchies and cities, an extremely powerful country emerged that shifted not only the European but also the world balance of power. France, which saw itself as the strongest European continental power, was humiliatingly defeated.

Germany was not merely another new powerful country. With Prussia as its foundation, it absorbed the most advanced world military tradition, which boasted of an unbroken sequence of victories. Prussian militarism became the German *raison d'être*. (Let us take into consideration that the process of German unification had not yet been completed by 1871, as many Germans lived in the Austro-Hungarian empire and elsewhere). Europe was shocked by the manifestation of German military power and German self-assertiveness, which had ruined the previous balance of power and had caused various changes in traditional European alliances.

The Russian empire was the largest in the world, larger even than that of the USSR today, since it included Poland, Finland, present-day Alaska, and Turkish Armenia. Throughout its history, Russia had expanded in every possible direction, stopping only when faced by resistance. Russia already controlled the Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; impinged on the borders of China, Persia, and Afghanistan; and threatened British India.

In the West, Russia's progress was barred by Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the Ottoman empire seemed to be a new natural prey. Whatever explanation there is for persistent expansion, Russia was regarded as a most important great power, regardless of its inefficiency. Although no Russian ruler made any public statement in favor of Russian world domination, it was widely believed in the West that the country did in fact strive in this direction.

At the end of the eighteenth century, a document known as the "Testament of Peter the Great" began to circulate in the West.² The authenticity of this document is doubtful, but nevertheless many people, both in the West and in Russia, regarded it as authentic or even, according to Marx and Engels, as a rationalization of Russian foreign policy. In spite of its doubtful authenticity, the Testament did have a powerful impact as it listed in great detail the variety of ways by which Russia would come to dominate the world, militarily and politically.

As a result, many European politicians and thinkers were persuaded that Russia posed a geopolitical threat that must be contained. An intense anti-Russian obsession, bordering even on frenzy, developed, and it reached its greatest peak of intensity in German lands.³ Both Prussia and Austria-Hungary had large Slav populations and regarded them as kin to the Russians, although this Slavic kinship was only a political chimera. Apart from a certain linguistic affinity, there was almost no link between Slav nations. However, the fear of a successful Pan-Slavic movement, which could destroy Austria-Hungary, cause the rebellion of Prussian Poles, and bring Russia into the conflict as the chief protector of the Slavs, was sufficient to create intense anti-Russian feeling in Prussia and Austria-Hungary. In fact, the collapse of Austria-Hungary would have been a most serious threat to Germany as well. A Pan-Slavic movement, among the Czechs, for example, could have brought the Russians as near as Bayern—where they now are, by the way. One must also keep in mind the already quite deep penetration of Russia into German political life via various dynastic intermarriages long before German unification under Bismarck.

Therefore, it was vitally important for Germany to keep Austria-Hungary as a buffer to guard the Slav population from any possible Russian penetration. An intense Russophobia permeated German circles, balanced to only a very small extent by Russophilia. This Russophobia reached a height for which there was no rational explanation and was verbalized in the concept of the so-called Teuton-Slav confrontation, which was regarded as existential, even racial, rather than political.⁴ Prussian militarists regarded the Teuton-Slav antagonism as a basic conflict to be solved sooner or later in mortal combat. They saw no political solution to this confrontation, which was part of the concept of a larger German race-cult that emerged in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century and which, as Leon Poliakov said, "has no analogy in any other country. None of the varieties of European nationalism which were beginning to compete with each other at the time assumed this biologically oriented form. Between 1790 and 1815 with practically no transition, writers moved on from the idea of a specifically German mission to the glorification of the language, and from there to glorification of German blood."⁵

This was only one side of the coin. What happened in Russia? Although many Germans anticipated the Slav threat and an inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation, there was a massive German penetration into Russia that was over and above any imagined Russian penetration into the German

world. The migration was in only one direction, eastward: *Drang nach Osten*. Since the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great had invited many German experts and advisers to modernize his empire and help him conquer the Baltic states, Russia had been inundated with Germans, who quickly became a most influential and skilled power group. It is ironic that the previously noted Russian penetration of German political life was mirrored by Germany to the extent that the formerly ethnic Russian ruling dynasty had become gradually Germanized: The eighteenth-century Catherine II was a German princess with no Russian blood at all.

At times, Germans completely dominated Russian politics, which does not mean, however, that they pursued a pro-German policy. Not only did united Germany not yet exist, but Russia itself at that time seemed like a large German principate, similar to Austria, which also controlled many non-Germans. Later, the German presence in Russian political life declined, but it was always rather inflated until the 1917 revolution. The Russian court, the army, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service were all highly Germanized.

However, Baltic Germans were only a part of this German migration. Russia was an attraction for a variety of Germans, many of whom succeeded in military or political careers after their emigration to Russia, as for example, Karl Nesselrode (1780-1862), who became Russia's foreign minister, and Egor Kankrin (1774-1845), who became finance minister. German peasant colonists were also included in the eighteenth-century invitations to set up progressive agriculture or to cultivate virgin lands, and they settled in the southern Ukraine, the Volga region, and in the Caucasus. The demographic strength of the Volga Germans permitted the creation of a separate Volga German autonomous republic after the Bolshevik revolution.

In 1897, there were 1,790,000 Germans in Russia as compared with approximately 56 million Russians, 22 million Ukrainians, 6 million Byelorussians, and just over 5.5 million Jews.⁶ On the eve of World War II, there were 170,000 German and 120,000 Austrian subjects in Russia, versus only 8,000 English and 10,000 French subjects.⁷

In spite of Russian religious constraints, Protestantism and Catholicism were recognized in Russia as full-fledged Christian denominations, and their followers were granted all civil rights. Mixed marriages were also permitted between Orthodox Christians and Protestants or Roman Catholics, with the proviso that children born to these unions would be brought up as Orthodox Christians. In fact, Protestantism had gradually permeated Russian ecclesiastical education and had been exercising influence over the Russian Orthodox church ever since the time of Peter the Great (1672-1725). Also, many German peasant colonists belonged to various sects, and their influence in Russia gave birth to the powerful Baptist sectarian movement, which became the biggest concern of the Russian Orthodox church and survived the Bolshevik revolution. (We can note, for example, that in 1928 Baptists accounted for about 25 percent of the population in the Donets Basin,⁸ and the Protestant youth organizations in all Russia had 1.7 million members

in that year—more than the membership of the Communist youth organization, Komsomol.)⁹

After the Russian victory over France in 1812, the leading foreign cultural influence in Russia became that of the Germans, a natural development arising out of the encouragement given by the Russian authorities to Russian youth being educated in Germany rather than in France, as they were prior to 1812. In addition, the educated strata of Russian society were exposed to the strongest German influences: Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and others became the principal intellectual fare in Russia. Moreover, Russian economics was largely in German hands. Engels himself confirmed in 1891 that the Germans controlled almost all Russian trade and industry, at least in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁰

I have already noted the abnormality of Russian-German relations during this period—the obsessive fear of the Germans with regard to the fateful and inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation together with the Germans' own penetration into almost every aspect of Russian life. The Germans who migrated to Russia were certainly loyal Russian citizens, but their loyalty was to the tsar as his subjects only. A distinguished English scholar and leading foreign journalist in Russia, Emil Dillon (1854–1933), who represented the *Daily Telegraph* there for many years, made the following observation:

From those days onward, the Germans played a predominant part in the Russian civil administration, in the army and navy, at the court, in schools and universities, in science and letters, in journalism, in trade and industry, everywhere, in a word, except in the Church. They have often been accused of acquiring the defects of the Russians and of contributing to demoralise these. It is true that like the Russians they did not scruple to cheat the treasury when opportunity offered, but justice compels one to add that they had at least a certain sense of measure which the Russian bureaucrat too often lacked. They sometimes appropriated funds, but generally limited the sums to their actual needs instead of making them commensurate with their grandiose opportunities. They served their Russian sovereign loyally, favoured men of their own race and religion, and stamped a Teuton impress on most things in the Tsardom. In the army, in the navy, in the administration of provinces, in the central ministries, in the schools and universities, on the estates of the great landowners, at the head of factories, on the boards of companies and banks, in apothecaries' shops and bakeries—were Germans. Whithersoever you went the majority of the men who transacted Russia's business, public and private, had German manners, spoke the German tongue; one must also confess that on the whole they did not disappoint the expectations of the Tsars who favoured and protected them.¹¹

Their "Russian" identity would be safely secured in the absence of any Russian-German *national* confrontation. The unification of Germany in the 1870s changed this situation drastically.

Russian geopolitics is usually discussed in terms of East-West relations. To a certain extent, this orientation is correct, but during the period under discussion the East-West question can be reduced to its central problem,

Russian-German relations, although this one aspect certainly does not cover all of the complexities of the situation. We will see later that the issue of the far-reaching Germanization of Russia was taboo in the Russian press due to censorship. The only outlet for the issue was the emigrant, or clandestine, press, and the most important generalizations on the subject were made after the revolution. Let us consider some of them, from completely different sources.

During his exile, Lev Trotsky (1879-1940) stressed that Russia was really ruled by foreigners and had been since Peter the Great, with foreigners' owning most of the important industrial, banking, and transport enterprises. He said that aliens, in no way connected with the Russian people, developed the pure culture of the "genuine Russian" administrator.¹²

One can understand Trotsky's psychological motivation for taking up this issue: He wanted to dissociate himself from the claim that Soviet Russia was ruled by aliens. He did not, however, emphasize the German nature of the foreign dominance, claiming that all European aristocracy had a supranational character, although all his examples are implicitly German. He spoke of the last tsarina as "this German woman," "this Hessian princess" "with a Windsor upbringing" who used to say, "Russia loves to feel the whip." Trotsky compared her to Marie Antoinette, the French empress (also of German birth) who was executed during the French Revolution. Both, said Trotsky, had a common denominator—gnawing hostility to an alien people under their rule.¹³

If Trotsky tried somehow to minimize German influence, the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) claimed in the 1920s that "the masculine German spirit had for a long time set itself the task of civilizing the feminine Russian land . . . the German spirit acted in numerous sophisticated ways: through Marx, through Kant, through Steiner and through many other teachers who seduced us and weakened Russian will." Berdiaev explained the "extraordinary power of Germanism in Russia" in religious-philosophical terms, but his main thesis was close to Trotsky's.¹⁴

That thesis was exactly the central message of the novel *Oblomov* published by Ivan Gontcharov (1812-1891) in 1859. The main hero of the novel, a young landowner Ilia Oblomov, is a kind, feminine, passive personality plunged into daydreams and fruitless fantasies. His counterpart is his friend Andrei Stolz, a Russian German and the son of Oblomov's family-estate supervisor. They were educated together and then their ways parted. Stolz quickly became an extremely dynamic and rich businessman while Oblomov gradually withdrew from any activity in order to live in full seclusion and absolute idleness. A Russian girl Olga, who originally fell in love with Oblomov, later marries Stolz. It is quite possible that Berdiaev had in mind this classic juxtaposition of the masculine German spirit and the feminine Russian spirit, and later *Oblomov* became a classic literary image that was used by those Russians, including Lenin, who wanted to castigate Russian passivity and idleness.

A very recent interpretation of the foreign domination of Russia is that of an official Soviet ideologist, Fedor Nesterov, who claims that Russian

autocracy was originally a reasonable and even a positive institution, serving specific Russian interests vis-à-vis Russian belligerence, but that it degenerated after Peter the Great because the ruling dynasty became foreign.¹⁵ This "foreignization" of the rulers created the gap between the government and the people that eventually led to the revolution. Nesterov identifies the entire Petersburg period of Russian history with foreign influence.

Russian Nationalism

For a long time, Russia had a very strong nationalist and sometimes even xenophobic tradition. Like every nationalism, that of Russia was not an abstract creation arising out of a political vacuum but a reaction against an external threat. Russia was always in a state of belligerence. The Tatar-Mongols, who invaded Russia in the thirteenth century, were not the only enemies; in that period, Russia repulsed the attack of the Teuton knights, not without Tatar help. Later, Poland became the principal danger to Russian national existence, nearly crushing it in the seventeenth century.

It is not by chance that Russia developed such a strong and assertive nationalism as a manifestation of its geopolitical isolation and lack of allies. Neither is it entirely accidental that the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome emerged in medieval Russia. The first proponent of this theory was the monk Philopheus who wrote in the sixteenth century:

The Church of the Old Rome fell because of the infidelity of the Apollinarian heresy. The Second Rome—the Church of Constantinople—was hewn down by the axes of the sons of Hagar. And now this Third Rome of thy mighty kingdom—the holy catholic and apostolic Church—will illumine the whole universe like the sun. . . . Know and accept, O pious Tsar, that all the Christian kingdoms have come together into thine own, that two Romes have fallen, and that a third stands, while a fourth there shall not be: thy Christian kingdom shall fall to no other.¹⁶

To understand this concept, one has to put it into the correct conceptual framework. Philopheus certainly did not mean either Rome or Moscow as world political capitals. For him, Rome was only the seat of the Orthodox faith, the Rome of the apostles, since Rome was the first Christian capital according to Christian tradition. For Philopheus, Byzantium was not a medieval superpower but the holder of the faith that had been inherited from Rome, which had meanwhile become heretical. The collapse of the First Rome was not political, but spiritual—from the political point of view, Rome was flourishing at the time of Philopheus. The collapse of the Second Rome was also political, but this fall was regarded as a divine punishment for the corruption of the Orthodox faith by the Greeks.

It was easy enough for an Orthodox Russian monk to come to the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. From the viewpoint of Greek Orthodoxy, the Catholic West was heretical. Byzantium had collapsed. Russia, which had maintained its national independence, inherited the Greek Orthodox

faith and thereupon became its only stronghold. Philopheus could not then think of Russia as the Third Rome in political terms, but only as an ecclesiastical, a spiritual concept. Rome, as in the time of the Apostles, could be politically humble.

However, there was a political implication in Philopheus's claim, since the very idea of equating Rome, Constantinople, and Moscow could imply a "grand design," especially in view of the fact that the new Rome was obliged to preach the only noncorrupted faith throughout the world. Indeed, every idea that assigns an exclusive feature to the specific locality might have geopolitical implications. The Third Rome concept was an anticipation of future Russian centrality. Indeed, the idea of Russian centrality became more and more pronounced as a corollary of Russian expansion. Later, however, this primitive organic unity of the Russian mind was split.

Peter the Great made a breakthrough in bringing Russia out of its obscurity and isolation and making it a great European power, but this very breakthrough created the basic duality of Russian life. On the one hand, Russia became much stronger and accelerated its expansion. On the other, it was never modernized to European standards. Since Peter's time, the basic dilemma of Russia has been very clear: its Asiatic or semi-Asiatic foundation versus its modernized ruling class and its growing physical strength as a great power. This duality influenced Russian nationalism too. Instead of one coherent ideology, Russian nationalism has always been split into seemingly opposing trends.

One of these trends, called Slavophilism, was inclined to accept Russia's existing reality vis-à-vis the West and regard Russia's backwardness as normal. The opposing trend, called Westernism, was deeply frustrated by Russia's backwardness and strove to make it equal to the West, not in order to ruin Russia but to make it stronger, to increase its attraction and the Russian state's power. Even such an extreme Westernizer as Petr Tchaadaev (1794-1856), who was regarded as a national nihilist, said, "I love my fatherland as Peter the Great taught me to love it." He did not regard as antipatriotic the opinion that pre-Petrine Russia was barbaric. According to Tchaadaev, "it proves that Russians excel men of other nations in taking unbiased views of themselves. . . . Peter showed that Russia's mission was to effect a deliberate synthesis of the best elements in European civilization."¹⁷ This opinion was also shared by Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), the literary critic.

Despite the fact that Slavophilism was conservative and Westernism was radical, they had a common denominator: Both were different manifestations of Russian militant nationalism. The Czech Slavist, later the first Czechoslovakian president, Tomáš Masaryk (1850-1937), emphasized that the Westernizers "had just as strong an affection for Russia as the Slavophiles."¹⁸

John Plamenatz tried to distinguish the two types of nationalism as Western and Eastern in his general theory of nationalism, with no special reference to Russian nationalism. According to Plamenatz:

nationalism is a reaction of peoples who feel culturally at a disadvantage. Not any reaction that comes of a sense of weakness or insecurity but a reaction when certain conditions hold. Where there are several peoples in close contact with one another and yet conscious of their separateness, and these peoples share the same ideals and the same conception of progress, and some of them are, or feel themselves to be, less well placed than others to achieve these ideals and make progress, nationalism is apt to flourish.¹⁹

This was exactly the case of Russian nationalism. One can follow this excellent explication of Plamenatz: "Nationalism is confined to peoples who, despite their rivalries and the cultural differences between them, already belong to, or are being drawn into, a family of nations which all aspire to make progress in roughly the same directions."²⁰

Now Plamenatz makes a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalisms. His definition of Western nationalism is not very persuasive, but this lack is not important for our purpose. Plamenatz does provide us with an excellent definition of Eastern nationalism:

the nationalism of people recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the nationalism of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so doing to raise themselves.²¹

He stresses that this nationalism is imitative and at the same time hostile to the models it imitates. It is exactly the nationalism of the Westernizers, which was later inherited by the Bolsheviks:

It has involved, in fact, two rejections, both of them ambivalent, rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.²²

This Eastern nationalism was essentially pro-Western since it strove to abolish the basic split in Russian society and strengthen Russia through the use of Western methods and the Western way of life.

However, Plamenatz's classification seems to be insufficient for the Russian case. One can define Westernism as an Eastern nationalism, but there is no possible way in which Slavophilism can be defined as a Western type of nationalism. In fact, Slavophilism was a nationalism that elevated backwardness in a narcissistic way to the rank of universality. One cannot help referring here to Trotsky, who called Slavophilism the "messianism of backwardness."²³ There is something to his definition.

Up until now, we have looked at Russian nationalism in the general context of East-West relations. There were other phobias directed against several Western countries—for example, France, Poland, and so on—but the most powerful phobia was directed against Germany and the Germans, and this phobia had been manifested in even the eighteenth century in

various ways. One of the numerous clashes was the conflict between the Russian poet-scientist Mikhail Lomonosov (1711-1765) and his German colleagues who dominated the Russian Academy of Science. Another was the Russian political opposition to Ernst Biron (1690-1772), the powerful German favorite of Empress Anna (1693-1740). Anti-German feelings became a powerful stream in Russian nationalism, but care had to be exercised in the expression of these feelings so that political persecution from the ruling German dynasty would not be forthcoming.

Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism

When one examines both of the above trends in the framework of Russian-German relations, one can understand why Slavophiles, for example, were regarded as so dangerous by the ruling autocracy. Indeed, if one examines in depth the utterances of Russian Slavophiles, one can see that their anti-Westernism was first and foremost directed against the Germans. All the outstanding Slavophiles—Konstantin Aksakov (1817-1860), Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), Yuri Samarin (1819-1876), and others—were militant Germanophobes so it is not surprising that the ruling dynasty was extremely suspicious of all of them. Indeed, they were discriminated against and sometimes persecuted. In the spring of 1848, Yuri Samarin, who had participated in an administrative inspection of the Baltic provinces, decided to rebel. He resorted to what is now called in Russia "Samizdat" and sent his "Letters from Riga" to circulate in manuscript form. He accused the Baltic Germans of oppressing Russians: "The Baltic Germans did not submit to the Russian state, on the contrary, they separated themselves from all Russians. . . . What right does a handful of newcomers have to trample on other people, to call themselves a nation, while bowing their heads before another people [Germans] who have extended state protection to them? Does every little group have a right to assign to itself the dignity of a nation?"²⁴

The Russian authorities found these "Samizdat" letters to be a most dangerous challenge. Samarin was arrested in March 1849 and brought within two weeks before Tsar Nikolai I (1796-1855), who told him:

You sow the hatred of Germans against Russians. You made them quarrel. You would like to turn Germans into Russians by using force and pressure. You write that if we will not dominate them, and so on, i.e., if the Germans will not become Russians, then the Russians will become Germans. You hinted directly at the government. You are trying to say that since Peter the Great and up to my time, everything is surrounded by Germans since . . . we are Germans ourselves. You incited public opinion against the government: a new December 14 was being prepared. . . . Your book would lead to worse than December 14, since it tries to undermine confidence in the government and its links with the people by accusing the government of betrayal of Russian national interests in favor of Germans. You ought to be brought before the court.²⁵

Samarin was frightened by the tsar's tirade and repented. He was released, and the lesson was well learned by the Russian public.

When later, in 1878, Ivan Aksakov violently criticized Russian diplomats for the so-called Berlin treaty after the victorious Russo-Turkish War, he was expelled from Moscow. We can draw the conclusion that, essentially, the Russian Slavophiles were an oppositional, anti-German nationalist party.

In its original form, Slavophilism was a purely Russian domestic affair. Its concern was Russia as such, and it had no international implications. In spite of its title, "Slavophilism," it was in fact "Russophilism." But there was another Slavophilism, and it became one of the most important factors influencing the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the German world. Its implication included the escalation of the Russian-German conflict in Russian-German revolutionary movements. It was Pan-Slavism. In spite of the evident lack of any Slavic unity and the lack of a common language, a common religious faith, or a common historical tradition, it was widely believed both by Pan-Slavists and by their adversaries that Slavs in their entirety formed a unique group that was striving for political unity. The contemporary and future destiny of the Slav nations has proved that Pan-Slavism was merely wishful thinking. However, ignorance and political romanticism made Pan-Slavism an important political obsession in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, one might go so far as to say that the chimera of Pan-Slavism has played a fatal role in world history. Not only did Pan-Slavism not sustain its credibility in Russian-Polish relations, it did not do so in Russian-Czechoslovak relations or in Russia's relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Even Ukrainian nationalism, which raised no suspicions in anyone, suddenly emerged as a very dynamic force.

At the time, Western Slavs were under the domination of various political entities, among them Austria and Turkey. In part because of their physical presence as a boundary between Russia and Germany, the Slavs acquired a strategic importance because of a growing European and especially German obsession with the Russian peril. But the Western Slavs were becoming discontented. Some of them were revolutionaries, and there were a few Slavic Russophiles who dreamed of a unified Slavic superstate under Russian domination. This romanticized Russophilia was not shared by the majority of the Slavs.

On the other hand, Pan-Slavism did not enjoy the good wishes of the Russian government for several important reasons. Pan-Slavism was a revolutionary movement, and any Slavic movement directed against Germans could have far-reaching domestic implications in Russia. As history has confirmed, the national momentum of Pan-Slavism posed a threat to the ruling Russian elite, which was of alien origin, and no wise tsar could support the movement unless he was prepared to make radical changes in the Russian political infrastructure. How could a tsar be expected to support a revolutionary pan-Slavism if it encouraged the bitter enemies of autocracy, the first Russian revolutionaries to arrive in the West—Alexander Herzen (1812–1870) and Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876)? It is important to stress that

later Pan-Slavism also incorporated Slavophilism, which made the movement even more frightening for the non-Russian element in Russia's ruling elite.

Westernism and Pan-Slavism

Alexander Herzen had an extremely strong impact on the revolutionary movement, as was widely acknowledged in all areas of Russian political thought. He was a most influential Russian political thinker and, as Isaiah Berlin claims, also the most interesting one.²⁶ The Bolsheviks could not even acknowledge the full extent of their debt to Herzen, and Daniel Pasmanik (1869-1930), a former Zionist leader, could point out that the Bolsheviks were much closer to Herzen than to Marx,²⁷ a very legitimate historical judgment. Most recently, Fedor Nesterov referred to Herzen in approving his attacks against Russophobia.²⁸

Ostensibly, Herzen was an enthusiastic Westernizer, but even before he left Russia in 1847 to settle in Paris, he was casting doubts on the Western revolutionary potential and preaching the decline of the West in its entirety.²⁹ He concluded that the Slavophiles (his former friends) had a point. It was high time, he thought, for Russia to raise its voice: He believed that only Russia could solve the problems that were allegedly devastating Europe. More important, Herzen suggested the principle of the independent character of Russian socialism, which must take advantage of Pan-Slavism. He regarded Russia as a young nation and, as such, healthier than the West. He protested against a Spanish contemporary, Marquis Donozo Cortez (1803-1853), who prophesied a barbaric Slavic invasion of Europe, which would ruin it, although the Slavs would then be poisoned by the European corpse.³⁰ Herzen retorted: "Russia is an empire still in its youth, a building still fresh with the smell of plaster, where everything is experimental and in a state of transition, where nothing is final. . . . We are simpler, we are healthier, we are incapable of any sickbed fussiness over food, we are no lawyers, no bourgeois."³¹

This concept had a very strong impact on the Bolsheviks, as did another of his suggestions: "Russia stands in the same position with regard to the Western world and to the proletariat. She has received nothing but misfortune, slavery and shame."³² Although this idea had been widely absorbed by the Bolsheviks by the eve of World War I, Herzen had already arrived at the existential rejection of the West and was preaching its decline in 1847. He said: "I don't believe in anything except for a small group of people, a small number of thoughts. . . . I have no pity for anything that exists here, neither for its superficial education nor for its institutions."³³

Herzen anticipated the fatal Slavic thrust against a decaying Europe. He wrote that Russia's future would pose a grave danger for Europe and that every day could see the overthrowing of Europe's old social structures and the embroilment of Russia in an immense and overwhelming revolution.³⁴ Here we are approaching the central issue of Russian radicalism. Herzen was probably the first to anticipate that a Russian social revolution would



Alexander Herzen (photo from A. Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 12 [Moscow, 1957], p. 1).

immediately acquire a universal expansionist dimension, transforming Russia into the world center. This was not only wishful thinking. Russia was indeed the biggest country in the world, and this fact was always, wittingly or unwittingly, in the mind of any Russian thinker. As a citizen of such a large country, Herzen's thought was naturally universal, supported as he was by the scale of his country. This point was well stressed by Berdiaev, who said that the patriotism of a great nation must necessarily be faith in its great and universal mission, otherwise it would be a provincial nationalism, limited and lacking in any universal perspective.³⁵

Herzen could not be parochial. The Russian revolution must acquire a universal dimension, such as the international dimension the French Revolution had acquired as early as 1793. A great social revolution, linked to the idea of revolutionary expansion, was necessary. Herzen was confronted by Western socialists, which meant that the problem at stake for him from the very beginning was, Which revolution should be the leading one, the Western or the Russian? Western socialists regarded themselves as entitled to lead the universal socialist revolution since, in their view, socialism was the last achievement of Western civilization. But for Herzen, the West was

rotten to the core. The Slavic world might be barbaric, but it was young, and the biological future belonged to it.

Herzen was not only a Pan-Slavist but also a Germanophobe. He followed his former friend, Yuri Samarin, but made his point even stronger. According to Herzen, since Peter the Great, Russia had been ruled by aliens and more specifically, by Germans. His book on Russian-German relations as the framework of the Pan-Slavist revolutionary expansion was published in French in 1853 and had wide repercussions, which have lasted until even now.³⁶

Herzen's book created a chain reaction of substitutions through which various Russian thinkers created mirror images of various Western ideas. Herzen, for example, substituted Western Russophobia with Russian Germanophobia. His appeal to destroy Germany by Slavic revolutionary invasion was a mirror image of a similar German concept since many radical Germans proposed the crushing of autocratic and reactionary Russia by a German revolutionary invasion.

This confrontation between Russian and German socialists became a hotbed of future European geopolitics, which permeated revolutionary thought in such a way that every revolutionary movement was a political inheritor of its country. Both sides justified their phobias, anticipating threats from each other. Western socialists regarded Russia as a barbaric horde while Herzen claimed that Russia was barbaric but young. Moreover, the German threat to Russia had to be taken into consideration, since Baltic and other Germans already dominated Russia.

The Germans were far from representing progress; with no links to the country which they made no effort to study and which they detested as barbaric, arrogant to the point of insolence, they were the most servile instruments of imperial authority. Having no objective but that of remaining in favor, they served the ruler, not the nation. Besides, they introduced manners uncongenial to Russians and a pedantic bureaucracy, etiquette, and discipline completely contrary to our customs.

The hostility between Slavs and Germans is a sad, but well-known, fact. Each conflict between them reveals the depth of their hatred. German domination, by its nature, has contributed much to the spreading of this hatred to Western Slavs and Poles. The Russians never had to submit to their oppression. If Russian possessions on the Baltic coast were conquered by Knights of the Teutonic order, they were inhabited by Finnish, not Russian, populations. Although of all the Slavs the Russians were those who least hated the Germans, the natural repugnance which existed between them could not be erased.

They have the advantage of us in their definite, elaborated rules; they belong to the great European civilization. We have the advantage of them in our robust strength and a certain latitude of hopes. Where they are stopped by their conscience, we are stopped by a policeman. Arithmetically weak, we yield; their weakness is algebraic, it is within the formula itself.

We deeply offend them by our carelessness, our conduct, our lack of attention to form, and by our display of semibarbaric and semicorrupted

passions. They have mortally annoyed us by their bourgeois pedantry, their affected purism, by their irreproachably petty behavior.³⁷

Herzen called Nikolai I "one of the most remarkable Russian Germans who wanted to be Russified."³⁸ Escalating his attacks, Herzen said: "Russian Germans are the worse of all Germans who have political power. . . . A German from Germany in our government can be naive, even stupid, but he can be benevolent to barbarians whom he ought to humanize. A Russian German is clever to some extent and looks with contempt at the people, as if he is a relative who is ashamed of them."³⁹ According to Herzen, the Germans conquered Russia through violence and exposed the country to German ideas. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Germans had been training Russians in a way completely alien to the Slavic character.⁴⁰

Germanized Russians are even worse than Germans, and if someone has fallen under German influence, it is extremely difficult to find a way out of this trap, as is manifested by all of the Petersburg period of Russian history. For Herzen, a most distasteful example of a Germanized Russian was the minister Alexei Araktcheev (1769-1834), who tried to militarize the life of the Russian peasants in the Prussian mode.⁴¹

Herzen dreamed of the greatness of Russia and even boasted of the fear that tsarist Russia inspired. He anticipated

Russian domination which reaches the Rhine, which goes down as far as the Bosphorus, and which on the other side extends to the Pacific. . . . Germany exists only in name.⁴²

The emperor Nikolai, carrying out grand works, the sense of which escapes him, may, if he pleases, humiliate the sterile arrogance of France and the majestic prudence of England; he may declare the Ottoman Empire to be Russian and Germany, Muscovy.⁴³

There is only one thought that links the Petersburg to the Moscow periods—that of the expansion of the state. Everything was sacrificed for the sake of this: the dignity of the sovereigns, the blood of the subjects, justice toward their neighbors, the well-being of the entire country.⁴⁴

Herzen appealed for the ending of the Petersburg period, saying that "if tsarism perishes, the center of liberty will be in the heart of the nation—in Moscow."⁴⁵ Therefore, the Russian revolutionary movement was from its first steps nationalist and potentially expansionist.

It was through Herzen that the discovery of the Russian rural commune by August Haxthausen (1792-1866, a Prussian official who studied Russia) was absorbed by Slavophilism. On the other hand, Haxthausen's discovery made Western socialists believe that the Russian autocracy might take advantage of Russian primitive rural communism in order to export revolutionary Pan-Slavism to the West and undermine European political stability. The idea that the Russian autocracy might export revolutionary Pan-Slavism against Germany and Europe spread rapidly in the West.⁴⁶

It was Herzen's ideas that became the principal source for the growing fear of any Russian radical revolution in the West. Russia was regarded as a barbaric Oriental society that needed to be civilized before any quest for international leadership could be launched. But this quest had already been launched by Herzen.

The very existence of Russian rural primitive communism only confirmed basic Russian backwardness in the eyes of Western socialists, and the very idea of a Russian or Slav invasion, even under revolutionary slogans, was frightening to European socialists. Moses Hess (1812-1875) sent Herzen an indignant letter, accusing him of having no respect for historical laws. "As a Russian," Hess said, "you countervail history with a certain hostility. As a philosopher you do not want to anticipate the future. As a Russian you forecast that the family of Slav nations will inherit the family of European nations as the latter have become too old to be revived. As a philosopher, the future contains for you an infinite number of options. However, as a Russian you anticipate only one possibility: namely, that of a Slavic invasion." According to Hess, such an invasion could bring only a "reactionary socialism." Hess also said that he could "by no means support the idea of a Slavic invasion. The death of European civilization does not contain any germ of life, any revival."⁴⁷

Herzen's name became taboo for Western socialists. As a repercussion of his revolutionary Pan-Slavism, several books appeared in the West that forecast the export of revolution by the tsars themselves, though there were a few Hegelian voices according to which a Slavic invasion could be fruitful since it would be another manifestation of the spirit of history, bringing perfection to all humanity.

In the middle of the 1850s, the idea of Russia's exporting revolution became a commonplace. A century later, a Polish refugee, Wladimir Baczkowsky, published a book in which he warned against the Soviet drive for world domination. As a wise and unique prophecy he quoted Zygmunt Krasinsky (1812-1859), a Pole who had warned in 1854 that "Russia will give all her power to social revolution in order to overthrow the thrones of those dynasties which recently broke off their alliances with her or despised her."⁴⁸ In fact, Krasinsky had only repeated what was being said by many leading Europeans at that time, and the Russian revolutionary movement acquired a strong geopolitical context in its cradle. We will see later that the attitude to Herzen became a litmus paper of the extent of nationalism in the Russian revolutionary movement.

At the end of his life, Herzen tempered his militant Pan-Slavism to some extent. In a letter written in 1869 he did not repeat his Slavic grand design, but he did not repudiate it either. He did not abandon his early idea of European destruction, although he claimed that this destruction should be only the first stage of revolution, which would be followed by the creative one.⁴⁹ This message was lost on the West, and Herzen entered European history as a rabid anti-German Pan-Slavist.

Marxism as German Revolutionary Nationalism

Although the Russian revolution was geopolitically conditioned to be nationalist and expansionist, the same might be said of the German revolutionary movement. First of all, Marxism, in spite of its declaratory internationalism, from the outset implied that the social struggle must be carried out within national boundaries and only after a successful victory in a certain country should the proletariat fulfill its international obligations. One can find this claim in Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto* published in 1848: "Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie."⁵⁰ Of course, "national struggle" in this context meant only a tactical step. This point was confirmed again in the *Manifesto*:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.⁵¹

These ostensible tactics immediately implied some strategy since the problem of an international leadership between different world proletariat "detachments" emerges. But even if one ignores the relationship between different European working-class "detachments," one can see that Marxism was Eurocentric, regarding Asia as inherently hostile, backward, and barbaric. Russia was the spearhead of Asiatic barbarism directed against European civilization. Marxism inherited the obsession with Russia from contemporary European political philosophy, and not only an obsession but a real Rus-sophobia; Marxism was not only Eurocentric, it was Germanocentric. Marx and Engels firmly believed in the German cultural and political leadership of Germany and stressed this point in the *Manifesto*. This belief is why their attitude toward Russia became a focal point of the political thinking of Marx and Engels.

One must stress the basic duality of the Marx-Engels heritage. Milorad Drachkovitch was perfectly right when he distinguished between Marxist theoretical thought and Marxist current political analysis as expressed by Marx and Engels, not only as political journalists but also in their correspondence. As Drachkovitch noticed, Marx and Engels "revised and invalidated" their own theoretical teaching in this second and almost more important part of their activity.⁵²

Marx and Engels singled out European historical development from all of human history. For example, they could not apply their historical materialism to stagnant, rigid Oriental systems like those of India, China, or Japan. This difficulty is why Marx suggested that world historical development is multilinear and that Oriental societies, with their so-called Asiatic mode of production (meaning they are neither feudal nor slaveholding

but are based on a centralized bureaucracy) cannot develop into modern societies as a result of their internal social dynamism.⁵³ They need an external stimulus to break their mode of production and their ancient stagnation. With reference to India, Marx demonstrated that only English colonial rule had broken the Indian stagnation (at least, as he thought). He was certainly wrong about the rigidity of Japan's system.

Neither India nor China had any emotional significance for Marx and Engels; these countries were too far from Europe. Russia, however, was Europe's neighbor, although, according to Marx and Engels, it had the same Oriental despotism and a bureaucracy that tried to consolidate its control over dispersed and primitive rural communes. Although Russia had a superficially Europeanized government, deep down it was Asiatic, as almost all experts in Russian affairs then claimed. According to Marx and Engels, Russia's expansionist drive had become a threat to European civilization, which could be frozen or could even regress as a result of Russia's influence.

Umberto Melotti noted that "Marx was led to conclude that there was no potential for autonomous development within societies based on the Asiatic mode of production. . . . Asiatic society was to receive the requisite stimulus from European colonialism."⁵⁴ Therefore, according to a fundamental and implicit view of Marx and Engels, Russia needed European colonialism.

Theoretically Marx and Engels explained Oriental societies in terms of their social structure, but in their political analysis they resorted to something that was very close to racism. For all practical purposes, Marx and Engels were militant German nationalists with racist overtones, whose attitude to the Teuton-Slav confrontation was only ostensibly different from that of Prussian militarists.⁵⁵ An Israeli historian, Jean Daniel, recognized that the

founders of Marxism did not try to distinguish between Russian rulers and the oppressed Russian people. They often identified tsarism with Russians and Russians with tsarism. From their point of view, Russia as a rule was regarded as a single concept: cumulative and negative. Both historical Russia and contemporary Russia were reflected in their minds and feelings as a materialization of evil. Probably their "rational" and irrational hatred of Russia was nourished by what was left in their souls and memories of old anti-Slav and anti-Russian prejudices and feelings of their German environment, the environment in which they were brought up.⁵⁶

This accusation is almost impossible to dismiss. Soviet Marxists, beginning with David Riazanov (Goldendach, 1870-1938), tried to whitewash the Russophobia of Marx and Engels, claiming that the founders of Marxism hated only Russian autocracy.⁵⁷ One should examine the numerous statements on Russia made by Marx and Engels to form his or her own judgment.

As early as 1842 Engels spoke of the Slavonic East as a barbarian land contained by civilized Germany:

It is now several years since Königsberg in Prussia acquired an importance which must be gratifying to all Germany. . . . The German element there

has rallied its strength and claims to be recognised as German and respected as Germany's representative *vis-à-vis* the barbarism of the Slavonic East. And, indeed, the East Prussians could not represent Germany's culture and nationhood *vis-à-vis* the Slavs better than they have done.⁵⁸

There is not the slightest doubt that Marx and Engels did not distinguish between the tsar and ordinary Russians. In 1844, Engels wrote that Nikolai I "is worshipped by the dumb, beastly stupidity of his degraded serfs."⁵⁹

There was a strong escalation of racist attacks against the Russians as a whole in 1853-1855, during the Crimean War. Let me give a few examples. Marx wrote in July 1853:

There is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before, inquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better informed, replied: "That animal is capable of anything." The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing.⁶⁰

In November 1853, he wrote: "The external dream of Russia was at last realised. The barbarian from the icy banks of the Neva held in his grasp luxurious Byzantium, and the sunlit shores of the Bosphorus."⁶¹ In a month, Marx said:

There is no such word in the Russian vocabulary as honor. . . .

For the invention of Russian honour the world is exclusively indebted to my Lord Palmerston, who, during a quarter of a century, used, at every critical moment, to pledge himself, in the most emphatical manner, for the "honour" of the Czar. . . .

Now it happens that the noble lord, while he expressed "his most implicit confidence in the honour and good faith" of the Czar, had just got into possession of documents, concealed from the rest of the world, and leaving no doubt, if any existed, about the nature of Russian honour and good faith. He had not even to scratch the Muscovite in order to find the Tatar. He had caught the Tatar in his naked hideousness.⁶²

In the same month, December 1853, Marx wrote: "Let us hope that the Russian Government and people may be taught . . . to restrain their ambition and arrogance, and mind their own business hereafter."⁶³ The founders of Marxism extended their distaste to all the Slavic race and saw the Slav-German conflict as racist in background. For this reason, not only Russia but also Pan-Slavism was regarded by them as a mortal threat to Germany and to Europe. In April 1855, Engels said:

The Slav race, long divided by internal disputes, pushed back towards the East by the Germans, subjugated, partly, by Germans, Turks and Hungarians, quietly reuniting its branches after 1815, by the gradual growth of Pan-Slavism, now for the first time asserts its unity and thus declares war to the death on the Roman-Celtic and German races, which have hitherto dominated

Europe. Pan-Slavism is not merely a movement for national independence, it is a movement that strives to undo what the history of a thousand years has created, which cannot attain its ends without sweeping Turkey, Hungary and half Germany off the map of Europe, a movement which—should it achieve this result—cannot ensure its future existence except by subjugating Europe. Pan-Slavism has now developed from a creed into a political programme, with 800,000 bayonets at its service. It leaves Europe with only one alternative: subjugation by the Slavs, or the permanent destruction of the centre of their offensive force—Russia.⁶⁴

Marx and Engels explained all German misfortunes in terms of Russian political pressure and appealed for a "holy war" against Russia. Speaking in London in 1867 at a meeting on solidarity with Poland, Marx said: "In the first place the policy of Russia is changeless, according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin. Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star. In our times only a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it."⁶⁵ Engels said in 1875 that Russia must be annihilated and dismantled, or at least must be contained in Asia.

Therefore, no revolution in western Europe can be definitely and finally victorious as long as the present Russian state exists at its side. Germany is its nearest neighbor. Germany must sustain the first shock from the armies of Russian reaction. The overthrow of the Russian tsarist state and the dissolution of the Russian empire is therefore one of the first conditions for the final victory of the German proletariat.⁶⁶

Marx and Engels almost ignored the fact that Russia was essentially ruled by a non-Russian minority. The only rather strange concession to this situation was Engels's controversial explanation that Russian foreign policy was the result of a conspiracy of foreign adventurers. According to Engels, this conspiracy had lasted more than a century.⁶⁷ Engels, however, tried to conceal the German domination of this alleged conspiracy, giving first place on the list of these foreign adventurers to Carlo Pozzo di Borgo (1764–1842), a Corsican rival of Napoleon.

Later it was suggested that Russia was only a scapegoat for Marx to justify why Germany did not behave according to his theoretical laws.⁶⁸ One cannot entirely dismiss this allegation, but it seems that the German nationalism of Marx and Engels had deeper roots, especially in view of the fact that their nationalism served as a pattern for all Marxist-inspired revolutionary movements.

In fact, Marxism, as did socialism, implied populism determined by the Marxist "electorate." Being self-appointed "proletarian" leaders, Marx and Engels felt that they were under "populist" influence. Certainly, the German proletariat had social concerns, but the national concern was much stronger, in spite of Marxist theory.

Marx and Engels had to rely on the value system of their "electorate" to have any influence on its members. Among German workers, nationalism was a harsh reality; for this reason, declaratory internationalism, along with a very nationalist realpolitik, very soon became the approach of Marx and Engels, and it was the source of the basic duality between Marxist theoretical thought and its practical policy.

If one attempts to be a successful politician while relying on a nonrealistic ideology, one has to absorb something that is alien to one's declaratory ideology. That is why socialism and nationalism are closely linked to each other. The "worker" is not only a social being, as Marx and Engels theoretically suggested, he or she is also (and perhaps first and foremost) a national being. German and Russian history have proved this point dramatically, and it has been repeated by every successful socialist movement: To be successful, the movement has to be nationalized.

It is interesting how, for example, Bolshevik leaders were forced to the realization that what they called "workers" according to Marxist theory were in fact Russian peasants with all their typical traits. In order to vindicate their theory and to justify their own legitimacy as holders of the proletarian dictatorship, the Bolshevik leaders introduced various internal distinctions within the working class, such as the notion of a "lower strata" of the working class, i.e., new workers who had only recently arrived from rural areas.

Trotsky, for example, said that the working class was recruited from peasants as if this idea were an enormous theoretical discovery, even though every working class is recruited from this source. Trotsky had to stress this fact in order to point out the alleged negative characteristics of Russian peasants—their lack of individuality, their passivity—that were inherited by new workers.⁶⁹

One must take into consideration the fact that the Bolsheviks also introduced the notion of a "working aristocracy," which, according to them, did not constitute an authentic part of the working class. The principal accusation against the working aristocracy was their chauvinism, as we will see. Therefore, one can ask, what is the genuine working class? What is the optimal span of work experience that will make a worker a genuine part of such a class, neither retarded nor corrupted?

The extent of Marx and Engels's nationalism was not conditioned only by the specific traits of their doctrine. German nationalism, which was shared by them, was the most assertive of the European nationalisms, and it had racist overtones.

Russian Revolutionary Nationalism Versus German Revolutionary Nationalism

Now the love-hate relationship between Russian and German socialists can be understood. Russian socialists, from Herzen to Lenin, were magnetically attracted by the extraordinary intellectual power and outstanding

erudition of Marx and Engels. At the same time, the former came up against the latter's extreme arrogance and disdain of all that emanated from Russia. Russian socialists of every ilk, with few exceptions, recognized the intellectual superiority of Marx and Engels, though they quarreled about the implementation of their ideas with respect to Russia. With that exception, Russian socialists inside Russia knew only the theoretical aspects of Marxism; they had as a rule little idea of practical Marxism, and when they finally came across it, it was too late for them. They had to reconcile themselves to this basic duality of Marxism, although an explosion might happen sooner or later.

When Herzen advanced the idea of a Pan-Slavic revolutionary invasion of Europe and the destruction of European civilization, Marx and Engels were furious. On February 13, 1855, Marx wrote to Engels: "at no time and in no place do I wish to appear alongside Herzen, not being of the view that Old Europe should be rejuvenated with Russian blood."⁷⁰ They realized that Russia must be rejected en bloc, both autocratic and revolutionary Russia, since the very scale of Russia, its very size, inspired Russian socialists to be overambitious. Marx and Engels maintained a deep hatred for Herzen all their lives, refusing to regard him as a revolutionary. They called him a Pan-Slavist and a landlord, which was basically true although not the entire truth. Marx even managed to immortalize his distaste of Herzen in a footnote of *Das Kapital*:

Since on the European continent the influence of capitalistic production, which has undermined the human race . . . is developing further, hand in hand with competition in the size of national armies, state debts, taxes, the elegant conduct of war, etc., the rejuvenation of Europe by means of the knout and the forced infusion of Kalmyck blood, may finally become unavoidable, a rejuvenation so earnestly prophesied by the half-Russian and entirely Muscovite Herzen. (This scribbler, it should be noted in passing, made his discoveries concerning "Russian communism" not in Russia, but in the works of the Prussian State Counsellor, Haxthausen).⁷¹

Nothing could change this negative attitude. Engels would say in 1894:

The opinions concerning the Russian communistic village communities which he raised against me were in essence those of Herzen. This Pan-Slavist journalist parading as a "revolutionary" had learned from Haxthausen's *Russian Studies* that the unfree peasants on his estate do not know private property in land, but rather re-divide fields and pastures among themselves from time to time. As a journalist he did not need to learn what soon afterwards became common knowledge, that communal ownership of land is a form of property which was predominant in pre-historic times among the Germans, Celts, Indians—in short among all Indo-Germanic peoples—still exists in India, has only recently been forcibly suppressed in Ireland and Scotland, and occurs even here and there in Germany but is now dying out. In fact, it is an institution common to all peoples at a certain state of development.



Mikhail Bakunin (photo from P. Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967], p. 278).

But since he was a Pan Slavist who could only be called a socialist by name he found in this fact a new pretext to present his "holy" Russia and its mission—to rejuvenate and to fertilize again the rotten degenerate West, by force if necessary—in a still more splendid light when contrasted with this same decadent West.⁷²

Neither Marx nor Engels ever met Herzen, so their relations were static. Meanwhile, there was a real personal (one might even say titanic) drama between Marx and Engels on the one side and Herzen's friend, Mikhail Bakunin, the founding father of anarchism, on the other. The two sides knew each other well and tried several times to cooperate, which led only to disastrous consequences. The struggle started when Bakunin appealed to German Slavs in 1848 to destroy the Austrian empire. He called German Slavs, "German slaves."⁷³ At the same time, Bakunin urged Western Slavs not to submit to the oppressive Russian autocracy. This plea was, and could only be, like a red rag to Marx and Engels. They suspected that Bakunin was a Russian agent provocateur, and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, a newspaper edited by Marx and Engels, published a letter alleging that Bakunin worked for the tsarist government, referring to information allegedly

received from George Sand (1804-1876), the French writer. George Sand published an indignant disclaimer, and later Marx and Engels always claimed that their allegation had been the result of a misunderstanding—Bakunin was never a provocateur.⁷⁴

However, they claimed there was a certain ambivalence in his political behavior. Arrested in the West and imprisoned in Russia after 1848, Bakunin wrote a voluntary confession to Tsar Nikolai I, which is very genuine and credible.

I assured myself that Russia—in order to save her honor and her future—must carry out a revolution, overthrow your Tsarist authority, destroy monarchical rule, and, having thus liberated herself from internal slavery, take her place at the head of the Slav movement. Then she must turn her arms against the Emperor of Austria, against the Prussian King, against the Turkish Sultan, and also, if necessary, against both Germany and the Magyars—in a word, against the whole world—for the final liberation of all Slav nations from an alien yoke. Half of Prussian Silesia, the great part of West and of East Prussia—in a word, all Slavic-speaking, Polish-speaking lands—had to be detached from Germany. My fantasies went even further. I thought, I hoped that the Magyar nation (forced by circumstances, by its isolated position in the midst of Slav peoples, and also by its more Eastern than Western nature), that all the Moldavians and the Vlachs, and finally even Greece would enter the Slav union; and thus there would be created a single, free, Eastern state, a reborn Eastern world, as it were, in contrast to the Western, although not hostile to the latter, and that its capital would be Constantinople. . . .

I am now still convinced that if you, Sire, had wished at that time to raise the Slav banner, then they unconditionally, without discussion, blindly submitting to your will, they and all others who speak Slavic in the Austrian and Prussian possessions would have thrown themselves with joy and fanaticism under the broad wings of the Russian eagle and would have rushed with fury not only against the hated Germans but against all Western Europe as well.

A strange thought was then born within me. I suddenly took it into my head to write to you, Sire, and was on the point of starting the letter. . . . I implored you, Sire, in the name of all oppressed Slavs, to come to their aid, to take them under your mighty protection, to be their savior, their father, and, having proclaimed yourself Tsar of all the Slavs, finally to raise the Slav banner in eastern Europe to the terror of the Germans and all other oppressors and enemies of the Slav race!⁷⁵

Bakunin did not publish his letter to the tsar in 1848. Marx and Engels never knew about his confession; otherwise they would have justified their reservations against Bakunin by pointing out his own ambivalence.

While Bakunin was in prison in Russia, Marx's adherents spread rumors to the effect that he was not imprisoned at all but was serving in the Russian army in the Caucasus. This rumor was not true, but when Bakunin was in (a very easygoing) exile in Siberia, he became an uncritical admirer of the Siberian governor, Nikolai Muraviev-Amursky (1809-1881), who at that time systematically expanded Russian territories in the Far East,

sometimes without any direct government approval. Bakunin sent Herzen one letter after another filled with enthusiastic praise of Muraviev-Amurak's patriotic activity.⁷⁶

One must therefore acknowledge that Bakunin was too controversial, and he had also become a rabid Germanophobe. In the above-quoted confession, he wrote to the tsar:

The Germans suddenly had become loathsome to me, so loathsome that I could not speak with one of them with equanimity, could not bear to hear the German language or a German voice, and I remember that once when a little German beggar boy walked up to me to ask for alms, I could hardly refrain from giving him a thrashing.⁷⁷

The conflict between Marx and Engels on the one hand and Bakunin on the other is very often interpreted as the ideological confrontation between anarchism and Marxism, but it was only a rationalization of a greater conflict between German and Russian socialism, which were incompatible from a geopolitical viewpoint. Herzen started this conflict; Bakunin only followed him.

Neither Herzen nor Bakunin contested the intellectual superiority of Marx. On the contrary, Bakunin several times stressed his admiration for Marx as an intellectual.⁷⁸ Marx evidently regarded his conflict with Bakunin as national, violently rejecting the very idea of any special Russian revolutionary mission. Marx regarded Bakunin as his most serious contender and accused him of being an ambitious potential dictator of international socialism.

Bakunin did nothing to allay this suspicion. In 1870, for example, he proposed mobilizing 40,000 young Russians who had no permanent employment in Russia for revolutionary activity in Europe. Engels's comment on this proposal was that if anything could ruin the European revolutionary movement, it would be 40,000 Russian "nihilists."⁷⁹

For some reason, Marx and Engels invited Bakunin to join their socialist International in 1868, when he was already an anarchist. This temporary alliance was short-lived, and Marx succeeded in ousting Bakunin from the group. In his struggle against Bakunin, Marx resorted to a political maneuver that anticipated the Bolshevik manipulation of the Communist International: He was asked by his Russian puppets to be "the Russian representative" in the International.⁸⁰

Bakunin then accused the German socialists of virulent nationalism.⁸¹ According to him, they took advantage of their socialist cover in order to gain ideological legitimacy for the German *Drang nach Osten*. He contested the Russophobia of Marx and Engels. According to Bakunin, Russia was ruled by a "mongolized German prince," or by "a Germanized Genghis Khan."⁸² He was highly critical of German workers,⁸³ although in his public statements he never resorted to a Germanophobia that was parallel or comparable to the Russophobia of Marx and Engels. However, as one can

see from his confession, his real anti-German feelings were as strong as, or stronger than, the anti-Russian feelings of Marx and Engels.

Bakunin claimed publicly that the nature of the German nation is more inclined to slow reforms than to a revolution. According to him, "German workers are the natural and violent enemies of a union with Russia and the Russian people. . . . Russian revolutionaries should not be surprised, and should not even be sorry, if at some time German workers will extend their deep and legitimate hatred against everything inspired by the very existence of the Russian empire and all her political actions."⁸⁴

Bakunin accused Marx of inciting German workers to hate Russia. "Don't they [the workers]," he asked, "too often following the example and advice of their leaders, mix the Russian empire and the Russian people in the same feeling of distaste and hatred?" "Indeed, what evil has the Russian empire inflicted on them?" "Has any Russian tsar dreamed of conquering Germany? Did he take any German province?"⁸⁵ German patriots therefore had no moral right to reproach the Russian empire. He dismissed the arguments of Marx and Engels that Russia exercised a morbid influence on Germany.⁸⁶

Bakunin said that it would be much better if a genuine German patriot like Marx would use his historical erudition to prove that Germany itself was responsible for its contemporary political slavery. Meanwhile, according to Bakunin, Marx was trying to soothe German national vanity by ascribing Germany's mistakes, crimes, and blots to a foreign influence.⁸⁷

It was Germany, not Russia, according to Bakunin, that was trying to conquer its neighbors slowly and systematically and was always ready to extend its own political slavery to neighboring nations. It was Germany, not Russia, that was an international threat.⁸⁸ Slavs had only one way out. If Herzen appealed for a Slavic invasion of Europe and for the destruction of European civilization, Bakunin suggested the concept of the international revolution, which would ruin all existing states, including Germany and Russia, in order to prevent German expansion into Russia.

According to Bakunin, only a universal community of free stateless nations could solve this geopolitical conflict. Slavs had to have their vested national interests to start such a revolution, which would have national-liberation implications.⁸⁹ One can see that Bakunin's anarchism had a deep national background. It was not only the rejection of an oppressive state but also the rejection of a state as an instrument of foreign oppression.

Is it not clear, therefore, that the Slavs must not seek and cannot conquer their rights and their place in history and in the brotherly alliance of peoples but by means of the social revolution?

But the social revolution cannot be the work of only one people; by its very nature, this revolution is international, which means that the Slavs, who aspire to their liberty, must for the sake of it link their aspirations and the organization of their national forces with the aspirations and organization of national forces of all the other countries.⁹⁰

Bakunin was ready to send all Slavs to hell if they forged new chains for humanity.⁹¹ Contrary to Herzen, Bakunin warned pathetically against any advance inside Germany:

Let us compare your poverty and impotence with German riches and power since . . . today Germany has become an arsenal bristling with menacing arms. And you, trained and armed so badly, would like to defeat it!

From the first step you would take on German soil, you suffer a crushing defeat and your offensive war would be transformed in the field into a defensive war; the German army would invade the territory of the Russian empire.⁹²

Bakunin was opposed to the so-called working aristocracy, since according to him, well-to-do workers are not revolutionaries. Only lumpen and peasants are genuine revolutionary material, and brigands are also an extremely important revolutionary force. As did Herzen, Bakunin anticipated the total destruction of the old society as a result of the revolution. Another extremely important point was anticipated by Bakunin. In defending his idea of a destructive peasant-lumpen-brigand revolution, Bakunin forecast that German socialists would decisively contest such a revolution on national premises:

Marxists . . . etatists under it all, they are forcibly brought to condemn every popular revolution, above all the peasant revolution, anarchic in nature and leading directly to the abolition of the state. Avid and insatiable pan-Germanists, they are obliged to repudiate the peasant revolution, even if only that it is essentially Slav.⁹³

Bakunin was also fundamentally anti-Semitic. He introduced a strong anti-Semitic trend into Russian socialism and accused Marx of manifesting Jewish traits.⁹⁴ He did not pay attention to the fact that all socialist Jews who confronted him were converted and anti-Semitic themselves. As a matter of fact, Jews who tried to be leaders of a socialist movement in a country that was inherently highly nationalistic had to be more nationalist than their "electorate." They had to be the champions of a national cause in order to not make themselves vulnerable. This point was dramatically manifested during the Bolshevik revolution when many Jewish Bolsheviks championed Russian revolutionary nationalism to the point of being anti-Semitic themselves.

A Jewish historian, Judd Teller, had a very deep insight into what he called the Marx-Bakunin debates. One cannot help but quote his remarkable comments:

This racist debate between the Marxists and Bakunin was only a dress rehearsal for a horrible contest between the Germans and Russians. This contest has twice been fought to a draw on the stage of a global theater of war and seems scheduled for additional billing. The Russian anarchist and the German Socialist dialecticians undoubtedly knew their own people, and we may assume that each imputed to the other what he found reprehensible in his own race. Bakunin's indictment of the Germans, therefore, may be in reality a portrait

of Russia, and the Marx-Engels' indictment of Russia may be a portrait of Germany. Place these portraits alongside each other and they are, except for minor ornamental details, remarkably identical. Both peoples, somehow, have been clumsy with their liberties and succumbed to strong masters. Both countries have demonstrated a "barbarous" "energy and vigor," have retreated only when handled in "the fearless way," and have been unconscionable with neighbors, except that Russia has been more successful than Germany in holding down her subjugated peoples.⁹⁵

One can stress once again that this Marx-Engels/Herzen-Bakunin confrontation was only an anticipation of the later clash between German and Russian socialists. It is also important to add that Marx and Engels not only clashed with Russian socialists, they also had a dramatic struggle with French socialists—primarily with Pierre Proudhon (1809-1865) and his followers. Marx and Engels did their best to discredit him, and Marx did not hesitate to write to Engels during the Franco-Prussian War that one of the positive results of a French defeat would be the defeat of the Proudhonists in their quest for leadership of the European revolutionary movement.⁹⁶

We will see later that Lenin wittingly used Bakunin's geopolitical arguments. Lenin was certainly against Bakunin's anarchism in principle, but a major part of Bakunin's political philosophy has no relation to anarchism whatsoever.

Pan-Slavism Receives Official Support in Russia

Only after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War did Pan-Slavism receive the first tacit support of the Russian government, a result of Russian isolation in Europe. Professor Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), the chief Russian Pan-Slavist of the time, could in 1855-1856 persuade the Russian government that the Slavs were Russia's only reliable allies in Europe.⁹⁷ That was wishful thinking, and it cost Russia a great deal.

Pan-Slavism was never accepted in prerevolutionary Russia as an official foreign policy, though it became a very powerful political tool of Russian nationalists who challenged German political domination in the Russian empire and eventually involved Russia in World War I. Pan-Slavists were extremely hostile to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, but sometimes friendly to France, England, and the United States due to simple geopolitical considerations. The specter of Pan-Slavism shadowed the European political scene and contributed to the escalation of mutual obsession and hostility.

The most important Pan-Slavist theoretician in Russia was a former Russian revolutionary, Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885).⁹⁸ He was arrested, later repented, and became a prominent Russian biologist. Danilevsky published in 1869 an extremely important book, *Russia and Europe*, which was another mirror image of the European obsession with Russia as a peril. He had a serious impact on his time, but he had a much stronger impact on postrevolutionary thought. A Menshevik historian, Boris Nikolaevsky

(1887-1966), called Danilevsky the first Russian geopolitician,⁹⁹ which is only partly correct since Bakunin and Herzen were geopoliticians too.

Danilevsky was influenced by a German philosopher, Heinrich Rückert (1823-1875), and claimed that humanity consists of ten cultural-historical types: (1) Egyptian, (2) Chinese, (3) Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician-Chaldean, (4) Indian, (5) Iranian, (6) Jewish, (7) Greek, (8) Roman, (9) neo-Semitic or Arab, and (10) German-Roman or European. These types are similar to biological entities in that they have their birth, blossom, and die. They struggle against each other, and the struggle is that of life and death. Every type develops its own laws and way of life, which cannot be imitated by another type.

According to Danilevsky, not all of humanity is covered by these types. Only peoples who have developed a cultural-historical type are positive actors in human history; other peoples are only comets among planets, and sometimes they are even "negative actors" in history (divine punishments). There are also tribes that acquire neither creative nor negative historical importance. They are only history's "ethnographic material." Human achievements are not cumulative and do not belong to the common historical stream, which is multilinear. There is no such thing, Danilevsky said, as a civilization shared by all of humanity, although it is not excluded that some formal achievements of one civilization might be added to another.

Danilevsky's philosophy of history had an extremely important political foundation. Its *raison d'être* was the claim that the contemporary Slav civilization had to be transformed into a separate (the eleventh) cultural-historical type, as Slavs had nothing to do with the European cultural-historical type. Russia was not Europe. Europe was hostile to Russia as a well-established cultural-historical type faced with a potential rival. The Slavs were in a state of self-creation, and if they did not elaborate their cultural-historical type, they would be doomed to be ethnographic material for others.¹⁰⁰ (By the way, the notion of "ethnographic material" is dangerously close to the Marxist notion of "nonhistorical" nations, an early Marxist example being the Czechs.)¹⁰¹

"The Slav idea," said Danilevsky, "ought to be the highest idea for each Slav, preceded only by God and His holy church, above liberty, above science, above education, above any earthly blessings."¹⁰² According to him, the dominant feature of European civilization was violence, which was completely alien to Slavs.¹⁰³ Russia, he added, was not a self-seeking country, and the driving force of the Russians was "internal moral consciousness."¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, Danilevsky completely excluded morality as a principle of international relations, in the same way as Machiavelli, although the former regarded himself as a faithful Orthodox Christian. In fact, Danilevsky's theory was a mirror image of Pan-Germanism, which he regarded as a serious threat to Russia.

One can stress again that Pan-Slavism was a dynamic force in Russia, but it never gained the upper hand in Russian foreign policy. The only high-ranking Pan-Slavist diplomat was the Russian ambassador in Turkey

in 1867-1877, Nikolai Ignatiev (1832-1908), who regarded Austrian and Ottoman Slavs as natural Russian allies in the struggle against Germany.¹⁰⁵ Later he became minister of internal affairs.

Russian Populism: The Worship of the Russian People

Herzen and Bakunin were only the first Russian socialist troublemakers for the Marxists. The next ones were Russian populists.¹⁰⁶ Populism proceeded from the same source of Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, and like the Slavophiles, the populists worshiped the Russian people and differed only in their search for the latter's liberation. In their idealization of the Russian people, the populists absorbed Herzen's idea of the Russian rural commune, the *obshchina*, as primitive Slav communism and a means of bypassing capitalism. Contrary to Herzen and Bakunin, however, Russian populists were internally oriented and did not long for Russian revolutionary expansion. Some of them practiced political terror. Isaiah Berlin suggested that Russian populists "did not believe in the unique character or destiny of the Russian people. They were not mystical nationalists."¹⁰⁷ In fact, they were, because of their worship of their own people.

There has been immense discussion of Marx and Engels's attitude toward Russian populism.¹⁰⁸ In fact, the Marxist attitude to populism must also be put into the framework of Marxist geopolitics. Marx and Engels looked favorably at the Russian populists' obsession with the *obshchina* for two evident reasons. First, Russian rural primitive communism was for Marx and Engels, not a manifestation of the precapitalist mode of production, but a manifestation of the Asiatic mode of production. This view excluded Russia completely from European civilization. For Marx and Engels, Russian primitive communism was incompatible with any Russian ambition for revolutionary leadership in Europe, since Russia was essentially backward. For this reason, they probably regarded Russian populism as an isolationist doctrine. Second, the populists also provided Marx and Engels with the future possibility of extending their benevolent patronage to a victorious Russian revolution, and even made them change their former negative attitude in 1878 to a positive one toward a premature Russian revolution.

Marx even suggested that Russian primitive communism might help Russia bypass capitalism in the case of a European social revolution:

The crucial question now is: can the Russian *obshchina* . . . an already seriously undermined form of the age-old communal property of the soil, become transformed directly into the superior form of communist ownership of land, or will it have to pass through the same process of decomposition which is evidenced by the course of the historical evolution of the West?

Today only one answer is possible to this question. If the Russian revolution sounds the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, [the decomposition of the communal ownership of land in Russia can be evaded] so that each complements the other, the prevailing form of communal ownership of land in Russia may form a starting-point for a communist course of development.¹⁰⁹

Marx was essentially suggesting what later became known, linked to the name of Trotsky, as the theory of the permanent revolution. Russia should start a revolution—which was certainly not conceived by Marx and Engels as a proletarian one—and that revolution would spark off the European revolution. Then the generous and progressive European (German) proletariat would extend its support to backward Russia to help it construct a new society. Russia itself was not regarded as mature enough for such an endeavor. This theory was the mirror image of the Bakuninist theory of an international revolution. For Bakunin, however, the international revolution would save Russia from the German peril; for Marx and Engels, the international revolution would save Germany from the Russian peril.

In spite of some hesitations, Engels kept his favorable attitude to Russian primitive communism until his death, but on certain conditions:

From this it already follows that the initiative for such a possible transformation of the Russian village community can only originate, not in the community itself, but solely among the industrial proletariat of the West. The victory of the Western European proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the associated replacement of capitalistic production by one socially directed—that is the necessary precondition for raising the Russian village community to the same level.¹¹⁰

The favorites of Marx and Engels among the Russian populists were certainly Nikolai Tchernyshevsky (1828–1889) and to some extent Petr Lavrov (1823–1900). Tchernyshevsky never left Russia; Lavrov emigrated to the West in 1870, but neither he nor Tchernyshevsky contested the authority of Marx and Engels. They lacked concern for international affairs and, as Marx and Engels thought, did not dream of any Russian universal mission.

It seems, however, that the favorable attitude of Marx and Engels toward the populists was a result of insufficient information. Although the Russian populists were ostensibly isolationists, the internal dynamics of a victorious Russian populism could easily have led to the idea of a world revolutionary mission. Tibor Szamuely, for example, quotes Tchernyshevsky on Peter the Great: "For us, the ideal patriot is Peter the Great; we find our highest ideal of patriotism expressed in the passionate boundless devotion to the good of the country which inspired the life and animated the actions of this great man. . . . A Russian who possesses both mind and heart can never become anything other than a patriot in the mold of Peter the Great."¹¹¹ If one remembers that Peter the Great was Marx's and Engels's *bête noire*, and if one remembers that he was an expansionist par excellence, one can easily understand what kind of implications these factors could have for his revolutionary admirers.

There were also populists like Sergei Stepniak-Kravtchinsky (1851–1895) who appealed to change socialism's German and foreign dress for the popular blouse of a Russian peasant.¹¹² Many populists later repented and became monarchists and nationalists. Such was the destiny of a leading populist, Lev Tikhomirov (1852–1923), who signed the death warrant of Tsar Alexander

II (1818-1881), who was indeed assassinated by populists, but in later years Tikhomirov repented and became a right-wing nationalist. On the other hand, in 1883 a group of former populists led by Georgy Plekhanov (1856-1918) organized the first Russian Marxist group proper, the Emancipation of Labor. However, the mainstream of Russian populism was later transformed into the so-called Social Revolutionary (SR) party, the left wing of which was later integrated into Bolshevism in 1917 and exercised very considerable influence over the future Soviet system. A Soviet author called the SR party "neopopulist."¹¹³

Ferdinand Lassalle and His Etatist-Nationalist Influence on Russia

The real founder of German political socialism was neither Marx nor Engels, but Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864).¹¹⁴ If Marx and Engels were German nationalists, Lassalle was a German nationalist par excellence. His socialism was not only German but Prussian, in spite of the fact that he was a Jew, though anti-Semitic. He founded a social-democratic party in Prussia before Bismarck accomplished the unification of Germany, and he organized a strictly centralized party under his absolute personal leadership, which anticipated Lenin's organizational ideas. Lassalle was an admirer of the etatist socialism that was deeply rooted in Prussian tradition and rejected any political cooperation with liberals, even tactical. He preferred a tacit cooperation with Bismarck while Marx and Engels were ready to cooperate tacitly with the liberals.

Lassalle regarded war with Russia as inevitable and necessary. In his view, Slavs were suitable only for colonization. He suggested the destruction of Turkey and the conquering of Turkish territories by the Germans. He also suggested the *Anschluss* of the Austrian empire.

Lassalle had an enormous impact on Russian socialism. His immense popularity was to a certain extent due to a novel by Friedrich Spielhagen (1829-1911), whose hero was a romanticized Lassalle.¹¹⁵ The novel was quickly translated into Russian and had extraordinary success.

Lassalle's books and pamphlets became part and parcel of every socialist library in Russia. He became the main channel through which socialist ideas, including Marxism, penetrated Russia at that time. As early as 1869, Herzen singled Lassalle out as a positive example of his defense of the state versus Bakunin's anarchism.¹¹⁶

A Soviet historian, David Zaslavsky (1880-1965), a former right-wing Jewish socialist who later became a pillar of the Soviet media under Stalin, tried to limit Lassalle's influence in Russia to his etatism (which is in itself important enough).¹¹⁷ Zaslavsky also acknowledged Lassalle's contribution to Russian revolutionary fervor. Indeed, a well-known Russian populist, Vladimir Debogorii-Mokrievitch (1848-1926), reported that Lassalle was used by the populists via a kind of substitution: everything Lassalle said about workers was interpreted by the populists as said about peasants.¹¹⁸ Zaslavsky

acknowledged Lassalle's influence on the programs of early Marxist circles, particularly in Plekhanov's group, the Emancipation of Labor.¹¹⁹ A prominent Russian Bolshevik, Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870-1928), who was later to become editor in chief of *Izvestia*, also acknowledged that revolutionary thought in the 1890s was a mixture of Marx and Lassalle.¹²⁰

The Menshevik leaders Pavel Axelrod (1850-1928) and Yuli Martov (Tæderbaum, 1873-1923) were virtually intoxicated by Lassalle,¹²¹ and a prominent Soviet diplomat, the Soviet ambassador to England and deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, Ivan Maisky (1884-1975), who moved from Menshevism to Bolshevism, reports that after reading Spielhagen's book, Lassalle became his life model.¹²² One can find an abundance of favorable references to Lassalle in the writings of leading Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. In fact, the extent of Lassalle's popularity in Russia can be seen from the memoirs of a Georgian Bolshevik who described how demonstrators carried portraits of Lassalle, Marx, and Engels in the famous demonstration in Tiflis on April 22, 1901—a demonstration in which young Stalin participated. The portraits are mentioned in that order.¹²³

Alexander Parvus (Helphand, 1869-1924) was another channel of Lassalle's influence among Bolsheviks. Parvus was a Russian-Jewish socialist who emigrated from Russia to Germany at an early age. He admired Lassalle and wrote in 1904 that the proletariat should follow Lassalle's precepts and penetrate the state. Parvus was an extremely important guide for Russian Bolshevism, although merely as a popularizer of political Marxism and Lassallianism among Bolsheviks. It is known that he exercised a strong influence over Trotsky and hypnotized him with the theory of permanent revolution, which Parvus had taken ready-made from Marx and Engels.¹²⁴

Admiration for Lassalle permeated the Bolshevik revolution, and he became a prominent name on the Soviet list of the founding fathers of socialism, after Marx and Engels. His popularity lasted throughout the 1920s, and almost every Soviet town and city had its own Lassalle Street. He was recommended as standard reading in 1919 for Russian communists in a book by Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) and Evgeny Preobrazhensky (1886-1937), *The ABC of Communism*. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 Lassalle's portrait followed those of Marx and Engels.¹²⁵

There is also interesting evidence of Lassalle's impact on Stalinists. Alexander Gorkin (b. 1897), who was chairman of the Tver' provincial Soviet executive committee during the revolution and later became a favorite of Stalin and secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, published an article in 1919 calling Lassalle the "great teacher of the working movement" who, as Gorkin stressed, developed the theory of the basic foundations of the Soviet state.¹²⁶ It is important to add that it was Gorkin who brought into political life the future main Soviet ideologist under Stalin, Andrei Zhdanov (1896-1948), who worked under Gorkin in the same Tver' Soviet during the Civil War. Therefore, contrary to Zaslavsky's opinion, Lassalle's influence extended even into Stalin's time.

Many opponents of the Soviet system among German socialists and communists claimed that the legacy of Lassalle's etatism was Bolshevism,¹²⁷

and Lassalle's influence did encourage another Russian mirror image of a German political idea. His German etatism and nationalism was changed by them to Russian etatism and nationalism.

Petr Tkatchev: The Revolutionary Reeducation of a Degraded People

The main official Soviet historian after the revolution, Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868-1932), called Petr Tkatchev (1844-1886) a Bolshevik,¹²⁸ and an Italian historian, Franco Venturi, noticed that Tkatchev found in Marxism the full expression of all his economic and historical ideas.¹²⁹ However, unlike Marx and Engels, Tkatchev, like many populists, regarded workers and peasants as belonging to the same social group.

What was missed by both Pokrovsky and Venturi was Tkatchev's debt to Lassalle. Like many Russian socialists, Tkatchev came to Lassalle through Spielhagen.¹³⁰ Even in 1869, before his emigration, he stressed Lassalle's central etatist idea, namely, that political reform must precede social reform.¹³¹ Although accepting the main principles of Marxism, Tkatchev rejected Marxist strategy in Russia because of the basic difference between Russia and the West, which he felt should be accepted by Marx and Engels if they wished to be consistent. Indeed, Tkatchev was perfectly right from a Marxist point of view when, in an open letter to Engels, he stressed that "the situation of our country is completely unique. It has nothing in common with the situation of any Western European country."¹³² Essentially, Marx and Engels claimed the same thing, advancing the theory of the Asiatic mode of production and of Russia as a semi-Asiatic country.

The reason why Tkatchev stressed this basic difference was not only because of the economic gap. According to Tkatchev, as a result of agelong slavery and oppression, the average Russian developed endurance, servility and the slave instinct, hypocrisy, and the ability to control any manifestation of his or her feelings. These qualities corrupted and made the average Russian helpless.¹³³ But if one remembers what was said about the Russians by Marx and Engels, one cannot see any difference between their definition and Tkatchev's.

Tkatchev came to the following logical conclusion: Nobody can rely on the Russians in any revolution from below, as in Europe. A revolutionary elite must take power through conspiracy, and only then can it engage in the necessary reeducation of the Russian people in order to liberate them from the legacy of slavery and oppression, to release their energy.¹³⁴ The idea of revolution through political conspiracy belonged to the French socialist Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881), and Bolsheviks were often accused of Blanquism.¹³⁵ If so, Tkatchev was the direct predecessor of Lenin.

In spite of his low regard for the Russian people, Tkatchev was deeply nationalist. Contrary to Herzen and Bakunin, who admired the Russian and Slav characters as they were, Tkatchev dreamed only of making Russians the equal of the people of Western nations, or even their superiors.



Petr Tkatchev (photo from B. Shakhmatov, *P. Tkatchev* [Moscow, 1981], p. 64).

"Those who flatter their people do not respect it," Tkatchev said,¹³⁶ which was exactly Lenin's attitude toward the Russians. Let us look, for example, at one of Lenin's many invectives against the Russian national character:

It is the worst feature in the Russian character, which expresses itself in enervation and flabbiness. It is important, not only to begin but to carry on and hold out; that is what we Russians are not good at. Only by long training, through a proletarian disciplined struggle against all wavering and vacillation, only through such endurance can the Russian working masses be brought to rid themselves of this bad habit.¹³⁷

Tkatchev decisively rejected the very principle of nationality, which, according to him, was incompatible with socialist revolution.¹³⁸ One can easily see, however, that this ostensible internationalism is potentially an etatist Russian nationalism. Tkatchev, for example, categorically rejected any quest for Ukrainian nationalism. The revolution, as conceived by Tkatchev, was to be a specifically Russian enterprise, which would claim its administrative authority over the former territory of the Russian empire.

Indeed, rejection of Ukrainian nationalism amounts to Russian monopoly of the future socialist state.

Tkatchev's magazine *Nabat*, published when he was an emigrant, was also explicitly anti-Semitic, another manifestation of his nationalism. He inherited Bakunin's anti-Semitic legacy: *Nabat* regarded Jews as a collective entity and as the ally of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists who entered into a conspiracy against poor peasants. In short, Jews were declared to be the main enemy of the peasants.¹³⁹

Tkatchev then developed the theory of a two-stage revolution, a continuation of Herzen's last concept. The first stage would use only destructive power directed at annihilating the enemies of the revolution. In the second stage, this power must be bridled and a new order created that would be essentially conservative as it would be based on a healthy popular conservatism, which would be developed and perfected.¹⁴⁰

Tkatchev was deeply influenced by Machiavelli, and this influence later became a leading intellectual influence among etatist Russian socialists. He said that Machiavelli liberates from "the heavy burden of scholarship, he provides us with a reasonable and sober opinion on phenomena which in his time nobody, and in other times only a few, could have any clear notion of."¹⁴¹

Tkatchev favored Russian military defeat as the starting point of a revolution. He advanced this point during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, saying, "War creates a lot of the most favorable conditions for a successful revolutionary explosion."¹⁴² By the way, it was not only Tkatchev's privilege to base his hopes on a war in order to encourage a possible revolution. The senior Russian diplomat Nikolai Tcharykov (1855-1930) remarked that in 1877 "the conviction grew among the intelligentsia of Russia that if the war they were doing their best to bring on took place, it would be followed in Russia by either a Constitution or a revolution."¹⁴³

Engels furiously and arrogantly attacked Tkatchev. In an insulting reply to him in 1875, he completely dismissed Tkatchev's theories.¹⁴⁴ It is perfectly understandable what bothered Marx and Engels. Only several years after the clash with Bakunin, another Russian was appealing for a self-contained Russian revolution, with geopolitical implications difficult to forecast. Tkatchev was not a populist, he was not obsessed by Russian primitive communism, and he did not worship Russian backwardness. He was an etatist, and could not his revolution be a more dangerous challenge on the part of the Russian and Slav world to Germany than the present Russia?

Some historians commenting on the Engels-Tkatchev controversy, have regarded it as Marxist dogmatism versus Tkatchev's realism.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Engels was no less realistic than Tkatchev in his polemics, but he simply obscured his real reservation, justifying his political concern by dogmatic arguments. Nikolai Berdiaev was wrong in accusing Engels of utopianism in this instance.¹⁴⁶ Tibor Szamuely essentially repeated Berdiaev's argument, saying that "Marxist dogma has served only to obfuscate the basic problems of the Russian revolution, the problem posed so starkly and uncompromisingly

by Tkatchev."¹⁴⁷ Both Berdiaev and Szamuely were wrong to blame Marx and Engels for incompetence. Marx and Engels understood Russia well enough, but in their value system they had a different concept of the Russian social revolution. According to them, it ought to be followed by German cultural colonization, and they dismissed any Russian quest for an independent social revolution as politically dangerous.

Nevertheless, in his official capacity, Pokrovsky stressed Lenin's dependence on Tkatchev, though he claimed that Lenin was not Tkatchev's pupil.¹⁴⁸ I will return to this subject later.

The last tribute to Tkatchev was paid by the Soviet historian Fedor Nesterov, who praised him for his struggle in defense of "centralism, hierarchy, and military discipline in a revolutionary organization."¹⁴⁹

The Russian Machiavellian: Sergei Netchaev

Tkatchev's tribute to Machiavelli was not unnoticed in Russia, as I have mentioned before. In the second half of the 1870s, there was a new, far-reaching mutation. A young Russian socialist, Sergei Netchaev (1847-1882),¹⁵⁰ injected Machiavellianism from below, as Anthony D'Agostino called it,¹⁵¹ into Russian revolutionary thought. It was not his main idea that a small dedicated group of revolutionaries should take political power, as had already been suggested by Blanqui and then by Tkatchev. His main idea was to rely on absolute immorality as revolutionary ammunition. He explicitly referred to Machiavelli and also to the Jesuits—it was widely believed that they practiced absolute immorality as well.

According to Netchaev, who was supported by Tkatchev and temporarily by Bakunin, there was no action that could not be used for the sake of revolution, including the betrayal of personal friends and committed revolutionaries, penetration into the police as double agents, and so on. Public opinion must be ignored completely, any dogmatism must be rejected. Everything that promotes revolution is moral. We can quote from his so-called Catechism of the Revolutionist:

1. The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has no interests of his own, no affairs, no feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name. Everything in him is absorbed by a single exclusive interest, a single thought, a single passion—the revolution.

2. In the very depths of his being, not only in words but also in deeds, he has broken every tie with the civil order and the entire cultured world, with all its laws, proprieties, social conventions and its ethical rules. He is an implacable enemy of this world, and if he continues to live in it, that is only to destroy it more effectively.

3. The revolutionary despises all doctrinairism and has rejected the mundane sciences, leaving them to future generations. He knows of only one science, the science of destruction. To this end, and this end alone, he will study mechanics, physics, chemistry, and perhaps medicine. To this end he will study day and night the living science: people, their characters and circumstances

and all the features of the present social order at all possible levels. His sole and constant object is the immediate destruction of this vile order.

4. He despises public opinion. He despises and abhors the existing social ethic in all its manifestations and expressions. For him, everything is moral which assists the triumph of revolution. Immoral and criminal is everything which stands in its way. . . .

8. The revolutionary considers his friend and holds dear only a person who has shown himself in practice to be as much a revolutionary as he himself. The extent of his friendship, devotion and other obligations towards his comrade is determined only by their degree of usefulness in the practical work of total revolutionary destruction. . . .

13. The revolutionary enters into the world of the state, of class and of so-called culture, and lives in it only because he has faith in its speedy and total destruction. He is not a revolutionary if he feels pity for anything in this world. If he is able to, he must face the annihilation of a situation, of a relationship or of any person who is a part of this world—everything and everyone must be equally odious to him. All the worse for him if he has family, friends and loved ones in this world; he is no revolutionary if they can stay his hand.

14. Aiming at merciless destruction the revolutionary can and sometimes even must live within society while pretending to be quite other than what he is. The revolutionary must penetrate everywhere, among all the lowest and the middle classes, into the houses of commerce, the church, the mansions of the rich, the world of the bureaucracy, the military and of literature, the Third Section [the Secret Police] and even the Winter Palace.¹⁵²

Netchaev also provided practical examples of a new revolutionary immorality. He betrayed his friends to the police, he forged documents, and he misrepresented himself as the leader of an immense revolutionary organization that actually was nonexistent. He issued membership cards of this organization, using four- or five-figure numbers for these cards, and with this forged identity, he raised money and looked for political support. He initiated the assassination of an innocent student by his circle in order to exercise absolute domination over its members. He calculated that by having shared the responsibility for this assassination, the members of his circle would be in constant fear of exposure. Like Bakunin, Netchaev appealed for the use of brigands to raise money as brigands were regarded as the only genuine revolutionaries.

Netchaev was condemned by the majority of the Russian revolutionaries and was also immortalized by Dostoevsky in *The Possessed*. A committed fanatic, Netchaev died in prison. He left an extremely important legacy to Russian socialism: Wittingly or not, Lenin absorbed almost all Netchaev's commandments of immorality. There is almost nothing contained in those commandments that was not imitated by Lenin or Stalin later. Moreover, there were several attempts to acknowledge Netchaev's legacy during the first period of Soviet rule. Pokrovsky acknowledged that the plan of the 1917 revolution coincided exactly with the plan elaborated by Netchaev's circle.¹⁵³ Less than a year after the Bolshevik revolution, *Pravda* conspicuously

printed "The Catechism of the Conscious Proletarian," hinting at Netchaev's Catechism of the Revolutionist.¹⁵⁴

Several books were published in Russia on Netchaev in the 1920s,¹⁵⁵ as well as one apologetic poem (1927) by Petr Oreshin (1867-1938) in which Netchaev is presented as an epic Russian hero.¹⁵⁶ Only since the 1930s, when Stalin decided that Russian socialism's tradition of conspiracy and terrorism was a dangerous model for his adversaries, has Netchaev been labeled an assassin and a traitor.¹⁵⁷

Superficially, Netchaev's Machiavellianism was only a foreign imitation: Machiavellianism was a dominant political tradition in Germany and in France in the nineteenth century. Napoleon III (1808-1873) widely relied on it in his plutocratic rule, which in 1864 became the subject of a satirical attack in Maurice Joly's ill-fated book, *Dialogue aux Enfers*, later used as a blueprint for the notorious forgery, *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.¹⁵⁸ *The Prince* was the model book for Prussian monarchs for a long time, and they used its wisdom extensively.

What was so special about Netchaev? Machiavellianism was a rationalization of the rules of the political struggle practiced in every age by all nations (for example, the diplomacy of ancient China). Netchaev's originality lay in the fact that he used Machiavellianism as a cover for Russian underworld rules, relying on a specific Russian tradition.

Since the seventeenth century, one can see in Russian history strong movements whose leaders had forged identities and claimed that they were tears or their legitimate heirs who had miraculously escaped assassination. Even in the sixteenth century, a young monk of obscure origin, Grigory Otrepiev, successfully posed as Ivan the Terrible's allegedly assassinated son who had in fact been saved by faithful followers. This young man succeeded in ruling Russia for a short time until he was killed in 1606 and entered history as the False Dimitry. Two other "false Dimitries" followed him, but they were less successful. A peasant uprising in 1773-1775 was led by a Don Cossack, Emelian Pugatchev (1742-1775), who posed as Peter III (1728-1762), claiming he had not died but had survived miraculously. Pugatchev surrounded himself with other Cossacks and brigands who posed (rather precariously) as well-known Russian princes and generals. The memory of these political forgeries was still fresh in Russia, and Netchaev's forgery of nonexistent organizations simply followed this old Russian tradition.

What was more important from the viewpoint of what was to happen later was that Netchaev justified the revolutionaries' acting as police double agents. The populists had already followed this advice and had their "mole," Nikolai Kletotchnikov (1846-1883), who successfully penetrated the Russian political police.

One might argue that although Netchaev was inspired by Machiavelli, or even by Russian tradition, he could have arrived at the same practical conclusions on Marxist premises. Indeed, Marx declared that morality was a class phenomenon, and as such he relativized it. Everything that could profit one or another class was regarded as moral. Therefore, Marxism theoretically destroyed the absolute and universal meaning of morality.

The problem was only in cultural constraints. Declaring the relativity of morality, Marx at least did not practice immorality on his friends. It was not a matter of principle but of the education he received. Netchaev, a young "barbarian" as Herzen and Bakunin would have liked to call him, did not have such constraints; he was not educated, and he had not been brought up in the "philistine, bourgeois, and rotten" West. In fact, Marx and Engels were inconsistent in their blame of Netchaev. If they had been consistent, they would have agreed that Netchaevism could also have been a logical result of their own relativization of morality.

There are too many implications of this revolutionary immorality, including ideological ones. Any idea might be used, any movement might be supported, any political step might be justified. The Bolsheviks later enjoyed the tacit support of the Russian political police; many double agents acted in the Bolshevik party. The Bolsheviks also took advantage of German money during World War I. They integrated the former radical right, they betrayed revolutions and Communist parties. Everything was justified if it served the final goal.

The Russian-European Revolutionary Contest, 1871-1914

Russia and Germany After 1871

Even in 1848, Prussia, then liberal, was weighing the possibility of leading a crusade of liberal Europe against autocratic Russia. This idea was enthusiastically supported by Marx and Engels, but it was not carried out because no consensus was reached. The spell of Russian power was too strong.

The Crimean War and the resulting Russian defeat entirely changed the situation. As one U.S. historian, Barbara Jelavich, said, that war "was perhaps the most decisive single conflict of the entire period since Peter the Great, because it created the general conditions that ultimately brought about the national unification of central Europe and a radical change in the European balance." Russia ceased being a military ogre after its humiliating defeat. In 1855, a dismembering the Russian empire was proposed by France, according to which "the allies should call for a general uprising of the Russian subject nationalities in Finland, Poland and the Caucasus."¹ This idea was rejected by England. Contrary to its own proposal, France eventually concluded an agreement with Russia that lasted from 1856 to 1863. During that period, and until 1871, France was the main protagonist on the European scene and initiated several extremely important revolutionary processes—encouraging, for example, the unification of Italy. The French-Russian agreement could not remain in force after 1863 because of a Polish uprising, which was influenced by French foreign policy. Russia once again resorted to its traditional alliance with Prussia, which was stronger under Alexander II because he had married a Hessen-Darmstadt princess. The unification of Germany by Prussia enjoyed Russian support and would have been impossible without it. For Russia, this support was a blind policy that led to disastrous consequences since it helped to create Russia's own mortal enemy.

Pan-Slavists criticized Russia's foreign policy. Jelavich said, these Pan-Slavists within the court "had deeply resented the place occupied by those of German nationality in the Russian army and bureaucracy."² Their favorite target of criticism was the Russian foreign ministry, but they remembered very well the lesson Nikolai I taught Yuri Samarin.

The year 1871 was defined as one of "pivotal change," and this change was immediately felt in Russian-German relations. Bismarck himself did not want to alienate Russia because he wished to prevent a new Russian-

French rapprochement. He was also against any war, even a victorious war against Russia. He regarded Russia as indestructible and was afraid that if it were defeated, it would remain a natural and revengeful opponent of Germany, just as France was after its defeat in 1871.

However, it was Russia who had unwittingly initiated the first radical step toward a global military-political confrontation in Europe. Trying to take revenge for the humiliating defeat of the Crimean War and to maintain a consistent expansion into the Middle East, the Russian government launched in 1877 a war against Turkey on the pretext of liberating Slavs from the Ottoman yoke. Russian Pan-Slavism was to a large extent responsible for this war. Leading Pan-Slavists waged a frenetic campaign in favor of the liberation of Bulgaria, and the tsarist government gave in under the considerable pressure of Russian public opinion. Russia won this war, but Austria-Hungary was greatly disturbed by the strong potential challenge thus posed to Austrian hegemony over various Slav nations. Germany was also greatly concerned about the new wave of Russian invasion into Europe.

Roman Rosen (1849-1922), a pro-German senior Russian diplomat of Baltic origin, regarded the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 as the cornerstone of the future Russian-German confrontation. He said that

in the seventies of last century began the preoccupation of our public opinion with the idea of the so-called tasks cut out for Russia in the [Middle] East in connection partly with the "Great Slav Idea," partly with dreams of the conquest of Tsargrad (Constantinople) and the Straits.

The influence of this idea on the direction of our policy had, directly or indirectly, the following consequences:

"It led to the war with Turkey in 1877-78, the outcome of which, aside from the satisfaction derived from having accomplished an act of disinterested magnanimity in the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, did not give the Russian people anything but disillusionment as to the results achieved at the cost of so much blood and treasure. And this disillusionment, in its turn, created most favourable conditions for the development of the germs of revolution sown by the internal enemies of Russia;

"It was the cause of the attribution to Russia of far-reaching plans in relation to the conquest of the Straits and the bugbear of 'Pan-Slavism,' at the same time intensifying the general suspicion with which her policy has always been regarded."

Indeed, Russian-German relations deteriorated as a result of this war. First of all, Germany convened an international congress in Berlin that deprived Russia of almost all its gains in the war. Then Germany concluded a treaty with Austria-Hungary in 1879 that was intended to neutralize the Russian menace in Europe. It is interesting that later Stalin pointed to this treaty as a main starting point of World War I without mentioning the Russo-Turkish War as its historical background. Stalin said that

in that period, when everybody was talking about peace and the false bards were lauding Bismarck's peaceful intentions, Germany and Austria concluded

an agreement, an absolutely peaceful and absolutely pacifist agreement, which later served as one of the bases of the subsequent imperialist war. I am speaking of the agreement between Austria and Germany in 1879. Against whom was that agreement directed? Against Russia and France. What did that agreement say? Listen:

"Whereas close collaboration between Germany and Austria threatens nobody and is calculated to consolidate peace in Europe on the principles laid down in the Berlin Treaty, their Majesties, i.e., the two Sovereigns, have resolved to conclude a peace alliance and a mutual agreement."

Do you hear: close collaboration between Germany and Austria for the sake of peace in Europe. That agreement was treated as a "peace alliance," nevertheless all historians agree that the agreement served as a direct preparation for the imperialist war of 1914.⁴

Stalin was given this view by nationalist-oriented Soviet-Russian historians, and it is interesting to see how two totally different, and in fact opposing, camps regarded the development of the Russian-German confrontation. Russian public opinion was indignant at German and Austrian behavior in this regard; Pan-Slavist fears were vindicated, and Pan-Slavist influence increased.

After 1878 there was an obvious duality in Russian foreign policy, which was split between fear of Germany, and the natural wish to find allies against it, and the loyal links between the ruling Germanized dynasty and ruling Baltic Germans with the German court, which not only blunted Russian alertness but in fact led to the creation of a powerful German lobby. Although the Pan-Slavists believed in the basic rivalry of Russia and Germany, the Russian-German lobby tried to do its best to prevent this rivalry. The duality led eventually to catastrophe.

Another turning point in Russian-German relations was the ascent of Wilhelm II (1859-1941) to the throne of Germany in 1888. The kaiser was a committed Prussian militarist who hated Slavs and believed in the fatal Teuton-Slav confrontation. Soon after his coronation, he refused to prolong the routine Russian-German treaty. The growing anxiety in Germany vis-à-vis Russia was partly connected with actual Russian policy and intentions, but in general it was geopolitical, and Russia was regarded by Germany as dangerous *per se*.

Two factors were responsible for Germany's anxiety with regard to Russia. The first was the gradual deterioration of the Ottoman empire, which still had a considerable Slav population. Since Russia saw itself as the main protector of the Slavs, Turkey's dissolution could easily have encouraged the new Russian expansion, especially if one keeps in mind the perennial Russian quest to control the Strait of Bosphorus. The new situation in the Balkans could have posed a serious threat for Austria-Hungary. The second important reason for this anxiety was the rapid demographic change in Austria-Hungary of the balance between Germans and Slavs, especially in Czech areas.⁵ During a short period of time, Germans became a minority in all Czech cities, which had previously been purely German. Moreover, Jews moved to the Czech side and accepted the Czech language. The

assimilation of Czechs by Germans not only stopped but was reversed, and the threat of Slavification of Austria emerged. Eduard von Hartman (1842-1906), a well-known German philosopher, forecast a Slavic Vienna in the twentieth century.⁶

Austria-Hungary was mortally threatened, and vital German interests were at stake since the collapse of Austria-Hungary could automatically bring Russian influence, if not the Russian army, into the heart of Germany. The Russians were quick to react. Alexander III (1845-1894), who ascended the throne in 1881 when Alexander II was assassinated and who was Russian nationalist oriented (he had married a Danish princess, not a German), began to seek an alliance with republican France, in spite of the dramatic differences between the two countries. He was influenced by the ober-procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1907). It caused military hysteria in Germany in 1891 but fortunately did not lead to war. Alexander III said at that time: "In case of war between France and Germany, we must immediately throw ourselves on the Germans, in order not to give them time to defeat France at once and turn against us. We must correct the mistakes of the past and crush Germany at the first opportunity."⁷

In 1892, Alexander III managed to sign a military pact with France in utmost secrecy. The Germany nightmare materialized: autocratic Russia allying itself with republican France. Every step of one partner in the Russian-German conflict provoked the response of the other. Prussian militarists began large-scale diplomatic and military preparations for "the inevitable Teuton-Slav confrontation."

In 1894, Alexander III, the only tsar who was more or less strongly Russian nationalist oriented, died. Germany benefited highly from his death, since his place was taken by the very mediocre Nikolai II (1868-1918), who lacked the will and intelligence necessary for a statesman; not only that, his wife was a German princess with hysterical tendencies who influenced him to fall under the spell of a most bizarre mysticism. There were rumors that Alexander II had died as the result of incorrect medical treatment given him by his team of doctors, among whom Germans predominated; these rumors acquired an anti-Semitic implication as the only Russian doctor on the team, Grigory Zakhar'in (1829-1897), was suspected of being a secret Jew.⁸

Nikolai II became an easy dupe of Wilhelm II. The latter was a skillful Machiavellian, far above the standard of such simpletons as Netchaev. Posing as a relative and a committed friend, Wilhelm II started a far-reaching and subversive policy toward Russia in the anticipation of a final battle, and he gave Nikolai II much diabolical advice. This policy had three aims. First, Germany wanted to seduce Russia into putting all its weight into the Far East in order to keep its forces occupied in that area and therefore make it more vulnerable in Europe.⁹ The second aim of the policy was to attempt to alienate Russia from France and prevent at the same time any kind of Anglo-Russian alliance through a Russian-English confrontation in the Far

East. To this end, one of the best tools was the fostering of anti-Semitism in Russia, since this bias was one of the main obstacles in both Russian-French and Russian-English relations. The more unpopular Russia was in Europe, the better the situation would be for Germany. The third policy aim was to support those revolutionary movements that would weaken Russia, especially national separatist movements.

The French ambassador to Russia in 1914-1917, Maurice Paleologue (1859-1944), claimed that Germany launched its campaign to thrust Russia to the Far East in 1897.¹⁰ However, Germany started this policy almost immediately after the death of Alexander III. In 1895, Wilhelm II had sent Nikolai II a symbolic picture in which the European peoples were depicted as looking anxiously at a bloody glow emanating from the east, symbolized by Buddha. The caption read: "People of Europe! Defend your sacred property."¹¹ Taking into consideration that the Pan-Germanists never regarded Russians as Europeans, this was a clever trick.

After 1897, Wilhelm II brandished the threat of the "yellow peril" as an immediate danger and succeeded in involving Russia in several Chinese adventures. He also tried his best to persuade Nikolai II that Russia should be a dominating factor in the Pacific.¹² On April 26, 1898, Wilhelm II told his diplomats that the deeper the Russians would involve themselves in Asia, the less active they would be in Europe.¹³

Serge Witte (1849-1915), Russia's prime minister in 1905-1906, wrote in his memoirs, "There is no doubt that German diplomacy and the German emperor did their best to push Russia into the Far East adventure."¹⁴ The German lobby used various justifications to gain this end. The Russian minister of internal affairs, Viatcheslav von Plehve (1846-1904), told Witte, for example, that Russia needed a quick and victorious war in order to prevent a revolution.¹⁵

Some Russian officials tried to resist the Russian drive to the Far East, but in vain. The same Witte, while minister of finance, had advanced in 1898 the thesis that China as it was constituted no direct threat to Russia and that "all Russian interests for many, many years must rest in a China which will remain as she is. It is only necessary to guard Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty."¹⁶ This reasonable idea was rejected, and as a result, Russia involved itself in war with Japan in 1904 and was humiliatingly defeated. Wilhelm II, who was constantly advising Russia not to make concessions to Japan, was at the same time secretly advising Japan to attack Russia.¹⁷ Germany could be very satisfied with the results of its policy. As Witte wrote, "The Manchurian war . . . passed the European conductor's baton . . . into German hands."¹⁸

In 1912, when Wilhelm II met the new Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov (1860-1927), he immediately advised him to do everything necessary to prevent a new Japanese attack on Russia, and according to Wilhelm II, the only way to do this was to make China militarily powerful. (This was only ten to twelve years after he had himself warned of the "immediate threat" of China!) Sazonov was very surprised and told Wilhelm II what

he had already been told in 1898 by Witte, namely, that Russia was vitally interested in keeping the status quo in China, not in creating a new great power on the Russian frontier.¹⁹ Fortunately for Russia, its leaders had tried to improve relations with Japan after the defeat in 1905, and the country was not seduced into becoming involved in new adventures.

One can deduce that only his deep belief in Russian inferiority encouraged Wilhelm II to give such diabolical advice to the leaders of Russia. Germany took advantage of Russia's weakness to impose on it a highly unfavorable trade agreement in 1904;²⁰ in 1905, Wilhelm II deliberately arranged a secret meeting with Nikolai II in the absence of the latter's foreign minister, Vladimir Lamzdorf (1845-1907), and Prime Minister Witte and literally forced Nikolai to sign a treaty along the lines of the Russian-German military alliance. By the terms of this treaty, Russia would be obliged to come to Germany's aid if the latter were attacked by a third party. Nikolai II signed this treaty in spite of the formal French-Russian military alliance; only after Lamzdorf and Witte intervened did Nikolai II withdraw his signature.²¹ This German attempt to destroy the French-Russian alliance was therefore a failure.

Another main German objective was to prevent any Anglo-Russian alliance. Militant Russian anti-Semitism, which was permitted and even encouraged by the government, was very beneficial to Germany. At the same time, Wilhelm II also tried to involve Russia in a confrontation with the United States. He gave "friendly" advice to Nikolai II to launch a trade war against the United States, which would also have made Russia more dependent on Germany.²² Not content with interfering with Russia's alliances with the above countries, Germany also did its best to prevent any Polish-Russian reconciliation for two vital reasons: (1) not to encourage a new escalation of the Slav national-liberation movement in Austria-Hungary, which might follow an amelioration of Russian-Polish relations, and (2) not to encourage a Polish national-liberation movement in the German part of Poland.²³

Meanwhile, there was extensive German and Austrian penetration into Russian political life. For example, Alois von Aerenthal (1854-1912), the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Russia who became foreign minister, was an intimate friend of the Russian state ombudsman, a Baltic German by the name of Petr Schwanebach (1846-1908), who supplied Aerenthal with classified political information. It is interesting that this same Aerenthal persuaded his friends in the Russian government not to give Russia any constitution,²⁴ but one can easily understand his motivation. First of all, he was afraid of the implications such a step might hold for Austrian Slavs, and second, he thought that any liberalization of Russia would necessarily mean further Russian rapprochement with France, England, and the United States.

In 1908, there was a new crisis in Russian-German relations, once again because of the deterioration of the political situation in Turkey. In July of that year the Young Turks came to power, which had dangerous implications

for Austria-Hungary. The latter had long occupied two Turkish Balkan provinces with Slav populations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but had not had formal sovereignty over them. Afraid of an explosion of Russian-supported nationalist movements in those provinces, Austria-Hungary decided on a quick annexation—an act of despair that in its turn was a challenge to Russian prestige. Russian society was deeply split over the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis, and the Russian liberal political opposition was decidedly anti-German and Pan-Slavist. Ardently nationalist in foreign policy affairs, it dreamed of Russian domination in the Balkans.²⁵

The leading Russian liberal, Petr Struve (1870-1944), wrote in 1908 that "there is only one way to create the Great Russia: to channel all efforts to the area which indeed is accessible to the real influence of Russian culture. This area is all the basin of the Black Sea and more precisely, all the so-called Middle East."²⁶ Russian liberals supported Russian expansion in the Middle East without considering the implications of such a drive. Meanwhile, Russian conservative and right-wing circles were decidedly pro-German and did not want to intervene in Balkan affairs. To this day, one can talk of a clear polarization between Russian liberalism, with its Pan-Slavist imperialist inclinations and its orientation toward a close alliance with England and France, and the pro-German right-wing circles, which preferred Russian expansion in Asia.

The "strongman" of Russia, Petr Stolypin (1862-1911), prime minister from 1906 until his death, came out decisively against Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was also firmly in favor of rapprochement with France and England. Though he was eager to maintain friendly relations with Germany as well, owing to his close connection with Russian nationalists, he anticipated the possibility that the pressure of public opinion would force Russia to enter into a military confrontation over the Balkan issue.²⁷

However, when Russia tried to contest the annexation, Germany threatened Russia with a war for which it was not ready. The annexation was accomplished, and Russia was humiliated, which produced an explosion of indignation among Russian liberals who called for a war against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Meanwhile, Stolypin became the target of intensive hatred on the part of the German lobby, and German intelligence reports did not conceal an intensive dislike of Stolypin.²⁸ For this reason, Germany greatly benefited from the assassination of Stolypin in 1911. The English ambassador to Russia during World War I, George Buchanan (1854-1924), wrote later that "his [Stolypin's] death was an irreparable loss not only to his country but to ours; for had his life been spared and had he been at the head of his government when war broke out many of the disasters which have since befallen Russia would have been avoided."²⁹ In view of all the mystery that still surrounds Stolypin's assassination, and in view of the explicit involvement in it of some high-ranking pro-German Russian officials due to criminal negligence,³⁰ one can suggest that perhaps the German intelligence service was involved as well.

The crisis over Bosnia and Herzegovina in fact caused the formation of blocs in Europe. Germany and Austria-Hungary were on the one side; Russia, France, and England on the other. Their confrontation was almost inevitable and only a matter of time if one takes into consideration the growing deterioration of the Ottoman empire, whose collapse would invite Russian intervention against Austria-Hungary's fight for survival.

Meanwhile, all German military, industrial, and political machinery was preparing for the total confrontation. Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916), the German chief of staff, "remains convinced that a European war is bound to come sooner or later and then it will, in the last resort, be a struggle between *Teuton and Slav*. . . . *But the attack must come from the Slavs*. Those who see this struggle approaching will be clear that it will call for the concentration of all forces, the utilization of all possibilities, and above all, complete understanding on the part of the people for the world-historic development."³¹ On the eve of the war, Wilhelm II had written on a report submitted to him by the German ambassador to England that a European war is "not a question of high politics, but one of *race*. . . for what is at issue, is whether the Germanic race is to be or not to be in Europe."³²

According to a senior German diplomat, Matthias Erzberger (1875-1921), the main German goal was to shatter the Russian colossus. A German historian, Fritz Fisher, remarked that there were two threads in Germany's aspirations in the East: "military-strategic and demographic-political considerations which produced the aim of limited direct annexations, while another school of thought aimed at weakening Russia generally by loosening its structure and dominating it economically, as a source of raw materials and as a market."³³ A leading German industrialist, August Thyssen (1892-1926), demanded, for example, the annexation of all Baltic areas and, if possible, the Donets Basin, Odessa, the Crimea, and the Caucasus.³⁴

Sergei Sazonov misunderstood the real background of German geopolitical thinking since he ignored the demographic changes in Europe that were seen as a threat by this obsessive thinking. He said, "Europe started to be reconciled with the thought of the inevitability of its transformation into a German tributary."³⁵ According to him, if Germany were satisfied with this recognition, it would already be the leading European state. However, Sazonov did not take into consideration the demographic changes in Austria-Hungary that could overthrow the existing balance of power. German political thinking demanded only one solution: absolute German superiority in order to stop dangerous processes in Europe.

Some Russian military warned their government that in the case of a European war, Russia would be helpless. For example, the Russian minister of war in 1898-1904, General Alexei Kuropatkin (1848-1925), submitted in 1900 a memorandum in which he said that "our western frontier, in the event of a European war, would be in such danger as has never been known in all the history of Russia." "The difference is too enormous and leaves our neighbours a superiority which cannot be overcome by the numbers of our troops nor their courage."³⁶

Fedor Dostoevsky: His Quest for Russian World Domination

Whatever geopolitical doctrines the Russian tsars or diplomats had, whatever authenticity was possessed by the Testament of Peter the Great, one cannot find in Russian political thought the quest for Russian world domination expressed publicly and comprehensibly until Fedor Dostoevsky (1821-1881). Here and there one can find some sentences or vague ideas along these lines, as for example in Herzen's notion of a Slavic invasion of Europe, but these are far from being a comprehensive doctrine. For this reason, Dostoevsky was the first Russian political philosopher of Russia as the Third Rome.

However, in analyzing Dostoevsky's thought, we once again come across Russian imitation of German political ideas, or in fact, their mirror images. Dostoevsky's was the plainest and boldest plagiarism of German political philosophy, and almost all his political philosophy was plagiarized from Prussian nationalist sources. One should not confuse Dostoevsky's artistic genius with his political philosophy, although even his artistic works were deeply influenced by Protestant mysticism and can hardly be identified with pure Orthodoxy, which has been noticed by several critics such as Konstantin Leontiev (1831-1891)³⁷ and Dmitry Mirsky (1890-1939).³⁸ Dostoevsky was close to the conservative prince Vladimir Meshchersky (1839-1914), who until his death was one of the main instigators of the Russian misconception of German foreign policy.³⁹

Russian Germanophiles became more active after 1871 and the collapse of the French monarchy when republican France and liberal England became *bêtes noires* of the Russian conservatives. In his political columns, Dostoevsky mainly attacked France and England, stressing sometimes that Germany was Russia's only natural and reliable ally, although this emphasis contradicted his quest for Russian world domination. Very selectively and willfully, Dostoevsky utilized what might be considered the vulnerable points of France and England by attacking Jewish domination and Catholicism. For example, he mainly attacked the so-called Jewish domination in those countries, as if Jews did not enjoy the same commercial success in Germany. In view of the violent anti-Semitism of German nationalists, it is quite conspicuous that Dostoevsky attempted to avoid referring to their accusations against German Jews. This cynical manipulation of anti-Semitism was very characteristic of Russian Germanophiles. Dostoevsky's fight against Catholicism was waged synchronously with Bismarck's famous *Kulturkampf*, which was directed against Catholicism in Germany.

Looking at the sources of Dostoevsky's famous theory of Russian national uniqueness and "panhumanism," one can be struck by the realization that all his basic ideas were simply yet another mirror image of the ideas of two of the main theoreticians of Prussian nationalism, Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), after a delay of sixty years. For example, Hans Kohn commented on Arndt as a German historian:



Fedor Dostoevsky (photo from F. Dostoevsky, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10 [Leningrad, 1974], p. 1).

Germany seemed "the sacred heart of old Europe." Without drawing on its strength there was no salvation for Europe. Geographically, Germany was the meeting ground and the synthesis of north and south; historically, most European peoples descended from tribes that had migrated from the German heartland; hence the Germans could feel they were the parents of all the European peoples and could understand them; intellectually the Germans had absorbed all that was best of the cultures of all other nations and thus developed a more universal humanity. In that sense, the nationalist Arndt could join with the classical humanists in proclaiming a universalism, but it was a German universalism with the German as the representative pan-human being. In 1843 he wrote: "The German is a universal man (*Allerweltmensch*), to whom God has given the whole world as his home. The more he has discovered and explored this home the more he will love his own smaller fatherland and the better he will build it."⁴⁰

For Jahn, "Germany was truly representative of humanity—a 'pan-human' people," and the Germans "a human Volk, the ancient and honorable mediator of Europe."⁴¹ Hans Kohn as a historian of both Russian and German nationalism certainly noticed the striking similarity between Dos-

toevsky and Arndt and Jahn, but he did not dare to claim the plain truth, that Dostoevsky was a plagiarist.

In later years Dostoevsky and the Slavophiles were to speak in the same way of the Russians. . . . Jahn—and later Dostoevsky—singled out one people as representing in its universality the whole of humanity, as mankind's holy people. [Jahn] solved the conflict between his German nationalism and Christian universality in much the same manner as Dostoevsky when faced with a similar problem. "Which of all the existing folkdoms corresponds most closely to pure Christianity?" Jahn asked. His answer carried the force of conviction. "The final judgment cannot possibly point to any other but to the genuine panhuman German folkdom."⁴²

"The Russian people," said Dostoevsky, are

a unique phenomenon in human history. The character of the Russian people is so different from that of all other contemporary European nations, that up until now the Europeans have not succeeded in understanding it—on the contrary, they have completely misunderstood it. Europe is losing her universality and the Christian links between people are losing their power. Contrary to Europe, the highly synthetic ability of panreconciliation, of panhumanism, is more and more strong among the Russians. A Russian does not have European awkwardness, impenetrability, inflexibility. He can come to terms with everybody . . . he has an instinct of panhumanism.⁴³

Moreover, the Russian has the best ability of self-criticism. "Universality was given only to the Russian spirit—the future mission to comprehend and to unite all the different nationalities, eliminating all their contradictions."⁴⁴ Dostoevsky claims that this ability extends to both Slavophiles and Westernizers, but in what way? Pre-Pan-Slavist Slavophilism was an isolationist doctrine. The Slavophiles only claimed their superiority over the West. Indeed, according to Dostoevsky, the Russians are superior, but they must not sit in Russia and look arrogantly at the West, they must generously extend their superiority in order to dominate the West. Therefore, Westernism must be understood only in this way: not to imitate the West but to dominate it.

"The Russian vocation," said Dostoevsky, "is to wait until European civilization expires in order to take its ideals and goals and to elevate them to a panhuman meaning."⁴⁵ Politically, this vocation meant the conquest of Europe by the Russians. Later, Dostoevsky stated this issue explicitly without any spiritual clouding. "It may be stated that very soon—perhaps, in the immediate future—Russia will prove stronger than any nation in Europe."⁴⁶

Dostoevsky's wishful thinking is characteristic. He boasted of an alleged Russian power while Bismarck had already unified Germany and that country was then preparing its final battle against the rest of Europe.

This will come to pass because all great powers in Europe will be destroyed for the simple reason that they will be worn out and undermined by the

unsatisfied democratic tendencies of an enormous portion of their lower-class subjects—their proletarians and paupers. In Russia, this cannot happen: our demos is content and, as time goes on, it will grow even more content because everything tends toward this condition, as a result of the general mood, or—more correctly—by general consensus. And therefore there will remain on the continent but one colossus—Russia. This will come to pass, perhaps even much sooner than people think. The future of Europe belongs to Russia."⁴⁷

One can add that it was also the time when the same Bismarck launched the ambitious and successful socialization of German workers while the mass impoverishment of the Russian peasantry was under way. Now the West has more or less successfully solved its social problems, but even "socialist" Russia cannot do so now. The Russian demos is as dissatisfied now as it was a hundred years ago.

Dostoevsky also suggested the theory of Russian militarism, which was a precarious mirror image of Prussian militarism with the difference that Prussian militarism had deep national roots while Dostoevsky's militarism was an imported item and alien to Russia. He claimed that humanity likes wars and degenerates during times of lasting peace.

War is a process by means of which *specifically* international peace is achieved with a minimum loss of blood, with minimum sorrow and effort, and at least more or less normal relations between the nations are evolved. Of course, this is a pity, but what can be done if this is so? And it is better to draw the sword once than to suffer interminably.

And in what manner is present peace, prevailing among the civilized nations, better than war? The contrary is true: peace, lasting peace, rather than war tends to harden and bestialize man. Lasting peace always generates cruelty, cowardice and coarseness, fat egoism, and chiefly—intellectual stagnation. It is only the exploiters of the peoples who grow fat in times of long peace. It is being repeated over and over again that peace generates wealth, but only for one-tenth of the people, and this one-tenth, having contracted the diseases of wealth, transmits the contagion to the other nine-tenths who have no wealth. And that one-tenth is contaminated by debauch and cynicism.⁴⁸

Only war, according to Dostoevsky, brings brotherly love and this typically Prussian militarist philosophy, completely alien to Russia, was suggested as an authentic Russian view! A prominent Soviet writer, Konstantin Fedin (1892-1977), who was a Russian prisoner of war in Germany during World War I, presents in his clearly anti-German book published in 1924 the following quotation from the German press, not without a wish to bully Dostoevsky's Prussian-inspired militarism:

If Jesus of Nazareth, who preached love for one's enemies, wished to descend once more to earth he would, of course, become incarnate in the German fatherland. And—how do you suppose—where could you meet him? Surely you do not think that he would proclaim from a church pulpit: sinful Germans, love your enemies? I am sure not! No, he would be in the very first ranks of our warriors, battling with implacable hatred. He would be there, he would

bless the bloody hands and the death-dealing weapons; he himself, perhaps, would seize the chastising sword and drive the enemies of Germany far beyond the bounds of the promised land, as he once drove the merchants and moneylenders from the temple of Judea.⁴⁹

Dostoevsky called himself a Christian, but at the same time he claimed that the wish to live in peace is a corollary to capitalism. One more step and he could have claimed that the Hebrew prophets of eternal peace were Rothchild's paid agents. On these grounds, Dostoevsky justified the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. "We ourselves need this war; not merely because our 'Slavic brethren' have been oppressed by the Turks. We are also rising for our own salvation. The war will clear the air which we breathe and in which we have been suffocating, closeted in spiritual narrowness and stricken with impotence of decay."⁵⁰

One can take a new look at Dostoevsky's "humanist" philosophy as expressed in *Crime and Punishment* (1866). Indeed, if violence could be justified in principle in international relations as a bringer of "brotherly love," why then cannot a personal crime promote new spiritual achievements for humanity? This is essentially Dostoevsky's message in *Crime and Punishment* and in *The Brothers Karamazov* (1879-1880). Then what is "brotherly love"? Dostoevsky claims Russian uniqueness in world history since allegedly only Russians have brotherly love for other people and therefore they are destined to arrange a general reconciliation.

This is actually, and in truth, almost our brotherly love of other peoples, which was the result of the hundred-and-fifty-year-long living experience of our intercourse with them. This is our urge to render universal service to humanity, sometimes even to the detriment of our own momentous and immediate interests. This is our reconciliation with their civilizations; cognition and excuse of their ideals even though these be in discord with ours; this is our acquired faculty of discovering and revealing in each one of the European civilizations—or, more correctly, in each of the European individualities—the truth contained in it, even though there be much with which it be impossible to agree. Finally, this is the longing; above all, to be just and to seek nothing but truth. Briefly, this is, perhaps, the beginning of that active application of our treasure—of Orthodoxy—to the universal service of mankind to which Orthodoxy is designated and which, in fact, constitutes its essence. Thus, through Peter's reform our former idea—the Russian Moscow idea—was broadened and its conception was magnified and strengthened. Thereby we got to understand our universal mission, our individuality and our role in humankind; at the same time we could not help but comprehend that this mission and this role do not resemble those of other nations since, there, every national individuality lives solely for, and within, itself. We, on the other hand, will begin—now that the hour has come—precisely with becoming servants to all nations, for the sake of general pacification. And in this there is nothing disgraceful; on the contrary, therein is our grandeur because this leads to the ultimate unity of mankind. He who wishes to be first in the Kingdom of God must become a servant to everybody. This is how I understand the Russian mission in its ideal.⁵¹

It is not difficult to image what Dostoevsky had in mind about "reconciliation." It was to reconcile people by force in the capacity of the world police and to teach them brotherly love on the battlefield. This kind of reconciliation is well known by now after the Hungarian "reconciliation" in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian "reconciliation" in 1968. However, a provocative question might be asked: Why do people need to be reconciled at all if war is the best school in the world? One can look in vain for any logic in Dostoevsky's controversial statements. It is easy to see why he irritated so many critics and provoked enmity such as that expressed recently by Alain Besançon.⁵²

The Pan-Slavist idea was declared to be the new world idea by Dostoevsky, the third according to its greatness: "Every great people believes, and must believe if it intends to live long, that in it alone resides the salvation of the world; that it lives in order to stand at the head of the nations, to affiliate and unite all of them, and to lead them in a concordant choir toward the final goal preordained for them."⁵³ He persistently escalated his panhuman quest.

Europe is our second fatherland, and I am the first ardently to profess this; I have always professed this. To us all Europe is almost as dear as Russia; in Europe resides the entire tribe of Japheth, and our idea is the unification of all nations descending from that tribe; even much farther—down to Shem and Ham. . . . The sun appeared in the East, and it is from the East that the new day begins for mankind. When the sun is shining in its full glory, then it will be understood what the real "interests of civilization" are.⁵⁴

As mentioned above, sometimes Dostoevsky regarded Germany as a natural Russian ally, in spite of his expansionist panhumanism. An ally for what? For Russian world domination? This international concession was most certainly made by Dostoevsky for his publishers, and he attempted to find arguments in favor of this thesis. Ignoring the fact that there were a great many German Catholics, Dostoevsky claimed that Germany also regarded Catholicism as its premier enemy.

At all events one thing seems clear to me, that Germany needs us even more than we think. And she needs us not for a momentary political alliance but forever. The idea of reunited Germany is a broad and stately one; it goes back into the depth of ages. What has Germany to divide with us?—Her object is all Western mankind. She has selected for herself the European Western world where she seeks to inculcate her principles in lieu of the Roman and Romanic tenets, and henceforth to become its leader, leaving the East to Russia. Thus, two great peoples are destined to transform the face of this world. These are not contrivances of the mind or of ambition: the world itself shapes itself thus. There are new and strange facts; they are appearing daily . . . at all events she counts on us not as on a temporary but an eternal ally.⁵⁵

Continuing his false prophecies, he announced that socialism would crush Europe but that this peril would be capsized on the Russian shore, and then all humanity would see the uniqueness of the Russian national organism.⁵⁶

Several months before his death, Dostoevsky dramatically changed his geopolitical ideas without acknowledging the change, as if he were continuing as before. However, now the internal contradiction between his quest for Russian world domination and his Germanophilism had disappeared. He suggested that Russia should turn all its expansionist efforts toward Asia. We have seen above that Germany had long dreamed that Russia would be contained in Asia. "This is necessary because Russia is not only in Europe but also in Asia; because the Russian is not only a European but also an Asiatic. Moreover, Asia, perhaps, holds out greater promises to us than Europe. In our future destinies Asia is, perhaps, our main outlet!" cried Dostoevsky hysterically.⁵⁷ "With our aspiration for Asia, our spirit and forces will be regenerated. The moment we become independent, we shall find what to do, whereas during the two centuries with Europe we lost the habit of any work; we became chatterers and idlers."⁵⁸ He complained that

in Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only necessary that the movement should start. . . . Wherever a "Uruss" settles in Asia, the land will forthwith become Russian land. A new Russia will arise which in due time will regenerate and resurrect the old one and will show the latter the road which she has to follow.⁵⁹

Dostoevsky now started preaching a Russian *Drang nach Osten* in full accordance with German political interests.

Dostoevsky exercised enormous influence on Russian political thought both before and after the revolution, although his direct influence on prerevolutionary Bolshevism was rather negligible. However, his indirect influence was very strong, since he prepared the way for the positively oriented differential treatment accorded to the Bolsheviks by the Russian authorities in comparison to the treatment accorded other revolutionary movements, on the grounds that Bolshevism was an authentic Russian movement.

Indeed, Dostoevsky claimed that Russian socialism (not liberalism) was genuinely Russian and would sooner or later become an authentic part of Russian life. According to him, Russian radicalism was destructive only in the extent to which it was directed against Western civilization (Herzen's theme), which it hated and tried to destroy.

Our most ardent Westerners, the champions of the reform, became at the same time the negators of Europe and joined the ranks of the extreme left. . . . And thus it happened that *eo ipso* they revealed themselves as most

fervent Russians—as champions of Russia and of the Russian spirit. . . . Russian European socialists and Communards are not Europeans, and . . . , in the long run, when the misunderstanding shall have been dispelled and they know Russia, they will again become full-blooded and good Russians.⁶⁰

In his artistic works, Dostoevsky displayed this idea in *The Possessed* (1871-1872) in the personality of Shatov. Therefore, if one would manage to cut off links between the Russian-rooted honest socialists and uprooted Russian liberals, one would solve the problem of Russian socialism in Russian national interests. (By the way, Lassalle did the same in Germany for German radicals.)

Another of Dostoevsky's contributions to the nationalization of Bolshevism was his view that the Russian people are a holy people and Godbearers, in spite of their ostensible corruption, which is only a veil under which their holiness is concealed. Later this point was taken over by Russian revolutionary mysticism, according to which the genuine, even highest, Christianity was compatible with war, violence, oppression, etc.

It is interesting to note that Dostoevsky affected even strictly Orthodox Jewish rabbis, such as Abraham Hein (1878-1958), a Russian and later an Israeli rabbi, who approved of Dostoevsky's concept of rightful sin as expressed in *Crime and Punishment*.⁶¹ What made Dostoevsky one of Russia's most harmful political thinkers was his unquestionable artistic genius.

The Jewish Peril

As said above, Dostoevsky was a most rabid anti-Semite, and only a few other people managed to convey the idea of the Jewish threat to Russia more strongly than he. Indeed, "the Jewish problem" occupies a place in Russian history in general, as well as in the history of the Russian revolution, that seems to be out of proportion. Many authors attempt to treat this problem as marginal, but it was very central. There was a set of reasons—demographic, political, national, and international—that contributed to the centrality of the Jewish problem in Russia.

Although chronic anti-Semitism had existed in Russia for a long time, and sporadic, small-scale anti-Jewish riots had taken place, not until Dostoevsky did anyone pose the idea of the Jewish peril as an existential threat to Russia. Dostoevsky's theoretical anti-Semitism was imported from Germany and was used by him to label France and England as countries under Jewish domination while Germany was not attacked in this way.

Through Dostoevsky, and also through direct German influence, rabid anti-Semitism also became a hallmark of later Slavophiles like Ivan Aksakov and Nikita Giliarov-Platonov (1824-1887). There is a contradiction between their militant Germanophobia and their importing of German anti-Semitism into Russia. For example, Giliarov-Platonov violently attacked "godless Prussian militarists"⁶² and was at the same time in correspondence with the famous Prussian nationalist and anti-Semite, Adolf Stöcker (1835-1905).⁶³ Ivan Aksakov, contrary to Dostoevsky, regarded Germany rather than France

and England as an example of Jewish domination, but he, too, avidly imported German anti-Semitism, paying no attention to its most anti-Russian source.⁶⁴

The relatively quiet situation dramatically changed in 1880.⁶⁵ A moderate conservative newspaper, *Novoe vremia*, launched a rabid anti-Semitic campaign, claiming that the Jews were Russia's main internal danger and also claiming that a situation similar to that of Jewish domination prevailed in Russia, where the majority of Jews did not have basic human rights. In 1881, for the first time since Poland was partitioned and Polish Jews had passed with Polish lands into Russian control, a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms occurred in the Ukraine. There was nothing in these pogroms that could benefit the Russian government; on the contrary, the pogroms ruined normal economic life. What was even more dangerous for the government was the fact that any spontaneous violence could be extended against the existing system as a whole, and indeed, Russian populists enthusiastically supported these pogroms as an anticapitalist manifestation.⁶⁶ The government ordered the pogroms suppressed.

The explanation has sometimes been put forward that the government encouraged this new wave of anti-Semitism in order to find a scapegoat for Russian public opinion. It is difficult to believe that any reasonable ruler would resort to a spontaneous mass violence that could undermine the stability of his own regime. Nevertheless, this explanation cannot entirely be dismissed. It is likely that there was a strong political group with a vested interest in dramatizing Russian anti-Semitism. Before the unification of Germany, the ruling German minority in Russia could feel relatively secure, but after 1871, and especially after 1878, the situation changed dramatically. Russia was no longer confronted by a multitude of German states among which one could have friends and enemies without any nationalization of the Russian-German conflict. Instead, Germany was united, and the deterioration of Russian-German relations implicitly endangered the political future of Russia's ruling dynasty and the country's German minority. Anti-German feelings in Russian society were quite strong and could be activated at any moment. Therefore, another alien scapegoat was urgently needed toward which anticipated national hatred could be channeled.

Meanwhile, an influential and conservative Pan-Slavist newspaper, *Moskovskie vedomosti*, edited by Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887) was decisively against anti-Semitism and preached rapprochement with England and France. As a result of the pogroms and the anti-Semitic campaign, many Jews turned toward the revolution: The Russian system itself did in fact transform Jewish youth into radicals while former Jewish Russophiles like Leo Pinaker (1821-1891) promptly became Palestinophiles or like Abraham Cahan (1860-1951) voted for America.

Very soon the Jews became a pawn in the cold war between Germany on the one side and France and England on the other. Indeed, Russia was very interested in French loans, and in this regard, Jews played a prominent role as bankers. For this reason alone, any aggravation of the Jewish problem in Russia could seriously harm vital Russian political interests—and in fact

did so. This simple equation has escaped the attention of historians who have ignored the fact that the main beneficiary of Russian anti-Semitism was in fact Germany. By exacerbating Russian anti-Semitism, Germany could hope to torpedo French-Russian and Anglo-Russian relations, since England in particular was always very sensitive on Jewish issues. The German lobby in Russia was highly instrumental in helping Germany isolate Russia via a skillful use of the latter's anti-Semitism.

The notorious Kishinev pogrom of 1903, which cost Russia so much in international terms, was largely possible because of von Plehve, Russia's minister of internal affairs who tacitly provoked it—the same von Plehve who encouraged the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

I have already quoted Judd Teller's remarkable comment on the Marx-Bakunin "racist debate." Teller was interested in this debate and its influence on the Jewish problem in Russia, and I will quote another extremely important observation:

Jewish history for the past one hundred and fifty years can best be understood in terms of this Slav-German contest. The majority of Jews resided in countries under the rule of one or the other power, and this has been costly to the Jews in persecution and lives. Peoples that disregard territorial frontiers cannot be expected to respect the more tenuous and sensitive frontier of religion and custom, hence both the Germans and the Russians have so frequently invaded the privacy of conscience of their citizens of the Jewish faith. Conquest requires preparation and maneuvers. In these mock battles, the Jews have served as live targets. They were subjected to the terror, sequestration, curfews, pillage, rape, and court-martial "justice" that are a concomitant of conquest. It has, furthermore, been the German and Russian position in war that conquest cannot be successful unless the enemy is forced into meek uniformity. If uniformity is to be enforced abroad, non-conformity must be suppressed at home, and hence another reason for the persecution of the Jew who is different mythically, if not in real life. Absolutist rule breeds its own disruption, hence the territory of the German-Slav contest has been periodically convulsed by revolutions ever since the sixteenth century. These have been most frequent in the past one hundred and twenty-five years. Revolution has always brought disaster for the Jew. None has more clearly defined the animus underneath the contest than Bakunin, Marx, and Engels. Significantly, the Slav and the two Germans have shared a strong animus against the Jew. Anti-Semitism has always been a strong concomitant feature of the horrible contest which may yet be fought out someday between a Communist Germany and a Communist Russia.⁶⁷

Teller did not guess the extent of his correctness, since he did not know Bolshevik history and Lenin's motivation to rely on Jews—and Lenin was more a follower of Bakunin-Herzen than of Marx.

Russian Gnosticism

Besançon,⁶⁸ Luciano Pellicani,⁶⁹ and others introduced a new interpretation of the intellectual roots of Leninism as the structural repetition of a very

ancient paradigm—gnosticism. One distinguishing feature of this metahistorical phenomenon is an illusive, symbolic interpretation of reality, including history. This interpretation separates gnosticism from the majority of world religions, though elements of gnosticism may be found in most faiths.

A typical gnostic approach is, for example, that of Christian gnostics to the text fundamental to them, Holy Scripture, which they interpreted exclusively allegorically.⁷⁰ One can see the same approach in the Jewish gnosticism that flourished in Cabbala and deeply penetrated all later Jewish mysticism.⁷¹ Besançon discovered the same gnostic paradigm in the secular world, too, in several crucial historical periods in France, Germany, and Russia, which, according to him, ended in Bolshevism.

It is my contention that the gnostic paradigm as recently manifested was not an exclusive Bolshevik property, as Besançon and Pellicani thought. One also finds this phenomenon outside the Bolshevik camp, though in different form. It was not merely a side effect of Bolshevism. It contributed considerably to Soviet culture and even influenced Soviet political life. Its foundations were laid before the revolution, and Besançon points out several gnostic trends in nineteenth-century Russian culture. One of them, Russian revolutionary mystical gnosticism, was founded in part by a well-known religious philosopher, Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900). For example, in a poem written by him twenty-five years before the October revolution, he said:

Dearest friend, do you not see
All that we perceive—
Only reflects and shadows forth
What our eyes cannot see?

Dearest friend, do you not hear
In the clamour of everyday life—
Only the unstrung echoing fall of
Jubilant harmonies.⁷²

Reality for Soloviev was merely an illusion, a set of allegorical symbols, a reverse image of the real essence of history. His writing manifested that religious trend which cleared the path to mystical gnosticism and created an opportunity for some people, curiously enough, to regard violent Bolshevik atheism as a very hopeful sign of Russia's spiritual revival and even redemption.

At the same time, Soloviev defended the idea of social progress based on the theological concept of "divine humanity," according to which man is an active partner of God in the creation of the world, which has not yet been accomplished. Therefore, social progress was the result of cumulative individual mystical actions. To reconcile the incontestable fact of human progress at the end of the nineteenth century with another, no less evident, fact of the decline of Christianity, especially among the intelligentsia, who were the main bearers of progress, Soloviev arrived at a paradox according to which the Holy Spirit now rested, not with the believers, but with the nonbelievers.⁷³ This paradox can be understood only in the framework of



Vladimir Soloviev (photo from the author's collection).

Soloviev's gnosticism. Indeed, in the illusory reality, nonbelieving liberal intellectuals seem to be enemies of Christianity and of God while, in fact, they fulfill the genuine objective of "divine humanity" and thereby are deserving of God's grace. Just before his death, Soloviev renounced his historical optimism and described the dramatic events that would follow the arrival of Antichrist,⁷⁴ but as often happens, this change has been passed over, and he entered Russian intellectual history as the bard of historical optimism.

Soloviev's attitude to nationalism was very ambivalent. Ostensibly, he was an extreme Westernizer and hated Slavophilism; he was very sympathetic toward Catholicism and dreamed of Christian ecumenism. However, his Westernism was not transformed into Herzen's wish to dominate the West. Moreover, Soloviev was an ardent Germanophile. He went as far as to regard Nikolai II as an exemplary ruler because he wanted to integrate the Germans into Russia, and Soloviev referred approvingly to Nikolai I's remarks to Yuri Samarin in 1848.⁷⁵

On the other hand, Soloviev, like Dostoevsky before his death, was a decisive partisan concerning Russian Asiatic strategy. He believed that weak and helpless China was the main immediate threat to Russia, and he

supported the shameful punitive action of several European countries in Peking in 1900 as a Christian crusade, praising Wilhelm II as the chief Christian crusader against the "yellow peril."⁷⁶ In 1894, Soloviev invented the chimera of "Pan-Mongolism,"⁷⁷ thereby contributing considerably to Russia's involvement in Far East adventures, which was provoked by Germany.

Soloviev exercised enormous influence on Russian mysticism and inspired a whole generation of philosophers and poets who regarded life only as a set of symbols of something real but hidden, which could be seen only by the initiated who were granted by divine grace the gift to perceive the spiritual dimension of the world. The powerful trend of Russian literary symbolism had its origins in Soloviev's mysticism, and it was this literary movement, as we will see, that accepted Bolshevism as the new religious revival.

One of Soloviev's followers, the leader of the so-called new religious conscience, Dimitry Merezhkovsky (1866-1941), who rejected the Bolshevik revolution as Satanism, did more than anyone else to transform Soloviev's paradox into an ideological weapon to serve revolutionary mystics during the Bolshevik revolution. It was he who advanced the theology of revolution, claiming that in our time providence acts through revolutionary hands.⁷⁸ This theory was certainly a development of Soloviev's ideas, since liberals of the 1890s, to whom Soloviev assigned divine grace, did not participate in violence and did not kill other people. It is doubtful whether Soloviev could accept such an enlargement of his concept, but Merezhkovsky applied it to terrorists. If the latter, like his wife Zinaida Hippus (1869-1945), inconsistently rejected Bolshevism, other representatives of the new religious conscience did the opposite.

Intellectual and philosophical gnosticism was only one of such trends in Russia. There was another powerful and popular trend in the form of a countrywide mystical sectarianism that rejected the state, the church, society, law, and even religious commandments, which according to these believers were abolished when the Holy Spirit descended to humanity.

Such gnostic trends emerged in the very beginning of Christianity, and there is an organic link between gnostic religious nihilism and the medieval revolutionary movement. But this link had its origin in the deep-rooted spiritual ambivalence of Christianity, which might lead to such conclusions.

To the same extent as medieval gnostic sectarians like Anabaptists, Bogomils, Cathars, and Taborites, Russian popular gnosticism had a very pronounced apocalyptic character. Russian mystical sectarians lived in anticipation of a catastrophe. The degradation of human life demanded purifying fire from heaven, which would devour the new Sodom and Gomorrah and replace them with the Kingdom of God. Any revolution could easily be identified by such sectarians as this fire, regardless of its external form. The view of sectarian apologetics in Russia was never formulated in any comprehensive literary form.

Russian revolutionary sectarians did not separate themselves formally from the official church, as did the Baptists. They existed within the church,

hiding themselves from inquisitive eyes. The most extreme Russian gnostic sect was called Khlysty, and its members were defined as "spiritual Christians." Khlysty claimed that the person guided by the Holy Spirit does not need to obey any external law and the best way to subdue human passions is by gratifying them. Its members also had their own "Christs" and "God-mothers" who performed the functions of spiritual leaders. The official report of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox church in 1900 recognized this sect as the most dangerous of all sects.⁷⁹ A prominent church missionary reported in 1915 that Khlysty had invaded all Russia and that there was no province where the sect did not exist in one form or another.⁸⁰ On the eve of the revolution, Khlysty penetrated educated Russian society, undermining the very foundation of the Russian political system and producing two outstanding personalities who, each in his own way, accelerated the final collapse of imperial Russia: Grigory Rasputin (1864-1916) and Hieromonk Ilidor (Trufanov, 1880-after 1943).

Russian mystical sects played an extremely important part in the Bolshevik revolution, on the side of the Bolsheviks. In spite of their rejection of the state and the church, these sects were deeply nationalistic, since their members were hostile to foreign innovations. They hated the West.

German Social Democracy and Russia

German social democracy, as it emerged after its founding Gotha Congress in 1875, became highly nationalized. Indeed, one of the points of the Gotha program declared: "The working class strives for its emancipation first of all *within the framework of the present-day national state*, conscious that the necessary result of its efforts, which are common to the workers of all civilized countries, will be the international brotherhood of peoples."⁸¹ Marx and Engels criticized this point as arising from Lassalle's influence:

Lassalle, in opposition to the *Communist Manifesto* and to all earlier socialism, conceived the workers' movement from the narrowest national standpoint. He is being followed in this—and that after the work of the International!

It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organise itself at home as a class and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle. In so far its class struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the *Communist Manifesto* says, "in form." . . .

And to what does the German workers' party reduce its internationalism? To the consciousness that the result of its efforts will be "*the international brotherhood of peoples*"—a phrase borrowed from the bourgeois League of Peace and Freedom which is intended to pass as equivalent to the international brotherhood of the working classes in the joint struggle against the ruling classes and their governments. Not a word, therefore, *about the international functions of the German working class!*⁸²

One can see that the Gotha program was a direct extrapolation of the *Communist Manifesto*. The program was later revised, but in the meantime, Bismarck had officially outlined his policy of socialization, which meant the

improvement of the workers' standard of living and social integration. Under such conditions, the German Social Democratic party (SPD) could not help but be influenced by its imperial environment. A well-known German Social Democrat, Paul Lensch (1873-1926), commented later that the German state was "exposed to the process of socialization and Social Democracy to the process of nationalization."⁸³ Naturally, the basic Russophobia of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle was adopted by the SPD en bloc.

Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826-1900), who became the SPD leader, regarded himself as a faithful follower of Marx and Engels and was an extreme Russophobe, while ostensibly professing internationalism.⁸⁴ During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Liebknecht published his famous article, "Must Europe Become Cossack?"

According to Liebknecht, Russia was a semibarbarous power that had adopted so many civilizations only in order to achieve the barbaric goals it pursued with consummate skill. Russia was the most brutal brigand state ever known by history, the only state whose long line of crimes was not balanced by any service to humanity. This, the most cruel, frightening, and brigandlike state of them all, callously caused all the world, all Europe, to face one panic after another. It adversely influenced trade and industry and could involve Europe and the world in a war at any moment. According to Liebknecht, Russian victory would mean death for European freedom and, first and foremost, for German freedom.⁸⁵ In a Reichstag speech in 1888, Liebknecht said that Russia would *always* be a threat for Europe. The country could be peaceful only if forced to it. It was Germany's goal to bring Russia into European civilization by force.⁸⁶

August Bebel (1840-1913), who succeeded Liebknecht as the unchallenged leader of the SPD until his death, was also a radical Russophobe, and it was he who brought the party to the support of the German quest for world power in 1914. One can observe the escalation of his foreign policy statements. In 1880, he said, "Should it ever come to the point where any foreign power—be it France or Russia—were to attack Germany, the Social Democrats would stand as firmly as any other party against the foe."⁸⁷ Even in the 1880s, Bebel saw a war as a panacea, just as Lenin would do later.

In 1886, Bebel said: "Germany is most vitally interested that Russian power not be established over Constantinople and Turkey. Whoever says . . . that Germany has no interest in the shape of things in the Balkan peninsula is afflicted with blindness and is working, howsoever unintentionally, in the service of the enemies of our country."⁸⁸ In 1889, his Russophobia escalated: "If indeed," he said, "we have a hereditary enemy, it is not France but Russia—that barbaric land, which in keeping with her whole nature, is oriented toward conquests in western Europe, which by reason of its geographic position is forced to try to expand its power in the West . . . with the objective of not only gaining mastery over the Black Sea and more or less dominating the Mediterranean, but also of seeking to win control over the Baltic."⁸⁹

The SPD was constantly encouraged by Engels in its unbending hatred for Russia as the main threat to Germany and to socialism. In view of an anticipated military conflict between Russia and Germany in 1890-1891, Engels contributed to a violent German anti-Russian campaign. He published at that time a fateful article about Russian foreign policy,⁹⁰ which was so comprehensive and offensive that more than forty years later Stalin himself condemned it as wrong.⁹¹ This article was later extensively used by German Social Democrats more than any other anti-Russian statement ever made by Marx and Engels.

Once again Engels claimed that Russia persistently strove for world domination and blocked any social revolution in Europe:

The Russian Czarist empire forms the greatest fortress, reserve position and at the same time reserve army of European reaction, because its mere passive existence already constitutes a threat and a danger to us.

It blocks and disturbs our normal development through its ceaseless intervention in Western affairs, intervention aimed moreover at conquering geographical positions which will secure it the mastery of Europe, and thus make impossible the liberation of the European proletariat.⁹²

Engels was critical of the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 because that act encouraged a Russian-French alliance:

And if in addition Germany were to drive France into the arms of Russia by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Germany either had to yield by becoming the obvious tool of Russian plans for conquest, or, after a short rest period, prepare for war against Russia and France simultaneously, a war which could easily turn into a war of races against an alliance of the Slavs and the Latin races.⁹³

However,

This entire danger of a world war will vanish on the day when the situation in Russia permits the Russian people to draw a thick line under the traditional policy of conquest of the czars, and to attend to their own vital interests at home—interests which are threatened in the extreme—instead of phantasies of world conquest.⁹⁴

Engels once again accused not only the tsar but the Russian people as a whole of dreams of world domination. He expected "the day when the Russian people will take part in the debate and when the settling of its own internal affairs will not leave enough time or inclination, to keep it occupied with such trifles as the conquest of Constantinople, India, and world domination."⁹⁵

Later Engels said that if Russia entered the war, the German Social Democrats would be obliged to join German national efforts to crush not only Russia but all those who might support that country. He said that there would be a

new defensive war, not a war like the new fashionable "local" wars, but a race war, the war against the unified Slavs and Romans. There is no doubt: versus this Deutschen Reich, even the existing French republic is the revolution—certainly a bourgeois revolution, but still a revolution. However, if this republic places itself under the orders of the Russian tsars, everything changes. Russian tsarism is the enemy of all Western peoples, even of the bourgeoisie of these peoples. If tsarist hordes come to Germany, they will not bring freedom but slavery, not development but devastation, not progress but savagery. . . .

And then Germany fights for her survival. If she wins, she will not find anything to be annexed: in the west and in the east there are only foreign-language provinces, and there are enough of them now. If she will be defeated, she will be crushed between the French hammer and the Russian anvil. She will lose East Prussia and the Polish provinces to Russia, Schleswig to Denmark, and all the left side of the Rhine to France. If even France would not like this conquest, Russia would impose it on France. This is because Russia needs first of all an eternal appeal of discord, a reason for a persistent quarrel between France and Germany. If these two countries will be reconciled, Russian domination in Europe is finished. Such a dismembered Germany will not be able to play the role she deserves in the historical development of Europe. . . .

Now the German Social Democratic party, due to thirty years of uninterrupted fighting and sacrifice, has conquered a position gained by no other socialist party in the world, a position that guarantees it political power in a short period of time. Socialist Germany now occupies the leading, the honorable, the most responsible position in the international workers' movement. It has the duty to defend to the last man this position against any aggressor. . . . The war which the Russians and the French could bring upon Germany would be a war of life and death in which national existence could be guaranteed only by revolutionary means.⁹⁶

In his letters to Bebel, Engels warned against any hope of a Russian liberal revolution because the Russian bourgeoisie only encouraged the war

since it translates Pan-Slavism materialistically; moreover, it has discovered its material background: expansion of internal markets through annexations.

Therefore there is the Slav fanaticism, therefore the wild hatred for Germans—only twenty years ago almost all trade and industry were exclusively in German hands—therefore the anti-Semitism. This mean and ignorant bourgeoisie which cannot see beyond its nose always wanted the war and agitated for it in the press. However, no tsar would like to launch the war because of the fear of revolution. . . .

A palace revolution or a successful assassination today can bring to power only the bourgeoisie.⁹⁷

Engels claimed that the war against Germany was first of all

the war against the strongest and most militant socialist party in Europe and the only way out we have is to defeat any aggressor who could help Russia,

since if we would be defeated the socialist movement in Europe will be retarded by twenty years, or we ourselves will come to power. . . .

The German victory is the victory of socialism and we must wish for it if the war comes, and not only wish for it but support it by every means. . . . If the danger of war will grow, we must tell the government that we are ready if we could possibly support it against the foreign enemy decently, on one condition, that the government will wage the war mercilessly in every way, including revolutionary ones. If Germany would be attacked from the east and the west, it can and should use any means for her defense.⁹⁸

The last formulation anticipated SPD support of the war, including the use of chemical weapons.

In a letter to Friedrich Sorge (1828-1906), Engels said:

We are of the opinion that if the Russians start war against us, German Socialists must go for the Russians and their allies, whoever they may be, *à l'outrance*. . . . If Germany is crushed, then we shall be too, while in the most favourable case the struggle will be such a violent one that Germany will only be able to maintain herself by revolutionary means, so that very possibly we shall be forced to come into power and play the part of 1793.⁹⁹

Engels suggested using the war as the way to the political revolution, not through defeat, as Lenin suggested for Russia twenty-three years later, but through victory. He hinted also that German Social Democrats would change the military-political situation during the war, as had been done in France in 1793 when the French revolutionary army, fighting against foreign invasion, itself invaded neighboring countries. This possibility can be interpreted as indicating that the SPD should repeat French military expansion and that it was the duty of German socialists to liberate Russia by force. The worst fears of Bakunin were materializing.

Engels and Bebel appealed for German rearmament, conceived as the first and foremost national goal of Germany. One of Engels's last articles (March 1893) dealt with the problem of what should be done with retired German sergeants. Engels suggested employing them as gymnastic teachers in high schools, in the best Prussian tradition.¹⁰⁰

Bebel followed Engels's advice to the letter. At the SPD Erfurt congress in 1891 he said:

If Russia, the archetype of cruelty and barbarism, the foe of civilization, were ever to attack Germany . . . with the aim of dismembering and annihilating her, we would be even more interested than the rulers of the Reich in resisting Russia. We would then stand beside those who are presently our opponents, not to save them and their social order, but to save Germany, which is to say ourselves, and to free our soil from a savagery that would be the biggest obstacle to all our endeavors and whose victory would mean the ruin of Social Democracy.¹⁰¹

There is no doubt that Bebel, like Marx, Engels, and Wilhelm Liebknecht, meant not only tsarism but also the Russian people *per se*. If someone like Bebel talks about "gruesome, barbaric, hypocritical Russia," about "the most dangerous enemy of European civilization," or about Russia as "the citadel of horror and barbarism,"¹⁰² he is referring to Russia itself rather than to its rulers.

Bebel came to the radical conclusion that "resistance to and even annihilation of that horrendous, barbarous Russia . . . is for us a sacred task which for the sake of the oppressed and enslaved Russian people we shall accomplish if need be with our last breath."¹⁰³ One can easily see that his concern for the "oppressed and enslaved Russian people" was only a propagandist excuse for the sacred task, since it is clear that those people would have been deprived of their national independence when they were "generously" accepted into the Social Democratic *Pax Germanica* as its subjects.

In March 1904, Bebel told the Reichstag that in the case of war where "all German existence would be on the stake, I give my word—up to the last man, including the eldest among us, will be ready to take flintlocks on shoulders in order to defend our German land."¹⁰⁴ Bebel cynically stressed in this speech that all German international successes could come about only because of the support extended to the government by the Social Democrats.

It is not surprising that neither Engels nor his pupils in the SPD were very happy when an orthodox branch of Marxism, a group called the Emancipation of Labor, eventually emerged in Russia with the former populist, Georgy Plekhanov, as its leading proponent.¹⁰⁵ Plekhanov claimed that capitalism was already ruining traditional Russian agriculture, so that any dreams of Russian populists about primitive rural communism were merely wishful thinking.

This idea had very important geopolitical implications. If it were so, then the main anti-Russian argument of German Marxists—that Russia was a barbaric, semi-Asiatic country—became invalid. Moreover, the prospect of a strong, modernized capitalist Russia was an even greater geopolitical danger to Germany. Such a change could make Russia much more powerful and efficient, and apart from that, it would make Russia a natural ally of France and England against Germany.

Engels, who became after Marx's death the only spiritual German socialist leader, tried to ignore Plekhanov for a long time, while Plekhanov tolerated all the humiliations he received from Engels. Eventually, Engels was forced in 1885 to react in a long letter to Vera Zaslitch (1849-1919), a former populist who had joined Plekhanov. In his letter, Engels could not help concealing his preference for those populists who tried to apply classical Marxism to barbaric, oriental Russia:

You asked for my judgment of Plekhanov's book. . . .

First of all . . . I am proud to know that there is a party among the youth of Russia which frankly and without ambiguity accepts the great economic

and historic theories of Marx and which has decisively broken with all the anarchist and slightly Slavophil traditions of its predecessors. And Marx himself would have been equally proud of this had he lived a little longer. It is an advance which will be of great importance for the revolutionary development of Russia. To me the historic theory of Marx is the fundamental condition of all reasoned and consistent revolutionary tactics; to discover these tactics one has only to apply the theory to the economic and political conditions of the country in question.

But to do this one must know these conditions; and so far as I am concerned I know too little about the actual situation in Russia. . . .

What I know or believe about the situation in Russia impels me to the opinion that the Russians are approaching their 1789. The revolution must break out there in a given time; it may break out there any day. In these circumstances the country is like a charged mine which only needs a fuse to be laid to it. . . . This is one of the exceptional cases where it is possible for a handful of people to make a revolution, i.e., with one small push to cause a whole system, which (to use a metaphor of Plekhanov's) is in more than labile equilibrium, to come crashing down, and thus by one action, in itself insignificant, to release uncontrollable explosive forces. Well now, if ever Blanquism—the phantasy of overturning an entire society through the action of a small conspiracy—had a certain justification for its existence, that is certainly in Petersburg. Once the spark has been put to the powder, once the forces have been released and national energy has been transformed from potential into kinetic energy (another favourite image of Plekhanov's and a very good one)—the people who laid the spark to the mine will be swept away by the explosion, which will be a thousand times as strong as themselves and which will seek its vent where it can, according as the economic forces and resistances determine.

Supposing these people imagine they can seize power, what does it matter? Provided they make the hole which will shatter the dyke, the flood itself will soon rob them of their illusions. But if by chance these illusions resulted in giving them a superior force of will, why complain of that? People who boasted that they had made a revolution have always seen the next day that they had no idea what they were doing, that the revolution made did not in the least resemble the one they would have liked to make. That is what Hegel calls the irony of history, an irony which few historic personalities escape. . . .

To me the most important thing is that the impulse should be given in Russia, that the revolution should break out. Whether this fraction or that fraction gives the signal, whether it happens under this flag or that flag matters little to me.¹⁰⁶

Plekhanov eventually succeeded in establishing himself as an internationally respected Social Democrat. However, the German Social Democrats stopped supporting the Russian populists much later. The successors of the populists—the Social Revolutionaries—maintained their membership in the Second International until 1914. Moreover, the Dresden SPD congress in 1903 appealed to Russian Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries to join each other in a single socialist party.¹⁰⁷



Georgy Plekhanov (photo from G. Plekhanov, *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia*, vol. 2 [Moscow, 1956], p. 1).

Plekhanov was probably not as orthodox a Marxist as is usually accepted. Even Vladimir Akimov (Makhnovets, 1872-1921), a liberal Marxist, had accused him of taking the first and very important step in the direction of Bolshevism by anticipating an immediate *proletarian* revolution.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Plekhanov advocated an immediate democratic revolution under proletarian domination, conceived only as a temporary stage in order to boost the country's economy for the following socialist revolution.¹⁰⁹

Plekhanov's concept of the democratic revolution was a compromise between Tkatchev's appeal for an immediate socialist revolution and the populists' appeal for a democratic revolution. His concept of the proletarian hegemony in the demographic revolution is reminiscent of Lenin's concept of the new economic policy (NEP) introduced in 1921, according to which the socialist government would permit capitalist development within a certain framework.

During his first period of Social Democratic activity, Plekhanov became a committed Germanophile. In 1893, in a speech at the Zurich congress of the Second International, he said that the Russian proletariat would meet the German socialist army as its liberator in the event of a victory for the German socialist revolution. Plekhanov appealed against Western

pacifism, since it would give the Russian army an opportunity to take over Europe without resistance. Plekhanov warned *inter alia* that "Russian despotism will destroy all culture, and instead of the freedom of the proletariat which the general war strike would like to manifest, the Russian whip will dominate."¹¹⁰

However, Plekhanov probably was the first Russian Marxist who started casting doubts on his German socialist comrades. When Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) came forward in 1896-1898 with his revisionism, and Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) criticized it, Plekhanov could not help attacking Kautsky for his conciliatory attitude toward Bernstein. Bernstein was not excluded from the SPD, and Kautsky even thanked Bernstein for making his party rethink theoretical problems. Plekhanov was furious, and in fact, his attack against Kautsky, then the main German socialist theoretician, was equal to an attack against the SPD itself.¹¹¹

Petr Struve, a leading Marxist theoretician in Russia in the early period of Russian Marxism, also suffered from the arrogance of leading SPD members. He discovered several previously unknown articles by Marx that revealed the latter's dependence on Prussian conservative thought. Struve's discovery was confirmed by Bernstein, but nevertheless, the Germans were very embarrassed by it. Franz Mehring (1846-1919), later a leader of the SPD's left wing, reprimanded Struve publicly, and afterward the SPD press was closed to Struve.¹¹²

The Russian Marxists did not express publicly everything that they expressed in a narrow circle. Vera Zasulich, who later became a Menshevik leader, told Trotsky in 1902, with regard to German Social Democrats, "They will finish with revisionism, they will re-establish Marx, they will achieve a majority, and in spite of it they will live with their Kaiser."¹¹³

Although Russian Marxists tried to ignore the evident reformism of the SPD, it became a subject for discussion in even the Russian liberal press. A leading Russian liberal journalist, Grigory Iollos (1859-1907), then the Berlin correspondent for *Russkie vedomosti*, did not leave any doubt about the problem. In 1899, he wrote from Berlin that "Bebel's party changed dramatically. Loud phrases disappeared, and one stone after another is falling from an awesome Marxist building, as they did in the past."¹¹⁴ Iollos noticed in 1900 that nobody did more than Liebknecht "to squander the great ideas of Marx and Engels on trifles."¹¹⁵

The first open rebellion of Russian Marxists against the SPD was declared in 1902, and it deeply influenced Russian Marxism. A radical Russian Marxist, Vatslav Makhaisky (pseud., A. Volsky, 1867-1926), wrote an extremely important book while he was in exile in Siberia; printed only in 1905, it had previously been widely read in manuscript form.¹¹⁶ He stated openly that the interests of the European proletariat clashed dramatically with those of the socialist-conscious German proletariat.¹¹⁷ Makhaisky blamed Kautsky for obfuscating the process of bourgeois transformation in the SPD,¹¹⁸ and he accused German socialists of losing their international vision and the vision of the proletarian revolution.¹¹⁹ He said that "German social

democracy has placed its revolutionary legacy in Bismarck's hands."¹²⁰ He further strongly criticized Marx and Engels for their appeal for war against Russia.¹²¹

Makhaisky legitimately saw the roots of Marxist nationalism as expressed in the Communist Manifesto, namely, the appeal to a proletariat to fight only the bourgeoisie of its own country.¹²² He claimed that even in the 1860s it was evident that the workers' movement was international, so the world revolution might be launched on a world scale. However, the SPD wanted to take power only in its own country, regardless of the situation in other countries. Makhaisky criticized Marx for his theory of the Russian revolution as only a spark for the European revolution. "The policy of an independent proletarian party must take into consideration first of all world economics, not the economics of some corner. . . . The international enterprise cannot be fitted into national boundaries, which will prove to be a Procrustean bed for it."¹²³

Makhaisky's manuscript was widely circulated among Siberian exiles and was read very attentively by Trotsky, who lived not far from him—in fact, Trotsky's theory of the international nature of revolution came as a result of Makhaisky's influence. When Trotsky met Lenin in 1902 for the first time, they discussed Makhaisky's book and came to the conclusion that "it agreed with our way of thinking provoked by the Kautsky-Bernstein polemics."¹²⁴

Another attack against Marx for his arrogance toward the Slavs came from the circles close to Lenin, for example, from a prominent Russian Marxist of that time, Vladimir Posse (1864-1940), who was well known as the publisher of a legal Marxist magazine *Zhizn'* which he had edited since 1897. Lenin published two important articles in this magazine in 1899 and 1900. In 1901 *Zhizn'* was closed down by the authorities. Posse emigrated and continued his activities as a publisher and a revolutionary theoretician in London.

Posse also attacked Plekhanov for his Germanophilism, criticizing him sharply for his Zurich speech of 1893. Speaking about Plekhanov's invitation to the German revolutionary Wehrmacht to come to Russia, Posse said: "Thank you for such liberators. We know the 'cultural level' of a German officer. . . . We know what kind of scoundrels, lost to all moral feelings, command in that German army to which Plekhanov appealed, whom he invited to enter the Russian land to liberate the Russian people." This was also another attack against German social democracy, since Engels, Liebknecht, and Bebel regarded the German Wehrmacht as an exemplary army that could fulfill the role of social liberator in other countries.¹²⁵

To justify himself, Plekhanov claimed that if someone were to accuse him of being an enemy of Russia, he could reply, "We are committed to international socialism, but this by no means prevents us from loving Russia with all our heart."¹²⁶

There were also a few Marxists from Russia and Poland who were later active in the SPD, although they never became an organic part of it.

Alexander Parvus, Karl Radek (Sobelson, 1885-1939), Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), and Leo Jogiches (Tyshko, 1867-1919) also violently attacked German revisionism, which amounted to an implicit criticism of the SPD as a whole. For this reason, they were treated by German Social Democrats as suspiciously extremist, as SPD leader Gustav Noske (1868-1946) wrote in his memoirs¹²⁷ (Radek later joined the Russian Bolsheviks).

The relationship between Russian and German Marxists became very tense. Meanwhile, SPD leaders had to pay lip service to the Russian revolution. In 1902, Kautsky ostensibly abandoned SPD suspicions about revolutionary Russia, even acknowledging that in the future, Russia would be the new center of the world revolutionary movement. One must remember that Kautsky was not only the chief SPD theoretician but also its chief propagandist.

At the present time [in contrast to 1848] it would seem that not only have the Slavs entered the ranks of the revolutionary nations, but that the centre of revolutionary thought and revolutionary action is shifting more and more to the Slavs. The revolutionary centre is shifting from the West to the East. In the first half of the nineteenth century it was located in France, at times in England. In 1848 Germany too joined the ranks of the revolutionary nations. . . . The new century opens with events which induce us to think that we are approaching a further shift of the revolutionary centre, namely, to Russia. . . . Russia, who has borrowed so much revolutionary initiative from the West, is now perhaps herself ready to serve as a source of revolutionary energy for the West. The Russian revolutionary movement that is now flaring up will perhaps prove to be a most potent means of exorcising that spirit of flabby philistinism and temperate politics which is beginning to spread in our midst, and it may cause the thirst for battle and the passionate devotion to our great ideals to flare up in bright flames again. Russia has long ceased to be merely a bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Western Europe. It might be said that today the very opposite is the case. Western Europe is becoming a bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Russia. . . . The Russian revolutionaries might perhaps have settled with the tsar long ago had they not been compelled at the same time to fight his ally, European capital. Let us hope that this time they will succeed in settling with both enemies, and that the new "Holy Alliance" will collapse more quickly than its predecessors. But no matter how the present struggle in Russia ends, the blood and happiness of the martyrs, whom, unfortunately, she is producing in too great numbers, will not have been sacrificed in vain. They will nourish the shoots of social revolution throughout the civilised world and cause them to grow more luxuriantly and rapidly. In 1848 the Slavs were a black frost which blighted the flowers of the peoples' spring. Perhaps they are now destined to be the storm that will break the ice of reaction and will irresistibly bring a new and happy spring for the nations.¹²⁸

This lip service of Kautsky's was the starting point in Lenin's quest for Russian world domination, for the Bolshevik Third Rome.



Vladimir Lenin (photo from L. Volkov-Lannit, *Lenin v foto-iskusstve* [Moscow, 1969], p. 174).

Lenin

Vladimir Lenin (Ulianov, 1870–1924) played an extraordinary role in contemporary world history. As John Plamenatz said: “Bolshevism—both the political theory and the movement inspired by it—is the creation of Lenin, the projection of his personality, stamped with his image. Perhaps no man since Mahomet has changed the world so greatly in so short a time.”¹²⁹

Lenin very quickly became the absolute leader of the most radical trend of Russian Marxism, and in 1917, he founded the new state that became the world revolutionary center, the genuine Third Rome of world radicalism. In spite of his self-declared internationalism, Lenin, like Marx and Engels, very soon became a nationalist. Lenin’s nationalism was the purely etatist, and even geopolitical, nationalism of a Russian revolutionary who, like Herzen and Bakunin, wittingly or unwittingly, was encouraged by the sheer size of his country, which amplified his ambitions. The leader of any Russian socialist trend had to see himself as a potential leader of this superpower if he really believed in the success of the revolution. The same was true

of Marx and Engels, since they saw themselves as successors of the great German empire. For this reason, Lenin's quest was incompatible with that of the German Social Democrats, just as the quest of Marx and Engels was incompatible with that of Herzen and Bakunin.

Lenin regarded Russia as his constituency. He had no national consensus behind him, but neither had Peter the Great or Catherine II. Many historians claim that it was Stalin who achieved the far-reaching etatist nationalization of the Soviet system, but this theory is an illusion. Bolshevism as a political movement was intensely nationalized long before the revolution, and the process was not only organic. The process of nationalization was determined by several factors:

1. The national heritage of Russian socialism which was absorbed by Lenin in its entirety, though transformed and synthesized. However, since this heritage in its turn was a mirror image of Western socialism, one can find in Lenin's thought many etatist and nationalist Western ideas adapted to Russian reality. Therefore, Lenin must be understood *vis-à-vis* the nationalist-etatist heritage of Russia and Western socialism.
2. Lenin's competition with Western and mostly German socialist movements that claimed to be the future centers of the new world socialist *pax* while Lenin reserved this status for himself and his country.
3. The Russian-German confrontation, which influenced all political development in Russia.

In fact, the first two factors are only corollaries of the last one, and might be deduced from it, but it is clearer to mention them separately.

Lenin's synthesis of the Russian and Western revolutionary and socialist heritage was not localized in time. It was a long drawn-out process during which Lenin reinterpreted various trends and absorbed them—a fact that was quickly noticed by his opponents. Soon after his split with Lenin in 1903, Plekhanov accused him of Bakuninism,¹³⁰ and another Russian Menshevik, Alexander Martynov (Piker, 1865-1935), said at a party congress in 1906 that "Tkatchev and Bakunin wrote exactly the same things about the uprising as we were told here by Lenin."¹³¹

After the revolution, Mikhail Pokrovsky officially recognized Lenin's synthesis. According to Pokrovsky, it is not necessary to "deny that certain elements in the Russian revolutionary movement of the sixties and seventies flowed into the Leninist tactic and were embraced by it. . . . In the Russian soil there had already existed certain models which Lenin was not ashamed of, which he referred to as examples worthy of imitation."¹³² Pokrovsky said that Lenin was "the man of synthesis who knew how to coordinate into one harmonious whole, to draw together all those revolutionaries of the old days who had forgotten one another and fought against each other."¹³³ Lenin's synthesis, as Pokrovsky said, was a result of the general Russian revolutionary synthesis:

If you look at the Russian revolutionary movement of the sixties and seventies you will note that it resembled at that time the creation of the world as pictured by the Roman poet Lucretius. . . . In Lucretius's description of the creation of the world, in the beginning a monster without a head but with arms and legs was born; next a monster with a head but without arms and without legs. And then, gradually, through the adaptation of these monsters to life, through their battles among themselves, that harmonious world of organisms arose that we have before us today. If we take the Russian revolutionary movement of the sixties and seventies, then we get, precisely, a picture that very much resembles the picture drawn by Lucretius.¹³⁴

Lenin himself was very cautious about acknowledging his non-Marxist heritage. In his early period, he publicly acknowledged his debt only to such noncontroversial people as Belinsky or Tchernyshevsky, since almost everybody else in Russia had been discredited by Marx and Engels. Later he broke this taboo and publicly eulogized Herzen. He also once referred positively to Tkatchev and with some restraint to Bakunin. But he never mentioned Netchaev.

Many people have questioned Lenin's Marxism. Indeed, if one examines his publications, one would come to the conclusion that he was not a Marxist. This was, by the way, the conclusion of John Plamenatz, who said that Lenin "never understood the intelligible parts of dialectical and historical materialism, and so—despite his good intentions—was never able to defend them except by quoting their authors and abusing their critics."¹³⁵

There are two very interesting insights into the essence of Lenin's Marxism. One is that of the former French Communist Henri Guillbeaux (1885-1938), who was acquainted with Lenin. Guillbeaux attempted to juxtapose Lenin's Bolshevism with his communism. According to this theory, Marxism is only the starting point for Lenin the Bolshevik, who would analyze facts with the help of Marxist methodology, but who never submitted to Marxist economic fatalism. Lenin, as a genuine Bolshevik, was always able to abandon theory if it did not correspond to the facts.¹³⁶

Another valuable insight is that of the former American Communist Max Eastman (1883-1969). According to him, Lenin broke with Marxian "metaphysics" and established what Eastman called "the science of revolutionary engineering." Lenin was an action-oriented personality, and his actions were based, not on a metaphysical theory, but on a careful and realistic analysis of the current political and social situation.

Lenin corrected the error of Marx, which was a mystic faith in the proletariat as such. . . .

Moreover, in discussing the part to be played by this organization of revolutionists, Lenin contradicted the Marxian metaphysics and abandoned it absolutely. He abandoned all the confused ideological dodges of the priest of economic metaphysics, who is "bringing to the working class a consciousness of its destiny," and adopted the attitude of a practical artisan who is doing work, and doing it scientifically, and not seriously deceiving himself either

about the historic destiny of his material, or the essentially decorative function of his own brain and volition.¹³⁷

According to Eastman,

Lenin's first innovation was to recognize the indispensable function of the man of ideas, his second innovation was to divide men of ideas into two camps, and expel without mercy those in whom ideas do not mean action. It is plain, then, that Lenin did not regard revolutionary ideas as a mere reflection of the evolution of the forces of production.

Eastman concluded that

the October revolution was a violation of Hegelian Marxism, and every success in the effort of the Bolsheviks since the October revolution has been a disproof of it. For their effort has been, on the one hand to make fast in Russia a political superstructure and a way of thinking which are in advance of her economic development, and on the other hand to make her catch up in economic development to this way of thinking and this political superstructure. No person who means what he says seriously, and concretely, could possibly declare that the political forms existing in Russia, and the ideas propagated by the Communist party, are a reflection of existing economic conditions.

And he was perfectly right when he said:

Lenin defended in philosophy a position inconsistent with his fundamental attitude in politics. And although his attention was called to it, he ever attempted to resolve this inconsistency. He instinctively ignored it, or chose to leave it standing. Why? Because for a revolutionist lacking the conception of a genetic science of the mind, that was the most practical thing to do.

However, Eastman was fundamentally wrong in this view of Marxism as a whole as a metaphysics. In fact, Marx shared Lenin's inconsistency, and what Eastman said of Lenin might also be said of Marx, if all of Marx's writings, not only his scholastic works, are taken into consideration. Lenin was Marx's star pupil in his *realpolitik*, which used an abstract theory to legitimize his political actions generated from the current political context.

Marxism was accepted by Lenin in its entirety. First of all, it was a dialectic in which everything could be transformed into its opposite. What was valid before could be invalid later. Abstract morality did not exist, and everything was submitted to "class" interests, since according to Lenin's deep conviction, he regarded himself as the most authentic representative of the working class. From this point of view, Marx's and Engels's political journalism, which ostensibly contradicted their theoretical writings, in fact did not contradict them at all. In terms of contemporary social science, the difference amounted only to that between "fundamental" and "operative"

ideology.¹³⁸ "Dialectics" could mean everything and justify any contradiction and any tactical move.

In 1923, in his famous Testament, Lenin reprimanded a well-known Bolshevik leader, Nikolai Bukharin, saying that he had never been a genuine Marxist.¹³⁹ This claim surprised many people since Bukharin was regarded as the best Bolshevik Marxist theoretician. In fact, Bukharin studied mainly the theoretical writings of Marx and Engels, ignoring their realpolitik, which is why he was so easily defeated by the "dialectical" Marxist, Stalin. In fact, Lenin was perfectly right about Bukharin.

Marxism contained the internal potential of its own relativization, and Lenin grasped this fact more fully than anyone else. Marxism was not a dogma for him, but a theoretical starting point that could be adopted to any political reality. One could rebel against Marx or Engels and remain a faithful Marxist in the framework of such an outlook.

Pavel Axelrod remarked that for Lenin, Marxism was not an absolute doctrine but a weapon in the revolutionary struggle.¹⁴⁰ It was also said that Lenin should be judged in a wider socialist framework, and indeed, he was deeply influenced by Lassalle, to whom he was indebted for several central ideas:

1. An extreme etatism, which went beyond any Marxist approach
2. A thoroughly negative attitude to liberals, which was alien to Marx and Engels
3. An authoritarian, even monarchist, approach to the party leadership (even the idea of systematic party purges was taken first by Lenin and later by Stalin from Lassalle)

Lenin many times referred to Lassalle very positively. "The great historic service performed by Lassalle," said Lenin in 1899, "was the transformation of the working class from an appendix of the liberal bourgeoisie into an independent political party."¹⁴¹ In 1901, he used Lassalle as ammunition against the so-called Russian economists, who professed to wage a purely economic struggle, not a political one, and quoted Lassalle as saying, "A party becomes stronger by purging itself."¹⁴² This quotation was also used by Lenin as the epigraph to his programmatic book, *What Is to be Done?* It is curious that Lenin used Lassalle for this purpose rather than Marx or Engels. In 1908, Lenin referred to the exemplary politics of Marx, Lassalle, and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who approved of Social Democratic parliamentary activity.¹⁴³ His last completely positive reference to Lassalle can be located in his polemics against Rosa Luxemburg in the spring of 1914: Lenin stressed the "country approach" practiced by Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, which is equivalent to defending their nationalism.¹⁴⁴

The first of Lenin's disclaimers against Lassalle was made only at the end of 1914 in an article on Marx, published legally in Russia, in which Lenin attacked Lassalle's nationalism, which was being used extensively at that time by the SPD to justify the war against Russia. Lenin tried to

create the impression that Marx was opposed to German nationalism. According to Lenin, Marx held that Lassalle's attitude was "objectively . . . a betrayal of the entire workers' movement to Prussia."¹⁴⁵ This public disclaimer did not mean that Lenin rejected etatism and nationalism in general. He rejected only Lassalle's German nationalism.

Another very important foreign influence on Lenin was Louis Auguste Blanqui, the first person to suggest social revolution through a conspiracy of a small revolutionary elite. Both Lassalle and Blanqui influenced Lenin directly and indirectly—as we have seen, they were both used as ammunition by Tkatchev, who greatly influenced Lenin.

With respect to orthodox German social democracy, Lenin had long recognized the authority of Kautsky and quoted him extensively, especially since Kautsky criticized Bernstein. It seems, however, that Lenin's enthusiasm for Kautsky was very pragmatic. Indeed, even after 1904, when Lenin clashed directly with Kautsky and the latter several times humiliated and insulted the former, Lenin restrained himself from any public attacks on Kautsky for a long time. Kautsky was then the key ideologist of international socialism, and conflict with him could have cost Lenin too much. Lenin could only court Kautsky in a vain attempt to achieve more international respect. At any rate, German Social Democrats taught Lenin the lesson of Marxist relativism, and Lenin's relationship with them is of great importance in the nationalization of Bolshevism.

No doubt Lenin's early Marxism was only scholarly, i.e., based on Marxist theoretical thought; Lenin had no access to Marxism in its entirety at that time. However, even in this phase, Lenin greatly contributed to the escalation of Russian Marxists' claims that Russia was no longer a primitive, barbaric country, as Marx, Engels, and contemporary German Social Democrats believed. If capitalism, inflated by Lenin, triumphed even in Russian agriculture, a stronghold of Russian primitivism, this meant that Russia was already a developing country and its "proletariat," i.e., Lenin himself, had the moral right to have a decent (leading) place in the international socialist movement.

Stanley Page recognized the geopolitical background of these first steps of Lenin's as revolutionary and stressed that Lenin tried to expand the extent of Russian capitalism beyond all proportion in his quest for international leadership.¹⁴⁶ Engels had argued in 1874 that Germany's superiority as a revolutionary nation stemmed from the fact that Germany was the last nation to join the revolutionary movement, which gave it the opportunity to avoid mistakes committed by others.¹⁴⁷ Russia was now the last nation to do so—why should it be deprived of the above-mentioned superiority?

Lenin imperceptibly brought Bakunin's reliance on peasants into Bolshevism. It was certainly heresy to rely on them as a force that might bring a country to socialism. Marxism insistently regarded peasants not only as nonsocialists but as antisocialists. In the case of such reliance, Bolshevism must support some principal peasant demands and adopt its political program to their mentality. However, their mentality was very national, and Lenin

was well aware of this fact. He said that the agrarian question was essentially a problem of Russian nationality,¹⁴⁸ since peasants were naturally the most nation-oriented sector in any nation. Politically, this opinion was quite realistic, since the workers constituted only a minor part of all the population. In inviting peasants to contribute to the socialist revolution, Lenin appealed to the majority of the Russian population. Stanley Page and Wolfgang Leonhard considered this reliance on peasants to be Lenin's innovation.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, it was an innovation for Marxism, but it was not an innovation in the Russian socialist tradition. Even disregarding the populists, Herzen and Bakunin were ready to rely on any force that would be useful.

Moreover, Lenin was without doubt influenced on this issue by Posse, who resumed publication of his magazine *Zhizn'* in London—just before Lenin suggested reliance on the Russian peasantry—in which he once again openly declared his old objective of combining Populism and Marxism. "Without the peasant movement," his magazine said, "their [social democratic] objectives move away to the unknown distance of the hazy future. What kind of troubles might the broad peasant movement inflict on Russian social democracy?"¹⁵⁰ Lenin never acknowledged Posse's influence, but it is quite obvious if one takes into consideration the timing of Lenin's idea to rely on the peasantry.

We have seen that Plekhanov was not treated as an equal by German Social Democrats, but Lenin fared even worse. Nothing he said could attract their attention, and there was no way they would accept that Lenin's geopolitical ambitions, as representative of primitive, semi-Asiatic Russia, should be recognized as at least equal in international socialism let alone its leader. We have seen how Kautsky had to pay lip service to the Russian proletariat, promising it a bright revolutionary future. Lenin was quick to rely on this lip service in his book *What Is to be Done?* in order to justify his quest for international leadership. He was very cautious, however, in his formulations and in his challenge of German social democracy, defending himself by using all possible authorities. He said that

the Social-Democratic movement is in its very essence an international movement. This means, not only that we must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries. In order to make use of these experiences it is not enough merely to be acquainted with them, or simply to copy out the latest resolutions. What is required is the ability to treat these experiences critically and to test them independently. He who realises how enormously the modern working-class movement has grown and branched out will understand what a reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is required to carry out this task. . . .

Thirdly, the national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are such as have never confronted any other socialist party in the world. . . .

At this point, we wish to state only that the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory.¹⁵¹

It is quite evident what he had in mind when, for the first time, he put forward Herzen's name as a precursor of Russian social democracy, knowing full well that this name was taboo for German Social Democrats.

Lenin made no disclaimer of Herzen's militant anti-European and anti-German Pan-Slavism, which amounted to his approving of Herzen as a whole. Herzen's name sounds very sinister in this particular context and promised many surprises. Lenin wrote, "To have a concrete understanding of what this means let the reader recall such predecessors of Russian Social-Democracy as Herzen, Belinsky, Tchernyshevsky, and the brilliant galaxy of revolutionaries of the seventies: let him ponder over the world significance which Russian literature is now acquiring."¹⁵² Lenin resorted to Engels in order to prove his claim to Russian revolutionary ascendancy: "The German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But let us hope that as long as they occupy it, they will fill it fittingly."¹⁵³ And he again used Engels to make the following programmatic statement:

History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the most revolutionary of all the immediate tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. And we have the right to count upon acquiring this honourable title, already earned by our predecessors, the revolutionaries of the seventies.¹⁵⁴

What is conspicuous in this blueprint is Lenin's heretical and ambitious claim in suggesting Russia as the leader not only of European revolution but also of Asiatic revolution. It is interesting that in spite of extremely sharp polemics between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks following the publication of Lenin's book and the internal split in the Russian Social Democratic party in 1903, no Russian socialist contested Lenin's quest for Russian international socialist leadership. Lenin's book also dealt with the organizational aspects of the above party, which implied his ambition to be absolute party leader.

The sharpest criticism of *What Is to be Done?* was that of Rosa Luxemburg published in the main SPD tribune, *Neue Zeit*, edited by Kautsky, although she criticized only his organizational ideas.¹⁵⁵ Lenin immediately reacted and sent his reply to *Neue Zeit*, but it was not published. Only twenty-six years later, after Lenin's death and at the height of the campaign against "Luxemburgianism," was this article, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," finally published in the USSR.¹⁵⁶ In June 1905, Lenin sent a letter opposing Kautsky to a left-wing SPD newspaper, *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, since Kautsky had refused to print the resolutions of the latest Bolshevik party congress. Lenin blamed Kautsky in this letter for incompetence in Russian affairs,¹⁵⁷ but this letter was also not published. Lenin could not forget this double

affront, so any positive reference to Kautsky on his part after 1905 is sheer hypocrisy.

Moreover, Kautsky did not recognize the split of the Russian Social Democratic party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Kautsky even wrote to Lenin's friends in 1904 that if he had to decide for whom to vote, he would definitely vote for Yuli Martov, who became a leader of the Mensheviks.¹⁵⁸ For his part, Bebel did his best to reconcile the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and did not support Lenin at all.¹⁵⁹

Bolshevism as a Political Movement

Lenin was, however, only the leader of Bolshevism. But what in fact was Bolshevism? To define it as a Russian revolutionary movement dressed up as Marxism would be reasonably accurate but not sufficient. A successful definition of Bolshevism might be to identify all those who accepted Lenin as their leader as Bolsheviks. One would then, of course, need to define Lenin himself. This definition might seem very efficient since everybody who deviated from Lenin in the Bolshevik movement was excluded from it. But Lenin was not strong enough to suppress all intra-Bolshevik dissent, and one must take into consideration various Bolshevik fringe trends that were more or less tolerated by Lenin: for example, right-wing and left-wing Bolsheviks who at various times tried to challenge Lenin's leadership but mostly had to submit. Only at the end of his rule in 1921, at the Tenth Party Congress, did Lenin manage to impose a totalitarian indictment to suppress all party factionalism. This indictment led to the suppression of all Bolshevik diversity, but that was achieved only by Stalin.

Another principal question remains. Was Lenin's success purely circumstantial or could it be explained in terms of the attraction of his program and behavior? Lenin's opponents explained his success by his brutality, unscrupulousness, and extensive use of money to buy his adherents. Trotsky wrote in a letter in 1912 that every socialism is influenced by its national legacy, and he pointed out that bureaucracy and corruption formed the background of Russian socialism.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, Lenin's behavior would have been completely unacceptable in the majority of Western revolutionary movements; however, if he did succeed in gathering followers through bribes, that only takes the explanation to a different level—why and how could so many people be bribed? In addition, he could not bribe everyone, and Lenin definitely enjoyed great popularity among Russian workers and intellectuals whom he could not bribe at all. There is no doubt that the Bolsheviks controlled the majority of the Russian Social Democrats on the eve of World War I, a fact recognized by a prominent Menshevik, Riazanov, in his secret reports to Kautsky.¹⁶¹ (Later Riazanov became a prominent Bolshevik.)

Lenin's radicalism was very national and attracted many Russians. When he was already a Bolshevik leader, Trotsky changed his definition of Lenin's success among the Bolsheviks: "To be able to lead such a revolution

unprecedented in the history of the nations as the one taking place in Russia, it is obviously necessary to have an unseverable connection with the basic forces of the people's life, a bond which springs from the deepest roots. . . . The absence of strict routine and conformity, of falseness and convention, a decisiveness in thinking, and a daring in action, a daring which never degenerates into indiscretion—all this marks the Russian working class and Lenin as well."¹⁶² Trotsky suggested that Lenin had much of the Russian peasant psychology. He did not regard Lenin as a revolutionary demiurge. According to him, the latter only joined the chain of objective historical forces¹⁶³—but all we know about the revolution does not convince one of such determinism. Lenin was a demiurge and molded the image of revolutionary Russia in the pattern of those elementary forces that he himself revoked. These forces were powerful only because of some historical circumstances: war, defeat, and so on. Bolshevism was not an historical necessity, only a historical option.

Trotsky was nevertheless right in his view that Lenin was not a historical accident. He was a product, but only a product, of all previous Russian history. According to Trotsky, Lenin was the most perfect manifestation of his party. He educated the party, and the party educated him. Lenin was exposed to strong feedback that influenced him and changed his tactics and strategy. Leaders, Trotsky said, are not created incidentally. They are chosen, trained during the course of decades, and cannot be replaced capriciously.¹⁶⁴

We can notice that Trotsky made an abrupt turnaround from his accusation of Lenin's corruption before the revolution and his eulogy of Lenin after it. There is a common denominator in his curses and praise: his recognition of Lenin as a national Russian character. Lenin always appealed to grassroots party members in every rebellion against him within his party, and he always received their support. No competing Bolshevik leader could withstand him. All his close associates became his mediums.

As a political movement, Bolshevism drew its principal supporters from Russian areas while Menshevik support came mainly from the Caucasus and southern Russia. The majority of the Bolshevik leaders belonged to Russian nobility while the Menshevik leadership was mostly middle class. David Lane explains this anomaly by the fact that the Russian nobility despised the bourgeoisie and therefore looked forward to a classless society while the Mensheviks favored capitalism.¹⁶⁵ According to Lane, although the Bolsheviks ostensibly rejected any national affiliation, they were in fact cemented by the Great Russian national solidarity, which gave them homogeneity.¹⁶⁶ To Pokrovsky, the Russian revolution was provoked by a chain of events that were not only purely Russian but even localized in the Petersburg-Moscow area.¹⁶⁷

Speaking at the Fifth Party Congress in 1907, a prominent Bolshevik, Grigory Alexinsky (1879-1969), stressed that "the most important industrial centers sent Bolshevik deputies to the congress. This is not accidental and fully corresponds to the party factional 'geography.' . . . While peasant

Georgia is the Menshevik stronghold, Petersburg, Moscow, and Ural gravitate to the Bolsheviks. Many among the Social Democratic proletariat of Polish cities also gravitate tactically toward Bolshevism. Together with this the artisan Jewish proletariat . . . is inclined to Menshevism."¹⁶⁸

All Bolsheviks outwardly professed internationalism and the world proletarian revolution, but these concepts meant even less for them than they did for the German Social Democrats.

Maxim Gorky

One of the most important personalities in prerevolutionary Bolshevism was Maxim Gorky (1868-1936), who later became a founding father of the present-day Soviet system. Gorky was never a formal Bolshevik, but as an outstanding writer he had a strong influence on Bolshevism. Apart from that, he raised a great deal of money for the Bolsheviks and contributed greatly to their public relations campaigns. He was a very controversial personality and never identified himself as a Marxist, being in fact a left-wing Bolshevik. The real extent of his impact on Soviet society was never acknowledged or investigated, but it was Gorky who served as the main bridge, the main link, between Soviet society and the Russian classical heritage. The Bolsheviks also badly needed him for their legitimacy. It is hard to say what Soviet cultural and ideological development would have been without Gorky.

Gorky had a lasting love-hate relationship with Lenin¹⁶⁹ and recognized the Soviet system after some hesitation. However, he never challenged the legitimacy of the Bolshevik revolution. He was merely more radical than Lenin, and moreover, much that happened later under Stalin could have been seen by Gorky as the materialization of his own radical concepts.

Gorky was a committed radical nationalist-Westernizer. On the one hand, he hated his people as they were. He was ashamed of them and dreamed of elevating them, reeducating them and transforming them into a people equal to the most advanced Western nation. He hated what he termed Russian idleness, laziness, barbarism, cruelty. On the other hand, he was proud to be a Russian and regarded Russians as a most talented people.

Gorky never disclosed why Marxism was not acceptable to him. He would sometimes say, "I am a Marxist not according to Marx but because my skin is tanned so."¹⁷⁰ Probably he wanted to stress that his outlook was not imported but was a result of his own internal development. Indeed, his Bolshevism did not have very much in common with classical Marxism. His famous novel *Mother*, written in 1906 and declared by the Bolsheviks to be the model for the so-called socialist realism, has more in common with Christian socialism. Apart from that, the intellectuals who help Russian workers in this novel are simply their friends and their educators, not their leaders. Gorky presented the Russian working movement in this novel as an authentic Russian movement with no alien influences. It is strange that the non-Marxist character of this novel was widely ignored.

In the first period of his revolutionary passion, Gorky adopted Slav revolutionary nationalism, which he had taken from Herzen and Bakunin. More important, the period of his love affair with Slav nationalism coincided with his closest contacts with Lenin, who never reprimanded Gorky for such ideas. In Gorky's private letters, one can find pure Herzen and Bakunin themes. He speaks of the youth of Russia, which makes the country better than ancient Europe. In December 1906, he wrote: "Our mother country is a good country and now it is playing first violin in the world concert. . . . It will play it for a long time and as well as at the beginning. Old and shabby Europe is very comical in its surprise when it speaks of Russia and does not conceal its fear of anarchism which is . . . organically inherent in the Slave race."¹⁷¹

After his emigration in 1906, Gorky for a time was even struck by national desperation and cast doubts on Russia's ability to survive.¹⁷² Then, however, he advanced a new version of radical Russian nationalism.¹⁷³ According to him, Russia has two souls, Occidental and Oriental—not socially but biologically. Russian or Slav blood is Occidental, and Mongol blood, historically injected into the Russians, is Oriental. It is this Oriental blood that is responsible for all the negative features of the Russian character. According to Gorky, the Russians are poisoned by this thick Mongol blood, which makes them passive. (Doubtless, he regarded Russian peasants as predominantly Mongol.) "The struggle between God and the Devil in the Russian soul is the struggle between the Slav and the Mongol," said Gorky.¹⁷⁴ The Russian revolution must be a decisive turn to the West, and one might conclude that for Gorky, this revolution also had to be demographic.

"Forward"—Left-Wing Bolshevism

If one tries to seek the essence of pure Bolshevism, unbridled by Lenin, one can first examine a Bolshevik splinter group *Vpered* [Forward], which united many, if not all, leading Bolshevik intellectuals. This group challenged Lenin's leadership both organizationally and intellectually. It was defeated and reintegrated into the Bolshevik party; nevertheless, this group exercised an enormous ideological impact on Soviet society, both under Lenin and after him.

Its leaders were an outstanding philosopher, Alexander Bogdanov (1873-1928), after the revolution the chairman of the so-called Proletcult [Proletarian culture], which tried to develop a purely class culture; Anatoly Lunatcharsky (1875-1933), philosopher and writer, after the revolution the people's commissar for education; Mikhail Pokrovsky, the chief official Soviet historian after the revolution and also deputy people's commissar for education (during the Bolshevik revolution he was chairman of the Moscow Soviet); Leonid Krasin (1870-1926), a leader of the Bolshevik fighting squads during the 1905 revolution, a prominent electrical engineer, and the people's commissar for external commerce after the revolution; Viatcheslav Menzhinsky (1874-1934), future chairman of the Soviet political police; Dmitry Manuilsky

(1883-1959), a future Comintern leader and after World War II Ukrainian foreign minister; a Duma deputy, Grigory Alexinsky, who later defected from Soviet Russia; Mikha Tskhakaia (1865-1950), a leading Georgian Bolshevik and a friend of Stalin; Iliia Trainin (1887-1949), chief Soviet expert in law under Stalin; and several future Soviet mass media leaders: Pavel Lebedev-Poliansky (1881-1948), Platon Kerzhentsev (1881-1940), and Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov. But even more important, this group enjoyed the firm support of Gorky for several years. Also, many leading "Forwardists" later supported Stalin, and almost none of them suffered during his purge. People such as Gorky, Menzhinsky, Manuilsky, Lebedev-Poliansky, Kerzhentsev, and Trainin constituted a foundation for Stalin's rule.

The ideology of the Forwardists was an extremely important contribution to the nationalization and totalitarianism of Bolshevism. One can even claim that the Forwardists advanced many major concepts of the national orientation of Bolshevism while Lenin was sometimes a conservative force who tried to check them. Let us analyze the main points of Forwardism as left-wing Bolshevism.

Radicalism

Forwardists were more radical than Lenin himself. They were decisively against any parliamentary activity in a capitalist society, and they always encouraged Bolshevik militancy. Bogdanov and Krasin were leaders of the Bolshevik fighting squads. They encouraged and organized so-called expropriations, which were in fact robberies, in their money-raising campaign. As has been claimed, Bogdanov and not Lenin was the main theoretician of expropriation. For example, money raised as the result of such a bank robbery in the Ural town of Mias was used by such outstanding intellectuals as Bogdanov, Lunatcharsky, and Gorky to arrange the famous "Capri school" for Bolshevik activists.¹⁷⁵ It is not by sheer fancy that Forwardists regarded their movement as genuine Bolshevism in comparison with Lenin's "reformism."

Human Engineering

The Forwardists advanced a theory according to which human progress is determined by the extent of energy accumulated in a society. They relied on the so-called energetism of a German chemist, Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), according to whom the main criterion for the level of evolution is the level of released energy. It was easy for the Forwardists to come to the conclusion that the pitiful state of Russians as a whole, and especially the Russian peasantry, might be explained by the fact that their implicit energy was not being used because of age-old oppression. The Russian as a barbarian and an idler must be transformed, his enormous but sleeping energy must be awakened and mobilized in order to achieve the energetic level of an American or a European. Left-wing Bolsheviks hated those Russians who wasted their time in senseless and useless conversations, in idleness, in drunkenness. They dreamed of a Faustian Russian for whom what was then regarded as genius would be the norm in the future.¹⁷⁶ Human life



Alexander Bogdanov (photo from *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, vol. 11 [Moscow, 1930], p. 288).

must be thoroughly rationalized, all useless human passions that hamper human life must be eliminated. Left-wing Bolsheviks felt the deepest hatred for Russian peasants, who they believed were the materialization of morbid Asiatic elements: cruelty, slyness, senselessness.

These Bolsheviks believed the Orient was the kingdom of sleep doomed to obscurantism. Lunatcharsky was probably the first of the Bolsheviks to introduce the distinction between the active Western man and the passive Oriental man. "An active man of the Occident," Lunatcharsky wrote, "in the case of any pain, any trouble, any catastrophe, tries to find the reason and to find a radical remedy. The passive man of the Orient in this case uses narcotics and even simply resorts to resignation."¹⁷⁷

Naturally, energetism easily integrated Nietzscheanism as the cult of the most beautiful and most fit people, who experience no compassion for weak and imperfect humans. Therefore, the elimination of individuals who cannot be transformed is welcomed, a situation that later brought disastrous consequences in Soviet times. A superhuman is the human whose energy is fully released. Faust became Lunatcharsky's ideal. He said: "This thirst for power over other souls, this marvelous, bright struggle for domination, the life struggle for his ideals against other inferior ideals . . . I want to

live for ages, I want to overcome, since it is I who bear the beauty, the fullness of life, of energy. . . . Such a person has a right to be cruel and must be cruel, he must be an egoist since his victory is the victory of superior forms of life."¹⁷⁸

Essentially, this ideology prepared the ground for the mass genocide of Russian peasants, which by no means contradicted the nationalism of left-wing Bolsheviks, who wanted to see the new Russian people as better than all contemporary Western peoples. The genocide was to them rather a selection of the fit, a "human engineering."

Human history had provided the Russian Bolsheviks with such a model, which they almost did not mention. Essentially, Moses was confronted by the same problem. He also had a love-hate relationship with his people and did not want to take them into the promised land until the generation of slaves would be fit for the new life. Moses waited until this change had been accomplished, even though by this criterion he himself was not deserving of acceptance into the new life. The Bolsheviks did not have Moses' patience, and they were ready for any selection that would eliminate their barbaric Oriental fellow Russians who could undermine the promised land.

We have seen that Tkatchev considered the same problem but did not go further than the idea of reeducating the Russian people. Brilliant Bolshevik intellectuals, equipped with the latest achievements of Germany's philosophy of science, came to more radical conclusions. It was not Trotsky or Grigory Zinoviev (Radomyslsky, 1883-1936) who first advanced the idea of the genocide of Russian peasantry at the time of collectivization in 1928-1933, but Bogdanov, Lunatcharsky, Gorky, and others, and Menzhinsky, as chairman of the secret police, carried out the idea on the operational level. Stalin was merely a means of accomplishing all the radical ideas suggested before the revolution.

Totalitarian Democracy

The Forwardists professed a pure totalitarian democracy that was very close to the model formulated by the Israeli historian Yakov Talmon.¹⁷⁹ They used the term "collectivism," which was intimately connected to Ostwald's energetism. "How wide should the circle of my 'ego' be?" asked Ostwald.

Everybody recognizes that it covers family and nation. That it must embrace all humanity seems to the majority a theoretical rather than a practical demand. . . . In its contemporary state man assigns too much importance to an individual. . . . An ordinary man whose disappearance would not leave any lacunae cannot have the same quest for life. Such a view is a rule of life in certain nations closer to nature. That is why such a deep impression was made on us by the unusual low esteem (alien to us) for individual existence with which we become acquainted in talented descriptions of the life of the Russian people. We feel as if this people owns the truth that is alien to us. This truth binds them closer to nature than us.¹⁸⁰

(Ostwald probably had in mind the famous literary image of Platon Karataev from Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.) All the philosophy of Russian totalitarian democracy, including national implications and posed as collectivism, might be deduced from this quotation from Ostwald. Indeed, family and nation are the breeding grounds for collectivism, not for an abstract humanity.

It is clear that collectivism was a militant antipersonalist and totalitarian concept. Personality was thoroughly rejected and could be sacrificed to a collective (a nation), but only if the collective benefited. The national dimension of collectivism was stressed by an accent on language and folklore as the best cultural achievements of a collective. Collective became simply a synonym for the nation as an ethnic entity. Therefore, any partial losses sacrificed in order to achieve a goal were recognized as legitimate. What did it matter if even 10 to 20 percent of the population would perish if the whole would benefit? The immense scale of Russia's population encouraged this antipersonalistic approach.

The program of collectivism was publicly declared in 1909 for the first time in a collection called *Essays in the Philosophy of Collectivism*.¹⁸¹ For Bogdanov, collectivism was simply an implication of the human struggle for survival against nature. He said that "the amalgamation of individual lives in one immense whole, which is harmonious in the interrelations of its parts, arranges and orders all the elements for the common struggle against infinite and elementary nature."¹⁸² Bogdanov repeated Ostwald's criterion: "Progress is the growth of the sum of life."¹⁸³ Bogdanov saw ideology as strictly instrumental because it is only a tool in the struggle for survival,¹⁸⁴ an individual human being is a microcosm that becomes part of a macrocosm only in relation to other microcosms.¹⁸⁵ An individual is not self-contained; the human struggle against one another must be eliminated.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the human experience is not individual. As a result of his views, Bogdanov turned to Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843-1896) in order to make their philosophy of empiriocriticism into the comprehensive philosophy of collectivism.¹⁸⁷

The national implications of collectivism were stronger for Lunatcharsky and Gorky. The former introduced the concept of "species consciousness,"¹⁸⁸ according to which an individual's life is only incidental, and the species is the basic phenomenon. One can see the evident parallel to Karl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). Indeed, Lunatcharsky studied in Zurich where Jung worked and was influenced not only by his teacher, Avenarius. According to Lunatcharsky, "the growth of species consciousness is the great process of the return of consciousness to the biologically subconscious truth."¹⁸⁹

Lunatcharsky said that "big masses create in their act of collective creativity a huge, complicated, very neatly interrelated world of dreams, sounds, rituals, concepts. But first of all they try to create the language."¹⁹⁰ It is quite clear that if language is a principal achievement of collective creativity, the collective is organically national and any alien influence on such a collective is not organic. Lunatcharsky expected socialism to restore genuine collectivism, which implicitly anticipated its nationalization. From

this point, Lunatcharsky arrived at a total rejection of the intelligentsia as a creative force because it was individualistic.

The most passionate declaration of totalitarian democracy was made by Gorky. If the views of Bogdanov and Lunatcharsky in this collection of essays were not integrated by Soviet official ideology, Gorky's article was reprinted during the Soviet era and influenced Soviet culture very strongly. People, according to Gorky, are the only creator of all culture. An individual is a conservative factor in the creative process. Moreover, an individual who tries to be superior to others must be eliminated.¹⁹¹ Gorky quoted with sympathy an ancient source according to which the Volga Bulgarians hanged everyone who manifested too much knowledge or mind.¹⁹² The same motives can be found among the early Slavophiles.¹⁹³ Gorky also remarked that all the best heroes of literature, such as Hamlet or Don Juan, were taken from folklore.¹⁹⁴ This is another example of how the utmost cruelty to a people and even their mass extermination are perfectly compatible with radical nationalism. The doctrine of such a nationalism is utterly antipersonalist and only statistical.

It might seem that this totalitarian democracy was incompatible with the concept of absolute leadership imposed on the Bolsheviks by Lenin. Indeed, the Forwardists opposed Lenin's leadership and were highly critical of him as a personality. Later, however, many of them enthusiastically supported Stalin as a person whom they accepted as a materialization of the people's will. By the way, it was the Forwardist Krasin who first suggested after the revolution the concept of personal administration versus the concept of collective administration.¹⁹⁵

Deification of the People

The last and most extreme conclusion of totalitarian democracy was the deification of the collective through the new religion. If even a nonreligious collectivism had strong national implications, such a deification could go too far and result in the deification of the Russian people. This trend became famous as so-called God-building¹⁹⁶ and was also imported. Its main original contributors were Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857). The Forwardists were also directly influenced by a German socialist, Joseph Dietzgen (1828-1888), who advanced the same idea. The first time Gorky, a principal God-builder after Lunatcharsky, mentioned this idea in a letter was in 1902.¹⁹⁷

God-building implied that a human collective, through the concentration of released human energy, can perform the same miracles that were assigned to supernatural beings: for example, to heal the incurably sick. Early Christianity was regarded by the God-builders as an authentic example of collective God-building, so Christ was nothing other than the focus of collective human energy.¹⁹⁸ When this concentration relaxed, God naturally died. Therefore, God belonged to the same category as language, dreams, and folklore. "The time will come," said Gorky, "when all popular will shall once again amalgamate in one point. Then an invincible and miraculous power will emerge, and God will be resurrected."¹⁹⁹

The West

In spite of their self-professed internationalism and Westernism, the Forwardists expressed their rejection of the West:

1. They claimed that Russia was in fact a colony of advanced Western countries and that the high standard of living of Western workers might be explained by their share in the high profits of their employers.
2. At the same time, like Lenin, the Forwardists tried to inflate the extent of Russian capitalist development in order to claim Russia's readiness for revolution.
3. They stressed the Russian revolutionary tradition in Bolshevism, pointing to Russian non-Marxist socialists as their predecessors and ignoring nobody.
4. They stressed the purely Russian character of the revolutionary movement in their country and claimed that all the national movement in the Russian empire had only a marginal character. Moreover, the Russian revolution was regarded by them as an "assertion of national independence."
5. They saw Western socialism in a negative light.
6. They anticipated that the future Russian revolution would be contained in the Russian state and national boundaries.

In the meantime, these left-wing Bolsheviks diligently imitated Western and predominantly German theories, only tailoring them to their objectives.

The first point was strongly advanced by Alexinsky²⁰⁰ and Pokrovsky,²⁰¹ and they did not differ from Lenin in the extent to which this point was suggested by him later. For his part, Gorky warned that there was a threat that Russia would collapse under the thrust of European capital. On the eve of World War I, Gorky resorted to arguments, later repeated by Lenin, warning that "expansionist and antihuman trends of European and American capitalism endanger the very existence of culture and civilization."²⁰² The difference between Lenin and Gorky is that Gorky did not blame Russia for expansionism as Lenin did. "The European [business] capital," Gorky said, "has for a long time been looking at Russia as if she were one of its colonies. It does not want Russian political revival. On the contrary, it prefers that we should remain forever in a state of disastrous anarchy."²⁰³

The main proponent of the second trend was Pokrovsky, who published an extensive book on this subject on the eve of World War I.²⁰⁴ He was also the main advocate of the Russian revolutionary tradition as distinguished from the Western revolutionary tradition. With regard to the low esteem accorded Western socialists, no one made this point more strongly than Bogdanov did in his science-fiction novel, *Red Star*, published in 1909, in which he presented the entire problem of Russian-Western relations in coded form. A group of Martians is looking for a representative of the terrestrial revolutionary intelligentsia in order to invite him to Mars, where socialism was established long before. In spite of all their efforts, they

cannot find anyone suitable among Western socialists. One of the Martians who had tried to find somebody suitable in France, for example, sends a telegram to Mars: "There is nothing to look for here."²⁰⁵ The choice eventually falls on a Russian socialist named Leonid. Probably Bogdanov was hinting at his friend Leonid Krasin.

Pokrovsky later compared Western European workers with Russian workers, saying, "The Russian workers were revolutionary under any circumstances, the Western only when threatened."²⁰⁶ Russia was declared the most revolutionary country in the world—not only in the twentieth century, but ever.

Lunatcharsky was also a very ardent anti-Westernizer. For him, even Gorky was too much of a Westernizer. In 1916, Lunatcharsky complained to the writer Romain Rolland (1866-1944) that Gorky had forgotten that the contemporary West was far from being a good model. Lunatcharsky was going to publish a collection of essays with the main thesis that each nation must be open to the creative life of other nations, without losing its individuality. Their different characters, the lack of similarity of their genius, are exactly the strongest ties between them as, for example, the diversity of musical instruments and their parts in a symphony.²⁰⁷ Lunatcharsky did not change his basic attitude after the revolution. In 1926, he said that "internationalism, understood in a Communist and a Leninist way, is a force that brings extremely sharp outlines of national faces into aesthetic and daily life, and also brings an extraordinary unity of their separate tunes into the universal-cultural concert and the single symphony."²⁰⁸ Gorky repeatedly called for the same kind of internationalism—namely, for the strong integration of all nations that populated the existing Russian empire in order to prevent its disintegration.²⁰⁹

The left-wing Bolsheviks anticipated a fatal Russian-German confrontation and were very suspicious of German Social Democrats. In Bogdanov's above-mentioned novel, the Martians (in a clear reminder of victorious German socialism) decide to destroy inferior terrestrial life in order to extract the energy that is vitally needed by them (a situation very similar to that of the German-Slav contest). However, a small group of Martians who are loyal to the terrestrial revolution prevent the catastrophe.

The most explicit geopolitical concern was expressed by Gorky. He warned of a possible German invasion as early as 1908.²¹⁰ He was decisively against any Russian involvement in Asia, warning in 1910 that "the Germans will achieve our complete isolation in Europe and once again will push us to Asia. Meanwhile," Gorky added, "they will take the Balkans."²¹¹ According to Gorky, Germany "is strengthening her militarism and tramples down all European culture. . . . I don't feel any growth of its culture. . . . I don't believe in Germany. . . . Soon they will thrust us from Europe. . . . 'Go away, go away,' they will tell us, 'go beyond Ural, why are you meddling here? Go out!' We will certainly quarrel, we will not go, but they will use against us artillery, artillery."²¹²

The most violent anti-German statement was made by Gorky in 1912. In a letter to a monarchist, he in fact repeated the claim of Bakunin and

Herzen that on the one hand, Russia is ruled by Germans and on the other, Germany wants to destroy Russia. Gorky said:

Doesn't it seem to you "patriots" that Europe, and especially Russia's closest neighbors, the Germans, enjoy the rotting and decomposition of your country—a process which you diligently serve? Doesn't it seem to you that Russia's helplessness is pleasant and comfortable to somebody, since the moment is approaching when healthy people who are not accustomed to be shy would come to you and say plainly: "Listen, boys, enough of behaving like hooligans. We are sick and tired of it. It's clear that you can't take care of things without Varangians. You're not capable of independent action. You need the strong hand of a master who would impose order on your country. In your savage situation, you are more dangerous to European culture than China was some time ago. Therefore we have decided to split you up, in a friendly way, just as you innocently split Poland some time ago—to divide you and start educating you."

Why have Prussian rulers misleadingly advised Alexander III and Nikolai II not to implement radical political reforms in Russia?

Why does Prussia always push the Russian government to the Far East, to Asia? and now once again, not without the influence of good neighbors, there are those of our people who contemplate the annexation of Manchuria?

Is it not because it is useful to have on one's side a country culturally weaker and incapable of resistance? And don't they calculate that we would stagnate in Asia for a hundred years in the war against China, we would exhaust our forces, we would weaken China and thus double their profits? Russia is exhausted, and the "yellow peril" is repelled, the peril with which Germany has intimidated Europe for a long time with the plain intention of first frightening Russia. And while we would be tied hand and foot by the struggle in Asia, Germany would take over Europe, would consolidate her power, and would then impose order upon our country. . . .

Why do the majority of Baltic Germans, those Barons, play their role in Russian history of employed servants whose duty is to grip Russians by the neck?

You cry: Russia for Russians! Away with the aliens!

If you wish, you can accomplish this proud slogan—start! Let me point out the alien family, the most harmful to Russia, the family which has already been mercilessly devastating our country for more than a hundred years, and three times during this period has brought it to national disaster. I am talking about the descendants of the Holstein prince Karl Ulrich who ruled in Russia under the name of Peter the Third, and his wife, the princess of Zerbst, Sophie Auguste, who also ruled under the name of Catherine the Second.²¹³

The direct line from Herzen to Gorky is evident.

Cultural Continuity

Cultural continuity was a matter of controversy among left-wing Bolsheviks. Bogdanov more consistently rejected any cultural continuity except purely collectivist popular culture.²¹⁴ All other culture is irrelevant for the proletariat. He and his followers advanced the concept of proletarian culture;

TABLE 2.1
Composition of Fifth Party Congress (1907)

	Bolsheviks	Mensheviks
Russians	82 (78.1%)	33 (34.4%)
Jews	12 (11.4%)	22 (22.9%)
Georgians	3 (2.9%)	28 (29.2%)
Other	8 (7.6%)	13 (13.5%)

after the revolution, Bogdanov managed to create the above-mentioned Proletcult, which was at first very influential but eventually dwindled away.

Meanwhile, inconsistent leftists such as Lunatcharsky and Gorky saw the cultural heritage, especially classical literature, as a value that must be incorporated into the new socialist society. In 1907, Lunatcharsky even advanced an idea according to which the Bolsheviks would be the moderating force in the destructive revolutionary explosion—which is essentially what happened. "If the revolutionaries would not restrain the explosion of energy of the rebellious masses and would not channel it, terrible things might happen. . . . Only we have the power to prevent Russia from . . . the real folly which is approaching."²¹⁵ (This was also Herzen's idea in 1869, as we have seen earlier.)

The Jews and Bolshevism

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jews became a most important revolutionary force in Russia. Besides the Jewish revolutionary movement proper, (the Bund and Zionist socialism), there was the active integration of Jews into all Russian revolutionary parties. Pokrovsky claimed before the revolution that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Jews constituted 25-33 percent of the leadership in all revolutionary parties,²¹⁶ and Lunatcharsky told Romain Rolland in April 1917 that the Jews dominated Russian socialism.²¹⁷ Meanwhile, Russian conservatives were deeply convinced that the revolutionary movement consisted exclusively of Jews. Witte claimed that Jews were also the main base for the liberal Constitutional Democrats (Cadets).²¹⁸

In fact, the Bolsheviks were the least popular revolutionary party among the Jews. The Mensheviks attracted them more. Alexinsky told the Fifth Party Congress that Jews mainly supported the Mensheviks, and the distribution of Jews between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks can be seen from the composition of the Fifth Party Congress (April-May 1907) (Table 2.1).²¹⁹

Let us take a deeper look at what kind of Jews supported the various revolutionary parties. The Bund consisted mostly of non-Russified Yiddish-speaking Jews; they demanded extraterritorial cultural autonomy but regarded

themselves as an organic part of Russia. The Zionists were oriented toward emigration.

The majority of the Menshevik leaders were a part of the well-educated Russian Jewish intelligentsia from the Pale of Settlement. They were Russified but came from circles with strong Jewish national backgrounds. Jewish Bolsheviks came from two different groups, which considerably influenced their political future. The members of one group came from noneducated Jewish families within the Pale of Settlement and were educated in cosmopolitan cities like Odessa or non-Russian cities like Warsaw. Then they fled to the West, not even visiting the central part of Russia. Such was the destiny of Trotsky, Zinoviev,²²⁰ Moses Uritsky (1873-1918),²²¹ Moses Volodarsky (Goldshtein, 1871-1918),²²² Joseph Piatnitsky (Tarsis), 1882-1936,²²³ Yakov Drobnis (1890-1936),²²⁴ and others. Another group of Jewish Bolsheviks came not from the Pale of Settlement but from central Russia itself and even from Siberia. They graduated from Russian schools and were utterly Russified.

A future Soviet president, Yakov Sverdlov (1885-1919), was born in Nizhny Novgorod and confessed that he had never personally experienced any anti-Semitism.²²⁵ Emelian Yaroslavsky (Gubelman, 1878-1943), a party secretary under Stalin and chairman of the party control committee, was born in the Siberian town of Chita. Grigory Sokolnikov (Brilliant, 1888-1939) graduated from a Moscow gymnasium and was friendly with Sergei Durylin (1877-1954), then a prominent literary critic but soon to become a Russian Orthodox priest.²²⁶ Sokolnikov was so Russified that even a rabid anti-Semitic defector, Sergei Dmitrievsky, a former general director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry who violently attacked all the leading Jewish Bolsheviks, spared Sokolnikov, then deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, from his criticism and said, "He is a Jew, but from those circles of the Jewish intelligentsia who consider the Russian cause to be their own."²²⁷

Solomon Lozovsky (Dridzo, 1878-1952), the future leader of the Communist Trade Union International (Profintern) and then a deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs during World War II, came from the pale, but he served in the Russian army and lived in central Russia, also having been exposed to intensive Russification.²²⁸ An active member of Forward, Martyn Liadov (Mandelshtam, 1872-1947), was born in Moscow.²²⁹ Some people make the mistake of regarding Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld, 1883-1936) and Yuri Steklov (Nakhamkes, 1873-1941) as Jews.²³⁰ They were half-Jews whose Jewish parents had converted to Christianity and can by no means be regarded as Jews.²³¹

The first group of Jewish Bolsheviks was therefore more internationalist, and the second, highly Russified, group had little internationalist concern. The latter, with ease, later joined Stalin's camp against Trotsky.

Lenin definitely regarded the Jewish problem as central for several very important reasons. First, he had clashed with the Bund. That group challenged the Russian Social Democrats, and especially the Bolsheviks, on several points: for instance, the Bund demanded a federative party structure, which

Lenin rejected categorically as a challenge to his absolute power. But there was another aspect. Lenin probably never really believed in the organizational abilities of Russians. In a private conversation with Gorky, he remarked that every clever Russian was Jewish or had some Jewish blood in his or her ancestry.²³²

Jews were therefore regarded by Lenin as a very valuable stock of dynamic people who could be a mobilizing force in the Russian revolution. He could not help attacking the Bund since the Bund was a manifestation of Jewish isolationism, but he badly needed the Jews. There was also another aspect of the Jewish problem: an international one. Jews constituted an international network with wide political influence in leading Western countries. Therefore, in the framework of Lenin's quest for Russian world political leadership, Jews must serve the role of natural Russian allies, which had been assigned by Herzen and Bakunin only to Slavs. The omnipresent Jewish minority could fulfill the same role in spreading the new social message, the new *lux ex Orient*, as it had done for Christianity.

Lenin realized how important the Jews were in the Russian and international socialist movements. Quite apart from Marx and Lassalle, there were Kautsky, Bernstein, Hugo Haase (1863-1919), and Rosa Luxemburg in Germany; Victor Adler (1852-1918) and Otto Bauer (1882-1938) in Austria; Anna Kulishova (Rosenshtein, 1857-1925) in Italy. To take firm control over the Jewish socialist movement became Lenin's top priority. In his zeal he interpreted the very idea of the Jewish nation as a Zionist idea.²³³ It should therefore not be surprising that Bundism or Zionism could be seen as a very serious obstacle to the success of the Russian revolutionary movement and should be destroyed.

However, Lenin's idea of Jewish importance did not give Jews the right to be leaders of the Russian revolutionary movement, only its soldiers and officers. Any ambition on the part of Jews to take the lead was met with utmost hostility. Many Russian socialists were anti-Semites, and the first Russian Marxist—Plekhanov—was also anti-Semitic, in spite of the fact that his wife was Jewish. In 1900, the young Lenin was embarrassed by an anti-Semitic explosion on the part of Plekhanov. Lenin later remembered that

on the question of our attitude towards the Bund, Plekhanov displayed extreme intolerance and openly declared it to be an organisation of exploiters who exploit the Russians and not a Social-Democratic organisation. He said that our aim was to eject this Bund from the Party, that the Jews are all chauvinists and nationalists, that a Russian party should be Russian and should not render itself into "captivity" to the "brood of vipers," etc. None of our objections to these indecent speeches had any result and Plekhanov stuck to his ideas to the full, saying that we simply did not know enough about the Jews, that we had no real experience in dealing with Jews.²³⁴

Characteristically, Lenin never accused Plekhanov of anti-Semitism; not one of the Russian Social Democratic leaders, including Axelrod, a Jew, who witnessed Plekhanov's outburst, reacted to it. Together with some lip-

service condemning pogroms, Plekhanov repeatedly manifested his anti-Semitism, although never publicly or in any explicit form. He was less hostile to Zionism since he was probably not very enthusiastic about the massive Jewish presence in Russia.²³⁵ Plekhanov taught Lenin a valuable lesson, and the latter never hesitated to take advantage of anti-Semitism for political reasons.

Bolshevik anti-Semitism, though concealed, was widespread and supported by Jewish Bolsheviks themselves. The future chief of the Soviet political police, a Pole, Felix Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926), who later married a Jewish woman, referred in 1903 to the Bund in almost the same insulting manner as Plekhanov. "There is no doubt," he said, "that the Bund blocked the development of Social Democracy. . . . The Bund always stresses its Jewishness, its cleverness and its activity, and confines itself in Jewish national boundaries. . . . It encourages anti-Semitism and all the enemies of the revolution who try to present the entire Social Democrat movement not as a class movement but as a Jewish movement. . . . Everything done by the Bund in this direction . . . can be reduced to the adoption of several 'Christians' to be servants of their Jewish movement."²³⁶

One of the most important manifestations of marked ambivalence toward Jews on the part of the Bolsheviks was Gorky's position.²³⁷ It was not static, and Gorky progressed from a naive and passionate Judophilia to a complicated attitude that combined basic and persistent sympathy for the Jewish people as a national entity, which sometimes included Zionism, and the decisive rejection of any Jewish quest for political domination over Russians and Jewish intervention in Russian spiritual life.

Gorky was the main Russian spokesman against anti-Semitism. At the same time, Gorky referred very approvingly to a play by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), the outstanding Zionist leader and writer, in which Jabotinsky ridiculed Jewish participation in the Russian revolutionary movement and the Jewish wish to be the revolution's leaders.²³⁸ Gorky would, however, have liked to see Jews as administrators of Russian economics, and in 1916 he wrote that "the Jewish organizational talent, their flexibility and restless energy, must be duly estimated in a country as badly organized as our Russia."²³⁹

In spite of the inflated Jewish participation in the revolution, the point that bothered so many people, including the Bolsheviks themselves, was that there was no single Jew who exercised any decisive ideological influence over the revolutionary movement and over the Bolsheviks in particular. As Mensheviks, they were ideological shadows of Plekhanov; as Bolsheviks, they were completely and exclusively under Lenin's political design and could cooperate with him only on his conditions. Lunatcharsky told Romain Rolland in May 1917 that Lenin surrounded himself with fools who did not contradict him.²⁴⁰ If this statement was true, it included all the Jewish Bolsheviks at that time—except Trotsky who joined Lenin later. The central Jew on Lenin's staff was Zinoviev, and the extent of Zinoviev's "independence" was very well illustrated by Trotsky and is confirmed by all the evidence.

In the agitation . . . a great place was occupied by Zinoviev, an orator of extraordinary power. . . . Zinoviev was a born agitator. He knew how to infect himself with the mood of the masses, excite himself with their emotions, and find for their thoughts and feelings a somewhat prolix, perhaps, but very gripping expression. Enemies used to call Zinoviev the greatest demagogue among the Bolsheviks. This was their usual way of paying tribute to his strongest trait—his ability to penetrate the heart of the demos and play upon its strings. It is impossible to deny, however, that being merely an agitator, and neither a theoretician nor a revolutionary strategist, Zinoviev, when he was not restrained by an external discipline, easily slid down the path of demagogism—speaking not in the philistine, but in the scientific sense of that word. That is, he showed an inclination to sacrifice enduring interests to the success of the moment. Zinoviev's agitatorial quick scent made him an extraordinarily valuable counsellor whenever it was a question of estimating political conjunctures—but nothing deeper than that. At meetings of the party he was able to conquer, convince, bewitch, whenever he came with a prepared political idea, tested in mass meetings and, so to speak, saturated with the hopes and hates of the workers and soldiers. On the other hand, Zinoviev was able in a hostile meeting—even in the Executive Committee of those days—to give to the most extreme and explosive thoughts an enveloping and insinuating form, making his way into the minds of those who had met him with a preconceived distrust. In order to achieve these invaluable results, he had to have something more than a consciousness that he was right; he had to have a tranquillising certainty that he was to be relieved of the political responsibility by a reliable and strong hand. Lenin gave him this certainty. . . . He was an ideal mechanism of transmission between Lenin and the masses—sometimes between the masses and Lenin. Zinoviev always followed his teacher except in a very few cases.²⁴¹

With regard to Zinoviev's attempt to challenge Lenin's basic political decision, namely, the rationality of the Bolshevik uprising in October 1917, that attempt was rudely suppressed by Lenin, and Zinoviev quickly repented. With regard to Trotsky, he joined Lenin only a few months before the Bolshevik revolution, after their long and bitter personal and ideological struggle. Trotsky differed from Lenin in major issues of theory and politics.²⁴² Nevertheless, all their differences were completely irrelevant since, when Trotsky joined Lenin, he abandoned all his previous "heresy" and submitted to Lenin completely. Any attempt of his to deviate from Lenin's policy was immediately restrained, as, for example, in Brest-Litovsk during the negotiations with the Germans in 1918. Only after 1923, when Lenin was sick and Trotsky was challenged by Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, did Trotsky step by step repeat his old theories as if he had been advancing them all the time during the period 1917-1923. Contrary to what is widely believed, Trotsky was only a top-rank executive under Lenin, no more. There is important evidence from left-wing Social Revolutionary sources published in 1917 that all matters of the Bolshevik government were even then decided, not by Trotsky, but by Lenin and—Stalin.²⁴³

There were two Trotskys: the first before 1917 and after 1923-1925 and the second between 1917 and 1923. The first was under the strong influence

of Lassalle, Parvus, Luxemburg, and George Sorel (1847-1922); the second was a top-rank Soviet military-administrative executive who acted strictly according to Lenin's guidelines. In 1917, Trotsky became Lenin's medium.

Neither Jew nor Russian could impose any political or ideological option on Lenin in any period, so to speak of Jewish influence as a determinative factor is completely irrelevant. Jewish Bolsheviks did not give Bolshevism any remarkable theoretician. Only Trotsky can to some extent be claimed to have made a theoretical contribution, but, as has been said, Trotsky's theoretical writings had no influence whatsoever on Bolshevism. There is also a claim that Parvus exercised an allegedly strong conceptual impact on the Russian revolution; this claim is based on misinformation.²⁴⁴ Parvus, as will be demonstrated, was no more than a German intelligence talent-spotter among Russian revolutionaries and a German intelligence contact with the Bolsheviks.

Jewish participation in the Russian and the Bolshevik revolutions was very central, but it was not Jews who initiated the revolutionary process and directed it. They were used very extensively and were recruited by many revolutionary organizations, but they served not "as masters but as shopkeepers and salesmen of the Russian revolution," as Pasmanik said.²⁴⁵ A most interesting observation was made by the German Slavist Walter Biehahn, who said that "the Russian Revolution found an excellent medium in Jewish internationalism to spread its ideas over the world so it would seem that all the Communist-Bolshevik movement proceeds from Jews."²⁴⁶ According to Biehahn, this rule was only an optical illusion since the Russian revolution was an entirely Russian phenomenon. Biehahn wrote these lines in 1935 in Nazi Germany, and thus opposed the official Nazi interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution.

It is interesting how Trotsky himself tried to explain the Jewish role in the Russian revolution. His explanation does not differ in principle from the explanations of Pasmanik and Biehahn:

Since the intelligentsia of the oppressed nationalities—concentrated as they were for the most part in cities—had flowed copiously into the revolutionary ranks, it is not surprising that among the old generation of revolutionaries the number of non-Russians was especially large. Their experience, although not always of a high quality, made them irreplaceable when it came to inaugurating new social forms. The attempt, however, to explain the policy of the soviets and the course of the whole revolution by an alleged "predominance" of non-Russians is pure nonsense. Nationalism in this case again reveals its scorn for the real nation—that is, the people—representing them in the period of their great national awakening as a mere block of wood in alien and accidental hands. But why and how did the non-Russians acquire such miracle-working power over the native millions? As a matter of fact, at a moment of deep historic change, the bulk of a nation always presses into its service those elements which were yesterday most oppressed, and therefore are most ready to give expression to the new tasks. It is not that aliens lead the revolution, but that the revolution makes use of the aliens. . . . In any case, the non-Russian intelligentsia of 1917 were distributed among the same

parties as the one hundred per cent Russians, suffered from the same vices, made the same mistakes—and moreover the non-Russians among the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries displayed a most particular zeal for the defense and unity of Russia.²⁴⁷

Marx, Engels, Herzen, Bakunin—all committed a mistake. Not the Slavs but the Jews became the main international outlet of the Russian advance against Europe and the rest of the world. It was Lenin's genius to rely on them and on other national minorities in the revolution. However, this reliance on Jews meant their national annihilation.

The Russian Authorities Versus Bolshevism

An extremely important and usually neglected aspect of the nationalization of Bolshevism was the attitude of the Russian authorities to it, which later became tacit support of Bolshevism by the Russian political police.

There was something like a list of priorities in the Russian political police (Okhrana). Several former Okhrana chief officials stressed that neither Social Democrats as a whole nor Bolsheviks were regarded as the number-one enemy, since they did not practice terror. As some of them claimed, the main danger lay with the Social Revolutionaries and anarchists who did practice terror. Nevertheless, one can cast doubts on the authenticity of some of these claims, made for example by Alexei Vasiliev (1869-?)²⁴⁸ and Alexander Gerasimov (1861-?).²⁴⁹ The Russian government's most important concerns were the liberals and the ghost of the alleged Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Nobody cared about the Marxists. Bertram Wolfe noticed, for example, that socialism never worried the Russian minister of internal affairs, von Plehve.²⁵⁰

Luigi Villari, an Italian historian who visited Russia in 1905, had an important conversation with senior Caucasian police officers and arrived at the following conclusion:

We find in Georgia the same tendency to encourage socialism as an antidote to middle-class constitutionalism and liberalism as in Russia itself. . . . Prince Golitsyn and the bureaucrats of the Plehve school were less afraid of Social Democrats than of the nationalism of the Georgian nobles and intellectuals, whose aims were in the direction of constitutional government of national autonomy which might lead to separation and the break-up of the empire. . . . Prince Golitsyn hoped to create a breach between the Georgian nationalist upper classes and the peasantry and to introduce a mild milk-and-water socialism, sufficient to weaken the autonomists but docile and friendly to the authorities.²⁵¹

As Villari stressed, this pattern was accepted not only in Georgia. One must take into consideration that the Okhrana could legally struggle only against offenders, so that when Vasiliev or Gerasimov did not mention liberals as the main danger, it was only because the latter were not their responsibility. Another former Russian minister of internal affairs, Alexander

Makarov (1857-1919), said during an interrogation by the Provisional government in April 1917 that "parliamentary speeches of leftist groups interested me less . . . than speeches of more moderate groups, which exercised influence over a wide segment of public opinion."²⁵²

The other ogre was the alleged Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Gerasimov reported that during a reception granted him by Tsar Nikolai II, he raised only two questions: the general political situation in Russia and the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy.²⁵³

It is easy to see that the Okhrana was trying to imitate the German policy of socialization of the working class and social democracy. Besides, Lassalle's cooperation with Bismarck was a promising model for Russia. In the beginning, the Okhrana supported what was called "legal Marxism" and even sponsored the first legal Marxist magazine, *Natchalo*, (Beginning) in which Lenin managed to publish his writings.²⁵⁴ Its editor was a prominent and sophisticated police agent, Mikhail Gurovitch (1859-1914), who had spoken to Villari on his visit,²⁵⁵ and it was he who most probably determined the future political destiny of the young Stalin when he was in the Caucasus, as we will see.

However, the Okhrana would not have liked to see a Jew as the Marxist leader.²⁵⁶ For this reason, it was Lenin rather than his rival Martov who received preferential treatment from the police. When Lenin was arrested and exiled in 1897, he was sent to a quite comfortable place in southern Siberia; the climate was tolerable, and he was not far from a large city. He enjoyed good conditions, received books, and so on. However, when Martov, who was regarded by the Okhrana as the leading Marxist and even as a second Marx, was exiled in 1896, he was sent to the far north; there the climate was almost intolerable, and he was almost cut off from the outside world. As a result, Lenin could be creative while Martov could not, and in fact the latter became fatally ill during his exile.

The most important attempt at socialization of the Russian workers came from a former populist, Okhrana Colonel Sergei Zubatov (1864-1917),²⁵⁷ a highly imaginative and daring politician. Zubatov decided to separate the authentic working movement from the intelligentsia, and he suggested that the tsar himself ought to stand above the bourgeoisie and not identify their interests with state interests. If one takes into consideration that the major part of large-scale Russian industry was under foreign and even Jewish control, it follows that the authentic working movement might then acquire Russian national overtones.

What was important was that there was a strong mind behind Zubatov that supplied him with basic political concepts—that of the renegade Lev Tikhomirov, a former populist leader and former friend of Plekhanov who repented and became a committed monarchist.²⁵⁸ Tikhomirov, like Zubatov, did not forget his former socialist concern. After ten to fifteen years of political testing, he decided to integrate his former populist values into his new monarchist outlook. He expressed his ideas in public and suggested the idea of a social monarchy, as in Germany. Tikhomirov's favorites were

Lassalle and Bernstein; he stressed that Lassalle did not humiliate the state or call for its destruction but only condemned the bourgeois police state, which betrayed lofty statist ideals. In Tikhomirov's opinion, it was good that German workers had lost their revolutionary zeal.²⁵⁹

Both Zubatov and Tikhomirov succeeded in making a deep impact on Russian history. The former managed early on to create nonpolitical workers' organizations, but his activity met with stiff resistance from the authorities. His first mistake was used against him, and in 1903 Zubatov was dismissed. A most able Russian official was ousted from Russian political life for good, and he committed suicide in 1917. In his diary, Tikhomirov commented on Zubatov's dismissal: "The officialdom does not want to resurrect monarchy and undermine the domination of bureaucracy."²⁶⁰ One can see from his diary how the existing system disappointed Tikhomirov, in spite of his ostensible loyalty to it.²⁶¹ However, Zubatov left many pupils and followers in the Okhrana, so his influence did not wane after his dismissal, and his plans also found an extremely positive response among Russian workers.

Lenin immediately grasped Zubatov's teachings, and one of the main points in *What Is to be Done?* is that workers per se are essentially only raw material to be used by any imaginative politician. Zubatov confirmed an old idea of Tkatchev's that the Russians are not able to wage a revolution from below without leadership.

One of the most important consequences of Zubatov's activity was the Petersburg workers' movement led by the priest Georgy Gapon (1870-1906), who was encouraged by Zubatov before his dismissal. Gapon was able to incite many thousands of Petersburg workers to turn to the tsar and ask him to improve their terrible conditions. On January 9, 1905, their peaceful demonstration was dispersed by force and there were many innocent victims, even though the tsar had had advance knowledge of their peaceful petition. This deliberate bloodshed was one of the worst crimes of the tsarist government, and it was the starting point of the first Russian revolution of 1905. Nothing contributed more to the wide discredit of the tsarist government than this massacre.

What is bitterly ironic about the events of January 9, 1905, is that it was the Okhrana that in fact launched the first revolution, since without Zubatov, Gapon's petition would have been impossible. Moreover, Gapon never severed his links with the Okhrana, and he was executed by his revolutionary friends when they discovered this fact.

Pokrovsky commented that Zubatov's activity created an enormous breakthrough in the progress of class consciousness of Russian workers.²⁶² Much later, Gorky was to hint in his novel that Lenin was highly encouraged by Zubatov,²⁶³ meaning that Bolshevism as a political movement had emerged as a reinterpretation of police activity.

Indeed, Zubatov's original success could have deeply frustrated orthodox Marxists, who would have liked to rely on only the internal dynamics of the working movement. No serious politicians could afterward rely on the inherent revolutionary potential of Russian workers. The latter had to be

organized by the revolutionary elite, exactly as Tkatchev had advised. Russian workers were mostly peasants who had only recently moved to cities; they were monarchist minded, antiliberal, antidemocratic, and nationalist. For this reason, Lenin acknowledged publicly for the first time in *What Is to Be Done?* the grandeur of Tkatchev's design.²⁶⁴

One of the most important areas of Okhrana attitudes to the Bolsheviks was the massive penetration of the latter by police moles. There was no time when Lenin was not screened by one or more police agents, and the police knew everything about the Bolsheviks. For example, when Lenin was abroad he was screened by Yakov Zhitomirsky (1880-?), who was not only a Russian agent but a Russian-German double agent. He was first employed by the Prussian police, who later loaned him to the Russian police.²⁶⁵ German intelligence, therefore, knew everything about the Bolsheviks long before it employed Parvus and others.

Before World War I, Lenin had several police moles in his narrow circle, including such leading Bolsheviks as Duma deputy Roman Malinovsky (1876-1918), Miron Tchernomazov (1882-?), Matvei Briandinsky (1879-?), Alexander Romanov (1881-1917), and others. Three of the seven members of the Petersburg Bolshevik party committee were police agents (Malinovsky, Briandinsky, and Romanov);²⁶⁶ still, according to a veteran Bolshevik, Tsetsilia Zelikson-Bobrovskaja (1876-1960), the Moscow and not the Petersburg party organization had beaten all records in provocation.²⁶⁷

There were serious allegations against many leading Bolsheviks because of their suspected collaboration with the Okhrana. The main Russian socialist spy-hunter, Vladimir Burtsev (1862-1942), who discovered many police superspies, claimed for example that Trotsky was once listed in a Nizhny Novgorod Okhrana archive as an agent.²⁶⁸ Kamenev allegedly enlisted himself as an agent in the Kiev Okhrana department, but after receiving his first paycheck, he cut off his links with the Okhrana.²⁶⁹ There were similar allegations against Krasin,²⁷⁰ Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952),²⁷¹ Viktor Taratuta (1881-1926),²⁷² Nikolai Krylenko (1885-1938),²⁷³ and, what is more conspicuous, against Stalin.²⁷⁴

At any rate, it seems strange that the Okhrana did nothing to bridle Bolshevik activity. All of Lenin's emissaries circulated freely in Russia with full Okhrana knowledge. The Okhrana decided not to hinder the convocation of the Prague conference in 1912; knowing every detail of its preparation, the Okhrana did its best to arrest all the non-Bolshevik members who might participate in the conference.²⁷⁵ This decision sounds even stranger if one takes into account that Prague was then a part of Austria-Hungary, which means that the Austrian and German police, through double agents like Zhitomirsky, also knew what was happening.

Malinovsky, whose Okhrana links were discovered before World War I (he was a most highly paid agent), became a leading Bolshevik and was elected in 1912 to the Duma where he served as the chairman of the Bolshevik Duma faction, which consisted of six deputies. Malinovsky was the most radical Duma speaker. Because of personal pressure from Lenin,

he was elected to the Bolshevik Central Party Committee in 1912 against the stiff resistance of some Bolsheviks. Everything known about Malinovsky permitted his biographer, Ralph Elwood, to come to the conclusion that Lenin was aware of Malinovsky's real activity at least after 1913.²⁷⁶

As far as one can judge, Malinovsky's chief loyalty was to the party and not to the police.²⁷⁷ He voluntarily returned to Bolshevik Russia in 1918 to prove his innocence and was executed. (What makes this affair more sinister is that after his exposure in 1914, Malinovsky had fled to Germany and was used by the Germans for antiwar propaganda purposes among Russian prisoners of war. Does this activity mean that, like Zhitomirsky, he was a double agent?)

According to a very pertinent remark by Ronald Hingley, who investigated the history of the Okhrana, "many policemen-revolutionaries or revolutionary policemen were unable ultimately to distinguish their own true allegiances."²⁷⁸ In September 1914, the director of the Russian police department, Valentin Brun-de-Saint Hypolite (1871-1918), issued secret instructions in which he said, *inter alia*:

Information that comes from party agency sources indicates the recent trend which manifests the wish to unify different existing Russian Social Democratic party factions in order to strengthen the party as a whole and also to bring to all its subsequent actions more organization, more energy, and full coordination. Taking into consideration all the seriousness of this intention and all its undesirability, the police department regards it as necessary to suggest to all chiefs of investigation bureaus to persuade all their secret agents who participate in all kinds of party meetings to suggest and argue insistently the idea of the perfect impossibility of any amalgamation of those factions and especially the amalgamation of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.²⁷⁹

But this instruction was exactly Lenin's line; he was categorically against any cooperation with Mensheviks.

During the interrogation of Sergei Vissarionov (1867-1918), who had been a deputy director of the police department since 1912, the chairman of the Provisional government investigation committee asked him: "How can you explain that all Bolshevik members of the Central Party Committee who were personally known to the police remained at large while Menshevik leaders were arrested one after another? . . . How can one explain that the police department, which knew very well who was a Central Party Committee member and, moreover, knew their whereabouts, did not arrest them?" In his answer, Vissarionov tried to claim that the Bolsheviks were regarded as more dangerous, but he could not explain the irregularity of his department's policy, especially with regard to Malinovsky's case.²⁸⁰

The British journalist E. H. Wilcox, *Daily Telegraph* correspondent throughout the war in Russia who was present during the interrogation of former tsarist officials by the Provisional government, came to an unambiguous conclusion:

Not the least of the sins of the Old Regime was the help it gave to Lenin in the building-up of his organisation and the spreading of his ideas. This was no mere indulgent toleration or passive connivance. Far from it; the Tsar's political police took a very active and enterprising part in the Bolsheviki propaganda, clearing obstacles from its path, assisting in the importation and circulation of its illegal literature, and even supporting it financially. At almost any time subsequent to the crushing of the revolutionary movement of 1905-6, the Ohrana had it in its power completely to destroy the machinery by which the extreme form of Marxian socialism was gradually gaining an ascendancy over the urban masses in Russia, to place the most effective agitators actually in the country under lock and key, and to cut the connections by which the propaganda was directed from beyond the frontier. For its own reasons, it preferred to take Bolshevism under its protection, and if Lenin, on his return to Russia after the second Revolution, found the ground well prepared for his devastating campaign, it was in no small measure due to the work which the Ohrana had done on his behalf.

An autocracy deliberately fostering a conspiracy to upset itself is one of those paradoxes of Oriental politics which the Western mind at first finds it hard to take seriously. As will, however, presently be seen, there can be no doubt whatever as to the facts. In this case, they have been established by a semi-judicial procedure, to the findings of which no objection can be taken. Nor is it so difficult to understand the action of the Ohrana—when once the necessary allowance has been made for the difference between the political practices of East and West—if we consider the motives by which it was actuated. As has already been said, at any time down to the Revolution it could have extinguished organised Bolshevism as one snuffs out a candle. So long as it was in a position to do this, no grave danger threatened from that particular direction at any rate, and it naturally could not foresee a time when Lenin's emissaries would be able to preach his doctrines openly in every factory and every barrack-yard in Russia. But it was only by itself becoming a partner in Bolshevism, by filling the chief executive of the Party with its own agents, that it was enabled to secure this absolute control over the destinies of the extreme Social-Democratic propaganda. Another reason for the peculiar attitude of the Ohrana towards the revolutionary movement in general was of a less legitimate character. This was the desire to maintain and enhance the prestige and power which made the political police the real autocrat of all the Russians. The Ohrana would never have been able to usurp this position unless it had been able to argue with some degree of plausibility that it was the only solid foundation on which the Old Regime rested. Dangers to the State were necessary to justify its existence, and for this reason it preferred to encourage them up to a certain point rather than put an end to them altogether. Probably it was also influenced to some extent by the calculation that violent political theories would have a sedative effect on the propertied classes, and so check the spread of revolutionary sympathies in those quarters where they were most likely to be really dangerous. With the same idea the old German police showed an otherwise unintelligible leniency in its dealings with the more extreme forms of socialism.

Whatever the Ohrana's motives may have been, it seems to have overreached itself. It probably did not reckon sufficiently with the human element in its own service. Gradually it began to lose sight of its own original objects and to associate itself in a half-conscious enthusiasm with the cause of Bolshevism.

Such a process was not only natural, but inevitable. Ulterior motives can never be an effective driving force for the many. The mass of the officials and agents of the Ohrana limited their vision to their immediate purpose, which was the promotion of Bolshevism, and acted as if that was something desirable in itself. Otherwise, it is not easy to explain the tone of benevolence, and even tenderness, with which Bolshevism was treated in official correspondence. No doubt Lenin was right when he said that this phase of their mutual relationships was of much more advantage to Bolshevism than it was to the Ohrana and its employers.²⁸¹

To dismiss the possibility of Lenin's tacit cooperation with the police on moral grounds is very precarious, since no moral grounds existed in principle for Lenin. He integrated all of Russian revolutionary tradition, but this tradition, let us remember, included Netchaev who, by the way, explicitly recommended the penetration of the Russian police by revolutionary moles. Why, therefore, could Lenin not use his "mole," Malinovsky?

Therefore, when one speaks of Lenin's cooperation, it is by no means to suggest that Lenin himself was an agent. He had too grand a design to allow his meddling in such things. But if the "cause" needed it, it would be "philistine" for Lenin to reject such an option on the spot. He extensively used "expropriations" (i.e., robberies) to raise money, and he became very angry if these actions were criticized on moral grounds.²⁸² (If Lenin could later cooperate with German intelligence, which amounted to high treason, then the use of double agents seems to be a trifle.)

One can find explicit references in Lenin's writings to the legitimacy of taking advantage of police misconceptions for revolutionary purposes. In 1901, he quoted Lassalle's letter to Marx in which he explained why the Prussian police would permit the latter's publication in Prussia:

The publication of your work against the "big men," Kinkel, Ruge, etc., should hardly meet with any difficulties on the part of the police. . . . For, in my opinion, the government is not adverse to the publication of such works, because it thinks that "the revolutionaries will cut one another's throats." Their bureaucratic logic neither suspects nor fears the fact that it is precisely internal Party struggles that lend a party strength and vitality; that the greatest proof of a party's weakness is its diffuseness and the blurring of clear demarcations; and that a party becomes stronger by purging itself.²⁸³

Certainly, such an approach could cover too many complicated and ambiguous situations.

Bolshevik political immorality must be contrasted with the political immorality of the Russian police, and in this regard, the police concept of "provocation" must be considered. Gen. Evgeny Klimovitch (1871-1930), director of the police department in 1916, gave the following definition of provocation: It is "a participation of secret agents in the activity of this or that revolutionary organization that helps to revive this organization, develop it, or recruit new members into it."²⁸⁴ Petr Kurlov (1860-1923), deputy minister of internal affairs, had a different definition of provocation. To

him, it was "any kind of promotion of agents. An agent is not only promoted, but he is strongly advised to achieve more important party positions."²⁸⁵

According to police instructions, a revolutionary society should be liquidated when it has achieved its maximal activity. Such action was never taken by the Okhrana. Gerasimov confessed that he recommended that members of revolutionary cells and centers not be arrested; on the contrary, they should be controlled with the help of police agents planted as party leaders.²⁸⁶

Russian Mensheviks were the first to accuse the Bolsheviks of enjoying the tacit support of the Okhrana, although they misunderstood the latter's real motives. In June 1914, Martov wrote to Axelrod that all the Bolshevik central press was directed by the Okhrana.²⁸⁷ In fact, Tchernomazov, an editor of *Pravda*, was discovered to be a police agent only in 1917. In order to explain why the Okhrana supported the Bolsheviks, Plekhanov cited as an example the support of the German police in the nineteenth century for left-wing extremists against the SPD majority.²⁸⁸

However, all the above explanations for the differential treatment of the police with regard to Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are not sufficient. It seems that a main consideration of the Okhrana was that it believed the Bolsheviks constituted an authentically Russian group that not only allegedly rejected terror but, more important, rejected cooperation with liberals whom, as we have seen, the Russian government regarded as the primary enemy, while the Mensheviks were ready to cooperate with the liberals. By the way, while rejecting individual terror, the Bolsheviks were involved in expropriations; the Okhrana, for some mysterious reason, tried to ignore this fact. The Russian police were also well aware of the tension between the Bolsheviks and the Western socialists, which was probably another credit for the Bolsheviks since the Okhrana wanted to alienate the Russian revolutionary movements. Too, it seems that the Bolsheviks were not only tolerated but even regarded with some sympathy by the police.²⁸⁹ People who admired Dostoevsky (and all the Russian police did so), could easily take the Bolsheviks to be those honest Russian socialists who eventually, as Dostoevsky forecast, would lead a genuine Russian trend.

However, the situation could be more complicated, due to the German connection. Germany had an immense and extremely efficient intelligence network in the anticipation of the final Teuton-Slav confrontation, and it would be very naive to think that the network was ignoring what was happening in the Russian revolutionary movement, resorting to its policy of *Revoluzionierung* only after August 1914. As we have seen, there were double German-Russian agents in the revolutionary movement,²⁹⁰ and one cannot lightly dismiss the suggestion that the Russian police was heavily penetrated by German intelligence to the same extent as all the Russian political system. It is well known, for example, that Stepan Beletsky (1873-1918), the director of the police department in the last period of the Russian empire, was a pillar of the Russian Germanophiles.²⁹¹

The Bolsheviks and Lenin had to have been a focus of German intelligence long before World War I. Lenin moved his operative center to Austro-

Hungarian territory on the eve of that war and was therefore screened not only by the Russian police but also by the Austrian police, which was only an extension of the German police. If so, to suggest that Parvus was the decisive factor that sealed Russian destiny seems to be somewhat precarious. Parvus and other German intelligence agents were no more than informers and talent spotters within the Russian revolutionary movement. Germany's export of revolution into Russia (and also into the British empire) was a long-standing strategic decision.

One may ask the legitimate question, Why were the Bolshevik-police connections not exposed after the revolution when the Russian police archives were opened? The answer is simple: The major parts of the Russian police and military-intelligence archives were destroyed on the first night of the March (February O.S.) 1917 revolution, most certainly intentionally. Col. Boris Nikitin, chief of Russian military counterintelligence in 1917, claimed that the Germans did it. He even gives the name of a certain Karl Giebson who, liberated from prison, immediately brought a mob to the military-intelligence headquarters and destroyed all its archives.²⁹²

A Russian-French anarchist, Victor Serge (1890-1947), who went to Soviet Russia and joined the Bolsheviks, worked for some time in what remained of the Russian police archives. He claimed that the people who destroyed the archives were criminals and former police agents who were afraid of revelations. According to Serge, there were 40,000 names of secret agents in the original files and no more than 3,000 were exposed. Serge also reported that even those names that were found were recorded as pseudonyms and could be discovered only through extremely difficult cross-examinations.²⁹³ Gerasimov added that the most important police connections were never put in writing, boasting that not one of his agents was exposed after the revolution.²⁹⁴

A radical right leader, Vladimir Purishkevitch (1870-1920), openly accused the Bolsheviks in May 1917 of destroying police archives in order to prevent the exposure of their agents. In a leaflet he appealed to Lenin:

I accuse you in that your party is full of an immense number of agents who earlier earned money from the police department. . . . Who, if not your anonymous leaders, encouraged the mob in the days of revolution to destroy courts and the Okhrana department in the capital? Who, if not you, benefited from the fires in those offices in which lists of the old servants of the Okhrana were destroyed, those same servants who simultaneously occupied prominent positions in your organization and committed themselves to the cause of criminal provocation, both on party press pages and even on the tribune of the State Duma? Can you dismiss my accusations, you who produced Malinovskys and Tchernomazovs, who keep in your party womb countless numbers of people who are similar to those and unknown to you who managed to burn traces of their former jobs on two fronts in the fires?²⁹⁵

Purishkevitch's accusations can be at least partly confirmed. The Bolsheviks did indeed participate in the destruction of the archives. This fact was

confirmed by the second Soviet president himself, Mikhail Kalinin (1875-1946), and his message leaves no doubt that he himself took part in this operation. Speaking *ex cathedra* in July 1919, Kalinin said: "We burned the Petrograd police department, we burned the papers of the Okhrana department, and while they were burning, we rejoiced very much. And now we cannot find a number of secret agents. . . . We certainly realized at the moment of struggle the value of these papers, but at that very moment I could only think, 'Damn all this, this must all be burnt, together with the Okhrana.'"²⁹⁶

Stalin

There is no need to describe the impact that Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) exercised on Russia. However, his influence was by no means innovative. What was later called Stalinism was artificially and intentionally separated from Leninism, and even set off against it. In fact, one can agree with Angelica Balabanoff (1878-1965), a Russian-Italian socialist who for a short time served as Communist International secretary under Lenin, that almost nothing can be found of Stalin's which had not been initiated by Lenin.²⁹⁷ Indeed, all the political and ideological developments attributed to Stalin as his own innovations or deviations were in fact conceived and initiated by Lenin. All the major issues of Soviet domestic and foreign policy were first formulated by Lenin, not by Stalin. Nevertheless, Stalin placed his own imprint on Soviet society. It was he who saw the culmination of the inherent trend of Soviet society to the full-fledged Oriental despotism that had so frightened Marx and Engels.

Stalin was an Asian, and not a Georgian Christian but a Georgianized Ossetian, a descendant of an Iranian tribe, a fact that gave Bertrand Russell the opportunity to compare him to the ancient Persian tsars.²⁹⁸ Stalin was brought up in an Ossetian-Georgian house in the utmost cruelty of his drunkard father. It was well known that the most enslaved Georgian woman would seem emancipated in comparison to an Ossetian woman and, too, that the old Caucasian tradition of blood revenge was especially strong among the Ossetians. Nothing could eradicate Stalin's Oriental despotic childhood. Lenin was despotic enough, but his despotism was rather semi-Asiatic while Stalin was a full-fledged Oriental despot.

In his youth, Stalin developed the mentality of a national avenger against the Russians. His favorite hero, Koba, whose name he later adopted, took revenge on Russians for the oppression of Georgians.²⁹⁹ This outlook did not prevent him from identifying with Russians in his later period when he had accomplished his adolescent dream—to dominate the Russians.

Anyway, the highly ambitious Stalin did not have enough space in provincial Georgia. He needed a foothold that would promise him countrywide activity. Stalin was an extremely authoritative personality, and to be the leader of a small and unimportant country did not suit his political perspective. As early as 1904, he was decisively in favor of the political



Joseph Stalin (photo from I. Stalin, *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, vol. 11 [Moscow, 1930], p. 424).

centralization of the existing Russian empire, and, while appealing for the destruction of national boundaries, he was in fact setting the stage for his own wider political power.³⁰⁰

The first formative period of Stalin as a revolutionary was marked by crime and violence. Luigi Villari, who visited Batum in 1905 (where Stalin spent the years 1901-1903), reported: "A criminal element is conspicuous in all the seaports of the Levant. Batum, however, most certainly takes the palm for its rascality of all kinds. Murders, robbery, mendicancy, are always common occurrences here."³⁰¹ According to him, Batum gave the general impression of being in Turkey rather than in Russia. There were 10,000 Turks, 10,000 Georgians, and 7,000 Russians among the 30,000 population; the rest were Persians, Greeks, Armenians, and Tatars. The town was in a state of chaos. One of the Rothschilds, who owned a factory in Batum, was always accompanied by bodyguards.³⁰² From such a background, the criminal theories of revolution preached by Bakunin and Netchaev could well have been attractive to Stalin.

The controversial process of Stalin's Russification began when he studied in the Tiflis ecclesiastical seminary in 1894-1899.³⁰³ The seminary was then the hotbed of the Georgian revolutionary movement, many of whose leaders

graduated from it. The Russian ecclesiastical authorities treated their Georgian pupils with extreme arrogance. Teaching in Georgian was forbidden, and all divine services were held in Church-Slavonic. Besides that, the Russian bishops who ruled the Georgian church, and the ecclesiastics who governed the seminary in Stalin's time, were chosen from ardent Russian nationalists who later became leaders of the Russian radical right; for example, Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoiavlensky, 1848-1918) and Archbishop Hermogen (Dolganev, 1858-1918). The seminary was naturally screened by the Okhrana through seminary inspectors. One of those was a Russophile Georgian prince, David Abashidze (1867-1945), who took monastic vows under the name of Dmitry. He personally searched Stalin's belongings. From the fact that later in Soviet times, Dmitry evidently enjoyed Stalin's protection in spite of his having been one of the staunchest supporters of the Whites, it is clear that the relationship between the young Stalin and Dmitry had been very far from hostile.

There is the suggestion, based on a large amount of circumstantial evidence, that Stalin collaborated with the Okhrana and, in fact, that the evidence collected against him would have been enough to impeach him.³⁰⁴ If so, the first person who could have been Stalin's control was Dmitry. Stalin himself confessed once that he had betrayed his fellow students in order to make them revolutionaries. He could have done so only through his inspector. Such an action would have been entirely in Netchaev's spirit. Did Stalin read Netchaev in the seminary? It would not have been surprising, full as the seminary was of young revolutionaries.

The alleged Stalin-Okhrana links are not necessarily an argument for the thesis that Stalin was a traitor to the revolutionary cause. Taking into account his despotic character, Stalin could not have been a "faithful informer." One could rather suggest that Stalin acted according to Netchaev's legacy and tried to use the Okhrana for his own ends. This "Machiavellianism from below" was in full accordance with the Russian revolutionary tradition, and Lenin could well have been aware of Stalin's real background.

On the other hand, Stalin's political behavior *before* 1913, when he was arrested seriously for the first time and not sent into mock exile as before, was behavior that the Okhrana could well have encouraged. Stalin's first political step was to incite the Batum demonstration in 1902, which was brutally suppressed. At the time, Zubatov's influence in the police was at its height, and he encouraged such strikes in many places. This strike was directed, not against a Russian-owned enterprise, but against a Rothschild enterprise, i.e., one controlled by Jewish capital.

We have seen that the Russian Caucasian administration tacitly supported Marxism in Georgia as a purely economic doctrine versus Georgian nationalism and separatism. The leader of the Georgian Social Democrats, Noi Zhordania (1869-1953), confirmed that there was no real censorship in Georgia and only direct revolutionary appeals to the masses were not permitted.³⁰⁵

In 1905, Mikhail Gurovitch went to the Caucasus as a political adviser to the head of the Caucasian police. Luigi Villari, who spoke to Gurovitch

in that year, reported that Gurovitch told him he would rather permit an illegal meeting than give an order to shoot its participants. He showed Villari a secret instruction not to arrest several people in Gori (Stalin's native town) since those people deserved a more severe punishment and their administrative exile without an explanation of its reason would only raise dissatisfaction.³⁰⁶ If those instructions were given, then many questions raised by Edward Ellis Smith, who advanced the theory of Stalin's Okhrana links, might reasonably be resolved in terms of general police connivance.

Ronald Hingley gives an explanation of the tacit Okhrana support of Stalin, according to which the real enemies of Stalin were not "the Tsar . . . and his . . . government but such obscure local rivals as might challenge whatever ascendancy Koba could now and then precariously assert over some regional Caucasian revolutionary association."³⁰⁷ "The authorities may therefore have thought Stalin worth preserving simply because he was so efficiently quarrelsome, being—in his small way—a greater nuisance to Caucasian fellow-revolutionaries than a whole squadron of gendarmes."³⁰⁸ This explanation is too simplified, although it probably contains an important part of the truth.

A question has been asked about Stalin's joining the Bolsheviks in 1902 or 1903. Adam Ulam suggests that he joined them since doing so gave him a much better chance of speedy promotion.³⁰⁹ That would have been a good enough reason, but also, Bolshevik antiliberalism could have seemed much closer to him than the democratism of the Mensheviks.

Stalin soon manifested his deep-seated anti-Semitism, which was very strange; for the average Georgian, anti-Semitism was never articulated strongly. One can safely suggest that it was the legacy he had received from his nationalist teachers in the seminary. As early as 1902, he stressed the Jewishness of the Mensheviks in very abusive words, claiming that all Jews were cowards.³¹⁰ In 1907, Stalin supported Alexinsky's speech at the Fifth Party Congress, at which he was present. As mentioned, Alexinsky stressed in this speech that the Jews were more Menshevik than Bolshevik. In an article printed in a Caucasian Social Democrat newspaper, Stalin repeated Alexinsky's words and added some interesting details of the speech that had not been included in the official proceedings:

No less interesting is the national composition of the congress. The figures showed that the majority of the Menshevik group were Jews (not counting the Bundists, of course), then came Georgians and then Russians. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik group were Russians, then came Jews (not counting Poles and Letts, of course), then Georgians, etc. In this connection one of the Bolsheviks (I think it was Comrade Alexinsky) observed in jest that the Mensheviks constituted a Jewish group while the Bolsheviks constituted a true-Russian group and, therefore, *it wouldn't be a bad idea for us Bolsheviks to organize a pogrom in the Party.*³¹¹

It seems that Stalin was not hostile to left-wing Bolshevism and was cautious about Lenin's attacks on Bogdanov.³¹²

Stalin actively participated in expropriations, which probably gave him important influence over Lenin. Stalin also had close connections with the Caucasian underworld,³¹³ probably dating from his time in Batum, and used these links both before and after the revolution.

Strangely unnoticed was Stalin's challenge to Lenin's party leadership. In an unsigned article by the former printed in Baku, Lenin's name was not mentioned, but the target of the article was perfectly clear.³¹⁴ "It is no secret," Stalin wrote, "to anyone that our Party is passing through a severe crisis. . . . All show that the party is ailing, that it is passing through a grave crisis." He accused the party leadership of "the most scandalously amateurish methods" and criticized all the party organs, including Lenin's own newspaper. "It would be strange," Stalin said, "to think that organs published abroad, far removed from Russian reality, can coordinate the work of the Party, which has long passed the study-circle stage." He called for a purge of the party intellectuals and their replacement with advanced workers.

The most experienced and influential of the advanced workers must find a place in all the local organizations, the affairs of the organizations must be concentrated in their strong hands, and it is they who must occupy the most important posts in the organizations, from practical and organizational posts to literary posts. It will not matter if the workers who occupy important posts are found to lack sufficient experience and training and even stumble at first—practice and the advice of more experienced comrades will widen their outlook and in the end train them to become real writers and leaders of the movement. . . .

That is why our organizational slogan must be: "Widen the road for the advanced workers in all spheres of Party activity," "give them more scope!"

He condemned emigrant-intellectuals who tried to run revolutionary activity from abroad (in explicit attack against Lenin):

The Central District and the Urals have been doing without intellectuals for a long time; there the workers themselves are conducting the affairs of the organizations. In Sormovo, Lugansk (Donets Basin) and Nikolayev, the workers in 1908 published leaflets and in Nikolayev, in addition to leaflets, they published an illegal organ. In Baku the organization has systematically intervened in all the affairs of the workers' struggle and has missed scarcely a single conflict between the workers and the oil owners, while, of course, at the same time conducting general political agitation. . . .

As regards the organs that are published abroad, apart from the fact that they reach Russia in extremely limited quantities, they naturally lag behind the course of Party life in Russia, are unable to note in time and comment on the questions that excite the workers and, therefore, cannot link our local organizations together by permanent ties. . . .

Conferences and organs published abroad, while extremely important for uniting the Party, are, nevertheless, inadequate for overcoming the crisis, for permanently uniting the local organizations. . . .

The only radical measure can be the publication of an all-Russian newspaper, a newspaper that will serve as the centre of Party activity and be published in Russia.

Later, he crystallized his proposals:

- (1) the transference of the (leading) practical centre to Russia;
- (2) the establishment of an all-Russian leading newspaper connected with the local organizations, to be published in Russia and edited by the above-mentioned practical centre;
- (3) the establishment of local organs of the press in the most important centres of the labour movement (the Urals, Donets Basin, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Baku, etc.).³¹⁵

Stalin actually proposed himself as the future leader, since according to any political tradition, the initiator of the move would like to implement it himself. Stalin made his quest for party leadership even more explicit when he announced that "our movement now needs Russian Bebels, experienced and mature leaders from the ranks of the workers." "Bebels do not drop from the skies, they grow up from the ranks in the course of Party activity in all its spheres."³¹⁶

He published a leaflet that contained inflated praises of Bebel as an exemplary revolutionary leader.³¹⁷ The real extent of his alleged "revolutionism" had been common knowledge for a long time, and Stalin was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless, one can find in his leaflet the following words: "Let us . . . send greetings to our beloved teacher—the turner Bebel. Let him serve as an example to us, Russian workers, who are particularly in need of Bebels in the labor movement."

This appeal is extremely conspicuous. First of all, if one speaks of Bebel, the reference is to the absolute party leader, which Bebel was in Germany. So, if someone appeals for a Russian Bebel while Lenin is the party leader, that person is appealing for the overthrow of Lenin and the appointment of a worker as party leader. There were many workers in the SPD, such as Philip Scheidemann (1865-1939), Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925), and Gustav Noake, but Bebel was the only leader.

Stalin, like Lenin, never suggested something for somebody else, only for himself. No Bolshevnik conceivable as a competitor of proletarian origin existed on the Bolshevnik political map in 1909-1910 apart from Stalin himself. This fact ruins the myth that Stalin never challenged Lenin's leadership and achieved power only as a result of his intrigues against Trotsky and others.

Stalin was an extraordinarily strong politician who, like Lenin, had had his "grand design" since his youth. What seems quite sinister is that Stalin's appeal to move the party center, together with its press, to Russia not only served his own ambitions but could have been extremely useful to the Okhrana as it could thus increase its penetration and control of the Bolshevnik organization.

As a result of his campaign, Stalin quickly became the main Caucasian Bolshevik, and in 1912, he was co-opted by Lenin to serve on the Central Party Committee. Soon he became an editor of *Pravda*, which was published in Russia as he had suggested, not abroad. However, his political career was suddenly brought to a standstill when he was for the first time seriously arrested and exiled to a distant place in Siberia. His arrest and exile coincided, incidentally, with the approach of a new police chief Vladimir Dzhunkovsky (1865-1937), who desired to cancel any political provocation.³¹⁸

Stalin was also influenced by Lassalle. After the revolution, Stalin repeated Lassalle's words about the purge three times,³¹⁹ and it seems that these served him as a model for his last purges. In April 1920, Stalin published an article in *Pravda* in which he stressed Lassalle's relevance and importance, although with reservations. "History knows of proletarian leaders," Stalin said, "who were leaders in times of storm, practical leaders, self-sacrificing and courageous, but who were weak in theory. The names of such leaders are not soon forgotten by the masses. Such for example were Lassalle in Germany and Blanqui in France."³²⁰

No Bolshevik leader openly manifested Russian statist nationalism as Stalin had been doing even before the revolution. In April 1912, he accused the Russian government of creating—"Instead of the international greatness of the Russian state—the ignominious failure of Russian 'policy' in the Near and Far East."³²¹

Russian Radical Right Versus Bolshevism

Bolshevism cannot be put in the right political perspective without taking into account all of the Russian political spectrum. As a rule, scholars relate Bolshevism only to Mensheviks or to other revolutionary or liberal groups and not to their ostensibly polar opponents—the Russian radical right. In fact, both the Russian radical left—the Bolsheviks—and the Russian radical right had a common denominator. As far as many major issues of domestic and foreign policy are concerned, these opposites of Russian political life were close to one another. Moreover, there was the massive merge of the radical right and radical left after the March (February) revolution of 1917.

The Russian radical right was not a monolithic movement. It included various monarchist and nationalist groups, which partly emerged spontaneously but were partly organized from above. These groups were mutually antagonistic. One stream of the Russian radical right came from the Russian neo-Slavophiles and Pan-Slavists who were very strongly opposed to Russian officialdom. Most typically representative of this type was the group that called itself the Union of Russian Men, led by Sergei Sharapov (1858-1911), or distinguished Russian bishops like Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky, 1863-1936) or Archbishop Hermogen, Stalin's former teacher. The neo-Slavophiles were sharply anti-German; Sharapov claimed in 1901 that the central issue of the twentieth century would be the Teuton-Slav confrontation.³²² In 1908, at the height of the Bosnian crisis, Sharapov suggested

the creation of a Balkan alliance between Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro in order to halt Austria-Hungary. Sharapov openly accused Mikhail Menshikov (1859-1918), a leading columnist of *Novoe vremia*, of having been bribed by the Austrian embassy. In 1909, Sharapov submitted a secret memorandum to Stolypin suggesting rapprochement with the United States.³²³ A Duma deputy, Vasily Obratsov (1857-?), claimed in 1907 that the source of all evil in Russia was "a corrupt alien bureaucracy."³²⁴ Yuri Bartenev (1866-1908) said that the Petersburg period was one of national self-abnegation, even self-negation.³²⁵

But it was not those groups that dominated the Russian radical right. Political domination was held by a group that called itself the Union of the Russian People (URP), led by Alexander Dubrovin (1855-1922) and then also by Nikolai Markov II (1866-after 1945). This particular group was organized by the Okhrana and the ruling minority in order to bridle the dangerous wave of Russian nationalism, which could have endangered the existing system.³²⁶

The URP was clearly Germanophile, anti-English, and anti-French.³²⁷ All the radical right was anti-Semitic, but the URP made the Jewish problem the only issue, blaming the Jews for all of Russia's ills. It was a continuation of the old scapegoat policy that had been practiced by the ruling bureaucracy since the 1880s in order to obfuscate real problems and also to alienate Russia from France and England. In fact, the URP was a very skillful falsification of the spontaneous Russian nationalism.

The URP systematically ignored all warnings about German military preparations against Russia. It demanded a very low Russian profile in Europe and full rejection of any Slavic concern. Markov II said in 1908 during the Bosnian crisis that "the bones of one single Russian soldier would not be sacrificed for all the Balkan peninsula," and Purishkevitch insisted on nonintervention in Balkan affairs.³²⁸ Nil Durnovo waged a total attack against the Pan-Slavists, claiming that they were not identical to Slavophiles. He categorically opposed any involvement in Balkan affairs that might bring Russia into a European war. "The Russian people," Durnovo said, "would not like to shed their blood for Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croatians, who belong to an alien faith." Durnovo openly suggested a treaty with Germany.³²⁹

Leading radical right spokesmen competed with one another in brandishing the threat of the English peril. Georgy Butmi-De-Katsman (1856-?),³³⁰ Pavel Bulatsel (1867-1919),³³¹ Alexei Shmakov (1852-1916),³³² and Yakov Demtchenko accused England of a world conspiracy against Russia. (Demtchenko also warned against the U.S. conspiracy.)³³³ They accused England of being eager to provoke a military confrontation between Russia and Germany. In 1909, Purishkevitch even published an open letter in the ultraconservative German newspaper *Kreuzzeitung* in which he said that "England needs Russia as the fist which must cross the German fist to the glory of English naval hegemony."³³⁴ A shadow leader of the radical right, former-Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Durnovo (1845-1915), submitted a secret memorandum

to the tsar in February 1914 falsely forecasting the Anglo-German conflict as the main European conflict and begging the tsar not to strive for any rapprochement with England, since such a tie would therefore involve Russia in the war. Durnovo falsely claimed that the vital interests of Russia and Germany had never clashed. According to him, the main threat to civilization was England.³³⁵

The URP was decisively against any Russian military buildup. In May 1908, Markov II and Purishkevitch condemned the budget of the Ministry of the Navy, demanding that no more Russian battleships be built. They completely ignored the tremendous reconstruction of the German navy (eventually the main reason why England decided to join in the war against Germany in 1914). According to Purishkevitch, Russia's future did not at all depend on its navy.³³⁶

Purishkevitch, however, called for the struggle against the "yellow peril," referring to Soloviev's prophecies.³³⁷ The cries of yellow peril from the URP and other relevant groups greatly increased on the eve of World War I. An active member of the radical right, Prince Nikolai Obleukhov, published a pamphlet calling for China to be attacked and promising that "our military confrontation with China will be victorious for Russia and will strengthen our power in the Far East."³³⁸ That was exactly the subversive German blueprint, the goal of which was to involve Russia in the Far East. As we have seen above, this adventurous policy was advanced by the entire German lobby in the Russian government.

Abundantly quoting German anti-Semitic sources, the URP spokesmen deliberately ignored the fact that all these anti-Semitic authors were also anti-Russian.³³⁹ The Russian radical right also ignored repeatedly voiced German appeals to combat barbaric tsarism. If one considers that after the revolution Markov II emigrated to Germany and later enlisted in German intelligence, where he served until 1945, one can entertain serious doubts as to the URP's political motivations.

If one compares the ideology of the radical left with that of the radical right, one is confronted by striking similarities:³⁴⁰

1. In the radical right there was violent criticism of capitalism, which, however, was assigned mostly to the Jews as if it were entirely a Jewish invention. Bulatsel, Butmi-De-Katsman, and Pavolaky Krushevan (1860-1909) criticized the merchants and industrialists and demanded improvements in the situation of Russian workers and artisans.
2. The rejection of parliamentarism, which resulted in a boycott of parliamentary elections after 1905: As is well-known, the Bolsheviks also boycotted these elections at first; then the boycott was lifted by both sides.
3. The hatred of liberals as the principal enemy.
4. The use of political violence: It is interesting that one can find certain leaders of the radical right who nourished the idea of the destruction of the existing Russian system in order to return to genuine autocracy. This idea also included the physical extermination of the ruling dynasty.

One of the URP leaders, Professor Boris Nikolaky (1870-1919), complained in his private letters that the neurasthenic tsar had brought catastrophe to Russia. Nikolaky cited that in the time of Emperor Paul I (1754-1801), who was assassinated by a court plot, everything was carried out very quickly. Later Nikolaky explicitly appealed for the extermination of the Romanovs as he had lost all his hopes for improvement under their rule. Tikhomirov, because of deep disappointment, recorded in his diary in 1911-1912 that the only way out of the abominable situation was a revolution.

5. The common constituency: The most important power base of the radical right was the workers. The URP cell in the famous Putilov factory was its stronghold in St. Petersburg.³⁴¹
6. A certain similarity in the approach to foreign policy.

There is a standard view that the Bolsheviks and the Social Democrats as a whole regarded the radical right as their worst enemy. This is a complete misunderstanding. In spite of verbal attacks against the URP and its allies, one can see that the Bolsheviks, and even some of the Mensheviks, regarded them not without sympathy, hoping that they would be a potential ally and constituency. Was it spontaneous sympathy, or was it influenced by the old Herzen-Bakunin-Netchaev tradition? It is difficult to say. It may have been a combination of these factors. Gorky tried repeatedly to hint as early as 1905-1906 in his private correspondence that he cherished hopes for the Black Hundreds (the popular name for the radical right). He particularly hoped that they would sooner or later turn against the government.³⁴²

But it was Plekhanov who was the first to publicly express this hope, which was by no means a side issue for this former populist. In the wake of the notorious Kishinev pogrom in 1903, Plekhanov had, surprisingly, expressed some sympathy for the pogromists, in spite of his condemnation of the pogrom. He said: "The road to progress is not yet closed to those ignorant workers who took part in the Kishinev brigandage. Today's thug—a proletarian—will in the future grasp the interests of his class, which demand the common efforts of the workers without religious and tribal differences."³⁴³

This comment was very ominous. The people Plekhanov looked forward to meeting in his party were, from any legal point of view, dangerous criminals who had carried out a cruel massacre of seventy innocent people, and the majority of the perpetrators certainly deserved capital punishment. Nevertheless, Plekhanov completely overlooked the moral and legal aspects of their deeds and invited them to join the class struggle in the tradition of Bakunin and Netchaev.

By 1906, Plekhanov's sympathy with the Black Hundreds had increased—which made his motives very suspicious. He said that the Black Hundreds consisted of 80 percent of the proletarians and semiproletarians and claimed that these people "will become ardent participants in the revolutionary movement."³⁴⁴ They must only be removed from reactionary influence.

Plekhanov bitterly condemned the negative attitude of Russian liberals toward the Black Hundreds. According to him the basic problem was, Why are they not with us but against us? He did not comment at all on their anti-Semitism. Plekhanov's point of view was quite widely shared. Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov said that many proletarians joined the URP only as a result of a misunderstanding. He reported that in 1905 he managed, overnight, to convert a large group of unskilled workers who had previously supported the URP to Bolshevism.³⁴⁵

The left-wing potential of the Russian radical right was also confirmed at that time by a former leading Russian Marxist, Petr Struve, who said in 1909 that the URP was a Socialist Revolutionary party turned upside down. According to him, the URP was only a preparatory class for Social Revolutionaries.³⁴⁶ He did not realize that the URP was in fact the Bolshevik party turned upside down.

At first Lenin was extremely hostile to the radical right. In October 1905, he recommended fighting, beating, and killing the Black Hundreds.³⁴⁷ However, in November of that year, Lenin changed his tune about the radical right, calling it the Russian Vendée:

Our Vendée has not yet said its last word either. . . . It, too, is just beginning to deploy its forces properly. It, too, has its "reserves of combustibles", accumulated during centuries of ignorance, oppression, serfdom, and police omnipotence. It combines within itself unmitigated Asiatic backwardness with all the loathsome features of the refined methods used to exploit and stultify those that are most downtrodden and tormented by the civilisation of the capitalist cities, and been reduced to conditions worse than those of wild beasts. This Vendée will not vanish at any manifesto from the tsar, or messages from the synod, or at changes in the upper or lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It can be smashed only by the strength of an organised and enlightened proletariat.³⁴⁸

Since Lenin refused to form an electoral bloc with the liberals, they accused him of supporting the URP in order to achieve a majority in various places. He rejected this accusation, claiming that it was a liberal trick.³⁴⁹ In fact, the radical right considerably improved its political position because of the split between the left wing and the liberals. It is interesting that the URP also preferred left-wing political success to any liberal success, and Purishkevitch secretly instructed his local branches to support Social Democrats in those places where his party could not win and where there was a threat of Cadet victory.³⁵⁰

The Fifth Party Congress (1907) discussed the attitude of the Social Democrats toward the radical right. There were various scholastic attempts to identify this group with landlords, although Trotsky tried to distinguish between different trends in the radical right.³⁵¹ Pokrovsky's was the only voice that tried to stress the positive aspects of the radical right: According to him, the URP was an antibureaucratic movement that was already out of police control.³⁵²

In June 1907, Lenin said that liberal democracy was a hundred times more harmful than the Black Hundreds;³⁵³ the same idea was repeated by Stalin in the Caucasus: "'The Black Hundred danger' was invented by the liberals to frighten certain naive people. The Black Hundreds cannot 'capture' the Duma. The Mensheviks only repeat the words of the liberals when they talk about the 'Black-Hundred danger'. But there is a 'Cadet danger,' and it is a real danger."³⁵⁴

It was Gorky who was probably responsible for changing Lenin's negative attitude toward the radical right. In 1911, the former publicly quoted a letter sent him by a political exile in Siberia in which the writer said the local Black Hundreds were "good democrats" and "the most interesting people here." The author cherished the hope that they would be in the future "good revolutionary democrats."³⁵⁵ When one reads what was said by Lenin later about the Black Hundreds, one can discern Gorky's arguments. In 1913, Lenin wrote:

There is in our Black-Hundred movement one exceedingly original and exceedingly important feature that has not been the subject of sufficient attention. That feature is ignorant peasant democracy, democracy of the crudest type but also extremely deep-seated. . . .

Every political party, even of the extreme Right, has to seek some sort of link with the people.

The extreme Rights constitute the party of the landowners. They cannot, however, confine themselves to links with the landowners alone. They have to conceal those links and pretend that they are defending the interests of the entire people, that they stand for the "good old", "stable" way of rural life. They have to appeal to the most deep-rooted prejudices of the most backward peasant, they have to play on his ignorance. . . .

Such a game cannot be played without risk. Now and again the voice of the real peasant life, peasant democracy, breaks through all the Black-Hundred mustiness and cliché.³⁵⁶

The extent of Bolshevik nationalization is easily grasped when one takes into account the Bolsheviks' readiness to rely on such a constituency. On the other hand, many radical right spokesmen were well aware of the similarity of some of their ideas with some of the ideas suggested by the left.³⁵⁷ For example, a member of the chief URP council, Apollon Maikov, reproached revolutionary leaders for not having a clear enough vision of the future society for which they were fighting. According to him, the rightists pursued the same objectives as the revolutionaries, namely, "the amelioration of the conditions of life, the goal that coincides in many respects with the teaching of social anarchists, when one tries to explain the origin of some particular burden of our existence. However, they are completely opposed in what concerns both world outlook and the means suggested in order to relieve the fate of suffering humanity."

"Constitutionalists," said Maikov, "call the revolutionary armies revolutionaries from the left and Black Hundreds revolutionaries from the right. From their point of view this definition has a certain legitimacy. . . . Both

of us think that the constitutional form of government brings the total domination of capital, and in such conditions power will pass exclusively into the hands of capitalists, who will take advantage of it only for their selfish benefits in order to oppress and exploit all the population. Neither the Black Hundreds nor the revolutionaries agree with such a situation." Maikov reproached revolutionaries who only imagined that they were fighting capitalism while, as a matter of fact, they were only tools for the Jews. His pamphlet was actually a suggestion of a common political platform for the radical right and the radical left.

In 1902, another URP leader, Viktor Sokolov (1880-?) also unambiguously confirmed some identity of political interests between the radical right and the radical left. He accused the ruling bureaucracy of wanting "to incite rightists to fight against revolutionary elements, and to weaken both of them through this fight, and to implement constitution." Sokolov suggested to the rightists that they leave the battlefield temporarily in order to give the possibility "to the revolutionaries to settle with the constitutional bureaucracy as they would like to."

It is no surprise that under conditions of general social collapse, many grass-roots members of the radical right could easily join the Bolshevik side, taking their ideological justification for such an action from the right-wing outlook itself. A former Russian state secretary, Sergei Kryzhanovskiy (1861-1934), wrote when he emigrated:

The extreme right wing . . . adopted almost the same social program and almost the same propagandist methods as those used by revolutionary parties. The difference was only that one side promised the masses the forcible redistribution of property in the name of the autocratic tsar as the representative of popular interests and the defender of the people against the oppression of the rich while others promised the same thing in the name of the workers and peasants united in a democratic republic. This difference was only formal, and one can probably regard this as the explanation of the, as one would think, strange phenomenon that radical right and radical left elements move easily from one camp to another.

Eugene Weber pointed out the psychological affinity between the radical right and radical left as another possible reason for their mutual rapprochement. He said that the rightists

can join in a *politique du pire* to bring the existing order down; and many a rapprochement between Nationalists and Syndicalists, between Fascists and Communists can be explained only by the temporary conjunction of their hatreds. . . . The fact is that, whatever their ultimate intentions, activists of any ilk find themselves involved in similar campaigns, similar organisational and didactic problems, so that the sociopolitical dynamism of their enterprise is stronger than the verbal differences between them. Thus the ideological options they may choose make little difference to the behaviour of their agents as long as they remain in the realm of action. Hence the coincidences between extreme Right and Left.³⁵⁸

Foreign Capital

There was another key problem in Russia's geopolitical position vis-à-vis the West: Russia's economic dependence. Before World War I, Russia had more national debts than any other country.³⁵⁹ First of all, Russia's fast industrial progress was heavily subsidized. Almost all railway construction, the main item of Russian economic progress, was not a matter of private initiative. The state also heavily subsidized other industrial branches, since predatory Russian capital usually preferred the traditional forms of investment: trade or light industry. Emil Dillon, who was well acquainted with Russian finance, had already remarked in 1891 that

No merchants or manufacturers in the world are so impatient to enrich themselves as the Russians. Ten per cent. on their capital—nay, 20 per cent. is not nearly enough to satisfy their cravings. Many of them look upon trade and industry as legalized robbery, and harmonize their actions with their theory. Hence their rooted aversion to every kind of enterprise that requires continued application to business and yields modest, though certain, profits; hence the contempt with which they allude to the markets of Persia, China, Bulgaria, Serbia, which might be theirs by a thousand rights, but are now being gradually closed to them.

He had given many terrifying examples of the predatory nature of Russian business: telling, for example, how in the 1880s

when English coal coming to ports of the Black Sea was shut out by a protective, or rather, prohibitive, duty, the Russian coal-mines merely raised their prices without taking any means to provide for the increased demand. The result was a coal famine in the south of Russia; mineral fuel was sold at fancy prices, the cost of wood rose proportionately, while the last forests of the south were hewn down; many manufactories had to be closed for want of fuel (for instance, the works of Bellino-Fenderich, in Odessa); the poor inhabitants stood for hours in long rows waiting for their turn to receive a little coal gratis from the city; attacks were made upon the coal-stores in Kharkov, and with considerable difficulty a rising was prevented.³⁶⁰

Almost all the advanced branches were a result of foreign investment, and all Russian mining and metallurgy was owned by foreigners.³⁶¹ The most important money market was France, but Russia's most important trade partner was Germany. From 1906 through 1910, imports from Germany amounted to approximately 40 percent of all Russian imports, and the figure was showing a tendency to increase. In 1914 it reached half of Russian imports. Meanwhile, during 1906-1910, almost half of Russia's agricultural exports was absorbed by Germany. The value of German imports in Russia amounted in 1913 to 643 million rubles; the value of English imports, 170 million; French, 56 million; Austrian, 35 million.³⁶²

Lenin presented figures according to which, in 1914, more than "three-fourths of the active capital of Russian banks belonged to banks which in

reality were only 'daughter companies' of foreign banks, and chiefly of Paris banks . . . and of Berlin banks."³⁶³ The majority of engineers were also foreigners who worked on a contract basis. Russia attracted foreign investments by its lower standard of living, which brought bigger profits in comparison to investments made in Europe. A Russian miner in the Donets Basin in 1904 earned 12 percent less than a French miner had in 1860-1870, and naturally, since that time the gap had widened.³⁶⁴

In spite of Russia's ability to produce some kind of machinery, the main export items were grain and natural resources. Therefore, in spite of relatively fast industrial progress, Russian economics became more and more dependent and could not compete in the international market of industrial goods. Russia was regarded as a colony of the West from an economic point of view by many people. A Russian economist said, "There is no other independent power that would be a colony of another power, and only Russia constitutes an exception to this rule."³⁶⁵ There were superb Russian scientists and engineers, but because of the predatory Russian capital, they were used mostly in foreign-investor-backed industry.

The Bolsheviks took advantage of Russia's economic dependence to attack not only capitalism as such but Russia's exploitation by other countries. Lenin made this accusation even more general, accusing a few of the richest states of exploiting the rest of the world.³⁶⁶ However, Lenin and the Bolsheviks labored under some restraints. It was dangerous to overstate Russia's economic dependence because doing so might undermine their ambitions for a socialist revolution and even for world leadership. How could a colonial and backward country launch an independent socialist revolution, let alone lead the world proletariat?

For this reason, for example, Pokrovsky rejected the claim that Russia was a colony, though he did not dismiss Russia's growing dependence on the West. He said that

investigations have established without question that Russian large-scale industry and the Russian banks on the eve of the war were regular dependents of foreign capital and that diverse groups of foreign capitalists were engaged in a mutual struggle on Russian territory long before these groups became interlaced in the mortal combat of world war. The gradual displacement from the Russian economy of the German capital which before 1910 had been predominant, or had been confidently moving toward predominance, exactly corresponded to the victory of the pro-Entente forces in Russia. We can watch this struggle in the minutest details—for example, when a factory which under the aegis of a major Anglo-French firm had been producing diverse equipment for torpedo boats halted this work instantly after its shares were acquired by a Berlin bank. The actions taken by banks, though bloodless, very accurately matched the military alignments of the future war.³⁶⁷

Moreover, according to Pokrovsky, foreign capital was not only exploitative, it also had varied interests in support of Russian autocracy. "The foreign capitalist," Pokrovsky said, "before the revolution regarded Russia as a

primitive country, whose population existed only in order to fill his capitalist pockets."

Georgy Tchitcherin (1872-1936), the people's commissar for foreign affairs in 1918-1930, said after the revolution that "the Russian people were the main victims of European exploitation."³⁶⁸ Trotsky, too, stressed Russia's economic dependence on the West no less than other Bolsheviks: "Whoever explains the character and policy of the autocracy merely by the interests of the Russian possessing classes forgets that besides the more backward, poorer and more ignorant exploiters in Russia, there were the richer and more powerful exploiters in Europe."³⁶⁹

All of these statements certainly had national overtones, and essentially they were an appeal for national economic independence. In addition, they were also an implicit attack against all Westerners, including socialists, who benefited from the exploitation of the Russian people. The concept of imperialism introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century by John Hobson (1858-1940) was extremely useful for Lenin's political purposes. First of all, it helped him present the Bolsheviks as a national force. Then he used the concept of imperialism in order to blame Western workers on the grounds that their high standard of living was achieved through a merciless exploitation of underpaid Russian workers. Russian workers were exploited not only by capitalists but also by the workers of advanced capitalist countries. Therefore, Western socialists had a vested interest in maintaining the system of international imperialist exploitation. Since Germany was a most important investor and importer for Russia, German social democracy was corrupt and chauvinist.

This opinion was widespread among Russian socialists, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Tchitcherin, who before the revolution was a Menshevik and lived in France, blamed French workers for their contribution to Russia's exploitation. At a meeting of French socialists, Tchitcherin attacked them, saying that French capital, as the capital of an advanced society, in general exploited Russian toilers most barbarically. The profit extracted by French capital was shared by all France and reached also those from whom French socialist leaders were recruited. "I look around," said Tchitcherin, "and see relatively general welfare that was achieved by the immense suffering of Russian toilers. I was interrupted by indignant voices: 'You are a nationalist!' I replied, 'If I am a nationalist, then I am a nationalist of the oppressed. I am a nationalist of Russian toilers exploited by world capital, and you are nationalists of a capitalist growth, you are nationalists of usurers and exploiters.'"³⁷⁰

This point was made as strongly as possible by Lenin himself when he advanced the theory of the correlation between imperialism and opportunism and social chauvinism.³⁷¹ According to him, Western socialists were simply bribed by their respective imperialist compatriots. Western socialists, he repeated were exploiters of Russian workers. We will see that the concept of the Bolshevik revolution's saving Russia from foreign capital became a central motive of Bolshevik propaganda during the Civil War and after it.

The 1905 Revolution and Its International Implications

The 1905 revolution, which was triggered by the Russian military defeat in the war with Japan, was another pivotal point in contemporary history, in spite of its partial failure. It manifested that the Russian political regime was doomed and that sooner or later, the revolution would have its victorious return. As a result of this revolution, Russia became a constitutional monarchy with a party system. The freedom of speech and of the press greatly increased, and monarchist allegiance of the workers and peasants was considerably undermined.

From the German viewpoint, the revolution had both positive and negative consequences. On the one side, it manifested the gradual weakening of the Russian state. For example, a German trade attaché in St. Petersburg reported in September 1905 that the workers' movement in Russia was favorable for German economic interests since it would undermine Russian industry, which would not be able to compete with its German counterpart. According to this report, many German industrial products that had not been able to compete on the Russian market before could now be imported successfully into Russia.³⁷² On the other hand, the political implications of the Russian revolution were terrifying for Germany. According to German documents, Wilhelm II anticipated in 1905 that Russia would be split into several republics which would become a constant threat to Germany since they would be more inclined to an alliance with France than was the existing monarchy.³⁷³

One of the most dangerous implications of the 1905 revolution was its negative influence on Austria-Hungary as the previously moderate constitutional struggle of the Austrian Slavs acquired an openly revolutionary character. The year 1905 revolutionized Austrian Poles, Ruthenes (now Western Ukrainians), and especially Czechs. An Austrian historian, Hans Mommsen, concluded that "the Russian revolution meant a dramatic change" since "a revolutionary impulse of Russia which ruined the electoral reform movement made impossible any reform of the Austrian nationality problem."³⁷⁴ Therefore, the geopolitical situation of Germany was seriously endangered, and, irrelevant to current Russian governmental intentions, the very existence of the Russian colossus, with its internal dynamics which could once again lead to a revolution, was regarded as a mortal threat that needed preventive action.

As a result of the Russian defeat, the Russian *Drang nach Osten* was stopped. It therefore followed that Russia would return to Europe. This situation was utterly undesired by Germany, and anticipation of a Teuton-Slav confrontation only grew. For this reason, this Russian revolution greatly accelerated the final battle. Indeed, the possibility of a Russian liberal government, which would be enthusiastically welcomed by France, England, and the United States and would eradicate Russia's previous international isolation, was very sinister in German eyes.

Apart from those fears, the 1905 revolution came as an unpleasant surprise for the SPD, in spite of all its lip service. In September 1905, Bebel said in a speech to the Jena SPD congress that unfortunately, the center of gravity of Russian expansionism had returned to Europe. According to him, a reformed or even a revolutionary Russia was also dangerous, if not more dangerous than tsarist Russia.³⁷⁵ This claim was in full accord with what had been said by Engels and by Bebel himself in the 1890s, that the Russian bourgeoisie was more dangerous than tsarism. It was evident that another revolution would bring the Russian liberal bourgeoisie to political power. In a private conversation with a senior German diplomat, Bebel said that Russia would remain a threat to Germany, regardless of its government.³⁷⁶ So he also definitely had in mind a radical Russian revolution. In a Reichstag speech, Bebel warned that Germany was "now in the most dangerous situation since 1870," and in December 1905, he again warned that Russian consolidation through reforms "endangers the territorial integrity of the Eastern German provinces."³⁷⁷

In 1907, at the Stuttgart congress of the Second International, the first convoked after the 1905 revolution, Bebel went so far as to not mention the revolution in his opening speech.³⁷⁸ Russian socialists, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, were embarrassed by this lack, so Lunatcharsky (using the pseudonym of Voinov) publicly attacked Bebel in a pamphlet. Lenin, who wrote the introduction to this pamphlet, tried to refute Lunatcharsky's argument that Bebel failed to mention the revolution deliberately. Lenin himself said that he had greatly looked forward to hearing what Bebel would say about the Russian revolution, and when Bebel did not mention it at all, Lenin and his neighbor, Henri Van Kol (1852-1925), a Dutch socialist, decided that it was simply an old man's slip:

Another mistake of Comrade Voinov was to believe Plekhanov when the latter said that Bebel *deliberately* omitted mention of the Russian revolution in his speech of welcome, and that Bebel *did not want* to speak about Russia. These words of Plekhanov's were simply crude buffoonery on the part of a socialist who is deeply respected by the liberals and should not for a moment have been taken seriously, should not have evoked even the possibility of believing that there was an iota of truth in them. For my part I can testify that during Bebel's speech, Van Kol, a representative of the socialist Right wing who sat next to me in the Bureau, listened to Bebel specially to see whether he would mention Russia. And as soon as Bebel had finished, Van Kol turned to me with a look of surprise: he did not doubt (nor did a single serious member of the Congress) that Bebel had forgotten Russia *accidentally*. The best and most experienced speakers sometimes make slips. For Comrade Voinov to call this forgetfulness of the part of the veteran Bebel "characteristic", is, in my opinion, most unfair. It is also profoundly unfair to speak in general about the "*present-day*" opportunistic Bebel.³⁷⁹

Was Lenin so naive? His refutation of Lunatcharsky speaks rather in favor of another suggestion. It was Lenin's way of hinting to his readers that something was wrong with German Social Democrats. If Lenin wrote

the introduction, and Lunatcharsky's attack against Bebel was unacceptable to him, Lenin could simply have advised him to omit this part. However, Lenin preferred to publish a very strange and seemingly naive polemic about Bebel's alleged slip. But, as if to cast doubts on what he himself said, Lenin continued:

Comrade Voitov has abundantly proved by his whole pamphlet that he is on the side of the German revolutionary Marxists (like Kautsky), that he is working together with them to get rid of old prejudices, opportunist clichés, and short-sighted complacency. . . . He is absolutely right in saying that we must now learn from the Germans and profit by their experience. Only ignoramuses, who have still learned nothing from the Germans and therefore do not know the ABC, can infer from this a "divergence" within revolutionary Social-Democracy. *We must criticise the mistakes of the German leaders fearlessly and openly* [italics added] if we wish to be true to the spirit of Marx and help the Russian socialists to be equal to the present-day tasks of the workers' movement. Bebel was undoubtedly mistaken at Essen as well when he defended Noske, when he upheld the division of wars into defensive and offensive.

In the same seemingly innocent and friendly way, Lenin tried to remind his audience of the kind of political implications a future Russian-German military confrontation might have. In his preface to Engels's correspondence with Sorge, which included Engels's above-quoted letter, Lenin wrote: "In 1891 there was danger of a European war. Engels corresponded on the subject with Bebel, and they agreed that in the event of Russia attacking Germany, the German socialists must desperately fight the Russians and any allies of the Russians."³⁸⁰

In 1908, Lenin took up the same issue again, directly attacking Noske, whom he had already attacked, along with another SPD leader, Georg Vollmar (1850-1922), and indirectly attacking Bebel and Engels:

Social-Democrats, headed by Bebel and Vollmar, hold rigidly to the view that the Social-Democrats must defend their country against aggression, and that they are bound to take part in a "defensive" war. This proposition led Vollmar at Stuttgart to declare that "all our love for humanity cannot prevent us being good Germans", while the Social-Democratic deputy Noske proclaimed in the Reichstag that, in the event of war against Germany, "the Social-Democrats will not lag behind the bourgeois parties and will shoulder their rifles". From this Noske had to make only one more step to declare that "we want Germany to be armed as much as possible".³⁸¹

This was exactly the view not only of Bebel but also of Engels.

Meanwhile, Lenin's active hatred for Kautsky increased, and he abused Kautsky in private correspondence for "meanness," "banality," and so on.³⁸² This hatred was only strengthened when Kautsky agreed in 1910 to be a trustee of money that belonged to Russian Social Democrats who had split into various factions and could not divide the money between them. In 1911, Kautsky gave up his trusteeship.³⁸³

One can discover a turning point, and even a revolution, in Lenin's attitude toward German Social Democrats. Herzen was anathema for Russian orthodox social democrats because of Marx's and Engels's extremely negative attitude toward him; accordingly, Plekhanov, the father of Russian social democracy, was very critical of Herzen during his early Marxist period, contrasting him to Belinsky and Tchernyshevsky.³⁸⁴

As we have seen, Lenin first mentioned Herzen as a precursor of Russian social democracy—without criticizing him—in *What Is to Be Done?*—a striking deviation from the former full rejection of Herzen. It seems that in 1906 Lenin published a laudatory, anonymous article about Herzen, which he later could not find.³⁸⁵ By that time, he was afraid to defend Herzen openly. The real breakthrough in Herzen's rehabilitation, however, came through Plekhanov, who greatly influenced Lenin on several crucial issues.

In 1908, Plekhanov exposed Herzen's revolutionary Pan-Slavism, without any criticism. He especially stressed Herzen's claim that the Western European worker was "a philistine of the future" while European socialism might become conservative,³⁸⁶ a serious implicit condemnation of German social democracy. In 1909, Plekhanov escalated his "Herzen crusade," awkwardly trying to reconcile Herzen with Marx and Engels. He said, "If, disappointed in Utopian socialism, Herzen began to see the Slavophile juxtaposition of Russia and the West as substantial, although in need of considerable improvement, he did so following the voice of an essentially correct theoretical instinct." Plekhanov tried to explain the controversy between Marx and Engels on the one hand and Herzen on the other as owing to sheer misunderstanding.³⁸⁷

In 1911, Plekhanov attempted to justify Herzen's condemnation of the West at least during his lifetime by remarking that Herzen had died before the revival of the genuine Western workers' movement.³⁸⁸ The real sensation was Plekhanov's speech at Herzen's grave in Nice on April 7, 1912, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of his birth. This speech marked Herzen's full-fledged rehabilitation and also represented a direct challenge not only to contemporary German social democracy but also to Marx and Engels themselves. Plekhanov said: "Freedom-loving, free-thinking Russia owes an enormous debt to Herzen. . . . Herzen never separated himself from the people or from Russia. . . . Herzen passionately valued the interests of the Russian people. . . . He was Russian to the tips of his fingernails. However, love for the motherland did not become a dark biological instinct for him. . . . He became a citizen of the world." It is interesting that Plekhanov dared to pass over Marx and Engels at that time.³⁸⁹

In 1908 and 1909, Gorky had joined the procession of Herzen's rehabilitators, enthusiastically praising him in lectures at the school for Bolsheviks in Capri.³⁹⁰ All of this rhetoric served as a green light for Lenin, and a month after Plekhanov's speech he subscribed fully to Herzen's rehabilitation. However, Lenin went further than Plekhanov, exhibiting Herzen with all the implicit implications that Herzen's revolutionary nationalism could contain. Lenin violently attacked those people who did not see Herzen as

a revolutionary, as if forgetting that Marx and Engels had no less violently rejected any ambition on the part of Herzen to be regarded as a revolutionary. To conceal his rebellion against Marx and Engels, Lenin claimed that Herzen was allegedly close to Marx at the end of his life, but Lenin did not say that Herzen repented of his early revolutionary nationalism. Indeed, Herzen had not done so, since he had repented only of his appeal for pure destruction in

the *Letters to an Old Comrade*—to Bakunin—written by Herzen in 1869, a year before his death. In them Herzen breaks with the anarchist Bakunin. True, Herzen still sees this break as a mere disagreement on tactics and not as a gulf between the world outlook of the proletarian who is confident of the victory of his class and that of the petty bourgeois who has despaired of his salvation. True enough, in these letters as well, Herzen repeats the old bourgeois-democratic phrases to the effect that socialism must preach “a sermon addressed equally to workman and master, to farmer and townsman”. Nevertheless, in breaking with Bakunin, Herzen turned his gaze, not to liberalism, but to the *International*—to the International led by Marx, to the International which had begun to “rally the legions” of the proletariat, to unite “the world of labour”, which is “abandoning the world of those who enjoy without working”.³⁹¹

Lenin, however, went much further, since he called Herzen the founder of Russian socialism, attacking those people who did not recognize him in such a capacity:

This shows how infamously and vilely Herzen is being slandered by our liberals entrenched in the slavish “legal” press, who magnify Herzen’s weak points and say nothing about his strong points. It was not Herzen’s fault but his misfortune that he could not see the revolutionary people in Russia itself in the 1840s. When in the sixties he came to see the revolutionary people, he sided fearlessly with the revolutionary democracy against liberalism. He fought for a victory of the people over tsarism, not for a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the landlords’ tsar. He raised aloft the banner of revolution.

In commemorating Herzen, Lenin said: “the proletariat will fight its way to a *free alliance* [italics added] with the socialist workers of all lands, having crushed that loathsome monster, the tsarist monarchy, against which Herzen was the first to raise the great banner of struggle by addressing his *free Russian word* to the masses.” The words “free alliance” are most conspicuous, since they represent the way Lenin rejected any German domination over the Russian revolutionary movement.

In December 1913, Lenin started attacking Kautsky publicly for claiming that there was a general disintegration of the Russian social democratic movement.³⁹² In 1914, Lenin was involved in organizational intrigues against Kautsky, which achieved a peak on the eve of World War I, since Lenin knew that a resolution was being prepared in the Second International

that would condemn him. At that time, Lenin called Kautsky "a mean creature."³⁹³

Meanwhile, the SPD observed the Russian socialist movement with growing anxiety. Not long before the war, Bebel told a senior German diplomat that he was afraid of Russian imperialism and Pan-Slavism while, at the same time, he, like all German socialists, regarded the East and also the Middle East as an extension of German cultural and economic interests. "That's why," Bebel said, "we must once again make clear that *regardless* of political rule in Russia, all the Slavs, together with the Tatars, will always be a threat to us. Recently I read once again Bakunin's correspondence . . . and also his other writings. These people are first of all Asians and their methods belong primarily to Asia, not to Europe. I am afraid that in the future we, socialists of Western culture, will not be able to identify with the outlook of these people."³⁹⁴

Lenin's enemies within Russian socialism did their best to warn German Social Democrats against Bolshevism. Kautsky's personal informer, Riazanov, reported secretly to him that Lenin's "Asian-Kalmyk politics attract many orthodox socialists."³⁹⁵ Georg Haupt, a historian of European socialism, said that "there was no one at the International Socialist Bureau meeting who was not aware of the Russophobia which prevailed in the circles of German Social-Democracy."³⁹⁶ The conflict between German and Russian socialist movements was a mirror image of the Russian-German geopolitical conflict. The former matured in July 1914, and one of its main political implications was a series of debates on self-determination.

Debates on National Self-Determination

Lenin insisted on national self-determination quite early on, implying that every nation has the right to declare its independence and establish its nation-state. This program seemed strange to many observers, since Lenin always explicitly wanted to control as much territory as possible for a future socialist state. The general consensus among scholars is that Lenin used this tactical approach in order to make Russian domination more acceptable after a short period of national independence, as happened later in Georgia, Armenia, the Ukraine, and so on. Indeed, the approach was tactical, and Lenin stressed this fact explicitly, as least as far as it concerned the former Russian empire:

If we demand freedom of secession for the Mongolians, Persians, Egyptians and all other oppressed and unequal nations without exception, we do so not because we favour secession, but only because we stand for free, voluntary association and merging as distinct from forcible association. . . .

And since the Poles and Finns are highly cultured people, they will, in all probability, very soon come to see the correctness of this attitude, and the possible secession of Poland and Finland after the triumph of socialism will therefore be only of short duration. The incomparably less cultured

fellahs, Mongolians and Persians might secede for a longer period, but we shall try to shorten it by disinterested cultural assistance as indicated above.³⁹⁷

In another place Lenin said:

People who have not gone into the question thoroughly think that it is "contradictory" for the Social-Democrats of oppressor nations to insist on the "freedom to secede", while Social-Democrats of oppressed nations insist on the "freedom to integrate". However, a little reflection will show that there is not, and cannot be, any other road to internationalism and the amalgamation of nations, any other road from the given situation to this goal.³⁹⁸

In a programmatic article published in 1915, he said: "We do not advocate preserving small nations at all costs; *other conditions being equal*, we are decidedly for centralisation and are opposed to the petty-bourgeois ideal of federal relationships."³⁹⁹

In his private letters, Lenin was much more cynical. In 1913, he wrote to Gorky that "the Austrian type of abomination" would not happen in Russia: "We will not let them go out. And there are more of our brothers, Great Russians, here. With the workers we won't let any of the 'Austrian' spirit,"⁴⁰⁰ which means that Lenin's benevolence toward Polish or Finnish independence was only declaratory. In fact, he did not want to let them leave the empire. In April 1917, Lenin once again publicly admitted the tactical character of his "self-determination" slogan:

The proletarian party strives to create as large a state as possible, for this is to the advantage of the working people; it strives to draw nations closer together, and bring about their further fusion; but it desires to achieve this aim not by violence, but exclusively through a free fraternal union of the workers and the working people of all nations.⁴⁰¹

On the very eve of the October revolution he stressed the point once again:

We do not at all favour secession. We want as vast a state, as close an alliance of the greatest possible number of nations who are neighbours of the Great Russians; we desire this in the interests of democracy and socialism, to attract into the struggle of the proletariat the greatest possible number of the working people of different nations. We desire proletarian revolutionary unity, unification, and not secession. We desire revolutionary unification; that is why our slogan does not call for unification of all states in general, for the social revolution demands the unification *only* of those states which have gone over or are going over to socialism, colonies which are gaining their freedom, etc. We want free unification; that is why we must recognise the right to secede (without freedom to secede, unification cannot be called free).⁴⁰²

Lenin's tactic was, however, more complicated than it seemed. The interpretation that reduces the problem only to the tactic of future expansion

is taken out of the geopolitical context, and in fact, as Rosa Luxemburg noticed in 1918, Bolshevism inflicted great harm by its quest for national self-determination.⁴⁰³ Indeed, Poland and Finland were lost by Russia probably forever. And the situation was not Lenin's mistake. He had a vested interest in supporting self-determination. One must put the problem into the general framework of the Russian-German conflict. German social democracy was against self-determination for obvious reasons, since this concept was very dangerous for Germany because of Austria-Hungary. Marx and Engels were decisively against self-determination for the Austrian Slavs, since it could lead, as they thought, to Russian expansion and endanger German national existence. Therefore, the Austrian Marxists who took upon themselves the elaboration of the nationality problem among the German Social Democrats decisively rejected any right to self-determination and claimed the necessity of Austro-Hungarian territorial integrity. They suggested instead the concept of a national-cultural autonomy within a multinational state, since every nation is diffused and is not linked to any localized territory. For this reason, the citizens of any diffused nation can enjoy cultural autonomy, an independent educational system, and so on, whether they are a majority or a minority in an administrative region.⁴⁰⁴

But the real background of this concept was the desire to maintain the German character of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Victor Adler, the leader of the Austrian Marxists and of Jewish origin, had in the past been a German nationalist. Antagonized by the anti-Semitism of his former friends, he decided to shift his efforts to the national integration of Austria-Hungary through Marxism in order to save its German character.⁴⁰⁵

The main theoretician of cultural-national autonomy, Otto Bauer, said, "Every reasonable man must strive to settle all national relations in the existing state framework."⁴⁰⁶ According to Bauer, the dismantling of Austria-Hungary would only create a foothold for universal Russian autocracy. Any collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire before the Russian revolution would be disastrous, and after the revolution it would be redundant. Bauer, however, repeated Engels's old thesis that genuine Russian imperialism would win only after the victory of a constitutional system in Russia.⁴⁰⁷ This thesis meant that Bauer, as well as the German Social Democrats, was very afraid of a liberal Russian revolution.

It is quite clear that this German-Austrian socialist rejection of self-determination, directed implicitly and explicitly against a potential Russian expansion into Slavic areas, was not acceptable to Lenin's vision of a victorious Russian revolutionary expansion into Europe, which he had inherited from Herzen. What was no less important than self-determination was a political guarantee for a Russian revolutionary state in the case of a victory for German social democracy, with its concomitant claim to be the center of the world socialist system within which all other nations would be granted only cultural-national autonomy. Rosa Luxemburg belonged to the SPD left wing and welcomed the Russian revolution, but even she decisively rejected self-determination, demanding a unified world socialist republic.⁴⁰⁸

Lenin was very well aware of the implications of the principle of cultural-national autonomy and hinted at his real motivation for so stubbornly supporting the principle of self-determination. He said that the French Proudhonists had rejected self-determination, which was equal to French chauvinism, since France was then regarded as the most powerful country and the prospective victory of the French socialist revolution would have made other countries a part of the great French republic.

The Proudhonists totally "negated" the national question and the right of nations to self-determination. Marx ridiculed French Proudhonism and showed the affinity between it and French chauvinism. ("All Europe must and will sit quietly on their hindquarters until the gentlemen in France abolish 'poverty'. . . . By the negation of nationalities they appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption by the model French nation.")⁴⁰⁹

So, according to Lenin, the rejection of self-determination leaves the way open for "social-patriots." If one takes into consideration the fact that Germany was the most powerful country at the time, it follows that the self-determination principle was now equal to German "social-patriotism" if a German socialist revolution were victorious.

In another place, Lenin quoted a left-wing Austrian-German socialist, Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), in order to support his hint that self-determination was directed against European capital, i.e., against the Western countries as such:

Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the European nations: the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces.⁴¹⁰

It is not by chance that when Lenin started his open rebellion against German social democracy, rehabilitating Herzen, he also directly challenged the principle of cultural-national autonomy as it was formulated by the Austrian Marxists. It is interesting that Lenin did not want to take issue himself and picked Stalin for this purpose. This choice was very conspicuous as Stalin was an Asian. That fact implied that the Bolsheviks also challenged the anti-Asian Eurocentric vision of German social democracy inherited from Marx and Engels.

Stalin made it clear that the Austrian program was the universal blueprint for other countries:

One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities. "In the multi-national state," according to Bauer, "the working class of all the nations

opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy."

Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues: "Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state." . . .

In the second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats . . . announce their readiness to unite the "two parts" of their people into one whole? What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is "inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations"? What sort of "solution" of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?¹¹

Stalin's reference to the wish of the Ruthenes to unify the two parts of their nation into a single one sounded extremely sinister from the German point of view since one part of the Ruthenes lived in Russia. This demand was a literal revival of the old Bakuninist idea of Slavic revolutionary unification. Stalin hinted also that the Austrian program served as a German expansionist blueprint:

The question arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be "united into a single nation"? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the *utopia* of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?¹²

Stalin's pamphlet explicitly supported the Western Slavs in their quest for national independence and separation from Austria-Hungary, and thus it was similar to Bakunin's famous speech in 1848 that laid the foundations for the hostility of Marx and Engels toward Russian socialists. Sixty-five years had passed, Russian socialists had become more and more sophisticated, and their appeal was now dressed in a theory that relied on Marxism itself as the highest source of authority.

At the time, the Austrian government allowed Bolsheviks on its territory, and Stalin (with the help of others) had written his pamphlet in Vienna. The Austrians clearly hoped to use the Bolsheviks as a disruptive force against Russia. They had no idea of what was being prepared by the Bolsheviks for their own country.

The Bolshevik Revolution as a Culmination of the Russian-German Contest

World War I

One of the great paradoxes of contemporary historiography is that there is an influential historical school that claims that World War I was a result of misunderstanding and of spontaneous, ill-advised actions of various statesmen (the classical compendium of this opinion is Luigi Albertini's work *The Origins of the War of 1914*). There are two main reasons for this grave mistake: One, Albertini and his followers relied too much on the authenticity of German sources. In fact, the German military and political establishment (including the Social Democrats) that launched World War I later swore its innocence to avoid the accusations both of the German people and of the victorious Entente. Many documents are missing, and, too, most important decisions were not recorded in order to avoid their disclosure.

A typical example of German treatment of archive material is the collection of reports from German military representatives in Russia published in Germany in 1937 and enhanced by Wilhelm II's comments in the margin.¹ The book gives a list of all the reports sent by seven German military attachés in St. Petersburg from 1904 to 1914, but only a small percentage of the lists is actually printed, and those that are published were mercilessly censored. The reader will search in vain for reports on crucial political events like the assassination of Stolypin.

The Soviet historian Igor Bestuzhev made a very apt comment concerning the documentation of the pro-German lobby's activities in Russia, saying that "materials that characterize the pro-German trend among Russian ruling circles are very scarce, since their representative, being very aware of the lack of popularity of their views among the Russian bourgeois-landed class public opinion, preferred not to leave any documentary traces of their activity."² This lack of material can be directly applied to the German military-political leaders, since they did not want the German people to know about the political process that had brought Germany to war. In addition, Berlin was not occupied by foreign armies in 1918, and the Germans could do as they wished with their archives and publications.

The second reason for the mistake was that Albertini's work treats the origins of the war from the point of view of purely diplomatic history, ignoring the social, political, and geopolitical background. It is not surprising that eventually several German historians, such as Fritz Fisher and Immanuel Geiss, decided to break this vicious circle and produce documentary evidence of what is completely evident from any social analysis of the origins of World War I: German responsibility.

There is no doubt that all the nations contributed to the outbreak of the war—one has only to recall French revanchism, English and Russian imperialism. Moreover, Germany was really threatened by Russian expansionism, but the Russian threat was abstract and by no means immediate. One can cautiously confirm Geiss's remark, "German Weltpolitik, the containment policy of the Entente and Germany's refusal to be contained, made war inevitable."³ The timetable the Germans had chosen for the war was almost obligatory. The framework of their national strategy would not let them wait any longer, and there would have been several dangers in postponing the war:

1. The Russian liberal revolution was a matter of time. This was a general consensus of all the observers, whether right or left wing. But such a revolution would put Germany in an extremely difficult position. First, any Russian republican government would mean the end of the German minority rule, so the German lobby in the Russian government would be brought to an end. This situation would deprive Germany of an extremely important political tool in its influence on Russian affairs. Germany also definitely preferred a weak tsar like Nikolai II. In the case of a liberal revolution, Russia would be enthusiastically welcomed by Western democracies, so Germany would lose any hope of alienating Russia from France and England. At the same time, Germany would lose its propaganda trump card as a fighter of brutal Russian autocracy.

On the other side, the prerevolutionary situation was regarded by Germany as a source of inherent Russian weakness that would undermine the latter's capacity to resist. Wilcox, who left Germany on the eve of the war, witnessed this basic calculation of German policy: "The persuasion that Russia was rendered impotent by impending revolution was one of the chief factors in determining Germany's policy."⁴

2. Turkey was on the verge of total collapse because since 1911, it had been involved in three successive wars. In the beginning, Italy took over a considerable part of Turkey's possessions in North Africa as well as the Dodecanese Islands. This easy victory immediately encouraged all the independent Balkan states—Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria—to wage war against Turkey, and as a result, Turkey lost almost all its European possessions. The Turkish defeats could not help inflaming the Russian Pan-Slavists and also the Austrian Slavs, especially those in the south.

The situation in Austria-Hungary was quickly growing worse. There was no hope for any consensus between Slavs and Germans, and the Czechs were becoming more and more aggressive and assertive, taking advantage

of tacit Russian support.⁵ Austria could not survive another Russian revolution. Western Slavs regarded Russia, if not as the future home state, at least as a natural and principal ally. As far as one can judge from what was said by Sazonov, the last but one Russian foreign minister, Russian politicians realized that the western and southern Slav movements endangered the very existence of Austria-Hungary. He said that "Vienna had realized for a long time that the national revival of Slav subjects of the Habsburg monarchy, which was a result of the Russian liberation policy in the Balkans, would sooner or later inevitably bring Austria-Hungary to collapse."⁶ However, the same Russian politicians tried to ignore the basic fact that Germans regarded such an eventuality as a mortal threat to Germany itself. From this point of view, the very existence of Russia, which catalyzed the natural disintegration of Austria-Hungary and was ready to extend its influence, was an act of aggression regardless of actual Russian political intentions.

3. Domestic German affairs also favored the war. The SPD had become the most powerful German political party, collecting more than one-third of the votes in the last Reichstag elections. Even a peaceful development could bring the SPD to the government. For this reason, the war might also seem desirable since it could bring in its wake nationalist agitation and a deterioration of the SPD's position. On the other hand, the Social Democrats support of the war was decisive.

Commenting on the theory suggested by some historians that the war was launched by Germany in order to suppress revolution, Georg Haupt said, "It is legitimate for historians to ask whether the war broke the rhythm of the revolutionary crises only to make them more violent in 1918 or whether it affected their development, directing it towards a national solution in Austro-Hungary, distorting it into fascist revolution in Italy, and aborting it in Germany in bitter defeat?" According to Haupt, there was "a process in which the war acted as a delaying or a deviating force and not as a catalyst."⁷

4. Russia had actively prepared for the war and was in a state of rearmament and modernization. It was unwise to wait for the end of this dangerous process.⁸

Thus, the German government had many vested interests in launching the war without delay. German diplomacy, utilizing its usual deception game, trapped Russia, which suffered from a basic duality, into making the first move toward a military confrontation. In this way, Germany hoped to neutralize England and to secure the support of German Social Democrats. In other words, Germany needed a *casus belli*.

As early as 1909 the Russian foreign minister Alexander Izvolsky (1856-1919) had said in a secret meeting that Austria-Hungary "is going to provoke Serbia to war, in anticipation that after Russia and Germany would join the war an all-European war would break out." Izvolsky had said that Germany was ready to be involved, realizing that it was a rare occasion for the destruction of the Slavs. According to Izvolsky, "too-active Russian intervention in favor of Serbia might be a *casus belli*."⁹ The assassination in Sarajevo seemed to be an excellent one.

Germany secretly pressed Austria-Hungary into the conflict with Serbia, which was then collectively blamed for the assassination in Sarajevo. This dilemma could easily have been settled, with Serbia taking the blame for the assassination, but Austria-Hungary sent Serbia an ultimatum, which was in fact a declaration of war. Here the inherent duality of Russia's foreign policy played its sinister role. The German lobby in the Russian government, falsely regarding Germany as a mediator, did not realize that Russia was perceived by Germany as a mortal threat *sui generis*. This situation is why the Russian government became an easy prey for German deception. Let us not forget that the Russian government was badly informed while the Germans screened all of Russian military and political life. In July 1914, the tsar said: "I cannot believe that the emperor wants war. If you were to know him as I do," he added to Paleologue.¹⁰ Nikolai II thought that "he had no reason to mistrust Germany except with regard to her Turkish policy," and also, Nikolai II regarded Wilhelm II as a mediator until July 30. Buchanan stressed that "the Russian government had . . . given their unqualified support to Serbia's claims under the erroneous impression that, even were Austria to prove troublesome, Germany was so bent on peace that she would not support her ally in any action likely to provoke international implications." The German chancellor, Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-1921), even guaranteed that "Germany would not support Austria in a forward policy in the Balkans," which is why Nikolai II could say that Austria was only "a source of weakness to Germany and a danger to peace." By the way, this was not only a Russian misconception. When Buchanan warned his government in June 1913 that Germany was probably preparing an offensive war, the English government dismissed his warning. "No one in England," said Buchanan, "believed Germany capable of such criminal folly." In fact, it was widely believed that Wilhelm II had the "wish of going down in posterity as the keeper of European peace."¹¹

On the other hand, the Russian government could not allow itself to not react to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, in order to prevent the deterioration not only of popular support but also of the Russian part of the ruling bureaucracy, which was becoming stronger and stronger. Indeed, Pan-Slavist agitation picked up momentum in Russia. In October 1912, a countrywide public campaign was launched in defense of Slavic interests, and Russian diplomats were nearly accused of high treason. There were several ministers who did not conceal their condemnation of "the weak and anti-Slav policy of the Russian foreign ministry."¹² The same people were persuaded that Germany would in any case attack Russia.

When, as a response to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Russia started a partial mobilization on the Austrian frontier, that action was immediately used by Germany as a *casus belli* to declare war against Russia. Germany, however, miscalculated. England, following France, declared war on Germany.

Russian claims to the Strait of Bosphorus were not made in the summer of 1914. Moreover, Russia tried to prevent any military confrontation with Turkey, but Turkey itself attacked Russia in October 1914, and only then

were all the Pan-Slavist quests advanced once again. Fervent Russian imperialism swept over the country. Not only the Strait of Bosphorus and Constantinople were claimed for Russia; some nationalists such as Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky) demanded that the Holy Land be considered genuine Russian territory.¹³ According to other demands, Germany and Austria-Hungary should be dismantled, and Prussia must become a separate German state.¹⁴ The potentialities of genuine Russian imperialism manifested themselves in an explicit way. As Marx and Engels suspected, imperialism was supported, not by the court or by the pro-German radical right, but by Russian liberals, radicals, and even such lofty religious thinkers as Berdiaev.¹⁵

Meanwhile, German and Austrian Social Democrats supported the war. Their main justification, as is easily imagined, were numerous statements by Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Bebel, but especially what had been said by Engels and Bebel in 1891. All these statements were extended to apply to 1914, and the SPD appealed to the German people to liberate Russia from absolutism. On July 29, 1914, Hugo Haase, a leader of the SPD left wing, said, "We know that Germany wants peace, but if Russia intervenes, Germany must also intervene."¹⁶

The German workers regarded the Russian anti-Austrian mobilization as a nonprovoked attack.¹⁷ Because of this attitude, the SPD had to choose "Germany unity rather than social revolution," as Wilhelm Maehl put it.¹⁸ According to him, if the SPD did not support the war, it would lose its control over the workers.¹⁹ On August 4, 1914, the SPD Reichstag faction adopted a resolution in which the first and foremost justification of the war for Germany was the struggle against Russian autocracy: "The victory of Russian despotism which is covered by the blood of the best Russians, puts at stake a lot, if not all, for our people and for our free future."²⁰ The resolution called for avoiding this threat and saving the culture and independence of Germany. A most concise position of the SPD vis-à-vis Russia during the war was formulated by one of its leaders, Eduard David (1863-1930), who abundantly quoted Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Wilhelm Liebknecht, and Bebel to prove the SPD policy. He claimed that only Germany's enemies in the war had expansionist policies and that Germany was only struggling for survival. He even complained that Western and Russian socialists did nothing to stop the war, explaining the war in terms of the Russian geopolitical threat.²¹

David said: "In the East, the state colossus has agglomerated during the last two centuries. From the point of view of geographical space and population, it leaves other countries far behind. . . . Semi-Asiatic in its political and cultural existence, this empire is a threatening catastrophe at the doors of Western Europe."²² He repeated the old German socialist claim that Russia was a brigand state, since its development was extensive and not intensive and therefore Russia was always in need of new territories for rapacious exploitation. David defined the Russians as backward and lacking in initiative and added, "the fear of Russia is the main German obsession."²³

If one were to anticipate the change of the Russian political system as the only way to avoid a Russian-German confrontation, according to David, there was now no hope for such change: A young Russian bourgeoisie had already emerged that was equally interested in Russian expansion.²⁴ He came to the conclusion that the German sword would open the Russian way to freedom.²⁵ (A nice freedom it brought, and with so many benefits for Germany!)

According to David's diaries, published only in the 1960s, he felt that Germany (even its monarchy) embodied the noble virtues and that its autocratic enemies embodied all the possible vices.²⁶ In August 1916, David suggested the annexation of Lithuania and Latvia, feeling that it was "a crime" to leave those areas to Russia.²⁷ The majority of German Social Democrats wanted to destroy France, to annex Belgium, and first to engage in large colonial annexations in Africa.²⁸

A former left-wing Social Democrat, Konrad Haenisch (1876-1925), declared the right of Germany to have a power policy and suggested what, in essence, was the first formulation of the principle of "socialism in one country." According to Haenisch, socialism might be constructed within national boundaries, and he appealed for the creation of strong national-socialist parties.²⁹ It is interesting that all these thoughts were exposed by Haenisch in a letter to his former friend, Karl Radek, who later made great contributions to the final formulation of the Soviet concept of socialism in one country.

Only some German revisionists, such as the hated Bernstein, whom Kautsky joined, together with leaders of the SPD left wing, like Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919), Luxemburg, and others, expressed reservations about and even openly criticized the official SPD policy.³⁰

Nevertheless, Kautsky explained that the war had been provoked by the 1905 revolution³¹ and its consequent revival of Pan-Slavism, which had given such a negative connotation to that revolution—ideas that had previously been expressed by SPD leaders only privately. Kautsky now said, loudly but quite hypocritically:

"The present war is not only the child of imperialism, but also of the Russian revolution" [*italics added*]. As early as 1904, he, Kautsky, foresaw that the Russian revolution would revive Pan-Slavism in a new form, that "democratic Russia would, inevitably, greatly fan the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs for national independence. . . . Then the Polish question would also become acute. . . . Austria would fall apart because, with the collapse of tsarism, the iron band which at present binds the centrifugal elements together would be destroyed." . . . "The Russian revolution . . . gave a new and powerful impetus to the national aspirations of the East, adding Asia's problems to those of Europe. All these problems are making themselves very strongly felt in the present war and are acquiring very decisive significance for the mood of the masses of the people, including the proletarian masses, whereas among the ruling classes imperialist tendencies are predominant."³²

In spite of this view, Bernstein condemned the slaughter of 150,000 Russian soldiers who had invaded eastern Prussia and, in so doing, provoked the indignation of his SPD colleagues.³³

Almost all Russian socialists supported their country against the unprovoked German attack. Only some Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, with some Socialist Revolutionaries, declared their defeatism. The most radical defeatism was declared by Lenin: In a private conversation he said that it would not be so bad if the German army were to occupy Riga, Tiflis, and Helsinki.³⁴ Taking his strategy into consideration, his defeatism was quite reasonable. For him, Russia's defeat was the best way to launch the revolution. Indeed, Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war had been a good enough lesson. However, to take only the defeatist position vis-à-vis Germany would signify a recognition of Germany and especially of the SPD as the right side in the war, with all of that fact's political implications. Lenin wanted to use a Russian defeat only for the Bolsheviks, not to benefit the SPD in the case of a victorious German revolution.

The war was also used by Lenin as a unique opportunity to settle accounts not only with the SPD but also with all Western socialism through its complete delegitimization. Lenin immediately rejected the Second International en bloc as illegitimate and treacherous.³⁵ A well-known Bolshevik, Vladimir Karpinsky (Minin, 1880-1965), noticed soon after war had broken out "the possible connection: the German SD struggles against Russian Tsarism and the Russian SD welcomes the victory of the German army."³⁶ A month after the war had begun, Lenin advanced the idea of a new International whose task, according to Lenin, would be "resolutely and irrevocably to rid itself of the bourgeois trend in socialism."³⁷

Lenin could not erase the repeated Marx and Engels's anti-Russian statements justifying the war against Russia, but he related them to a situation that first justified such an approach and would afterward be submitted to changes:

False references to Marx and Engels are the crowning argument of . . . social-chauvinism. . . . In all times the sophists have been in the habit of citing instances that refer to situations that are dissimilar in principle. . . . The SPD has distorted an 1891 quotation from Engels to the effect that the Germans must wage a life-and-death struggle against the allied armies of France and Russia.³⁸

Lenin argued that the situation had changed qualitatively, and he therefore took advantage of the theory of imperialism, which he claimed had appeared only in 1897, i.e., after the fatal period 1891-1892. We have seen that it was this theory that was used by Lenin against Western socialists corrupted by their exploitation of Russia.

The exploitation of worse paid labour from backward countries is particularly characteristic of imperialism. On this exploitation rests, to a certain degree, the parasitism of rich imperialist countries which bribe a part of their workers

with higher wages [italics added] while shamelessly and unrestrainedly exploiting the labour of "cheap" foreign workers. . . .

It would be expedient, perhaps, to emphasize more strongly and to express more vividly in our programme the prominence of the handful of the richest imperialist countries which prosper parasitically by robbing colonies and weaker nations. This is an extremely important feature of imperialism. To a certain extent it facilitates the rise of powerful revolutionary movements in countries that are subjected to imperialist plunder, and are in danger of being crushed and partitioned by the giant imperialists (such as Russia), and on the other hand, tends to a certain extent to prevent the rise of profound revolutionary movements in the countries that plunder, by imperialist methods, many colonies and foreign lands, and thus make a very large (comparatively) portion of their population participants in the division of the imperialist loot.³⁹

Later, after the revolution, Lenin developed this argument:

Why is this opportunism stronger in Western Europe than in our country? It is because the culture of the advanced countries has been, and still is, the result of their being able to live at the expense of a thousand million oppressed people. It is because the capitalists of these countries obtain a great deal more in this way than they could obtain as profits by plundering the workers in their own countries. . . .

It goes without saying that, out of this tidy sum, at least five hundred millions can be spent as a sop to the labour leaders and the labour aristocracy, i.e., on all sorts of bribes. The whole thing boils down to nothing but bribery. It is done in a thousand different ways: by increasing cultural facilities in the largest centres, by creating educational institutions, and by providing co-operative, trade union and parliamentary leaders with thousands of cushy jobs. This is done wherever present-day civilised capitalist relations exist. It is these thousands of millions in superprofits that form the economic basis of opportunism in the working-class movement.⁴⁰

Whatever Lenin's reasons were for making his accusation, it was completely artificial to refer to 1897 as the time when the original sin of Western socialism was committed. The European economic drive into Russia had started long before 1897, and the European population as a whole had benefited from its in various ways. But everything said by Lenin against German and other Western socialists was not strong in comparison to what was said against the SPD by Plekhanov. When the war broke out, Plekhanov told the SPD leaders that to fight Russian tsarism with the help of German imperialism was the same as "wishing to defeat the Devil with the help of Beelzebub."⁴¹

If Lenin attacked only the SPD leaders and "working aristocracy," Plekhanov attacked all German workers: "The German proletariat," he said, "left the banner of the International of workers and moved to the imperialist banner." He accused SPD leaders of deliberating directing the German working class onto the road of expansion and the exploitation of other countries.⁴² The German proletariat, he claimed, "was seduced by the

thought of German economic domination over other peoples."⁴³ According to Plekhanov, this was the secret of SPD policy in August 1914.

He justified his Zurich speech of 1893 in which he had welcomed the revolutionary German army as the liberator of the Russian people, but, he said, the present German army was imperialist and chauvinist: "German militarism is incomparably more dangerous for all Western Europe than Russian militarism."⁴⁴ Plekhanov added that he was very frightened of a possible German victory over Russia, and from his point of view, the interests of revolutionary socialism demanded German defeat.⁴⁵

Alexinsky also became an ardent socialist defensist, supported at first by Manuilsky, another Forwardist. Alexinsky founded his own tribune, *Russia and Freedom*, to which Benito Mussolini, then a left-wing Italian socialist, contributed. Alexinsky violently attacked the SPD.⁴⁶ Many Bolsheviks took a defensist position, and only Lenin's pressure changed their public attitude toward the war. Such prominent Bolsheviks as Bukharin, Krylenko and his wife Elena Rozmirovitch (1886-1953),⁴⁷ Kamenev, Grigory Petrovsky (1878-1958),⁴⁸ and Tchitcherin⁴⁹ were defensists at the beginning of the war. Trotsky later accused many local Bolsheviks of defensism, among them the future people's commissar for defense under Stalin and, after him, Soviet president, Kliment Voroshilov (1881-1969).⁵⁰

Contrary to the position of the defensists and defeatists, Lenin's defeatism was carefully calculated from the political point of view. It seems that he anticipated Germany's need for his cooperation, and he took a political position that would prepare the way for such cooperation. Certainly, this was only a tactical step for Lenin. He had a world vision and could not be a German puppet. His political plan was very clear: (1) take advantage of German support but by no means directly or through the SPD; (2) use the Russian defeat to launch a revolution and forestall a German revolution, otherwise the revolutionary Wehrmacht would definitely carry the latter out, as anticipated by the Engels-Bebel blueprint of a new German 1793; (3) start, if possible, the Russian 1793 instead.

He more or less explicitly verbalized this plan in 1915:

The victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in *one* capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise *against the rest of the world*—the capitalist world—attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and in case of need using even *armed force against the exploiting classes and their states*. The political form of a society wherein the proletariat is victorious in overthrowing the bourgeoisie will be a democratic republic, which will more and more concentrate the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations, in the struggle against states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without a dictatorship of the oppressed class, of the proletariat. A free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.⁵¹

Lenin did not say which country he had in mind, but it was not, as Stanley Page suggested, Germany.⁵² It was certainly Russia, as is quite clear from his following words:

It is the proletariat in the most backward of the belligerent Great Powers which, through the medium of their party, have had to adopt—especially in view of the shameful treachery of the German and French Social-Democrats—revolutionary tactics that are quite unfeasible unless they “contribute to the defeat” of their own government, but which alone lead to a European revolution.⁵³

He also hinted that he would not hesitate to take advantage of Asian support against Europe. “The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone for ever.”⁵⁴

As we have seen, the promotion of revolution—*Revolutionierung*—was one of the most important aspects of German warfare against both Russia and the British empire. In 1914, Wilhelm II instructed his “consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc. . . . [to] inflame the whole Mohammedan world to wild revolt against this hateful, lying, consciousnessless people of hagglers.”⁵⁵ A similar goal was proposed with regard to Russia. “The network of informers and agents with which Germany covered the whole Russian empire” was mobilized for this purpose. It was coordinated by a German deputy foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman (1866–1940), and the German ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen (1872–1943), who was chiefly concerned with mobilising Russian revolutionaries belonging to the radical wing of the socialist movement in Russia herself.” Other centers were located in German embassies in Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Turkey.⁵⁶

There is an inflated myth surrounding Parvus that implies he was the brain who invented the *Revolutionierung* of Russia.⁵⁷ This plan was in fact elaborated by German intelligence, and Parvus was only a German talent spotter and also a cover for the real actors behind the scene. Parvus, incidentally, recommended at first that the Mensheviks be relied upon as the group more influenced by the SPD. However, the Mensheviks as a rule became defensists.⁵⁸

It was an Estonian Bolshevik, Alexander Kesküla (1882–?), another German talent spotter, who recommended in September 1915 that German money be channeled to the Bolsheviks.⁵⁹ Kesküla obtained Lenin’s blueprint of peace with Germany, and only then did the German ambassador to Denmark, Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau (1869–1928), (who manipulated Parvus), recommend the overthrowing of the Russian monarchy, which until then Germany had not been able to afford. He wrote: “Victory, and as its prize, the first place in the world, are ours if we succeed in revolutionizing Russia in time.”⁶⁰

Lenin’s position suited Germany very well. He was a defeatist, and he was hostile to all Triple Entente countries, which meant that his prospective victory could not safely be used by the Entente and that, therefore, Russia would be alienated from its allies. Moreover, the SPD’s collaboration with

the German government in the revolutionizing of Russia was evident enough. Scheidemann and David confirmed in their memoirs and diaries that Parvus was in permanent contact with SPD leaders.⁶¹

The first rumors of Lenin's collaboration with Germany came from Alexinsky as early as 1915,⁶² and in 1917, after the March revolution, Alexinsky launched a public campaign against Lenin's treachery. The Bolsheviks treated the campaign as a vicious slander. Then in 1921, another round of accusations concerning Lenin's collaboration with German intelligence came from German revisionists.

"From the Entente side," wrote Bernstein, "it has been asserted and still is maintained that Lenin and his comrades had been supplied at that time with large sums of money by Imperial Germany in order that they might carry on more effectively therewith their disruptive agitation in Russia.

"Lenin and his comrades have indeed received sums from Imperial Germany. I learned of this as early as the end of December 1917. Through a friend I made inquiries of a person who, owing to his connection with official quarters, was in a position to be well informed and I received a reply confirming this. I was not able, however, to find out how large the amounts were or the name or names of the intermediaries. Now I have learned from reliable sources that the sums in question were almost incredibly large, certainly amounting to more than 50 million gold marks. In other words, the sums were sufficiently large to remove all doubt as to their origin in the minds of Lenin and his comrades. The matter is therefore of no small interest in the evaluation of their political morality. Nor is it without value in judging the methods employed by Imperial policy.

"Of this we shall treat in a separate article. I am sure of the arguments which, from the viewpoint of military expediency, could seem to justify the financing of the Bolshevik coup. The officer who first mentioned this matter to me quoted a leading member of Parliament of one of the Allied Powers, with whom he had official contacts as saying that this was 'a master stroke on the part of Germany.'" . . .

Bernstein published another article on this matter. "My bringing to public attention the fact that Lenin and his comrades had received more than 50 million gold marks from the German Imperial Treasury for the furtherance of their activities," he wrote, "has elicited from the *Rote Fahne* [official organ of the German Communist Party] a threatening note against me. It demands that I name my informers so that these 'unscrupulous slanderers' might be given the opportunity to prove their assertions before a court. And as a docile pupil of Moscow it writes in the same gracious tone: 'Should Herr Eduard Bernstein not heed this demand we will then call him not only an old idiot but also brand him publicly as a shameless slanderer and we will see to it that Herr Eduard Bernstein never comes before the public without the charge of shameless and unscrupulous slanderer falling upon his head. . . . We still hope that Bernstein is only an old feeble-minded gossip and that he will name his witnesses. We are waiting.'

"My reply can be very short. . . . As author of the article I am responsible for its assertions and am therefore entirely ready to support them before a court. The *Rote Fahne* need not set in motion its alarm-and-cudgel guards against me. Let it bring charges against me or let it get a legal representative

of Lenin's to do this and it may rest assured that I will do my best to dispose of all the difficulties that might stand in the way of a thoroughgoing investigation of this affair."

They never did.⁶³

However, Lenin was by no means a German marionette. "It was a policy of interests," said Fritz Fisher, "on both sides that brought monarchist Germany and the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution into their short-lived cooperation."⁶⁴

Lenin was a gambler. His grand design during World War I could have remained the same utopia dreamed of by Herzen, Bakunin, Tkatchev, and Netchaev, and he would have gone down in history as another distinguished, albeit unsuccessful, Russian socialist. However, historical circumstances benefited him. Trying to defend his defeatism during the war, Lenin for the first time explained his "patriotism," declaring himself a Russian radical nationalist in the traditions of that concept—the traditions of Belinsky, Tchernyshevsky, and Tkatchev. The Russian people must be saved from their slavery and degeneration and reeducated by the revolutionary elite.

Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doing our very utmost to raise *her* toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of a democratic and socialist consciousness. To us it is most painful to see and feel the outrages, the oppression and the humiliation our fair country suffers at the hands of the tsar's butchers, the nobles and the capitalists. We take pride in the resistance to these outrages put up from our midst, from the Great Russians. . . .

We remember that Tchernyshevsky, the Great-Russian democrat, who dedicated his life to the cause of revolution, said half a century ago: "A wretched nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves." The overt and covert Great-Russian slaves (slaves with regard to the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love for our country, a love distressed by the absence of a revolutionary spirit in the masses of the Great-Russian people. There was none of that spirit at the time. There is little of it now, but it already exists. We are full of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, too, has created a revolutionary class, because it, too, has proved capable of providing mankind with great models of the struggle for freedom and socialism, and not only with great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility to priests, tsars, landowners and capitalists.

We are full of a sense of national pride, and for that very reason we particularly hate our slavish past and our slavish present. . . . Nobody is to be blamed for being born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews a striving for freedom but justifies and eulogises his slavery . . . such a slave is a lickspittle and a boor, who arouses a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt, and loathing. . . . And, full of a sense of national pride, we Great-Russian workers want, come what may, a free and independent, a democratic, republican and proud Great Russia.⁶⁵

It seems that Lenin's main anxiety during the war was not so much the revolution itself, in which he probably believed firmly, but where it would start first. That was a life-and-death question for him as a prospective political leader. He realized that a victorious German revolution would be a mortal threat to Russian independence and would destroy his personal design.

Germany supported not only the Bolsheviks but also various national separatist movements in the Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus. One of the worst German provocations was their demonstrative appeal to Russian Jews to rebel against Russia. The German High Command distributed leaflets as early as August 1914 that said: "Jews of Russia, rise! Spring to arms! Help hunt the Moskal out of the West, out of Poland, Lithuania, White Russia, Volhynia and Podolia! Freedom is coming from Europe!"⁶⁶

The Germans also tried to take advantage of the Russian Zionist movement, to no avail.⁶⁷ As Alexinsky noticed in 1915, the Jewish bourgeoisie in Poland and parts of western Russia had a vested interest in staying in Russia since their economic interests were closely connected with Russian trade, both foreign and domestic. Polish separation from Russia would be a mortal blow of them—which is what eventually happened.⁶⁸ Apart from that economic factor, the Jewish middle class was Russified, and the prospect of living in a small anti-Semitic nation-state like Lithuania or Poland would be terrible for them. Jabotinsky warned against Polish independence, saying that Polish politicians were not ready for autonomy because of their anti-Semitism.⁶⁹ Besides, the Jews preferred to live in large states; almost all the Jewish intelligentsia in Poland and the Baltic states became Russophiles after these states gained independence.

Nevertheless, German provocation fell on fruitful, anti-Semitic soil. In the spring of 1915, the Russian government began deporting hundreds of thousands of Jews as a security risk from areas near the front. This action was immediately used in a frenetic anti-Semitic campaign with two important implications: (1) The Jews were once again revolutionized, and (2) the hundreds of thousands of these revolutionized Jews expelled to the Russian heartland became most favorable soil for revolutionary activity.

There were two other implications of the German lobby's campaign. The first lay in the fact that by deporting Jews from the front, the Russian government had de facto abolished the notorious Jewish Pale of Settlement introduced in the eighteenth century. Also, this frenetic anti-Semitic campaign served as an excellent smokescreen for the real German fifth column in the Russian court and army, as well as undermining the Entente and trying to prevent U.S. support of Russia.

In 1919, Lenin told a Jewish Bolshevik leader, Semen Dimanshtein (1886–1937), that the mass expulsion of Jews during the war to the Russian heartland exercised an enormous impact on the Russian revolution. The Jews, said Lenin, had "spoiled" the general anti-Soviet sabotage and by doing so had saved the revolution, such sabotage having been mortally dangerous for the Bolsheviks.⁷⁰

In the meantime, the country was seized with a tremendous hatred of the Germans, including Russian Germans, which endangered their political and even physical survival. A leading columnist of *Novoe vremia*, Menshikov and a former Tolstoyan wrote in 1915: "This countless number of spiders who were defended by Russian statehood over the last centuries have become enriched at the expense of the Russian people's toil. These snakes and scorpions of the Teutonic race are now hissing in all the corners of our motherland where we committed the terrible mistake of allowing them to live."⁷¹ Although Menshikov could not attack the ruling Germans directly, many people did not conceal their feelings in private conversations. Paleologue has provided us with several examples of such conversations among the Russian establishment. The director of ceremonies of the Russian court told Paleologue in 1914, "After the war we'll wring the necks of the Baltic barons."⁷² In August 1915, a well-known neo-Slavophile, Alexander Briantchaninov (1874-?), said that Russia "has had the German virus in her veins for two centuries and now it's killing her. The only thing that can save her now is a national revolution."⁷³ Vasily Maklakov (1869-1957), a prominent Cadet, said in February 1917 that "Petersburg is a German city and has no claim to a Slav name."⁷⁴ (St. Petersburg had been rechristened Petrograd in 1914).

In October 1914, the main tribune of the Russian Germans, *Petrograder Zeitung*, was closed, and in May 1915 Moscow was swept by anti-German pogroms while Petrograd remained tense but inactive.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the German ruling minority was still intact. Only in the army were there 180 generals of Protestant affiliation and 157 generals of German ethnic origin, the latter had converted to Orthodoxy, however.⁷⁶

It is not surprising that Russian public opinion assigned all misfortunes to the German lobby, including the tsarina, and this suspicion was not entirely unfounded. Indeed, defeat and victory were both almost equally dangerous for the ruling elite and for Russian Germans as a whole. Paleologue tells how one baroness of German origin exclaimed to him, "Rather than give up music, I'd give up Russia," which gave him the opportunity to notice that "the cry . . . is only an accurate gauge of the degree of patriotism which animates some families of the Baltic nobilities."⁷⁷ One can find an interesting confirmation of this mood in a letter written from Russia by a close relative of the tsar and published in Germany in January 1915 in the *Münchener Post*. In it, the letter writer complained about the terrible situation in Russia; she and her husband, together with several crown princesses of German origin, had tried to restrain the tsar from war. Her letter blamed the Russian "decision" to declare war on "war party" intrigues.⁷⁸

On the one hand, the inherent duality of Russian political life paralyzed the country; on the other, the direct intervention of German intelligence aggravated the situation. One of the most conspicuous manifestations of this intervention was the notorious Rasputin affair, which is too well known to need a detailed description here.⁷⁹ It was most definitely manipulated by German agents to paralyze political life and discredit the government. The

sick, perverted mysticism dominated all the government's vital political decisions and added an element of blatant corruption. The magic circle of Rasputin's morbid influence was impossible to break. Thoroughly corrupted, Rasputin became part and parcel of the German lobby. He could be easily bribed to secure a top-rank political nomination; moreover, he could pursue a policy that accorded with the devilish advice given him, and, too, he was a prime source of top priority political and military information.

What is even more important, Rasputin's narrow circle also included the police department chief, Stepan Beletsky, and the minister of justice, Ivan Shcheglovitov (1861-1918), who was one of the main official patrons of the Russian radical right. In addition, the chief official who controlled the Russian Orthodox church became an open Germanophile, Vladimir Sabler (1847-1929), who was also a protégé of Rasputin. Therefore, the Okhrana, the radical right, and the German lobby in the government were linked together in one sinister ring.⁸⁰ Witte, who in the past had acted against German interests, became one of the main pillars of the German lobby. His German bank account was sequestered, and he sent desperate letters to his bank blaming England for everything that had happened and proposing himself as a negotiator between Russia and Germany. Witte went so far as to persuade the Japanese, who were Entente allies, not to send their forces to Europe against Germany, since tsarism was on the point of perishing. Witte's example demonstrates that the community of industrial and commercial interests also encouraged a pro-German mood.⁸¹ The radical right raised its head and started to systematically attack Russia's allies, especially England.

The Russian nationalist society, "1914," included in its blacklist of Germanophiles in 1916 Markov II and the editor in chief of the Black Hundred's *Zemshchina*, Sergei Glinka-Yantchevsky (1844-1921).⁸² In the same month, Bulatsel published a sharp anti-English article while expressing his sympathy for Germany. The English ambassador, Buchanan, officially intervened against this article, and the 1914 society decided to regard Bulatsel as a traitor too.⁸³ Germany realized in the meantime that it would not achieve a military victory and tried proposing a separate peace to Russia, but it was too late.

Russian economic dependence, which had been strong even before the war, became even greater, and all the country's debts had to be repaid after the war. Thus, Russia's future was gloomy, even if it were to be victorious, and the Russians knew that they faced mortal danger. The above-mentioned Briantchaninov told Paleologue in August of 1915: "Russia is in peril of death. Never before in her history has she been in such great danger."⁸⁴ The Russian colossus was shattered.

The March (February O.S.) Revolution

The concept that the Russian revolution of March 1917 was spontaneous is widely accepted among historians,⁸⁵ and some evidence has also been

submitted to prove that the idea of a liberal conspiracy behind this revolution succeeded.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, other evidence has been ignored, evidence to the effect that the revolution could have been at least partly provoked by the German lobby, or by the direct intervention of German intelligence, according to a plan outlined by Brockdorff-Rantzau that, since there was a group (the Bolsheviks) ready to sign a separate peace agreement on German conditions, the liberal revolution in Russia would now serve German interests.

Paleologue recorded in his diary in October 1916 that, according to a French intelligence agent, two leading members of the Russian government, the prime minister, Boris Stürmer (1848-1917), and the minister of internal affairs, Alexander Protopopov (1866-1918), probably had the "Machiavellian idea of causing famine in order to provoke strikes and thus make the continuation of the war impossible." The same source claimed that the Okhrana was behind the antiwar propaganda in the principal industrial plants of the Russian capital.⁸⁷ This rumor is repeated in a letter of Gorky's dated October 21, 1916, in which he said that "the proclamation appeared with an appeal for peace. One English correspondent said to me with great confidence that he knew the origin of these proclamations. According to him, the government artificially supports anarchy in the country in order to take advantage of the clause in the Entente treaty that regards popular disorders in Russia as a justification for the conclusion of a separate peace."⁸⁸ Gorky took this explanation very seriously. There were rumors that it was the Okhrana that spread antiwar leaflets, which was basically confirmed during an investigation arranged by the Provisional government in 1917. A leading member of the URP, Varvara Stepanova-Desobri, who was at the same time an Okhrana agent, appealed to the workers of the well-known Putilov plant, saying that the war was being managed in the interests of the bourgeoisie.⁸⁹

Incidentally, rumors about the Okhrana being the wasps' nest of the treason were spread even before the March revolution, and Alexander Kerensky (1881-1970), who became Russia's prime minister in 1917, himself supported this accusation.⁹⁰ One of the most important parts of the evidence supporting the accusation of Okhrana's antiwar efforts came from Trotsky. According to him, after the March revolution the Provisional government mobilized a considerable number of Russian policemen into the acting army, including those who had served in the Okhrana.⁹¹ In order to clear themselves, as Trotsky thought, these people incited the soldiers against the officers and spoke out more strongly than anyone else against discipline. Some of them posed as Bolsheviks. Trotsky most certainly did not realize the sinister character of his evidence.

One must remember that it was police provocation that had led to the 1905 revolution. Keeping in mind what has been said above with regard to the German penetration into the Russian police, one could suggest that the purpose of the March revolution, insofar as the German intelligence was concerned, could have been to take Russia out of the war. This possibility is why the spontaneity of the March revolution seems to be somewhat suspect.

The March revolution plunged Russia into political chaos immediately. Colonel Nikitin stressed that the worst blow to the new government's administrative capacity was the destruction of the archives, which seemed to be prearranged. The buildings of the ministry of internal affairs, the judicial offices, and the offices of the military governor and the Okhrana were burned on the first night of the revolution. Nikitin claimed that the destruction was done by German agents. All the criminals were released from Russian prisons, and Petrograd and other cities were flooded with the most dangerous elements, who immediately dominated the mob.⁹² The old dream of Bakunin and Netchaev had materialized.

The Bolsheviks did not contribute to the March revolution, which came as a great surprise to Lenin in Zurich. On the other hand, there was a conspicuous lack of resistance on the part of the radical right, which melted away immediately after the revolution. Later Markov II claimed that all his party branches were destroyed, but this was not a real explanation since almost none of its leaders had suffered.⁹³ It seems that they simply did not want to resist.

The new government tried to start an active foreign policy and even to increase Russian military efforts, but it was too late. It had lost control over the situation since there was another focus of power: the Soviet. The latter very quickly established its control over the army. The more radical and pacifist slogans were advanced, the more receptive was the lumpen-peasant audience, which was sick and tired of endless war. Russia was in danger of collapse.

Germany could be jubilant although the destiny of the ruling German minority was sealed and the anti-German mood gained in momentum. Generals and officers of German origin were slaughtered by their soldiers. The Germans started their exodus from Russia, although the German government clearly regarded this exodus as only a temporary measure.

What was paradoxical about the March revolution was that the new popular explosion was not aimed at other aliens, which was rather to be expected. Among the new revolutionary leadership one could find increasing numbers of Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Letts, and so on. Viktor Shklovsky (1893-1984), a prominent Soviet writer and literary critic who was then a prominent Social Revolutionary, reported that Jews constituted 40 percent of the army committees, which were the real rulers of the army. At the same time, "the army was permeated with the most ingrained, irrational anti-Semitism and organized pogroms."⁹⁴ This strange phenomenon can be explained. The March revolution came as a big shock for the Russian people. The peasants could have seen it as a temporary development, perhaps to be followed by counterrevolution and restoration with all kinds of punitive action, as had happened in 1906-1907. If this were so, then to take any initiative in political events could have been most dangerous. Since everybody was sick and tired of the war, and there were those who could bring it to an end at any price—why not support them? Therefore, the enormous success of the aliens in the revolution does not mean a sudden mass

internationalization of Russian peasants. The aliens were simply used as scapegoats in case of restoration.

Bolshevism became very popular and quickly spread among Russian soldiers as the political movement that promised the quickest end to the war. Pasmanik realized that the roots of Bolshevism were not social but psychological. He said that Russian soldiers had simply run wild during the war and that "Marx's teaching was only a fig leaf by which the Bolsheviks covered" their actions.⁹⁵ Shklovsky arrived at the same conclusion: "Russia," he said, "invented the Bolsheviks as a motivation for desertion and plunder; the Bolsheviks are not guilty of having been dreamed."⁹⁶

Lenin was in Zurich when the revolution broke out, and for a month and a half, his party in Russia was without his direct leadership. It is interesting that the majority of Bolsheviks then openly expressed their revolutionary nationalism. For example, after his release from prison, Alexei Rykov (1881-1938), the Soviet prime minister in 1924-1930, sent a telegram from Siberia in which he expressed support for what he called the "national revolution."⁹⁷ This was also the position of both Kamenev and Stalin who, after their return from exile, temporarily became leaders of the Petrograd Bolsheviks. Later in March 1917, Stalin published a surprisingly overlooked Russian nationalist slogan: "Soldiers, organize in unions of your own and gather around the Russian people, the only true ally of the Russian revolutionary army!"⁹⁸ His reference to the Russian people was not a slip. After 1917, Stalin became the most outspoken Russian nationalist in the Bolshevik party.

The Bolsheviks in Russia knew nothing about Lenin's arrangement with Germany, and when he returned to Russia in April 1917, he severely censored the new revolutionary nationalism, resorting to radical defeatism. It was only a tactical move for Lenin, and later he took advantage of that same revolutionary nationalism.

Lenin was well aware that Germany was interested in Bolshevism only for tactical reasons and that, for the Germans, Bolshevism had to be contained in Russia in order to not infect Germany. Lenin could not be overoptimistic about what would await him in the case of a German victory. It is difficult to say how balanced Lenin was in his estimation of international affairs, or to what extent he was influenced by the U.S. decision in April 1917 to declare war on Germany, a step that radically changed the military-political situation. Most likely, Lenin decided to take a risk. At any rate, the very idea of a Russian socialist revolution before a European socialist revolution was deeply nationalist in its roots. Lenin waged his own game of deception with the Germans.

In spite of the rapid success of their ideas, the Bolsheviks as a party made up a very small force, too small to allow for an entirely independent political path. In October 1917, on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin claimed that there were 240,000 Bolsheviks,⁹⁹ but in an official speech in Lenin's presence in 1920, Zinoviev said that at that time the Bolsheviks had had only 10,000 party members—and even this figure could have been an overstatement.¹⁰⁰

The Bolsheviks badly needed to expand their power base in order to achieve a political takeover. The huge Bakuninist peasant revolution that had swept the country was impossible to control. In the autumn of 1917, Lenin said that there was no difference between the Bolsheviks and Bakunin about the first and destructive stage of revolution in which all the old state machinery must be destroyed:

Marx agreed with Proudhon in that they both stood for the "smashing" of the modern state machine. Neither the opportunists nor the Kautskyites wish to see the similarity of views on this point between Marxism and anarchism (both Proudhon and Bakunin) because this is where they have departed from Marxism.

Marx disagreed both with Proudhon and Bakunin precisely on the question of federalism (not to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat). Federalism as a principle follows logically from the petty-bourgeois views of anarchism. Marx was a centralist.¹⁰¹

According to Lenin, this destructive stage would be followed by a creative stage, exactly as Herzen had suggested in 1869. The Bolsheviks had thus to consolidate their power at the height of chaos and anarchy in order to later impose a new iron discipline. Lenin's Bakuninism was strictly tactical. He was inclined to think along the lines of Herzen and Tkatchev, on whose theories Netchaev's Machiavellianism had been imposed. And then Lenin would have liked to immediately begin his 1793, with revolutionary advances abroad, according to his blueprint of 1915.

Lenin did not call in April 1917 for an immediate uprising. He put this issue on the agenda as a future eventuality, but there were Bolsheviks who did appeal for an immediate uprising.¹⁰² In the framework of the Bakuninist concept of the first stage of revolution, Lenin was prepared to mobilize any force on his side for tactical reasons. Criminals released from prison became Bolshevik "shock troops."¹⁰³ Another powerful ally was the bulk of the former radical right, who had long been regarded by the Bolsheviks as their reserve army, and correctly so: One of the most remarkable developments of 1917, which made the Bolshevik revolution feasible, was the *actual merging of the Bolsheviks with the radical right*. This coalescence certainly took place under Bolshevik leadership, and almost none of the radical right leaders participated in it.

According to statistics, the active members of the radical right on the eve of the March revolution numbered approximately 3,000, a figure that might seem insignificant.¹⁰⁴ This figure, however, is an illusion as it includes only the activists and the radical right electorate was enormous, as the Duma 1912 elections demonstrated. But even this figure is comparable to the certainly inflated figure of 10,000 Bolshevik party members on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution.

The merging started before the March revolution, and we have seen from Skvortsov-Stepanov how easily the workers could move from one camp to another (see Chapter 2). There was a permanent stream of defectors

from the radical right to the Bolsheviks. For example, it was claimed that before a future prominent left-wing Bolshevik leader, Yuri Piatakov (1890–1937), joined the Bolshevik party in 1910, he had been the chairman of the right-wing student organization in Kiev.¹⁰⁵ There was also a deliberate penetration of right-wingers into the revolutionary organizations in order to watch them from within, which essentially aided police penetration of those organizations. A monarchist congress in 1915 adopted a secret decision that encouraged such infiltration.¹⁰⁶

The first signs of the new massive merging were noticed as early as the summer of 1917. During the search of a Bolshevik stronghold in Petrograd, the Provisional government investigators found anti-Semitic drawings and leaflets by a former Black Hundreds activist, Luka Zlotnikov, who had since joined the Bolsheviks.¹⁰⁷ On the very eve of the Bolshevik revolution there was an article in an anti-Bolshevist newspaper with the conspicuous title, "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."¹⁰⁸ The article said: "Recent hauntings of the URP tearoom have become the most reliable Bolshevik manpower. . . . It is curious to see how URP slogans are changing into demands for the dictatorship of the proletariat." According to a radical right newspaper, *Groza*, quoted in the article, it was the wealthy classes who had overthrown the tsar while the simple people contested their right to do it. The Provisional government, *Groza* said, tried to strangle the popular voice in order to continue the war so the wealthy classes would profit; the war was initiated by the Jews, England, and France—Germany was not mentioned in the *Groza* list. "However, God ruined the plans of those who longed for the blood of the people." The Bolsheviks, irritated by their treachery, which was supported by Jewish bankers, ruined Kerensky's plot (Kerensky was regarded by the radical right anti-Semites as a half-Jew). "When, suddenly and unwittingly for the Russian people the autocracy that had been created by them was overthrown . . . the power was taken by a Jewish scoundrel [Kerensky] who is treacherously preparing a new foreign yoke in order to sit on the people's neck." According to *Groza*, "It is necessary to throw out political tricksters, to give all the power to the Soviets in order to establish the best possible way to rule the country." It is interesting to note that this newspaper was distributed free of charge.

One can easily see not only Black Hundred influence behind these appeals but also German influence. The Germans were, it seems, now trying to bring together the two poles of Russian political life. A Russian Orthodox priest, Sergei Friazinov (1880–1922), executed by the Bolsheviks confirmed at the end of 1917 that people from two opposite camps came together under the Bolshevik banner. "One one side," said Friazinov, "we know that all the young workers and Baltic navy sailors who always belonged to the radical left constitute the nucleus of Bolshevik political power; however, on the other side, it is no secret that this includes all those pogromists who until now represented a terrible and abominable army, namely the Black Hundreds. . . . It is conspicuous that the same party is inspired by completely different ideals and it seems that the only common feature of

these heterogenous elements is violence, which is accepted both by the radical left and the radical right."¹⁰⁹

One of the leading Cadet publicists, Alexander Izgoev (Landa, 1872-1935), who was expelled from Soviet Russia in 1922, had a more radical opinion. He claimed that the URP "could blossom and win only by acquiring the new image of joining the Communist party." According to him, "all mass elements, wherever they were in 1917—in the URP, in military or Social Revolutionary organizations—gradually moved to communism but started leaving it in 1920."¹¹⁰ One of the leaders of the Russian right, a former deputy minister of internal affairs, Vladimir Gurko (1863-1927), wrote after he had emigrated that the URP "had many absolutely indifferent members in both its metropolitan and provincial branches, who were prepared, as the occasion demanded, to work in Soviet Chekas or to take part in patriotic manifestations."¹¹¹ Only a few principal leaders of the radical right seriously considered then the option of joining the Bolsheviks.

The way of cooperation suggested by Purishkevitch is quite interesting. He was arrested in October 1917 by the Provisional government and remained in custody when the Bolsheviks came to power. He showed his readiness to support the latter only in order to defend Russia from the Germans. He proposed to other politicians under arrest in the same prison that they sign a declaration "to do anything. If they send us to the front in order to fight aggressors—let us go. If they make us military medical personnel, cannon fodder—we are ready for everything. Let them lead us, but let them not lay down their arms."¹¹² In private conversations, Purishkevitch expressed his opposition to the restoration of the monarchy because he hated the tsar.

In May 1918, he was released from prison as a result of the political amnesty. He met Dzerzhinsky, who had already become the chief of the Soviet political police, and tried to persuade him that the Russian people would return to monarchy. Later, however, being repelled by the Red Terror and by the execution of the tsar's family, Purishkevitch abandoned his plans to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and joined the active anti-Bolshevik forces. He died during the Civil War.

Glinka-Yantchevsky (who was a populist in his youth) had a meeting with Kamenev after the former was arrested, and he told Kamenev that he perfectly agreed with what was being said in Bolshevik newspapers about the necessity for a strong hand. "I have the privilege," said Glinka-Yantchevsky to Kamenev, "to congratulate you as people who share my ideas." He promised the latter to write excellent articles for the Bolsheviks if he were released.¹¹³

There were several second-rate radical right journalists and activists who joined the Bolsheviks and received important appointments.¹¹⁴ Some of them thus managed to join the new political police. The most conspicuous conversion at the time of the revolution was that of the aged Ieronim Yasinsky (1850-1930), a then well-known nationalist writer. Justifying his new support of the Bolsheviks, Yasinsky said: "It only seems that Bolshevism

came out of the social-democratic nest, but in fact it is a deeply rooted Russian phenomenon. Bolshevism is the same as anarchism, only organized. . . . There are different kinds of Bolsheviks, but the Bolshevik type is well defined. It is bright and powerful, it is the type of a strong Russian hero, strong both psychologically and morally. I was immediately attracted by him."¹¹⁵ Yasinaky was at once invited by Lunatcharsky, who had just become the people's commissar for education, to go to Kronstadt to lecture to Baltic sailors.¹¹⁶

Many rightists sympathized with the Bolsheviks on the premises mentioned by Yasinaky. They despised the parliamentary system and welcomed a new strong power, though mostly as a temporary solution. Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), a former Marxist who later became an Orthodox priest, described at the very beginning of 1918 a right-wing view that was sympathetic to Bolshevism. The proponent of this view said: "The very thought of a Cadetized 'Constitutional-Democratic' Russia is completely abominable. No, Bolsheviks are better: Russian style *a la Russe*. . . . From this something can emerge. . . . But from the mortal grip of Messrs. Cadets, Russia will not come out alive." The same person continued: "Our Bolshevism is popular just because it doesn't want to recognize this Godless 'legal state.' . . . In general, one can discern something alive on the crest of Bolshevism."¹¹⁷

Many active members of right-wing political parties were integrated by Soviet society after the revolution, and some of them were integrated by the Russian Orthodox church, certainly with official approval. Alexander Koni (1844-1927), a right-wing lawyer and academician, told Lunatcharsky during a conversation in 1919 that "only such a 'violent-radical' coup d'etat and the seizing of power by courageous men who were close to the people and also knew that it was impossible to achieve anything in Russia by the force of authority—only this was a way out of the situation."¹¹⁸

There is a unique eulogy of the Russian radical right in the Soviet period that was given by a high-ranking rightist general, Andrei Zaiontchkovsky (1862-1926), who sided with the Bolsheviks. A distinguished military historian as well, Zaiontchkovsky insistently contrasted the radical right in the capacity of a peace-loving force against those social forces which provoked the world war. "This militant and chauvinist clique," said Zaiontchkovsky, "which was supported to a great extent by bourgeois parties, was resisted by a group of the radical right [meaning that the author did not regard the radical right as a bourgeois party] that was powerful because of its influence on Nikolai II. It warned him against the break with Germany, which it regarded as a foundation of Western European order, and against the risk of war, which, in its view, could result in a more menacing revolution than that of 1905, one that could put at stake the very fate of the dynasty. In order to paralyze the influence of the radical right leadership of the Black Hundred, URP, and the Union of the United Gentry, the war party strove to create a situation from which the tsar had no other way out except war."¹¹⁹

One of the most conspicuous examples of the integration of former right-wingers was the destiny of an archpriest and former chairman of the

Tiflis URP branch, Sergei Gorodtsov (1866-1956), who was notorious for his activity in 1905-1906 when he organized pogroms that led to a loss of lives. At the end of his life, he became, as Metropolitan Varfolomei, a leading bishop of the Russian Orthodox church.¹²⁰

Exactly as before the revolution, Bolshevik leaders systematically encouraged the Russian right wing to join their side. In the days of the October revolution, Trotsky published an appeal in which he called the anti-Semitic agitation against the revolution, as opposed to a "Jewish revolution," a manifestation of the feelings of the "deceived popular masses" who received no real benefits from the revolution. He called it "a spontaneous protest of the darkest and most unhappy workers, soldiers, and peasants against their difficult lives, against war, against hunger, injustice, and lies. . . . When the Soviet power will solve all the problems . . . the pogromists of yesterday will realize from practice which is truth and which is a lie, and they will join the revolution."¹²¹ Therefore, if *carte blanche* was given to the October 1917 pogromists, the same *carte blanche* had to be given to penitent pogromists of the prerevolutionary period, especially if they had joined the revolution.

In June 1919, a former active URP member from Petrograd, one Koniakov, was accused in Kostroma of having joined the Bolshevik party by concealing his political past. Indeed, Koniakov had approached the Bolsheviks when he was a soldier, and after the March revolution he was elected a member of the Soldiers Soviet. Returning to his native Kostroma, he founded a local Soviet and soon afterward joined the Bolshevik party. Somebody denounced him, he was searched, and his URP papers were found. Koniakov was sentenced to death, but this verdict was commuted to five years in prison. However, Lunatcharsky, who was then in Kostroma as a plenipotentiary commissar, intervened and sent a complaint to Moscow: "It is impossible to regard a semiliterate peasant as a political criminal because he was once in the URP. On the contrary, the most active peasant elements were involved in the URP (because of their ignorance). Their political consciousness was awoken, but they still had not seen the real light."¹²² Lunatcharsky demanded a full pardon for Koniakov and received it. Certainly, the former acted in the framework of the adopted party line.

In 1920, Lenin, while discussing the political developments in Germany, clearly hinted that the Bolsheviks had integrated many Black Hundred members and that there was even a type of Black Hundred revolutionary:

In that country a situation arose very much like that which could be seen in Russia in 1905, when the Black Hundreds aroused and involved in political life large and most backward sections of the peasantry, which were opposed to the Bolsheviks one day, and on the next were demanding all the land from the landed proprietors. In Germany too we have seen a similar unnatural bloc between the Black Hundreds and the Bolsheviks. There has appeared a strange type of Black-Hundred revolutionary.¹²³

It was a mass phenomenon in Russia.

Therefore, all contemporary evidence of the massive merging of the radical right with the radical left was confirmed by the long-standing favorable party attitude toward the radical right. If such a merging occurred, what kind of implications did it have? Indeed, former rightists were transformed into loyal members of Soviet society and the Bolshevik party, which was anticipated by the Bolshevik leadership. Thus, when Soviet society later manifested its open trend to nationalism, as soon as the first signs of the conflict between radical left elements and Soviet society came to the surface, the former rightists, the former Black Hundreds, could not help supporting those who imperceptibly rehabilitated their former values and especially anti-Semitism. It is most likely that many active Stalinists were recruited from among former rightists and their families.

There was another source of support that the Bolsheviks tacitly enjoyed. It came from those circles that preferred the Bolsheviks to the Provisional government on the general premise that a Bolshevik regime could not last more than a few weeks. The idea of Bolshevik takeover as a political provocation that could be used as a pretext for counterrevolution was advanced by some people as early as the summer of 1917. Petr Balashov (1871-?), the chairman of the All-Russian National Union, an influential moderate right-wing political party that had many representatives in the Duma, said in July 1917: "I beg only one thing from God. The Bolsheviks must take power. It will be followed by a little bloodshed and everything will be finished."¹²⁴

What about the Germans? They were not stupid enough to bring a permanent radical regime to Russia that could possibly radicalize both Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Bolshevik regime was profitable for the Germans only until the end of the war in order to detach Russia from the war, isolate it, and prevent any possibility of a Russian-Entente alliance. The more destructive and radical the Bolshevik revolution was, the more repulsive it would be for the rest of the world. Anyway, it would be much better than a liberal revolution in Russia as an immediate revolutionizing factor for Austria-Hungary. Therefore, Germany and Austria-Hungary were vitally interested in ending as soon as possible the Russian liberal revolution, which served them only as a way to the Bolshevik regime. Meanwhile, the Russian radical revolution would not be attractive to Western Slavs.

It is absolutely impossible to think that the Germans regarded the prospective Bolshevik regime as more than a short-lived tactical solution that would be replaced by something else after the German victory. Since the Germans had no reliable ally in Russia apart from the radical right, they could consider the option of a new conservative restorationist regime. All of these plans could materialize only if the United States did not join the war, though the extent of U.S. involvement was a result of German success in Russia.

The deceptive character of the German official slogans in 1914, according to which Germany was struggling only to crush the Russian autocracy, was clearly seen when the autocracy had already been crushed but Germany

did not stop the war. It is conspicuous that the majority of the SPD was not influenced by the March revolution. The SPD continued its support of what was, in fact, a purely imperialist German war. In spite of some lip service to the effect that Germany did not want annexations, a far-reaching program to dismantle the former Russian empire was prepared, and the German appetite increased to the extent of Russia's weakness. Nevertheless, the so-called USPD (Independent SPD), a revisionist wing led by Kautsky, Bernstein, Haase, and others, split from the SPD and tried to be more consistent and opposed German imperialist plans while the majority of the SPD unanimously supported the imperialist expansion.

The Bolshevik Revolution

The Bolshevik revolution was conditioned to a large extent by the general international situation and can by no means be regarded as only the result of Russian internal dynamics. Lenin was not entirely free in his tactics since he had commitments to the Germans to launch the revolution as soon as possible, but he also had his own vested interests in being quick. In September 1917, there was the first sinister (for Lenin) sign of the approaching German revolution, an uprising in the German navy that was suppressed. It was a red light for him: As we have seen, a German revolution that would forestall the Bolshevik revolution would be a mortal blow for all his plans.

After the German naval uprising, Lenin began to insist on the need for an immediate Bolshevik uprising. On September 29, he wrote: "The . . . stage has now begun. This stage may be called the eve of revolution. Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and particularly in the beginning of mutinies in the German army, are indisputable symptoms that a great turning-point is at hand, that we are *on the eve of a worldwide revolution*."¹²⁵ Lenin resorted to political demagoguery concerning the internationalist duty, but the German revolution was certainly his nightmare.

Waiting . . . Bolsheviks would most certainly be *miserable traitors* to the proletarian cause.

They would be traitors to the cause, for by their conduct they would be betraying the German revolutionary workers who have started a revolt in the navy. To "wait" . . . under such circumstances would be a *betrayal of internationalism*, a betrayal of the cause of the world socialist revolution.

The whole future of the Russian revolution is at stake.¹²⁶

Lenin added several words that manifested his real fears. "It would be sheer treachery to the German workers. . . . Should we wait until their revolution begins? In that case, even . . . [Mensheviks] would be in favor of supporting it."¹²⁷

Two days later, he addressed the Central Party Committee with a dramatic appeal:

In Germany the beginning of a revolution is obvious, especially since the sailors were shot. . . .

Under such circumstances to "wait" would be a crime.

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait . . . they must take power at once. By so doing they will save the world revolution (for otherwise there is danger of a deal between the imperialists of all countries, who, after the shootings in Germany, will be more accommodating to each other and will unite against us), the Russian revolution (otherwise a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are) and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people at the front.¹²⁸

He intimated the existence of problems arising from a possible peace between England and Germany, which would spoil any chance for revolution: "Fourth, the vague but persistent rumours of a separate peace between Britain and Germany 'at the expense of Russia' could not have arisen without cause."¹²⁹ Lenin continued: "We must appeal to the Moscow comrades, persuade them to seize power in Moscow, declare the Kerensky government deposed, and declare the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Moscow the provisional government of Russia in order to offer immediate peace and save Russia from the conspiracy. Let the Moscow comrades raise the question of the uprising in Moscow immediately."¹³⁰ A day later he once again appealed, adding new manifestations of the international revolutionary movement:

The growth of a world revolution is beyond dispute. The outburst of indignation on the part of the Czech workers has been suppressed with incredible ferocity, testifying to the government's extreme fright. Italy too has witnessed a mass outbreak in Turin. Most important, however, is the revolt in the German navy [*italics added*]. One can imagine the enormous difficulties of a revolution in a country like Germany, especially under present conditions. It cannot be doubted that the revolt in the German navy is indicative of the great crisis—the growth of the world revolution. While our chauvinists, who are advocating Germany's defeat, demand a revolt of the German workers immediately, we Russian revolutionary internationalists know from the experience of 1905–17 that a more impressive sign of the growth of revolution than a revolt among the troops cannot be imagined.

Just think what our position is now in the eyes of the German revolutionaries.

Yes, we shall be real traitors to the International if, at such a moment and under such favourable conditions, we respond to this call from the German revolutionaries with . . . mere resolutions.¹³¹

At the session of the Central Party Committee on October 10, Lenin demanded, "The international situation is such that we must take the initiative."¹³² As a result of Lenin's pressure, the Central Party Committee adopted a resolution about the military uprising in which international factors were assigned the highest priority:

The Central Committee recognises that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy which is an extreme

manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the threat of peace by the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation . . . and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets—all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov revolt . . . all this places the armed uprising on the order of the day.¹³³

From his point of view, Lenin was right in insisting on immediate revolution. Any German revolution, liberal or radical, would, as we have seen, be an irreparable catastrophe for the Bolsheviks for several reasons. First, it would put an end to their secret German financial support. Second, it would mean a repetition of the sinister (to the Bolsheviks) 1793 scenario of Bebel and Engels, in which the German revolutionary Wehrmacht would easily defeat the rest of the incapacitated Russian army. Third, the new German republican or socialist leadership would definitely prefer to deal with Russian Mensheviks, and fourth, that would mean the end of the war and therefore the loss of the Bolshevik's "pacifist" appeal to the Russian people.

It was natural that Lenin, who was immensely more far-sighted than his colleagues, should be extremely afraid of losing his historical chance, and he therefore violently attacked everyone who opposed his plan of an immediate takeover. On the other hand, the Germans, being themselves frightened by the naval mutiny, were highly interested in a quick Bolshevik revolution so they could sign a formal peace agreement with Russia, which would bring fresh hope for their own people who were also sick and tired of war.

The German foreign minister, Richard Kühlman (1873-1948), wrote in his diary in December 1917, "It was only the resources which the Bolsheviks received regularly from our side, through various channels and on various pretexts, that enabled them to develop their chief organ 'Pravda,' to carry on a lively agitation and greatly to expand the originally narrow basis of their party."¹³⁴ Indeed, as Fritz Fisher noticed, "Lenin's victory over Kerensky on November 7, 1917, could not but seem to the German government to be the crown of their military and political campaign against Russia."¹³⁵ Germany has never been so self-confident as in those days. "These were the days immediately preceding the outbreak of the October revolution in Russia," Fisher continued, "and the historian must note at this juncture the birth in Germany of a great new self-confidence and self-assertiveness, directed towards the conquest of a wider sphere of domination in east and west."¹³⁶

Trotsky supported Lenin in his own concept of a permanent revolution. Contrary to Lenin, however, Trotsky believed in a revolutionary chain that would entice a world revolution. But it was Trotsky's private business how to justify his political activity since the general political design belonged only to Lenin, and Trotsky came up against this harsh reality very soon.

On the other hand, Stalin cautiously supported Lenin while repeatedly expressing his strictly nationalist view of the Russian revolution. In his speech at the Sixth Party Congress, which took place in July and August 1917, Stalin clashed with a party left-winger, Evgeny Preobrazhensky, who proposed a clause in a resolution in which was said:

"The task of these revolutionary classes will then be to bend every effort to take the state power into their hands and, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, direct it towards peace and towards the socialist reconstruction of society."

Preobrazhensky: I propose a different formulation of the end of the resolution: "to direct it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism." If we adopt the formulation proposed by the commission it will contradict Bukharin's resolution which we have already adopted.

Stalin: I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism. No country hitherto has enjoyed such freedom in time of war as Russia does, or has attempted to introduce workers' control of production. Moreover, the base of our revolution is broader than in Western Europe, where the proletariat stands utterly alone face to face with the bourgeoisie. In our country the workers are supported by the poorer strata of the peasantry. Lastly, in Germany the state apparatus is incomparably more efficient than the imperfect apparatus of our bourgeoisie, which is itself a tributary to European capital. We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter.¹³⁷

A short time later, Stalin elaborated this thesis:

It used to be said in Russia that the light of socialism came from the West. And this was true; for it was there, in the West, that we learned revolution and socialism.

With the beginning of the revolutionary movement in Russia the situation somewhat changed.

It is not socialism and emancipation that the West is exporting to Russia so much as subjection and counter-revolution. Is that not so?¹³⁸

Lenin boasted soon after the revolution:

Things have turned out differently from what Marx and Engels expected and we, the Russian working and exploited classes, have the honour of being the vanguard of the international socialist revolution; we can now see clearly how far the development of the revolution will go. The Russian began it—the German, the Frenchman and the Englishman will finish it, and socialism will be victorious.¹³⁹

He stressed that Russia would now be the world center: "I am profoundly convinced that more and more diverse federations of free nations will group themselves around revolutionary Russia."¹⁴⁰ Sokolnikov, a Jewish Russophile

Bolshevik who later became the people's commissar for finance, made a stronger point after the revolution: "History clearly points out that the salt of the earth is gradually moving eastward. France was the salt in the eighteenth century, Germany in the nineteenth century, and it is Russia now."¹⁴¹ Another Jewish Russophile Bolshevik, Lozovsky, literally cried during his Soviet speech in November 1917, "Russia is great!"¹⁴²

One of the most important but unnoticed national transformations of the Bolshevik revolution was the entirely new concept of foreign relations on the part of the new revolutionary country. It thoroughly contradicted all the declarations of the world revolution, which was ostensibly the objective of the Bolshevik revolution and could therefore seem heretical. The Bolsheviks established a Foreign Ministry (People's Commissariat) (for Foreign Affairs), which was de facto and de jure recognition of the existing system of international relations and the first legal but unnoticed step toward "socialism in one country." Indeed, Trotsky thought that his Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (he was appointed its head) would be only the body for some transaction such as publication of former secret Russian diplomatic agreements.¹⁴³ But Lenin regarded the existing system of international relations as something more stable. This view contradicted his previous plan, advanced in 1915, according to which a revolutionary government must start its revolutionary advance into other countries. He realized that now, in 1917, Russia was too weak to manage this advance. Lenin, however, never dropped his grand design. The problem was merely one of tactics for him, and he knew that Russia had to consolidate its power in order to recover before its 1793.

Contrary to Lenin's grand design, it seems that many Bolsheviks regarded the Bolshevik revolution as national. In December 1917, Sergei Kirov (1886-1934), the future number-two person in Stalin's administration until his assassination, did not exclude the possibility that the Bolshevik revolution might be contained within Russian national boundaries, though in this case, Kirov said, its destiny will depend on what will happen in the West.¹⁴⁴

The new Bolshevik government included an extraordinary number of aliens, whereas there had been, for example, only one Jew in the Russian government before the March revolution, and even after that revolution, such an appointment would have been regarded as an intolerable offense by the Russian population. Lenin even offered Trotsky the post of head of government, but he reasonably declined this proposal, citing his Jewish origin.¹⁴⁵ In his policy of political nominations, Lenin was very consistent. He badly needed aliens, and especially Jews, in order to demonstrate the internationalism of the new system to aid in his search for allies. No minority group was so promising as the Jews. Nominating several Jews to top-rank positions, Lenin made revolutionary Russia attractive to Jews both in Russia and abroad, although these top-rank Jews were no more than his executives. Any attempt to deviate from his blueprint was doomed to failure and reprimand. The top-rank alien executives enjoyed a great deal of liberty in their actions, but only in the framework of the goals set by Lenin.

Another of Lenin's considerations with regard to Trotsky's appointment seemed to be strictly Machiavellian. The old Italian sage had recommended that the prince use someone else to carry out unpopular actions and then dispose of that person after the actions had been accomplished.¹⁴⁶ Lenin understood very well that the destruction, terror, and economic chaos produced by the first stage of the revolution would be highly unpopular and that he therefore needed a scapegoat. Trotsky was well suited for this role. As both a Jew and as a former enemy of Bolshevism with no roots in the party, Trotsky could never compete with Lenin, who had never liked him and never forgot their rivalry before 1917.¹⁴⁷ Trotsky was too clever, ambitious, and independent, but he was harmless. Lenin's intrigues against Trotsky started in 1919,¹⁴⁸ and directly after the end of the Civil War in December 1920, he started to publicly criticize Trotsky in order to contain him within certain dimensions.¹⁴⁹

The general destruction at the hands of the lumpen and peasants, tactically encouraged by the Bolsheviks, and the extra-orbital Jewish presence in the Soviet leadership provoked a new split between Lenin and Gorky. During 1917 and the first months of 1918, Gorky published an independent left-wing newspaper, which was not, however, of Menshevik trend, as the Bolsheviks claimed. Gorky expressed his fear that by encouraging the lumpen-peasant Bakuninist-type revolution, the Bolsheviks would endanger Russia's very existence. Gorky hated the Russian peasants, who for him embodied the Asiatic-Mongol biological heritage that, he felt, had ruined Russia. Their active intervention in political life could have only disastrous consequences; Gorky feared that the peasant element would destroy Russia's only demographic hope, the Russian working-class elite and the creative intelligentsia. His attacks against the Bolsheviks after their revolution were violent:

The People's Commissars treat Russia as material for an experiment; to them the Russian people is that horse which bacteriologists inoculate with typhus so that the horse produces antityphoid serum in its blood. Just such a cruel experiment, which is doomed to failure beforehand, is being performed by the Commissars on the Russian people, without considering that the worn-out, half-starved horse may die.

The reformers from Smolny do not care about Russia: they are cold-bloodedly sacrificing her to their dream of world or European revolution.

There is no place for a social revolution in the present conditions of Russian life, for it is impossible, just by a wave of the wand, to make socialists out of the eighty-five percent peasant population of the country, among whom are several tens of millions of non-Russian nomads.

The working class will be the first to suffer from this utterly insane experiment, because it is the vanguard of the revolution and it will be the first to be wiped out in a civil war. And if the working class is crushed and destroyed, that means the best forces and hopes of the country will be destroyed.

And as long as I am able, I shall tell the Russian proletariat again and again:

You are being led to ruin, you are being used as material for an inhuman experiment, and in the eyes of your leaders you are still not human beings!¹⁵⁰

At the same time, Gorky condemned the new Bolshevik revolutionary nationalism and the new Russian messianism:

And this weak, ignorant people, with an inborn inclination toward anarchism, is now called to be the spiritual leader of the world, the Messiah of Europe.

It would seem that this curious and sentimental idea should not disturb the tragic game of the People's Commissars. But the "leaders of the people" do not conceal their intention to kindle a fire from green Russian logs, a fire whose flame would light up the Western world, that world where the fire of social creativity burns brighter and more sensibly than in our Russia.

The fire is kindled; it burns poorly, it stinks of Russia, filthy, drunk and cruel. And this unfortunate Russia is being dragged and shoved to Golgotha to be crucified for the salvation of the world. Isn't this "Messianism" with a hundred horsepower?¹⁵¹

As regards Jews, Gorky had already, in July 1917, begged them to be extremely careful and to not do anything that might provoke anti-Semitism, since any irresponsible behavior on the part of one Jew would immediately be extended to all Jews.

I deem it necessary—considering the conditions of the times—to point out that nowhere is such tact and moral sensitivity required as in the relation of Russians to Jews and of Jews to the manifestations of Russian life.

This does not mean at all that there are some facts in Russia which should not be mentioned critically by the Tartar [sic] or the Jew, but one must keep in mind that even an involuntary mistake—not to speak of deliberate meanness, even though it may have sprung from a sincere desire to gratify the instincts of the crowd—can be interpreted in a way harmful not only to one angry or stupid Jew but to all of Jewry.¹⁵²

Later, he directly attacked Jewish Bolshevik leaders for their tactless behavior, an attack he would later repeat several times. Speaking against anti-Semitic leaflets, Gorky said:

The leaflets, of course, devote no little attention to such Jews as Zinoviev, Volodarsky, and other Jews who stubbornly forget that their tactlessness and stupidity serve as a basis for the indictment of all Jews as such. Well, so what? "It is a small flock that has not a black sheep," but the whole flock does not consist of black sheep and, of course, there are thousands of Jews who hate the Volodarskys with a hatred which is probably just as violent as that of the Russian anti-Semites.¹⁵³

At the same time, Gorky stressed his basic sympathy with the Jewish people as a nation, making a sharp distinction between them and the denationalized Jewish Bolsheviks. This distinction was an extremely important political concept, and it had many far-reaching implications in the formative period

of the Soviet system. According to this concept, the Jewish people deserved all sympathy and support in the extent of their national distinction. Jews could participate in economic, cultural, and even political issues of other nations, but as Jews and not as self-appointed representatives of Russia or other nations. In this respect, Gorky remained faithful to his previous Russian revolutionary nationalism. Jews must not try to be substitutes for Russians, since such an effort could only prevent the release of their inherent energy.

Later Gorky repented of his opposition to Lenin in 1917 and 1918, quite sincerely confessing that he had misunderstood Lenin's real intentions.¹⁵⁴ Whatever Gorky said, the Russian demographic revolution followed the Bolshevik revolution. New fresh historical masses entered the historical process, and since they came from the most authentic Russian national group, the peasantry, the Bolshevik revolution conceived by Lenin as a Russian-centered world revolution could not help being transformed into a Russian national revolution.

Indeed, Gorky was right. In the first stage of their revolution, the Bolsheviks attracted not only the peasantry itself but also those political radical groups that looked forward to the peasant revolution and even welcomed it as the fatal struggle of the village against the city. These groups turned out only to be Bolshevik fellow travelers and were later destroyed, but at the same time their ideology, if not themselves, was later integrated into Soviet society, since eventually the Russian village indeed defeated the city, but in a very dialectical way. The village was destroyed, too, but Russian peasants as individuals, not as a class, eventually attained political power in the country.

The Bolshevik revolution provoked a split in the largest Russian political party, the Social Revolutionary (SR) party, which identified itself with the Russian peasantry. Its massive left wing joined the Bolshevik government and greatly contributed to the consolidation of the Bolshevik system during the first period of its existence. The left-wing SR party was, in fact, the left wing of Russian populism, as Leonard Schapiro noticed.¹⁵⁵

Essentially, the SRs always remained populists with strong Slavophile roots. If their majority opposed Bolsheviks, their left-wing members were ready to form a coalition government with the latter, which they did just after the October revolution. Although this alliance was temporary, the coalition government surviving no more than several months, its implications were much more serious. First, it was exactly during these few months that the SR left wing suggested an ideology that was to exercise a very strong influence on the future Soviet society, which soon forgot its origins. Second, many of the SRs joined the Bolshevik party out of populist-radicalist motivations. Brought to extreme logical conclusions, the populist idea could not exclude the Bolsheviks; if the latter succeeded—as they did—in taking power, it could only be through mass popular support. At the height of events, it was difficult to discern which part of the people supported them or, indeed, even whether they did enjoy mass popular support. But, if they

succeeded in defeating other political parties, if they succeeded in taking power not only in the capital but also in many other parts of the country, this success could have been regarded by committed populists as a decisive criterion of popular will that could not be ignored.

No mass movement is determined by its leaders. The leaders are only an instrument in the hands of the people, who thereby dictate their will to history—or, according to an expression used by the left-wing SR leader, Alexei Ustinov (1879–1937), they are a gramophone that “plays” the popular will.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, Bolshevism was successful, not because of Lenin, Trotsky, or any aliens, but because of the Russian people themselves, who made these leaders fulfill the people’s will despite the leaders’ words. If even Bolshevism acquired some undesirable features, its victory in spite of them must necessarily be regarded as popular will and as such accepted unconditionally and lived with until Bolshevism dies out. Meanwhile, populism was traditionally opposed to the capitalist West, clinging to the hope that the Russian people, relying on their own tradition, might bypass capitalism and achieve socialism in their own way.

Although the left-wing SRs saw themselves as internationalists, their internationalism was demonstrably Russian and messianic in character. The new Soviet Russia was regarded by them as the *avant-garde* of all humanity, raising the torch of liberty for all the oppressed world. Maria Spiridonova (1884–1941), a famous SR terrorist, proudly declared a week after the Bolshevik revolution, “We are now showing the way to our brothers in Western Europe.”¹⁵⁷ Ustinov went further. He said: “Russia is a backward country. However, Russian barbarians have turned out . . . to be perfectly in command of all those ultrademocratic and ultrasocialist slogans that Europe adopted only during the last year.”¹⁵⁸ One Shifer from Odessa claimed that only in “revolutionary Russia can the International find strength in its struggle against world imperialism.”¹⁵⁹ Roman Petkevitch wrote in the beginning of 1918:

The peculiarity of the Russian spirit, its uniqueness, is expressed in Bolshevism. Note well the saying: “To each his own!” Each nation creates its own particular and individual modes and methods of social struggle which are characteristic of that nation only. The French and Italians are anarcho-syndicalists, the English are more strongly inclined toward the trade unions, and the social democratism of the Germans, patterned after their military establishment, is the clearest possible reflection of their lack of talent.

We, on the other hand, according to the prophecy of our great teachers—for instance, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy—are a messianic people entrusted with the task of outpacing and outdistancing all others. It is precisely our spirit that will liberate the world from the chains of history.¹⁶⁰

Left-wing SRs possessed a strong mystical pathos that was not contained within some confessional framework, and for this reason, the Bolshevik revolution was seen by them as a spiritual, messianic revolution. Even their suppression during their uprising in July 1918 by the Bolsheviks did not

alienate them from the latter. With Ustinov as the leader, one SR group created a small party of Revolutionary Communists. Later, another small party emerged: the party of Populist Communists. Both of these parties joined the Bolshevik party.¹⁶¹ Ustinov became a prominent diplomat, and many left-wing SRs joined the Soviet political police (the *Tcheka*).¹⁶²

Even the right-wing SRs were not as hostile to the Bolsheviks as is widely believed. Their struggle against the Bolsheviks contained important elements of self-restraint and was therefore never consistent enough. Sometimes the right-wing SRs sought a middle way between Bolshevism and the White movement. Faithful to populist tradition, they believed that the overthrow of Bolshevism might be only a matter concerning an internal evolution of the Russian people themselves. Moreover, some of the right-wing SRs also joined the Bolsheviks.¹⁶³ It is conspicuous that the Bolshevik party integrated more former right-wing SRs than left-wing SRs. In 1922, the Bolshevik party had a total of 22,517 former members of other political parties within its ranks, which amounted to 5.8 percent of its members. The left-wing SRs constituted 12.7 percent of this number and right-wing SRs, 17.5 percent, for a total of 7,000.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile, there were sixteen former left-wing SRs and twenty right-wing SRs among the provincial party administration.

The interesting case of right-wing SR Sergei Dmitrievsky manifests that this process of merging former SRs into the Bolshevik party cannot be explained only by SR political opportunism. Dmitrievsky opposed the Bolshevik movement, joined the White movement and was arrested, but in 1918 moved to the Bolsheviks and joined that party.¹⁶⁵ According to his own words, he, together with other SRs, had previously thought that the Bolsheviks were acting in the interests of the people, though with some distortions of those interests. Dmitrievsky was connected, at least temporarily, to the *Tcheka* and accompanied Zinoviev to Germany in 1920. Listed as director-general of the People's Commissariat for Transport, Dmitrievsky asked for vacations in order to write a book in 1921. Lenin considered his request and, after personally scrutinizing his dossier, approved it. Then Dmitrievsky moved to the diplomatic service, where at one time he served as first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Greece, under Ustinov. At the end of the 1920s, Dmitrievsky was appointed director-general of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; in 1930, he asked for political asylum in Sweden under very suspicious circumstances and published several extremely curious books. He then began to support Nazi Germany, claiming that the Soviet system was gradually moving toward Russian national socialism.¹⁶⁶ One can presume that Ustinov and Dmitrievsky were part of some political faction.

A special place in the national recognition of Bolshevism was occupied by a group of the SR party that advanced peasant cooperative socialism, the leaders of which were Alexei Tchajanov (1888-1939) and Nikolai Kondratiev (1892-perished in the 1930s). This group, sometimes called Neopopulists, split away from the SR party and cooperated with the Bolsheviks, not recognizing the latter's ideology.

Both Tchaianov and Kondratiev began to be politically active after the March revolution, participating in the so-called State Conference in August 1917. Speaking at this conference, Kondratiev verbalized the usual populist view that a people develops spontaneously and no leader's will can withstand its pressure.¹⁶⁷ Both Tchaianov and Kondratiev were confident that the Bolsheviks followed the will of the people, that the latter would eradicate them sooner or later, but that in the meantime it was necessary to cooperate with them as a power supported by the people.

As director of the Institute of Agricultural Economics in the 1920s, Tchaianov occupied a central position,¹⁶⁸ and Kondratiev had a no less important position as director of the Institute for World Economics. Although, formally, the ideas of cooperative socialism are economic, in fact they had a strong national context—the very idea of relying on Russian peasants, both subjectively and objectively, means the existence of a national orientation. The preservation of the peasantry as the economic foundation of the country, and the most powerful productive force, could not help but nationalize the Soviet system.

Tchaianov and Kondratiev often clashed with the Bolshevik leadership. The former rejected both capitalism and socialism as being the outcome of urban Western civilization: Socialism is only the Western antithesis of Western capitalism and has its origin in German capitalist industrial plants, reflecting only the psychology of the Western urban proletariat, which is exhausted by forcible toil and has lost the habit of creative work during several generations. The future economics of Russia, the two claimed, must return to that of ancient Russia, when every toiler was in creative communication with the cosmos.¹⁶⁹ (Tchaianov regarded religion only from the aesthetic point of view.) He and Kondratiev preserved their central position until the end of the 1920s, when the collectivization and terror against the peasants swallowed them up too. Nevertheless, they played an outstanding role in the national consolidation of the Soviet system.

There was another small party that had split from the SR party in 1905—the so-called Popular Socialist party led by Alexei Peshekhonov (1867–1933), who became a minister in the Provisional government. Its ideology opposed the Bolsheviks at first, but later, when the Bolshevik system consolidated, Peshekhonov also decided to follow popular will as he understood it and enlisted as an economist in a Soviet office. Lenin, who mistakenly saw him as a subversive element, ordered him to be expelled from Russia. But Peshekhonov was defiant and spent the rest of his life trying to obtain permission from the Soviet government to return; unsuccessful in this attempt, he was, however, eventually appointed commercial adviser to the Soviet embassy in Latvia. He confessed: "I rejoiced in the successes of the Soviet system. I grieved at its failures. I was happy when the Soviet army drove the Poles out of Kiev. I was happy when Soviet diplomacy made a successful move and raised Russian international prestige. And I will rejoice if the Soviet system vindicates Russian interests in [the Bosphorus] Straits, if it secures the return of Bessarabia to Russia, if it makes the Japanese

clear the Russian part of Sakhalin."¹⁷⁰ After he died in 1933, the Soviet government did allow him to be buried in Leningrad, which Peshekhonov had requested in his will. Another leader of this party, Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz (1865-1936), was more radical and became one of the leaders of nonparty National Bolshevism, as we will see later.

National Catastrophe

Until now, I have dealt mainly with the various manifestations of Russian historical optimism. But this optimism was paralleled by Russian pessimism, which had already begun to be verbalized at the end of the nineteenth century by various ultraconservative elements. Indeed, the expectation of doomsday and the end of the world has always followed great social crises and foreign invasions. After the fall of Constantinople, for example, the former Byzantine empire was swept by such a mood, and the Turkish invasion was interpreted as a reliable sign of the approaching Last Judgment.

Russian conservatives expected the Last Judgment as early as the end of the nineteenth century. A hermit bishop, Feofan (Govorov, 1815-1894), prophesied: "It is pleasant to find radiant descriptions of Christianity's future, but there is no justification for them. . . . The Savior Himself foretold the rule of evil and unbelief." Feofan warned of the imminent coming of Antichrist.¹⁷¹

An outstanding representative of the Russian Orthodox church, Archpriest John (Sergiev) of Kronstadt (1829-1908), said in 1907: "The Russian kingdom is shattering. It is trembling and close to collapse. If things will remain as they are in Russia, and godless people and reckless anarchists will not be punished according to the righteous law, and if Russia will not cleanse herself from darnels, she will become desolate like many ancient kingdoms and cities that were razed to the ground by divine justice because of their godlessness and lawlessness."¹⁷²

Metropolitan of Moscow Makary (Nevsky, 1835-1926) warned that the Russian people had become "a purulent corpse from feet to head." He claimed that the Russian people were guilty of "betrayal of God, defection from the church, rebellion against God-given authority, mutiny, massacres, instigation to disorders, assassinations of officials and other faithful servants of the tsar. In the middle-class—merchants and artisans—there is the worship of the golden calf and the consigning to oblivion of God, truth, honor, mercy. As regards the simple people, one can only say that they have become drunken and corrupted."¹⁷³

The Bolshevik revolution served only to strengthen this dark pessimism. From a commonsense point of view, everything in Russia had collapsed, and violence and brute force had gained the upper hand. The country was in a state of rapid decomposition: Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, Bessarabia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine, Central Asia, and even many ethnically Russian areas had declared their independence or were occupied by foreign armies. In many areas, Russians were endangered as Russians,

their legal and economic positions shattered. In violation of all traditions, many aliens came to power. Antireligious terror swept over the country, and many cultural monuments were destroyed. The very existence of Russia was challenged.

It is not surprising that the majority of the Russian population, which did not accept Bolshevism, regarded the Bolshevik revolution as an apocalyptic national tragedy, as a national catastrophe, as the death of Russia. According to the Russian emigrant philosopher Fedor Stepun (1884-1965), "Bolshevism seemed to the Orthodox consciousness [to be] . . . not the beginning of history, but its end, not the morning star heralding the coming radiant kingdom but the evening star of the world immersed in sin."¹⁷⁴ Religious circles expected an imminent world catastrophe, conceived of as the completion of temptations and the limit of physical trials and griefs. Russia was declared to be the kingdom of evil, the abyss from which one could emerge only through superhuman efforts, through repentance, through military struggle.

Leonid Andreev (1871-1919), a leading Russian writer who had welcomed the March revolution, was terrified by Bolshevism even before its revolution.¹⁷⁵ When it happened, he declared that Russia was a "nameless heap of ruins and rubbish, the bloody chaos of internecine war."¹⁷⁶ Leading Russian philosophers such as Struve, Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Izgoev, and Semen Frank (1877-1950) contributed to the collection *Iz glubiny*, published only fifty years later, in which Struve expressed their common opinion: The Bolshevik revolution is a national bankruptcy and the world shame.¹⁷⁷

Many people blamed the Russian people per se for this catastrophe. Ivan Bunin (1870-1953), who later, as an émigré, received the Nobel Prize in literature, did not conceal his hatred of his own people: "Yes, indeed," he said, "the Bolsheviks are authentic representatives of working-peasant power." They fulfill "sacred popular dreams." But everybody knows what kind of dreams these people have, Bunin said ironically, who are "now invited to rule the world, culture, law, honor, conscience, religion, art." He continued, "Russia is the classical country of the ruffian."¹⁷⁸ A prominent Russian historian, Robert Vipper (1859-1954), went so far as to "bury" the Russian people, claiming that Russian nationality is dissolved, weakened, exhausted, without the slightest hope that it might revive. The very thought of revival is a collective madness.¹⁷⁹

The sharpest accusations against the Russian people came from rabid Russian nationalists. Ivan Rodionov (?-1943), a Don Cossack writer, said: "The Russian people, deceived and robbed, beggared and deprived of all rights, corrupted and hungry, fell into a stinking abyss and now, under the yoke of international political cheats, thieves and assassins . . . flounder helplessly on the bottom in blood, dirt, and dust, frightening all cultured humanity and having lost all its reason and conscience in the terrible infection of the all-exterminating mortal sickness called Judeo-Bolshevism." Rodionov called the Russian people "seduced, forgotten of God and conscience"—a group that had stopped being "the people-builder, people-

statesman, and in all its bulk became a rebellious wayward rabble which forgot both divine and human laws."¹⁸⁰ Col. Fedor Vinberg (1861-1927), a former active Black Hundred member, claimed that the Great Russians had become worse than any other people in the Russian empire. "One is embarrassed," he said, "by this rough, cruel, stupid, cold, hopelessly thick-skinned wickedness."¹⁸¹

World Mystery

What was for some people a national catastrophe was for others a bright holiday. Probably the first poetic salute to the victorious Bolshevik revolution as an authentic Russian revolution belongs to the young poet and a former futurist, Riurik Ivnev (Kovalev, 1891-1981), who later became an established Soviet poet but at that time was close to the new people's commissar, Lunatcharsky.¹⁸² Ivnev exclaimed:

Enough, enough!
 To howl heartrendingly like an hysterical woman!
 I am entirely yours, bubbling Smolny!
 It is shameful for me to be with others.
 Let the cold and strong wind
 Roar and not calm down.
 I was taught by Dostoevsky
 to understand my Russia.¹⁸³

Meanwhile, a whole pleiad of outstanding Russian poets and writers of the mystical ilk also enthusiastically welcomed the Bolshevik revolution as genuinely Russian, and even Christian. What was a national catastrophe for the pessimists was a world mystery for this group. Some of them gathered around the new collection, *Skify* [Scythians], which appeared only twice—at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918.

Those writers and poets saw the Bolshevik revolution as a messianic, anti-Western popular movement, and many of them also saw it as a world mystery. The collection gave a name to a broad intellectual movement, which partly entered into conflict with the Bolshevik regime but was integrated as a whole into the Soviet system. The collection was edited by a prominent SR essayist and literary critic who became the main ideologist of the left-wing SR, Ivanov-Razumnik (1878-1946); by a left-wing SR leader, Sergei Matislavsky (Maslovsky, 1876-1943), later an established Soviet writer; and by an outstanding Russian writer and poet, Andrei Bely (Bugayev, 1880-1934). The majority of these writers and poets constituted the foundation of Soviet culture, though some of them later perished in purges, emigrated, or committed suicide.¹⁸⁴

In a programmatic article, Ivanov-Razumnik claimed that the main driving force of the current Russian social development remained nationality; the national principle would be eternal. He criticized those people who could not discern behind the "alien revolution" (i.e., beyond the superficial Marxist

shell of the revolution) the genuine Russian revolution. He pointed to Peter the Great as the historical model of the Bolshevik revolution, one that deserved imitation. "Peter the Great," Ivanov-Razumnik said, "looked after the new city thousands upon thousands times more strongly than the hundreds of Old Believers who burned themselves in the name of 'Holy Russia.'"¹⁸⁵ Later, the Peter the Great model became a dominant historical model for people who looked for historical continuity in the Soviet system.

Ivanov-Razumnik anticipated that the Russian revolution would turn the world upside down, and he insisted on Russia's messianic mission. But this messianism had no traditional religious meaning for him; Russia was to him no more than a young, savage people, the Scythians, who are full of power and, because of their unbridled barbarism, will dictate their laws to the West. "Yes, there is a fiery vortex in Russia now," Ivanov-Razumnik said, "there is litter in this vortex, there is dust in this vortex, there is stench in this vortex. The vortex brings spring seed. The vortex flies to the West. Our Scythian vortex will whirl and shake up the old West. The old world will be turned upside down."¹⁸⁶

One can easily discern old Herzenian motives in this invocation. Evgeny Lundberg (1887-1965), later a Soviet writer and critic, defined Scythianism not as an internal but as an extrovert trend directed against European culture, and accurately reaching the latter's "meanest places." According to Lundberg, "no one with political revolutionary trends, including traditional populism, can stand the implacability of Western lies."¹⁸⁷ Lundberg, who was a disciple of Merezhkovsky, compared the Bolshevik revolution with the origin of Christianity. "Christ was followed," he said, "not by professors, nor by virtuous philosophers, nor by shopkeepers. Christ was followed by rascals. And the revolution will also be followed by rascals, apart from those who launched it. And one must not be afraid of this."¹⁸⁸

The majority of the Scythians and people close to them were revolutionary mystics influenced by Russian gnosticism, concepts that were so well defended against any criticism that nothing could shatter them: neither the chaos of the first days of the revolution, nor its ostensibly antinational trends, nor bloody violence, nor the destruction of cultural monuments, and by no means antireligious persecutions. A gnostic perceived everything differently from other people. The worse the situation, the better its mystical implications. "The worse, the better"—such was the principle of these gnostics. The more hatred now, the brighter will be love in the future; the more crimes now, the sooner the sins of the old world will be redeemed; the more suffering, the closer is redemption; the more cultural monuments are destroyed, the more real spiritual treasures will be created in the future. Some gnostics regarded the reigning evil as the essence and the highest value of events and welcomed evil as evil.

Alexander Blok (1880-1921) was the most important Russian poet to recognize the Bolsheviks.¹⁸⁹ He drew his inspiration from Dostoevsky and Soloviev, and was also among the first to discern in Bolshevism the great national renaissance. "I am listening: Russia is perishing," "there is no

Alexander Blok (photo from A. Turkov, *Alexander Blok* [Moscow, 1969], p. 4).



Russia any more," "may Russia's memory live forever," Blok said in January 1918; "but I see before me Russia, that Russia which great writers saw in their terrifying prophetic dreams. I see that Petersburg which Dostoevsky saw, that Russia which Gogol called a speeding troika. . . . Russia is destined to suffer the pains of humiliations and division. But she will emerge from these humiliations reborn and great in a new way." He said further, "Russia is a big ship that is destined to make a great voyage."¹⁹⁰

Blok saw a grandiose drama in the Bolshevik revolution, which to him had a hidden religious content inside the external cruelty and chaos. The brightest artistic expression of this idea is at the end of his famous poem "The Twelve," when the invisible Christ leads the march of participants of the revolution:

. . . So they march with sovereign tread:
In their rear, the hungry cur,
And with blood-red flag ahead,
Unseen, since the blizzard's there,
Unharm'd as the bullets fly,
Stepping gently, blizzard-high,

Sprinkling pearly trails of snow,
 With garland of white roses spliced—
 Up in front is Jesus Christ.¹⁹¹

In his apologia of violence and sin as a means to achieve good, Blok even wanted to see the hidden leader of the revolution, not as Christ, but as Antichrist. He recorded in his diary, "There is a terrible thought: the whole point is not that the Red Guard 'did not deserve' Christ, who follows them, but that it is He who follows them while it is necessary that Another should follow."¹⁹² (According to Besançon, "Blok thought . . . that one needs to take the initiative in destruction in order to fight against it.")¹⁹³ Blok regretted that the Bolsheviks' persecution of the church played into the latter's hands, since he hated the church. "Blok did not love Christ," Besançon said, "and, deprived of hope, he was also deprived of faith. He was among those . . . who believed in the devil but did not believe in Christ."¹⁹⁴

Blok contrasted revolutionary Russia with the West, the former intimidating the latter with its Asiatic, barbaric face. He called Russia the "Scythian," i.e., the young, fresh nation whose destiny it was to challenge the decaying West:

You are but millions—we are an infinite number.
 Measure yourselves against us, try.
 We are the Scythians, we are the Asians
 With slanted and greedy eye.

Centuries of your days are but an hour to us,
 Yet like obedient slaves,
 We've held a shield between two hostile races—
 Europe, and the Mongol hordes. . . .

But time has come to term and the evil hour
 Flaps its wings. Each day multiplies
 Offenses: soon of your very Paestum
 There will be no trace. . . .

From war and horror come to our open arms,
 The embrace of kin,
 Put the old sword away while there's time,
 Hail us as brothers. . . .

Ah, Old World, before you have perished, join
 Our fraternal banquet. Hear,
 Perhaps for the last time summoning you
 The barbaric lyre.¹⁹⁵

It is appropriate to quote here the prominent Soviet literary critic and poet Kornei Tchukovsky (1882–1969), who remarked about Blok, while the latter was still alive: "Here we see that obstinate form of nationalism which is not embarrassed by anything and wants to see holiness in everything, even

vileness, just so long as that vileness is native. This is the kind of faith in one's nation and in the inevitability of its glorious destiny that enables a man to look beyond its syphillis and see its blinding beauty."¹⁹⁶

Blok approached the left-wing SR, and his most important works at this time were printed in its publications. After the defeat of the left-wing SR in July 1918, Blok was disappointed with the Bolsheviks as the bearers of genuine revolution. Later he stressed that the Russian revolution had been finished in the summer of 1918 and nearly apologized for his poem "The Twelve," claiming that it had been written in that "extraordinary and always short period when the rushing revolutionary cyclone produces a tempest in all the worlds of nature, life, and art."¹⁹⁷

However, Blok's disappointment with the Bolsheviks found expression only in his little-known articles and speeches while his revolutionary poems will remain forever as documents of this epoch. Moreover, his disappointment did not change his basic revolutionary mystical nationalism. In April 1919, he declared the people to the bearers of culture, rather than the intelligentsia. Every popular movement, whether it was an uprising, a revolution, or a mutiny, was regarded by Blok as the manifestation of the highest spiritual values. He was concerned with concepts of culture and civilization. According to Blok, civilization begins when culture perishes. Culture is the result of mystical creativity when all the spheres of life are encompassed by it, and only afterward does civilization begin, in what Blok believed is a nonspiritual material process. In Europe, the nineteenth century was the end of culture and the beginning of civilization. This juxtaposition of culture and civilization, which was taken from Nietzsche, would not have had a national context had Blok not claimed that no popular mass had ever been touched by civilization. The people, he said, were the only custodian of culture. "If we would speak of the acculturation of humanity," he said ironically, "one does not know who should acculturate whom: civilized people the barbarians, or vice versa, since civilized people are exhausted and have lost their cultural values. At such a time, the fresh, or barbarian, masses become the unconscious bearers of culture."¹⁹⁸

To Blok, since the main foundation of culture is music (an idea taken from Nietzsche), it follows that the people are the custodians of the spirit of music. "One of the principal motives of every revolution," Blok said, "is that of return to nature,"¹⁹⁹ which pledges the funeral of civilization. Therefore, every victorious revolution must lead to the restoration of the musical, i.e., popular, roots. It should be mentioned that as early as 1919 Blok thought that civilization had once again defeated culture during the Bolshevik revolution, but this opinion could have been a result of the defeat of the revolution and not its victory.

In spite of all the differences, one might see a common denominator between Blok and the Bolshevik Forwardists in their attitude toward the people as the main source of genuine cultural creation. This similarity is not entirely accidental, since Blok regarded Gorky as a genuine Russian nationalist, too. If it was national, revolution was justified for Blok.

A very sophisticated Russian writer and literary critic, Petr Guber (1886-1941), stressed another aspect, namely, that "the mystical concept of Russia as a genuine living personality constituted the authentic foundation of all Blok's political poetry. . . . His patriotism has all the features of eroticism, at the same time passionate and pathetic. . . . Russia was indeed a living woman for him, real and loving. He wanted to possess her."²⁰⁰ These words might be used as the starting point for the psychoanalysis of Blok, which is beyond the scope of this book.

Andrei Bely, the well-known Russian writer and poet whom many experts regard as the greatest Russian writer of the twentieth century, was another prominent gnostic who not only welcomed the new Russia in the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution but maintained this attitude until his death. Open to many influences in his youth, he fell under the exclusive influence of Soloviev but then embraced anthroposophy, becoming a disciple of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925). But in his attraction both to Soloviev and to Steiner he had a common denominator: a deep commitment to free Christian mysticism in its gnostic form. Bely was a very talented mystical interpreter of political events.

Mystical dialectics were from early on very attractive to him. The poet Vladislav Khodasevitch (1886-1939) said that from his childhood, Bely had "fallen in love" with "compatibility of incompatibility, with tragedy and complications of internal contradictions, with truth in lies and probably with good in evil and evil in good."²⁰¹ Bely welcomed theurgy as a means to change the world actively in collaboration with God. It is interesting to note as a side issue that it was not by chance that revolution occupied such a prominent place in Steiner's anthroposophy as a powerful theurgical instrument: In spite of ostensible evil, revolution in this philosophical context serves as an instrument of the new creation.

Bely enthusiastically welcomed the March revolution. He was not repelled by its violence, and it had a creative character in his eyes. Comparing revolutionary forces with the fountains of artesian wells, he said, "In the beginning, the well spews out mud . . . then the water becomes pure."²⁰² Human life, in this way of thinking, becomes only a metaphor. Indeed, violence is presented very poetically as an artesian well while blood is representative of mud and life is reduced to symbols, some beautiful (such as the artesian well), some not. Bely welcomed the Bolshevik revolution with a lofty poem, "Christ is Resurrected," in which the revolution was compared, not with an artesian well, but with a world mystery of Crucifixion and Resurrection. The events of the Gospels served Bely as a supramundane model of every catastrophe, which will culminate in redemption and resurrection.

Bely was not at all concerned with humanity. Russia was the center of his concern, and he was indignant with the people who mourned Russia's fate:

We are brigands and violators
we powder our hair with ashes



Andrei Bely (photo from A. Turkov, *Alexander Blok* [Moscow, 1969], p. 256).

over the body of the Deceased
and snuff our candles.
We are in the same abyss of disbelief
not realizing that in these very days and hours
the world mystery is being performed.

The "Deceased" is Russia, now the "Bride" who must accept the "message of spring." Being crucified, as was Christ, Russia must be resurrected in glory:

Russia, my country—you, that woman invested by the Sun
I see clearly
Russia, my Godbearer, who defeats the serpent
and something in my throat chokes with tenderness.²⁰³

Even specific political forms took on symbolic characteristics for Bely. He saw the Soviets as the foundation of collective joy.

Bely's mysticism was not a temporary phenomenon. Throughout his life, he returned to the same subject, always demonstrating his deep faith in

Russia. Being very ingenious, Bely always suggested new metaphors, new images of mystical transfiguration for Russia as a result of the Bolshevik revolution. Once he suggested a physicochemical analogy: Russia was being transformed from a solid corpse into a gas in order to later inundate the earth in the form of rain. Then he compared Russia with Socrates, who drank a cup of poison. We pity Socrates, Bely said, but what would have happened if he had refused the cup? We would not in this case have his bright historical image.²⁰⁴

Some Russian writers and poets who did not formally participate in the "Scythians" belonged, however, to that trend and should be regarded in the larger framework of the Russian revolutionary national mysticism, becoming some of the first allies of the Bolsheviks. Like Bely, Maximilian Voloshin (1877-1932) was an anthroposophe, but Voloshin was closer than Bely to Russian Orthodoxy. His gnostic mysticism was more moderate, and his metaphors and images bore a specific historical character, although he also regarded the Bolshevik revolution as a grandiose world mystery. In all of Voloshin's visions, Christian Russia occupied the central and absolute place. He was concerned with the country's suffering, its fate, its ways along which all the world will probably follow.

Voloshin condemned the cruelty of revolution, but nevertheless he did not reject it because of its universal and providential meaning. He was also dominated by the idea of "holy sin." One can be saved only by committing sins. The revolution had its hidden Christian meaning, and its essence lay in the preaching of the Christian message by sinners. The Bolshevik regime itself, said Voloshin, had its Christian dimension.

Voloshin was the most consistent Russian revolutionary gnostic, and he stressed more than others the traditional continuity of Bolshevism. In 1920, he said that nothing had changed in Russian history:

What has changed? Signs and titles?
The same hurricane in every way:
Commissars with the spirit of autocracy
Tsars with explosions of revolution.²⁰⁵

Voloshin, however, was controversial; like St. Augustine he welcomed the revolution as a divine whip, complaining that people were incapable of understanding providence. Here he was already following church tradition, and he was ready to share Russia's real destiny: "If one must die, one must die with you / and with you, like Lazarus, rise from the grave."²⁰⁶ Bunin, who met Voloshin in 1919, commented ironically that Voloshin thought that the unification and construction of Russia were already under way. "The worse, the better," he quoted Voloshin as saying: "there are nine seraphs who come down to earth and mingle with us in order to undergo crucifixion and the fire with us—this same fire from which a new image will appear, hardened and enlightened."²⁰⁷

Valery Briusov (1873-1924) occupied a special place among those Russian mystics who glorified the national character of the Bolshevik revolution.

His uniqueness lay in the fact that he professed, not a Christian, but an anti-Christian messianism. For him, Russia's greatness was not that it had passed through suffering and death and would be resurrected as the luminary of Christianity; on the contrary, its greatness was that it would bring the death of Christianity and the triumph of an ancient civilization that predated Christianity. Anti-Christian mysticism and even demonism had already captured Briusov long before the Bolshevik revolution. In fact, he had declared his attachment to demonism in 1901:

For a long time I haven't believed
 In an unshakable truth,
 I love, love equally
 all seas and havens.
 I want my free boat
 to sail everywhere.
 I would like to glorify
 both the Lord and the Devil.¹⁰⁸

Briusov was involved in black magic, occultism, and spiritualism, and he was possessed with a thirst to destroy the existing world. In a letter to Gorky, he described the delight with which he would participate in the destruction of the old world, his "best dream: when all this will be crushed."¹⁰⁹ After the revolution, Briusov almost immediately supported the Bolsheviks, identifying with them much more than other revolutionary mystics did, and he joined the Bolshevik party in 1920. It is highly improbable that he sincerely accepted Marxism and abandoned all that he had accepted before, nihilism and demonism. But what significance can a party card and presence at a party meeting have for someone who regards the world only as an illusory phenomenon? One cannot exclude the fact that Briusov saw his joining the party as a mystery and some kind of cult activity. The national theme appeared in his work, not immediately after the revolution, but toward the end of the Civil War; Russia, for Briusov, was settling accounts with the Christian world through unopposable brute force:

Leader of countries, ahead of everyone else
 You waved the torch in the dark
 Illuminating the way for the peoples. . . .
 Where is he who would dare to oppose?¹¹⁰

Russia points the way for other peoples, but not in the directions envisaged by Blok and Voloshin, and Briusov glorified Russia for this reason. He was enthusiastic about the unification of the Russian empire by the Bolsheviks; the empire's previous collapse had only increased its demonic messianic power in Briusov's eyes. He said in 1920: "The ancient space is once again closed up / Under a common banner."¹¹¹ This motif can be found in other poems by Briusov, but here it stresses unambiguously that

Russia's destiny is being worked out, not on earth, but by mystic forces for which October is part of the mystical plot:

Did you realize, did you feel
that the ancient Parcae were present
on the day of October baptism
like stars in the dawn?
Long threads, woven
from the days of Ivan Kalita
lost in the darkness of centuries,
were curled in the knot.²¹²

Therefore, if Christ is the invisible leader of the revolution in Blok's poem, in Briusov's poem the invisible leaders are the Parcae, the civilization that Briusov contrasted with Christianity. The poem deeply impressed Trotsky,²¹³ who was not yet aware that the Parcae, after having woven into the knot the threads of Ivan Kalita, would not find any place into which to weave Trotsky, discard his thread, and toss it away to distant Mexico.

Sectarian Nihilism—An Ally of Bolshevism

As we have seen, even before the revolution large peasant masses were dominated by religious nihilism, which had encouraged millions of Russian peasants to willingly support the Bolsheviks. In spite of their ostensible incompatibility, sectarian religious nihilism and Bolshevism shared some common ground. First and foremost, they attempted the destruction of the old world in order to replace it with a new world messianic center. One can only comment that the Bolsheviks can hardly have been aware of what kind of ally they had: Trotsky himself confirmed that sectarianism was an important source of Bolshevik support, quoting with favor an anonymous author who said, "I knew many peasants who accepted . . . the October Revolution as the direct realization of their religious hopes."²¹⁴

Emil Dillon, for many years the main Western spokesman of persecuted Russian religious communities, said later:

Among the various revolutionary agencies which were at work . . . the most unpretending, indirect, and effective were certain religious sectarians. . . . Coercion in religious matters did more to spread political disaffection than the most enterprising revolutionary propagandists. It turned the best spirits of the nation against the tripartite system of God, Tsar, and fatherland, and convinced even average people not only that there was no lifegiving principle in the State, but that no faculty of the individual or the nation had room left for unimpeded growth.²¹⁵

It is useful to note here that in speaking of sectarian support for the Bolsheviks, I am deliberately paying no attention to the Protestant fundamentalists, such as Baptists. This support is not discussed because such

groups were not representative of a Russian national trend, influenced as they were by foreign sources.

Sooner or later, such a community of interests as that between sectarian nihilism and Bolshevism had to be broken, which is what essentially happened. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that the Bolsheviks most probably would not have been able to take power or to consolidate it if the multimillion masses of Russian sectarians had not taken part in the total destruction brought about by the revolution, which acquired a mystical character for them. To them, the state and the church were receptacles for all kinds of evil, and their destruction and debasement were regarded as a mystic duty, exactly as it was with the Anabaptists, Bogomils, Cathars, and Taborites. The persecution of the Orthodox church must not be seen as the responsibility only of the Bolsheviks. It was also the manifestation of sectarian Russia's long-standing hatred of the church.

Bolsheviks who attempted to destroy old Russia systematically certainly enjoyed the deep sympathy of such sectarians, and any attempt to restore old Russia, especially via foreign intervention, was seen by the latter as a most harmful action that should be fought against with all the might at their command. Apart from this common ground, there was also some junction of various trends, including the radical right, that also had a sectarian dimension. A most typical representative of such a junction was a former leader of the religious radical right, Hieromonk Ilidor, who had become notorious during the 1905 revolution for his political extremism, religious fanaticism, and violent anti-Semitism.²¹⁶ His theological education (he was a graduate of the St. Petersburg ecclesiastical academy) did not prevent him from becoming an extreme religious nihilist under the influence of Marfa Medvensky (1872-1920), a "holy fool" from Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad) who, according to Ilidor, "passed a verdict of death on all external manifestations of religion, all sacraments, all ritual, all human institutions."²¹⁷ In 1912, Ilidor had repented before the Jews and the intelligentsia and given up his priesthood, and in 1914 he had escaped from Russia (incidentally, with the help of Gorky).²¹⁸ In 1917, he returned to Russia and cooperated with the Bolsheviks as an extreme religious nihilist. He was invited to be a Bolshevik propagandist among the Don Cossacks, but he rejected this proposal.²¹⁹ In 1919, he declared: "I am sympathetic toward the October revolution, since after the February revolution, the gentry, merchants, and industrialists remained, who drank the blood of the people."²²⁰ These words were a new version of his sermons before 1912 against the Jews and the ruling bureaucracy. In 1919, he returned to Tsaritsyn, where he enjoyed wide popular support. There he organized a mystic community, Eternal Peace and declared himself a Russian "pope" and "patriarch."²²¹ In 1922, he was expelled from Soviet Russia because of an interest in bridling the nihilist elements. He went to the United States and, once there, went from one Christian sect to another, including the Ku Klux Klan. In 1943, at the height of World War II, Ilidor demonstratively supported the USSR's struggle against Germany.²²² It was also suggested



Nikolai Kliuev (photo from N. Kliuev, *Sotchinienia*, vol. 2 [Munich: A. Neimanis Verlag, 1969], p. 320).

that Khlystovstvo had influenced the so-called Living Church in the twenties, which accepted the Soviet system as the accomplishment of Christianity.²²³

Russian sectarian nihilism spawned several outstanding poets and writers who naturally joined the Scythians: Nikolai Kliuev (1887-1937), Sergei Esenin (1895-1925), Sergei Klytchkov (Leshenkov, 1889-1940), and others. Nikolai Kliuev, brought up in the Khlysty sect, welcomed the Bolshevik revolution as the authentic Russian national-religious revolution. His biographers try to present Kliuev as a victim of the Soviet system, which he opposed. However, his personal tragedy and his bitter end cannot conceal the fact that he voluntarily welcomed the hurricane of destruction that heralded the Bolshevik revolution, which created, as he thought, the new Russia, the messianic hub of the universe. Only because of this revolution, Russia became the mother of the earth for Kliuev. At the end of 1917, he wrote:

We are the host of sunbearers.
 On the hub of the universe
 we will erect a hundred-story, fiery house.
 China and Europe, the North and the South
 Will come to the chamber in a round-dance of playmates

to match together Abyss and Zenith.

Their godfather is God Himself and their Mother is Russia.²²⁴

Kliuev saw the Bolshevik republic as no more than a temporary instrument of providence that makes Russia the messianic center of the universe. Under Russia's bleeding surface he discerned something different:

The republic is for the mind
 Mother Russia is for the heart. . . .
 The republic is for the mind
 Kitez-city is for the heart.²²⁵

It is evident that Kliuev, the typical gnostic, saw Mother Russia and Kitez behind the illusory events of the Civil War. Trotsky noticed Kliuev's duality, but could not understand its spiritual roots.²²⁶ Was it really possible for Trotsky to see the hosts of Basilides and Markion, the founders of ancient gnosticism, behind the bloody vortex of October?

Kliuev even saw Lenin as the popular leader and the materialization of the ancient Old Belief:

There is the spirit of Kerzhenets
 and the shout of the hegumen in his decrees
 as if he is looking for the roots of devastation
 in Pomor answers.²²⁷

Destruction and violence became a blessed mystical act for Kliuev, when it concerned the profanation of churches. He did not stop short of sacrilege: In "The Red killer is holier than a chalice,"²²⁸ he declared the holiness, not only of "ordinary" sin, but also of sacrilege.

Like all Russian sectarian nihilists, Kliuev was deeply disappointed in the Bolshevik revolution, and after much suffering, he died in exile. His hatred of the Russian Orthodox church did not weaken on the eve of his arrest in the 1930s, and in 1932, he even expressed his fear that collectivization would bring about the forcible domination of the official church over the Russian peasantry.²²⁹

Although Sergei Esenin originated from an Orthodox peasant family, his creative work and outlook were very close to Kliuev's, insofar as both poets were very close to each other, albeit in an ambivalent way.²³⁰ If Kliuev was a conscious sectarian-nihilist, Esenin hesitated between blasphemous theomachy and a pagan interpretation of Christianity. He represented those elements concealed in Russian peasants, even those who did not belong to any sect under the fragile shell of Orthodoxy, that very force through which religious nihilism swept so quickly over Russia. For this reason, Esenin might be legitimately regarded, like Kliuev, as being in the framework of Russian religious nihilism. Khodasevitch tried to reconstruct the early religious outlook of Esenin in the following way: The mission of the peasant is divine, he has his part in divine creativity. Esenin's world is trinitarian:



Sergei Esenin (photo from S. Esenin, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, vol. 2 [Moscow, 1970], p. 1).

God, the Father; Earth, the Mother; Harvest, the Son. Christianity was form rather than content to Esenin, who used sets of expressions such as Virgin: Earth, Cow, Peasant Russia; Christ: the Son of Heaven and Earth, Harvest, Calf, the Future Russia.²³¹

Like other Russian mystics, Esenin thirsted for the destruction of the old world and its replacement by a new one. He saw the Bolsheviks as natural allies and even tried to join the Bolshevik party, but he was not accepted. In 1918, he planned to declare a new religious trend, "aggelism," which meant demonism, together with Klytchkov.²³² He published a theomachical poem, "Inonia," in which he declared himself to be a prophet who would personally like to dethrone God and take His place. Esenin would, he said, "spit Christ out" and pluck God's beard. Although he cursed old Russia, he saw it as the source of renaissance. He warned the United States, to him the symbol of all non-Russian and rationalist sources, that it must not commit the mistake of "unbelief" and ignore the new "message" from Russia, as the way to the new life is only through Russia.²³³

Later, the theomachical motives in his poetry waned, but Russian messianism remained. Esenin appealed, for example, for a revolutionary march in Europe. Later, he was to regard the Bolsheviks as right-wingers;

he sympathized with the anarchists and was also very anti-Semitic, seeing the Jews as the evil genius of the Russian revolution.²³⁴

Supraorganical Solution

It was an open secret that one of the most important sources of the Bolsheviks' financial power was the secret subsidies they received from rich Russian merchants and industrialists. What were the motives of these rich men? Such support was, in fact, a widespread pattern in other countries as well, and there was a variety of motivations behind it, including personal perversity and anxiety regarding the future. One cannot generalize about the reasons for support of violent, radical movements that eventually turn on their wealthy patrons.

At any rate, Russia was the first country in which this situation occurred, and we can explain the motives of the Bolshevik supporters by political naiveté. As far as we can understand their motives, some were also nationalists, although they could not have foreseen all the implications of the radical revolution in Russia.

One of the first of the Russian tycoons to support the Bolsheviks was the very rich industrialist Savva Morozov (1862-1905). Gorky, who knew him well, had many conversations with him in which Morozov explained his sympathy for the Bolsheviks in the following way:

Even if we were to follow Europe in a ceremonial procession headed by a parliament, we would never be able to catch up. However, we might be able to do so if we made a revolutionary jump. I see Russia as a huge accumulation of potential energy, and it is high time to transform it into kinetic energy. We are talented. I feel our energy could revive Europe, cure its tiredness, its decrepitude. That is why I say that we desperately need a revolution that might bring all the masses to their feet."²³⁵

Several years after the 1905 revolution, Lenin received another proposal for support from rich Russian capitalists. In March 1914, he received a heavily coded letter from Skvortsov-Stepanov, who was in Russia. He reported to Lenin that for three and a half years he had been in contact with some very rich, liberal Russian industrialists, including Alexander Konovalov (1875-1948) and most certainly Pavel Riabushinsky (1871-1924), who was very close to Konovalov. Konovalov had told Skvortsov-Stepanov that his circles had "lost their hope for—let us say—an organical solution and they are saying more and more insistently that it is necessary to be ready for a 'nonorganical'—or let us say, 'supraorganical' solution." Lenin approved Skvortsov-Stepanov's negotiations, and as a result of them, he and Grigory Petrovsky went to Konovalov to obtain money for a party congress.²³⁶ No doubt, the rich Russian industrialists had probably the same motives as Morozov for encouraging radical revolution in Russia.

One must look at the kind of political philosophy they supported. In 1916, at the height of the war, they began to publish a very conspicuous

collection, *Problemy velikoi Rossii* [The Problems of Great Russia], the very title of which discloses its Russian nationalism. In October of that year, a very important article was published in the magazine. Its title was characteristic: "To the Problem of Russian Imperialism," and it was written by a young associate professor of Moscow University, Nikolai Ustrialov (1891-1938), a future founder of Russian National Bolshevism. Ustrialov professed faith in "Great Russia" which, however, was regarded by him as a huge multinational empire: According to him, the state is an organism that has soul and body, spiritual and physical qualities. He concurred with Hegel's definition of the state as an earthly God. Every state organism, he said, has a vocation to contribute to the historical life of humanity, to say its own word to the world. However, a great culture could appear only in a powerful state. Therefore, Ustrialov appealed, "Try to expand, be powerful, if you would like to be great." Moreover, according to him, "the foreign policy of Great Russia must be the policy of imperialism. Imperialism is the legitimate way of all great states. Russia must behave aggressively. The best people of Russia, such as Dostoevsky, appealed for the taking of Constantinople. With regard to the war, it is a trial of the peoples, it is a challenge against an established balance of power." It is very interesting that Ustrialov approved of Herzen's idea that the Russian people might use socialism as political ammunition for expansion. Was this idea an anticipation of a "supraorganical solution"?²³⁷

The editors stressed that they did not share all of Ustrialov's ideas, but two months later they published a new article in which he claimed that nationalism was the Eros of politics. Love for the homeland was a basic fact that did not need a rational explanation. There was no clear answer as to why one needed to wish for victory for the Russians and defeat for Germany. Nationalism was a flame that created a culture; nationalism was beyond ethics, an aesthetic category.²³⁸

In that same year, 1916, Ustrialov delivered a lecture on Russian Slavophiles to the Moscow religiophilosophical society (which confirmed his origin in authentic Russian religious philosophy). On that occasion, Ustrialov formally analyzed only the national doctrine of the Slavophiles, though essentially he was proposing his own interpretation of the nationality problem.

The strong influence of Danilevsky is detectable in the lecture. Following in his steps, Ustrialov claimed: "Nations are not eternal. They are born, grow older, and die as do individual personalities." Russia, according to him, was experiencing its springtime and had a world mission. Although this idea might seem trivial, it was a key to his later recognition of the Bolshevik revolution. It implied the consideration of a national defeat as a victory. "Ordeals of life," he said, "do not undermine one's belief in the world mission of the motherland but change one's view of the specific forms of its realization."²³⁹

Ustrialov was an active Cadet at that time, and at the end of 1917 he was elected chairman of a provincial Cadet party committee. However, unlike the majority of his party, he emphasized the need for firm, strong,

and united political action.²⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he still shared the general liberal enthusiasm. To him, the March revolution was the victory of truth over falsehood, good over evil.²⁴¹

In fact, the March revolution was already the supraorganical solution anticipated by Konovalov and Riabushinsky. But things went much further and brought the Bolshevik revolution. Half a year after that revolution, Riabushinsky managed to publish his daily *Utro Rossii* [The Morning of Russia] and then *Zaria Rossii* [The Dawn of Russia], in which Ustrialov became a leading columnist. (Some of his articles were published under the pseudonym P. Surmin.) It is very important to stress that *Utro Rossii* sharply criticized the Bolsheviks at that time, but merely on a foreign policy issue, which was the only watershed between them. On November 16, 1917, Ustrialov stressed that Bolshevik state power was only an illusion. He claimed that the revolution had been caused by hunger and was therefore neither political nor socialist. In another article (December 7), he expressed strong confidence that "Russia will survive the revolution." *Utro Rossii* always stressed that the Bolshevik revolution, regardless of its negative character, was an authentic Russian revolution that would dialectically bring Russia to new glory.

That was the central theme of all Ustrialov's articles at that time. On December 24, 1917, under the name of Surmin, he wrote that "through the negation of Russia we will only come to its strong assertion. A great holiday, solemn and great historical days, await us." The triumph of internationalism was only illusory, and the people who were crucified by history had not yet perished. The most important of Ustrialov's political statements appeared on the same day, the eve of Christmas, under his own name. It is the foundation of all his future National Bolshevism and is organically linked to the supraorganical solution of Riabushinsky and Konovalov.

Ustrialov stressed the deep national character of the Bolshevik revolution, saying:

The events we go through are organically linked with all the history of our liberation movement. They are authentic, they are national. They are part and parcel of our flesh, of our blood. All the Russian intelligentsia and all the Russian people are directly responsible for the current revolution. There is nothing accidental in what happened. Even if there is not now any Great Russia, it will revive, it will be resurrected. The sickness is undoubtedly very deep, but it is a sickness of a great organism. It is the greatest event of world history in spite of its nightmarish qualities.

Ustrialov stressed that the Bolsheviks were contemporary Slavophiles and that they had direct continuity from Herzen, Bakunin, and Tkatchev. Bolshevism emphasizes a different stress (not on Russia but on socialism), and it has a different framework, but they are elements of the same concepts, there is the same utopian spirit and the same self-confidence. Russia is the first country in the world to grasp socialism, and if this acceptance is

delirious, it is an old and authentic Russian delirium where Herzen meets (Slavophilism) and populism meets Marxism. Now this delirium has moved out from underground, from Bakunin's book written in French, from a London printing press, from Paris coffeehouses to the Winter Palace and to the Kremlin wall. Ustrialov stressed that Tkatchev's reliance on a revolutionary minority was a cornerstone of Bolshevism. "There is now genuine, authentic Russian revolution. There is a realization of a set of ideas, which might be wrong, might be false, might be savage, but were for a long time integrated into Russian national consciousness," Ustrialov said.

One can see how Ustrialov was already reconsidering his enthusiasm about the March revolution, which was also approved by Riabushinsky. Now Ustrialov regarded the March revolution as an amorphous, passive, feminine period of Russian history. "Now, vice-versa, we have acquired active power." Lenin, Trotsky, Krylenko are authentic members of the Russian intelligentsia. "Great Russia has died—glory to Great Russia!" exclaimed Ustrialov.

On February 21, Ustrialov said that German domination was more frightening than any Soviet power. "One can hate a red banner, but it is impossible to betray the national banner," he said. He was not jubilant at the prospective Bolshevik defeat. He said explicitly that the members of his circle were not happy since "the failure of their cause is not our victory. It brings Russia neither liberty, nor peace, nor happiness. . . . We would like to bless the slaying of the Bolsheviks, but only by Russian hands."

In the spring of 1918, Ustrialov launched the weekly *Nakanune* [On the eve] together with Yuri Kliutchnikov (1886–1938) and Yuri Potekhin (1888–1927?), young Cadets who had graduated from Moscow University—Kliutchnikov had also participated in *Problemy velikoi Rossii* in 1916.²⁴² *Nakanune* replaced *Utro Rossii*, which was closed in 1918 by the Bolshevik authorities, although it survived for a while as *Zaria Rossii*. *Nakanune* repeated all the basic ideas defended in Riabushinsky's newspaper and was probably supported by him financially. Ustrialov, for example, expressed his faith that "the revolutionary crisis will give rise to an unheard-of growth in the national organism and also an unheard-of blossoming of culture."²⁴³

When the Bolsheviks launched the period of terror in the summer of 1918, Ustrialov and his friends fled Moscow and joined the active military resistance against the Bolsheviks, but not for good. Riabushinsky and Konovalov emigrated to the West. Were they unhappy with the supraorganical solution? If so, they were inconsistent; their spokesmen were much more consistent.

Brest-Litovsk Debates

The trend to consolidate Russia vis-à-vis the West before the country's revolutionary advance was quickly strengthened in the aftermath of the October revolution. Soviet Russia appealed to all countries to conclude the

immediate peace agreement without annexations and contributions. Naturally, only Germany and its allies were benevolent enough to send a positive response. Germany wanted to dismember Russia in order to not give it any opportunity to rise again. The German ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Botho von Wedel (1862-?) wrote on February 10, 1918: "If Russia is reborn, our descendants will probably have to fight a second Punic war against Anglo-Russian coalition. . . . The further eastward our power extends, the better for us."²⁴⁴

The main Soviet negotiator, Trotsky, who was not aware of Lenin's secret intentions, decided to delay negotiations as much as possible, to make them a revolutionary demonstration in order to influence the Western proletariat. His tactics were very successful, and as early as January 1918 mass strikes took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary.²⁴⁵

The German and Austrian revolutions became more of a possibility. The Germans realized the dangerous implications of Trotsky's tactics and exerted pressure on the Bolshevik delegation. Then Trotsky took a dramatic, but reasonable, step: He left Brest-Litovsk, declaring the end of the war but without signing the humiliating peace agreements suggested by Germany.

Lenin was furious and demanded the immediate acceptance of German conditions, well aware of what he was doing. The German revolution, if it were to happen, could have been a mortal threat to him, since Russia had still not consolidated its power and was in fact defenseless against the revolutionary Wehrmacht. If any peace agreement could postpone this nightmarish German revolution, the Russian side must sign it immediately. A world revolution that would emanate from Moscow would be possible only after a period of consolidation of power. Not every revolution was valuable to Lenin: only one that proceeded from Moscow. We should not think that such anxiety is only a matter of current interpretation; it was verbalized in Soviet Russia at that time, although not publicly. The French liaison officer Pierre Pascal (1890-1983)—who joined the Bolshevik revolution, later worked in the Comintern, and then broke with the USSR to become a prominent historian of Russia—recorded in his fascinating diary on August 22, 1918, that a person whose name he did not provide had said: "I don't want the German revolution. It would be a great disaster." "Why?" "It would guarantee socialist hegemony for Germany."²⁴⁶

The SPD felt uncomfortable at the rapacious behavior of the German militarists, whom it so strongly supported.

When the terms of the proposed . . . Treaty were read in the Reichstag on February 28, . . . the [SPD] leader . . . Scheidemann delivered a speech . . . in which he said: "It is impossible to begin a debate on the political situation without bearing in mind Russia's great tragedy—a tragedy on the fifth act of which the curtain will probably fall shortly. The Chancellor has already told us of the acceptance by the Russian Government of the terms made by the German Government. It was not our intention—I am speaking quite candidly—it was not the intention of the [SPD] to bring about the present state of things in Russia. We fought to defend our Fatherland against Czarism; we

are still fighting against the Entente's policy of conquest, but we are not fighting for the partition of Russia any more than we are fighting for the suppression of Belgian independence. . . . We consider it necessary to say to all the world that the policy pursued toward Russia is no policy of ours. . . . If our policy has not been pursued in the East, if steps have been taken contrary to our advice, that according to our conviction do not conduce to the welfare of our people, Russian Bolshevism has largely contributed to this state of things. After Czarism's defeat in the field, Bolshevism completely disarmed Russia, and has, at any rate in its early stages, taken not the slightest interest in the preservation of the Russian Empire. It has actually played into the hands of dismemberment."²⁴⁷

It was too late. A more innocent USPD, made up of revisionists, appealed to the Bolshevik government not to sign any peace agreement with Germany, since doing so would inflict harm on the prospective German revolution. Kurt Eisner (1867-1919), a leader of the Bavarian revolution who was later assassinated, published an article on January 24 in Gorky's newspaper, under a pseudonym, saying:

The German officers are enthusiastic about these wonderful revolutionists. General Hoffmann, who conducted the preliminary armistice negotiations, laughingly tells how he cheerfully answered the Bolsheviks' long declarations of principles: "Pardon me, gentlemen, but how do your principles concern us?" Once the Bolsheviks not only sacrifice their principles, but at the same time create the impression that Prussian militarism went over to the side of their Social Democratic revolutionary principles under their pressure, once they act this way—it makes no difference whether they do it consciously or through folly—their role is identical with that of the German agents on whom Germany spends countless millions to spread among the people of Allied and neutral countries the ideas of pacifism, anti-militarism, anti-capitalism, and revolution.

In German military circles, the success of the negotiations with the Russians is openly interpreted as an indication that all the necessary parties were paid off. As far as we German Socialists are concerned, convinced as we are of the personal integrity of Lenin and Trotsky on the basis of our long associations with them, we stand before an insoluble riddle. Some of us ascribe this riddle to the purely "business considerations" of the Bolsheviks who originally used German money for their agitation and are now captives of their thoughtless step. The German Socialists are driven to such suppositions, because nobody in Germany can believe that the Bolsheviks are sincerely convinced of the revolutionary consistency of their tactics.²⁴⁸

One can imagine Lenin's reaction to the vain appeals. Later, Hilferding, who became a USPD leader, said:

Lenin signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in order to prolong the war between Germany and Austria on the one hand, and Great Britain and France on the other hand, and in order to secure peace for himself. He did it at the risk of bringing about a victory of the reactionary Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns over the western democracies, and against the opposition of Trotsky, who

fully realized the possibility that a German victory might result from the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The intervention of the United States, of American "capitalism," as the foolish "vulgar Marxists" used to say, intervention which could hardly be foreseen at that time, saved him from this danger. But Lenin may at that time still have counted on a world revolution after the war, and the most important thing to him was to gain time.²⁴⁹

On the other hand, Lenin met with almost general resistance within his own party, the absolute majority of which did not want to sign any agreement with Germany. First of all, in the view of the party activists, Lenin was betraying his own principles of the transformation of the war into a class war, for which the Bolsheviks were prepared. Then the Bolsheviks were afraid that the peace treaty would harm the German revolution. Apart from those problems, there was a general consensus that German imperialism endangered Russian national existence. And in any case, the majority of the Bolsheviks were not prepared for the embarrassing prospect of diplomatic relations with capitalist countries, which implied the future principle, "socialism in one country." Following the Brest-Litovsk controversy, one can see the full extent of Russian revolutionary nationalism from both sides. Furious debates flared up in the party. Contrary to what he had said only two or three months before, Lenin then claimed that the German revolution was not a matter of the current political reality, in spite of the mass strikes in Germany and Austria-Hungary and all the rumors of an imminent revolution. According to Lenin, it was a mistake "to declare, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, that the German revolution is *already mature* (although it obviously is not) and to base your tactics on it. There is not a grain of revolutionism in that, there is nothing in it but phrase-making."²⁵⁰ Lenin said that the German revolution would not be delayed for more than a few months.²⁵¹ Anyway, according to him, it was completely impossible to forecast such a revolution, and even if one could foresee a specific time, it would be unwise to rely on such speculation.²⁵² He threatened his party with the imminent advance of the German army and its possible occupation of Petrograd.²⁵³ Lenin's arguments, here too, were rejected by the Bolshevik majority.

Bukharin, who became a leading representative of the left wing of the party, remarked that by keeping their own republic, the Bolsheviks were losing their chance to bring about the international revolution: exactly the argument used by Trotsky in his debates with Stalin and Bukharin himself only six or seven years later. Bukharin also warned that the Entente countries were planning to make Russia their colony. Peace, according to Bukharin, would mean the death of revolution.²⁵⁴

Dzerzhinsky, who became the chief of the Tcheka, accused Lenin of overtly doing the same as those Bolsheviks who had tried to postpone the October revolution; according to Dzerzhinsky, Russia should be a model for the West.²⁵⁵ The left-wing Bolsheviks Georgy Oppokov (Lomov, 1888-1938) and Kollontai said that even if the Russian revolution were to be strangled, it would spark the Western revolution.²⁵⁶ The sharpest of Lenin's

critics, Moses Uritsky, a Jewish socialist who had recently joined the Bolsheviks together with Trotsky and who was assassinated on August 30, 1918, said that Lenin had committed the same mistake as before, namely, in regarding the Bolshevik revolution only from the Russian, not from the international, point of view. Uritsky accused the Bolsheviks of having forgotten the world revolution.²⁵⁷ However, Uritsky was not alone in making this clear-cut accusation. We cannot examine all the provincial publications of that time, but the accusation was repeated, for example, in the editorial of the Saratov Bolshevik newspaper. The leader of the Saratov Bolshevik organization, Mikhail Vasiliev-Yuzhin (1876-1937), sharply criticizing peace with Germany, said, "Lenin probably cast doubts on the inevitability of an imminent international revolution, and he wants to preserve a national socialist revolution."²⁵⁸

Riazanov, Kautsky's former informer against Lenin, demanded the kindling of the fire of the international revolution since only by relying on the European proletariat could the Bolsheviks lead the Russian peasant masses. Russia itself, Riazanov added, was a petty bourgeois country of peasants.²⁵⁹ Nikolai Osinsky (Obolensky, 1887-1938), who became one of the most consistent left-wing Bolsheviks, warned against a German colonization of Russia and demanded a complete break with Germany. The Germans, he said, had the perfect opportunity to crush the Russian revolution, as they had had to crush the Russian army during the days of the Provisional government. Why did they not do it? His (correct) explanation was that the Germans were simply waiting for Russia's internal decomposition, which they estimated the revolution would bring, and they wanted the Bolshevik government in Russia to regard them as a peace party.²⁶⁰

Osinsky was very shrewd. The Germans' intimidation of the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk was merely a bluff. As Osinsky explained it, the Bolshevik government was completely helpless, and the Wehrmacht could have done whatever it liked—but it would have been too dangerous a venture to start any German advance into the center of Russia as that would require an enormous army of occupation in that chaotic country and would also involve—with great speed—the revolutionizing of the German soldiers. Kühlman warned that "the entry into Petersburg would only awaken Russian nationalism and strengthen the revolution."²⁶¹ The historian who analyzed the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, John Wheeler-Bennet, came to the conclusion that the Germans "feared the effect on the internal condition of Germany if hostilities were resumed."²⁶²

It is not excluded that the Entente would have been pleased if Germany had begun such a suicidal move.²⁶³ On the other hand, Germany had no better partner within Russia at this particular moment than the Bolsheviks, at least until the end of the war. There were some German military commanders who were not informed by their government about the game that was being played with the Bolsheviks and who demanded to be allowed to crush them, but those commanders did not determine Germany's political actions.²⁶⁴

From German and Austrian sources one can see to what extent the German, and especially the Austrian, negotiators at Brest-Litovsk were afraid of a breakdown of those negotiations. The Austrian foreign minister, Ottokar Czernin (1872-1932), wrote on January 4, 1918, that "if the Russians do break off negotiations it will place us in a very unpleasant situation." On January 30, he wrote that "there is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a general convulsion." On February 11, he wrote about the "disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna."²⁶⁵ The extremely dangerous implications of Trotsky's position on German domestic affairs were stressed by Erich von Lüdendorff (1865-1937), the commander in chief of the German army; Trotsky's position, he said, revolutionized Germany.²⁶⁶

It is interesting that *Utro Rossii* and Ustrialov particularly supported Trotsky against Lenin. When Trotsky refused to sign the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, Ustrialov immediately changed his critical attitude toward the Bolsheviks. In an article published on January 21, 1918, he called the Bolsheviks patriots; on February 15, Ustrialov cited the confrontation between Trotsky and Kühlman as an example of the irreconcilability of Russia and Germany. He claimed that Trotsky's policy was the best way out of the situation the Bolsheviks were then in. "If the negotiations will be finished like this, the purity of the Bolshevik dogma will remain untouched," Ustrialov said. When the Bolsheviks eventually did sign the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Ustrialov was furious. He accused them of betraying their own ideals, and he stressed that only Trotsky had the right approach (February 22).

The bluff of the German advance into Russia was well understood by Tchitcherin, who replaced Trotsky after Brest-Litovsk as the people's commissar for foreign affairs. He explained later why the German army did not advance into Russia. "To occupy all Russia," he said, "to have instead of the Ukraine the immense space, with a popular partisan war, would have meant engaging too many of the German forces away from the Western front. . . . The Entente would have been happy if Germany would have occupied all of Soviet Russia, since it needed first of all to reduce German forces on the Western front."²⁶⁷

Lenin effectively used this bluff to intimidate his party. He and the Germans had the same goal: to do their best to prevent a German revolution, their common threat. One may stress again that the arguments used by the opposition against Lenin in 1918 were very close to those arguments used by Stalin's opposition some eight or nine years later. Therefore, the concept of socialism in one country was formulated, not in 1924, but in February-March 1918 during the debates on the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

Lenin was still playing a risky game. He had not foreseen that the Brest-Litovsk peace would influence President Woodrow Wilson to mobilize all U.S. resources to aid the Entente to defeat Germany. History worked in Lenin's favor. Lenin also used the bluff of the German advance in another far-reaching political act: in March 1918, he moved the Bolshevik capital from Petrograd to Moscow. As we have seen, Herzen had been the first to

suggest this move. Petrograd seemed to be the main power base of Bolshevism; why then did Lenin have to leave it? We shall see that he had several vital considerations.

Petrograd was an ocean of military anarchy and a paradise for criminals. It was good for the first destructive (Bakuninist) stage of revolution but very bad for any stable political system. Moving to Moscow meant putting an end to the Bakuninist stage: Moscow was a much quieter place. Then, too, Petrograd was the capital of the old empire and was therefore essentially alien to the new system, which had grown out of the Russian geopolitical confrontation with the West.

Petrograd was a symbol of German and foreign influence; Moscow was an authentic Russian city. It is not excluded that Lenin was following Herzen's blueprint and wanted to end, symbolically as well as practically, the Petersburg period of Russian history. Lenin could also have realized that through this step he could mobilize an immense amount of popular—and not only popular—support. By making the Kremlin, the former tsar's residence, the official seat, Lenin also demonstrated the Bolsheviks' Russian national continuity and legitimacy.

After the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed and Russia lost the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, Finland, and Byelorussia, Lenin overtly and explicitly formulated strictly Russian national goals: namely, the consolidation of Russian power:

The more clearly we understand this, the firmer, the more steeled and tempered will be our will to liberation, our aspiration to rise again from enslavement to independence, and our unbending determination to ensure that at any price Russia ceases to be wretched and impotent and becomes mighty and abundant in the full meaning of these words.

And mighty and abundant she can become, for, after all, we still have sufficient territory and natural wealth left to us to supply each and all, if not with abundant, at least with adequate means, of life. Our natural wealth, our manpower and the splendid impetus which the great revolution has given to the creative powers of the people are ample material to build a truly mighty and abundant Russia.²⁶⁸

At the same time, Lenin appealed to the Russians to learn from the Germans: "It so happens that it is the Germans who now personify, besides a brutal imperialism, the principle of discipline, organisation, harmonious co-operation on the basis of modern machine industry, and strict accounting and control."²⁶⁹

A former Menshevik who became a leader of the Petrograd Soviet after the March revolution and then editor in chief of *Izvestia*, a leading Soviet newspaper, Yuri Steklov, clearly hinted in his editorial on March 14, 1918, that the main goal of the Bolshevik revolution must be the consolidation of Russian state power. "Every people," he wrote, "must search and find in themselves the source of their own power and revival. We are deeply persuaded that the great, one-hundred-million-strong Russian people, who were liberated from a yoke that had lasted for an age, will find within

themselves enough internal resources in order to go along the path of reconstruction and strengthen their own power by quick and confident steps."²⁷⁰

Meanwhile, the Bolshevik leaders began to brandish purely nationalist slogans, stressing that they were the only force which could save Russian independence. When SR members suggested inviting Allied troops in order to secure Russian independence against the possibility of a German invasion, Zinoviev, who became the main Bolshevik leader after Lenin and Trotsky, vigorously protested. Addressing SR members in May 1918, he said that their "party, which had appealed for the defense of the motherland, now tries to involve Russia in a new war, it tries to invite to Russian territory alien troops, which are as hateful to us as any alien troops that might come to strangle us. I declare that we cannot help seeing this invitation as treason to our motherland."²⁷¹

A former Forwardist, Platon Kerzhentsev, who was to become a supporter of Stalin, waged a full-fledged chauvinist attack against the Allies. "No one of the fighting Allies," he said, "paid such a heavy tribute in people and territories as Russia. . . . All these countless sacrifices of the Russian people gave the possibility to the Allies, if not of advancing, then of maintaining the front in a stable position. . . . Without the participation of Russia on the side of the Allies, Germany would have ended the war very quickly."²⁷²

It is interesting to note how Kerzhentsev ignored the basic fact that the war had been declared first of all by Germany against Russia, which was then supported by France and England, and not vice versa. His statement was typical Russian nationalist propaganda. Kerzhentsev added that Russian heroic deeds were "immediately forgotten when the monarchy was overthrown, and Russia, exhausted by unbelievable sacrifices, had to refuse to continue the war." This remark was a most violent distortion since even in comparison to Lenin's official statement, Kerzhentsev completely ignored Russian imperialist endeavors during the war. He further claimed that the Allies "wanted from our fatherland only one thing: soldiers, soldiers, and soldiers."

The leader of the Caucasian Bolsheviks and chairman of the besieged Baku commune, Stepan Shaumian (1878-1919), said in July 1918: "Our party . . . struggles for Russia's freedom and independence," and on this premise, he rejected the Allied invitation to Baku. "We are confronted with the problem of whether Russia would be humiliated, partitioned, reduced, but all the same independent, or whether she would become a colony of England, France, with Germany fighting them on our territory. . . . The policy of the Allied invitation would put an end to Russian independence."²⁷³ Pokrovsky, then a left-wing Communist, violently attacked the Brest-Litovsk treaty; he would, however, later repent and rationalize the national implications of the treaty:

What was important in the Brest peace, which not everyone grasped at the time, was not so much the peace with the Germans as the rupture with the Entente. The bourgeoisie wailed that the peace was "indecent" and "despicable,"

but in fact the peace was leading Russia out of the most despicable condition that one can imagine for any country at all, in which a foreign ambassador becomes the uncrowned emperor of a country. An end was put to the Entente's yoke upon Russia, and this was most clearly expressed not so much by the fact that we concluded peace as by the fact that we refused to pay all, war and prewar, debts. We ceased to be "accomplices," or partners in capitalism and imperialism of whatever kind, and no one shall drive us again into that servile condition. If reaction meant war in 1917, reaction now means that a tribute in the hundred millions would be imposed on the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union. It is significant that the intelligent White-Guardists perceived long ago that the most difficult aspect of a "restoration" was precisely the question of debts.²⁷⁴

Lenin efficiently used the time given him by Brest-Litovsk for the consolidation of Russian state power. The new army was quickly created. All dissident press was forbidden, including Gorky's newspaper. However, very soon Gorky was once more reconciled with Lenin, after the unsuccessful SR attempt to assassinate the latter in August 1918; from that period until 1921, Gorky supported Lenin and openly preached revolutionary and even messianic Russian nationalism. Gorky explained later that he had realized only in August 1918 that the Bolsheviks were the sole rampart against the peasant elements.²⁷⁵ Most certainly Gorky regarded the Red Terror launched by the Bolsheviks in July and August 1918 as a guarantee against the mongolization of the country.

Moreover, in 1918 the Bolsheviks waged what was in fact the first selective genocide against the peasants—the massacre of the Don Cossacks. In a short period of time, almost 80,000 Don Cossacks—men, women, and children of all ages—were executed, which provoked civil war in this area. This period has been described by Mikhail Sholokhov (1905-1984) in his Nobel Prize-winning novel, *And Quiet Flows the Don*.²⁷⁶

The New Army

The buildup of military power was a sine qua non condition for the consolidation of the Bolshevik system. This process was one of the most important catalysts of the further nationalization of the system: The soldiers of the new army were peasants, but on the other hand, the old Russian officer corps was in strong evidence. As the people's commissar for defense after Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky was the chief Bolshevik agent in this process, and later, in exile, he indignantly rejected accusations that he had underestimated the peasant question, claiming that this was impossible since he had commanded the peasant army.²⁷⁷ He was also very flexible and favorable toward the former tsarist officer corps that served in the Red Army. Later, Radek claimed that one of Trotsky's most important talents was his ability to persuade people from the enemy camp who were forced to join the Bolsheviks that the Soviet state struggled for the welfare of the Russian people.²⁷⁸

Among the Russian officers and generals, there were liberals and even leftists. Some of them joined the Bolsheviks for ideological reasons, but the majority of the Russian officers were right-wingers who were simply forced to serve the Bolsheviks. They became an important source of National Bolshevism. Dozens of thousands of former officers served the Bolsheviks in this way, under the threat of death penalty for them or for their families.²⁷⁹

In addition, many Russian military commanders, including those who served in the Ministry of War, did not leave their positions after the Bolshevik revolution since they felt that the army should not be dependent on the country's political regime. According to Gen. Nikolai Potapov (1871-1946), a senior official of the Ministry of War who moved to the Bolshevik side immediately after the revolution, this ministry did not interrupt its activity at all.²⁸⁰ The minister of war in 1915-1916, Alexei Polivanov (1855-1920); the commander in chief of the army, Alexei Brusilov (1853-1926); Adm. Vasily Altfater (1883-1919); Gen. Alexander Svetchin (1878-1938); and many others quickly moved to the Bolshevik side. Several officers and generals were even executed by the Whites for serving in the Red Army.²⁸¹

Approximately half of the 130,000-strong Red Army officer corps was composed of former tsarist officers and generals. That the Russian army high command joined the Bolsheviks almost en bloc was openly recognized by a main anti-Bolshevik leader, the former foreign minister of the Provisional government and leader of the Cadet party, Pavel Miliukov (1859-1943). According to him, "the leaders of the army . . . after a few moments of hesitation, declared themselves on the side of the Bolsheviks. Of course, they were forced to do so out of fear of being killed by their soldiers. But at the same time they somehow felt satisfaction at seeing Kornilov's defeat avenged. . . . It was not the first time that the two extremes, the Red and the Black, came together and seemed to understand each other better than their opponents from the moderate center."²⁸²

However, regardless of the reason why those or other officers and generals joined the Bolsheviks, including even those who did so because of threats, an ideology had to appear that would justify their service, even only as a rationalization. In fact, the majority of them tried to interpret their service not only as a military but also as a national duty. Admiral Altfater told Radek in 1918: "I did not believe you. Now I will help you and will perform my duty as I did not do before being deeply convinced that I serve my motherland."²⁸³

It would be a grave mistake to think that all Russian military commanders who served the Bolsheviks did so either because of their own opportunism or because of crude Bolshevik pressure. The majority of them served honestly in the Red Army but did not identify with the Bolsheviks. It is difficult to prove now what their exact motivation was then, but some evidence can be produced. The well-known general Brusilov was a right-wing mystic, and even an occultist, who regarded communism as a temporary phenomenon that was alien to the outlook of the ordinary Russian people,



Alexei Brusilov (photo from the illustrated magazine *Niva* [Petrograd, 1917]).

although he recognized that Bolshevik propaganda suited the tastes and concepts of Russian soldiers and was not forced on them. According to Brusilov:

Internationalism, Communism, and suchlike ideas had no interest for them. All that they could take in was the idea of a free life on the following lines: Peace was to be declared at once and at any price; the richer classes, whatever their occupation might be, were to be deprived of all their property; the landed gentry and the upper classes in general were to be wiped out. Any hopes that ranged farther than this consisted in the belief that all authority of every kind would be abolished, and that no one would have to pay any more taxes; everyone would live as he liked, and there was nothing more to be said. It was all beautifully plain and straightforward.

As for Russia, no one thought, or cared for her.²⁸⁴

It sounds like a paradox, but for Brusilov, the Bolshevik revolution became a restoration of his power over rebellious soldiers. By reaccepting military obligations, Brusilov probably found revenge of some sort on soldiers who wanted to eradicate war.

Alexei Ignatiev (1877-1954), the son of a former Russian right-wing senior official, served in France as the chief Russian liaison officer. He moved to the Bolshevik side and later, after World War II, became a central public personality in the USSR. He wrote that he was always guided by his blind faith in the creative genius of the Russian people, who would "always be able to determine its own destiny."²⁸⁵

Some officers and generals who served the Whites also defected to the Bolsheviks. One important example was that of Gen. Yakov Slashchev (1885-1929), who was a chief military personality in the White government led by Baron Petr Wrangel (1878-1928) in the Crimea. Notorious for his cruelty against Jews and Communists, Slashchev started his secret negotiations with the Bolsheviks while he was in the Crimea. He promised that he, together with thirty other officers and generals, would defect to the Bolsheviks if Brusilov would be nominated as the commander in chief of the Red Army in the Crimea.²⁸⁶ Lenin and Trotsky immediately accepted this proposal, but meanwhile, Wrangel's army collapsed, and Slashchev fled from the Crimea to Constantinople. In November 1921, he returned to Russia and published an appeal to the remnants of Wrangel's army, which had escaped from Russia, in which he said that "the Soviet system is the only power which represents Russia and the people." The appeal warned the Whites that the West, which had sent them to fight the Bolsheviks, wanted to make "the Russian people its slaves."²⁸⁷ This appeal was signed by various generals and officers who had also returned to Russia.

The tragic story of Gen. Anatoly Pepeliaev (1891-1938) demonstrates that right-wingers from the Russian officer corps came to terms more easily with Bolshevism. Pepeliaev was famous as an extremely honest and courageous man. At the end of the Civil War, he was close to accepting the Bolsheviks and was secretly invited to become commander in chief of the Far Eastern Bolshevik army, but at the last moment he rejected this proposal because, sympathizing with the SR, he wanted a democratic army. The antidemocracy of the Red Army repelled him, and he emigrated to Harbin, where he became a cabdriver. Soon, falsely persuaded that there was a wide popular anti-Bolshevik uprising in Yakutia and that he was desperately needed there to command it, he and 700 fighters began a hopeless venture. In 1923 he was defeated and imprisoned. Pepeliaev sincerely repented before the "working-peasant" state, and his death sentence was commuted to imprisonment. He died in the purges.²⁸⁸

In 1919, a so-called military opposition emerged within the Bolshevik party, and it ostensibly tried to bridle the transformation of the Red Army into a modernized tsarist army with the old officer corps. Behind this accusation was also the fear that Trotsky might take advantage of his position as commander and undertake a Bonapartist coup d'etat, relying on the old officer corps, which was sympathetic toward him. It seems that these fears were shared by Lenin since they are cautiously mentioned by Trotsky himself in his memoirs²⁸⁹ and also by Angelica Balabanoff, who was for a short time a Communist International secretary.²⁹⁰

There was an interesting indirect attack against the alleged Trotsky-officer corps conspiracy, made by Sokolnikov when he attacked General Svetchin for his praise of Napoleon in a lecture at the general staff military academy. "When there is an intention to discredit the revolution," Sokolnikov said, "it seems natural to praise a general who reestablished order and discipline and thus saved the day. Which 'Russian Bonapart' did Svetchin have in mind?"²⁹¹ All of this fear and discussion did not prevent Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet historians from inventing a myth about the hostility of the old officer corps against Trotsky.²⁹²

War Communism—Communism in One Country

In order to cope with Bolshevik ambitions for Russia to be the new world revolutionary center, not only a spark for others, Lenin launched a large-scale public relations campaign in 1918 that presented the new Soviet system as full-fledged socialism. Recognition of this fact was very important, since socialist Russia would have moral rights in that case to lead the world revolution in the capitalist and "retarded" West.

Stanley Page has suggested that the so-called Soviet War Communism, which abolished money and resorted to the centralized distribution of food and other commodities, was politically motivated²⁹³ and not, as the majority of scholars of Soviet history have suggested, the only expedient in the existing economic situation. The claim of the latter ignores overwhelming evidence that is completely contradictory, including the evidence of official Soviet statements.

Roger Pethybridge stressed that War Communism, as it misleadingly became to be called after it was over, was stopped, not because it was a measure intended for wartime purposes only, but because Bolshevik sovereignty was at stake.²⁹⁴ Jonathan Frankel also stressed that Lenin "clearly dreamt that Russia could take a direct road to socialism,"²⁹⁵ and Paul Roberts leveled devastating criticism at those people who reject the ideological character of War Communism.²⁹⁶ An article was published in 1928 in the official *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in which the author, a disciple of Bukharin, Alexander Aikhenvald (1905-1939), said:

It would be a mistake to see in "War Communism" only a mobilization conditioned by the military situation. The working classes, trying to adapt the economy to the demands of the Civil War, building up the war Communism system, tried at the same time to lay the foundations of further socialist construction. At the time, this side of War Communism was greatly overestimated. All the principal measures of War Communism were regarded not only as a means of guaranteeing final victory, . . . but they were regarded as direct socialist reconstruction. . . . The accomplished War Communism system was regarded as the authentic socialist economic organization.²⁹⁷

Lenin himself repeatedly stressed that he did not regard the social system implemented at that time as an expediency. One of the most conspicuous

FIGURE 3.1

<p>Unfortunately, there is almost no centralisation.</p>	<p>What we have is not yet communism,* but state capitalism, with inequality of remuneration including piecework payment, with forms of compulsion, sometimes reproducing the old regime, with centralised management even of production and a restricted factory self-administration. We have a Red Army of state capitalism with an apparatus of very strong compulsion, and not an army of communism. . . .</p>	<p>This is not a sign of capitalism.</p>
<p>This is altogether wrong. ???</p>		<p>This is due to the forms of struggle of the enemy and the level of culture and not due to capitalism.</p>

*I don't think so. We have the struggle of the first stage of the transition to communism with peasants and capitalist attempts to defend (or to revive) commodity production.

Lenin²⁹⁸

acknowledgments of this view was his remarks on a letter from Tchitcherin dated October 12, 1919 (Fig. 3.1). His remarks are written in the margins and below.

When this principal area of War Communism is disregarded, an extremely important political aspect of Soviet history is distorted and obscured; indeed, if one accepts that War Communism was not a temporary expedient, one must see that essentially, the Soviet system in 1918–1921 practiced not only socialism in one country, but *communism in one country*, and if Trotsky himself did not want to recognize this basic fact, it speaks only of his lack of intellectual integrity.

Nevertheless, it seems that War Communism was not only ideologically but also politically motivated. Until the end of 1920, Lenin still believed that Soviet Russia had enough power to start its revolutionary advance, and he therefore badly needed to present his completely disorganized country, in which the working class had virtually disappeared, as a model country with the most advanced society and economy and the moral right to lead the world.²⁹⁹

The Long-awaited German Revolution

The Brest-Litovsk treaty was only the first German step toward the ultimate solution of the Russian problem. Indeed, in July 1918, Wilhelm II suggested to Petr Krasnov (1869-1947), the Germanophile Don Cossack leader who later accused the Bolsheviks and the Jews of treachery, that Russia be divided into four independent states: the Ukraine, a southeastern state, Central Russia, and Siberia.³⁰⁰

Meanwhile, the Germans preferred the Bolshevik regime, as we have seen, over any other political alternative. When the German ambassador to Moscow, Wilhelm von Mirbach (1871-1918), was assassinated in July 1918 by a left-wing SR party member, Lüdendorff again suggested the overthrow of the Bolshevik government. Adm. Paul von Hintze (1864-1941), at that time the German foreign minister, opposed this suggestion: "Any other government," he said in a secret memorandum dated August 6, 1918, "is either immediately or within a short time a friend and ally of the Entente. . . . We have no reason to wish or to provoke a rapid end of the Bolshevik regime."³⁰¹

However, the U.S. decision to mobilize all its resources against Germany ruined these plans, and Germany was defeated. In November 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary collapsed, the SPD came to power, and Austria-Hungary passed away as an empire. This revolution in defeated Germany was not a threat for Russia and the Bolsheviks, who had meanwhile well consolidated their power. Lenin enjoyed his triumph. The Brest-Litovsk treaty was annulled, and his political genius was reaffirmed.

There were several naive Soviet attempts to take advantage of the German defeat. Even at the beginning of October 1918, Trotsky suggested Russian military intervention in Germany. Anticipating the German revolution, Trotsky said, "If the German proletariat would make an attempt to advance, it would be the basic duty for Soviet Russia to abandon national boundaries in the revolutionary struggle."³⁰² Moscow, immediately after the armistice between Germany and the Entente countries, urged a USPD leader, Hugo Haase, to continue German military resistance on the Russian side.³⁰³ Scheidemann said in his memoirs that Moscow also suggested that the SPD establish a German Soviet republic under Russian protection, a suggestion that was categorically rejected by the SPD. "The Bolsheviks are only waiting," Scheidemann said, "for the moment when they can proclaim the German Soviet Union as a branch establishment of Bolshevik Russia." He continued: "There was certainly more to destroy in our midst than in Russia, for what was the trifling amount of Russian trade and commerce compared with our highly developed German industries? Germany, a land of education for centuries—Russia, a land of millions of illiterates. No, no, we declined with our best thanks the solution of our war troubles by Bolshevik horrors."³⁰⁴

The Bolshevik Latvian corps waited on the frontier of eastern Prussia for a possible advance into Germany, but the latter had enough military power to resist such a small-scale invasion, and it did not materialize.³⁰⁵ The Entente realized the danger. The role of the SPD government "as a factor of stability in the heart of Europe induced the Allies to allow Germany to keep her troops in the East on guard against a Red revolution until replaced by Allied forces."³⁰⁶

Several months after the November German revolution, Trotsky said publicly in March 1919 that "the thought of a possible Red Army invasion into eastern Prussia is a nightmare that causes sleepless nights to Mr. Ebert and Mr. Scheidemann." Although Trotsky claimed that "we are not thinking about it," he warned that "if . . . our Western brothers ask us to come to their aid, we will answer. . . . We are here, in the meantime we have learned to use arms, we are ready to struggle and die for the world revolution."³⁰⁷ Zinoviev predicted that this opportunity would come within the following several months.³⁰⁸

Lenin had written off the SPD as either an ally or a client, but he had another dangerous rival in Germany: The former SPD left wing had created its own Communist party (KPD) at the end of 1918, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and this group had no intention of regarding Lenin as its leader.³⁰⁹ The KPD was a minor force and had no hope for political success at that time; it was still, however, a serious obstacle for Lenin because of Rosa Luxemburg's charisma as a theoretician among Western radicals.

Lenin could not ignore the KPD and its leaders. Luxemburg welcomed the Bolshevik revolution and criticized the SPD, but at the same time she also criticized the Bolsheviks for their suppression of democracy and for their evident nationalism. Paradoxically, she attacked the Bolsheviks for permitting the former Russian empire to be dismembered because of their nationalist slogan of self-determination. According to Luxemburg, "liberated" nations become the mortal enemies of revolution. Nationalism as encouraged by the Bolsheviks, it followed, divided the proletariat and betrayed it to the bourgeoisie.³¹⁰ She did not understand Lenin's real motivation when he advanced his thesis of self-determination, but she did understand that for some reason he most certainly did support nationalism. Her staunch rejection of self-determination and any national boundary by potential leaders of the radical German revolution was very dangerous for the future of Bolshevik Russia.

Lenin was eager to launch his own International, but the very existence of independent German Bolsheviks was a serious obstacle. Neither Karl Liebknecht nor Rosa Luxemburg wanted a new International since they were afraid that if one were formed, it would be entirely under Russian domination. Their program, adopted in January of 1919, did not mention the Bolsheviks.³¹¹

Soon, however, both of them perished as a result of what seems to have been a deliberate provocation. The KPD was involved in a hopeless uprising,

which Luxemburg herself regarded as having been provoked by the German government.³¹² She failed to realize that there was another beneficiary of this uprising: Lenin.

Lenin's emissary Karl Radek, who became his main political agent in Germany, was then in Berlin and appealed to the KPD for a revolution, promising Russian support. The KPD leaders "chose to interpret Radek's speech as a call to arms."³¹³ When the hopeless uprising started, Radek, from his asylum, appealed for moderation, but it was too late. The uprising was decisively suppressed by the SPD; both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were discovered in their secret sanctuaries and were assassinated by the military.³¹⁴ Radek was not found for several months, and when he was, he not only was not killed but was sent to a luxurious imprisonment, which turned out to be a political salon.

Warren Lerner, Radek's biographer, noted: "Lenin could not have failed to realize that her [Luxemburg's] death had removed a major obstacle to his plans. Luxemburg's very existence had threatened Lenin's International. . . . Her death enabled Lenin to assume unchallenged leadership of the movement for an International."³¹⁵ A short time after her death, the mock founding session of the Communist International in Petrograd was summoned by Lenin.

Red Patriotism

Under the influence of Soviet Russia's geopolitical situation, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and under the influence of the national Russian environment, which dominated the country, the Bolshevik party, in trying to adapt itself to the new situation, had to accelerate the statist nationalization that had been implicit to Bolshevism for such a long time. The Bolsheviks badly needed to secure wide popular support, which they did not have, though they could not and did not intend to waive Marxism as their official legitimization for being world revolutionary leaders.

In the outlook of the majority of the Bolshevik party, revolutionary goals such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the anti-imperialist struggle, and the world revolution were automatically linked to the unquestionable hegemony of Soviet Russia, though there was a certain segment of the Bolsheviks who strove only for the world revolution as such, regardless of its leadership. As a result, Red Patriotism emerged, and it is ironic that Marxism as such also encouraged it. Indeed, Marxism unwittingly localized capitalism geographically as existing in only several European countries and the United States. Therefore, if Russia was already liberated from capitalism, it was set off against the West as a seat of universal evil, and capitalism thus became the manifestation of Western civilization. In fighting capitalism, Soviet Russia fought the West.

Red Patriotism soon became a very familiar, acknowledged phenomenon, unconsciously drawing its inspiration from those ideas of old Russian socialism that contrasted Russia with the soulless, capitalistic Western civilization.

Red Patriotism was also subject to the influence of various fellow travelers of the Bolshevik revolution. The extraordinary power of this phenomenon was that it permitted many Bolsheviks to identify themselves not only with the party and Communist ideology, and not only with the working class (which became a political fiction during the Civil War), but with the Russian state.

In 1945, a Columbia professor, the former Zionist leader Max Laserson (1887-1951), gave almost sensational emphasis to a 1943 official speech of Alexander Shcherbakov (1901-1945) in which he had claimed that the Bolshevik revolution had saved Russia from the loss of its independence.³¹⁶ Laserson regarded this speech as a turning point in the nationalist transformation of the USSR, overlooking the fact that Lenin himself had said for the first time in November 1918 in *Pravda* that the Bolshevik revolution was a Russian revolt against foreign imperialism. It was an entirely new political concept, at that time.

Patriotism is one of the most deeply ingrained sentiments, inculcated by the existence of separate fatherlands for hundreds and thousands of years. One of the most pronounced, one might say exceptional, difficulties of our proletarian revolution is that it was obliged to pass through a phase of extreme departure from patriotism, the phase of the Brest-Litovsk Peace. The bitterness, resentment, and violent indignation provoked by this peace were easy to understand and it goes without saying that we Marxists could expect only the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to appreciate the truth that we were making and were obliged to make great national sacrifices for the sake of the supreme interests of the world proletarian revolution. . . .

The facts of world history demonstrated to the Russian patriots, who formerly would hear of nothing that was not to the direct advantage (as formerly understood) of their country, that the transformation of our Russian revolution into a socialist revolution was not a dubious venture but a necessity, for there was no other alternative: Anglo-French and American imperialism will inevitably destroy the independence and freedom of Russia if the world socialist revolution, world Bolshevism, does not triumph.³¹⁷

Lenin's statement was a full-fledged declaration of militant Russian revolutionary nationalism, with a new accent. From then on, the main enemy of Russia would be Anglo-French and U.S. imperialism, and the world revolution would be the only escape from this danger. The concept was an expansion of the old Bakuninist slogan: The world revolution is the only way to maintain Russian independence vis-à-vis Germany. Implicit is the fact that Russian independence might now only be achieved through Russian world domination under a revolutionary disguise.

Lenin suggested two different goals. First, the consolidation of power was an immediate task: "The revolution showed that revolts against imperialism are inevitable. And now our "Allies" have proved to be the chief enemies of Russian freedom and independence. Russia cannot and will not be independent unless Soviet power is consolidated."³¹⁸ Second, preparation for Russian revolutionary expansion was the next task:

The Russian workers will understand that very soon they will have to make the greatest sacrifices in the cause of internationalism. The time is approaching when circumstances may require us to come to the aid of the German people, who are struggling for their liberation from their own imperialism, against British and French imperialism.³¹⁹

Stalin echoed Lenin's appeal in December of 1918 in pure Russian tradition, as if it had been formulated by Dostoevsky or Danilevsky: "*Ex Oriente lux!* The West, with its imperialist cannibals, has become a breeding ground of darkness and slavery. The task is to destroy this breeding ground, to the joy and comfort of the working people of all countries."³²⁰ A year later he repeated Lenin's thesis:

The Soviet Government is the only popular and only national government, in the best sense of the words, because it brings with it not only the emancipation of the working people from capitalism, but also the emancipation of the whole of Russia from the yoke of world imperialism, the conversion of Russia from a colony into an independent and free country.³²¹

Stalin also stressed the purely national base of power of the Bolshevik regime:

As the civil war developed, the areas of revolution and counter-revolution became sharply defined. Inner Russia, with its industrial and cultural and political centres, Moscow and Petrograd and with its nationally homogeneous population, principally Russian, became the base of the revolution. The border regions of Russia, however, chiefly the southern and eastern border regions, which have no major industrial or cultural and political centres, and whose inhabitants are nationally heterogeneous to a high degree . . . became the base of counter-revolution.³²²

Many Bolshevik leaders made similar statements. Kalinin, the new Soviet president, said in June 1919 that the Soviet government was the only genuine national government. Later he remarked that those people "who think that the government that would replace Soviet power would keep Russian national policy are terribly mistaken. There is not, and cannot be, such a Russian government."³²³ In his turn, Zinoviev said: "Now that Russia has become, not the stepmother, but the mother of Russian workers and peasants, we have the right to speak of the motherland. However, who now crucifies and trades the motherland? Who sells it to Englishmen, Frenchmen, Japanese, Turks, Chinese, and any other buyer?"³²⁴

The "crucifiers" were obviously the people who resisted the Bolsheviks. Interestingly, Zinoviev was one of the first, if not the first, of the Soviet leaders to advance the slogan of the "rotting West." Returning in 1920 from Germany, he said: "When one listens to conversations of merchants and speculators in railway carriages, one hears only talk about profits, 'business.' When one looks at the bourgeoisie, at the women, one sees how stupid, trivial, banal, humiliating all this is for human decency." In another

report of his trip to Germany, Zinoviev stressed this point even more. "One can think involuntarily—how good that these times have already passed for our country."³²⁵ Later, Zinoviev attacked victorious Russia nationalism, forgetting that he was one of the Soviet leaders who had legitimized it in the new system.

Tchitcherin recalled old Western forecasts that the first genuine revolution, which would revive all the world, "would come from our young, fresh people, from half-ruined peasant huts." According to Tchitcherin, "this revolution, which will revive the decrepit [Western] world, has already started."³²⁶ In 1922, he said that "the October revolution was not only the deposition of our ruling classes but in the last resort an uprising against the world capitalist domination. The struggle against counterrevolution after that was essentially the defense of the independence of our working-peasant economical entity against the same advancing world capital."³²⁷

As has been mentioned, Lunatcharsky became one of the main spokesmen of Russian nationalism, warning the Soviet leaders that ignoring the national problem would mean the Bolsheviks "could find themselves in the situation of a band of conquerors in a foreign country."³²⁸ In 1921, he referred to Dostoevsky as a national prophet. "Dostoevsky," he said, "forecast a bright future for Russia, and now it has materialized. Russia contributes to human history pages of extraordinary brightness, unsurpassed anywhere."³²⁹ That was not a thoughtless statement. In 1931, Lunatcharsky, discussing Dostoevsky's mystical belief in the Russian vocation, said: "The former Russia, the USSR, fulfills the role of liberator of all humanity—of the Western proletariat and of the colonial slaves of the East. It happened not by chance, but different from Dostoevsky's prophecy, in a completely different way."³³⁰

Lunatcharsky quite definitely broke Lenin's and Gorky's tradition of looking down on Russian national character. When Lenin was already ill, Lunatcharsky publicly contested the view that Russians were less active than other people, especially Americans. Ostensibly presenting this as the view of former Forwardists, Lunatcharsky claimed that the national character of capitalist nations, especially the United States, irreversibly changed under the negative influence of a mechanized civilization. This claim was also an implicit contradiction of Marxism as such, which appealed for the achievement such a civilization as an ideal. "To control a machine," Lunatcharsky said,

not adapting to it, not being in time with it, not becoming its living, thinking part, is impossible. But this mechanization of man went further than necessary. It has eradicated living values from man, values such as idealism and that feeling of solidarity that Marx and Engels hold, in spite of all their sober rationalism, in such high esteem. Yes, an American is highly efficient, highly expedient, and a Russian by comparison seems to be friable and awkward. But at the same time, an American doesn't have time to think profoundly about his life—individual and social. . . . As soon as this or that American moves from defense against poverty into an attack, a persistent thirst develops within him to increase the sum of dollars that belongs to him, not only in order to raise his standard of living but also in order to raise his social status.³³¹

Thus, according to Lunatcharsky, the soul of an American is an "industrial-commercial" soul, to which he opposed the more profound, elementary Russian soul. In his view, "the Russian working class was able, bleeding and offering enormous sacrifices, to rise from the depths of autocracy and barbarism to the position of the avant-garde of humanity, in spite of all its awkwardnesses, which however were . . . recompensed by barbarian freshness [Scythians!] and by the ability to be captivated by grand slogans—in other words, by its inclination toward active realistic idealism." In 1926, Lunatcharsky went further and called the American civilization empty and disgusting.³³² That was his response to the appeal that Russia should become a new United States minus capitalism.

Pokrovsky declared Russia to be the most revolutionary country in the world:

In reality, Russia, starting from the sixteenth century, was in all likelihood the most disturbed, the most revolutionary country in Europe. From the middle of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century, all Russian governments were living on a volcano. At every moment, beneath their feet, an abyss filled with boiling lava was about to open up. This abyss did open many times, and it was not merely autocratic government which fell into it.³³³

Moreover, Russia was more progressive, for example, than France:

In 1909 the proletariat from large industry in Paris was smaller in number than in Moscow. In Moscow there were 130,000; in Paris 108,000 or 110,000 workers employed in large-scale enterprises, while the population of Moscow then was 1.3 million, whereas in Paris it was 2.8 million. Thus, in Paris, in comparison with Moscow, the large-scale industrial proletariat was very insignificant. Paris was above all a production center for all kinds of luxury goods, women's dresses, all sorts of finery, bijouterie, etc., and all of these were concentrated in small shops that one can hardly call large-scale industrial enterprises. The overwhelming majority of Parisian proletarians were *handicraft workers*; Paris was the most important commercial center of France, one of the greatest on the whole continent of Western Europe, with the biggest banks and so on; and even though bank clerks are of course proletarians in a way, nevertheless they are not like our metalworkers or textile workers; it was a proletariat which stood very close to the petty bourgeoisie. That is why Paris was a much more backward center than Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1905.³³⁴

Russian workers were not egoistic in comparison to their Western counterparts, Pokrovsky said:

The Russian worker was completely uninterested in the victory of native imperialism. The fate of the Russian worker did not in the least depend on whether "we" would take the Dardanelles or not. But the German or English nonsocialist worker (and nonsocialists formed a majority of the working masses

there) tied his own fate to the victory of "his" side, and he was perfectly right from the narrow "stomach" point of view.¹³⁵

The Bolshevik revolution brought Russia national independence:

During the course of the war dependence on the Entente became a yoke. The English ambassador in St. Petersburg was the second emperor, and when the first emperor failed to obey him, the second took measures to dethrone the first. And if he failed to execute these measures, it was entirely due to "absolutely unforeseen events"—the entry of the working class onto the stage.¹³⁶

The new Russia became the genuine world center:

The revolution which began on the streets of St. Petersburg in January, 1905, now occupies in the world's view approximately that position which the French Revolution occupied in the view of Europe alone in the first years of the nineteenth century. That was considered a world event at the time, and all progressive Europe hurried to pay homage to Paris. Today Moscow has become such a Mecca for nations.¹³⁷

Krasin, a former leading Forwardist and now the people's commissar for external commerce, stressed that the Soviet state would never agree to any reduction of Russian territory. He also boasted that only after the revolution was Russian foreign trade no longer controlled by foreigners.¹³⁸

Larisa Reisner (1895-1926), the brilliant young and intellectual wife of Fedor Raskolnikov (1892-1939), a deputy people's commissar for the navy, followed him during the Civil War. She wrote one of the first essays on the Civil War, which was published as early as 1921 and enthusiastically received by critics, including Trotsky. Her description leaves no doubt that her circle regarded the Bolshevik revolution and the Civil War as purely Russian affairs. She thought only in Russian national terms and used expressions such as "the great Russian revolution"; "Russia is recovering and gathering herself together"; "Russia, for which he [a naval captain] is fighting and will fight to the end"; and "Russia is going to fight in the South."¹³⁹ She never used any term that might betray her, or her husband's, internationalism.

A wave of Red Patriotism also flooded the so-called Proletcult led by Bogdanov. Alexei Kraisky (1891-1941), a Proletcult poet, wrote:

When the country where I was born, blind,
had overthrown all mercenary order
I fell in love with her.

Another Proletcult poet, Yakov Berdnikov (1889-1940), appealed to Russia in 1918:

Is it not you, my dear Rus!

who has lit the eternal beacon?

Vladimir Kirillov (1890-1943) was thoroughly messianic:

You, the renovated Russia,
enter into the world contest
as the sun-faced God-Messiah
with the proudly-raised head. . . .
All the oppressed world looks
at the blazing Orient
and makes a garland
for you, Russia, with bright faith.³⁴⁰

It can now be understood why Trotsky became a main proponent of Red Patriotism. He had joined the Bolshevik party only on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, having no personal base of power. The old Bolsheviks hated him as a parvenu who illicitly took the second place in the party and in the state after Lenin. Trotsky therefore badly needed to widen his personal power; the army could have seemed to him to be an appropriate area in which to do so—a fact that was well understood by his adversaries in the party. On the other hand, as head of the army, Trotsky was objectively interested in the efficient use of former tsarist officers, and he could not see a better means of integrating them than Russian etatist nationalism. Besides, his attitude to Russian nationalism was conditioned by the narrow political base of the new regime and by the pressure of the Russian national environment, which was sensed first of all by marginal groups in the party.

In April 1919, Trotsky said, for example: "It seemed to our jubilant enemies that the revolutionary Russia is a political corpse that will be used as a fertilizer on the field of an alien culture, an alien civilization, that the Russian revolutionary people will not have an independent future."³⁴¹ In the framework of his Russian appeal, Trotsky went even further and advanced a new concept of the Russian national character that did not, on the one hand, contradict that of Lenin but differed from that of Lunatcharsky. Trotsky claimed that the new Russian national character was being forged during the revolution.³⁴² He tried to reconcile this concept with Marxism—which Lunatcharsky had not attempted. "Dynamically," Trotsky said, "the national and class elements coincide,"³⁴³ which meant that at least during the revolution, the only bearer of Russian nationality was the working class. On the other hand, Trotsky recognised that the revolution came from national elements, although he did not say that this point was in fact vital, since the revolution was national. "The October revolution is profoundly national," Trotsky declared, "but it is not only a national element—it is a national academy."³⁴⁴ That meant that the Russian national character would change during the revolution, as I noted earlier. At any rate, Trotsky had no doubt that there were processes in the revolution that had a common denominator with nationalism. "Bolshevism is more



Lev Trotsky (photo from A. Moorhead, *The Russian Revolution* [New York: Harper and Row, 1958], p. 112).

national than the monarchist and other émigrés, and Buddeny is more national than Wrangel."³⁴⁵

Soviet leaders such as Kalinin and Pokrovsky had already compared Lenin with Peter the Great, making of the former a Russian national hero.³⁴⁶ Trotsky also implied this comparison, regarding Peter the Great as the Russian leader who anticipated Bolshevism. "The barbarian Peter," he said, "was more national than the whole bearded and over-decorated past which opposed him."³⁴⁷

Red Patriotism, as noted, was not expressed only by Russians, attracting to no lesser an extent Russified representatives of national minorities that had lost their links with their national milieu. Former aliens who suddenly became leaders of the country could easily compensate for their lack of confidence via Red Patriotism, which made their activity national and even promoted Russia's greatness, and liberated them from accusations of persecuting Russians and thus attempting to destroy Russia. Red Patriotism for them turned out to be a compromise that permitted them to remain in power. Many Letts, Jews, Georgians, and Armenians found themselves in this situation, for example, such prominent Caucasian Bolshevik leaders as Grigory Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937), Avel Ehlukidze (1877-1937), Anastas

Mikolan (1895-1978), Levon Karakhan (1889-1937), Alexander Miasnikov (Miasnikian, 1886-1925), and many others.

It was the Georgian Stalin who led Soviet nationality policies after 1917; he was the main spirit behind the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922. Stalin encouraged the suppression of all national separatism, beginning with his native Georgia. It was Stalin who would accept National Bolshevism as an ideology and would embody it, and not by chance. Internationalism as a principle, in spite of all deviations from it, was strong enough in the party that any attempt to violate it as a principle in order to declare Russian nationalism in any form, also as a principle and not as a tactic, would meet with strong opposition. As a Georgian, Stalin could not arouse such suspicions, and he succeeded in achieving things that were unachievable by a Russian leader.

The key role of minorities in national movements of great nations may be often observed. Many nationalist movements have been led by people who did not belong to the national group they identified with. For example, the leader of Romanian fascism was a half-Pole, Corneliu Codreanu (1899-1938), and the leader of Hungarian fascists was an Armenian, Ferenc Szalasi (1897-1946).³⁴⁸ Assimilated aliens often identify themselves with local nationalism in their search for some universalism that will make up for their minority status. In addition, such assimilated elements, by virtue of their origin, have a high level of social mobility that allows them to occupy a dominant position in a more inert dominant population.

What is very interesting is that Gorky also joined this Red Patriotism fervor, completely reversing his former negative attitude toward Russian revolutionary messianism. Indeed, in November 1918, he said: "Almost every people at different times have regarded themselves as a messiah destined to save the world, to revive its best forces for life and activity. Now history has likely entrusted this great role to the Russian people."³⁴⁹ Gorky repeated the old arguments of Herzen and Bakunin: "We Russians are the nation that is regarded legitimately as culturally backward. We are the nation without traditions and because of that, more daring, more rebellious, less bound by the influence of the past—we are the first to enter on the road of decisive destruction of the outlived conditions of the capitalist state."³⁵⁰

He repeated these remarks in a speech on May 1, 1919, expressing his confidence that "the Russian people will fulfill properly and powerfully the role that it took upon itself—to liberate the world from the rusted chains of the past."³⁵¹ Several months later Gorky said about the Russian people as saviors of the world, "It is quite evident that a comical dream of the Russian alienated intelligentsia about the people as world savior has suddenly become real."³⁵² It is quite possible that Gorky was insincere, as we will see later, but his words contributed to the Russian revolutionary nationalist frenzy of the time.

In 1921, Vladimir Zatonky (1888-1938), a leader of the Ukrainian Soviet republic, complained at the Tenth Party Congress: "There is a national movement also in Central Russia, and the very fact that Russia was first

on the road of revolution means that Russia became the center of the world movement after being a *de facto* colony of Western Europe; this very fact filled with pride those hearts linked with the Russian revolution, and Russian Red Patriotism emerged as a result. Now we can observe how our comrades without foundation regard themselves as Russians, and sometimes even as Russians first and foremost."⁵³

Self-Determination in Practice

The pressure of the Russian national environment on the Bolsheviks and their wish to adapt to real conditions in the country were expressed not only as Red Patriotism. In spite of all official statements, these factors were soon manifested in the relations of Russians and Russified Bolsheviks with national minorities in the country. In the beginning, this was somewhat of a spontaneous process, a simple result of the dominant position of Russians in the country where the Russian language, the centrality of Russians, and the unity of state were taken for granted as a result of accustomed habits from which people could liberate themselves only by an effort of will. The function of the Russian language as the imperial *lingua franca* remained under the new conditions as well, leading necessarily to the centralization of life in spite of the fact that, officially, all national cultures were equal.

Naturally, various diaspora minorities were vitally interested in centralization, since only thus could their survival be guaranteed. The Jews made up the most important of these minorities, and they played an extremely important role in the consolidation of Russian influence in the Ukraine and Byelorussia against local nationalism and separatism. That role was stressed by Lenin himself (as we will see later) and by other Bolshevik leaders such as Zatonaky⁵⁴ and Bukharin, who charged the Ukrainian party organization with "violently" struggling against Ukrainian nationalism.⁵⁵ A prominent party official and later party secretary, Yakov Yakovlev (Epahtein, 1896-1938), called Russified Jews "the most consistent agents of the Great Russian national oppression."⁵⁶

In the Caucasus, and more exactly in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the same role belonged to the Armenian diaspora, which constituted the majority of the population in the capitals of these republics, Baku and Tiflis. For Armenians, Russian centralism had an even more important meaning than for the Jews: Without the Russian umbrella they could be physically exterminated, including the Armenians who lived in Armenia.

Although the reintegration of former Russian boundaries was performed actively and consciously by Moscow itself in the beginning, when the status of these boundaries was considerably higher than it would be later, central party organs often blamed "Great Russian chauvinism" for wanting to prevent the development of national boundaries. In a resolution adopted by the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, it was said that

the Great Russian Communists who were brought up in conditions of "imperial nation" and who did not know national oppression sometimes underestimate the importance of national peculiarities in the party and state activity, or completely ignore them, not taking into consideration peculiarities of class structure, culture, customs, the historical past of a nationality, and by this they vulgarize and distort the party line in the nationality problem. This leads to deviation from communism in the direction of great power oppression, colonialism, and Great Russian chauvinism."³⁵⁷

The process was both a spontaneous demographic process that was not directed by the state and a covert state policy.³⁵⁸ A prominent left-wing Bolshevik of Bulgarian origin, Christian Rakovsky (1873-1941), then a leader of the Ukrainian party organization, bitterly complained in 1923, "If I would take the Communist party, I don't know what percentage of us has deeply rooted nationalism and which part has peacefully reconciled internationalist and nationalist feelings."³⁵⁹

There was another process at that time, namely, the integration by the Bolshevik party of many Russians who disregarded Communist ideology but regarded Bolshevism as something identical with Russia. This process manifested itself mainly in national boundaries and especially in Muslim areas, where the very fact of Bolshevik party membership meant loyalty to Russia. The process was a kind of national self-defense on the part of the local Russian population, which wanted to thus survive against the hostile attitude of the indigenous population. The formal internationalism of such Russians defended them from accusations of nationalism. This aspect was also reflected in the above-quoted party resolution, which also mentioned "the contamination of the party organizations in the boundaries" where kulak-colonizer elements "stick to the party."³⁶⁰ At the Baku congress of the people of the east, which took place in 1920, one Muslim representative openly condemned Russian Communists: "Take away your alien elements, take away your colonizers who act now under the guise of Communists."³⁶¹

The Third International: World Revolutionary Center Moves from Russia to Germany

The Communist International

The assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and the convocation of the mock founding session of the new International launched a terrifying process of the systematic destruction, subversion, and later physical extermination of independent leftists throughout the world who could become a nucleus of a successful revolutionary movement. They were declared to be almost enemy number one for the Moscow-centered world revolutionary movement. Lenin did not want any independent Communist revolution that he could not efficiently control, especially in the most advanced countries. Meanwhile, he desperately needed the worldwide Communist movement, which would blindly follow Moscow's instructions along the lines of the Bolshevik party proper. The main and proved instrument of effective control over this foreign extension of the Bolshevik party was once again money, of which Lenin now had enough.

All the ethnocentrism of German socialists now turned out to be child's play in comparison with Lenin's really brutal policy. He knew very well what he was doing, and he himself expressed his fear of a European revolution that could bring Russian national resignation. "After the victory of the proletarian revolution, in at least one of the advanced nations, a sharp change will probably come about: Russia will cease to be the model country and will once again become a backward country (in the 'Soviet' and the socialist sense)."¹ Such a change would have suited Lenin only if he himself would move to the capital of this advanced revolutionary nation as its leader, and such a possibility would be feasible if Russia could consolidate its military power sufficiently in order to guarantee its world leadership.

Only a few unimportant people participated in the first "congress" of the Communist International, and they represented only themselves.² But if we examine the history of the First International created by Marx and Engels,³ we shall see that it was no better from the point of view of representation than the new International. Several foreigners delivered a few servile speeches at the mock founding session, and this participation

was the manifestation of the new Russian international network, which blindly repeated everything issuing from the Kremlin.

A former French military attaché in Russia, Jacques Sadoul (1881-1956), begged that Russian supermen be sent to France for several weeks in order to command the French revolution—if it should take place. "You will certainly not refuse to let them go to us," begged Sadoul. "We Frenchmen . . . don't have such outstanding revolutionary generals as abound in Russia and who are essentially a genuine Russian phenomenon created by the very nature of the country, with its sharp climatic contrasts, with its immense valleys. They are genuine Russian people."⁴ A Dutch leftist, Sebald Rutgers (1879-1961), said that the giant revolutionary Russia was in fact the Third International itself.⁵ The sole representative of the new German Communist party (KPD), Hugo Eberlein (1877-1944), was the only guest who did not want to support the new International.⁶

Lenin was extremely suspicious of two rival leftist groups, the German and the Italian, and he did everything he could to crush all traces of their independence. He first tried to get rid of their leaders, who might possibly have been possessed of political charisma, exactly as he had done in his own party in Russia.

To do this job in Germany he found an excellent operative, Radek, who, while being a very bright and extremely cynical politician, was no more than an operative. Before joining Lenin, Radek had belonged to the German left wing and had criticized him; however, the German left wing did not recognize Radek for personal reasons and refused to regard him as an equal. Probably for reasons of revenge against the German left, the clever Radek became an excellent instrument against it. Radek maintained his individuality mainly by his daring cynicism, clear-cut formulations, and his good knowledge of German affairs. He became a main verbalizer of Russian National Bolshevism and later an adviser to Stalin and chief architect of the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement.⁷ His activity in Germany after 1919 developed in three directions: (1) discredit of those charismatic and independent German Communist leaders; (2) a public relations campaign to persuade the German left that the world revolution was not on the immediate horizon; (3) cooperation with German right-wing nationalists and sometimes even with the SPD.

Political development gave Radek another opportunity. In 1919, the idea of cooperation between Communists and right-wing nationalists emerged with the objective of combating the Entente.⁸ The initiative for this cooperation belonged to Hamburg Communists Heinrich Laufenberg (1872-1932) and Fritz Wolffheim, who created in 1919 a parallel Communist party known as the Communist Workers party of Germany (KAPD). They appealed for the national defense of Germany against Western imperialist countries via revolutionary means; they also appealed for an immediate popular war during which all patriotic forces would unite. They called their trend *National Bolshevism*, the first usage of this term. The most important representative of right-wing German Russophile nationalism, Ernst von

Reventlow (1869-1943), claimed, however, that National Bolshevism was conceived as a political option, not by Communist, but by nationalist circles. "Many former German officers," he wrote, "mostly young, belonged to this trend. They were also joined by those with academic backgrounds, who, relying on logic and analogy, came to the conclusion that only this way would bring redemption."⁹ According to Reventlow, National Bolshevism was not successful enough in Germany because of its lack of suitable leaders.

Both Laufenberg and Wolffheim, as well as Reventlow, visited Radek in his "prison salon" in 1919. Radek flirted with both trends and suggested a "possible alliance with defeated Germany against the West." Publicly, Radek criticized National Bolshevism, but his biographer noticed that this was only a "double-cross."¹⁰ In his criticism, Radek said that there were different roads to communism: philosophical, religious, aesthetic. The national concern was definitely one of such roads.¹¹ Three years later, Radek in his conversations in Germany stressed all central National Bolshevik issues even more energetically than those he ostensibly criticized. He said to the prominent German historian Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) that it was necessary for German Communists and right-wing nationalists to wage a decisive war against West European capitalism. "Only communism and nationalism can solve together the world crisis and implement a regulated economy," Radek said.¹²

Radek first formulated the principle of so-called peaceful coexistence, which was in fact only a rationalization of the principle of diplomatic relations with capitalist countries, which had already been advanced in October 1917. According to Radek, capitalist and socialist states can coexist peacefully and cooperate. As an example of such coexistence, Radek pointed out the mutual coexistence of capitalist and feudal states! He wrote that the Versailles negotiations could produce in German bourgeois circles a manifest trend to support Soviet Russia, though only out of national considerations. The German right, Radek said, claimed that in order to resist the Entente it was permitted to resort to the devil himself as an ally. Since this trend was sincere, Communists could not reject the proposals on the spot; Radek warned, however, that German Communists must not be an umbrella for capitalist circles in times of bad weather.¹³

National Bolshevism as a term survived its German progenitor, and Lenin used it in 1920.¹⁴ At any rate, the KAPD was admitted to the new International. Meanwhile the frustrated Kautsky completely dismissed Bolshevism as socialism. According to him, it was only the outcome of non-Marxist trends associated with Lassalle and Bakunin. In a pamphlet published in 1920, Kautsky wrote that

the old antagonism between . . . Marx and Lassalle rose again after the revolution in Russia in 1917. . . . As at the time of Lassalle, the time of the second Russian revolution, if for quite other reasons, proved to be unfavorable to Marxist doctrines. Those among the laboring classes in Russia, who had been trained on Marxist lines, were dead or swept away by the backward masses, who had suddenly awakened to life. It was pre-Marxist ways of thought

which gained the upper hand, ways such as those represented by Blanqui, Weitling or Bakunin.¹⁵

It is interesting that Lenin pressed for the publication of Bakunin's works as soon as possible after the revolution.¹⁶ Trotsky was deputized by Lenin to reply to Kautsky. He ironically commented on the latter's pamphlet, rejecting his argument as reformulated by Trotsky: "backward Russia cannot put objects before itself which would be appropriate to advanced Germany."¹⁷

The Polish War

The Bolsheviks exploited the direct national appeal very early on, treating the fight against intervention publicly as the Russian national fight for independence, a direct implication of their Red Patriotism. In March 1919, for example, the Bolsheviks distributed leaflets in Odessa against the French interventionist force: "Are you not ashamed to support Frenchmen?" such a leaflet chided the Russians, "have you forgotten 1812?"¹⁸

A most important escalation of Russian nationalism on the part of the Bolsheviks was undertaken in the spring of 1920 during the successful Polish advance against Soviet Russia. On May 4, the Politburo for the first time discussed the idea of publishing an appeal by former tsarist generals to defend Russia against foreign invasion. Meanwhile Radek, most probably encouraged by Lenin and Trotsky, began to deliver inflammatory speeches in which he presented the war against Poland as a Russian national war and encouraged former Russian regular army officers and generals to serve in the Red Army.

The leftist Preobrazhensky who—as was known—opposed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, immediately protested and sent Lenin a confidential memorandum asking "to stop the indecency" of the "patriotism" in Radek's speeches and in propaganda leaflets. Lenin made a hypocritical resolution of instructing the Soviet press to implement a class approach to the Polish war and to separate Polish capitalists and landlords from workers and peasants.¹⁹ What kind of class approach this was shall be seen later.

Indeed, on May 8 Radek delivered a new speech appealing to White officers and generals to join the Red Army. "The Soviet government," he said,

which defends the territorial integrity and independence of the country that is populated by Russians, this Soviet government is for honest White officers the government that defends Russian independence. . . . Since those people are honest, they cannot now go to Allies, since they had raised the banner of the rebellion against us not only in favor of the bourgeois and landlord system in Russia but also in the name of Russian nationalism. Allies . . . help us to become the center around which all elements that would like to defend Russian independence would unite."²⁰

On May 11-12, *Pravda*, published a long article of Radek's that revealed what Lenin indeed wanted while lulling Preobrazhensky's anxiety.

Didn't our Civil War . . . also have a character of a national struggle against foreign invasion? All the capitalist press, English and French, realized very well that our Civil War is at the same time a war for independence, for its reunification against the attempts of the victorious French, English, and American capitalists to make Russia a colony. . . . It was this intention of foreign capital . . . which became the reason for the failure of attempts to overthrow us by the hands of Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenitch. Creating for the sake of their interests boundary states against Denikin's will, manifesting constantly their own self-interests, the English and French sowed disbelief toward themselves in Denikin's army, they hesitated to support Denikin and Kolchak with the energy that they needed in order to secure the victory of the Whites over the Reds. On the other side . . . the part of the former regular officers who honestly fulfilled their duty during our Civil War . . . realized that Soviet Russia . . . reunites the land populated by Russians and defends Russia from the destiny of colonial loot of her former allies.

Radek said that the Poles were indifferent as to who ruled Russia; they wanted only to weaken it. "While all our civil wars in the past three years," he continued, "were also national, [Russian] masses think that the Polish war is national first and foremost. In fact, . . . our Civil War was always national, it was a recollecting of Russian lands in the hands of the dictator—the working class. It was always the struggle for independence from the yoke of foreign and native capitalism."

On May 18, 1920, Steklov decisively supported the Russian national appeal in *Izvestia*: "The people that is attacked must defend itself. When its Holy of Holies is endangered it begins to feel the awakening of national consciousness." Steklov in fact accepted the idea that national values take priority over class values—a strange enough concept for the time. However, Steklov attempted to calm his readers: "It is still far from nationalism in the bad sense of this word." There was now, Steklov said, a nationalist explosion all over Russia. "It has confused some people. One fears the penetration of our ranks by alien elements that move with the deliberate goal of bringing harm, not benefit, to the cause of the republic." Steklov did not share such fears. "Even the criminal hand of a Black Hundred will shake if he has to extend it against his own country." Meanwhile, Zinoviev gave an interview to *Pravda* on May 18. He, too, then saw no danger in the exploitation of Russian nationalism. "The war is becoming the war of all our people," Zinoviev declared: "not only the avant garde of the population is fighting, but even kulaks regard the aggression of Polish landlords in a negative way. . . . We Communists must lead this popular movement."

Trotsky was jubilant that his "Russian officers . . . have understood that the Red Army will save the independence and the freedom of the Russian people."²¹ He was very eager to exploit the traditional Russian animosity toward the Poles. He said publicly that "hatred of Russia and the Russians since they were identified as the tsar and his servants, penetrated the consciousness of broad [Polish] popular masses, attracting also the backward part of the Polish working class."²² Again, this standard argument to a "backward part of the proletariat" is invoked!

The former Menshevik Mikhail Pavlovitch-Veltman (1871-1927) also made a nationalist appeal à la Radek. He said that "all honest Russian and Ukrainian citizens . . . will unite around the government . . . in favor of defense of the endangered motherland. We Communists are the most sincere patriots." He stressed that the war with Poland had turned out to be a national war encompassing all the population.²³ Gorky joined this campaign also in purely nationalist terms. "Vainglorious Poland," he said, "having broken its forehead several times in the confrontation with Russia, will break it once again."²⁴

On May 30, 1920, a joint appeal of former leading Russian generals was published, in which they appealed to all the Russian officer corps to join the Bolsheviks. "The free Russian people has liberated all peoples subjected to it in the past, and has given each of them the possibility of self-determination. . . . The more, then, have the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples the right to decide their destiny and arrange their lives as they choose, and we are all obliged by our consciences to work for the sake of the benefit, freedom, and glory of our motherland, Russia." Also said was the following: "In this critical historical moment of our popular life we, your veteran and elder comrades, appeal to your feelings of love and devotion to the motherland." Otherwise, "our descendants will rightfully curse us and accuse us that because of selfish feelings about the class war we did not use our military experience, forgetting our own Russian people and ruining our Mother Russia."²⁵ The appeal was signed by Brusilov, Polivanov, Zaiontchkovsky, and by other generals and admirals. Several days later, Lenin, Trotaky, and the people's commissar for justice, Dmitry Kursky (1874-1932), extended full amnesty to the former White officers if they would repent.²⁶

Zinoviev noted that the Bolshevik leadership was stunned by the patriotic wave raised by Brusilov's appeal. "We never thought," he was quoted as saying, "that Russia had so many patriots; the next day, thousands of officers and many thousands of intelligentsia, workers, and peasants came to the military enlistment offices."²⁷ In 1921, Lenin himself noted that

The war with Poland aroused patriotic feelings even among the petty-bourgeois elements, who were by no means proletarians or sympathisers with communism, by no means giving unconditional support to the dictatorship of the proletariat; sometimes, in fact, they did not support it at all.²⁸

In the middle of September, the appeal to the officers of Wrangel's army was published, and it also exploited Russian nationalism. The officers were told that they were simply an auxiliary force of the Polish aggressors, who attracted some part of the Red Army only in order to help themselves. Wrangel existed only because of Anglo-French support.²⁹

The people who may be inclined to believe that Brusilov's appeal and other manifestations of spontaneous Russian patriotism during the Polish war were no more than a Bolshevik public relations campaign are grossly mistaken. Fifty-four years later, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a committed ad-

versary of the Soviet system, related to the Polish invasion of Soviet Russia in 1920 in almost the same terms Brusilov and his friends had used:

For more than a century Poland experienced the misery of dismemberment, but then under the Versailles treaty gained independence and a great deal of territory (once more at the expense of the Ukraine and Byelorussia). Poland's first action in its relations with the outside world was to attack Soviet Russia in 1920—it attacked energetically, and took Kiev with the object of breaking through to the Black Sea. We are taught at school—to make it seem more awful—that this was the “Third Campaign of the Entente” and that Poland concerted its actions with the White generals in order to restore tsarism. This is rubbish. It was an *independent* act on the part of Poland, which waited for the rout of all the main White forces so as not to be their involuntary ally and so that it could plunder and carve up Russia for itself while the latter was most helplessly fragmented. This did not quite come off (though Poland did extract an indemnity from the Soviets).³⁰

The weak opposition to the exploitation of Russian nationalism still continued, however. As in the case of Preobrazhenaky, it came from left-wing Bolsheviks. For example, Miasnikov, at that time leader of the Byelorussian party organization, commented on Brusilov's appeal, saying, “The age of national and other wars has passed.”³¹ In his turn, Bukharin insisted that the concept of fatherland had only a class meaning.³²

The Polish war had many other implications. At the height of the Soviet advance to Warsaw, i.e., in the summer of 1920, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders decided that it was high time to launch the Russian 1793, not stopping in Poland but going further and invading Germany with the help of the growing KPD as a potential Soviet base of power. It was Lenin who insisted on the nonstop Red Army advance, disregarding all military considerations and keeping in mind Germany and not Poland as his target.³³ At that time, the second congress of the Communist International took place. Lenin did his best there to rein the radicalism of Western Communists, and he published the pamphlet, “Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.”³⁴ As we have already seen, Lenin did not want to support any revolutionary activity that might lead to an independent focus of power.

His struggle was directed not only against German but also against Italian left-wingers, since Italy was very revolutionized and anything might happen there. When Italian socialists achieved a considerable electoral success in 1919, Lenin warned their leader, Giacinto Serrati (1872–1926), against a premature revolution. He asked them not to lift arms since Italy lacked coal and raw materials.³⁵ Meanwhile, Lenin launched a vilification campaign against Serrati, because Serrati was too independent and charismatic. The Bolshevik favorite was one Niccolo Bombacci (1879–1945), who later became a prominent fascist and was hanged together with Mussolini.³⁶ (Incidentally, another congress star from France, Henri Guilbeaux, also later became a sympathizer of Italian fascism.)

A central event of the congress was the clash between Lenin and USPD representatives who tried to obtain International membership. A USPD

leader, Arthur Crispian (1875-1946), explained why German socialists had not been able to afford a socialist revolution in November 1918. "Germany was so weakened," he said, "that if we had been blockaded once again, the impoverishment of the German masses would have been more terrible. Layers impoverished to the extent of lumpenproletariat cannot be an avant garde. They will not be able to make any revolution. Only those working layers who can reasonably raise their standard of living are capable of making a revolution."³⁷ Another USPD leader, Wilhelm Dietman (1874-1954), stressed, "Nobody would take on himself a responsibility that would doom the whole nation to starvation."³⁸

Lenin violently attacked both Crispian and Dietman:

This is the language of counter-revolution. The standard of living in Russia is undoubtedly lower than in Germany, and when we established the dictatorship, this led to the workers beginning to go more hungry and to their conditions becoming even worse. The workers' victory cannot be achieved without sacrifices, without a temporary deterioration of their conditions. We must tell the workers the very opposite of what Crispian has said. If, in desiring to prepare the workers for the dictatorship, one tells them that their conditions will not be worsened "too much", one is losing sight of the main thing, namely, that it was by helping their "own" bourgeoisie to conquer and strangle the whole world by imperialist methods, with the aim of thereby ensuring better pay for themselves, that the labour aristocracy developed. If the German workers now want to work for the revolution they must make sacrifices, and not be afraid to do so.³⁹

The attack was sheer hypocrisy, since Lenin did not then want a socialist revolution in Germany. One is reminded of the kind of argument Lenin used to persuade the Italian socialists not to begin the revolution: the lack of coal and raw materials.

The Red Army imperialist advance into Poland and the threat of a Soviet invasion of Germany provoked resistance within the new Communist movement, both in Poland and in Germany. A member of the Central Party Committee of the Polish Communist party, Henrik Kamensky (Domsy, 1883-1937), published an article on July 22, 1920, in Germany in which he condemned Red imperialism. He wrote, "No republic may be created by foreign bayonets."⁴⁰ USPD leaders in Germany also started talking about Moscow dictators, and even the German Communists talked of foreign Russian dictatorship.⁴¹ It is difficult to say what might have happened, but the Red Army was defeated, which essentially put an end to all Lenin's plans to invade Germany in the foreseeable future and led to a reformulation of Soviet strategy.

It is no surprise that the first person to publicly reformulate Soviet policy was Radek, who was definitely acting as Lenin's mouthpiece. Radek advanced the concept of the proletarian revolution as a *process*. According to him, the world revolution might take another twenty, thirty, or fifty years, and in the meantime, the Bolsheviks must reconcile themselves to the situation of Russia's being the only socialist soviet republic surrounded by capitalist

countries with whom Russia would have to coexist.⁴² It is clear that here Radek was once again making a clear-cut formulation of the "socialism in one country" principle, against which, oddly enough, he struggled four or five years later.

Ruth Fisher (1895-1961), a German Communist leader later expelled from the party, noted that "this basic pessimism concerning the future of Communism was a facet of Radek's personality obvious to anyone who knew him intimately." It is interesting that Radek even approved of Peter the Great's Testament! Radek emphasized "the nationalism of the Soviets, which regard as completely logical the so-called 'Testament of Peter the Great.'"⁴³

Radek was violently attacked by many left-wing Bolsheviks who advanced another theory—the purest and the boldest so far—of Soviet imperialism. In September 1920, when the Red Army had already been defeated by the Poles, the ninth Bolshevik party conference took place. There was a clash between Radek, who professed explicit nationalism and the consolidation of power period, and the people who professed that the world revolution was a sine qua non. It is not surprising that Osinsky, who had already warned against the nationalization of the Bolshevik revolution during the Brest-Litovsk debates, became Radek's most outspoken opponent, attacking his concept of the Polish war as a Russian national war, which, according to Osinsky, was only its secondary feature.⁴⁴ Zinoviev, who became in 1919 the chairman of the International and ipso facto a left-wing Communist, also condemned Radek and violently criticized Kamensky's letter. "I regard this letter," said Zinoviev,

as a program of a trend in Communism. . . . This is a rebellious petty bourgeoisie in Communist dress. [Ironically, the same accusation was used against Zinoviev himself by Stalin only five or six years later.] While we approached the Polish frontier a nationalist awoke in him. . . . When Russian workers who took power earlier proposed helping him, he said that our bayonets were foreign. Where is his internationalism? It is nationalism advanced under a reasonable-seeming mask. . . . There are no bayonets that are either ours or foreign. . . . It is the same party. . . . It turns out that every country should rattle around in its separate box. . . . We must regard ourselves as the common military organization of the international proletariat."⁴⁵

One can see that Zinoviev was advancing the pure theory of Soviet imperialism, which does not differ in the least from the theory of Soviet imperialism in current use by contemporary Soviet propaganda.

Radek was also attacked by the Hungarian Communist leader, Bela Kun (1886-1939), who was the leader of the abortive Communist government in Hungary in March-July 1919. Bela Kun criticized Radek both for his concept and also for his defense of Kamensky's letter, which had been used by Radek in order to defend his concept of revolution as a process. "If the German USPD," Kun said, "babbled about Moscow dictators, then I

am for the Moscow dictatorship."⁴⁶ He was shot dead in Moscow, allegedly as a foreign spy.

Kamenev condemned as nationalist attempts to regard the territorial expansion of the victorious proletariat as a Russian expansion.⁴⁷ In answer to this attack, Radek claimed that if there would really be a grand revolution, "we would step over the Polish corpse and establish our occupation there." But "the Russian proletariat must realize that it will struggle for a long time. If it would like to consolidate the power of the European and world proletariat, it must realize that this cannot be done through appeals to accelerate revolution, which cannot proceed quickly enough anywhere. . . . The way to victory is long."⁴⁸ This was a full-fledged formulation of the principle of socialism in one country as the principle of consolidation of power.

Radek was indirectly supported by the prominent commissar Jan Poluan (1891-1937), who said that only the Jewish population of Poland, including all its social classes, regarded the Red Army as a liberator while the Polish army, which was predominantly a workers' army, violently resisted the Reds. Poluan said, for example, that the demonstration which had welcomed the Red Army in Bialystok included Jewish merchants.⁴⁹

More important, however, Radek was supported by Lenin against Zinoviev, as noticed by Gerald Freund.⁵⁰ This support can also be established from what Lenin said in public several months later. He in fact repeated the main points of Radek's previous declarations, though in a more restrained form:

In these last three years, we have learned to understand that placing our stake on the world revolution does not mean relying on a definite date, and that the accelerating pace of development may or may not lead to a revolution in the spring. Therefore, we must be able to bring our work in line with the class balance here and elsewhere, so as to be able to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long time, and, however gradually, to remedy all our numerous misfortunes and crises. This is the only correct and sober approach. . . .

Our attention and all our endeavours were aimed at switching from our relations of war with the capitalist countries to relations of peace and trade.⁵¹

In his secret instructions, Lenin was much more categorical, as, for example, in a secret letter to the Polish Communists: "Don't let the government and bourgeoisie strangle the revolution through bloody suppression of a premature uprising. Don't yield to provocation. Wait until the increase of a full wave. . . . One must at any price bring the revolution to full maturity."⁵² This message is identical to everything that was systematically carried out by Lenin and the Bolsheviks to prevent at any cost independent and strong revolutionary centers during the period of consolidation of their power. In May 1921, Lenin advanced the thesis that would several years later be reproduced by Stalin in his polemics against Trotsky. Lenin said that the

Bolsheviks' influence on the world revolution was now being exercised by their economic policy.⁵³

To the same extent that the Polish war was said to be a Russian national war, the Red Army actions against the Japanese in the Far East were interpreted as a Russo-Japanese national war.⁵⁴ Those actions were defined explicitly as that by one of the leaders of the Bolshevik struggle against the Japanese, Petr Parfenov (1894-1937), who later became chairman of the state planning committee of the Russian republic and identified himself at the beginning of the 1930s with what he called the "Russian group" in the party.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, criticism of Bolshevik imperialism was stronger among Western Communists and leftists. They rejected the right of the Russian Bolsheviks to dominate them, and stressed the Bolsheviks' Asiatic nature, as Marx and Engels had stressed this feature of early Russian socialism. Paul Levi (1883-1930), a leader of the German Communists, "attacked the Bolsheviks for their Asiatic character. He called the Russian agents in Germany, "the mullahs of Khiva and Bukhara."⁵⁶

The first German National Bolsheviks, Wolffheim and Laufenberg, were also deeply disappointed in Russian Bolshevism and attacked it as Russian imperialism. The Second Comintern congress members were forced to send a letter to the German Communists in which they said: "Wolffheims and Laufenbergs do their best to separate you from communism. They have slandered the powerful and heroic struggle of the Russian proletariat against world capitalism as the struggle of the Russian Communist party organs for world domination. . . . They try to distract the German proletariat from its revolutionary duties, appealing for the rejection of 'the transformation of Germany into a boundary state of Russia.'"⁵⁷

The anarchists were extremely sensitive to the totalitarian and imperialist features of the Bolshevik system. Two prominent leaders of U.S. anarchism, Alexander Berkman (1870-1936) and Emma Goldman (1869-1940), unfolded devastating criticism against Bolshevism and Lenin. Berkman called the Bolsheviks "Asiatic revolutionaries,"⁵⁸ and Goldman called Lenin a "shrewd Asiatic" who "knows how to play on the weak sides of men by flattery, rewards, medals."⁵⁹

The Asiatic Strategy

Lenin was always extraordinarily rapid in reformulating his strategy. When it became evident after the Polish war that the balance of power would not permit any Russian advance into Europe, a new strategy was suggested as early as September and October 1920: Russia must mobilize Asia against Europe during the period of consolidation of power and invest its main efforts, not in European expansion, but in the encouragement of Asiatic anti-European movements. According to Lenin's political calculations, Asia could not be a geopolitical threat to Russia, as Russia could easily establish its leadership over Asia: a reconstruction of old Russian geopolitical theories.

However, the Asiatic strategy had first been proposed by Trotsky in a secret memorandum on August 5, 1919, before the Polish war. Trotsky said that there

are all symptoms of the sort that indicate that the incubatory, preparatory period of the revolution in the West may last for indeed a considerable time yet. This means that Anglo-French militarism will still retain a certain measure of vitality and strength and our Red Army will, in the arena of the European paths of world politics, figure as a quantity of fairly modest proportions, not only for the purpose of attack but also for that of defence. . . .

The position takes on a different aspect if we face to the East. There is no doubt at all that our Red Army constitutes an incomparably more powerful force in the Asian terrain of world politics than in the European terrain. Here there opens up before us an undoubted possibility not merely of a lengthy wait to see how events develop in Europe, but of conducting activity in the Asian field. The road to India may prove at the given moment to be more readily passable and shorter for us than the road to Soviet Hungary. The sort of army which at the moment can be of no great significance in the European scales can upset the unstable balance of Asian relationships of colonial dependence, give a direct push to an uprising on the part of the oppressed masses and assure the triumph of such a rising in Asia. . . .

We have up to now devoted too little attention to agitation in Asia. However, the international situation is evidently shaping in such a way that the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal.

Our military successes . . . should raise the prestige of the Soviet Revolution throughout the whole of oppressed Asia to an exceptionally high level. It is essential to exploit this factor. . . .

Naturally, we had had in mind even earlier on the need to assist the revolution in Asia and had never abandoned the idea of revolutionary offensive wars.⁶⁰

Trotsky was probably supported by Tchitcherin, who only a week later published an article on the same problem, calling the Russian people the first Asiatic people and the most important victim of European exploitation. Interestingly, Tchitcherin stressed the continuity of Russian foreign policy, referring to the Russian foreign minister, Alexander Gortchakov (1798-1883). "If Gortchakov," Tchitcherin said, "could perfectly legitimately say that Russia's future is in Asia, this historical unity of the Russian and Asiatic working masses will be manifested in the new proletarian period of human history, and is being manifested already in the contemporary common revolutionary struggle." Later, Tchitcherin said that the conflict between the West and the East was the main antagonism of contemporary times.⁶¹

Speaking on June 10, 1920, Kamenev also brandished the Asiatic strategy, saying that the Red Army had already started its advance towards India. "The Soviet system in all Asia," he said, "would be recognized as the only liberator and the only defender of the people of the East against the West European imperialism."⁶²

On September 1-8, 1920, the First Congress of the People of the East took place in Baku, and Radek was the main speaker. He delivered a most violent anti-Western address in the tradition of Herzen-Bakunin. "Capitalist culture means the death of every culture," he said, "and the sooner this culture will perish, the better. . . . We appeal, comrades, to the fighting spirit which in the past inspired the people of the East when these peoples, under their great conquerors, went to Europe. We know, comrades, that our opponents would say that we appeal to the memory of Genghis Khan, to the memory of the great caliphs of Islam. However, we are confident that you drew your daggers not for the sake of conquest."⁶³

However, Trotsky's proposal had not been adopted in 1919, and only the Polish war made Lenin reformulate his strategy. He turned eastward almost immediately. The natural executive of the new Asiatic strategy seemed to be Stalin, and it was he who later delivered a speech in Baku in which he compared Russia with Martin Luther:

Paraphrasing the well-known words of Luther, Russia might say:

"Here I stand on the border line between the old, capitalist world and the new, socialist world. Here, on this border line, I unite the efforts of the proletarians of the West and of the peasants of the East in order to shatter the old world. May the god of history be my aid!"⁶⁴

Lenin repeatedly stressed the centrality of the Asian strategy for Soviet Russia:

Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation—all the Oriental, non-European countries. . . .

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.⁶⁵

To ensure our existence until the next military conflict between the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East, between the most civilised countries of the world and the Orientally backward countries which, however, comprise the majority, this majority must become civilised.⁶⁶

It is quite natural that Gorky should oppose the new Asiatic strategy. In December 1920, he wrote to H. G. Wells (1866-1946) that he looked with suspicion on the new Soviet "friends" in Turkey who, according to Gorky, only dreamed of establishing a Muslim state that would include the Russian Caucasus, Central Asia, and also Egypt. "Don't you see," Gorky asked, "a terrible threat to European culture from this possible union with Asiatic nations?"⁶⁷ Gorky's opinion probably had an important impact on

Stalin later in the 1920s, when he abandoned the Lenin-Trotsky Asiatic plan.

World Recognition and Coexistence

Miliukov aptly noticed in 1922 that "Bolshevism was considered the 'common enemy' of all 'capitalist' states only by the Bolsheviks themselves."⁶⁸ In fact, the Bolsheviks enjoyed a rapid international success. There were many reasons why the West not only quickly became reconciled to the Bolshevik regime, which openly declared war on it, but in fact encouraged it.

The first reason was geopolitical. In the existing European balance of power, Russia could serve as a counterbalance, useful to this or that great power, and was seen by Western politicians, not in terms of the country's declared policy, but only in terms of the real extent of its power. Russia was not strong enough to stand against all other countries. Defeated Germany was vitally interested in Russia as an ally against the West, and England, for example, was rather interested in Russia as a balance to French influence in Europe.

The second overriding reason was economic. The great powers were afraid of losing the captive Russian market to their economic competitors; England was afraid of losing Russia to Germany, and so on. The third reason was that Russia was regarded as sick and inefficient, and in this capacity was not dangerous.⁶⁹ Moreover, Western countries had vested interests in keeping Russia as it was for as long as possible. Many Western politicians regarded Communist propaganda and appeals for a world revolution merely as lip service and as nothing to do with the real intentions of the Soviet statist leadership. They did not take seriously the possibility of a Russian revolutionary advance.

That attitude had essentially formed British policy toward the Soviet Union since 1919, and its main proponent was the British prime minister, David Lloyd George (1863-1945). He was confronted by competitive attitudes. France at that time was much more hostile to Soviet Russia: Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929), the French prime minister, suggested isolating Russia from the rest of the world by a "sanitary cordon" of buffer states, or, as was said often, by barbed wire. The toughest policy toward Soviet Russia was advanced by Winston Churchill (1874-1965) as he suggested military intervention in order to overthrow the Bolshevik system. However, it was Lloyd George's view that eventually won, and the White movement lost its support. Even in January 1919, the Versailles Peace Conference invited the Bolshevik government to participate in negotiations.

In January of 1920, the Allied Supreme Council declared the end of the blockade of Soviet Russia. Moreover, it adopted a decision that permitted "an exchange of goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian people and Allied and neutral countries." This formulation did not imply a formal recognition of the Bolshevik rule, it was merely a tactical step.

The British government suggested trade negotiations to the Central Soviet cooperative organization, Tsentrosoiuz, as if it were a grass-roots peasant organization. However, in its reply in February 1920, Tsentrosoiuz suggested a delegation that included Leonid Krasin, the people's commissar for external commerce, and Maxim Litvinov (Wallach, 1876-1951), a people's deputy commissar for foreign affairs—in other words, a high-ranking government delegation. It was duly accepted by the British government and went to England at the end of March. The delegation was soon joined by Kamenev, i.e., by one of the most important Bolshevik leaders. Negotiations, which were approved by the Allied Supreme Council, lasted ten months, and on March 18, 1921, the first Soviet-British trade agreement was signed. This agreement went much beyond any normal trade agreement since it included important political clauses. Both sides were committed not to entertain any hostile or even propaganda actions against each other; the agreement covered all the territory of the British empire, Afghanistan and India being specifically mentioned.⁷⁰

However, the most important breakthrough was the Soviet-German political treaty signed in Rapallo in April 1922. This treaty summed up the process of Soviet-German rapprochement, which was initiated by powerful German military leaders who regarded Russia as the only natural and reliable ally of Germany. Even before Rapallo, German military officials had signed a secret agreement with Soviet Russia, according to which the Germans were permitted to build on Russian territory an aviation plant to produce military planes for both countries. In so doing, Germany provided a good start to the future Soviet military-industrial complex. The Germans also got several secret military bases to train military personnel. The Versailles peace treaty had strictly forbidden the Germans to carry on these activities in Germany.

It is very intriguing that the first German ambassador to Soviet Russia was Brockdorff-Rantzau, the man who had arranged German money for the Bolsheviks during World War I. The Bolsheviks did not reject his nomination, as if to confirm that their cooperation with Germany was based on geopolitical premises. It was a dangerous game for both sides, and Lenin was well aware of it. However, the existing system of international relations and European geopolitics favored the consolidation of power in Soviet Russia, although it was evident that this situation might well turn around when both Germany and Russia had recovered and consolidated their power.

In order to understand why many Western politicians were ready to recognize the Bolshevik system *de facto* and then *de jure* in spite of its declared threat to them, one must also regard these decisions as the result of some collapse in Western mentality. Many people had been frightened by the sheer scope of World War I and its implications. This lapse did not necessarily mean that Western politicians blindly followed fashionable ideas or, vice versa, that these ideas were simply a rationalization of political actions. The process was parallel.

At the time, the concept of a "rotten Europe" came from Europe itself. The most important contribution to this idea was Oswald Spengler's book, *The Decline of the West* (1918-1922). Spengler (1880-1936), a German philosopher, signed European civilization's death warrant. He had tremendous success both in Europe and in Soviet Russia: The first volume of his book was translated into Russian in 1923 and sold 10,000 copies—for that time, record sales.⁷¹

Spengler's verdict was not only a psychological result of the German defeat. Bolshevism hypnotized intellectuals in many other countries: H. G. Wells, for example, wrote to Gorky that there was a belief in England that the Russians were a powerful people destined to be the leading force in the creation of a new world.⁷² French surrealists and later Communists André Breton (1896-1966) and Louis Aragon (1897-1984) told Lunatcharsky in 1923: "We need the revolution in order to turn the kingdom of bourgeoisie upside down, and with it, the kingdom of reason. We will bring back the kingdom of elementary life. . . . We respect Asia as the country that is still alive, using the genuine source of energy, unpoisoned by European reason. Come to us, Muscovites, bring with you your immense Asiatic troops, trample on European postculture. Even if we would perish under the hooves of steppe horses, let us perish."⁷³ (Lunatcharsky was frightened by this European masochism. He dreamed of bringing reason to Asia.) A Palestinian Jewish writer Micha Berdyczewsky (1865-1921) said, "Russians are destined to conquer all the world in the future."⁷⁴ Such was the intellectual atmosphere in the West produced by World War I's immense catastrophe, which highly encouraged the international success of Bolshevism, both politically and ideologically.

The Jewish Problem

It is not surprising that the active participation of Jewish Bolsheviks in the revolution provoked a new violent wave of anti-Semitism, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Jewish population—which lived in the former Pale of Settlement including Poland, Lithuania, and so on—was cut off from Russia and did not participate in any Russian political events. The rest of the Jewish population in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, occupied by Germans in the beginning of 1918, were under German occupation until November of that year and were not enthusiastic about Bolshevism.

Moreover, many Jews actively supported the Provisional government, and last detachments of those troops that defended the Provisional government regime in October 1917 consisted mainly of Jewish cadets.⁷⁵ They defended the Winter Palace in Petrograd and were massacred by pro-Bolshevik troops. A considerable part of the anti-Bolshevik forces regarded the Bolshevik revolution as an intrigue of hostile alien forces that had fallen upon innocent Russia. More specifically, the revolution was seen as the result of a "Jewish-Masonic" conspiracy with the goal of destroying Russia and enslaving the Russians. The overwhelming evidence that Bolshevism was supported by the popular peasant and lumpen uprising was ignored.

"The sting and poison of Jewish hatred," said the Holy Synod's organ, "is more or less visible everywhere. . . . This explains the brutality and extremism of persecutions—qualities that were always characteristic of the Jewish mentality."⁷⁶ Such opinions were quickly increasing both among the Whites, who struggled against the Bolsheviks in Russia, and later among Russian emigrants.

There was a quick escalation of the allegation that Bolshevism established Jewish domination in Russia. An emigrant, one V. Vitukhin, said that the people who would reject the idea that Russia was dominated by Jews had been bribed or had lost their capacity of orientation.⁷⁷ Colonel Vinberg compared Russia with a careless beauty who had been attacked by a Jewish-Masonic serpent.⁷⁸ Yuri Odinzogoev (a pseudonym) wrote that regardless of how people looked at the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, there was a close correlation between Bolshevik tactics and what was suggested in the Protocols.⁷⁹ A former deputy ober-procurator of the Holy Synod, Nikolai Zhevakhov, went further. He was confident that any revolution in any place, regardless of its motivation, reflected, not the dissatisfaction of the people, but the dissatisfaction of the Jewish part of the people. Zhevakhov was absolutely confident of the authenticity of the Protocols.⁸⁰

Markov II, who emigrated to Germany, regarded both the March and the Bolshevik revolutions as part of the "war of dark forces" waged against Russia. As a committed Germanophile, he completely ignored the German contribution to this war. For him, the roots of the war were to be found in Jewish worship of Satan, and the revolution was the Jewish attack on Russia.⁸¹ (Later Markov was employed by Nazi intelligence.) A Russian German, Grigory Bostunitch (Schwartz, 1883-?), declared that Judaism was Satanism and had as its goal world government.⁸² Ilya Ehrenburg (1891-1967), who probably did not know Bostunitch's fate, tells in his memoirs how he and his friends enjoyed Bostunitch's books in the 1920s because of their stupidity.⁸³ Ehrenburg cannot have known that during the period of the Nazis, Bostunitch became an SS general specializing in anti-Masonic activity.

Regardless of differences among the people who saw the Bolshevik revolution as Jewish, hardly anyone would have refused to sign an indictment such as that of V. Vladimirov: "Now Russia is literally Judea. . . . The proletarian-peasant socialist republic is only a screen behind which Judaism hides, and triumphs over the Russian people."⁸⁴

It would be a grave mistake to think that the idea that the Bolshevik revolution was an alien one was shared only by Russian right-wingers. This opinion was shared by Russian liberals and even by non-Bolshevik socialists, though these circles seemed not to have supported the idea of a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. A lawyer who had defended Mendel Beilis (1879-1934) during his trial in 1913, Nikolai Karabtchevsky (1851-1925), considered the revolution to be a result of common Jewish actions, though not a conspiracy.⁸⁵ A leading Russian liberal, Ekaterina Kuakova (1869-1958), a former champion of Jewish civil rights, justified the deep resentment of the Russian intelligentsia

against the Jews. According to her, there was no doubt that Bolshevism was identified in Russia with Judaism. She appealed to the Soviet government not to exploit Jews for evil and dirty jobs, then the microbe of anti-Semitism would disappear.⁸⁶

Anti-Semitism was widespread among the right wing of the SR. In December 1917, that group's newspaper, *Narod* [People], published an editorial that asked, "Will not inquisitors from Smolny bring us before the court . . . for spreading unrefutable rumors that Trotsky in fact is Bronshtein, Kamenev is Rosenfeld, Steklov is Nakhamkes, Antonov is Ovseyenko and probably even someone else?"⁸⁷ One of that newspaper's editors was the famous "grandmother" of the Russian revolution, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya (1844-1934), who later remarked: "The Bolsheviks destroyed everything. Why did they do it? Because the majority of them are not Russians. Yes, they are not Russians. They are brigands. The Soviet of worker deputies is a gang of criminals. But the most important thing is—they are not Russians."⁸⁸

In an appeal signed by the Arkhangelak, workers in the defense of the local SR government led by the famous Russian populist Nikolai Tchaikovsky (1850-1926), it was said that only Russian churches are robbed and defiled, not synagogues. While starvation and sickness take hundreds of thousands of Russian lives, Jews don't die from starvation.⁸⁹ Anti-Semitism was widespread also among those workers under Bolshevik control. When Kalinin appealed at one of the meetings during his trip in Byelorussia to workers to support the Bolshevik regime, he was told, we will support it only after the Soviet system gets rid of the Jews.⁹⁰ One trade union in Moscow adopted a resolution that demanded that aliens such as Radek and Bela Kun not speak in the name of the Russian working class. According to this resolution, the Russian working class should have *national*, social and professional ties with its leadership.⁹¹

One of the main spokesmen of anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia was Esenin. In his poem "The Land of Scoundrels" (1922-1923), he introduced a Jewish commissar, Tchekistov, who saw all Russians as stupid barbarians whom he wanted to reeducate and despised everything Russian, especially the Russian church. It is easily noticed that Tchekistov's opinion is a carbon copy of what was said of the Russians, not by the Jews, but by Lenin and Gorky themselves:

Tchekistov: Your people sit like loafers
and don't want to help themselves.
Nobody is as mediocre and hypocritical
as your Russian moujik-plainman.
If he lives in Riazan province
he doesn't care about Tula province.
How much better is Europe!
You won't find such huts there
which, like silly hens, need
their heads cut off with an ax.

Zamarashkin: Listen, Tchekistov!
 Since when
 have you become a foreigner?
 I know that you're a Jew,
 your name is Liebman,
 the hell with you, you lived abroad. . . .
 Only your house in Mogilev.

Tchekistov: Ha, ha!
 No, Zamarashkin,
 I am a Weimar citizen
 and came here, not as a Jew,
 but *as someone with a talent*
for taming fools and animals.
 I scold and will persistently
 curse you for even a thousand years.
 Since . . .
 Since I'd like to go to the lavatory
 and there are no lavatories in Russia!
 You are a strange and ridiculous people
 you lived all your life in poverty
 and built divine temples.
 and I want to rebuild them
 for a long time, as latrines.⁹²

More important, there were many signs of Bolshevik anti-Semitism. Its first public manifestations were seen before the revolution, Alextnaky, who in spite of his split with the Bolsheviks and his violent campaign against Lenin in the summer of 1917 because of his conspiracy with the Germans was for a while the head of a trade-union department until his escape from Russia,⁹³ stressed that for the majority of the Russian workers, the alien leaders were the enemy.⁹⁴

After 1917, the Bolsheviks exploited anti-Semitism as a tool against non-Bolshevik Jewish socialists. The champion of this overture was the official Bolshevik satirist, the poet Demian Bedny (Pridvorov, 1883-1945), who systematically invented ambiguous anti-Semitic clichés. His first invention in 1917 was "Liberdan," composed of the names of two leading Jewish Mensheviks, Marc Liber (1880-1937) and Fedor Dan (1871-1947), which sounds insulting in Russian.⁹⁵ Lenin himself immediately picked up this cliché with its evident anti-Semitic context, since only Jewish names were used against the Mensheviks as a whole.⁹⁶ No doubt Lenin was against any escalation of anti-Semitism, but he could not help using something that could ensure him more popularity among the masses. In 1923, Bedny repeated the same trick with an emigrant Bund leader, Raphael Abramovitch (1880-1963). In his poem against him, he wrote:

Abramovitch, that's him!
 The Russian patriot waves the tricolor flag.⁹⁷

The evident meaning was that a Jew could not be a genuine Russian patriot.

Much later, Bedny's basic anti-Semitism was confirmed by Trotsky, who said that Bedny's "national onomatopoeia smelled of the Black Hundreds."⁹⁸ Trotsky, however, was irritated only when Bedny attacked him and paid no attention to the fact that Bedny had used his Black Hundred onomatopoeia, encouraged by Lenin, at least since 1917.

Alexander Arosov (1890-1938), a prominent Bolshevik leader and writer, published a novel in 1922 in which the hero was a Tcheka official named Kleiner. Kleiner smiled only once in his life, when he told an old Russian woman who asked him to intervene in favor of her arrested son that her son had already been executed. Kleiner's main thesis was, "It is necessary to intimidate the public, to intimidate." He suggested, for example, showing executions in the cinema.⁹⁹

The Red Army became one of the most anti-Semitic parts of the new system, the first successes of which were linked with Red troop actions in the Ukraine led by Matvei Hryhoriv (Grigoriev, ?-1919), Zeleny (Daniil Terpylo), Nestor Makhno (1884-1934), and others. These troops rebelled against the Bolshevik government and often massacred Jews themselves, taking many thousands of Jewish lives. They were known as "Greens." Numerous soldiers of the White army also joined the Bolsheviks. It is clear that the Red Army, which was influenced intermittently by Whites and Greens, was extremely unstable ideologically and could at any moment have changed its behavior, depending on the political situation. The earliest information about the Red Army's involvement in pogroms reached the Bolshevik government in March 1918.¹⁰⁰ The famous First Cavalry army commanded by Semen Buddeny (1883-1973) was especially notorious for its anti-Semitism.¹⁰¹ Evgeny Dumbadze (1900-?), a nephew of the former governor of the town of Yalta, Gen. Ivan Dumbadze (1851-1916), a notorious Black Hundred, joined the Bolsheviks and then escaped to the West. He recalled what had been said to him by one drunken Red Army soldier in 1919: "We . . . are beating the bourgeoisie and the White bandits and at the same time also the Jews who sold out Christ."¹⁰²

From the very beginning of Bolshevik rule, the idea spread among the Russian people that Bolsheviks and Communists were not the same thing. The Bolsheviks were Russians who gave the land to the people; the Communists were foreigners who tried to put a new yoke on the people. Bunin overheard a conversation in Odessa in 1919 between two Red Army soldiers: "All evil comes from the kikes. They are all Communists. The Bolsheviks are all Russians."¹⁰³ It is difficult to discover the source of this belief as it emerged spontaneously. The idea was confirmed by Trotsky, who said that at some time, the Russian peasant would try to accept Bolshevism and reject communism.¹⁰⁴ The Russian peasant was not alone in such an endeavor.

It is interesting that Trotsky's and Zinoviev's names were linked with communism, not Lenin's. The myth was then current of "Bolshevik" Lenin imprisoned by "Communist" Jews who concealed the truth from him. During

the Kronstadt uprising in 1921, the sailors destroyed portraits of Trotsky and Zinoviev, not Lenin.¹⁰⁵

In 1919, anti-Semitism reached such a pitch that Gorky, who had attacked Jewish Bolsheviks in 1917-1918, decided to intervene. He published an appeal against anti-Semitism, noting, however, that the Jews were then dominant. He explained this fact in the following words: "Jews are ahead only because they can work better than you and they like to work."¹⁰⁶

Shocked by the anti-Semitic explosion in the Red Army, Trotsky asked the Politburo in April 1919 to discuss the problem. The Politburo minutes record that

Comrade Trotsky's statement that Latvians and Jews constituted a vast percentage of those employed in Cheka [Tcheka] frontal zone units, Executive Committees in frontal zones and the rear, and in Soviet establishments at the centre; that the percentage of them at the front itself was a comparatively small one; that strong chauvinist agitation on this subject was being carried on among the Red Army men and finding a certain response there; and that, in Comrade Trotsky's opinion, a reallocation of Party personnel was essential to achieve a more even distribution of Party workers of all nationalities between the front and the rear."¹⁰⁷

It was decided

that Comrades Trotsky and Smilga be recommended to draw up a report to this effect and pass this report, as a C.C. directive, to the commissions responsible for the allocation of personnel between the central and local organisations and the front.

In the spring of 1920, the Red Army captured the city of Novorossiisk. Details about this event are few, since the information was censored in the Soviet press, but some leaked abroad. The Red Army carried out a pogrom against the Jews as a result of which several Jews were killed and Jewish property plundered. Trotsky immediately went to Novorossiisk and stopped the pogrom. It was reported that two commanders of the Red Army troops that had captured the city, Boris Dumenko (1888-1920) and Dmitry Zhloba (1887-1938), "escaped as outlaws." At any rate, Dumenko was executed on May 11; the latest Soviet official sources state that this was done according to "false accusations."¹⁰⁸ Zhloba survived, in order to perish in the purges.

One manifestation of Bolshevik sensitivity to anti-Semitism was a speech by a prominent old Bolshevik, Mikhail Olminsky (Alexandrov, 1863-1933), at the ninth party conference in September 1920 in which he complained that somebody had distributed in Moscow leaflets claiming that the old Russian populist and later Menshevik, Vera Zaslitch, was a Jew.¹⁰⁹ Such a remark could have been made only if the Bolshevik regime were regarded as Jewish and any new, especially wrong, confirmation of the Jewish origin of a Russian socialist looked criminal.

Anti-Semitism was especially strong among Ukrainian Communists and officials. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman visited the Ukraine in 1919, and Jews in Poltava complained to Goldman: "If a Jew and a Gentile happened to be arrested on the same charge, it was certain that the Gentile would go free while the Jew would be sent to prison and sometimes even shot. . . . The Jews in the Ukraine were suffering a continuous silent pogrom. . . . Their [the officials] dislike of the Jews was frank and open. Anti-Semitism throughout the Ukraine was more virulent than even in pre-revolutionary days."¹¹⁰ It was said that there was opposition to the Jews in the Kiev Tcheka, where they constituted the majority. As a result, there was an instruction not to nominate any more Jews to leading positions, and, as a public relations campaign, it was recommended that some Jews be executed, which was immediately done.¹¹¹

Berkman noted that "to the Gentiles, Bolshevik now means a Jew." Speaking of Ukrainian Communists, Berkman noticed "obvious anti-Semitism in their resentment of Kremlin domination." Ukrainian Jews complained to Berkman that "we have the 'quiet' pogroms, the systematic destruction of all that is dearest to us—of our traditions, customs and culture. They are killing us as a nation. . . . Some foolish Jews are proud that our people are in the government. As if Trotsky and such others are Jews."¹¹²

Communist anti-Semitism in the Ukraine was confirmed in December 1919 by Zatonsky during the eighth party conference. His speech sounds almost anti-Semitic.

The Jewish population, by pressure of destiny, support the Soviet state completely sincerely. Indeed, they are the only group that does not leech on it. So there is the need to support the Soviet system. A psychological precondition is created that all these *pharmacist's apprentices* and all other petty Jewish *intelligentsia* came into the Communist party in flocks. Some people, being *speculators by nature and by profession*, think that it doesn't matter what they speculate about. Others came to the party and the Soviets sincerely, but they brought their specific middle-class psychology with them. They could not get rid of it.¹¹³

The anti-Semitic character of the speech is unquestionable. Zatonsky accused the Ukrainian party organization of being inundated by Jews, for whom membership was only a political speculation. Moreover, those Jews spoiled the party. Nobody at the conference took issue with Zatonsky.

Lenin only poured oil on the flames. In the same December 1919, he accused Ukrainian Jewish Communists of being to a great extent responsible for the wrong attitude toward Ukrainians. He evidently encouraged Zatonsky:

Under these circumstances, to ignore the importance of the national question in the Ukraine—a sign of which Great Russians are often guilty (and of which the Jews are guilty perhaps only a little less often than the Great Russians)—is a great and dangerous mistake. . . . As internationalists it is our duty, first, to combat very vigorously the survivals (sometimes unconscious) of Great-Russian imperialism and chauvinism among "Russian" Communists.¹¹⁴

Lenin knew perfectly well that the Jews had become the backbone of Bolshevik influence in the Ukraine, so his condemnation of Jewish "Great Russian imperialism" was a sinister use of the Jews as a scapegoat.

Such occasional hints permitted Lenin to build a reputation as an authentic Russian patriot. As a result of this myth, the following version of Lenin's death was suggested later by an emigrant, Mikhail Dzogaev. Dzogaev, suddenly "realizing" that the Bolshevik revolution had in fact been a Jewish-Marxist revolution, understood Lenin's death in a new light. The Jews pushed the Russian revolution into "Jewish directions"; their actions and instructions were completely alien to Lenin, who exploded in 1923, "Ninety percent of Jewish scoundrels have stuck on to the Russian Communist movement." After that explosion, Dzogaev said, Lenin was killed.¹¹⁵

Resistance to the acceptance of Jews into the Bolshevik party was not confined to the Ukraine. Skvortsov-Stepanov, who followed the Red Army as a commissar during the Polish War in Byelorussia and Poland, came out decisively against the acceptance of former Bundists into the Communist party, saying, "If the door were to be opened only a little a real flood of Bundists would pour into the Polish Communist party."¹¹⁶ He confessed that the Polish party was anti-Semitic, did not wish to accept these Jews, and openly supported this resistance. "The Jewish problem emerged before the proletarian government of Poland and also Lithuania and Byelorussia, not as a national but as a difficult economic problem," he explained.

Although he recognized that Jews in Lithuania and Poland clearly preferred the Russian Soviet system and that there was a very strong gravitation of Polish and Lithuanian Jews toward Russia as such, Skvortsov-Stepanov claimed that the Bundists were simply opportunists and that it was understandable how Polish Communists disbelieved those Jews who call themselves Communists.

However, Skvortsov-Stepanov went much beyond those relatively "innocent" remarks. He claimed that the Jews were a crippled race: "See what kind of an unlucky race was created by age-long persecution!" he exclaimed. The Jews, he said, had inherited hysteria and "nervousness" from their past. "What do they expect under the Soviet system?" he asked prophetically. "What can be used to forward them? How would they exist at all?"

He had witnessed how religious Jews were forced to work on Saturday in a shtetl. "Let anyone who likes be indignant," he wrote; "I regarded such 'violence' against religious persuasions and faith as natural and inevitable, and decisively approve it." One might say that this was not a marginal remark by a marginal person. Skvortsov-Stepanov later supported Stalin and soon replaced Steklov as editor in chief of *Izvestia*.

It seems that the first national clash within the party itself was provoked by Zinoviev, who gathered too many Jews into his Petrograd party organization. A prominent party official, Yuri Larin (Lurie, 1882-1932), hinted at this situation, noting later that the majority of the people in a photograph of the Petrograd Soviet at the end of the Civil War were Jews.¹¹⁷ This statement is confirmed by the list of senior Petrograd party and government officials.

The Jewish overrepresentation in the Petrograd party organization became so odious that in 1921, the Politburo decided to send several ethnic Russians there. Nikolai Uglanov (1886-1940) was sent as a party provincial secretary, replacing Semen Zorin (Gomberg, 1890-1937); Nikolai Komarov (1886-1937) was sent to replace Meir Trilisser (1883-1940); an old Petrograd Bolshevik, Ivan Moaskvin (?-1937), was sent to replace Zinoviev's wife, Sophia Ravitch (1879-1957); and Alexei Semenov (?-1937) was sent to the Petrograd Tcheka.

There were Russians in Zinoviev's coalition too, like Grigory Evdokimov (1884-1936), Ivan Bakaev (1887-1936), and Mikhail Kharitonov (1887-1948). However, the new Russians challenged Zinoviev's Jewish coalition in principle, and Zinoviev accordingly declared war on the group and complained to the Politburo. As a result, an ethnic Russian opposition emerged, which others, including Semen Lobov (1888-1937), a future people's commissar under Stalin, joined. However, Zinoviev got the upper hand, and Uglanov was removed.¹¹⁸ Later, Stalin took advantage of this national clash.¹¹⁹

A student from Kiev University left a diary in which she had written in September of 1919, "Would the Russians become reconciled with the Bolsheviks if several hundred Jewish commissars would disappear?"¹²⁰ It was indeed a crucial question.

The optical illusion of Jewish domination in the Bolshevik system was not entirely alien to many Jews. A prominent Yiddish writer, Reuben Brainin (1862-1939), wrote in his diary just after the arrival of the news of the Bolshevik revolution in New York:

Why could not Lev Trotsky be foreign minister? Is he worse than Plehve, Stolypin, Stürmer, Protopopov or Lansing, the American secretary of state? No doubt that Trotsky, a new Russian ruler, is more honest, cleverer, and more dynamic in his work; no doubt that a Jew, Trotsky, is a better speaker than the above-mentioned ministers. No doubt that he commands his pen better and more successfully than his predecessors. . . . And if Trotsky and his Jewish friends, who now head the Russian government, destroy Russia, then this will be the revenge taken by the Jewish people on their torturers and oppressors, their persecutors, foes, and executioners of yesterday. The dog deserves the stick. . . . Only yesterday the Russians exterminated our people, tortured our souls. . . . And now our sons, the Trotskyes and the Goldbergs, will . . . avenge the "goyim" and will probably bring wealth and salvation to the Russian people and repay evil with good.¹²¹

Joseph Nedava quotes a Hebrew article of 1921 printed in New York, according to which: "The Jewish Bolsheviks demonstrate before the entire world that the Jewish people has not yet degenerated and that this ancient people is still alive and full of vigor. If a people can produce men who can undermine the foundations of the world and strike terror into the hearts of countries and governments, then it is a good omen for itself, a clear sign of its youthfulness, its vitality and stamina."¹²²

However, Jews were not on only one side of the barricades. Many Jews sided with the Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, Ukrainian nationalists, Cadets, and even monarchists. They actively resisted the Bol-

sheviks. Many of them perished in this struggle, many emigrated—in addition to the Zionists who then constituted a mass Jewish movement and were oriented toward emigration.¹²³

But probably the most conspicuous example of the Jewish contribution to the anti-Bolshevik cause is that of Zinovy Peshkov (Sverdlov, 1884–1966). Peshkov was a brother of Yakov Sverdlov, the first Soviet president and one of the main Bolshevik leaders. They originated in Nizhny Novgorod and as young men were close to Gorky. Then their ways parted: In order to avoid legal limitations on his education, Zinovy was baptized and adopted by Gorky as a son, taking Gorky's real name, Peshkov. He emigrated and lived for some time in Italy with Gorky. When the war broke out, Peshkov enlisted in the French Legion, was made an officer, and lost his hand leading an attack against German positions in his first battle. After recovering, he enlisted in French military intelligence. During the Russian revolution and the Civil War, Peshkov became one of the chief manipulators of the several White movements on behalf of French intelligence. He supported Kornilov's attempt to overthrow the Provisional government; then he went to the anti-Bolshevik military leader Grigory Semenov (1890–1946) who operated in the Far East. However, in July of 1918, French support of Semenov was stopped on Peshkov's advice.

Peshkov next took part in the organization of Kolchak's military takeover of Omsk and remained with Kolchak until his defeat. Peshkov was then sent to the Crimea as a French military agent in the Wrangel government, leaving Russia with Wrangel. Later Peshkov became close to Gen. Charles de Gaulle and was a prominent French politician. He died, still a committed Orthodox Christian.¹²⁴

What is curious is that Peshkov until 1933 maintained excellent relations with Gorky, and Gorky knew about his intelligence activities.

The Sverdlov brothers, who were active on both sides of the barriers, symbolized the natural political struggle among the Jewish people who, like every nation, were split between different trends, different political camps.

Defeat as Victory

The White movement was overwhelmingly defeated in 1920, and that defeat launched a very interesting process of reorientation of many anti-Bolsheviks who tried to rationalize the Bolshevik victory. One of the first anti-Bolshevik leaders to recognize the Bolshevik regime essentially as a Russian national order was a former prominent leader of the Russian right, Vasily Shulgin (1878–1976), who before the revolution was deputy chairman of the All-Russian National Union, a moderate right-wing party. Shulgin, together with Alexander Gutchkov (1862–1936), pressed Nikolai II to abdicate in March 1917.

In 1920, Shulgin published a sensational book in Sofia in which he said that "under the shell of the Soviet state there is a process which has nothing to do with Bolshevism."¹²⁵ He claimed that "White ideas crossed

the frontier" and regarded as one of those ideas the trend to restore the former Russian empire. According to him, the main reason for the nationalization of Bolshevism was the creation of the Red Army. Shulgin was ironic: Bolsheviks think that they have created a socialist army that is fighting "in the name of the International," but this idea is rubbish. In fact, they restored the Russian army. "Bolsheviks, in fact, raised the banner of united Russia." Shulgin for the first time pointed at the International as an instrument of Russian national policy, as an instrument of expansion for the power that sits in Moscow "up to the boundaries where it meets real resistance from other state organisms." Socialism is a temporary phenomenon, but the frontiers set by the Bolsheviks will remain. Shulgin also noted that personal power was imitated by the Bolsheviks from their predecessors. He regarded the national transformation of the Bolsheviks as an organic process, since White ideas had conquered the Bolshevik subconscious, and forecast the inevitable emergence of a Bolshevik leader who would take advantage of Bolshevik political culture and fulfill "White" goals. For Shulgin, this future leader would be "Bolshevik in the extent of his energy and a nationalist according to his persuasions." He will be neither Lenin nor Trotsky.

Shulgin did not come to the conclusion that the Bolshevik regime ought to be supported. He only predicted its positive transformation. Soon after, a prominent Cadet émigré journalist, Petr Ryss (?-1948), recognized the national character of the Bolshevik revolution—about which, however, he was not overly enthusiastic. For Ryss, Bolshevism was a religious phenomenon, since it was, like Slavophilism or populism, charged with an immense religious faith. Bolshevik views were to him a primitive eschatology. "Through the tinsel of party dogmatism, through socialist phraseology," Ryss said, "become visible the outlines of a strong and deep faith in the sanctity of Russia, in the vocation to save the world which wallows in sin." According to him, "Bolshevik psychology was a typical Russian psychology, with its rejection of the West and its organic distaste for culture."¹²⁶ Ryss thought that the Bolsheviks had disorganized the country according to the will of the popular elements but, according to the same elements, they would have to start the reorganization of the state. Bolshevism became a national reality and it did not differ to any considerable extent from autocracy.

Meanwhile, the people who had earlier advanced a supraorganical solution and were ready for a political compromise with the Bolsheviks in 1918 once again suggested a "new tactic." Konovalov and Riabushinsky had formulated a new approach, according to which "one can discern behind the Bolsheviks, behind the hazy screen, a genuine popular revolution, the process of shifting of all classes, and the regeneration of all tissues of popular life."¹²⁷ The new tactic was a direct continuation of the *Utro Rossii* line.

Miliukov, who had not belonged to the supporters of a supraorganical solution but now joined them, had to recognize that "from then on the 'White' movement helped to strengthen Bolshevism instead of destroying it. It promoted a national feeling as against the foreign intervention and it

made the population realize that they still had to defend their social gains from the claims of the dispossessed privileged class."¹²⁸

Still, this was not a recognition of the Soviet system. Such recognition was nevertheless soon granted by other former Whites. In October 1920, Petr Struve, the foreign minister of the Wrangel government, received a letter from the Far East that was signed by Ustrialov.¹²⁹ Referring to German National Bolshevism, Ustrialov informed Struve that after the defeat of Kolchak in January 1920, he started preaching his own Russian National Bolshevism.¹³⁰ In the same month, Ustrialov published a collection of articles he had been writing since February 1920.¹³¹

What happened to Ustrialov after he fled Moscow? In 1918, he taught briefly at a provincial university. In December 1918, he moved to Omsk, the capital of the Kolchak government and there met his friend Kliutchnikov, who was for a time foreign minister in that government. In their conversation, the latter expressed an idea, fatally attractive to them both, that if the Bolsheviks should win, their victory would mean that Russia needed them and that history would move in their direction. "Anyway, we ought to be with Russia," said Kliutchnikov. "Damn it! Let's meet the Bolsheviks!"¹³²

Ustrialov soon emerged as a leader of the local Cadets. In October 1919, he was elected chairman of the eastern branch of the Cadet party. The defeat of Kolchak plunged him into a terrible state of crisis. He spent three sleepless days and nights in the town of Chita, thinking over what had happened. Suddenly there came a radical conversion. There, in Chita, he finally came to the logical conclusion of what he had said in 1917-1918: He recognized the Bolsheviks' usefulness from the Russian national point of view! He moved from Chita to Harbin, in China, and started actively preaching National Bolshevism. His scepticism of the wisdom of military resistance against the Bolsheviks dates from February 1920, and especially his doubt of the need for military coordination with the West, particularly with Poland. He appealed to the Whites to stop their military struggle against the Bolsheviks since the national motivation for it had disappeared. "The anti-Bolshevik movement," he said, "has tied itself too closely to foreign elements and as a result has endowed the Bolsheviks with a certain national halo."¹³³ Soviet power, according to Ustrialov, had become a national factor in contemporary Russian life. He flatly rejected foreign intervention in Soviet Russia and claimed that "the interests of the Soviet system will fatally coincide with Russian state interests" and that "the Bolsheviks, by the logic of events, will progress from Jacobinism to Napoleonism."¹³⁴

Ustrialov could not well have forgotten his conversation with Kliutchnikov in Omsk, though it was by no means sufficient to provoke the fatal decision proposed by his friend. Indeed, it was not yet clear whether the Whites had been decisively defeated. Wrangel was still fighting a successful war against the Reds in the southern Ukraine, Poland was preparing a major attack against Soviet Russia, and Japan and the United States occupied the Russian Far East. However, Ustrialov decided that the remnants of resistance to the Bolsheviks would very soon be suppressed. Yet this situation, too,

was surely not enough to make such a man recognize the Bolsheviks as national saviors. For his conversion, several components of Ustrialov's conceptual system had to be fused under the pressure of events.

First of all, it was well prepared by his participation in *Utro Rossii* and its attempt to find a compromise with the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the main watershed between *Utro Rossii* and the Bolsheviks was foreign policy issues. Even in 1917, Ustrialov recognized the authentic national character of the Bolshevik revolution; his rejection of the Bolsheviks was based on the wrong assumption that they were weak and undermined the Russian state. Ustrialov was at the time decisively against foreign intervention, even in order to topple the Bolshevik regime. Now the Bolsheviks had demonstrated their strength, Germany had collapsed, and the White movement was also not victorious. The country was to a large extent reassembled by the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the political obstacles to recognizing the Bolsheviks had disappeared—but that fact was not enough to explain his conversion.

It is quite evident from what Ustrialov said in 1917 about the bright future of Russia in the most critical days of the Bolshevik revolution that he was a committed gnostic. Regardless of how close he was to political recognition of the Bolsheviks, at that time he was not yet psychologically prepared for it, and his resistance to the Bolsheviks only became greater when he saw the terrifying and indiscriminate Red Terror. But his gnosticism eventually got the upper hand, and Ustrialov experienced his conversion during a crisis situation. He was not, of course, the only survivor of the White movement, but the majority of the survivors remained staunch anti-Bolsheviks all their lives. The gnostic component of his personality was, however, triggered when his worldview was confronted with total annihilation.

Then, Ustrialov was originally a liberal, but gradually he retreated from his liberalism. He espoused the cause of the new wing of his party, which emerged at the beginning of 1918 to challenge formal, parliamentary democracy. A leading personality of this wing, Petr Novgorodtsev (1886–1924), said: "The revolution must be overcome. One must take from it its realistic goals but crush its utopianism, demagogy, rebelliousness, and anarchy by an unbending strength of will."¹⁵

The *Nakanune* group to which Ustrialov belonged also started to retreat from an unconditional acceptance of the legal state, which was a cornerstone of Cadet ideology. It was recognized at the time that in a crisis situation, an unconditional demand for formal democracy would have to be rejected as harmful. This theory was characteristic of Ustrialov's later rejection of the idea of law as an absolute value.

In Omsk, Ustrialov had been the chief advocate of a so-called pure dictatorship and had appealed to Kolchak to put an end to any form of representative rule. He then came to the conclusion that the transition from democracy to dictatorship was both necessary and historically inevitable. This was an important step toward Bolshevism, though it was not at all sufficient in itself. Ustrialov expressed support for the strengthening of the

Kolchak dictatorship and, as spokesman of the local Cadets, stated that they "oppose the idea of the consultative and legislative body since it would weaken and not strengthen the dictatorship."¹³⁶ It was Ustrialov who exercised the decisive influence on Kolchak to separate him from the left-wing anti-Bolshevik forces. Ustrialov even led the right-wing opposition to Kolchak. But Ustrialov was not alone in his disappointment with formal democracy. There were numerous enemies of every shade of democracy among active Whites and monarchists, but the very idea of recognizing the Bolsheviks would have seemed outrageous to them.

Another national dimension was his distrust of the West, which is explained by his national outlook. He realized that foreign powers were attempting to exploit the Civil War in order to weaken Russia on the world stage. The clear objective of these powers, according to him, was to undermine the strength of the future Russia. Such behavior could not but provoke a hostile reaction on the part of Russians toward the West, regardless of their political orientation. This hostility even increased when Western powers betrayed the Whites by handing Kolchak over to the Bolsheviks for execution even though he was diplomatically recognized by the Entente. The West was a traitor for Ustrialov as well as for the majority of the Whites. For them, it had forgotten Russia's enormous sacrifices during World War I. The West did nothing to help the Whites in their hardship and then, after a brief period of support given for ulterior motives, betrayed them. But this fact, too, was not enough to make a White recognize the Bolsheviks.

There were Russian nationalists among the Cadets who seemed very close to Ustrialov, but they did not recognize the Bolsheviks. For example, Struve could say, "If I believed that Bolshevism, even in the ugliest way, might accomplish the national mission, somehow raise and maintain the national pride of Russia, I, as I am now, as an individualist, as a religious person, as a person who fanatically loves Russia's historical image, the Russia of Peter the Great and Pushkin . . . I would not even for a minute support the Civil War."¹³⁷ It might seem from such statements that there was only one step to the recognition of the Bolsheviks, but this impression would be a mistake. One had, not to take a step, but to traverse a deep gulf.

First, Struve was a realist who relied on common sense. He could not see in the Soviet system more than was visible in it. He accepted traditional values, contributing to the anthology *Iz glubiny*, all of whose authors appealed to national and religious values and to the legal state. To recognize Bolshevism, even pragmatically, even tactically, would have meant a complete break with his past views. Struve was probably closest to Ustrialov, but eventually he courageously rejected him as a dangerous seducer. For Struve, defeat was not victory; it was simply defeat. He was a man of common sense who called a spade a spade.

The retreats from liberal democracy and national messianism were necessary but not sufficient conditions for Ustrialov's conversion. His final decision was made with the help of a powerful gnostic tool—dialectics. He

was a Hegelian; dialectical philosophy affected him very deeply and helped him to find a way out of his desperate dilemma and to interpret total defeat as a glorious victory. He had experienced Hegelian influences even before his conversion as while he was working on *Nakanune*, he had had a conversation with an anonymous person who had said: "I eagerly await a world revolution which would shatter radically the lives of all civilized nations! I wish it since it would stir the deepest world spiritual reaction, which alone is capable of curing contemporary humanity."¹³⁶

Despite not being orthodox religious mystics, Hegelians were able to regard the visible world of events as a mirror image of reality. From every event one could expect its negation and later the negation of the negation. We have here the same model for justifying reality as in gnosticism, and not by chance since Hegelian dialectics has its roots in ancient gnosticism. In spite of the fact that Hegel himself was not a gnostic, his dialectical approach, with its interpretation of progress as the struggle of opposites, is a philosophical rationalization of gnosticism: revival through destruction, life through death, holiness through sin. Such a view proposes a model of the world in which, in consciously seeking one objective one unconsciously arrives at its opposite because of the dialectical qualities of the objective itself.

Thus, the antinational movement of the Bolsheviks became for Ustrialov a national one, and the national movement of the Whites became, on the contrary, antinational. The miraculous world of Hegelian dialectics does not differ from the gnostic world, but what the gnostics explained as mysterious and esoteric, controlled from beyond the sensual being, Hegelian dialectics explained by laws immanent in being. There is no basic difference no matter who uses dialectics; materialists or idealists. It remains a powerful method for reconciling one's self to any reality, by taking disastrous defeats as victories. It allows the cunning dialectician to smile on his enemies (this time the Bolsheviks) while they, as unconscious tools of the world spirit, "heap coals of fire" on him as St. Paul would have it (Rom. 12:20).

These are historical epochs, said Ustrialov on one occasion, when one can follow only the stars. In 1920, a year fatal for him, he had only the starry sky to guide him, but the constellations he perceived were unlike those visible to his contemporaries. The presence in this sky of Slavophiles, Danilevsky, and Dostoevsky is not surprising, though one readily admits that this was a rare combination of planets. But they were only planets. The luminary in this sky was certainly Hegel, whose beams outshone all the Russian thought that excited Ustrialov. One must remember that Ustrialov's heavenly bodies were not exclusively Russian: They included Machiavelli, Giambattista Vico, and, as some suppose, Thomas Campanella, too.

When in this period of crisis Ustrialov scanned this intellectual environment, he underwent a deep and radical conversion. A mysterious internal mechanism armed him and transformed him into a powerful personality, reconciled him with tragic reality, and gave him a firm intellectual foundation.

An ancient pattern overcame all later psychological influences and occupied the central place in his personality. Hegel was the trigger. In a very short time, this influence was to re-form the rest of Ustrialov's thoughts in an entirely new way. He was illuminated by a new world of light, which he saw very clearly. Current tragic events appeared to him as an illusive reflection of profound historical processes beyond the intellectual grasp of his contemporaries. In his defeat, Ustrialov had seen the glorious victory. Now he held the sacred key that would permit him to eventually decide what is good and what bad in our world. Euphoria seized him.

The center of Ustrialov's thought was the dialectical resistance to common sense, and he said that one must really be a great person to stand up against common sense.¹³⁹ Indeed, only certain individuals have such a faculty; Ustrialov certainly belonged among them. Contrary to common sense, he said, "a new age is coming that is deeply rooted in the depth of the highest revelation of the historical spirit."¹⁴⁰ Mass movements are exposed to the "most curious historical dialectics." There is in these movements a game of "cunning reason" in which individual aspirations are merely a "tribute paid by matter to idea."¹⁴¹ On the one hand, there are subjective intentions, aspirations, personal endeavors; on the other, there is the objective logic of historical inevitability.

Ustrialov rejected those people who regarded Bolshevism as demonism and the essence of evil. Bolshevism was only a relative evil that dialectically, could be a weapon for good. "It is everyone's moral obligation to promote such progress," he demanded.¹⁴² He also said: "The movement of pure materialism, saturated with slogans of the body and inferior sensuality, is transformed dialectically and becomes spiritualized in spite of itself. It overflows the boundaries of its own 'logical' content, it acquires power in the sphere of purely spiritual values, and so asserts a new meaning, sanctified by the lives of those who perished for it."¹⁴³

Ustrialov ridiculed the people who supposed that the White disaster was a sign of the imminent end of the world, "since it is not beyond possibility that the current world crisis may rejuvenate humanity's historical being." Thus, the newly converted gnostic perceived the hardly credible revival of the Soviet system! Admittedly, this system was permeated with hatred and negation, but these qualities were only "peculiar guarantees of the vitality of the organism."¹⁴⁴

After his conversion, Ustrialov permanently rejected the legal state. The March revolution, which he first saw as the victory of good over evil, was not interpreted as pure evil, death, destruction, and decay. Now his symbol of Russia during the March revolution was "a silent train covered with the grey, terrible mass of human locusts." Since reason could find no way out, history was made to do so; "breathing in the October frost of a Russia drunk with freedom, thus the giant rebellion was transformed into the great revolution."¹⁴⁵

Ustrialov now claimed that freedom was evil. Formal democracy was everywhere in a state of decline, transforming itself into its own opposite.

One of the most important objectives of the Bolshevik revolution was now the overthrow of the foundations of nineteenth-century formal democratic statehood. Great epochs are far removed from the legalistic perception of life. What is important is, not law, but devotion to the force in which resides the meaning of world history. Ustrialov finally rejected also the idea of moral politics. Being a Christian, he reduced his Christianity to the limited sphere of personal piety in the same way Danilevsky had, who claimed that Christianity should not be interpreted as having direct relevance to political life. Henceforth, the only moral politics for Ustrialov was *realpolitik*.

To Ustrialov, the overthrow of Bolshevism would be fatal for Russia. In his dialectical interpretation, he resorted to the idea of the death and consequent resurrection of Russia. During the revolution, "Russia was to disappear, to be annihilated in order to be resurrected again from this void."¹⁴⁶ Now all was clear with regard to Russia. It must single-handedly be "powerful, great, and frightful to her enemies. The rest will follow of itself" since only powerful states can enjoy great culture.¹⁴⁷ The future destiny of Russia Ustrialov entrusted to dialectics. The state can overcome the revolution through the gradual regeneration of revolutionary elements. Ustrialov no longer expected the encroachment of internationalism on Russia, which was anathema to all Russian nationalists. He pointed out that internationalism was concentrated only in the sphere of statehood and it was a very valuable instrument for the national integration of the Russian state. Moreover, Bolshevism, with its international influence and all-penetrating connections, now became an excellent weapon of Russian foreign policy.¹⁴⁸ Ustrialov was even ready to accept internationalism if it meant permanent and positive links among nations. If, however, internationalism implied the end of the nation-state, it would inevitably face the irresistible opposition of life.

In a brilliant article about Chinese culture, Ustrialov warned, following Danilevsky, about the impossibility and danger inherent in the mixture of different cultures. The very idea of the penetration of European civilization behind the Great Wall of China seemed to him suicidal.¹⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Western civilization was losing its main international tool—Christianity—which now was only an item of imperialist export for "colored" peoples. It might seem a contradiction for Ustrialov to accuse Europe of a decline in Christianity while supporting an openly antireligious Soviet Russia. But there was no contradiction for him, since the essence of the Soviet system remained a creative idea, a religious tide, while, in contrast, there were no religious ideas supporting contemporary European civilization. The anti-Christianity of Soviet Russia was dialectically genuinely religious while the Christianity of Western Europe was dialectically anti-Christian and anti-religious. In the same way, Christian European culture might become an instrument of anti-Christian European imperialism in China.

The end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 was the most interesting stage in Ustrialov's search for roots, probably a part of every syncretic

process. His conversion sharply increased the keenness of his vision. His starry sky became richer and shone more brightly. He discovered in it new planets and stars that he had hardly noticed before. Now they assumed the utmost importance for him. His attention to authentic Russian thinkers increased.

Although Ustrialov increasingly emphasized his Slavophile legacy, he did not identify himself with it thoroughly. He did claim that the Slavophiles always believed in the sovereignty of the people. His rejection of law as an absolute value he also took from the Slavophiles. Now he, who himself rejected autocracy, insisted that the Slavophiles also regarded autocracy merely as a useful public institution, not as an absolute value.

Ustrialov reduced the whole conflict of ideas in contemporary Russia to the revived struggle between neo-Westernizers and neo-Slavophiles, and he considered himself to be one of the latter. "Contemporary Slavophiles," he said, "don't care at all for Slavs, but they insist particularly on the originality of Russia's historical development and of its historic mission. They welcome in the Russian revolution a clear message heralding 'a new era in human history.'" ¹⁵⁰ Thus, the Bolshevik revolution was the inheritor of the "curiously refracted and sophisticated Slavophile spirit."¹⁵¹

Ustrialov again read Herzen.¹⁵² He was magnetically attracted by the religious dialectics of Dostoevsky, who was also a source of his inspiration on the nationality problem. He was enchanted by Shatov's words in *The Possessed*, "God is the synthetic personality of the whole people"—which he interpreted in an entirely new way.¹⁵³ A nation that does not create its own strong, exclusive God is bad. Ustrialov did not notice, by the way, that Shatov came very close to ideas expressed by those God-builders, Gorky and Lunatcharsky. Otherwise he would undoubtedly have used them as ammunition, too.

Ustrialov's search for roots brought him to reject his real godfather, Hegel, whose dialectics confused him by their Western origin. Thus, he claimed that it was better to learn dialectics from Dostoevsky, Leontiev, and Soloviev, than from Hegel.¹⁵⁴ Admittedly, he was perfectly right to emphasize Russian gnostic thought, but he did not see the Western origin of its dialectics. Ustrialov tended to see the Russian intellectual tradition as self-contained and capable of influencing the whole world, but he himself belonged to the "generation of the desert." He was not able to rid himself of Western thought completely. How, for example, could he ignore Spengler, who preached the decline of the Western world and the rise of Russia? Nor could he help referring to the perfidious advice of Machiavelli, who came closest to Ustrialov's world of amoral realpolitik.

Sometimes, however, Ustrialov was seized by doubts. Is dialectics really so omnipotent? At such moments, the spiritual Christianity that he had so carefully isolated from practical life demanded its place in his gnostic system. On one occasion, doubt prompted him to record the following warning: "If Russia should emerge from the crisis as a country devoid of musical civilization [a phrase borrowed from Blok], if she should lose her God, her

living soul—this will be nothing but a specific form of her historic death.”¹⁵⁵ Yet such doubts were overcome by the power of dialectics.

Ustrialov's gnosticism contained even more radical possibilities for facing a reality worse than even the defeat of the Whites during the Civil War. I have already mentioned his ideas about the death and consequent resurrection of Russia. This radical view could be taken to its nihilistic conclusion—the death of Russia—but for the sake of humanity. When this idea was enunciated by Nikolai Rusov (1884—perished in the purges), an extreme gnostic, Ustrialov immediately subscribed to it. For Rusov, and subsequently for Ustrialov, the best expression of love for the beloved country is hatred. Tchaadaev was cited as an exemplary model for imitation. Russia ought to lose itself, its face, reject its identity in the name of humanity and for the sake of humanity.¹⁵⁶

The real objectives of Russia are, according to this gnostic point of view, broader than its frontiers and deeper than its narrow national interests. Russia must liberate labor and creativity, must accomplish the synthesis of civilization and culture, technology and the new man. Rusov called it the “living death,” and Ustrialov later accepted this view without question.¹⁵⁷

Canossa

Ustrialov succeeded in inspiring a movement that was to play a very important role in Russian political life. In November 1920, Ustrialov and the poet Sergei Alymov (1892–1948), who later became prominent because of his popular songs in which, for example, Stalin was glorified, published in Harbin the first National Bolshevik collection, *Okno* (Window). Their editorial said, “We regard our initiative as cutting a small window in the enormous wall of the burning building named Russia.”¹⁵⁸ Two other Russian poets, then in Harbin, who later became very prominent in Soviet literature, a futurist Nikolai Aseev (1889–1963) and Sergei Tretlakov (1892–1939), also contributed to this collection.

In spite of the enormous distance separating Harbin from Europe, Kliutchnikov and Potekhin (who had been a deputy minister of trade in Denikin's government) supported Ustrialov without reservation. Even in June 1920, Kliutchnikov said at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Cadet party in Paris that there were only two roads: Lenin's politics or the unification of all anti-Bolshevik organizations (which was not realistic).¹⁵⁹ Kliutchnikov and Potekhin were joined by other emigrants who belonged to political circles to the right of the Cadets, among them a prominent lawyer and journalist, Alexander Bobrishchev-Pushkin (1875–1958), a former deputy chairman of the Octobrist party (constitutional monarchists). During the Civil War he had actively supported the Whites.

The young Sergei Lukianov (?–1938) delivered a lecture in Paris in February 1921 about positive trends in Bolshevism, distinguishing between Bolshevism and Communism. According to this distinction, pure Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and partly by Krasin, are revolutionary opportunists; Com-

munists are something else. The latter are inspired by Communist internationalism, and led, according to Lukianov, by Trotsky and Zinoviev. He thus separated Bolsheviks and Communists according to nationality, in the hope that at some time they would clash. He stressed the idea of the unity of the former Russian state as a positive trend in Bolshevism, saying that there was a revolutionary evolution of that ideology.¹⁶⁰ Sergei Tchakhotin (1883-) a young physiologist and a pupil of the famous Russian scientist Ivan Pavlov, also joined this group, surviving all of them and working in Soviet biophysics until the middle of the 1970s.¹⁶¹

The members of this group verbalized their common program in the collection *Smena Vekh* [Change of milestones], published in the beginning of 1921 in Prague. The basic theme of this collection is the claim that the Soviet state was now the only Russian national power in spite of its ostensible internationalism. Moreover, it was not even a lesser evil; in specific historical conditions, only the Bolsheviks would be able to restore the Russian national state, the Russian state power. Bolshevism was the Russian national phenomenon; the Russian revolution was a popular mutiny in the style of Stepan Razin (1630-1671) and Pugatchev. The fact that it was joined by many aliens was not confusing, since they were only captivated by the Russian elements and did not play any independent role. Bolshevik internationalism was only camouflage; moreover, it turned out to be a very important and useful instrument for the restoration of Russia as a unified state and also for its further expansion. The *Smenovekhists* welcomed the Russian military who joined the Bolsheviks, and they dedicated their collection to Brusilov. They also saw themselves as the descendants of the Scythians.

Ustrialov's article "Patriotica" took a central place in this collection. According to him, the objective of modern politics must be a "powerful state," since only such a state could possess a "great culture." Ustrialov said that even if 90 percent of the Russian revolutionaries were aliens and the majority of those aliens were Jews, that situation did not disprove the purely Russian character of the movement. There would be no world revolution, claimed Ustrialov. Moscow was sacrificing communism in order to save the state, and Lenin had stopped regarding Russia as a guinea pig.

Bobrishchev-Pushkin contributed a genuine apology of Bolshevism. For him, the only alternative to Bolshevism was anarchy, and he sharply criticized the March revolution and parliamentarism as such: this revolution, with its ideology, was fifty years too late. The lawyer Bobrishchev-Pushkin claimed that the Russian people rejected in principle the liberal ideology of the legal state. There is nothing new about a strong power being accused of keeping its population in slavery. If the state is weak, nobody will blame it for anything. It will abolish itself and perish. Bobrishchev-Pushkin regarded Bolshevism as Russian social messianism. Russia, which leads the victorious camp, is hated because this camp represents the future, and official Europe the past. *Ex Oriente lux!* The Russian people will bring their worn-out brothers universal ideals while themselves suffering immense torment. In

the last resort, Bobrishchev-Pushkin said, the crucial question for defenders of Russian statehood, for patriots, is, What is the Soviet state for Russia? Cement that will hold it together, fill its cracks, or acid that will corrode it? The answer was clear for Bobrishchev-Pushkin: cement, and cement alone.

Kliutchnikov advanced the idea of the mysticism of the state. Bolshevism was a tragedy, but it would be lived out by the Russian people organically; Russia could survive its crisis only by deepening the revolution. He resorted to an unexpected argument: Either all Russians are criminals and responsible for everything that is happening, or, since they cannot all be criminals, a great cause is being carried out in Russia, and one needs to strengthen it more. Still, Kliutchnikov regarded the final target as being genuine liberalism, which would replace the Bolshevik state.

Lukianov excluded the former juxtaposition of Trotsky and Lenin as well as all hints of the possibility of a national clash among Soviet leaders. The Russian revolution, he said, was a traditional Russian radicalism. Russian workers and peasants realized through their own experience the economic necessity of Russian unity. They discovered not only the economic base of Russian patriotism in their defense of their own revolutionary conquests but also acquired a national consciousness of a lofty Russian heroic deed that brings, as one would believe, liberation to all the oppressed peoples of the world.

Potekhin, advancing the same idea that internationalism was a strong instrument in the achievement of Russian national goals, regarded it, as did Dostoevsky, as a result of the universality of Russian culture. He cited Blok as a genius who could discern the invisible Christ under the revolutionary banner. Only in October, he said, had the people for the first time consciously fulfilled their role. He condemned "hardline" communism and "theoretical parliamentarism"; the Soviets were a new form of Russian popular power. Bolshevism was an antinational power, but the national popular mass was transforming it imperceptibly. The Soviet system was destined to fulfill the revolutionary national goal of Russia.

Tchakhotin said that Bolshevism, with its extremism and nightmares, was terrible, an illness, but at the same time it was a logical though unpleasant stage of a country in the process of evolution. He made the fatal appeal "To Canossa": One needs to contribute to the support of Russia. We all must save Russia, make its ways of progress, peace, and welfare easier. More than the others, Tchakhotin stressed that his position was compulsory. If Russia were not surrounded by enemies, if instead there was a solidarity of cultured nations, he would not, he said, have suggested such a point of view. However, there was no other way out. A Bolshevik Canossa!

In the autumn of 1921, the Smenovekhists willingly adopted the term *National Bolshevism*, which returned to them like a boomerang when Struve, protesting against *Smena Vekh*, published Ustrialov's letter to him in the Crimea where this term was used. National Bolshevism sounded far more authentic than Smenovekhism, since the latter might mean any opportunistic collaboration with the Soviet state.

Several months after *Smena Vekh* appeared, Kliutchnikov launched another magazine with the same title, which survived only until March 1922. Then he started a new daily in Berlin, *Nakanune*, which lasted until 1924. Kliutchnikov was evidently stressing a continuity by using the title of the short-lived *Nakanune* of 1918. The new *Nakanune* went considerably further in the direction of unreserved recognition of the Soviet state, and it attracted to Smenovekhism many emigrants who were exhausted by war and torments and hoped that now the Soviet state would gradually become more tolerable and even moderately liberal. *Nakanune* appealed to White emigrants to return to Russia. In spite of the fact that *Nakanune* appeared in Berlin, there was also a Moscow branch, which published a literary supplement.¹⁶²

If Ustrialov defended only certain limitations of parliamentarism, Kliutchnikov now defended totalitarian democracy as a goal, appealing for the planned reorganization of the world and for active intervention in the course of history. It seems that he had fallen under Gorky's direct influence and was professing a new version of the Forwardist philosophy of collectivism. If Gorky praised the Volga Bulgarians for exterminating their too-talented people, Kliutchnikov referred to Aristotle, who said that the state needs only mediocre people and it ought to ostracize not only the too-bad but also the too-good citizens.¹⁶³

Kliutchnikov, as Ustrialov in 1916, openly defended imperialism as a principle, arguing that nationalism and internationalism were in fact identical in their eventual goals, differing only in means and ways. Internationalism, he said, was only a logical outcome of national-etatist egoism, since the latter served the cause of integration of all nations no less than the most unselfish internationalism. Huge imperialist states, in Kliutchnikov's view, that united large territories and many peoples were a "valuable achievement of internationalism."¹⁶⁴ These views coincided literally with those of Tchitcherin on "supra-imperialism."¹⁶⁵ Russia must once again become a great power, and Kliutchnikov appealed to Russia to occupy a place in international life that would prevent the creation of hostile coalitions of states.¹⁶⁶ Lukianov also fell under the influence of the Forwardist philosophy of collectivism, and he referred in a very positive way to the Bolshevik policy of social mobilization.¹⁶⁷

The last Russian Holy Synod procurator under the Provisional government, Vladimir L'vov (1872-?), went even further than *Nakanune* in his recognition of Bolshevism. Before the March revolution, L'vov belonged to the Octobrists; then to the nationalists. He played an ambivalent role in September 1917, when the rebel general, Lavr Kornilov (1870-1918), used him to send his ultimatum to Kerensky. In November 1921, L'vov delivered a lecture in Paris in which he declared himself to be a National Bolshevik. According to him, Communist ideology had no chance of being applied in Russia. "Suspended in the air, this grandiose idea will serve humanity for a long time as a beacon, to which they will approach very slowly, but it will not bring any immediate results in the country where it was declared. The revolution, liberated from this idea, will take the course of historical

necessity, submitting to the chains of historical laws." The idea of the Russian revolution, L'vov said, "came up against the stone wall of the real conditions of Russian life. . . . No idea can surpass the lack of education, the archaic agriculture, the industrial backwardness. The more grandiose an idea, the further it is from reality.¹⁶⁸ L'vov, however, regretted that the Communist idea had not succeeded in Russia since, if the Communist experience had been useful (he had in mind War Communism), it would have saved not only the Communist theory but also Russian culture from popular savagery.¹⁶⁹

L'vov also praised Bolshevik nationality policy. "What emperors could not achieve by police measures is being done very naturally in the name of human solidarity and the defense of the oppressed classes. . . . Social justice serves the Russian state better than all the bayonets and police measures."¹⁷⁰ A Russian Communist, L'vov said, has in his heart at one and the same time an ostensible love for the International and a secret love for Russia.¹⁷¹ Like Shulgin, Ustrialov, and other Smenovekhists, L'vov claimed that there was a transformation of International slogans into Russian slogans. The Bolshevik uprising was undertaken in the name of the welfare of all humanity. However, in fact, the activity of the Soviet state was directed to the defense of Russian national interests. Soviet ideology is Russian ideology. L'vov had faith in Russian messianism.

Meanwhile the nationalism of Russian reaction was ruining Russia.¹⁷² L'vov, as Ustrialov, saw himself as a descendant of the Slavophiles. He regarded the Soviets as analogous to the deceased Russian commune. "The Soviet," he said, "is a fragment of Russian communal self-government, and that is why it is close to the people."¹⁷³ The idea of self-government, implicit in the commune, overcomes all party and political struggle, since all those who participate in a commune "are united by common activity in the name of the common ideal." Is not this the objective," L'vov asked, "which the Soviet state put before itself?" Unfortunately, it was not. L'vov did not realize that in 1921 the Soviets were already deprived of any real meaning and all power in Russia was in the hands of the party administration. "The Petersburg period," L'vov continued, "which the Slavophiles so hated, is finished. From the depth of centuries, the Russian uniqueness emerges for creative work for its own sake and for that of all humanity."¹⁷⁴ L'vov suggested the following program: "Maximum benefits for the Russian people."¹⁷⁵

Alexei Tolstoi (1882-1945) was a prominent Russian writer even before the revolution and was close to mystics such as Voloshin.¹⁷⁶ He had always been an ardent nationalist; during the Civil War he joined the Whites and emigrated. However, his own reorientation began even before that of Shulgin and Ustrialov.

In February 1920, Tolstoi wrote to a friend: "Russia is becoming formidable and strong. . . . We have all already passed the period of pure destruction and are entering a destructive-creative historical period. We will also see a creative one."¹⁷⁷ One can discern here the Bakunin-Tkatchev theory of revolution, which is hardly a coincidence. Tolstoi had probably already seen



Alexei Tolstoy (photo from A. Tolstoy, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 2 [Moscow, 1953], p. 1).

their writings. Naturally he joined Smenovekhism and became the editor of *Nakanune's* literary supplement.

"Let our roof be humble," he said in 1922, "but it is we who live under it. . . . If history has reason," he continued, following the mystical dialectics, "and I believe that it has, everything that is happening in Russia is done for the sake of world salvation." Tolstoy referred to Russia as a savage, mad country that exists in opposition to common sense. He said that one must "do everything in order to help the revolution develop in the direction of enrichment of Russian life, in the direction of extraction of all good and all justice from the revolution, in the direction of destruction of all the evil and injustice brought by the same revolution, and eventually in the direction of strengthening Russia as a great power." Yes, there was no freedom in Russia, "but does a soldier look for freedom in battle?" A personality in Russia is liberated through the creation of a powerful state.¹⁷⁸

Naturally, Tolstoy as a writer had to reflect his reorientation creatively. His major work then was his novel *The Road to Calvary*, the first part of which was published in 1922. Unfortunately, the book underwent many transformations later, and the authentic version is the first edition, which was luckily translated immediately into English. In this book, Tolstoy gives

a broad picture of the Russian intelligentsia on the eve of the war and during it. According to him, the revolution was a completely authentic Russian enterprise to which no aliens contributed. It was a result of the internal dynamics of Russian society and even more generally of the Slavs. The revolution was frightening but not hopeless. Evil is an instrument of good.

A provincial says:

The Slavs number more than two hundred millions and they breed like rabbits. Secondly, the Slavs succeeded in creating a powerful military state like the Russian Empire. Thirdly, the small Slav groups, notwithstanding the process of assimilation, are organizing into independent units and are striving toward what is known as Slav federation. Fourthly, and this is most important of all, morally the Slavs represent something quite new and in a sense highly dangerous to European civilization, the type of a seeker of God. And God-seeking—mark my words, . . . is a negation and destruction of our modern civilization. I seek God, that is, the truth within myself. For this purpose I must be free, so I destroy the moral foundations beneath which I am buried and I destroy the state that keeps me in chains. Why can't I lie? steal? kill? Tell me? You think that truth lies only in the good. But I will go and kill purposely and cross that most painful thing of all, conscience, and will find truth in despair.¹⁷⁹

Tolstoi demonstrated how the Russian intelligentsia began to develop its destructive ideas. A Ukrainian girl who joined the anarchists thinks: "Modern civilization had come to this monstrous pass. The state consumed itself for the sake of equality, which was universal slavery. There was only one issue: to destroy to the roots our present world civilization and on the liberated and desolate earth, to begin to live for the sake of oneself."

On the other side, the Bolsheviks nurture the idea of totalitarian democracy known from the Forwardists. The Russian Bolshevik worker, Gvozdk, explains his political philosophy:

"During the revolution there will not be equality; there will be dictatorship. Revolutionary ideas are implanted in fire and blood, as you ought to know."

"And what will you do with your revolutionary proletariat when the revolution is over? Will you level the whole class . . . or will you allow your worthy revolutionary aristocracy to remain somehow or other?"

Gvozdk stopped and scratched his beard.

"The proletariat will return to its lathes. . . . Of course you are bound to come in conflict here with human nature, but what are you to do? The tops must be lopped off."

Tolstoi expressed his firm conviction that Great Russia would revive. His main positive character, Ivan Telegin, says:

We won't perish now. . . . Great Russia lost! The grandchildren of those ragged peasants, who with their staffs set out to rescue Moscow, defeated Karl XII, drove the Tartars [sic] beyond Perekop, captured Lithuania and on their

rafts began to haunt the shores of the Pacific Ocean. . . . And the grandchild of the boy who was brought to Moscow in a sleigh, built Petersburg. . . . Great Russia lost! If only a district is left after us, Russia will grow from that.

One of Tolstoi's creations was the science-fiction novel *Aelita*. He placed the scene on Mars, which is none other than a symbol of the West while the Earth is Russia. This device enabled him to conceal his most intimate thoughts so that nothing hindered his reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. An engineer, Los' (Tolstoi), escapes to Mars in order to extricate himself from a desperate situation (i.e., emigrates from Russia to the West). He is followed by a typical Scythian a former Red Army soldier, Gusev. Los' finds Mars (the West) in total decline and, not unnaturally, in a mood of deep gloom. The Martian leader Tuscoob has told his people: "We shall not manage to save civilization by destroying the city. We shall not even thereby postpone its end. But we shall help the Martian world to die with dignity and in peace."¹⁸⁰ One of Tuscoob's opponents, Gor (a Western Communist), hopes that Mars might be saved by Earth (i.e., Russia):

"We were born to live. We know that Mars is doomed to extinction. But there is salvation—it will come from the Earth, the people of the Earth—a sound, fresh race with hot blood."

Tuscoob lifted his eyebrows and went on unperturbed: "You say, depend on the immigrants from the Earth? Too late for that. Infuse new blood into our veins? Too late—too late and too cruel. We shall only prolong the agony of our planet. We shall only add to our suffering, for we shall inevitably become the slaves of our conquerors. Instead of meeting our end with dignity, we shall again enter the weary cycle of centuries. What for? Why should we, a frail and wise race, work for the conquerors?"¹⁸¹

Tolstoi did not believe in Western Communists and thought they had no will for life. He put the following words in the dying Gor's mouth: "But for us, there is nothing but ice deserts, death and agony. Aye, we've let our chance slip by. We should have loved life furiously and ardently—ardently."¹⁸² Only Russians know how to enjoy life. Gusev, the Scythian, thinks only of one thing, how to annex Mars to Earth (Soviet Russia).

Tolstoi was true to his convictions to his death, and he played a very important, even central, role in the formation of Soviet culture and its real ideology. Many people regard him as an opportunist, but even a very superficial analysis shows that his political opportunism never deviated from his main point, National Bolshevism, although following this line was not the only way to survive in the USSR. On the contrary, Tolstoi made less of an effort to adapt himself to Soviet reality than other writers. Jurgen Rühle's comment that the idea of communism's being Russia's national fate dominated Tolstoi's thought is perfectly correct.¹⁸³ One of Tolstoi's major contributions to Russian culture was his monumental novel on Peter the Great, the first volume of which was published in 1929, in which he was evidently seeking Russian historical continuity under the Bolshevik regime.

All of this writing was foreshadowed by the ideas he advanced in 1922-1923.

Smenovekhism in Bulgaria

Probably the strongest mass movement inspired by Smenovekhism was in Bulgaria where many Wrangel troops (mostly Cossacks) awaited their fate. These troops were completely demoralized, and any ray of hope could have ignited the mass demand for return. Slashchev's return to Russia and Smenovekhism could have had a very simple message for the Cossacks: the new victorious Bolshevik government will permit them to return home without revenge.

A group of committed National Bolsheviks managed to take over this movement. Their main leader, Alexander Ageev (1897-1922), was soon assassinated by the Whites, and the leadership moved to A. Bulatsel, M. Adamovitch, and a former rector of St. Petersburg University, Erwin Grimm (1870-1940), a Russian German. In the framework of this movement, several White generals issued an appeal on October 29, 1922, saying that the White movement that had emerged under the slogan of defense of the motherland had been a well-manifested anti-Russian movement for a long time. On February 2, 1923, they issued another appeal in which they said that the Soviet system, which enjoyed full popular support, was step by step rescuing the decent standing of the motherland from international predators and strengthening the stability of the frontiers and the territory of the Russian state.

Soon a Cossack congress, which assembled 4,000 people, was convened in Sofia. It adopted a resolution according to which the congress unconditionally submitted itself to the only legal Soviet power that existed in Russia. This power had "accomplished the national objective of the re-gathering of the Russian state, the defense of its interests in international affairs, and at the same time it does not furl the international banner of the liberation of the world's toilers."¹⁸⁴

It is important to notice that the Bulgarian Smenovekhists stressed all the national points of Smenovekhism, but at the same time they did not express any hope for the restoration of some democratic institutions, or the restoration of the market economy as, for example, did Ustrialov. They accepted everything about Soviet Russia, and in fact belonged to the left wing of Smenovekhism. M. Adamovitch wrote in December 1922 that even though the Soviet system was becoming more and more national, it was in fact a supranational entity that organically united national and international. He criticized those Smenovekhists who hoped for restoration.¹⁸⁵

A poet, Vladimir Kholodkovsky, said in March 1923 that the "USSR is not only a state of the historical development of Russia as some ethno-territorial entity. . . . It is a turn on the way of evolution from nationality to humanity. . . . If Moscow of Kalita could 'assemble the Russian land' into a great empire of glory and oppression, the Soviet Moscow had started



The meeting of solidarity with the Hungarian and Bavarian revolutions, 1919. Front row: first from right, with glasses, M. Litvinov; second from right, V. Lenin; second from left, Shmuel Agursky (1889-1947), the author's father, who was at the time deputy chairman of the Jewish section of the Communist party and, later, director of the party history institute (photo from the author's collection).

'assembling' the earth of all humanity into the future united kingdom of toil and freedom."¹⁸⁶ The effort was clearly an imperialist quest for Russian world domination that went much beyond original Smenovekhism. Kholodkovsky quoted Kliuev's "We are the host of sunbearers" in order to prove his claim.

The principal leader of the Bulgarian Smenovekhists, A. Bulatsel, explained the strong stream of National Bolshevism among the Whites in the following way:

The abandonment of the White camp, the reconciliation with Soviet Russia among emigrants, is channeled through two ideological riverbeds. One trend stresses the national-etatist motivation, and another trend stresses the social-political one. National-etatist motivation is reduced to the claim that the revolution, and Bolshevism as its most active part, had restored the state unity and power of Russia. They work successfully on the restoration of its international influence and prestige and step by step return Russia its historical objectives—the advance to the Bosphorus, hegemony among the Slavs, the pressure on India in controversy with Anglo-Saxons, the cleaving of new roads to the open sea.

All the sins of the Soviet system are temporary. In due course this system will acquire polish, will make an evolution, will liberate itself from its youthful passions and the influence of the revolutionary period, from its class origin, and will gradually be transformed into a "genuine" national etatist power.¹⁸⁷

Grimm had formerly been a violent anti-Bolshevik. In May 1917, he asked pathetically, "Must we lay down our arms to Lenin and not believe that the Russian people who survived the Tatar yoke will survive and digest Lenin too?" During the Civil War, Grimm worked in Denikin's propaganda service.¹⁸⁸

Almost all the leading Smenovekhists returned to Russia—Kliutchnikov, Bobrishchev-Pushkin, Lukianov, Potekhin, L'vov, Bulatsel, and Tolstoi—as did many other former Whites.¹⁸⁹ Grimm was simply expelled from Bulgaria in 1923 in a group of eighty to a hundred others, who were sent to Odessa. After his return to Russia, he was employed, together with Kliutchnikov, by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as an adviser.¹⁹⁰ Among the minor Smenovekhists who returned one might point out Ivan Sokolov-Mikitov (1892-1975), a second-rate writer who lived until the 1970s as a quite popular Soviet literary patriarch. Soon after his return, he sent a letter abroad in which he said that contemporary Russian Westernism "is only a trick that rabbits perform in order to confuse dogs. And it is not by chance that 'Westernizers' are exclusively Jews. Only a thin European veneer covered Russia in the past. It has been washed away, and only pure Asia remains."¹⁹¹

A former secretary of the Russian embassy in Madrid, Yuri Soloviev (1872-1934), who had joined the Smenovekhists just after their emergence, went back to Russia at the end of 1922. On January 3, 1923, he published an article in *Nakanune*, in which he stressed the reemergence of Russia as a great power, a new world center. "Thousands of threads stretch to new Moscow and also thousands of threads come from it. They reach Japan, South America, Australia. . . . Nothing human is alien to us and in our turn we are very close to all human."¹⁹² It is clear that Soloviev was simply paraphrasing Dostoevsky.

Ustrialov severely criticized other Smenovekhists, accusing them of abandoning their principles. He was not quite right: There were certain changes in their views, but essentially, they all belonged to left-wing National Bolshevism, only expressing more commitment to the Bolsheviks. Although Ustrialov remained alone among them, it was he who had the most important impact on Soviet society of them all. Ustrialov refused to return to Russia, although he was offered a professorship in a Siberian university, since he decided that only a decent position in Moscow would be suitable for him.¹⁹³

Smenovekhism in Soviet Russia

Meanwhile, Smenovekhism found wide support in Soviet Russia among professional intellectuals and the military, who also welcomed the transformation of Soviet Russia into a national state in spite of the revolution, which had tried to destroy its national face. Although some Scythian mystical ideas were also integrated, the majority of the *Smena Vekh* supporters were

pragmatic and did not cherish any mystical dreams. For this reason, Smenovekhism soon became the ideology of the Russian professional intelligentsia, who served the new state.

An outstanding representative of this trend was Ivan Alexandrov (1875–1936), a leading Russian expert in energetics who later was chief engineer of the famous Dnieper hydroelectric plant. In his book on economic planning, for example, he advanced the central Smenovekhist claim that revolutionary Moscow had assembled around it the rest of the previous empire much more quickly than it had been done by the same Moscow in the sixteenth century. Later, he made the following rationalization of the Russian professional intelligentsia's Smenovekhism: "Smenovekhism appeared in our country for a comparatively short period of time as a trend in journalism that tried to demonstrate to the average professional that there is no threat toward him in communism. Only work diligently, and then history will itself bring the Bolsheviks to a safe haven, their 'secularization' will take place, all freedoms will be declared, according to Ustrialov's expression and so on."¹⁹⁴ He was probably right in presenting in this way the right-wing Smenovekhism of Ustrialov, but Alexandrov belonged to the left-wing trend of this group.

Dmitrievsky was much more assertive in his description of the influence made by Smenovekhism on all the Russian professional intelligentsia, and even on those party members who came to the Bolsheviks from other parties, as he had. "The impression," he said, "was tremendous. . . . [*Smena Vekh*] bridged us with historical Russia. It brought a new sense to our work and our struggle. It was said that we and our deeds are pages of Russian history, and not something accidental, superficial, beyond time and space."¹⁹⁵

Although Smenovekhism was formulated abroad, it had deep roots in Soviet Russia itself. In general, it would be a grave anachronism to separate in this period the emigrants and the people in Soviet Russia proper. These two sides were not separated by an Iron Curtain, and they enjoyed mutual influence. Both *Smena Vekh* and *Nakanune* were freely on sale in Soviet Russia and had good circulation. After 1921, the Smenovekhists were openly active in the largest Russian cities, many of them sending their articles abroad. There were many public debates and, as a result, collections of articles on this issue. One of the former leading Cadets, Professor Nikolai Gredeskul (1864–?), became a leading Smenovekhist. He, like Kliutchnikov, refused to believe in the fall of the Russian people, and on that premise he accepted Russian messianism. "Soviet Russia is a bastard," he said, "and if so, the blame for this falls on all the Russians, and they cannot be cleared of this accusation, since the whole people must not submit willingly to a criminal gang. Or, Soviet Russia is a germ—the germ of a new humanity, an attempt of toilers to fulfill their age-old dream."¹⁹⁶

Guber agreed that "the great power policy of the Soviet state is a fait accompli," and he anticipated that eventually Russia would become "the Third Rome." Dark popular instincts and external pressures made the

Bolsheviks deviate from their original road.¹⁹⁷ In fact, under the cover of *Smenovekhism*, a wide range of National Bolshevik ideas appeared that often had only vague links with the *Smena Vekh* movement.

But the real triumph of National Bolshevism in Soviet Russia began when *Smenovekhism* became a focus of the Soviet official media and even of party life. At that period of time, all emigrant press material was widely read by party officials, and the Central Party Committee received leading emigrant press members, as did some of the provincial party committees. In April 1921, the presidium of the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee (i.e., the office of the president) subscribed to every leading emigrant newspaper, receiving twenty copies of each.¹⁹⁸

The first official positive reaction to Ustrialov's first collection was Yaroslavsky's article in *Pravda* with the conspicuous title "Patriotica." Yaroslavsky, who only several months before had protested against a book by Tchaianov because of its Russian nationalism and Slavophilism, this time stressed as positive Ustrialov's hopes for the Russian national revival and his appeal to the Whites to abandon their armed resistance against the Bolsheviks as quickly as possible. Yaroslavsky wrote:

Communists are confident that the state will disappear in the future. However, Communists know that during the period of the transition to communism, when big imperial states exist, the weakening of our statehood means death. Communists struggle for statehood for the sake of the proletarian revolution all over the world. In this struggle they become, in the eyes of such patriots as Professors Ustrialov, Gredeakul, former generals such as Polivanov, Brusilov . . . and others, the only force that is able to defend deeply popular and national interests. . . .

The close federative union of the Russian republic with all the provinces—the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and others—is the only way for any genuine patriot who loves Russia and who is still able to prevent the plunder of all Russia by imperialists and her transformation into their colony.¹⁹⁹

A few weeks later, a leading Soviet literary critic, Alexander Voronsky (1884–1943), once again commented on Ustrialov. Voronsky claimed that Ustrialov's book was of extraordinary interest. "Communists," he said, "try to take advantage of people like Ustrialov for the triumph of the common cause of the world's workers, while the Ustrialovs try to use the internationalism of Communists for the triumph of old great power and national-patriotic ideas."²⁰⁰

The situation became more sensitive when *Smena Vekh* appeared in Prague. Open approval of Russian National Bolshevism was dangerous, since it would provoke dissatisfaction among many non-Russian Communists. Moreover, many authors of this collection openly expressed liberation from communism as their final objective. This goal created from the very beginning a certain duality in the official attitude to *Smenovekhism*.

One can hear the first badly hidden reaction to *Smena Vekh* in Steklov's *Izvestia* editorial on August 14, 1921, which bore the characteristic title:

"The Triumph of the Crucified" and was written in the tradition of Russian mysticism. "The 'forgotten and miserable Rus' now shines on all the world," said Steklov, "illuminated with the truth. It subjugates the hearts of all the toilers on the face of the earth. . . . Now the Russian people, this lamb that took upon itself the cross of the world, this hero who joined battle with the father of lies and the lord of the capitalist darkness—is the object of love and adoration for the oppressed and the insulted."

"The Slavophiles always claimed," Steklov also said, "that the Russian people will say its word and reveal its truth. It did so, but not in the form dreamed of by adherents to national uniqueness. The Russian people has accomplished, not the truth of humility, but the truth of struggle; not the truth of slavery, but the truth of revolution."

Only two months later, on October 13, 1921, Steklov published a very positive editorial in *Izvestia*, almost without criticism, about *Smena Vekh*, claiming that its contributors expressed "genuine mood and interests of wide circles of the intelligentsia, if not of today, then certainly of tomorrow." He suggested reprinting their articles widely. On the next day, *Pravda* published an article by a senior party official, Nikolai Meshcheriakov (1865–1942), who directed Soviet political censorship. He gave *Smena Vekh* an extremely positive appraisal. "The contributors to the collection," he said, "preserved many traits of their old mentality. However, life is a teacher, and they are apt pupils. The logic of life will make them go further and further down the road of rapprochement with revolution."

Several days later, Trotsky elevated the encouragement of *Smenovekhism* to the rank of state policy, stressing mainly its National Bolshevism. "The *Smenovekhists*," Trotsky said, "from patriotic considerations, came to the conclusion that the salvation of Russia lies in the Soviet state and nobody can defend the unity of the Russian people and its independence from the external threat in contemporary historical conditions besides the Soviet state, and it needs help. . . . They approached, not communism, but the Soviet state through patriotic gates."²⁰¹

Trotsky recommended the dissemination of *Smena Vekh* as widely as possible: It was vitally important, he said, to first of all supply the military with such ideas. This statement was the first on this issue to be delivered by a Soviet leader, and it indicates that Trotsky was a main advocate of *Smenovekhism*, though, as we will see, its principal "shadow" advocate was most certainly Lenin himself.

The real eulogy of *Smena Vekh* was, not surprisingly, given by Lunatcharsky. First of all, he gave an interview in which he said: "Leading government and party circles follow with great interest the change that took place within Russian emigrants. We will be very happy if they will return to Russia and collaborate with the Soviet state. . . . There are in Russia many who have undergone the same evolution as our emigrant groups." Lunatcharsky, however, warned the *Smenovekhists* against any attempt to create their own party, which might compete with the Bolsheviks.²⁰² Later, he asked: "How could it happen that 'right-wing patriots'

and 'active counterrevolutionaries'" could agree to collaborate with the Bolsheviks? His own answer was, "They took arms against us because they saw us as ruinners of Russia as a great power." According to him, the Smenovekhists were "national liberals and sometimes almost national conservatives with a Slavophile lining; they are representative of the most vital circles of the strongest groups of middle and probably only partly of dominant classes."²⁰³

Lunatcharsky accepted practically all *Smena Vekh* arguments. "Now," he said, "the Smenovekhists realized that the Soviet constitution does not contradict Russia's interests as a great power." Having looked attentively at the tactics of the Communist International, they realized, though in a "crooked and wrong way," that these tactics "serve the interests of Russia as a great power, bringing her friends both in the West and in the East among millions of oppressed people." He went further, pointing at nationalism as a social force that could collaborate with communism. "It is likely that apart from communism there is in Russia a genuine bourgeois patriotism, the remainder of the vital force of individualist groups and classes. If it exists, it will gather around the unique banner raised by the knights of the *Smena Vekh*." Lunatcharsky hoped that the Smenovekhists would be long-time allies of the Communists.

Ustrialov was deeply satisfied with this Soviet reaction, praising what was said by Steklov, Lunatcharsky, and Trotsky: "The Bolsheviks manifested neither party dogmatism, nor narrow sectarian intolerance in their estimation of slogans of reconciliation," he said, expressing, however, his dissatisfaction that the Smenovekhists had been in fact welcomed overenthusiastically. "We are with you," Ustrialov said, "but not yours. . . . We recognize the Red banner only since it is blossoming with national colors."²⁰⁴

One can discern, however, another theme in the appraisal of Smenovekhism.²⁰⁵ One of the sources of this theme can be fixed upon: minority Communists. Naturally, they tried to express their opinion through the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, led at that time by Stalin. Its main organ, *Zhizn' natsional'stei* [National life] tried to calm their anxiety, treating Smenovekhism as a marginal phenomenon. It published an editorial, probably written by its editor, Trainin, a former Forwardist, which said that though Smenovekhism had its origin in the feeling of insulted and frustrated patriotism and national self-respect, a result of the Entente that pushed the Whites to fight Russia, many Smenovekhist expressions "cannot help grating on the ears." The editorial stressed that Communists preached, "not the Russian spirit, but the ideas of international communism." Bolshevism was born, not of the Russian spirit, but of capitalism. "We are proud, not so much of the 'Russian spirit,' as of the 'world soul' we have acquired."²⁰⁶

Still, the editorial stressed, though very cautiously, the positive value of Smenovekhism. Its ideology was treated as the ridiculous self-consolation of people who have submitted to the Soviet state. One can sense the growing anxiety among minority Communists from an article that, trying to calm those Communists, attempted to distinguish between Smenovekhist

and Cadet nationalism. Although Cadet nationalism was bourgeois, that of *Smena Vekh* was rather a survivor of the time when capitalism was very young and Slavophilism and Russian messianism had been born. In order to neutralize the negative impact of official support of Smenovekhism on the question of national boundaries, the article argued that the collaboration of Central Asian national movements with the Soviet state was also Smenovekhism. This inflated interpretation of Smenovekhism was exploited widely in order to conceal Russian National Bolshevism, the real background of Smenovekhism. "Both 'Russian' and 'Eastern' communisms are out of the question," the article declared.²⁰⁷ The article could not ignore the fact that local Central Asian nationalists gloatingly pointed to the official recognition of Smenovekhism by the Soviet media.

This explanation could hardly calm the people to whom it was addressed. The article mentioned a prominent Tatar Communist (most certainly the famous Mirza Sultan-Galiev [1880–after 1930], the leader of the Tatar party organization and a member of the *Zhizn' natsional'stei* editorial board) who had commented on *Smena Vekh*: "No doubt it is the collapse of the anti-Soviet front and an important victory of the Soviet state, but it rather looks like the *victorious conquest of a city struck by plague*." Sultan-Galiev soon opposed the party line and in 1923 became the first senior party official ever to be arrested. No doubt, Smenovekhism contributed to his transformation. However, the magazine continued to claim that National Bolshevism was an innocent toy. Trainin said, "We will not be weaker if . . . we will be supported by our former enemies, even if they will cherish only an ephemeral thought that they are doing it for the sake of the Russian people."²⁰⁸

It seems inconsistent, but one of the main adversaries of Smenovekhism was Pokrovsky, Lunatcharsky's deputy. Indeed, Pokrovsky was also a Russian revolutionary nationalist, as were the majority of the former Forwardists. However, Smenovekhism, which then regarded national elements in Bolshevism as a guarantee of the eventual restoration of non-Communist Russia, was completely unacceptable to him. In addition, Pokrovsky's criticism of Smenovekhism versus its positive appraisal by his superior, Lunatcharsky, was most likely a manifestation of their personal struggle. Strangely, Pokrovsky accused Ustrialov of a lack of dialectics!²⁰⁹ According to Pokrovsky, the new Soviet system was separated from the past by an unbridgeable abyss, so Smenovekhist dreams were no more than naive fantasy. It is very curious how Pokrovsky exploited dialectics, forgetting completely an iron dialectical law, the last part of Hegel's triad, according to which a synthesis consummates the former struggle of opposites. If so, Ustrialov was right and not Pokrovsky.

Gorky was not very happy about Smenovekhism. He wrote Kliutchnikov that Smenovekhism was rootless since on the one hand it was alien to the heroic intelligentsia that had remained in Russia and on the other it would hardly be able to persuade emigrants. He did not want to cooperate with *Smena Vekh*.²¹⁰ Gorky's behavior is easily explained. Like Pokrovsky, he was too radical to accept this ambivalent ideology, and, apart from that,

Smena Vekh believed in the Russian peasant—Gorky's nightmare. Still, he realized the pragmatic value of this trend for the Bolshevik state. In December 1921, he recommended L'vov's book to Lenin,²¹¹ though he regarded it as somewhat mediocre. "L'vov will please Lenin very much," Gorky wrote, "although he will certainly not deceive him."²¹² Later, Gorky encouraged Tolstol to leave *Nakanune*.²¹³

Lenin's Intervention

In May 1921, Ustrialov received a message from Moscow that his collection was on Lenin's desk. According to this message, Lenin had given his personal staff strict instructions to bring him all Ustrialov's articles immediately, by special messenger. Lenin also wanted to arrange Ustrialov's triumphal return to Moscow.²¹⁴ When *Smena Vekh* appeared, Lenin suggested to *Pravda* that Kliutchnikov's article on international relations be reprinted, and he also recommended him as a member of the Soviet delegation to an international conference in Genoa.²¹⁵ Lenin also instructed his staff to mail him Sme-novekhist publications, and he read them systematically.²¹⁶ But his first public statement on Sme-novekhism was made in his address to the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922. He said:

The *Smena Vekh* . . . is a socio-political trend led by some of the most prominent Constitutional-Democrats, several Ministers of the former Kolchak government, people who have come to the conclusion that the Soviet government is building up the Russian state and therefore should be supported. They argue as follows: "What sort of state is the Soviet government building? The Communists say they are building a communist state and assure us that the new policy is a matter of tactics: the Bolsheviks are making use of the private capitalists in a difficult situation, but later they will get the upper hand. The Bolsheviks can say what they like; as a matter of fact it is not tactics but evolution, internal regeneration; they will arrive at the ordinary bourgeois state, and we must support them. History proceeds in devious ways."

Some of them pretend to be Communists; but there are others who are more straightforward, one of these is Ustryatlov. I think he was a Minister in Kolchak's government. He does not agree with his colleagues and says: "You can think what you like about communism, but I maintain that it is not a matter of tactics, but of evolution." I think that by being straightforward like this, Ustryatlov is rendering us a great service. We, and I particularly, because of my position, hear a lot of sentimental communist lies, "communist fibbing", every day, and sometimes we get sick to death of them. But now instead of these "communist fibs" I get a copy of *Smena Vekh*, which says quite plainly: "Things are by no means what you imagine them to be. As a matter of fact, you are slipping into the ordinary bourgeois morass with communist flags inscribed with catchwords stuck all over the place." This is very useful. It is not a repetition of what we are constantly hearing around us, but the plain class truth uttered by the class enemy. It is very useful to read this sort of thing; and it was written not because the communist state allows you to write some things and not others, but because it really is the

class truth, bluntly and frankly uttered by the class enemy. "I am in favour of supporting the Soviet government," says Ustryalov, although he was a Constitutional-Democrat, a bourgeois, and supported intervention. "I am in favour of supporting Soviet power because it has taken the road that will lead it to the ordinary bourgeois state."

This is very useful, and I think that we must keep it in mind. It is much better for us if the *Smena Vekh* people write in that strain than if some of them pretend to be almost Communists, so that from a distance one cannot tell whether they believe in God or in the communist revolution. We must say frankly that such candid enemies are useful. We must say frankly that the things Ustryalov speaks about are possible. History knows all sorts of metamorphoses. Relying on firmness of convictions, loyalty, and other splendid moral qualities is anything but a serious attitude in politics. A few people may be endowed with splendid moral qualities, but historical issues are decided by vast masses, which, if the few do not suit them, may at times treat them none too politely.

There have been many cases of this kind; that is why we must welcome this frank utterance of the *Smena Vekh* people. The enemy is speaking the class truth and is pointing to the danger that confronts us, and which the enemy is striving to make inevitable. *Smena Vekh* adherents express the sentiments of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, or of Soviet employees. . . . This is the real and main danger.²¹⁷

Lenin seemed to be favorably disposed toward Smenovekhism, and more than that, he favored Ustryalov over the group's left wing. However, he somewhat distorted Smenovekhism's political accents, though formally he was correct in calling Smenovekhism an ideology of bourgeois restoration. No doubt, the majority of Smenovekhists shared the hope of restoration; almost all of them hoped that as a result of national evolution, Russia would revive not only as a great power but also as a country with a market system and a wealthy peasantry. Still, one can discern that the second part of their hope was not vital for them. First of all, they looked toward the restoration of Russian state power. If they had thought that, for example, the Bolshevik system would guarantee Russian greatness in the quickest way possible, they would not have hesitated in their preference. They opposed communism only as they saw it during the War Communism period. However, the Soviet state never returned to that form of communism. No further evolution of the Soviet state changed its social foundation, which was the system of increasing social stratification where all power belonged to the new class, the nucleus of which was the party apparatus. Bakunin forecast this potential of state socialism. Capitalism was a value for the Smenovekhists only because they saw it as the most efficient economic system, but they by no means wanted to restore it as a form of social oppression.

Still, it is doubtful as to where Lenin was sincere in his warnings. It seems that he would have preferred to dramatize the Smenovekhists' quest in order to attract general attention to them. He definitely saw them as a new expansion of the social base of the Soviet state. However, Lenin's ambiguous criticism of Smenovekhism did not satisfy many of the congress

delegates, and several prominent Bolsheviks attacked Lenin indirectly. A left-wing Communist, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko (1884-1939), then the chief army political commissar, lumped together the SR, Cadets, and Smenovekhists because of their alleged common hope for the degeneration of the Soviet state. In doing so, he obscured the uniqueness of Smenovekhism. According to him, Ustrialov did not differ from Miliukov, who also expressed his hopes for the internal evolution of the Soviet system, though on different premises. Since Miliukov was a committed enemy of Bolshevism, the similarity cast doubts on Ustrialov's loyalty: In Antonov-Ovseyenko's view, Smenovekhism seemed to be only a harmful and subversive trend.²¹⁸ It is curious that Antonov-Ovseyenko, who was then close to Trotsky, differed from him in their appraisals of Smenovekhism.

Much sharper criticism of Smenovekhism was leveled by Mikolai Skrypnik (1872-1933), the people's commissar for education at that time in the Ukraine, which explains why *Zhizn' natsional'stei* had decided to calm its readers. Skrypnik was as anxious as the "prominent Tatar Communist" about the official encouragement of Smenovekhism, hinting at its anonymous supporters in the congress and in the party as a whole. Skrypnik definitely regarded Smenovekhism as the ideology of Russian nationalism and tried to extend it to all attempts to curtail the small amount of Ukrainian national independence which that region still enjoyed. "The one and indivisible Russia," Skrypnik said, "is now also a Smenovekhist slogan." He tried to be as explicit as possible. "There is a trend toward the liquidation of the statehood of workers and peasants which was obtained by the power of workers and peasants of this country. The question of the liquidation of the worker-peasant Ukrainian statehood is put on the line here by some supporters of Smenovekhism," Skrypnik said, mentioning no names. During his speech, a defiant Jewish Bolshevik, Lozovsky, shouted from his place, "The one and indivisible Russian Communist party!" provoking Skrypnik's criticism and an attack on both Lozovsky and Lenin for such a slogan. Skrypnik complained that "officials of the state apparatus consist not of Communists but of Smenovekhists."²¹⁹ Zinoviev also sounded negative with regard to Smenovekhism, although, being afraid of Lenin, he was careful not to take public issue with him. However, Zinoviev assigned to Ustrialov words the latter never said: "They will degenerate, they will eat each other."²²⁰

Thus, there was a certain duality in the official party attitude toward Smenovekhism. Trotsky, Lunatcharsky, Steklov, and Meshcheriakov, supported by Lenin, were ready to exploit Smenovekhism while others, like Antonov-Ovseyenko, Pokrovsky, Sultan-Galiev, and Skrypnik, were deeply dissatisfied at the very thought of taking advantage of Russian traditional nationalism. However, as we shall see later, the subsequent main opposition to Russian nationalism was to be leveled by Zinoviev and Bukharin.

As far as one can see from his archives, Ustrialov had occasional contacts with some senior Soviet officials, for example, Yulian Marchlevsky (1866-1925), a former Polish-German Communist who had collaborated with Karl

Liebknrecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Marchlevsky was in Harbin in May 1922 and sent Ustrialov a note urging him to expand his activity in the Far East.²²¹ Meanwhile, *Nakanune* was secretly subsidized by Moscow, and it was through Dmitrievsky that money for the newspaper was transferred.²²²

Gorky's Attack Against Jewish Bolsheviks

Gorky became a nuisance because of his persistent lobbying for the intelligentsia, and Lenin pressed him to leave Russia, ostensibly out of concern for his health.²²³ Gorky left Russia in October 1921, but he soon clashed with the Bolshevik government because of the SR trial in Moscow, which he condemned. The clash provoked a temporary conflict between the two sides, and Gorky was quick to take advantage of this short break for some important political offensives.²²⁴

On April 29, 1922, the leading New York Yiddish socialist newspaper *Forwärts* published a sensational interview with Gorky and the Yiddish writer Sholom Asch (1880-1957) in which Gorky resumed his old attack—in abeyance since 1918—on Jewish Bolsheviks. The pretext for this new attack was the so-called campaign for the confiscation of church treasures, which was, in fact, a countrywide campaign against the Russian Orthodox church.²²⁵ Many young Jewish Communists were mobilized for this campaign.

In his introduction, Asch disclosed that there was a terrifying explosion of anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia, which had reached such proportions that the entire Jewish population was "sitting on hot coals." This anti-Semitism, Asch said, had now penetrated beyond anti-Bolshevist circles: "Anti-Semitism in the Red Army," he said, "acquired such a cannibal character that only iron discipline and the death penalty prevent violence." Anti-Semitism was widespread not only among soldiers but also among workers and all the urban population. According to Asch, the new anti-Semitism exceeded anything known before in Russian history. The Russians, he explained, thought that the Jews were taking revenge for their former persecution.

Gorky himself said that

the reason for anti-Semitism is the tactlessness of Jewish Bolsheviks (certainly not all of them), . . . of those irresponsible boys who profane the sacred things of the Russian people, who turn churches into cinemas and reading rooms, who don't pay attention to the feelings of the Russian people. Jewish Bolsheviks must leave this job for Russian Bolsheviks. However, Jewish commissars took upon themselves the sacred things of the Russian people. A Russian, worker or peasant, is cunning and reticent. He will put on an easy face, he will smile, but in the depths of his soul he will never forget that Jews undertook the profaning of his sacred things. We must fight against it. . . . For the sake of the Jewish future in Russia we must warn Jewish Bolsheviks: Hands off the holy things of the Russian people! You are capable of doing other important and creative works, don't meddle in these problems which belong to the Russian church and the Russian soul!

Certainly, Jews are innocent. There are many provocateurs among the Bolsheviks: old Russian officials, scoundrels, and all kinds of vagabonds. It smells of provocation when Bolshevik leaders send Jews, uneducated, irresponsible youths, to carry these jobs out. . . . Jews must keep themselves apart from this. Jews must realize what poison is accumulated in the soul of the Russian people. There are certainly very able people among the Jewish Bolsheviks. Trotsky is a genius, in my opinion. Jews played an important role in the economic revival. If Jewish Bolsheviks would do what they are capable of doing, they would be loved in Russia. Today, however, because of the irresponsible behavior of young Jewish Bolsheviks who don't pay attention to the tragic situation of the Jews, all Russia cries that all the Jews profane Russian holy things. . . . I wanted to warn a few of the Jewish Bolsheviks: Hands off Russian holy things!

Gorky stressed that he was then in conflict with the Bolsheviks; however, he also stressed that no alternative government was now feasible in Russia: "Russia may be restored *only by Jews* [italics added] since they are the most able and active people in the country." Meanwhile Gorky condemned as vandalism persecution of the Hebrew language by the Jewish Bolsheviks.

When Gorky spoke about provocateurs who sent Jews to perform unpopular jobs, whom had he in mind? He was a very well-informed person. Indeed, why was Lenin interested in nominating Trotsky as the secret coordinator of this campaign?²²⁶ Was it because of his new personal intrigue against Trotsky? Machiavelli recommended that the prince involve in an unpopular but necessary campaign a person of whom he was more afraid than others in order to get rid of him later.²²⁷ It is not clear, however, whether Gorky knew of Trotsky's role in this campaign since he publicly paid tribute to him in this interview.

What Gorky said was only a verbalization of what many Bolshevik leaders thought themselves, as events were to demonstrate later, but the interview provoked a stormy reaction throughout the Jewish world. The Soviet Yiddish official paper, *Der Emes* [The Truth], attacked both Gorky and Asch, calling them "cowards" who "suggest a means that is worse than the evil itself. . . . What do they suggest? That Jews will abandon any participation in the government apparatus?"²²⁸ Only the Zionists were jubilant. They had always claimed that the Jewish problem could not be solved in the USSR, and now Gorky himself had confirmed their opinion.²²⁹

Since a Communist Yiddish newspaper in the United States, *Freiheit* [Freedom] claimed that Gorky's interview was a forgery, Gorky published another in which he only dismissed his having said "hands off." But that was a minor detail since he did not deny anything else and, moreover, he escalated his accusations, extending them for example to Jewish participation in the confiscation of food from peasants during War Communism.²³⁰ Gorky also condemned as a provocation statements claiming that Jews were assigned the most dangerous operations in the Tcheka.²³¹ He once again paid tribute to Trotsky, this time stressing that Trotsky had saved Russia from anarchy and was a man who understood the soul of the Russian people. For his

part, Trotsky, it was reported, defended Gorky at a Politburo meeting while the latter was still in Russia.²³²

Gorky went so far as to send a special letter to a Russian-language Zionist magazine published in Berlin. He once again corrected his interview, claiming that he had not spoken about the reasons for anti-Semitism but had tried to explain its increase and its transmission from the city to the Russian village.²³³ Gorky also gave several other interviews to Jewish publications,²³⁴ and when he later launched his own quarterly in emigration, he demonstratively gave space to Zionist writers.²³⁵

Cultural Continuity

Meanwhile, a new Soviet literature emerged. It was originally split into the privileged "proletarian" literature, which posed as the only legitimate class-oriented literature, and the wrong (from the ideological viewpoint) but permitted literature of the so-called fellow travelers (a nickname coined by Trotsky),²³⁶ which based itself on the Russian and world cultural heritage.

The first trend did not survive and left only a few traces in Soviet cultural history, since it tried to swim against the current and ignore the cultural legacy. However, its cultural nihilism did not contradict its assertive Russian etatist nationalism. As an example of the first approach, one can quote a typical (for this time) statement made by an avant-gardist critic, Kornely Zelinsky (1896-1970), who later became a leading Soviet literary critic. It has been quoted by a contemporary Soviet-Russian nationalistic critic, Viktor Petelin, in order to prove Zelinsky's national nihilism. "Yes," Zelinsky said, "the Russian people were not lucky as a people. . . . We start our life as if from the very beginning, hindered by no prejudices, by no conservatism of the complicated and developed old culture, by no obligations toward traditions and customs apart from prejudices and customs of our animal past, from which our thought and heart are difficult to estrange, but from which one turns away with disgust, with a feeling of happy relief as after recovery from a lasting and almost incurable illness."²³⁷

Petelin is completely hypocritical in blaming Zelinsky and other second-rate critics for such an approach. We have seen that it was a dominant view shared by leading Bolsheviks, who inherited it from Russian revolutionary nationalism, and shared by Lenin himself, who combined an ardent etatist Russian nationalism with a disdain for historical Russia, which remained for him a barbaric country. He said one should "not shrink from adopting dictatorial methods to hasten the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, without hesitating to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism."²³⁸ The same view was repeated by Pokrovsky, Bukharin, and many other Bolsheviks.

At the same time, the Russian cultural heritage put its iron grip on the new state, and the purely etatist nationalism gradually integrated some parts of it. Fellow travelers served as a Trojan horse, regarding the Bolshevik revolution as the Russian national revolution. There was, however, a great

difference between fellow travelers and the classical Russian heritage. The former were militant antihumanists resorting to the genuine cult of violence. Contemporary Soviet literary criticism pays considerable attention to national trends in early Soviet literature, and it seems that Oleg Mikhailov has managed to formulate their meaning in the best way, taking into consideration his various ideological constraints.

Using ordinary Soviet political symbolism, Mikhailov says that the "revolutionary proletariat came out under the unfolded banner of internationalism, ideas that did not reject the content of Russian culture, patriotism, and the feeling of national pride. However, all these concepts acquired a new quality." He formulates, quite correctly, the following question, which he regards as central for early Soviet literature: "What is the meaning of 'mother country' for a man, for a citizen, for a writer?"²³⁹

Fellow travelers later became the mainstream of Soviet literature and received all the important positions while the "proletarian" literature was mercilessly destroyed. These writers were concerned with several issues from which I will pick out only two problems: the village versus the city and the rejection of the West.

The Village Versus the City

It is not surprising that this problem attracted so much attention in literature. Indeed, Lenin's strategy, taken from Bakunin and Tkatchev, vindicated itself. The destructive stage of the revolution was extremely successful. Many things were ruined, including the working class itself, which allegedly carried out the revolution. Part of the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the middle class were exterminated, part emigrated. The country was flooded by peasant elements. The Red Army was recruited from among the peasants, and party members were to a large extent recruited from among former peasants. There was a far-reaching demographic revolution in Russia, and new layers of Russian people were summoned by history. Tchaianov published in 1920, under a pseudonym, a novel about a peasant utopia in which he forecast the successful struggle of the village against urban culture, accomplished by the total destruction of the latter. The final battle was predicted by Tchaianov for 1937, after which Moscow would actually disappear, becoming only a large memorial.

During the period of War Communism, the Bolsheviks alienated the peasants by the policy of food confiscation, and as a result there were huge peasant uprisings in Central Russia and Siberia, which were brutally suppressed.²⁴⁰ But peasant resistance did its job: The Bolsheviks abandoned War Communism and the policy of food confiscation. The peasants had won their first battle against the city.

It is quite natural that the majority of the fellow travelers regarded the village as Russia's main hope. When Sokolov-Mikitov came back to Russia, he sent a letter abroad: "City died. . . . Russia is alive in the village."²⁴¹ Writers who shared this view constituted something that might be called rural National Bolshevism.

Boris Pil'niak (*Vogau*, 1894–1937) Pil'niak, a prominent Soviet writer, occupies a special place in Soviet literature as a main spokesman of rural-oriented National Bolshevism. He admired the cruelty and violence of the Civil War, stressing the peasant character of the Bolshevik revolution, which returned Russia to pre-Petrine times. In his novel *The Naked Year*, written in 1918–1920, Pil'niak introduced the distinction between Bolshevism and communism. He was decisively against the West and Western civilization. One of his characters, Ordynin, stated:

I've spent a good deal of time abroad and always felt like an orphan there. The people in their bowler hats, jackets, dinner jackets, frock coats, the trams, buses, the subways, skyscrapers, the dazzle, the brilliance, hotels with all modern conveniences, restaurants, bars, baths, the finest linen, and female night staff who come quite openly to satisfy unnatural male demands—and what social inequality, what bourgeois customs and rules! and every worker dreams about stocks and shares and so does the peasant. And everything is dead, a mass of machines, technology and comfort. The path of European culture led to war, "fourteen was able to create this war. The machine culture forgot about the culture of the spirit, the spiritual."²⁴²

Pil'niak regarded the revolution as an organic source of the nationalization of the new Russia: "And the Revolution set Russia against Europe."²⁴³ However, for Pil'niak, the Bolshevik revolution was the return to rural pre-Petrine times, not to Peter the Great:

Immediately after the first days of the Revolution, Russia, in its way of life, customs and towns—returned to the seventeenth century. . . .

In Russia there was no joy, but now there is. . . . The Russian intelligentsia did not follow October. And it couldn't. Since Peter, Europe hovered over Russia, but below, under the rearing horse, lived our people, like a thousand years ago, but the intelligentsia are the true children of Peter.²⁴⁴

He stressed the sectarian character of Russia, claiming that the sectarian movement was the dominant factor of the revolution:

Popular rebellion is the seizing of power and creation of their own genuine Russian truth—by genuine Russians. And this is a blessing! . . . The whole history of peasant Russia is the history of sectarianism. Who will win this struggle—mechanized Europe or sectarian, orthodox, spiritual Russia?²⁴⁵

Another character, Archbishop Sylvester, regards the Bolshevik revolution as the continuation of the peasant struggle for freedom and the Pugatchev rebellion:

Serfs ran away to the Don, to the Yaik—and from there went in rebellion to Moscow. And now—they've reached Moscow, seized their own power and have begun to build their own state—and they will build it.²⁴⁶

A Russian peasant, the sorcerer Yegorka, says:

I spoke out at a meeting: there's no Internashnal, but there is a popular Russian Revolution, a rebellion—and nothing more. Like Stepan Timofeevich's.—“And Karl Marx?” they asked.—“A German,” I say, “so he must have been stupid”—“And Lenin?”—“Lenin,” I say, “was of peasant stock, a Bolahevik, and I suppose you are Communesta. . . . But get rid, too, of—the Communesta!—the Bolahevika, I say, will sort things out by themselves.”²⁴⁷

The setting of this novel is a Russian province, which is intended to demonstrate that the sources and the character of the revolution depended very little on “Communists,” aliens who were only in the cities. The only alien, a Lett, is marginal.

In April 1922, Pil'niak wrote in *Nakanune*:

Povertyridden, naked,
barefoot, hungry,
lousy, savage.

—Yes, it is my Mother country, my mother.²⁴⁸

In June 1922, Pil'niak declared himself to be a Smenovekhist in a private letter: “New Russia came. . . . Those who want to be with Russia ought to live in Russia. They ought to transfer their landmarks there. I congratulate *Smena Vekh* . . . as a search. I am myself essentially a Smenovekhist.”²⁴⁹

A declaration Pil'niak made in 1924 is very characteristic: “I recognize that the Communist system in Russia is determined—and not by the will of the Communists but by the historical lots of Russia, and since I would like to follow . . . these historical lots I am with the Communists, i.e., since the Communists are with Russia, I am with them. . . . I confess that the lots of the Russian Communist party are less interesting to me than Russian lots, the Russian Communist party is only a link in Russian history to me.”²⁵⁰

Vsevolod Ivanov (1895–1963). If Pil'niak turned out later to be not very compatible with the Soviet system, and perished during the great purges, Ivanov became a leading Soviet writer. His first novel, which brought him fame, was *The Armored Train 14-69* (1922), a novel about the Russian guerrilla war in the Far East against Japan and the United States, supported by the Whites. It is a Russian popular war, a war of local Russian peasants, partly sectarians. One of the most committed Red partisans is an Old Believer. Fighting on the Bolshevik side, this Russian peasant fights his old persecutors, the state and the official church—which is not at all in contradiction to his faith.

Still, the Russian popular peasant war has its international dimension. Russia becomes for them the messianic center of the world. A Russian peasant tries, though unsuccessfully, to persuade an American of the legitimacy of his cause.²⁵¹ However, the only real Russian allies are the

Chinese, and Sin-Bin-U, a Chinese, sacrifices his life for the revolutionary cause.

Leonid Leonov (b. 1899). This very important Russian writer was still alive at the time these lines were written. When he was young, he promised to be a great master, but ideological pressures crushed his talent. Nevertheless, Leonov has always exercised a very important influence on Soviet literature. In his early creative period, he saw the revolution as deeply Russian, a popular cause badly needed first and foremost by the Russian peasant. Leonov lacks internationalist or messianic motives. He simply presents the Russian people as the main driving force of the revolution. One might get the impression that he was influenced by Tchaianov. He is so confident in the strength of the Russian peasantry that he regards everything that happens in the city as marginal. In his novel *The Badgers* (1924),²⁵² the two main heroes are brothers and peasants. One becomes a Bolshevik commissar, the other the leader of an anti-Bolshevik peasant uprising. Both sides of the conflict are rural. Like all National Bolshevik writers, Leonov admires violence.

In his novel *The Thief* (1927), Leonov verbalized a straightforward totalitarian idea. His main hero, Mitka Vekshin, a former Red Army officer of peasant origin who later became a supercriminal, says:

Mankind can't do without a shepherd. In one of his poems Donka says: "Behind the mountain peaks the sun shines, but the road over the mountain is dangerous. . . ." There's sense in that, I tell you! You won't lead men to the light unless you harness them with an iron yoke. I've been living with the mouzhiks this summer, and, take my word for it, they need a kind father, but a father with a rod. They'll remain as they are for another five hundred years, like an undiscovered vein of ore.²⁵³

It is not surprising that Leonov became a main pillar of Soviet literature under Stalin and after him.

The Rotting West

Another strong and increasing trend in Soviet literature was the rejection of the West as degraded and rotting. The most important motive in this trend was anti-German as Germany was regarded as the most conspicuous example of philistine degradation. This opinion was shared by many Bolsheviks, though it was mostly verbalized by the fellow travelers.

Konstantin Fedin (1892-1977). A most outspoken critic of Germany and later a leading Soviet writer, Fedin was chairman of the Soviet Union of Writers after World War II, which meant that everything he said was of great importance. He had been a Russian prisoner of war in Germany and was personally strongly embittered against that country. Fedin became a personal friend of Gorky, and everything he did was approved of and even encouraged by Gorky.²⁵⁴

In his play *Bakunin in Dresden* (1921), Fedin contrasted the Slavs, represented by a powerful Bakunin, with the degenerate Germans. The



Konstantin Fedin (photo from *Tvorchestvo Fedina* [Moscow, 1966], p. 69).

national superiority of Bakunin vis-à-vis the Germans is evident. Bakunin says: "Those who are with us, the Slavs, are on the right path. Our nature is great and simple. Those who are enfeebled and diluted by what decrepit old Europe crams into the world don't suit us. We have an internal plenitude and the vocation to pour it like fresh spring sap into the veins of stiffened European life."²⁵⁵

His novel *Cities and Years* (1924) followed the same trend of juxtaposing Russia and Germany. Germany is a rapacious militaristic country full of hatred; militarism has become its national characteristic. This country has no future, anything alive in Germany clings to Russia. Meanwhile, Russia is a foothold of genuine humanity, but even German Communists have the same abominable features as ordinary Germans. Fedin, however, had to obscure his total condemnation of Germany in order to avoid the retroactive accusation of defensism during World War I. A Russian student, Andrei Startsov, was interned in Germany during the war and witnessed unbridled German chauvinism. Returning to Russia, Andrei meets there his former German friend Kurt, who has in the meantime become a Communist, though he has changed only the direction of his basic existential hatred. Andrei asks him:

Has anything in you changed? I've remained the same: the very word war is repulsive to me."

"Wait," said Kurt, "wait, wait. I understand you. . . . But do you really suppose that I haven't thought about this? There are many kinds of war! And how will you annihilate war if not by war itself? If not by opposing war? Why, there's no other way, no, no, no!"

He stamped his foot and shouted:

"Blood, blood, that's what frightens you. And this eternal fear that evil gives birth to evil. And what can you offer me in exchange for evil? My veins are being drawn out of me, a thread at a time, endlessly, for the whole of my life. And it is suggested I build my life on good, because evil breeds evil. Where can I find good if there's evil all around me? Prove to me that it's impossible to attain good through evil." . . .

"That means the greatest thing in your life during these years was love?"

Andrei said:

"Yea."

And again waiting several minutes, in the cold night, in the darkness, he said:

"And in mine it was—hate."²⁵⁶

Eventually Kurt shoots Andrei dead when the former realizes that Andrei did not arrest another German prisoner of war in Russia, a monarchist officer who once helped him in Germany. This symbolic juxtaposition between Russia and Germany is unambiguous. The officer Andrei saved recorded in his diary in 1918:

I found Russia in revolution. I don't know her as being any other way. I think of the millions of kilometers lying prostrate like Picheur. The seventh century. With November, snow has started to fall. People hide in their dens, sleep for six months. If that is revolution, what came before it? . . .

Amid this primeval grandeur—settlements called towns and, here and there, fields. These strata are suitable for colonization. A colony has still to pass along the path of enlightened tyranny. Then, perhaps the future will open before it. Here they need feudal lords, not socialists. (Are socialists needed anywhere at all?) Feudal lords will force them to learn to work sensibly. There is no other means of forcing them to plant corn where rye has been scorched by the heat.²⁵⁷

The theme of Germany appears once again in Fedin's novel *The Brothers* (1927). A Russian composer, Nikita Karev, studies in Germany and unwittingly provokes the suicide of a mediocre German musician who realizes his lack of creative importance vis-à-vis this talented Russian. Karev returns to Russia and being accused of not having participated in the revolution, replies: "I came to the Mother Country and did not find her. But I want to find her, since without her it is impossible to live. . . . I cannot fulfill myself without the Mother country."²⁵⁸

In *Transvaal* (1925), a South African, Svaaker, caught by the course of events in the Russian revolution, decides to be its leader. In broken Russian, Svaaker exclaims: "We are cultured people, we ought to rule events. We

ought to be the head of this terrible revolution. . . . Svaaker will help to make revolution, make America."²⁵⁹ Certainly, the personality of Svaaker is a symbol of the abortive alien participation in the revolution. It is exactly the message of *Transvaal* that is accepted by contemporary Soviet literary criticism.²⁶⁰

It is interesting that Fedin, in spite of his closeness to Gorky, did not share the latter's hatred of peasants. Fedin wrote to Gorky in 1925 that "the future culture will depend on the peasants."²⁶¹

Marietta Shaginian (1888-1982). This writer was a central personality of Soviet literature. In a very interesting way, she became one of the bridges between prerevolutionary Russian religious mysticism and the mainstream of Soviet culture. An assimilated Armenian, Shaginian became an ardent Russian nationalist. She was a pupil of Merezhkovsky and Hippius and regarded the revolution as an essentially religious accomplishment.²⁶² The Bolshevik revolution appeared to her as a great moral transfiguration. Like many mystics, she discerned a Christian background in Bolshevism. Shaginian stressed the national continuity of Bolshevism and became an ardent anti-Western spokeswoman. She claimed that there was a new "Slavophile-Bolshevik consciousness" and wrote: "Russian history is not yet finished, it was not interrupted. It is being made now by people in leather jackets, and only lunatics in the Mother Country and in emigration don't see, don't understand, don't feel that these leather jackets are akin to Peter and possibly also to elements of the pre-Petrine time, that it is a power and, what is more important, that it is our power." Shaginian said that "the dimming sun of the Occident is ready to rise in the Orient."²⁶³ In 1922, in an article "We and the Germans," she discussed the confrontation between Slavs and Germans.²⁶⁴

Certainly, she was influenced also by Spengler, since she explicitly referred to him in 1923, saying that "the Spenglerian subject is not invented. Only its scope is invented." Shaginian declared that there was a new age—"the liquidation of the European mentality."²⁶⁵ Later, she became obsessed by the pathos of the socialist modernization of Russia, which she regarded almost in the spirit of the God-builders, a sacred creation of the new world.

Mikhail Prishvin (1873-1954). Active in literature even before the revolution, Prishvin's blossoming as a writer came after it. Gorky regarded him as one of the best Soviet writers.²⁶⁶ Prishvin resorted to pantheism, which was, however, very national. It was a pantheism of Russian nature, of the Russian world. He said, "The smell of earth, the smell of its grass, bread, flowers, bind the man to his Mother Country more than anything else." He even claimed that "every people creates its artistic images partly under the influence of its national drink."²⁶⁷

In his large and very deep novel *The Chain of Kashchei* (1923), his hero, Misha Alpatov, spends several years in Germany as a student, enchanted by Goethe and Nietzsche but deeply disappointed in the German Social Democrats. He ridicules Bebel and German reformism. Contrary to that, Prishvin professed the idea of universal catastrophe, which he later identified with the Bolshevik revolution.²⁶⁸

He exercised an extraordinary impact on modern Soviet literature; in fact there is now something like a rediscovery of Prishvin.²⁶⁹ Vadim Kozhinov, a Russian ultranationalist literary critic, recently declared that "our time is the age of Prishvin."²⁷⁰

Futurists. The Russian literary and artistic avant-garde—Russian futurism—also professed ardent Russian nationalism and the rejection of the West from its very origin before the revolution. At the height of the crisis over Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the creators of futurism, Velimir Khlebnikov (1885–1922), distributed leaflets among the Slav students in St. Petersburg University in which he said:

Slavs! Lübeck and Danzig look to us in silent question—these cities with German populations and Slav names. Your injuries are great, they are enough to make a cavalry regiment of revenge—let us bring them from the Don and the Dnieper, from the Volga and the Vistula. . . . Should we not understand that what is happening now is the struggle between Germanism and Slavdom? . . . Russian horses know how to trample the streets of Berlin with their hooves. Immanuel Kant is on the list of Russian subjects. I bless you, the war for Slav unity, wherever you come from: from Poznan or from Bosnia! Come! I bless you, the sacred, the necessary, the imminent war for the trampled rights of the Slavs! Away with the Habsburgs! The bridle for the Hohenzollerns!²⁷¹

The principal leader of Russian futurism, Vladimir Maiakovsky (1893–1930), was no less ardently nationalist and even chauvinist. His violent chauvinism virtually exploded after war with Germany broke out when he wrote disgusting couplets for political placards. One of his most moderate statements was made in November 1914 when he wrote that Russia was fighting in order not to become a German grainbag. "If Germany," he said, "had not made any attempt up to now to stunt Russian growth, it was only because it regarded us as a new colony which, when it was ripe, would fall by itself into German jaws with guns instead of teeth."²⁷² In December 1914, Maiakovsky falsely predicted: "It will take a month, a year or two, but I am confident: The Germans will look in confusion at the Russian banner flapping in the Berlin sky while the Turkish sultan will see the day on which the Russian shield will be glimpsed over the gates of Constantinople from behind mournfully faded half-moons."

Maiakovsky also waged the old Herzen-Bakunin arguments appealing to Russians to impose the Russian will, that daring will of the Orient, on the rotten West. He did not single out Germany from France or England. One can grasp the background of this violent anti-Westernism, which had a strong cultural foundation. The futurists relied upon purely linguistic experiments that had no chance of being understood and translated into foreign languages. They were Russian purists and opposed the influence of foreign words. They placed the same emphasis on the Russian language as the main background of culture as the Forwardists had only a few years before.



Vladimir Maiakovsky (photo from I. Ehrenburg, *First Years of Revolution* [London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962], p. 96).

Moreover, they were Westernists exactly as the Forwardists had been. Maiakovsky said at the time that "for us to 'be Europe' is not a servile imitation of the West . . . but the strain of our own forces exactly as it is being done there." This statement directly coincides with what Gorky, for example, always said. "Literature," said Maiakovsky, "which had in its ranks Khlebnikov, does not emerge from an imitation of books published by 'cultural nations' but from the bright riverbed of our own primordial world, from the Russian folk song. Give it its head! Maiakovsky appealed for the exclusion of foreign words from the Russian language to make it authentic. The influence of the assertive nationalism of Italian futurism also contributed to the nationalism of Russian futurists. During the war, Maiakovsky largely lost his previous anti-German imperialist chauvinism, but his basic anti-Western orientation stayed with him for the rest of his life.

Another prominent futurist, Vasily Kamensky (1884-1961), was also an ardent Russian nationalist. In 1916 he published, for example, a poem in which he said, among other things:

I am roaring like a bull, being happy that my motherland—
mother—is the Russian land, Russian land, Russian land!

I am ready to live my life again, only knowing the words
 "Russian land." . . .
 I know no deeper awareness than being a Russian
 I know no deeper feeling than being a Russian lad
 a genuine Russian lad.²⁷³

It is not surprising that almost all the futurists became ardent supporters of the Bolshevik revolution (I have already mentioned Ivnev and Aseev) or that Maiakovsky became the most popular Soviet revolutionary poet who, after Gorky, is now regarded in the USSR as a founding father of contemporary Soviet culture.

One of many examples of how Maiakovsky regarded the West versus revolutionary Russia is his grotesque poem, "150,000,"²⁷⁴ in which he contrasts the generalized Russian, Ivan, to the West. The giant Ivan crosses the Atlantic on foot, as if he is walking on land. He arrives in the United States to fight President Woodrow Wilson, who is the incarnation of the evil West. Oleg Mikhailov noticed that "revolutionary internationalism [for Maiakovsky] . . . the most important national feature of the Russian people on the decisive stage of its historical development."²⁷⁵

The futurist artist and photographer Alexander Rodtchenko (1891-1956) went to Paris in 1925. He wrote from there: "Yesterday, looking at the fox-trot public, I wanted very much to be in the East and not in the West. . . . How simple, how healthy this East is, and it can be seen only from here. . . . Idiots, how can they not understand why the East is more valuable than the West? . . . Take technology from them, and they will remain a scabby dunghill, helpless and sickly." He stressed that his rejection of the West had no class meaning: "The light from the East is not only a liberation of toilers, the light from the East is a new attitude to man, to woman, to things." Essentially, he spoke of a new civilization. When Rodtchenko was criticized for his Paris letters, Maiakovsky passionately defended him during the public discussion saying, "These are the words of a revolutionary."²⁷⁶

In the same vein, Larisa Reisner wrote from Germany in 1923 to her friends: "If you only knew what is the death and decay of the whole nation. It stinks like a dead volcano."²⁷⁷ Esenin visited Germany at the same time and also sent a letter from there expressing his national arrogance: "Let us be Asians, let us stink, let us scratch our buttocks shamelessly in sight of everyone. Even so, we don't have such a putrid smell as they have inside. No revolution is possible here. Everything is at a standstill, a dead end. Only an invasion of barbarians like us can save and reshape them. The march on Europe is necessary."²⁷⁸

Gorky as the Godfather of Contemporary Soviet Literature

Gorky and also Lunatcharsky became the main protectors of the fellow travelers, legitimizing this trend in official Soviet culture and later making it dominant. For this reason there is no doubt that Gorky was a founding

father of the Soviet system in his role as the main bridge over which a considerable part of the Russian cultural heritage crossed the abyss created by the revolution. Gorky shaped this heritage as a committed National Bolshevik himself.

Almost all the above-mentioned writers enjoyed his support and protection, which were not interrupted even during his period of emigration. His favorite Russian writers were Prishvin, Sergei Sergeev-Tsensky (1875-1958), and Alexei Tchapygin (1870-1937), but he also liked very much Fedin, Leonov, Vsevolod Ivanov, Alexei Tolstoi, and many others. He had a voluminous correspondence with dozens of Soviet writers.²⁷⁹

As early as January 1922, Gorky wrote to Rolland about the "degradation of Europe,"²⁸⁰ and he regarded contemporary European culture as disintegrating and anemic.²⁸¹ Meanwhile, he welcomed the young Soviet literature (fellow travelers) as a new cultural revelation. He hated, however, the Russian literary avant-garde. One of the few new writers Gorky actively disliked was Pil'niak,²⁸² probably because the latter supported "village versus city" too enthusiastically. On this point, Gorky was defiant. He hated the Russian peasant.

We have seen that from the very beginning of the revolution Gorky warned against the Asian peasant peril and became reconciled with the Bolsheviks in 1918 when he decided that they were the only hope in the fight against Russian peasants. In spite of all his declared optimism during the Civil war period, Gorky was deeply depressed. He did not care about mass terror if it could save the city and the genuine proletarian revolution from the village. However, the peasant elements frightened him.

Privately, Gorky was desperately afraid of the victory of the Asian village over the European city in Russia. "We will all perish," he wrote in a private letter, "it is inevitable. We will be strangled by the village. The Western proletariat has betrayed the Russian workers. The Western bourgeoisie will support Russian peasants until their victory over the city. . . . The revolution has degenerated into a struggle between village and city."²⁸³ Gorky complained to Lenin that "insignificant remainders of reasonable workers" say that they are "sold out to the muzhiks."²⁸⁴

Only in 1921-1922, in emigration, did Gorky take advantage of his temporary conflict with the Bolshevik government to make a statement not only on the Jewish problem, as we have seen, but also on the peasant problem. Gorky published a pamphlet in which he in fact appealed for genocide against the Russian peasants. He declared the Russian peasant to be a victim of boundless Russian space:

The boundless, flat country, in which straw-thatched, wooden hamlets closely huddle together, has a poisonous quality which devastates a man, and empties him of desire. When a peasant goes beyond the limits of his hamlet and looks at the emptiness around him, after a time he feels that this emptiness has filled his heart. Nowhere around are these stable traces of labour and creative work to be seen. The seats of the landlords? But they are few and occupied by enemies. The towns? But they are distant and are little more

significant culturally than the hamlet. Around is a limitless plain, in its centre an insignificant little man, cast up on this boring earth for hard labour. Man is overcome by indifference, which kills his ability to think, to remember what he has seen, to generate his own ideas from his experience. A historian of Russian culture described the peasantry as: "a multitude of superstitions and no ideas."²⁸⁵

Russian peasants, he added, don't know their heroes and leaders, the fanatics of love, justice, and vengeance. This people does not have a historical memory. The urban population bothers the Russian peasant, who sees it as superfluous. Russian peasants also cannot be genuinely religious.²⁸⁶

The environment in which the tragedy of the Russian revolution has been and is being played out . . . is an environment of semi-savage people.

I explain the cruel manifestations of the revolution in terms of the exceptional cruelty of the Russian people.

When the leaders of the revolution, a group of the most active members of the intelligentsia, are accused of "brutality," I regard these accusations as lies and slander inevitable in the struggle of political parties, or, among upright people, as honest error. . . .

I cannot consider those who took on themselves the hard, the Herculean labour of cleansing the Augean stables of Russian life as "tormentors of the people," to me they are rather its victims.²⁸⁷

Gorky said that

Almost the whole store of intellectual energy accumulated by Russia in the nineteenth century has been expended by the revolution and dissolved in the peasant mass. . . .

We can now say with certainty that the Russian peasantry has come alive at the price of losing the intelligentsia and the working class.²⁸⁸

He signed the death warrant of the Russian peasants:

Like the Jews that Moses led out of Egyptian slavery, the half-savage, stupid, ponderous people of the Russian villages and hamlets—all those almost terrible people of whom we spoke—will die out, and a new tribe will take their place—literate, sensible, hearty people.

In my view this will not be a very "nice and likeable Russian people," but this will be finally a businesslike people, distrustful of and indifferent to everything which is not directly related to its needs. . . .

They will develop a good historical memory and, remembering their recent tormented past, in the first stages of building a new life they will be rather distrustful of, if not outright hostile to, the intelligentsia and the workers who cause various disorders and revolts.

The town, the inextinguishable hearth of a demanding and ever-exploring thought, the source of stimulating events and phenomena, not always comprehended, will not quickly earn a just evaluation from this man; he will not be quick to see it as a workshop where new ideas, machines, things are continually made, intended to lighten and embellish the people's life.²⁸⁹

This pamphlet was never approved in Soviet Russia; it was never reprinted and even *post factum* it was criticized and condemned. But it was a blueprint for Stalin's future collectivization campaign, which was in fact genocide against the Russian peasants.

It is usually fashionable to blame Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others for their hatred of the Russian peasant, but they never conceived anything like what was proposed by Gorky and accomplished by Stalin. In April 1924, Zinoviev publicly rebuffed Gorky for his pamphlet, accusing Gorky of not understanding the revolutionary role of the peasants. Zinoviev ridiculed Gorky, quoting him: "Remember my words: sometime a muzhik will unscrew your noddle."²⁹⁰

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko called Stalin a "peasant-fighter."²⁹¹ He did not realize that Stalin had absorbed this concept from Gorky. Roman Szporluk noted a very interesting point. According to him, the struggle against the peasantry had other implications, since it was directed not only against the Russian peasants but also against the so-called peasant nations, in which even the Ukrainians could be included.²⁹²

"Russia"

Beginning in 1922, the Soviet government supported loyal fellow travelers in general, permitting their relatively free literary activity while at the same time expelling from the country those outstanding intellectuals who, in the government's view, could create intellectual opposition to the new system, even if they justified it for any reason.²⁹³ For example, Lenin was very angry about the collection of articles devoted to Spengler's book to which writers such as Berdiaev and Stepun contributed.²⁹⁴ Certainly, they took advantage of Spengler in order to deliver their own ambivalent interpretation of the Russian revolution, which was very far from identification with it.

Lenin was furious about this book, regarding it as counterrevolutionary. In 1922, many leading Russian intellectuals, including Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and others, were expelled from Soviet Russia. However, Berdiaev, being abroad, contributed more than anyone else to the controversial justification of the Bolshevik revolution from the religious point of view.²⁹⁵ At the end of his life, he became an outspoken sympathizer of the Soviet Union as it was under Stalin after World War II.²⁹⁶

In addition, the Soviet government decided to support the first Smenovkhist review, which was for several years the main formative tribune of Russian National Bolshevism. Lunatcharsky was certainly involved in securing clearance for this review, since it was he who made a statement on the issue. He said that a "group of writers who share the Smenovkhist platform appealed to the Politburo for permission to publish a magazine."²⁹⁷ Lunatcharsky said that this permission was granted together with moral and material support. Nevertheless, the Politburo forbade these writers any organizational activity. One might guess that the Tcheka was also involved in this decision, as some later events indicate.

In 1922, this magazine, *Novaya Rossia* [New Russia], started to appear. It is impossible to say that all the materials published in it were National Bolshevik, but this issue was central. It is not surprising that many writers and poets whom I have already mentioned became contributors (Pil'niak, Bely, Prishvin, Fedin, Rusov) as well as many others, like Mikhail Bulgakov (1891-1940), who will be discussed later. One must mention specifically the collaboration between *Novaya Rossia* and Ustrialov. The magazine was the only Soviet journal to publish his works after 1922, and on the occasion of its third anniversary, Ustrialov warmly congratulated *Novaya Rossia* for its "ideological independence, for its deep intellectual character."²⁹⁸ What is more intriguing is that the backbone of *Novaya Rossia* was formed from a group of Russified Jews, especially Isai Lezhnev (1891-1955) and Tan-Bogoraz.

Jewish National Bolsheviks

It was indeed an unexpected development that a group of Russified Jews should greatly contribute to the ideological crystallization of Russian National Bolshevism, though mainly to its rationalization. The group included not only Lezhnev and Tan-Bogoraz; it was a large group, which proved that Sokolov-Mikitov, who claimed that all Jews were exclusively Westernizers, was a blind anti-Semite. The movement involved both emigrant Jews and Jews who stayed in Russia. An example of a emigrant Russified Jew who became a National Bolshevik is the lawyer Ilia Gurovitch, who escaped to Prague during the Civil War. Regarding himself as a Russian, he joined a Russian nationalist group that was also inclined to recognize the Bolsheviks. Gurovitch argued that it was necessary to recognize the Bolsheviks since another explosion would only put Russia into a state of anarchy. "It is better to restore it," Gurovitch said, "through any state apparatus and then make this power undergo evolution."²⁹⁹

In 1922, he returned to Russia and participated as a lawyer in the trial of Metropolitan Veniamin (Kazansky, 1874-1922) in which a group of Petersburg ecclesiastics were falsely accused of resisting the authorities. Some were executed.³⁰⁰ In spite of his clash with the authorities in this trial, Gurovitch held Bolshevik political culture in such high esteem that he insisted on its preservation even if, as a result of the evolution of the Soviet system, only this culture would remain. It was necessary, he insisted, until the new Russia would be stronger.³⁰¹

Many assimilated Jews who did not join the Bolshevik party became ardent National Bolsheviks, which should not be surprising. A considerable part of the assimilated Russian-Jewish intelligentsia who partly converted to Russian Orthodoxy before the Bolshevik revolution welcomed it. On the one hand, these intellectuals strove for their full integration into Russian society and culture; on the other, even though they were converts, they were rudely rejected by the majority of that same Russian society, which did not regard them as authentic Russians. For this reason, the majority

of the assimilated Russian-Jewish intelligentsia was very radical, although not Bolshevik oriented. Some Russified Jews linked themselves to the Whites and emigrated; those who remained in Russia were critical of National Bolshevism.

However, the most radical segment of the Russified Jews welcomed the revolution because it destroyed a society that insulted one of their most sensitive points: their unrequited love for Russia. As they were not Bolsheviks, Russified Jews remained in an ambivalent position after the revolution too—this time, not as Jews, but as bearers of Russian culture, to which they were sincerely devoted.

In the beginning, they enthusiastically welcomed Scythianism and Sme-novekhism, which gave them the opportunity to demonstrate that their loyalty to the Bolshevik system was not opportunistic but based on a deep devotion to Russia. Justifying their rejection of Jewish identity, they became radical nihilists for whom confessional aspects were unimportant. In addition, Russified Jews enjoyed a better position at that time than Russians; it was easier for them to be bearers of Russian National Bolshevism since they could hardly be accused of chauvinism.

Isai Lezhnev (Altshuler, 1891–1955). If Ustrialov was the principal proponent of the emigrant National Bolshevism, Lezhnev became an equally central figure in National Bolshevism in Soviet Russia itself. Lezhnev played the role of “manager” in the intellectual formation of National Bolshevism, and he also verbalized in a clear-cut way many of the central ideas of this trend, which had vaguely circulated before in party and nonparty circles. Lezhnev and Ustrialov became that left-right couple through which National Bolshevism successfully penetrated Soviet society.³⁰² Although Ustrialov was never officially recognized in the USSR, with the exception of his last *Izvestia* article in 1937, Lezhnev became one of Stalin's favorites after making a unique public confession in the 1930s, and he won a key ideological position in 1935 when he was appointed head of *Pravda*'s literary and culture section. He led purges in this field until 1939; after that, he was dismissed from the post but remained a leading Soviet literary critic.

Lezhnev was born to an Orthodox Jewish family, with whom he broke at the age of thirteen.³⁰³ As a Bolshevik, he participated in the 1905 revolution, but later he left the Bolsheviks and fell under the influence of Russian mysticism. He left Russia and studied in Zurich. Returning to Russia after the March revolution, he contributed to the newspaper *Russkaia volia* [Russian freedom], edited by Gredeakul. This newspaper was hostile to Bolshevism.

At the time, Lezhnev was a defensist and supported the Provisional government.³⁰⁴ He was against Bolshevik propaganda in the army since he felt that it obscured the key term necessary for Russian soldiers: “Mother Country.”³⁰⁵ To Lezhnev, mutiny was simply a result of immense popular ignorance. He asked: “Will a hand be found that will stop this violent stream? Will state reason and supranatural energy be found that will take the necessary steps and cure our internal sores?”³⁰⁶



Isai Lezhnev (photo from I. Lezhnev, *Izbrannye stat'i* [Moscow, 1960], p. 1).

Lezhnev joined the Bolsheviks soon after the Bolshevik revolution, but not the party itself. In a magazine he edited for Red officers, he printed in 1919 an article that persuaded the reader that the Jews of western Russia gravitated to Russia, not to Poland or Lithuania. The article said that "the cruel oppression of the Jewish population by Polish White-Guardist gangs might be . . . partly explained by the Russifying influence of Jews."³⁰⁷

As editor of *Novaya Rossiia*, Lezhnev advanced the theory of revolutionary conservatism, defending many central points of National Bolshevism without regarding himself as a Smenovekhist since he had already collaborated with the Bolsheviks long before. He advanced a left-wing National Bolshevism, rejecting traditional values, law, and ideology and recognizing as the chief criterion only the "popular spirit."

Lezhnev's starry sky differed considerably from Ustrialov's. In it, one will not find Danilevsky or the Slavophiles, but there were Nietzsche and Russian-Jewish nihilist philosophers like Lev Shestov (Schwartzman, 1866-1938) and Mikhail Gershenzon (1869-1925) and certainly Forwardists with their philosophy of collectivism and God-building. But they were all cemented with Hegel, as was Ustrialov. Dialectics dominated Lezhnev's thinking: Everything has its opposite potential, atheism is religious, internationalism

is national, ideas are devoid of principles. Of course, Lezhnev's "popular spirit" was Hegel's disguised "spirit of history."

Lezhnev did not create any original philosophical or political system. What for other people could remain only a theory was and had to be practice for him. In his autobiography, he said that his main objective was always clarity and a lack of internal contradictions, and his statement is true. He was absolutely honest in the framework of his outlook and extremely consistent in his inconsistency. Nadezhda Mandelstam (1899-1980), who knew him at the beginning of the 1930s, noticed the genuine sincerity in his new Marxist passion.³⁰⁸

Lezhnev welcome Bolshevik rule as the manifestation of the popular spirit. He sharply attacked parliamentarism, and like all National Bolsheviks, he criticized the legal state. For him, "legal categories" are "self-contained substances in the vacuum of pure speculation."³⁰⁹ Lezhnev spoke of the dialectical antinomy of dictatorship and democracy. According to him, "dictatorship came . . . from the bosom of democracy," and he said ironically that those who respect the Russian people as a nation cannot see as their representatives helpless and pitiful politicians dispersed by the Bolsheviks.³¹⁰ He accused the SR of overfastidiousness.³¹¹ Naturally, Lezhnev looked forward to the new society and a new man who would emerge "without the heavy chains of traditions," spontaneous, free of "the spiderweb prison of ideological prejudices, of outdated principles."³¹²

One of the central points of Lezhnev's outlook was his faith in the religious background of the Bolshevik revolution. Certainly this claim must be regarded in the framework of Forwardist God-building. It is interesting that Lezhnev raised Gorky's and Lunatcharsky's banner after they stopped preaching their idea of God-building in any explicit way after Lenin's criticism. Lezhnev insisted on the religious character of socialism, which was "equal to atheism only in a narrow theological sense. Emotionally, psychologically, socialism is extremely religious." From this point, Lezhnev, following Gorky and Lunatcharsky, claimed that socialism would bring the affirmation of religion. "Spontaneous-religious popular consciousness," he said, "moved not to atheism, not to the rejection of religion, but to its active and fiery affirmation."³¹³

For him, the revolution was the fulfillment of God-building predictions. However, Gorky was more ecclesiastical than Lezhnev, since for him, Christ was an ideal concentration of the popular will. For Lezhnev, the popular will was more capricious: It might produce something worse than Christ, who incidentally meant little to Lezhnev. "Religious consciousness breaks through to the popular masses," Lezhnev said, "since for its fulfillment it needs a 'collective action,' it creates its jargon, its gonfalons. But there is a danger: Since spontaneous consciousness simplifies the highest idea, it vulgarizes it and reduces it to two opposite forces: good and evil, Ormuzd and Ahriman. Today it might concentrate on a Tatar, tomorrow on a kike or a German imperialist, tomorrow on a bourgeois."³¹⁴

However, Lezhnev was ready to identify himself with any manifestation. For him, only the people as custodian of religious consciousness is the

source of truth: "To sense the popular spirit, to identify with it in one creative match, this is the first commandment . . . and it is only the second commandment to adjust and smooth the movements according to ideological-ethical guidelines."³¹⁵

It is clear that for Lezhnev, as for all left-wing populists, the criterion of the popular spirit is the principal one. Since Bolshevism is its manifestation, he is ready to support it. "Russian imperialism (from ocean to ocean), Russian messianism (*Ex Oriente lux*), Russian Bolshevism (on the world scale) are all magnitudes of the same dimension," Lezhnev said.³¹⁶ If the popular spirit manifests itself now in imperialist form, one must be guided by it and support it. It is irrelevant against whom this spirit would be directed, against Jew, Tatar, German, bourgeois. Spirit guidance is not a value orientation. For nihilist Lezhnev, values did not exist, only the passionate longing to gain a foothold, not to lose the identity for which he, as a Russified Jew, yearned so much. He was less rooted in Russia than Ustrialov, which is why he was ready to make more concessions for his sacred goal. Lezhnev did not repeat Ustrialov, as some people have suggested.³¹⁷ They always disagreed, publicly and privately. As Ustrialov later wrote, they simply belonged to opposite wings of the same trend.³¹⁸ Lezhnev reproached Ustrialov for appealing to patriotism since "there is no principal contradiction between nationalism and internationalism" as they are not absolute categories.³¹⁹

One of the points of their discord was their attitudes toward religion. In a public letter to Ustrialov, Lezhnev reproached him for missing the "new religion" that influenced the new age with its new statehood and new culture.³²⁰ Ustrialov as a Christian rejected this religion since, in his view, the idea of internationalism could not replace religion, and vice versa. He had no doubt that the spiritual "potential of universal amalgamation could be put into the framework of great human religions." Nobody could exceed Christianity in universalism and love, and internationalism could perfectly well be put into the Gospel's ethical commandments. Nevertheless, he did not reject the future possibility of a "new religious restoration," but technology would not be its source. Internationalism, according to Ustrialov, was a technical category while nation belonged to a spiritual category.³²¹ Strangely, taking into consideration that he himself was a party outsider, Lezhnev reprimanded Ustrialov, saying that it was impossible to work outside of the Bolshevik party.³²²

Lezhnev was a radical nihilist. In his acceptance of Marxism at the beginning of the 1930s, in his appeal to intellectuals to adopt Marxism as he himself had done, and in his committed servitude to Stalin, Lezhnev strongly reminds one of a Jewish historical model: the false messiah Shabbetai Zevi (1626-1676), who persuaded Jews to adopt Islam in order to approach the triumph of Judaism. Another Shabbetaian, Jacob Frank (1726-1791), appealed to his followers to adopt the holy faith of Edom—Christianity—for the same reason.³²³ The shadows of false messiahs hang over our time.

Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz (1865-1936). Tan was an old populist and had converted to Christianity long before the revolution, but he did not remain

faithful to that religion. Later, he became a founder of the Popular Socialist party led by Peshekhonov, which was the most radical wing of the neopopulist movement. He was also an outspoken defensist. In 1917, Tan worked on *Russkaia volia* with Lezhnev, Grimm, Gredeakul, and other future National Bolsheviks.

In July of 1917, Tan said that the Bolshevik leaders were "alien to Russia and every month become more alien to her." Addressing Bolshevik leaders, he said: "In the moment of terrible national disaster you extinguish in the Russian soul the flame of national consciousness with your internationalist mist. Indeed, the Russian people . . . did not have until now national consciousness. Its being was ethnographic, almost zoological. But the Russian people deceived by you will turn from internationalism and will obstinately start from the national beginning. This will grow and will nourish their national feelings so jealously and passionately, and even intolerantly, as it was in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or France after Sedan and the Paris Commune."³²⁴

The homeland was for Tan holy. It is not surprising that he discovered organic Russian nationalism in Bolshevism soon after the Bolshevik revolution. "Russia did not perish," he said at the end of 1917; "Petersburg is perishing but not Russia. It has nine lives like a cat. . . . Hungry Russia will eventually swallow this nasty, shameful, obscene world like a living frog and no doubt it will not be choked. . . . In a soldier's belly a chisel will be digested. . . . I know," Tan said "that the spring will come and Russia will be green again. Russia will be saved by the power which has saved it for ten centuries—by the power of the Earth."³²⁵

Overtaken by the course of events, Tan became a religious nihilist and a militant anti-Christian. His religious ideas differed from those of Lezhnev. Tan's one and eternal God is the passionate God of destruction and creativity. There is no dialogue with God: Tan always appealed to him and never received an answer. However, once God did reply: "I am the Lord of Being and not the Lord of Unbeing. All existing goes to non-existence. I am life which fights against death." Life is the people. Jewish motives are easily discerned in Tan, however, in a strange interpretation. Sometimes one can see echoes of cabbalistic ideas. God tells him: "I am a drop of light which fell into darkness," reminding us of the dispersed sparks of the Shekhina, which fell into the material world and await redemption and liberation. The God of the Old Testament is for Tan a terrorist-populist. The ten Egyptian plagues are ten terrorist acts against the Egyptian autocracy. Moreover, to Tan, the Jewish wandering in the desert is a paradigm of War Communism. The Old Testament God is a divine maximalist. His objective is to crush the Egyptian bondage for good, so that it would be impossible to return to it, even if one wanted to. The destruction is the main goal.³²⁶ However, this destruction is a part of divine creativity: whatever is destroyed is replaced by something qualitatively new. Christ is not a creator but a teacher; he pitied humanity, but that was a mistake. Christ is alive only in the period of spiritual upheaval when the revolution is being prepared.

There is no place for him during the revolution, and he inevitably degenerates into an inquisitor. Anyway, Tan said, both the Old and the New Testaments are dead. Only the eternal God is alive, the living God of the popular revolution.³²⁷

Tan expressed his militant anti-Christianity at every opportunity. He was jubilant during the persecutions of the Russian Orthodox church, and he welcomed the victory of Muslim Turks over Orthodox Greeks in Asia Minor.³²⁸ Later he became a militant atheist and even became director of the Institute of the History of Religion, which does not necessarily mean that he abandoned his religious nihilism. Indeed, in 1923, he applied the theory of relativity to religion, claiming that "the relativity of being makes nonsense of any correction for objectivity. The difference between real and imaginable relative knowledge disappears. All our perceptions, including religious ones, become equal elements of our knowledge of the world."³²⁹ In Tan's world everything became possible.

If Lezhnev looked like a Shabbetaian, Tan was even closer to Shabbetaianism. During the debates on Smenovekhism, Tan remarked that one could be proud of being called a National Bolahevik.³³⁰ It was like a new creed. Tan, like Lezhnev, preferred domestic National Bolshevism to the emigrant version; he preferred the bitter to the sweet. He shared all the basic points of National Bolshevism, especially its idea of Russian national revival and its strong anti-Western mood. "Russia has recovered," Tan said, "she is now healthy in a new way in all her madness and intestinal wars. Contemporary Russia is healthier than Europe, and for us survivors, it is strange to look back on Europe in a completely different way from before."³³¹ The same orientation Lezhnev had *vis-à-vis* the popular spirit inspired Tan. "I don't know where Russia is going," he said, "but nobody knows. One thing I can say with confidence. Wherever Russia might go—to God or to the devil, to heaven or to hell—she cannot rely any more spiritually on Europe. Even if she would like to, there is nothing to rely upon."

Tan defended the idea of the one and indivisible Russia in the spirit of aggressive nationalism. "One thing can be forecast," he said, "with considerable confidence. This is the growing role of Russia in international affairs, in world affairs, insofar as that she from the very beginning had a definite will and passion to influence the old Europe and all the fire-spitting world of the East and the West. Russia presses her neighbors, both near and far, for recognition now. . . . It is possible that the day is not far away when on the contrary, close neighbors will seek her recognition and will hardly obtain it."³³² Like many others, Tan suggested the time of Peter the Great as a model for the new system.³³³

One can discern certain anti-Semitic overtones in Tan's writing. For example, he was not frightened by the wave of anti-Semitism, or even by the pogroms. In his view there was a certain balance in the pogroms: Jewish and Russian, White and Red, class and nonclass. It was not known, said Tan, whose hands were bloodier.³³⁴

Ilia Vasilevsky (1882-1938). A prominent prerevolutionary Russian journalist, *Ilia Vasilevsky* took an ambiguous position versus Bolshevism even

in the aftermath of the revolution,³³⁵ but later emigrated. He converted to Smenovekhism in Berlin in 1922, and in that year, he published an interesting interpretation of his position as a Russified Jew. He was deeply frustrated by Jabotinsky's accusations that Russified Jews were traitors to Jewry. The extent of his frustration is easy to explain since he regarded Jabotinsky as a most remarkable Russian publicist.

Vasilevsky was indignant that Jabotinsky called "Russian writers of Jewish origin" "second-rate citizens" and "defectors" while, according to Vasilevsky, they "regard themselves as inseparably bound by blood to Russia." "Is it true," Vasilevsky asked, "that Jabotinsky calls us only 'patriots of any small railway station, slaves who want to stay near the copper kettles in Egypt?'" Vasilevsky also asked whether it was true that he must inevitably be rejected by Jewry because of his love for Russia, or whether he must cast out something that was imbedded in his soul.³³⁶ He returned to Russia, became a second-rate journalist, and perished in the purges.

Ilia Ehrenburg (1891-1967). Ehrenburg occupies an extraordinarily important place in the development of Russian National Bolshevism, not so much because of his position during the revolution or after it, but because he became the main spokesman of ardent official National Bolshevism during World War II.³³⁷ He was a thoroughly Russified Jew, was educated in a Moscow gymnasium, and had participated since his youth in the Russian revolutionary movement. The young Ehrenburg emigrated to France and nearly embraced Catholicism; he approached French Catholic mystics, who were very close to the Russian mysticism of the time.

After the revolution, he returned to Russia, professing religious Russian nationalism. He published poems foretelling the resurrection of Holy Russia, then crucified. He wanted to be accepted by the anti-Bolsheviks, but they did not want to accept a Jew as a defender of Holy Russia.³³⁸ Ehrenburg then turned to the Bolsheviks and professed that holy sin was the only way to sanctity. In 1919, in Kiev, he wrote a play, the central character of which is a holy convict, Gongora, the leader of a popular uprising. Gongora says that "blind people must be whipped into Paradise."³³⁹

One of Ehrenburg's poems, dated 1920, is very characteristic. He addressed Russia:

Russia, they regarded your puerperal fever as deadly
Clever, cynical, clean, they disdain you
Their lap is barren, their empty breasts petrified.
Who will accept the ancient heritage?
Who will kindle and carry forward
the half-extinguished torch of Prometheus?
The birth-pangs are severe . . .
Another great age is being born.
Come to believe! Receive it from our hands!
It is ours and yours—it will wipe out all boundaries.³⁴⁰

Ehrenburg then emigrated, and in 1920 or 1921 he converted to an extreme radicalism, even nihilism, against freedom, for totalitarian democracy

Ilya Ehrenburg (photo from I. Ehrenburg, *Childhood and Youth* [London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962], p. 81).



on a world scale. He confessed that he had acquired a new vision: "I killed myself in order to live. . . . My rebellion was not for the sake of freedom, but against freedom, for organization, reason, justice, clarity. I am speaking . . . in the great twilight of Europe."³⁴¹

In 1922, he published his famous novel *Julio Jurenita*, in which he ridiculed his former Russian nationalism, confessing that his favorite writer when he was eleven or twelve years old was Dostoevsky and his favorite hero the famous spiritual leader of the Old Believers in the seventeenth century, Archpriest Avvacum. According to his own confession, he was possessed by genuine Russian chauvinism. In spite of his life abroad, he regarded himself and Russia as special: "I began to feel myself a Scythian, I despised the miserable philistine Europe, and so on."³⁴² But as a result of the disappointment in Russian nationalism his hero (i.e., himself) lost everything: religious canons, ethical commandments, and even a most simple philosophical system. He decided to violate all existing ethical and legal codes.³⁴³

Ehrenburg's national nihilism was directed not only against Russians but also against the Jews.³⁴⁴ Gorky simply hated him,³⁴⁵ and when a Zionist

leader Berl Katznelson (1887-1949) visited Gorky in Italy in 1930, complaining about Ehrenburg's anti-Zionism, Gorky exploded, calling Ehrenburg an uprooted person.³⁴⁶ However, Ehrenburg's early Russian nationalism returned to him after 1941 when, in fact, he became the main Russian nationalist spokesman and German-baiter in the Soviet press.

Ivan Knizhnik-Vetrov (Israel Blank, 1878-1965). Knizhnik-Vetrov was a most mysterious example of a Jewish Russophile and National Bolshevik. Originating in the southern Ukraine, he emigrated to France in 1904, becoming an anarchist and also converting to Christianity—not to Russian Orthodoxy but as an Uniate under the influence of Vladimir Soloviev. During the revolution he was elected to the Petrograd Soviet, professing an alliance between Christianity and socialism.³⁴⁷ Just after the Bolshevik revolution, he supported the Bolsheviks and was often given space in *Pravda* for his very unorthodox political statements. What is puzzling in the case of Knizhnik-Vetrov is the fact that he enjoyed Lenin's personal protection. Indeed, in *Pravda* on January 7, 1918, Knizhnik-Vetrov criticized Gorky for his disbelief in the revolutionary capacity of Russian peasants. "How much more right," he said, "are those who estimate highly *all the Russian people, all the peasantry and all the working class.*" (Italics added) Knizhnik-Vetrov said that the problem of the revolutionary capacity of the Russian people should not be linked to their moral or intellectual perfection. According to him, it was not realistic to expect perfection from them at that time.

A week later (on January 13, 1918), he published another answer to Gorky in *Pravda* in which he stressed that there was now a "national socialist" revolution in Russia in the sense that it was a revolution of all the Russian people. This national revolution would develop in the future into an international revolution. "However, even in the case that our social revolution would not produce any response in Europe, we should be revolutionaries and not helpless . . . whiners remaining in debt to our people with their natural inclination to social revolution."

This article was strange enough for *Pravda* in January 1918, but the most important thing is that Lenin himself secretly went over (and probably edited) the texts of both of Knizhnik-Vetrov's articles before publication³⁴⁸—rare documentary evidence of Lenin's personal involvement in the formulation of nationalist statements in the early Soviet period. Lenin might also have had personal reasons to support Knizhnik-Vetrov, but this is only a suggestion. However, the original surname of Knizhnik-Vetrov, Blank, was the same as that of Lenin's Jewish grandfather on his mother's side. Was that only a coincidence?

It seems that Knizhnik-Vetrov never changed his Russian revolutionary nationalism. For example, in his book on Petr Lavrov published in 1925, he wrote, "How should Lavrov have been happy if he had known that Moscow was to become the staff of the international workers' movement?"³⁴⁹ Until his death, Knizhnik-Vetrov worked as a historian of Russian populism.

Counterattack Against Smenovekhism

Soon after its first triumph, Smenovekhism met stiff resistance from some party officials. In order to explain why Zinoviev and not someone else led this resistance, one needs first of all to recall that Zinoviev was the Communist International chairman, which made him functionally the first Soviet partisan of internationalism. Meanwhile, Smenovekhists discredited his organization among foreign and minority Communists when they unanimously repeated that the International was an instrument of Russian foreign policy.

Contrary to Trotsky, Radek, or Steklov, Zinoviev was an old Bolshevik and had a solid personal base of power in the Petrograd party apparatus, which was personally committed to him. He was not interested in the expansion of the party social base more than others were; moreover, he always wanted to limit permissible ideological frameworks and took a very tough ideological stand. He was the main party hawk in several crucial ideological problems.

We have seen that during the Eleventh Party Congress, when Lenin was still active, Zinoviev was restrained in his criticism of Smenovekhism. However, soon after that congress, Zinoviev launched his attack. The first secret clash between Zinoviev and the Politburo majority on this issue took place in May 1922 when the Petrograd Soviet, which was completely under his control, decided to close *Novaia Rossia*, which was published in Petrograd. The excuse for this decision was Lezhnev's article "Emancipation of the Soviets"; the second issue of the magazine was even confiscated.³⁵⁰ It is not known who made a complaint, but within a month Lenin personally intervened on Lezhnev's behalf. He sent a note:

Novaia Rossia No. 2. Closed down by the Petrograd comrades.

Perhaps it has been closed down too early? Circulate it to the Politbureau members and discuss more thoroughly. What is its editor Lezhnev? Is he from *Dien*? Could information about him be collected? Of course, not all the people working on the magazine are candidates for deportation.³⁵¹

Lenin proposed that all Politburo members should take three days to read this *Novaia Rossia* issue. As a result, the Politburo revoked the decision of the Petrograd Soviet. However, the defiant Soviet lodged a complaint against the Politburo—which it could not have done had it not been supported by Zinoviev himself. The Politburo then commissioned Meshcheriakov to study this problem, and he—who, as we have seen, was favorably inclined toward Smenovekhism—suggested a compromise: not to revoke the Petrograd decision but to permit Lezhnev to publish his magazine under a new title. However, the Petrograd Soviet protested once again, and the Politburo passed the question to the presidium of the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee. In June 1922, that committee confirmed the Politburo decision, and the question was closed.³⁵² After August 1922, the magazine was published

in Moscow under the title *Rossia* [Russia]. Zinoviev could manage to rid only Petrograd of Lezhnev.

However, the situation changed radically. In May of that year, Lenin had his first stroke and the power in the leadership moved to the triumvirate of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin; Zinoviev, being in a fool's paradise, regarded his position as the dominant one although, in fact, it was Stalin who controlled the party apparatus. First of all, Zinoviev tried to discredit Smenovekhism. On July 23, 1922 *Pravda* issued the first peremptory shout in the direction of Smenovekhism, taking advantage of an artificial pretext. The *Pravda* editorial asked conspicuously: Who are the Smenovekhists? spongers on the revolution or its allies? *Pravda* intimated that if the Smenovekhists continued on their present path they could at best only remain spongers; in the worst case, they would be enemies of the revolution.

Several days later, Andrei Bubnov (1883-1940), a former left-wing Communist during the Brest-Litovsk debates and then head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Party Committee, published an article that widely criticized Smenovekhism.³⁵³ According to him, Smenovekhism was a very vague trend and if earlier only its positive trends had been stressed, it was now high time to stress its negative sides. Bubnov entered into debate only with Meshcheriakov and did not mention Lenin, Trotsky, or Lunatcharsky. Another weapon was used against Smenovekhism—its interpretation, which was extended to include any dissent. Even Tchaianov and Kondratiev were labeled Smenovekhists, and their trend was called “cooperative Smenovekhism.”³⁵⁴

It is easy to see that the Smenovekhists themselves did nothing, so all attacks against them were caused by the party's internal struggle, and those leaders who favored the Smenovekhists were indirectly or directly blamed for political negligence. The attacks began to intensify when Lenin's control was weakening. At the beginning of August 1922, the twelfth party conference was convened, the first party meeting of importance at which Lenin was not present. Zinoviev seemed to be the main party leader of this conference; it was he who delivered the official address on the revival of the bourgeois ideology and party objectives. This report was an open assault on Smenovekhism, limited only by the fact that Lenin had not yet lost his entire control and was probably also balanced by Trotsky, who was regarded as one of the main supporters of Smenovekhism.

Zinoviev evidently conceived of his report as revenge for the defeat in the Politburo over *Novaya Rossia*. He called the Smenovekhists “quasi-friends” who hoped for the revival of bourgeois democracy. His comment was demagoguery, since this trait was not what irritated him about Smenovekhism. Zinoviev violently attacked Lezhnev, declaring that his ideology was a blurting out of intimate thoughts of the bourgeoisie. He accused the Smenovekhists of trying to replace existing party cadres. “It would be a grave mistake to expect [from the Smenovekhists] that they would indeed to any extent support the Communist party.” Moreover, according to Zinoviev, the Smenovekhists were allegedly united with the Mensheviks and the SR.

Zinoviev called Ustrialov the most clever Smenovekhist, who, however, was expecting a "bourgeois boss."³⁵⁵

However, Zinoviev's conclusions completely contradicted everything he had said. According to him, Smenovekhism had "played to some extent a positive role." It is difficult to understand this positive role of a trend that did not want to support the party, and so on. It seems that Zinoviev was still afraid of Lenin's shadow. The decision adopted by the conference was even milder. It was decided that

Smenovekhism played until now and will play an objectively progressive role. It consolidated and will consolidate those emigrant groups which "reconciled" with the Soviet state and are ready to collaborate with it for the sake of the country's revival. That is why Smenovekhism deserved and deserves positive treatment. However, we should not forget for a minute that bourgeois-restorationist trends are strong among Smenovekhists, that they have a common hope with Mensheviks and SR that political concessions in the direction of bourgeois democracy will follow economic concessions, and so on.³⁵⁶

Attacks on Smenovekhism followed the conference. Zinoviev even opposed publicly the policy of allowing former Whites to return, which was an officially declared Soviet policy.³⁵⁷ His close collaborator, Georgy Safarov (Egorov, 1891-1942), a leader of the Petrograd party organization, commented on a new issue of *Rossia* in a very hostile way. He hinted at Lezhnev's expulsion from Petrograd, speaking about him as a person "who had no success in Petrograd and therefore moved to Moscow."³⁵⁸

Lezhnev complained that he was misunderstood. Replying to Safarov, he wrote:

I am standing on his standpoint, attentively reading debates and resolutions of the last conference about the necessity for the stratification of the intelligentsia and the rapprochement of its more leftist elements with the revolution, and I cannot invent anything wittier than to publish the magazine *Rossia*. I am appraising thoughtfully—from a Communist point of view—the behavior of the Safarovs [Zinovievs?] and see indisputably that these tactics have pushed wide circles of the intelligentsia to the right. . . . The activity of Safarovs who are more zealous than necessary will objectively lead to counterrevolutionary results. It hampers our positive, socially necessary work and undermines it.³⁵⁹

Lenin read this article and did not react.³⁶⁰ At the end of August, mass arrests and expulsions were carried out, evidently the result of Zinoviev's report at the conference.

Lenin partly recovered for a while but could no longer play the same dominant role. His position eroded; he did not intervene in favor of Smenovekhism, but not long before his final stroke in March 1923, he explicitly verbalized his intrinsically statist-nationalist attitude toward the Bolshevik revolution. He formulated his view in purely nationalist terms, though rather pessimistically. If earlier Lenin had spoken about Russian

superiority, he now limited the goal of the Russian revolution first and foremost to achievement of Russian equality with the advanced nations, i.e., the modernization of Russia in order to overtake Western countries later. He asked his invisible opponents:

But what about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that would offer it at least some chance of securing conditions for the further development of civilisation that were somewhat unusual? . . .

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite "level of culture" is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and then, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?³⁶¹

Did that "definite level of culture" necessarily mean socialism? It is doubtful if one follows Lenin's line.

Lenin also made a very ambivalent remark about Spengler, which seemed negative but essentially, Lenin accepted Spengler's main thesis of the decline of the old Europe:

The old bourgeois and imperialist Europe, which was accustomed to look upon itself as the centre of the universe, rotted and burst like a putrid ulcer in the first imperialist holocaust. No matter how the Spenglers and all the enlightened philistines, who are capable of admiring (or even studying) Spengler, lament it, this decline of the old Europe is but an episode in the history of the downfall of the world bourgeois oversatiated by imperialist rapine and the oppression of the majority of the world's population.³⁶²

That statement was the last National Bolshevik testament of Lenin.

In April 1923, the Twelfth Party Congress took place. The triumvirate of Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin was now completely free of Lenin's influence and even of his shadow. Lenin was incapacitated. This situation also undermined Trotsky's position in the complicated balance of power in the Kremlin, since Trotsky had always been used by Lenin to neutralize his minor colleagues.

Now Russian nationalism and Smenovekhism became the prominent, even if not the central, issue on the agenda. Indeed, the nationality problem was officially included in the agenda, and Stalin delivered the report on this issue, attacking the so-called Georgian National Deviationism, since the new Georgian Soviet republic wished to keep strict rule over its citizenship and prevent free Russian migration into the republic. Stalin took a strict centralist position in spite of the fact that on the eve of the congress, before his last stroke, Lenin had severely criticized him for excessive centralism and had even suggested abolishing the USSR created in December 1922 as too centralist, a form that was counterproductive for Soviet interests.

Lenin preferred a looser type of state union.³⁶³ His letter to the congress was ignored, not even being read there. Stalin tried to cover his etatist Russian nationalism by hypocritical public attacks against the same Russian nationalism and Smenovekhism, linking the two. He said that

a force . . . is growing in our country . . . Great-Russian chauvinism. It is by no means accidental, comrades, that the Smena-Vekhites have recruited a large number of supporters among Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messieurs the Smena-Vekhites are singing the praises of the Bolshevik Communists, as much as to say: You may talk about Bolshevism as much as you like, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that you will achieve what Denikin failed to achieve, that you Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at all events will resurrect, the idea of a Great Russia. All that is not accidental. Nor is it accidental that this idea has even penetrated some of our Party institutions.³⁶⁴

That statement was sheer hypocrisy on Stalin's part, since he himself was to blame for the very thing of which he accused the Smenovekhists: the restoration of Great Russia in December 1922 in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Stalin understood very well that this USSR fulfilled the functions of the former "one and indivisible Russia." Nevertheless, he attacked "dominant-nation chauvinism":

The chief danger that arises from this is that . . . dominant-nation chauvinism is growing in our country by leaps and bounds, striving to obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather all the threads of government into the hands of Russians and to stifle everything that is not Russian. The chief danger is that with such a policy we run the risk that the Russian proletarians will lose the confidence of the formerly oppressed nations which they won in the October days. . . . Unless we all arm ourselves against this new, I repeat, Great-Russian chauvinism, which is advancing, creeping, insinuating itself drop by drop into the eyes and ears of our officials and step by step corrupting them, we may lose down to the last shreds the confidence we earned at that time.³⁶⁵

Stalin understood very well the power of Russian nationalism. The intimidation against Smenovekhism and Russian nationalism did not seem too persuasive to many congress delegates. Bukharin, for example, said, "I understand when our dear comrade Koba Stalin criticizes Russian chauvinism *not strongly enough*." Indeed, Bukharin violently attacked "Great Russian chauvinism," which he saw mainly in Russian domination over non-Russian nationalities.³⁶⁶ Bukharin still misunderstood Smenovekhism and practically ignored it in his speeches to the congress, although later it became his *bête noire*. The leader of the struggle against Russian nationalism at the congress was Zinoviev, though he suffered from contradictions.³⁶⁷ On the one hand, he definitely supported Soviet centralism, but he dismissed any identification of Soviet Russia with Russia as such. For example, he remarked

that there was a growth of Great Russian chauvinism "which is extremely dangerous since it has behind it three hundred years of autocracy and imperialist policy." It is clear that Zinoviev regarded the encouragement of Smenovekhism as a dangerous concession.

"Now," Zinoviev said, "Great Russian chauvinism raises its head. When we are heaped with pleasant compliments by the *Smena Vekh* camp who say: 'Yes, we are for the Comintern since it serves the Kremlin and fulfills the idea of the one and indivisible Russia,' when we listen to such dubious compliments, when we see that the bourgeoisie is only waiting for us to fight at this place, it is dangerous." Zinoviev appealed for the extirpation of Russian chauvinism. Otherwise, he said, in two or three years the situation would aggravate and "we will lose everything which we have now." The struggle against Smenovekhism became an obsession for Zinoviev as well as for Bukharin later. One cannot help realizing that Zinoviev regarded it as a struggle for survival.

Yakov Yakovlev (who was, by the way, Stalin's man) attacked Russian nationalism too, but he did not mention Smenovekhism.³⁶⁸ He reduced the problem to the claim that the economic unity of the country was perpetuated by "splinters" of the old Great Russian bourgeoisie. Yakovlev claimed that the Great Russian chauvinism and nationalism dominated all the commissariats.

The congress adopted a decision that was considerably more hostile to Smenovekhism than the decision of the Twelfth Party Conference had been. The new decision said, inter alia, that "vestiges [of Great Russian chauvinism] . . . are supported by new Smenovekhist Great Russian chauvinist trends." The accent was placed only on the negative side of Smenovekhism, unbalanced by any positive references.³⁶⁹

The struggle against Russian nationalism and Smenovekhism was also extended into a literary struggle against fellow travelers and went on between the same forces. Trotsky, Lunatcharsky, Radek, Meshcheriakov, Voronsky, and Yakovlev tried to support the fellow travelers as much as possible, claiming that the national interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution was not only permissible but useful. On the other hand, the fellow travelers were attacked by left-wing Bolsheviks who contested the national interpretation of the revolution.

The main tribune of the struggle against the fellow travelers became the literary-criticism monthly *Na postu* [At the post], which demanded strict totalitarian control over literary life, including strict control over fellow travelers Pil'niak, Vsevolod Ivanov, and others were declared to be counter-revolutionaries. The literary struggle acquired a new dimension when Trotsky published his book *Literature and Revolution*, which he finished in June 1923, two months after the Twelfth Congress. Trotsky considered, inter alia, the question of a national trend of fellow travelers, calling it the "new Soviet populism."³⁷⁰ Defending this trend, Trotsky said that the Soviet state was essentially national; in his national interpretation, Trotsky preferred as a model the time of Peter the Great and not pre-Peterine time, as did

Pil'niak, who was held by Trotsky in high esteem. However, Trotsky contrasted Blok with Pil'niak, whom he regarded as a deeper writer. Blok broke with "the Russia of the peasant hut" and it is "a holy affair, even . . . a state for conciliation with Christ." Trotsky said that "in this archaic form the thought is expressed that the break is not imposed from without, but it is the result of national development."³⁷¹

Following Lenin's preference for Ustrialov over *Smena Vekh's* left wing, Trotsky also preferred Ustrialov to Lezhnev, sharply criticizing Lezhnev for his words about "an artistic synthesis of Russia and the revolution." Nobody can synthesize what is organically united, Trotsky said. Lezhnev, in his opinion, rejected ideology and invited nonideological people to power. Therefore, Lezhnev was moving away from the Soviet state while Ustrialov was approaching it, by the very recognition of any ideology—even a non-Communist one.³⁷²

Trotsky paid a great deal of attention to Esenin and Kliuev who, according to him, had their roots in Slavophile and popular trends of the old literature. Trotsky had a very high esteem of Kliuev's poetry from the artistic point of view, but he rejected his nationalism, which, according to him, was primitive.³⁷³ Moreover, he felt that the revolution had positively influenced the national character of contemporary Russian literature. It is clear that in spite of his criticism, Trotsky without doubt would have liked to legitimize the new Soviet "literary populism," as he called the fellow travelers.

In May 1924, there was a meeting in the press department of the Central Party Committee, which was directed by Yakovlev.³⁷⁴ The main report of the meeting was delivered by a passionate enemy of every nationalism, the Georgian Illarion Vardin (Mgeladze, 1890-1941), who had been head of the press department until 1924. He was supported by the *Na postu* group, the nucleus of which, apart from Vardin, consisted of several literary critics of Jewish origin: Leopold Averbakh (1903-1939), Grigory Lelevitch (Kalmanson, 1901-1945), Boris Volin (Fradkin, 1886-1957), and Semen Rodov (1893-1968). The fellow travelers were defended by Yakovlev, Lunatcharsky, Trotsky, Radek, Meshcheriakov, Voronsky, and the inconsistent Bukharin. Raskolnikov supported *Na postu*, probably because of Radek, who publicly lived with Raskolnikov's wife Larisa Reisner and was on the opposing side. The meeting discussed the problem of whether loyal literature might be permitted in the USSR if it were not written from a pure party point of view. The legitimacy of the national interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution permeated this discussion both openly and covertly. The meeting adopted a decision, suggested by Yakovlev, that urged a tolerant attitude toward fellow travelers. Therefore, the new populist literature was approved by the Central Party Committee. The door of the Soviet system was opened to national trends, and in fact, it was the door to the heart of the party.

If fellow travelers enjoyed protection, the same might be said about the *Smenovekhists*. In spite of all the criticism and warning party decisions, they were well integrated into Soviet society. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, Kliutchnikov, Potekhin, Bulatsel, Gredeskul, and Gurovitch published their books.

Rossia was being published, and the *Nakanune* literary supplement acquired wide circulation. However, the central place still belonged to Ustrialov. Through his direct and open articles published in Harbin, he embarrassed some party circles and pleased others. He became the enfant terrible of Soviet society.

It seems that at that period of time, the main supporter of Smenovekhism was Trotsky. In June 1924, Ustrialov received a letter from Berlin in which he was told that there was a controversy among Soviet leaders over *Nakanune*. Bukharin was urging a cut in the subsidy to the newspaper while Trotsky regarded *Nakanune* as the outpost of the Soviet press abroad. It was Trilisser, a deputy GPU chairman, who went to Berlin in order to close *Nakanune*.³⁷⁵ A recent Soviet source has claimed that Trotsky also supported *Rossia*.³⁷⁶ There is no evidence that Ustrialov was by some means manipulated by any Soviet group, although manipulation is almost evident in Lezhnev's case.

A great deal of excitement was provoked by Ustrialov's article "Secularization" reprinted by Lezhnev at the end of 1923. Ustrialov said that only terminology remained of Communist ideology, and he compared the process that had brought this situation about with the "secularization" of the medieval church. "The original impulses of the revolution," he said, "clearly became their own opposites in their embodiment." "The more the spirit of the Communist revolution conquered Russia," Ustrialov continued in his usual dialectical paradox,

the more communism must become bourgeois. The idea of the rejection of private property became itself the source of the redistribution of wealth and therefore the source of new property. The more insistently the revolutionary spirit tried to run from the specific conditions of reality, the deeper it had to immerse itself in the vanity of contemporary politics. The rejection of the existing social-political world on the one side caused its equal confirmation on the other side. In spite of rejection of militarism, the Communist state acquired the strongest regular army; despite rejecting patriotism in principle, it in fact taught it in the struggle against intervention and foreign yearnings; despite its negation of property instincts, it awakens them with an intensity which was nonexistent in communal peasant Russia; the antistate ideology . . . helped the Soviets take power of the most powerful and the greatest state in the world. There is a tragic contradiction of the Great Russian revolution in its internal decomposition of the internationalist-Communist idea. The Bolsheviki revolutionary spirit tried to get rid of national and bourgeois influences, and this attempt became a source of submission to these influences.

The irresistible process of the secularization of revolutionary extremism is the genuinely active and the deeply fruitful self-criticism of the Russian revolution. It will inevitably bring, and already brings, the genuine Russian Renaissance.³⁷⁷

When Ustrialov was criticized for this article by Bubnov³⁷⁸ and Pokrovsky,³⁷⁹ he warned that "exaggerated enthusiasm of internationalist maximalism would only bring a sick hypertrophy of an inevitable future nationalism."³⁸⁰

In April 1924, Skrypnik complained that the Smenovekhists especially praised the Red Army, which, according to them, was "the bearer of the Russian national idea."³⁸¹ It is clear that Skrypnik was indirectly attacking the Russified character of the army. However, after 1923, there was a long lull in party discussions of Smenovekhism.

The End of Revolutionary Hopes in Europe— The Triumph of Fascism

The immense success of the Bolshevik revolution and the worldwide Communist propaganda that brought several countries to the verge, but only to the verge, of a socialist revolution, produced another effect: the worldwide success of the radical right, which saw itself as the last rampart in the struggle against world Bolshevik imperialism. The first far-reaching event in this process was the victory of Italian fascism.

The former left-wing Italian socialist, Mussolini, who was well acquainted with Bolshevism and even, as we have seen, collaborated with Alexinsky during the war, became the leader of a movement that expanded very quickly and succeeded in many European and Asian countries. Mussolini acknowledged that he took advantage of Bolshevik political culture.³⁸² His success was also a result of the paralysis of the Italian left wing, caused by Soviet intrigues among Italian socialist movements, which proved incapacitating.³⁸³ Lenin begged the Italian socialists not to wage any revolution, and in so doing, he favored the fascists. Meanwhile, Lenin gave secret instructions to Tchitcherin: "Start a highly circumspect flirtation with Italy immediately."³⁸⁴

The nightmare of a successful independent socialist revolution in a large European country, which haunted Lenin, was postponed in Italy by the fascist victory, which was more evidence of the power of radical nationalism. The socialist origin of Italian fascism was another confirmation of the ease with which one could move from radical left to radical right, using the same political means.

In his extraordinarily well-documented research, Leonid Luks demonstrates the ambivalence of the Soviet reaction to Italian fascism. A senior Soviet diplomat, Vatslav Vorovsky (1871-1923), met Mussolini on November 15, 1922, soon after his ascension to power. Mussolini expressed his confidence in the political stability of the Soviet system while stressing that he would not take any humanitarian motives into consideration while dealing with the Bolsheviks. As a consequence of this conversation, Steklov published an editorial in *Izvestia* on November 26 in which, alongside certain criticisms, he praised Mussolini for his political pragmatism. Luks stresses that the Soviet leaders did not at that time see in Italian fascism any threat to Soviet interests.³⁸⁵

It was quite natural that Ustrialov welcomed the Italian fascist revolution, though he did not suggest fascist rule for Russia. "Why do we need fascism?" he asked ironically,

if we have Bolshevism. . . . It is not by chance, it is fate. The way granted by history is impossible to change as one would gloves. There is no doubt that Russian Bolshevism and Italian fascism are kindred phenomena, they are signs of an epoch. They hate each other like brothers. They are both messengers of "Caesarism," which sounds somewhere in the distance in the nebulous "music of the future." There are melodies of fascism and Bolshevism in this music; it embraces them, reconciles them in dialectical categories.³⁸⁶

Bolshevism gave birth to fascism, not vice versa. "In the matter of the overthrow of formal democracy, which is stricken by an aneurysm, 'Moscow' showed 'Rome' the road," Ustrialov said proudly. Apart from that, Bolshevism for him was a more grandiose phenomenon than fascism, since, first of all, "the Russian specific weight is not comparable with the Italian specific weight" and, second, "Bolshevik internationalist nationalism" is in the spirit of the age while the old-fashioned great power fascist nationalism is "considerably behind it."

Another of Lenin's nightmares was the possibility of an independent socialist revolution in Germany, and when he was still in control of state affairs, before his stroke, Lenin did his best to bridle the German left wing. Radek, Bukharin, and also a former people's commissar of the short-lived Hungarian Communist republic, Evgeny Varga (1879-1964), suggested various rationalizations of Lenin's approach. Germany was regarded as a Western colony and the German bourgeoisie as a victim, not as a class enemy. This rationalization was motivated mostly by political considerations, and Ruth Fisher, then a leader of the KPD, noted, "The alliance between Russia and the German bourgeoisie was urged as necessary for the defense of Russia against future invasions from the West."³⁸⁷

Ruth Fisher did not realize at the time that this could not have been the reason for the alliance since nobody wanted to invade Soviet Russia. The main reason, in fact, was that Lenin and his proxies did not want a successful German revolution. Fisher stressed that Bukharin advocated political alliance with the German bourgeoisie even more aggressively than did Radek,³⁸⁸ which is more evidence of Bukharin's having been a main contributor to statist National Bolshevism, although he fought the Russian traditional legacy inherent in it.

The idea of political alliance was soon extended to the idea of common actions with German National Socialists as an anti-imperialist force. Indeed, German Nazism became a mass movement that inherited Bolshevik political culture exactly as Italian fascism had done. Incidentally, Bukharin stressed this point in his speech at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923.³⁸⁹ However, German National Socialism differed from fascism in its violent anti-Semitism. The National Socialists regarded the "Jewish-Masonic conspiracy" as the main source of German misfortunes.

Nevertheless, on June 20, 1923, Radek delivered a sensational address at a meeting of an extended session of the Comintern Executive Committee proposing a common front with German National Socialists.³⁹⁰ He dedicated his speech to a young Nazi, Leo Schlageter (1894-1923), who had just been

executed in the Rhine province for terrorist activity against the French troops who occupied that German area.

"We must not ignore the fate of this martyr of German nationalism," Radek said; "his name speaks to the German people. . . . Schlageter, a courageous soldier of the counterrevolution, deserves that we, soldiers of the revolution, evaluate him courageously and honestly. . . . If the circles of German fascists that would like to serve the German people honestly will not understand the meaning of Schlageter's fate, then he perished in vain." "Against whom are German nationalists going to fight?" Radek asked, "against the Entente capital or against the Russian people? With whom will they unite? With the Russian workers and peasants in order to overthrow together the Entente capital, or with the Entente capital in order to enslave the German and the Russian peoples? . . . If patriotic German circles are not determined enough to make the cause of the majority of their people their cause, and thus create a front against the Entente and German capital, then Schlageter's road led to nowhere."

Radek's speech caused a storm in Germany.³⁹¹ Von Reventlow, who became close to the German National Socialists and soon was their Reichstag deputy, openly discussed the possibility of cooperating with German Communists.³⁹² Communists delivered addresses at Nazi meetings, and Nazis came to Communist meetings. Even some Communist leaders of Jewish origin, following party discipline, appealed to fight against Jewish capitalists, while the Nazis appealed to the Communists to get rid of their Jewish leaders, promising them full support if they did so. On July 13, 1923, Radek explained that the problem of Nazi-German cooperation was, not one of sentiment, but one of sober political calculation. Meanwhile, he said that to him, "people who might perish for the sake of fascism are more sympathetic than those who fight only for their chairs."³⁹³

In the views expressed in his Schlageter speech, Radek was not alone; he most certainly had support. On the other hand, he was entirely within Lenin's political tradition, which always regarded the radical right as a potential or an actual ally of Bolshevism. Anyway, Radek's idea was clearly directed against any independent Communist revolution in Germany.

Naturally, if Radek delivered his Schlageter speech in the official Comintern body in the presence of Zinoviev, the latter had to have approved it since he did not criticize it. Moreover, as Luks demonstrates, Radek at that time enjoyed Zinoviev's full support, and Luks also contests Ruth Fisher's claim that Radek's "adventurism" contradicted Lenin's and Trotsky's ideas. Indeed, Luks quotes a speech by Zinoviev in June 1923 in which he took as a compliment a statement made by a German nationalist newspaper, *Das Gewissen*, that the KPD was a nationalist party. Zinoviev reacted thus because of his narrow outlook; he did not realize that Radek's speech undermined not only the German revolution but also his own political position in the USSR itself, as the chairman of the Comintern.

Doubtless, Luks is also correct in calling Radek's speech "Leninist" and in regarding Radek as "a diligent pupil of Lenin." Not only Radek, but

also Zinoviev and Bukharin, believed that the rejection of parliamentary democracy by right-wing extremists was more important than their hatred of Marxism. Indeed, the idea was a very old one, suggested first by Plekhanov and later by Lenin, and Radek did not deviate from it—he said, for example, that the possibility of right-wing extremists' accepting Communist ideas was much greater than the possibility of Social Democrats' doing so. In August 1923, Radek said there were classes that were separated from each other by an abyss and those that would become Bolshevik allies in the next battle.³⁹⁴

Being liberated from Lenin's control, Zinoviev decided to launch an important revolution as quickly as possible; any success of such a revolution could strengthen his position as a potential Soviet leader. Two countries were chosen—Bulgaria and Germany. Zinoviev ran a separate network in Germany, which was opposed to Radek's network. Meanwhile, the KPD—supported by Trotsky, Radek, Stalin, Bukharin, and a Comintern leader, the Finn Otto Kuusinen (1881–1964) who was a Soviet Politburo member in 1957–1964—came out against these revolutions. Nevertheless, Zinoviev's network started preparing them.³⁹⁵

The attempt to stage a revolution in Bulgaria in September 1923 was unsuccessful; next came Germany. Many prominent party officials worked in the German underground. It is curious that Lezhnev also went to Germany in the autumn of 1923 for several months for an unidentified purpose,³⁹⁶ which rather indicates that he was closely connected with the Soviet political police, who were also involved in these preparations.

Every effort was made by the unfortunate Zinoviev himself to abort this German revolution in October 1923, a revolution messianically expected by left-wing Russian Bolsheviks. It turned into a farce, which had a deep impact on further political development in the USSR and on all international affairs. In Germany, it not only ended a short-lived Nazi-Communist dialogue but provoked the abortive Nazi putsch in Munich, which had fatal consequences. The failure ended the dream of an imminent world revolution. It provoked a very sharp reaction on the part of the German government; the German ambassador Brockdorff-Rantzau wanted to leave Moscow and break off Soviet-German relations.³⁹⁷ It also aggravated the struggle for power in Moscow, while Radek was declared the scapegoat for the failure and lost his commanding position in German affairs. Zinoviev maintained his position only because of his temporary coalition with Stalin. In hitting Radek, he also hit Trotsky, who was indirectly made another scapegoat for Zinoviev's adventurism. The Bolshevik revolution once again faced a crossroads, as it had during the Brest-Litovsk debates and at the end of 1920 after the defeat in the Polish war.

The geopolitical situation of Soviet Russia demanded the end of any political adventurism in international affairs, which could lead to the country's complete international isolation and the breaking off of trade relations. The consolidation of Soviet power had only just started, and therefore Communist activity abroad had to be contained in reasonable terms below some line.

The main objective was only the consolidation of power in the expectation that another great international conflict like that of 1914 would give Soviet Russia the opportunity to intervene victoriously and to expand its sphere of influence. The nucleus of this future conflict already existed in German revanchism, so the wisest Soviet policy would be only to encourage its aggravation without becoming directly involved. Meanwhile, Comintern policy had to follow Lenin's old line—prevent any victorious independent Communist revolution and put all internationalist left-wing movements under Moscow's strict control.

It is no surprise that the Russian-German *détente* in 1922 and then the abortive German revolution in October 1923 made many countries reconsider their attitude toward Soviet Russia, now considering it a more or less normal country that must not be alienated in order to prevent the dangerous Russian-German alliance. In February 1924, England (because of the Labour-Liberal coalition that replaced the tough anti-Soviet line of the previous government), Italy, Austria, and Norway granted diplomatic recognition to Soviet Russia. In March, Sweden did so as well; in May, China; in June, Denmark; in August, Mexico; and in October, France. What is especially interesting is that Italy was among the countries to recognize Soviet Russia first, and it remained on the best of terms with the USSR until it submitted to German pressure at the end of the 1930s. The merger with the radical right expanded over Russian boundaries. A senior Comintern official of that time, a Swiss Communist, Jules Humbert-Droz (1891-1971), claimed that Mussolini recognized Soviet Russia in order to split the Italian left wing.³⁹⁸

There was no consensus among Soviet leaders on the issue of Italian fascism, but the first Soviet ambassador to Italy, Konstantin Yurenev (Krotkovsky, 1888-1938), a close ally of Trotsky, successfully resisted not only the pressure from Russia but also the pressure from Italian Communists.³⁹⁹ Yurenev was invited to present his credentials just after the assassination on May 30 of a leader of the opposition, Giacomo Matteotti (1895-1924). Stalin agreed that the Soviet anthem "The International" would be replaced during the ceremony by music from *Carmen*. Moreover, Moscow instructed Yurenev to suggest to Mussolini a military-political union, which was rejected by Italy.⁴⁰⁰ In January 1934, Stalin said: "Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country."⁴⁰¹

Socialism in One Country: Triumph of Russian Etatist Nationalism

Socialism in One Country as Consolidation of Power

It is quite clear that the policy of consolidation of power called for the encouragement of deepening nationalization of the Soviet system. The Bolshevik party was under massive pressure from the dominant national environment, felt both inside and outside the party, within the country and in emigration, in different classes, in different social layers. It was felt in political, cultural, economic life. It acquired various forms: neopopulism, Scythianism, Red Patriotism, Smenovekhism, anti-Semitism against Jewish Bolsheviks.

Resistance to this overwhelming pressure was dangerous, since it could lead to the erosion of political power, while the opposite trend—the pressure of minorities—was not so important from the point of view of survival. It was vitally necessary for the sake of preservation of power, for the sake of preservation of the new ruling class,¹ to find a compromise with the Russian national environment that would prevent any political instability. It was necessary to create a visible national consensus without making any considerable political concession. This equation had many unknown quantities, but it was solved when two streams met: Russian etatist nationalism, which was ready to recognize Bolshevism as a Russian national power, and Bolshevism, which for a long time was itself nationalized geopolitically and integrated many nationalist movements in the process of the revolutionary struggle and the revolution.

The slogan, socialism in one country, advanced by Stalin in 1924 was not an innovation, as has been stressed repeatedly earlier. The slogan was advanced before the revolution and verbalized for the first time during the Brest-Litovsk debates. It is rather strange that it became a political issue in 1924 since it was essentially already a *fait accompli* of Soviet reality. After October 1917, the Bolshevik party was always split over this central issue: What is a reasonable proportion between the drive toward Soviet world domination and the benefits of consolidating power? There was no basic difference concerning the final goal. The controversy was only over

tactics, which, however, implied a very important dimension. For some Bolshevik leaders, the world Communist system was a value as such, and they did not care which country dominated the world system. However, the majority of the Bolsheviks wanted only one kind of world Communist system: a Russian-dominated one. They needed Moscow to be the Communist Third Rome.

It seems that the 1925-1927 socialism-in-one-country debates were regarded by Stalin merely as a very successful public relations campaign that would enable him to mobilize wide popular support for himself as the national leader, while the real power was in fact in his hands and had been at least since 1924. He launched a war that was decided before it was started. Stalin was perfectly right in his claim that the slogan had been formulated by Lenin himself. In fact, the opposition to the slogan was belated opposition to Lenin. Stalin's adversaries were simply trapped by him through his public relations campaign.

Stalin more than many other Bolsheviks identified himself with Russian statist nationalism, though he was not alone. After the Bolshevik revolution, he succeeded in building his own powerful coalition. Its members shared his basic political ideas, although almost no one in it could anticipate his personal ambitions. He was accepted as having a mediocre mind but being a very good politician. His political philosophy and the stock of his specific ideas were absorbed by him from Lenin and from other Bolshevik leaders. Therefore, it is misleading to claim that Stalin radically changed the Soviet system.

Leszek Kolakowski formulated this point in a very clear-cut way: "The Soviet system as it developed under Stalin was a continuation of Leninism, and that state, founded on Lenin's political and ideological principles, could only have maintained itself in a Stalinist form. . . . Stalin as a despot was much more the party's creation than its creator. He was the personification of a system which irresistibly sought to be personified."² The same point was insistently stressed by Angelica Balabanoff. She said that "Stalin was by no means an innovator. He lacked for this intellect, knowledge and initiative. He was a genuine pupil, an imitator but not a pioneer." She claimed that there was no basic difference between Lenin and Stalin: "An artificial juxtaposition of Leninism and Stalinism is one of the reasons for the many misunderstandings and mistakes concerning the essence and goals of Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks spread this juxtaposition consciously."³ One cannot help referring here to Rabbi Abraham Hein, who certainly had no scientific authority but was a wise man and witnessed the first years of Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine, which terrified him. He came to the conclusion that "Stalinism is an extreme expression of Bolshevism" in its cynicism and its complete rejection of human dignity.⁴

The first far-reaching step taken by Stalin after Lenin's death in January 1924 was a new policy of party recruitment, which Stalin disguised as "Lenin's promotion." In his quest for power, Stalin badly needed to change the party composition in order to neutralize its overrepresented left-wing

minority. Although formally this recruitment was worker oriented (mostly industrial workers were recruited at the time), in fact this promotion was made up of peasants who had just left their villages and found new employment. The old working class had persisted. (According to official party statistics, there were 83,000 party industrial workers in January 1924; in January 1925, their number had increased to 302,000; in January 1926, 409,000; and in July 1926, 433,000.)

Georgy Malenkov (b. 1902), a close associate of Stalin who was to become Soviet prime minister after him, recognized that skilled workers did not want to join the party, which became a peasant party par excellence.⁵ However, the new recruits, as we have seen, were not traditional peasants. Brainwashed by official ideology as they were, they still could not magically change their distant background. Moreover, the party became predominantly Russian.

Certainly Stalin was well aware of what he was doing, as can be seen from a 1907 article in which he discussed the social and national structure of the Bolshevik movement. The new policy of party recruitment was not only to aid consolidation of his own personal power. The party was not rooted firmly enough, so the "Lenin promotion" was also a large-scale social mobilization. By expanding party ranks, Stalin prepared the party for further ideological changes, which had already been started by Lenin. The new promotion was a much more favorable environment for Russian nationalism than the previous party composition, which had included a large left-wing proportion.

The new recruitment started just when the struggle for power became open. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were not such authority figures for new party members as they were for the old members. Although it has been widely accepted that Stalin's most serious rival was Trotsky, there is no factual background for this premise. In fact, Trotsky was helpless and knew in advance that he had no chance in the struggle for power. Trotsky was an outsider: He had no personal base of power and was hated by the majority of the old Bolsheviks, including especially Zinoviev and Kamenev—let alone Stalin. Balabanoff, who knew Trotsky well during the Civil War, noticed:

He was the neophyte who wanted to outdo in zeal and ardor the Bolsheviks themselves, the neophyte who wanted to be forgiven the many crimes against Bolshevism he had committed in the past—by becoming a greater royalist than the king, by becoming more intransigent, more revolutionary, more Bolshevik than any of them. He avoided everything that held even the remotest possibility of his being taken for a Menshevik.

Despite all this, the Bolsheviks were not less hostile toward him now than they had been before his conversion. Some felt slighted by having to accept him as a leader; others suspected him of not having undergone a complete conversion, of being still heterodox. Still others, and they perhaps were the majority, asserted that Trotsky had joined the Bolsheviks and accepted Lenin's orders because the Bolsheviks had won.⁶

Trotsky was well aware that in the case of any debates, his anti-Leninist past would be immediately exploited. Balabanoff stressed: "This man . . . was extremely weak when he found himself running counter to the opinion of the Party or the masses. It frightened him to be taken for less of a Bolshevik than the others or to be suspected of Menshevik leanings."⁷ He was Lenin's nomination in order to neutralize Stalin's growing influence and also to be a potential scapegoat. In his last months, Lenin tried to make a coalition with Trotsky against Stalin, but it was too late, which explains Trotsky's passivity in 1923 and 1924. He had nothing to do: Lenin's illness and death incapacitated him.

Being attacked by Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in the first round of the "succession struggle," Trotsky gradually moved to his pre-1917 views as if he had been advancing them all the time. The struggle, therefore, was not against the Trotsky of 1917-1923 but against the "theoretical" Trotsky. He was Lenin's faithful medium: "Trotskyism," as noted by Kolakowski, "never existed but was a figment invented by Stalin."⁸

Indeed, Zinoviev, as the Comintern chairman, identified himself with the party's left wing and could debate various issues, but Kamenev always belonged to the party's right wing, and linking the two together as a "political Gemini" is completely artificial.⁹ In self-defense, all of these politicians, who were helpless without Lenin, attacked socialism in one country as Stalin's evil invention. They were successfully trapped and easily defeated. Stalin emerged as the authentic party leader. He was supported by wide party circles, which gave some observers the opportunity to claim that Stalin had been created by the party apparatus.¹⁰ There is much truth in this claim. At the end of 1923 a former left-wing Communist, Oppokov, said: "We prefer three people [he meant the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate] with a small head over one person with a double head."¹¹

Lidia Shatunovskaia, who now lives in Israel, spent many years in the Kremlin as the wife of an old Bolshevik. In attempting to answer the question why almost all the old Bolsheviks supported Stalin and not Trotsky, she said that "it was an organic rejection of Trotsky by all the old Leninist-Bolshevik guard." They simply hated Trotsky, as for example, Petr Krasikov (1870-1939), an old Bolshevik, confessed.¹²

It is not by chance that Pokrovsky was one of the first to attack Trotsky on national grounds as early as 1922. He challenged Trotsky's view that Russia was a retarded country before the revolution and regarded his view of slow Russian industrial development as a prejudice. Since Trotsky claimed that only the world economy in its entirety was ripe for socialism, Pokrovsky's view amounted to a defense of the slogan socialism in one country even before the debates started over this issue.¹³

It is also not by chance that the old Bolsheviks initiated the process of rehabilitating the Russian revolutionary non-Marxist tradition. The main contributor to this process was again Pokrovsky in his official capacity,¹⁴ but he was not alone. Senior officials Sergei Mitsukevitch (1869-1944) and Ivan Teodorovitch (1875-1940) did a lot to rehabilitate Tkatchev, for example,

Mitakevitch claiming that "the Bolsheviks acted according to the testament of the (Russian) Jacobin-Blanquists, and we were not deterred when our opponents abused us . . . as Blanquists and Jacobins."¹⁵

Shatunovskaia verbalized very well the background of the rejection and hatred of Trotsky, stressing the fact that it was certainly directed at Trotsky's internationalist orientation. She said that it was a "deep, unconscious incompatibility of the Jewish mentality and the gravitation to cosmopolitanism with the traditional Russian etatist idea, regardless of how it was formulated."¹⁶ However, the so-called internationalist orientation of Trotsky manifested itself mostly when he had already lost his power after Lenin's death.¹⁷

Ustrialov: A Litmus Paper of Soviet Political Debates

The attitude toward Smenovekhism and the literary fellow travelers became a litmus paper of party political debates over the principle of socialism in one country. Left-wing Communists who opposed it violently attacked these trends directly—or more often, indirectly—blaming the party leadership for having encouraged them. They tried to overdramatize this threat in order to stress the dangerous course taken by the leadership. In January 1924, Vardin publicly accused the fellow travelers, claiming that their dominant type was a writer who distorted the revolution and even slandered it, being permeated by the spirit of nationalism, great-power chauvinism, and mysticism.¹⁸

In the same meeting at which Vardin leveled such criticism, Lunatcharsky defended the fellow travelers, saying that "it was impossible to discard even reactionary writers—even if they teach obscenities. Why? Because even a reactionary writer might produce sometimes marvelous artistic material, he might reflect the masses well."¹⁹ Lunatcharsky suggested guidelines for the party's literary policy, in which he, *inter alia*, stressed that Smenovekhist writers, while not a main part of Soviet literature, nevertheless constituted a very valuable part of it. He warned that it was intolerable to "attack these people as if they were a great class enemy."²⁰

Lunatcharsky was supported by Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925), the new people's commissar for defense, who defended Leonov and Pil'niak on a special literary committee nominated by the Central Party Committee. After long debates, a resolution on the party's literary policy was adopted on July 1, 1925, in which fellow travelers were not only defended but, in principle, the possibility of a nonorthodox interpretation of the revolution was approved. The resolution read: "Sifting antiproletarian and antirevolutionary elements (now utterly insignificant), fighting against the emerging ideology of the new bourgeoisie among some fellow travelers of the Smenovekhist ilk, the party must tolerate intermediate ideological forms, patently helping these inevitable forms to overcome them in the process of increasing cooperation with cultural forces of communism." It was demanded that Smenovekhist liberalism be exposed, though this was demagoguery since authentic Smenovekhists were not liberals. The resolution in fact gave a green light to the

national interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution. In fact, the entire range of National Bolshevik ideas was approved.²¹

In July 1925, Ustrialov visited Moscow for the first time since 1918. This trip made him very enthusiastic, but the evident shortcomings of the Soviet political system could not be obscured. These shortcomings dialectically encouraged him: He saw them as the "overcoming of the historical abyss between the people and the authorities." Otherwise the political system had been better before the revolution, but the main thing for him was that patriotism had become legitimate in Soviet Russia.²² Ustrialov met Lezhnev and his old friends several times, but it is unlikely that he met any important Soviet official; at least, no such meeting is recorded in his archives.²³

After his return to Harbin, a new collection of his articles appeared there with the provocative title *Pod zhakom revoliutsii* [Under the sign of the revolution]. This book was immediately used by Zinoviev, who declared that Ustrialov was an ideologist of the new Soviet bourgeoisie,²⁴ which was only a slight transformation of Zinoviev's previous attacks against Smenovekhism. Earlier, he had claimed that the Smenovekhists were striving for bourgeois restoration; now Zinoviev declared that this restoration was already a fact of Soviet reality. Zinoviev was especially irritated by Ustrialov's idea of the "transformation of the center," which the latter had advanced in his new collection, hinting at Stalin's accession. Zinoviev boasted that Ustrialov would see no transformation at either the fourteenth or the fifteenth party congresses.

Ustrialov was declared by Zinoviev to be a most dangerous enemy since he ostensibly accepted Lenin. The unfortunate politician Zinoviev, who tried somehow to damage Stalin, trapped himself by awkward hints at Bukharin, who was then regarded as Stalin's main ally. No doubt, Bukharin wittingly and unwittingly contributed a lot to the formation of National Bolshevism. He differed from Stalin, however, in his lack of flexibility and, following from this, a certain dogmatism. Bukharin had once undergone a radical transformation, repenting his Brest-Litovsk left-wing communism and becoming a party right-winger; he was not psychologically prepared for another radical transformation. In fact, he was full of contradictions. On the one side, he was a Russocentric revolutionary who dreamed of the future world revolution, but at the same time, he hated the Russian national past and used every opportunity to demonstrate his national nihilism. He dreamed of a new human type in Russia. At the height of his right-wing enthusiasm, Bukharin released a dangerous slogan addressed to the peasants: Enrich yourselves! Ustrialov welcomed this slogan, and Zinoviev took up the issue without, however, mentioning Bukharin's name.²⁵ Zinoviev did his best to avoid the national aspects inherent in Ustrialov's new book since he was probably afraid that his criticism might only encourage sympathy with Stalin and Bukharin in Russian public opinion.

Zinoviev's article was a spark thrown into a powder keg, especially in view of the approaching Fourteenth Party Congress. Bukharin, who was

frightened by Ustrialov's support, published a long article in which he tried to demonstrate that his views had nothing to do with Ustrialov.²⁶ According to Bukharin, Ustrialov was looking forward to fascist Caesarism in the USSR. Contrary to Zinoviev, Bukharin stressed Ustrialov's national aspects, probably in order to distract public attention from the economic aspects of the latter's collection.

Formally, Bukharin was even a supporter of Zinoviev, but only in order to clear himself from parallels with Ustrialov. According to Bukharin, Ustrialov also had become a most dangerous enemy, since he wanted to take advantage of Soviet internal contradictions. He rejected formal democracy, as did the Bolsheviks, but not in favor of proletarian dictatorship but in favor of fascist Caesarism. He did not recognize the class structure of Soviet society, did not see the difference between Lenin and Mussolini. Bukharin formulated Ustrialov's main thesis quite accurately. "According to Ustrialov," Bukharin said, "all our socialism is bluff. But the new state, with the extraordinarily wide scope of its politics, with cast-iron people who strengthen Russian influence from one end of the earth to the other, is not a bluff." Bukharin did not want to recognize that Bolshevism might enter into some illegal bond with nationalism.

Lezhnev was given permission to reprint Ustrialov's book in his publishing house,²⁷ but the articles by Zinoviev and Bukharin blackened the Ustrialov's name too much, and the project never materialized. However, everything said by Ustrialov turned out to be a focus of Soviet political life.

At the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, Stalin demagogically reduced Ustrialov's views to the idea of the restoration of a bourgeois republic—a possibility suggested to him by Zinoviev. However, Stalin disagreed with Bukharin that Ustrialov was now enemy number one, saying:

I should like to say a word or two about the new bourgeoisie and its ideologists—the Smena-Vekhites. Smena-Vekhism is the ideology of the new bourgeoisie, which is growing and little by little linking up with the kulaks and the intelligentsia in the government service. The new bourgeoisie has put forward its own ideology, the Smena-Vekh ideology, which consists in the view that the Communist Party is bound to degenerate and the new bourgeoisie to consolidate itself, while it appears that, without ourselves noticing it, we Bolsheviks are bound to reach the threshold of the democratic republic, then to cross that threshold and, with the assistance of some "Caesar," who will come forward, perhaps from the ranks of the military, or perhaps from the government service officials, to find ourselves in the position of an ordinary bourgeois republic.

Such is the new ideology with which attempts are being made to fool our government service intelligentsia, and not only them, but also certain circles that stand close to us.

If I have mentioned the Smena-Vekhites, after all, it is only in order to answer in a few words all those who are counting on the degeneration of our Party and our Central Committee. Ustrialov is the author of this ideology. He is in the transport service. It is said that he is serving well. I think that if he is serving well, let him go on dreaming about the degeneration of our

Party. Dreaming is not prohibited in our country. Let him dream to his heart's content. But let him know that while dreaming about our degeneration, he must, at the same time, bring grist to our Bolshevik mill. Otherwise, it will go badly with him.²⁸

It is evident that Stalin in fact defended Ustrialov, ignoring Zinoviev's hints and Bukharin's warnings, but his people attacked Zinoviev. Lazar Kaganovitch (b. 1893), who later became one of Stalin's main proxies and a Politburo member, argued that Zinoviev, in attacking Ustrialov, was actually attacking Bukharin.²⁹ Mikhail Tomaky (1880-1936)—Politburo member, chairman of the Soviet trades unions, and Bukharin's ally—appealed that no attention to be paid to a provincial author.³⁰ Mikhail Riutin (?-1938), who would be arrested in connection with the plot against Stalin in 1932, blamed the opposition for saying that "Smenovekhists disguised as Communists" contribute to *Pravda* (Bukharin was editor in chief of *Pravda*).³¹

Zinoviev awkwardly justified himself, saying that he did not criticize the party but could not help repeating Ustrialov's words about the transformation of the party center and the increasing elimination of the left wing from the Party. Zinoviev also stressed other words of Ustrialov: "There is a new wave of common sense, which is being driven by the powerful breath of the immense peasant elements."³²

Zinoviev, who still controlled the Petrograd (now Leningrad) party organization, used the Leningrad press for counterattacks. The main organ of the Leningrad party organization accused the Central Party Committee majority by saying that behind its loud phrases about the world revolution, it regarded Lenin as a theoretician of a National Socialist revolution.³³

Ustrialov was jubilant in spite of the fact that he had become notorious in Russia. He called the party congress a council and said: "How can one not be happy, realizing that the Communist party leads in a confident iron march the Great Russian revolution into the national pantheon prepared for it by history." Naturally, Ustrialov condemned the opposition and noticed with satisfaction that "the party is going further and further away from Lenin's epoch," making the following forecast: "If the Fourteenth Party Congress goes under the slogan Forward with Lenin, the Fifteenth Party congress will go under the slogan Forward with Lenin and from Lenin."³⁴

Ustrialov realized that the party's old generation was more literate and cultured than the new generation but, following his own dialectics, claimed that "good people from the opposition are much worse than 'bad' from the 'majority.'" "An average party member," according to Ustrialov, "is now socially more useful and fruitful from the state point of view." This view is exactly that expressed by Oppokov. He was burying alive the old party generation: "The twilight of the old Lenin guards is coming."³⁵

Not only Zinoviev, whose twilight Ustrialov forecast, was frightened by Ustrialov. Soon, in spite of all his optimism, the inconsistent winner, Bukharin, began expressing his anxiety. Stephen Cohen thought that Bukharin was confused by the national overtones of socialism in one country and tried to neutralize them in three ways: (1) by assertions that socialism

would be constructed only during several decades; (2) by statements that if it would be achieved in solitude, it would be imperfect; (3) by warnings against any accent on the slogan's national aspects. Speaking after the congress, Bukharin said that if the USSR overestimated its potential, if the world revolution were ignored in the USSR, a specific ideology, a special kind of National Bolshevism, might emerge and it would be only a few steps from this concept to worse ideas.³⁶ Eventually, Bukharin was ruined by the inconsistency of his ideas.

Turkestan Socialism Versus Basel Socialism

In the struggle against Ustrialov, the opposition and Bukharin had forgotten that in Moscow itself, a variety of the latter's National Bolshevism was blossoming that was no less dangerous than Ustrialov's. In fact, Russia was prospering, and the most surprising thing about it was Lezhnev's articles, in which, in a loud voice, he advanced an ideology that challenged classic Marxism, one no one else would dare to voice. Also, Russia remained Ustrialov's main tribune in Russia.

Soon after Lenin's death, Lezhnev attacked the opposition, suggesting a new legitimacy to the struggle against it. He demanded "the refreshment of the livestock of the revolution, the regroupment of the human material." This demand would certainly have pleased Stalin. Lezhnev appealed to the iron party discipline. "Democracy," he said, "is not an end in itself, neither for Bolsheviks nor for other practical workers in the field of the economic, technical, national, and cultural revival of Russia," since democracy "is a phenomenon of parliamentarism that is dying out throughout the world." Lezhnev opposed the demands of democracy, which could throw the party and the country into terrible internal struggles. The new common form of state life toward which Europe is developing in the twentieth century is without doubt the dictatorship. This new state system, which he almost openly identified with fascism, simply not using that word, is founded on the dictatorship, which tries to be as national as its forces will permit in order to keep political sovereignty and economic independence. Lezhnev said that this was the general direction of current political life and Russia should not resist this trend. This form is not an ideal, but is the best for this particular moment.³⁷

What was not said overtly by Lezhnev was said in Russia by Sergei Adrianov (1871-1941), who openly expressed his sympathy with Italian fascism. According to him, Mussolini did not place his cause in opposition to that of the working class. Adrianov praised the anticapitalist motives in fascist ideology because it was impossible to equate Italian fascism with the interests of large capital.³⁸

However, those views were all rather a repetition of what Ustrialov was saying. An original contribution of Lezhnev to the debate was his juxtaposition of the socialisms of Turkestan and Basel. In fact, Lezhnev took advantage of Martov's accusation against the Bolsheviks that their socialism was that

of Turkestan. He cited this accusation as praise, condemning Basel socialism, which in fact amounted to condemning classic Marxism. Lezhnev appealed for socialism to concentrate on revolutionary Asia, not on Europe; according to his dialectical interpretation of the Turkestan brand, subjectively it was national, but objectively it was international since it had integrated the idea of universal human unity, whereas the Basel form of socialism was essentially nationalist and etatist. Lezhnev said that the domination of the white race was drawing to an end; new, hidden potential forces of new races were being discovered, which would bring about a new renaissance. Petersburg, he claimed, fettered peasant Russia, and Europe fettered the peasant planet. The "colored races" would crack European-American imperialism like a nut. (The most important target of his attack was the United States.) Lezhnev forecast that the twentieth century would be marked by a worldwide struggle between a "coalition of those countries and races with low fertility and highly advanced culture and another coalition of those countries and races with high fertility and a relatively low level of culture."³⁹

"The greatest war of liberation in human history is imminent," Lezhnev forecast. "With enormous force, which will shatter the planet, avalanches from the West and the East will clash in the struggle for universal unity of liberated humanity, for the displacement of world centers, for new life, for new continents."⁴⁰ In this future culture, Europe would not be dominant. The only thing Europe has to offer is ossified stocks of its culture, its civilizatory placenta. "Europe will retain only the role of the professional intelligentsia."⁴¹ The decline of Europe is not yet the decline of humanity.⁴²

What about Russia? asked Lezhnev. Russia is the crystal on which universal human unity will be formed. It is not a territory but a function of the cultural acceleration of humanity; it is now the intelligentsia of the world's peoples. The Russian intelligentsia appeals to turn "face to village" while Russia as a world intelligentsia appeals to turn "face to the world village—face to the East." Russia is the nervous system of future humanity.⁴³ The revolution pulverized the contradiction between Westernism and Slavophilism by synthesis: This synthesis was Lenin.⁴⁴

The Fourteenth Party Congress gave Lezhnev an opportunity to attack the opposition violently and to support Stalin in his demand to build the economy independent of the West.⁴⁵ Even in the beginning of 1926, Lezhnev was daring enough to print Ustrialov's long article about his visit to Moscow,⁴⁶ which would have been impossible had Lezhnev not had very reliable support in the leadership.

The accusations of the opposition and the suspicions of Bukharin made Stalin resort to a series of maneuvers. In April 1926, there was a session of the Central Party Committee, the first at which Trotsky, being cornered, supported Zinoviev. Having not yet finished his public relations campaign, Stalin made some concessions before the final "spectacle." One of those concessions was the suspension of *Rossia* two weeks after the session. Lezhnev, who had once been saved from Zinoviev, was even arrested for a short time and then expelled to Estonia.⁴⁷ A *Pravda* article accused

Lezhnev of struggling against the Soviet economic policy and declared him an economic spokesman of the "new bourgeoisie." *Pravda* left no doubts about his National Bolshevism, since he was also accused of saying that "Bolshevism is national, and the Bolsheviks were summoned to restore Russia as a great power." As an essayist, Lezhnev was praised for his brilliant style, which conceded nothing to Ustrialov, the latter being described as a "prophet of the bankrupt and wandering intelligentsia."⁴⁸ Since Bukharin was the editor of *Pravda*, it was most certainly his article, or else it was inspired by him.

Lezhnev was most certainly a bone thrown to the opposition and to Bukharin. Mikhail Lashevitch (1884-1928), an active member of the opposition and Zinoviev's man, was expelled later to Harbin and there revealed that *Rossia* had been closed down because of Zinoviev, who brandished the latest *Rossia* at a Politburo session and accused Stalin of deliberately closing his eyes to his harmful magazine.⁴⁹

Lezhnev's expulsion looks very suspicious. If one can judge from his own letter to Ustrialov sent from Estonia (the last letter in their exchange), it seems that he probably had some GPU links and was used by them abroad.⁵⁰ He spent three years with the Soviet trade mission in Germany, and interestingly, in his last letter to Ustrialov he begged him not to make any fuss concerning his expulsion, since it would harm him.⁵¹

Lezhnev then returned to Moscow and after several years joined the party with Stalin's personal recommendation. He always remained the same committed National Bolshevik; in 1937, he printed in *Pravda* (where he had become head of a department) an article called "Smerdiakovs" in which he presented the former anti-Stalin opposition as enemies not only of the Soviet state but of the Russian people par excellence.⁵² One must take into consideration that the majority of the people he mentioned were Jews. He repeated Smerdiakov's words from *The Brothers Karamazov*: "I hate all Russia. . . . The Russian people want thrashing."⁵³ This was, according to Lezhnev, the culprits' mentality. He was very sensitive to the "popular spirit," and he knew that this spirit had already turned against "kikes." And where this spirit went, Lezhnev followed. Later, after World War II, *Pravda* criticized Lezhnev for treating the war as a Russian national war.⁵⁴

The suspension of *Rossia* changed nothing. In one of its last issues, Lezhnev printed the first part of an excellent novel by the young writer Mikhail Bulgakov: *White Guard*.⁵⁵ Bulgakov himself described with great wit how *White Guard* was published, and he presented Lezhnev with great sympathy.⁵⁶ In his book, Bulgakov portrayed the hopeless situation of the Whites during the Civil War. The Soviet literary critic Vladimir Lakshin was perfectly correct in his formulation of Bulgakov's concept of the revolution: "The rebellious popular depth of depth is bubbling, and on the surface of life, political favorites and adventurers flash, replacing each other, striving to defend their privileges or simply to warm their hands at the fire kindled by peasant anger."⁵⁷

One of the novel's heroes, Alexei Turbin, had a dream in 1919 in which he saw his cavalry sergeant who had been killed in 1916. The sergeant told

Turbin that Bolahevik squadrons who were to perish in Crimea in 1920, a year after these events, are expected in paradise. When this sergeant, completely confused, asks God why Bolsheviks are admitted to paradise, he is told: "I have neither profit nor loss from your faith. One believes, another doesn't, but your deeds are the same, at every moment you strangle one another."⁵⁸ Bulgakov was saying that the Bolaheviks were no less justified by history than the Whites.

Russia was closed, and the publication of *White Guard* was suspended, but it was staged as a play by the prestigious Moscow Art Theater, directed by Konstantin Stanislavsky (1863-1938) and Vladimir Nemirovitch-Danchenko (1858-1943) in October 1926. This play, called *Days of the Turbins*, not only was a cultural sensation but it became an issue of hot controversy between the Moscow party committee and Lunatcharsky, covertly supported by Stalin. National Bolshevik trends were strengthened in the play in comparison to the novel. In it, a White officer, Myshlaevsky, appeals to his friends to join the Bolsheviks:

Myshlaevsky I'm for the Bolsheviks, only against the Communists.

Studzinsky That's ridiculous. One should know what one's talking about.

. . . you used the word "fatherland." What kind of fatherland is it when there are Bolsheviks. Russia is finished. . . .

Myshlaevsky The Bolsheviks? . . . Fine! Very happy!

Studzinsky But they'll mobilize you.

Myshlaevsky And I'll go and I'll serve. Yes!

Studzinsky Why?

Myshlaevsky I'll tell you why! Because! Because Petlyura has how many, did you say? Two hundred thousand! Those two hundred thousand have their heels greased and they blow away at the mere word "Bolsheviks"! Did you see it? Great! Because behind the Bolsheviks there are peasants as thick as locusts. . . . And what can I oppose them with? . . . Let them mobilize me! At least I'll know that I'm serving in the Russian army. The people are not with us. The people are against us. . . .

Studzinsky What the hell kind of Russian army can there be when they've put an end to Russia?! And they'll shoot us anyway!

Myshlaevsky And they'll be right to do so! . . .

Studzinsky We had a Russia—a great power! . . .

Myshlaevsky And it will be! . . . It will!⁵⁹

On the day of the premiere, Lunatcharsky, anticipating the tempest the play would provoke, published a review in which he said that it was a "melee of evident merits and clear, great shortcomings." On the one hand, he pointed out its nationalism, covered, "as usual by decorations of patriotic enthusiasm": on the other, Lunatcharsky regarded that the merit of the play lay in its demonstration of how right-wing, and even the most right-wing, Smenovekhists, as "philistines, surrender their positions."⁶⁰

Lunatcharsky's authority was not enough to stop a stream of indignation from the party critics. Several newspapers leveled sharp criticism at *Turbins*, but Lunatcharsky was defiant. Meanwhile, the head of the propaganda

department of the Moscow party committee, Nikolai Mandelshtam (1878-1932), demanded the suspension of the play, accusing the Moscow Art Theater of counterrevolution and blaming Lunatcharsky for encouraging it.⁶¹ In February 1927, there was a public dispute about *Turbins* in which Lunatcharsky was opposed by *Na postu* literary critics who called the play "right-wing opportunist and chauvinist."⁶² However, the play was staged by the Moscow Art Theater 987 times between 1926 and 1941.⁶³

One must understand the role of theater in the USSR at that time to realize that every performance of *Turbins* means more than any political literature. *Rossia* was suspended, but its ideas survived and increased their impact. Lunatcharsky's daring behavior and the impunity of the Moscow Art Theater become more understandable if one knows that it was Stalin who defended Bulgakov. Stalin visited the theater to see *Turbins* fifteen times.⁶⁴ When the playwright Vladimir Bill-Belotserkovsky (1884-1970) intervened, asking Stalin to suspend the play, Stalin explained that

as to "Days of the Turbins" itself, it is not such a bad play, because it does more good than harm. Don't forget that the chief impression it leaves with the spectator is one that is favourable to the Bolsheviks: "If even such people as the Turbins are compelled to lay down their arms and submit to the will of the people because they realise that their cause is definitely lost, then the Bolsheviks must be invincible and there is nothing to be done about it." "Days of the Turbins" is a demonstration of the all-conquering power of Bolshevism.⁶⁵

Stalin's letter is an extremely valuable document in defense of National Bolshevism.

Encouraged by his success, Bulgakov wrote another National Bolshevik play, *Flight* (1926), whose hero is a former general of Wrangel who returns to Russia—clearly modeled on General Slashchev, who was still alive.⁶⁶ *Flight* was accepted by the Moscow Art Theater and approved by Gorky, but in October 1928, it was suspended. Stalin was ready to permit *Flight* if Bulgakov were to introduce some elements that would justify it ideologically, but Bulgakov refused. It is highly important that Stalin did not agree that *Flight* was a right-wing threat:

I consider that to raise the question of "Rights" and "Lefts" in literature (and, hence, in the theatre also) is in itself incorrect. In our country today the concept "Right" or "Left" is a Party concept, properly speaking an inner-Party concept. . . . To apply them to literature, at the present stage of its development, where there are trends of every description, even anti-Soviet and downright counter-revolutionary trends, would be turning all concepts topsy-turvy.⁶⁷

Therefore, Stalin gave a *carte blanche* to literature that he did not give to politics, as one can see throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

TABLE 5.1

Territorial distribution of the Jewish population in Russia in 1897, 1923, and 1926

	1897	1923	1926
Ukraine	1,674,000	1,556,000	1,574,000
Byelorussia	571,000	517,000	407,000
European Russia	153,000	533,000	544,000
Transcaucasus	106,000	141,000	155,000

Stalin Resorts to Anti-Semitism

The final triumph of socialism in one country, i.e., the adoption of the decision to consolidate power in isolation, had many internal political implications. One of them was the gradual erosion of the political position of aliens in the Soviet leadership, which was part and parcel of Lenin's original plan of world revolutionary expansion. If now the focus of Soviet strategy was Russian state power, the role of minority allies eroded—although not entirely. Meanwhile, the abnormality of Jewish overrepresentation in the Soviet leadership became very glaring.

The usual statistics do not give the right impression of the national composition of the leadership. According to official data, Jews constituted only 5.2 percent of all party membership in 1922, i.e., 19,564 party members.⁶⁸ However, their importance was much greater than that figure would indicate. At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Jews constituted 14.6 percent of the delegates with casting votes and 18.3 percent of those with deliberate votes. Jews also constituted up to 25–30 percent of the Politburo membership, occupying many key political positions in that body.⁶⁹ According to understated figures, Jews constituted 8 percent of all officials, though this figure is an average for the whole country, including rural areas where Jews were a very small percentage of the population.⁷⁰

It was not only in the party or the government that Jews were over-represented. There was an immense Jewish migration inside of Russia from the former Pale of Settlement. According to understated figures, the territorial distribution of the Jewish population in Russia in 1926, in comparison to 1923 and 1897, was as shown in Table 5.1.⁷¹ Therefore, even in 1923, the Jewish population in European Russia had increased by almost 400,000 in comparison to 1897. Part of this growth could have taken place before the revolution, especially because of the mass deportation of the Jewish population inside of Russia during World War I.

The same source gives the following figures for Moscow. In 1920, there were 28,000 Jews in the city, i.e., 2.2 percent of the entire population. By 1923, the percentage had increased to 5.5 and by 1926, 6.5. By 1926, 100,000 Jews arrived in Moscow from the former Pale of Settlement.⁷² According

to another source, there were 170,000 Jews in Moscow in 1927, or 8.5 percent of the city's population.⁷³

The percentage of Jews among students was even higher. In Russia proper, where this percentage had been very low before the revolution, Jews constituted 14.7 percent of all students in technical institutes in 1926, 4.2 percent in agricultural institutes, 17.3 percent in socioeconomic institutes, 11.3 percent in teaching colleges, 15.3 percent in medical schools, and 21.3 percent in artistic institutes of higher learning.

Jews also constituted a very important part of private business permitted after 1921. In December 1926, there were in Moscow 24,216 private businessmen including 3,437 Jews; in the category of rich private businessmen, they numbered 810 out of 2,469.⁷⁴

It is quite evident that the immense Jewish migration into Central Russia, let alone their overrepresentation in the party and government, contradicted all Russian tradition. Nobody cared about the explanation that the Jews, on average, made up only a small percentage of the government and party apparatus,⁷⁵ though even this percentage was much higher than their real demographic weight. In vital fields of the government, social, and economic sectors, Jews were so overrepresented that the Russian population could not help reacting even more sharply than in 1922 when Gorky gave his interview to Asch. Jews now were even more than then identified with the new system.

The Jews were not the only alien diaspora overrepresented in the Soviet system. Another group was composed of the Letts. A considerable Lett migration inside of Russia proper took place during the war when several Riga military factories were evacuated. Lenin stressed the importance of this migration too, since according to him, the Letts helped Russian workers create a network of Bolshevik party cells.⁷⁶ With regard to the Civil War, its fate was decided in some critical situations because of the intervention of the Lett corps, which was entirely committed to the Bolsheviks and was violently anti-German.⁷⁷ The corps was the Red Army's shock brigade. In July 1918, the Letts saved the Bolshevik regime during the abortive left-wing SR uprising. The Letts were massively integrated into the Soviet political police, where they held many key positions until 1936-1938. They gave the Bolshevik party such outstanding leaders as Jan Rudzutak (1887-1938), a Politburo member in 1926-1932; Ivar Smilga (1892-1938); Petr Stutchka (1865-1932), the people's commissar for justice; Robert Eikhe (1890-1940), an alternate Politburo member in 1935-1938; and Wilhelm Knorin (1890-1938), a chief party ideologist.

Several Caucasian minorities were also overrepresented, especially the Armenian diaspora. Some insight into the Armenian diaspora members in the leadership is given by data provided by Anastas Mikoian, a Politburo member since 1926 and Soviet president in 1964-1965, on graduates of the Tiflis Armenian ecclesiastical seminary, Nersesian. Just among these graduates, apart from Mikoian, there were a famous military commander in the Civil War, Gaia Gai (Bzhkian, 1887-1937); the head of a Comintern department,

Gevorg Alkhanian (1897-1937, the father of Elena Bonner-Sakharov); a trade-union secretary, Aikaz Kostanian (1897-1938); a member of the Moscow party committee, Napoleon Andreasian (1896-1973); senior officials of the Central Party Committee, Suren Akopian and Artak Stamboltian; a senior political police official, Sedrak Markarian; senior party and government officials Aram Shakhgaldian (1897-1948), Tatevos Mandalian (1901-1938), Gurgen Voskanian (1899-1971), Vagan Balian, and Shavarsh Amirkhanian (1894-1959); the future chairman of the Soviet union of architects, Karo Alabian (1897-1959); and many others.⁷⁸

An active role in the Civil War was also played by Chinese who went to work temporarily in Russia during World War I. They enlisted as a rule in the Red Army as mercenaries, demanding salaries also for those killed in action.⁷⁹ Their number is difficult to estimate, but it seems that several tens of thousands of Chinese fought in the Red Army. The majority of the survivors left Russia after the Civil War.

When the internationalist halo of the revolution started fading, the political position of the alien revolutionary diaspora eroded. However, only Jews became a symbol of the Russian abortive and hated internationalism, and their overrepresentation, cultivated by Lenin, provoked hatred not only in the population but also in the party.

Roy Medvedev was wrong in his underestimation of national friction in Soviet internal politics.⁸⁰ Indeed, the Russians constituted the absolute majority and determined the policies and ideology of the new system, but the Jews were overrepresented. That fact was enough. Shmuel Ettinger has said that up to the end of the 1920s Jews turned out to be the only ethnic group that benefited from the revolution.⁸¹

From the very beginning of the socialism-in-one-country debates, Stalin encouraged anti-Semitic passions against Trotsky and Zinoviev—and even against Kamenev, who was a half-Jew and had nothing to do with Jewry but was regarded as a Jew. As early as December 1924, Stalin implied Trotsky's contempt for the Russian people as exemplified in the latter's theory of permanent revolution (which Stalin had resurrected from the political dust): "Lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian proletariat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of 'permanent revolution.'"⁸² One can find the same concept in the words of one of Stalin's main allies, Sergei Kirov. He said that "the opposition accuses us that we are all real 'katsapnia' [a humiliating nickname given to Great Russians], that we don't see anything beyond our own country, that we don't believe in the world revolution and so on, that we are narrow nationalists, mediocre people, while Trotsky and Zinoviev are genuine internationalists."⁸³

We do not have complete data about the national composition of the opposition. If one can judge from a document signed by 121 members of the opposition in 1927, Jews constituted not more than 30 percent of them.⁸⁴ If the opposition was led by Jews, that fact was enough for the absolute majority of the Russian population to make it unpopular, and

Stalin was well aware of this situation. There were many Jews on Stalin's side, but the opposition was regarded as being essentially Jewish while Jewish supporters of Stalin were regarded as loyal Jews.

In a secret report of the Smolensk provincial party committee, the attitude of local peasants to the political debates was documented by the following record of a conversation: "Our good master, Vladimir Ilich [Lenin], had only just passed away when our commissars began to fight among themselves, and all this is due to the fact that the Jews became very numerous, and our Russians do not let them have their way, but there is nobody to suppress them." According to this secret report, a Briansk worker said: "Trotsky wanted to lead the state, that is, to take Lenin's place and put Jews in all responsible positions, but Trotsky and his opposition were unable to do this, and that is why they were fighting against the Central Committee of the party."⁸⁵ A village party cell in Eastern Siberia adopted a decision that said, "Trotsky cannot be a Communist; his very nationality shows that he needs to speculate."⁸⁶ Zinoviev and Kamenev were accused by the same party cell of opposing the Russian spirit.

One senior GPU official, who supervised all the railway GPU, escaped from Russia and made a statement abroad that after 1921 he had felt himself to be a puppet of the "Jewish" Central Party Committee. He said that "the hatred of Jews is increasing among Russian Communists. . . . The opposition doesn't enjoy any support from the population only because it is led by Jews, in spite of the fact that it comes out against the existing regime."⁸⁷

During a Politburo session in March 1926, Trotsky sent Bukharin a note complaining that Moscow workers were saying openly that "the kikes are rioting." Trotsky claimed that he had received hundreds of letters complaining about the anti-Semitic outburst, and one letter reported that the opposition had been labeled a group of "dissatisfied Jewish intellectuals." Bukharin replied that these examples were only exceptions. Then Trotsky sent him another note inviting him to visit a shoe factory. Bukharin agreed, but Stalin advised him not to go. Trotsky suggested discussing the problem of anti-Semitism in the Politburo, but he received no support.⁸⁸ A provocative official statement was made that the party fought Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, not as Jews, but as opposition: This was, in fact, another reminder that they were all Jews.⁸⁹

The extent of the anti-Semitism and its tolerance in Moscow might be judged from the fact that Kliutchnikov, who by the way was accused of anti-Semitism as early as 1922 during his Kolchak period,⁹⁰ gave a lecture in the biggest hall in Moscow to explain the reason for the anti-Semitic outburst. The text of this lecture was printed in a Moscow party newspaper. He said that the hostility toward the Jews was caused by the "frustrated national feelings of the Russian people." "The Russian people," Kliutchnikov said, "manifested the national self-limitation. There is a certain disproportion between the demographic weight of Jews in the USSR and the number of places which they temporarily occupy in the cities. . . . We live in our city and they arrive and hamper us. . . . The proportion between the

demographic weight of the Jews and the entire population is terribly distorted in political development, in daily life and in other fields." Kliutchnikov complained that although there was a terrible shortage of housing in Moscow, Jews who arrived there from other areas received lodgings. "It is not anti-Semitism," Kliutchnikov said, "there is the growth of national discontent and national anxiety, the anxiety of other nations. One must not close his eyes to this. What a Russian might say to another Russian he would not say to a Jew. The masses say that there are too many Jews in Moscow. You must take it into consideration, but don't call it anti-Semitism."⁹¹

Kliutchnikov's lecture and its printing in a Moscow newspaper could not have come about without the approval of the new Moscow party secretary, Nikolai Uglanov, an old enemy of Zinoviev whom Stalin efficiently used. By the way, Moscow newspapers printed cartoons in which "national" features of Trotsky and Zinoviev were stressed grotesquely.

Uglanov publicly condemned anti-Semitism, but his condemnation was comparatively much milder than other public refutations of anti-Semitism at the time.⁹² However, he acknowledged that there was anti-Semitism among workers and even among party members. It is interesting that he claimed that the Moscow party committee started its fight against anti-Semitism as early as 1925, which sounds sinister. There is interesting evidence of how anti-Semitism was openly encouraged by the central party apparatus. Sergei Malashkin (b. 1888), a former SR member who became a senior official of the Central Party Committee, published an anti-Semitic novel, *Luna s pravoi storony* [The moon from the right side].⁹³ The main positive character of the novel, a young Russian girl, Tania Aristarkhova, daughter of a rich peasant, leaves her family and enters a university in Moscow. There she falls under the morbid influence of Jewish students, both boys and girls, and is thoroughly corrupted—having twenty-two husbands [sic]. The main negative character is a Jew named Isaika Tchuzhatchok (Russian for "little alien"); his description is anti-Semitic in the extreme. He has a "big red nose and broad, yellow, predatory teeth which stick out from his mouth." He combines all feelings, all thoughts, all temperaments of an international kind—said the author. Aleshka, a Russian student, says to Isaika, "You're babbling well now, you've even lost your accent." Another Russian student, Andriushka, adds, "You, Isaika, have completely lost your nation." Isaika interrupts, "I am an internationalist." Doubtless, in Malashkin's vocabulary, the word had a negative implication.

Malashkin invented an Aesopian language in order not to use the word "Jew"; using instead various euphemisms in order to replace this word. One positive Russian character, Tania's brother, says to his friend, who later becomes Tania's last husband, "Nikolai, please never mix children of party and government officials, especially that suspicious youth which came from the periphery, with genuine working youth." Tania herself says: "I have no idea where this youth came from. It was completely impossible to work with them since they were mostly alien to us, they came from families of small artisans and so on." It is interesting that Tania herself was the daughter of a kulak.

In this novel, Malashkin claims that Trotsky's support came only from Jews. Tania says that "it was this youth which raised their heads and went after new slogans which were alien to the Bolshevik party." Tania's brother says: "Was it not evident who followed Trotsky during that discussion? It was that youth which flooded in from the periphery, from the small bourgeois families, that went after Trotsky."

Malashkin survived all the purges and, achieving a very old age (still alive at 98 in 1986), has been glorified by a new generation of Russian nationalists as a Columbus of Soviet literary anti-Semitism.⁹⁴ He was officially decorated in 1978 at the age of 90.

Pierre Pascal, who worked at the time in the Comintern, recorded many cases of anti-Semitism; for example, the full indignation of the Russians at the offer to Jewish agricultural colonists to settle in the steppe and arid areas of the Crimea (mistakenly regarded as the best regions) while Russian peasants were offered Siberian lands. He also recorded rumors of Jewish domination of the press, the political police, and so on.⁹⁵

There is a very interesting anonymous report, printed in a Prague SR magazine, on the extent of Soviet anti-Semitism.⁹⁶ The author, who condemns anti-Semitism, claims that the Jewish problem is now an obsession of the Russian population. Everyone is talking about the Jewish domination. All government offices are filled with Jews; foreign service and foreign trade missions consist mainly of Jews. The housing crisis is caused by Jews (as Kliutchnikov said). The allegedly best lands of the Crimea are given to Jews. Soviet leaders of Russian origin, like Lunatcharsky, Rykov, and Krasin, divorce their Russian wives and marry Jewish women. Meanwhile, the same source reports the growing popularity of Stalin, who is identified with the struggle against Jewish domination, and attributes to Stalin anti-Semitic propaganda. Moreover, Stalin is compared favorably with Lenin by the population, since the latter filled the party with "clever" Jews and half-Jews while Stalin has broken the party away from Jewish lines.

The source gives an interesting verbalization of a new Soviet staff policy toward Jews, which, surprisingly, recalls the latest formulation of Soviet anti-Semitic staff policy. According to this source, some party officials say privately: "Our party is a Russian party. There was a period of Jewish influx—Bundists joined the party [recall Zatonky's and Skvortsov-Stepanov's statements on this subject]. There was a massive Jewish influx in the governmental apparatus. . . . Now there is a process of normalization; the party is stronger and more and more closely approaching the people. Naturally, it must reflect more evenly the national composition of the country in its composition. There is no anti-Semitism whatsoever."

Although Trotsky was well aware of what was going on, he did not blame Stalin for active anti-Semitism until 1937. He well understood that such an accusation would be a trap for himself in Stalin's public relations campaign. Trotsky and Zinoviev limited themselves to demagogic attacks against the new bourgeoisie as the bearer of anti-Semitism, ignoring the party's anti-Semitism.

Regarding Stalin's allies, such as Bukharin, they actually encouraged anti-Semitism. Bukharin explained the new wave of anti-Semitism as the class hatred of Russian toilers against new Jewish capitalists, which anticipated contemporary Soviet anti-Semitism. "The Jewish petty bourgeoisie," he said, "took the place of the Russian petty and middle-class bourgeoisie. The same happened with the Jewish intelligentsia. The Jewish intelligentsia and bourgeoisie moved to central Russian cities from western and southern areas." He acknowledged that there was anti-Semitism even in the party.⁹⁷

His view was developed by the Lett Karl Bauman (1892-1937), a senior party official who justified anti-Semitism even more. According to Bauman, anti-Semitism was only an implication of the current economic policy, which tolerated capitalism. He said that "the hostility of the working masses against the bourgeoisie acquires an anti-Semitic shell under the influence of the petty bourgeois ideology." Meanwhile, Bauman acknowledged that anti-Semitism had permeated the Komsomol and Young Pioneer organizations.⁹⁸

Stalin took good advantage of these explanations. Indeed, if Bukharin and Bauman regarded anti-Semitism as class hatred against the Jewish petty bourgeoisie, Stalin regarded the opposition as a petty-bourgeois deviation in the party. Therefore, the national hatred of the Jewish opposition leaders could be interpreted as a manifestation of the same legitimate class hatred of the working masses.

The Jewish population was frightened by this new semiofficial and even official anti-Semitism. Although nobody could dare to publicly blame the authorities for the anti-Semitism, rumors were rife. Jewish sources reported in 1926 that Stalin enjoyed the reputation of being a rabid anti-Semite. The Russian population praised him for "moving the party from the Jewish tracks." A Jewish joke compared Stalin and Moses: Moses took the Jews out of Egypt, and Stalin took them out of the Central Party Committee.⁹⁹ And so on.

A leading Jewish politician, Boris Brutskus (1874-1938), expelled from Russia in 1922, wrote in 1926: "Russian life has plunged stormily into a river-bed that has nothing to do with the ways outlined in Marx's teachings. From this moment, the star of Jewish Bolsheviks has been setting." Brutskus, like Gorky and others, put the responsibility for the anti-Semitism on the Jewish Bolsheviks themselves. "Jewish Bolsheviks," he said, "have abundantly sown the most malicious seeds of anti-Semitism."¹⁰⁰

Jabotinsky called the new political development in the Soviet leadership a mobilization of Russian nationalism. "Many people," he said, "have forecast for a long time that the moment would come when Bolshevism—a typical Russian movement born in the brain of a typical Russian sectarian, Lenin—will start its liberation from its—in the broad sense of this word—Jewish section."¹⁰¹

The *Chicago Tribune* stressed that the opposition was predominantly Jewish and that Stalin encouraged anti-Semitism in the party.¹⁰² The *London Jewish Chronicle* published an anonymous letter from a nonparty Leningrad Jew in which the author stressed the Jewish character of the opposition.

"This is not at all, in my view," he wrote, "because Trotsky is himself a Jew, but because the policy which Stalin desires to enforce is so exclusively Russian in the sense of regarding Russia not as one of the family of nations, but as a segregated entity closed against the world and the world closed against it." The author claimed that his view was shared by the majority of nonparty Jews. Stalin's victory was extremely dangerous for the Jews. Their situation would become intolerable, but the same would happen in the case of Trotsky's victory, too.¹⁰³

In 1921, the Soviet political police arrested a former monarchist, Alexander Yakushev (1876-?), who had not recognized the Provisional government in 1917. After the Bolshevik revolution, Yakushev had joined a small underground monarchist organization, but from the very outset, he had preached "Soviet monarchist populism." Felix Dzerzhinsky suggested that this petty organization not be liquidated but instead infiltrated through Yakushev since he, as Dzerzhinsky said, regarded Russian national interests above everything.

This suggestion was the beginning of a large political operation known as "Trest."¹⁰⁴ Several former Russian monarchists who became provocateurs actively collaborated in it, including two persons we already know: Generals Zaiontchkovsky and Potapov—the latter had already worked for a while as chief of Soviet military counterintelligence.¹⁰⁵ These people posed as members of a powerful underground monarchist organization that had penetrated the party, the army, and the political police. Trest was so successful among White emigrants that it enjoyed the confidence of the former Russian commander in chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevitch (1856-1929), and Markov II.¹⁰⁶

Trest reached its apogee in 1926 when the Soviet political police managed a far-reaching political deception in which Vasily Shulgin, who lived in Yugoslavia, was unwittingly framed. His book *1920* was suddenly reprinted in the USSR. As we have seen, this book forecast the appearance of a new leader (Shulgin said that it would be neither Lenin nor Trotsky), and in 1926, the reader could guess that this long-expected Russian national leader would be Stalin.

But the reprint was only the first part of the complicated deception. Trest also arranged a "secret" trip for Shulgin to Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad. The reason why Shulgin risked such a dangerous trip was that he received incorrect information that his son, whom he had lost during the Civil War, was allegedly alive and might be found in Russia. During Shulgin's trip, Trest arranged for him to meet with a mysterious man who passed himself off as both a senior government official and a leading member of this secret underground and omnipresent monarchist organization. This man, who was in fact a GPU operative, suggested to Shulgin an elaborate right-wing National Bolshevik program and begged him to pass it on to monarchist emigrants. When Shulgin said, "I thought that I was going to a dead country, but I witness the reawakening of a powerful people," the GPU operative commented: "It is exactly the point that we couldn't manage to pass on to the emigrants. . . . Every day we as a people, as a nation, as a state,

recover from the terrible blows that we suffered from socialism." The GPU operative claimed that in spite of continuing Jewish domination, new and powerful Russian layers come to power organically. The moment would come when they would take all power in their hands, without chaos and bloodshed. In contemporary Russian life, a very strong Russian stream was forging a new way along with the Jewish stream. "We must," the GPU operative said, "prepare the successor of the Soviet system. . . . And it will collapse since one cannot sit on such a hatred. We see it clearly. This hatred every day takes in wider circles. This hatred is not hidden any more by the population." The Jews will be pushed aside, but "a savage reprisal with Jewry would be highly unprofitable for the future of the Russian people." The only solution of the Jewish problem in Russia would be their mass exodus.¹⁰⁷

Shulgin saw what was going on in Soviet Russia as an evolution toward fascism. "Let the Communists pass the power to the fascists without waking the animal," Shulgin said. "Fascism and Communism (Leninism) are brothers. . . . The kikes will be liquidated soon. But no sooner than troops will appear who went through a hard schooling." Shulgin came to the following conclusion: "One can be against the Soviet system with every fiber of his being and at the same time participate in the life of the country; rejoice with all the achievements and be sorry about all the failures, realizing firmly that these are the assets and liabilities of the Russian people as such."¹⁰⁸

Shulgin fulfilled his promise and passed the GPU message to the emigrants in a book that he wrote after his return to Yugoslavia. Then Shulgin sent his manuscript back to Moscow in order to get the approval of the "underground" since he was afraid to bring harm to its members. Shulgin's manuscript was read by senior GPU officials and sent back to him.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the text of his book was a joint venture with the GPU, and everything eventually printed bore the GPU "seal of approval."

As we know, four people coordinated this operation from beginning to end: Dzerzhinsky himself; his deputy Menzhinsky; the chief of the GPU counterintelligence department, Arthur Artuzov (Fraucci, 1891-1943); and his deputy, Roman Pilar (1895-1937), whose full name was Barón Pilar von Pilhau.¹¹⁰ Artuzov was the son of an Italian cheesemaker from Switzerland, and Pilar von Pilhau, of mixed Polish-German origin, was a cousin of Dzerzhinsky.

What did these people wish to gain by this deception? Misinformation? It is difficult to believe that that was the real objective. Indeed, Shulgin's book was immediately brought back to Russia (certainly by the GPU itself) where it was avidly read. Pascal said, for example, that the Society of Old Bolsheviks had one copy of this book and there was a huge waiting list of impatient people to read it.¹¹¹ What kind of impression would they receive? The book said there was a powerful monarchist organization in the USSR with a militantly anti-Semitic program, which penetrated all Soviet ruling bodies. Only a few readers knew that the book was a GPU affair.

It is more feasible to think that Dzerzhinsky and his associates were suggesting options for any eventuality in the Soviet system, entirely in the Netchaev-Lenin fashion. Nikolai Valentinov (Volsky, 1879-1964), who worked under Dzerzhinsky in the Supreme Economic Council, claimed after his defection that in fact Dzerzhinsky was a leader of what he called "right-wing" communism,¹¹² actively supporting Stalin in his struggle against the left-wing opposition but by no means a puppet of Stalin. It is obvious that the exploitation of anti-Semitism proceeded from different political corners and that the non-Russian leadership was the first to exploit it. Doubtless, Stalin made successful use of Shulgin's book, with the approval of the GPU, in order to rally new allies, both among the party leadership and also among its rank and file. In July 1926, Dzerzhinsky suddenly died, and in the summer of 1927, the GPU disclosed its deception and suspended Trest.

Meanwhile, Shulgin's book had been officially discussed in the Soviet press, in a quite positive review by a leading *Pravda* columnist, Mikhail Koltsov (Friedland, 1898-1942). Nothing was said about the Trest anti-Semitic plot,¹¹³ but the suspension of Trest certainly discredited Shulgin's book. Shulgin was arrested in 1945 by the Soviet army in Yugoslavia and spent almost ten years in a Soviet prison. But at the beginning of the 1960s, he became one of Nikita Khrushchev's favorites and even published a long article in *Pravda* defending his National Bolshevism. He was almost 100 when he died, a defiant National Bolshevik monarchist to the end.¹¹⁴

The Destruction of National Trends Among Minority Communists

At the beginning of this book, it was noted that Marxism and socialism both had strong populist backgrounds so that an assertive nationalism was a common denominator of all local socialist movements.¹¹⁵ Minority Communists in backward nations believed, for example, that a strong Communist economy would be a guarantee against national oppression. All of these national trends among local Communists were brutally suppressed by Moscow.

The first victim of repression was the Turkish Communist nationalism of leading Tatar party officials, linked mainly with Sultan-Galiev who, as we have seen, was greatly frustrated by Smenovekhism.¹¹⁶ But his frustration, however, manifested itself as early as 1919 when he expressed doubts that the world class struggle started by the Russian Bolsheviks would change the fate of colonized peoples. He thought that the proletariat of developing countries was, as before, interested in preserving its exploitation of colonized peoples. In fact, Sultan-Galiev extended Lenin's criticism of the Western European proletariat to the Russian working class as well. He also saw Russia as an industrial country; revolutions in such countries, he felt, would mean for colonized peoples only a change of master. The consolidation of the Soviet state was a catastrophe for Sultan-Galiev; he lost his hope that the proletariat of advanced countries could liberate the proletariat of colonized peoples.

Sultan-Galiev suggested the exclusion in principle of the restoration of Russian domination over colonized peoples even in a Communist guise. He proposed the dictatorship of colonies and semicolonies over industrial countries, a concept he contrasted to the new Communist International dominated by Western peoples. He also suggested a Muslim Soviet republic and a Muslim Communist party.

Sultan-Galiev was arrested in the spring in 1923, the first Communist senior official to undergo this fate. Stalin initiated his arrest, as well as the destruction of Turkish Communist nationalism. As we have already seen, Georgian National Bolshevism was suppressed in the beginning of 1923, and almost all previous Georgian leaders were expelled from Georgia.¹¹⁷

The most powerful local nationalism turned out to be the Ukrainian. Exactly as in the case of formally independent Georgia, the Ukraine, which was regarded in the beginning as an independent country, was never treated as one by Moscow. After 1922, when the USSR was created, the status of the Ukraine quickly deteriorated. The situation grew worse in 1926, when Olexander Shumsky (1890-1946), a former SR member and people's commissar for education of the Ukrainian republic in 1924-1927, demanded from Stalin an intensive Ukrainization of the government and cultural life in the republic and accused the existing Ukrainian party leadership, especially the first-party secretary, Kaganovitch, of preventing this process. Shumsky even suggested personnel changes in the Ukrainian leadership, including that it be formed of Ukrainians.

A former Soviet diplomat, Grigory Besedovsky, who defected in 1929, wrote that Ukrainian members of the Ukrainian Central Party Committee waged a campaign against Kaganovitch, claiming that a Jew could not be tolerated as the leader of the Ukrainian party.¹¹⁸ Stalin, who used anti-Semitism intensively against the opposition in Moscow and Leningrad, was still interested in keeping his reliable proxy, Kaganovitch, in the Ukraine, probably in order to channel the general Ukrainian dissatisfaction against the Jews and in order to make the latter a scapegoat later on.

In April 1926, Stalin accused Shumsky of provoking, via his proposal, anti-Ukrainian chauvinism among Russian workers in the Ukraine. He also accused the Ukrainian intelligentsia of an anti-Russian mood. His main target was Mikola Khvilevoy (1893-1933), a Ukrainian writer and party member. Stalin said that

Khvilevoy's demand for the "immediate de-Russification of the proletariat" in the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get away from Russian literature and its style as fast as possible," his statement that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his infatuation with the idea that the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia has some kind of Messianic role to play, his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this and much else like it sounds (cannot but sound!) more than strange nowadays coming from the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist. At a time when the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are in sympathy with "Moscow," this citadel of the international revolutionary

movement and of Leninism, at a time when the proletarians of Western Europe look with admiration at the flag that flies over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvilevoy has nothing better to say in favour of "Moscow" than to call on the Ukrainian leaders to get away from "Moscow" "as fast as possible." And that is called internationalism!¹¹⁹

It is interesting that Khvilevoy, in defending himself against Stalin's accusation, was able in 1927 to introduce in his current novel a woman character who criticized socialism in one country and accused a Russian intellectual of belonging to those "internationalists" who willingly speak of self-determination and ignore their own Ustrialov.¹²⁰

There was also a Jewish Communist nationalism, limited by Baruch Gurevitz to the Zionist Socialist party, Poalei Zion.¹²¹ It is interesting that the Poalei-Zion press in Soviet Russia also attacked Smenovekhism.¹²² All Zionism, including socialist Zionism, was soon forbidden.¹²³ However, Jewish nationalism probably extended beyond Zionist circles. It is interesting that even the term *National Bolshevism* was used in Byelorussia in connection with the leanings of some Jewish party members.¹²⁴

The Destruction of Independent Foreign Communism

One of the most important aspects of the Soviet policy of the consolidation of power was the brutal suppression of independent foreign communism, both Western and Eastern. This suppression was managed by the Comintern and the Soviet political police and was staged as a struggle against Trotskyism. In a short time, all independent Communists had been expelled from the Comintern and from their respective parties, replaced by obedient Soviet agents who operated according to Comintern or GPU instructions. The Soviet side used Netchaev's methods to their full extent. Foreign Communists were betrayed to their respective police, as in the case of Arkady Maslov (Tchemerinsky, 1891-1941) in Germany,¹²⁵ or assassinated, as in the case of a German Communist who lightheartedly went to Moscow in December 1923 and was killed in an alleged accident according to the instructions of Piatnitsky.¹²⁶

Anthony D'Agostino said: "The theory of 'Socialism in one country' seemed to say that Communist parties need not lead their own proletariats to power, but should instead simply be fifth columns representing the Soviet national interests. Here was the entire case of Stalinist national Communism against Leninist internationalism."¹²⁷ D'Agostino was wrong only in this juxtaposition. Stalin followed Lenin's way as in other respects.

However, for once differing from Lenin, Stalin decided to abandon the Asiatic strategy because it had become too successful and brought Soviet Russia to the brink of a dangerous development. The Chinese Communist revolution could be successful, and if it were, Moscow would have no means of controlling it. "Stalin knew," commented Robert Tucker, "that a Communist China would inevitably develop into a second hegemony center of world Communism." Stalin's policy vis-à-vis China was, as Tucker well

understood, also entirely in the framework of Lenin's geopolitics. Stalin's "vision of future Communist revolutions," Tucker said, "was Russocentric. Because his revolutionism was blended with his Great Russian nationalism, the further progress of Communist revolution was associated in his mind with the future extension of the international power and domination of Soviet Russia and its territorial aggrandizement."¹²⁸

The most difficult operation was the destruction of the KPD. In order to accomplish this destruction, the Comintern atomized it by introducing a new system of party cells to replace a regional structure in which Communists from various cells knew each other personally. Under the new system, they knew only their party apparatus control, and previous horizontal links were broken. The party apparatus was liberated from any control of its rank and file.¹²⁹

This party cell system was run by direct Soviet agents like Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), who in 1949 became the East German party boss. As did many, Ruth Fisher blamed only Stalin for this: "Utilizing the despair that followed the German defeat, Stalin transformed the internationalism of 1917 into 'Socialism in one country,' into Russian national-socialism which . . . was a bold and far-reaching reassertion of Russian nationalism, the extension of every aspiration of imperial Russia."¹³⁰ She was wrong. The transformation was the honest continuation of Lenin's original plan. Robert Tucker was perfectly right, stressing that Stalin was mistakenly regarded as a "nationalist leader who, in fact if not in theory, had jettisoned the Communist revolution."¹³¹ For him, the revolution was, as it was for Lenin, Russocentric and Russocentric only.

Beginning in the second part of the 1920s, one can also observe a process, the objective of which was to diminish as much as possible the German heritage of the Bolshevik revolution. One by one, former German socialist authorities were taken out of Soviet circulation. This fate was shared by Kautsky, whose early works were still respected in Russia after the revolution. Then came Lassalle's turn, and appeals were made to not put him in the same rank as Marx and Engels.¹³² Then Rosa Luxemburg was posthumously accused by Stalin of heresy.¹³³ In 1934, Stalin for the first time shattered Engels's infallibility via the latter's notorious article about Russian foreign policy.¹³⁴

The Sinister Shadow of Ustrialov

At the beginning of 1927, the beleaguered Bukharin decided to make an open attack on Russian cultural nationalism. "One must realize," he said,

that Smenovekhism's "National Russian" aspect was in its time, at a certain stage of our development, a bridge that enabled a part of the bourgeois intelligentsia to become reconciled with the Soviet system, which they had previously sabotaged. The fact that we Bolsheviks had gathered Russia together in the fashion of Ivan Kalita was regarded in a positive light by the Sme-

novekhists. We tried to use them, direct them, lead them. . . . However, it happens that according to Lenin's expression, the steering wheel is slipping from our hands. This was clearly manifested in our literature. A very considerable part of it is now howling in a "genuine Russian" fashion, though it is usually dressed in a Soviet cap for decency, decorated with Soviet trinkets, and disguised as Communism. However, this is in fact a quite insignificant proportion, which is not harmful or dangerous, since if, near this dwarf—the Smenovekhist Russian ideology—there is the giant fist of our proletariat, then one should not care how the Smenovekhists squeak, they cannot destroy our proletarian internationalist chorus. But when our activity on this front is not sufficient, when a small Smenovekhist-Russian figurine begins shouting too loudly, then, I am sorry, but we cannot ignore it. We must catch up with it.¹³⁵

In January 1927, Bukharin attacked the peasant poet Pavel Druzhinin (1890–1965), ridiculing one line of a poem in which Druzhinin said that every peasant hut has its own princess and every village street has its own fool. Bukharin commented that he was in agreement with Druzhinin as regards the fool, but as for princesses—they had been "shot down some time before, and had outlived their necessity."¹³⁶ Bukharin's joke referred to the tsar's children, assassinated in July 1918.

In the same article, however, his main target was Esenin, who, he alleged, was the most harmful phenomenon of Soviet literature. Bukharin claimed that Esenin was a quasi-national poet since he manifested the most negative features of the Russian national character. He was utterly indignant that Esenin had glorified and exalted Russia's slave past, which was still alive in the Russian people. Bukharin was very anxious that the ideologists of bourgeois national pride, ideologists of "Kvas patriotism" [Kvas is a Russian malt], chip away at the stone of public opinion every day, "nationalizing" Soviet literature while "some simpletons applaud them." Bukharin complained that the new Russian bourgeoisie "push their ideological fingers in everywhere." His article launched public hysteria at Esenin and his admirers. There were brainwashing public debates at which sinister Eseninists were unmasked, and these poor creatures were blacklisted.¹³⁷ This anti-Esenin witch-hunt initiated by Bukharin became possible only after October 1926 when Trotsky, who was much more tolerant of Esenin, was expelled from the Politburo and was no longer able to protect him. The campaign against Esenin was therefore also a campaign against Trotsky.

The weakening opposition decided to level an open accusation against Stalin for allegedly falling under Ustrialov's influence. An opportunity to do so was provided by Ustrialov himself in his article "The Russian Communist Party Crisis," published in October 1926 in Harbin:

"What we need now is a new manoeuvre, a new impulse, to put it figuratively, a *Neo-Nep*. From this standpoint, it must be recognized that a number of actual concessions recently made by the party to the Opposition cannot fail to inspire serious apprehension. All hail to the Political Bureau if the declaration of repentance on the part of the leaders of the Opposition is the result of

their *one-sided* and *unconditional* capitulation. But woe to it, if it is the fruit of a compromise with them. If the latter is the case, the struggle must inevitably flare up again. . . . The victorious Central Executive Committee must acquire an inner immunity against the decomposing poison of the Opposition. It must draw all the necessary conclusions from the defeat of the Opposition. . . . Otherwise, it will be a calamity for our country. . . . It is thus that the cause must be approached by the Russian intelligentsia within the country, by the business elements and the specialist circles, the ideologists of evolution and not of revolution." Ustrialov draws the conclusion: "That is why we are now . . . definitely in favor of Stalin."¹³⁶

Trotzky then joined in this accusation, which was completely inconsistent. As an old patron of Smenovekhism, he realized that Stalin had stolen this concept from him and was directing it against him. At the Politburo meeting that sealed his fate, Trotzky said:

The real danger is from the Right, not from the Right wing of our party—the Right wing of our party serves only as a transmitting mechanism—the real, basic danger comes from the side of the bourgeois classes who are raising their heads, whose ideologist is Ustrialov, that wise and far-seeing bourgeois to whom Lenin used to listen and against whom he warned. You all know that Ustrialov is not supporting us; he supports Stalin. . . . And what is your reply to that? You seek to remove the Opposition from the Central Committee—for the time being only from the C.C. Ustrialov is a bourgeois who is acquainted with the history of the great French revolution, indeed, very well acquainted with it. And this spokesman for the moods of the new bourgeoisie understands that only the back-sliding of the Bolsheviks themselves can prepare the power for the new bourgeoisie least painfully. Supporting the Stalinist C.C., Ustrialov writes that it is necessary to safeguard . . . against the decomposing poison of the Opposition. In consequence he also is in agreement with you that the Opposition is—a decomposing poison; that it is necessary to destroy this poison, otherwise "it will be a calamity for our country." That is what Ustrialov says. That is why he is not only against me, but also why he supports Stalin. Reflect on this. You are dealing here not with ignorant people, the unconscious or the duped who think that the Opposition carries on its activity with English money—no, Ustrialov is a very class-conscious man, he knows what he is saying and whither he is going. Why then does he support you? What is he defending together with you? . . .

I fear . . . that you are about to shoot us in accordance with the Ustrialov, . . . Ustrialovism, which is already penetrating through the official institutions of our party, and which is disarming the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat at a time when the party régime stifles everyone who struggles against Thermidor.¹³⁹

Larisa Reisner referred to Ustrialov in a very hostile way, stressing, however, that he was a "most remarkable publicist." "Ustrialov is beaten," she said, "and will be beaten since he is an enemy, dangerous because he is extraordinarily clever and talented."¹⁴⁰

At the very end of 1926, there was an extended meeting of the Comintern executive committee. Kamenev rejected the accusation that the opposition had been praised by the Mensheviks, and by the Cadets. He decided to quote Ustrialov's words, already quoted by Trotsky. "I will refer," Kamenev said, "to that most thoughtful enemy of the proletarian dictatorship." Kamenev hinted that Stalin enjoyed Ustrialov's advice; he said that "Mister Ustrialov, this thoughtful enemy who recommends that the Central Party Committee draw conclusions from the defeat of the opposition and finish it, does not deny his advice to the Central Party Committee." Kamenev accused the leadership of taking the road to "national reformist perspectives."¹⁴¹ In his reply, Stalin said:

Kamenev (and Zinoviev too) referred to . . . Ustrialov . . . who expresses solidarity with the position of our Party. Who is Ustrialov? Ustrialov is a representative of the bourgeois experts and of the new bourgeoisie generally. He is a class enemy of the proletariat. That is undeniable. But there are various kinds of enemies. There are class enemies who refuse to reconcile themselves to the Soviet regime and are out to overthrow it at any cost. But there are also class enemies who in one way or another have reconciled themselves to the Soviet regime. There are enemies who are trying to pave the way for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These are the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets and the like. But there are also enemies who co-operate with the Soviet regime and oppose those who stand for its overthrow, hoping that the dictatorship will gradually weaken and degenerate, and will then meet the interests of the new bourgeoisie. Ustrialov belongs to this latter category of enemies.

Why did Kamenev refer to Ustrialov? Maybe in order to show that our Party has degenerated, and that it is because of this that Ustrialov praises Stalin or our Party in general? It was not for that reason, apparently, because Kamenev did not venture to say so frankly. Why, then, did Kamenev refer to Ustrialov?¹⁴²

Stalin asked this provocative question, knowing in advance that his opponent could not use adequate arguments against him. Thus, he could answer his own question:

Evidently, in order to hint at "degeneration."

But Kamenev forgot to mention that this same Ustrialov praised Lenin even more. Everybody in our Party is familiar with Ustrialov's articles in praise of Lenin. What is the explanation? Can it be that Comrade Lenin had "degenerated" or had begun to "degenerate"? . . . One has only to put this question to realise how utterly absurd the assumption of "degeneration" is. . . .

Ustrialovs, knowing that the dictatorship cannot be overthrown, reject the idea of overthrowing the Soviet regime, try to secure a snug corner under the dictatorship of the proletariat and to ingratiate themselves with it—and they praise the Party.

In his last article, Zinoviev decided to attack Tchaljanov and Kondratiev. He called the latter Ustrialov's Moscow ambassador and added that the

Ustrialovs and Kondratievs would like to eternalize capitalism. According to Zinoviev, the Ustrialovists had achieved important positions. "Lately they have begun to throw aside all restraints with extraordinary impudence. It is high time to repulse ideologically and politically the Kondratievs and company, who are now active in the heart of very many important government offices, and take advantage of legal Soviet possibilities in a very diligent way."¹⁴³ Zinoviev could not say more while editorial comments were claiming that he artificially exaggerated Kondratiev's weight. The last document of the opposition published on the eve of the fatal Fifteenth Party Congress stressed that Ustrialov was against the opposition.¹⁴⁴

The opposition held the opinion that Ustrialov influenced Stalin. The people's commissar for internal affairs of the Russian republic in 1923-1927, Alexander Beloborodov (1891-1938), shouted "You serve Ustrialov!" as he was being expelled by guards from the conference hall.¹⁴⁵ Resuming debates with the opposition on the issue of Ustrialov, Alexander Zaitsev, a disciple of Bukharin, recognized the extraordinary importance of the issue in party life. However, he tried to accuse the opposition of sharing his views. The opposition, he said, had fallen for Ustrialov's sophisticated provocation to such an extent that it was Zinoviev who had been captured by Ustrialov's concepts.

"Recall all the acute and actual problems of the debates," Zaitsev said, "which in 1925 and later started the arguments; you will see everywhere Ustrialov's ghost, hovering in a sinister way like a fatum over Zinoviev and company. . . . In all the more or less significant issues of debate in 1925 and later, Zinoviev and Kamenev stood entirely on Ustrialov's analysis."¹⁴⁶ According to Zaitsev, the only thing that Ustrialov succeeded in doing was to take away from the working class part of the skilled party intelligentsia. Zaitsev contrasted Bukharin to Zinoviev as the allegedly only correct critic of Ustrialov.

It seems that Zaitsev was right in his claim that Zinoviev indeed believed in the Ustrialovian model of Soviet society. Zinoviev realized that events were going exactly in the direction pointed out by Ustrialov and tried in vain to stop the course of these events. However, Bukharin's estimation of Ustrialov, in spite of Zaitsev's glorification, was the most shortsighted and inconsistent, as was everything that issued from Bukharin. Protesting Russian cultural nationalism, he supported socialism in one country, the slogan that was the main triumph of statist Russian nationalism.

The Fifteenth Party Congress—Stalin's Triumph

The Fifteenth Party Congress, held in November 1927, summed up the spectacular public relations campaign that Stalin had been waging since 1923-1924. The so-called left-wing opposition was not only defeated politically but expelled from the party, and the arrests of active oppositionists started. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Preobrazhensky, Osinsky, Evdokimov, Bakaev, Smilga, Rakovsky, Piatakov, and many others were expelled from the party

and exiled from Moscow and Leningrad. Even poor Radek, a most right-wing Machiavellian Bolshevik, was expelled and exiled.

The congress was held under the shadow of violence and anti-Semitism. On its eve, there was the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, usually marked by popular demonstrations. The opposition tried to organize its own counterdemonstration, but it was brutally dispersed, and the people who participated in the dispersal shouted anti-Semitic insults. Yaroslavsky, Stalin's reliable proxy, confirmed these events in *Pravda*.¹⁴⁷ The dispersion was organized by Uglanov.

In his address to the congress, Yaroslavsky enlarged on anti-Semitism and accused the opposition of having provoked this anti-Semitic explosion by its behavior. Yaroslavsky said:

I know that the struggle of the Opposition has let loose very many unhealthy symptoms. Comrade Stalin absolutely rightly underscored the need to draw serious attention to the fight against anti-Semitism which has struck little roots here and there. However, the Opposition gives this question more attention than this unhealthy matter deserves; it exaggerates it, seeking to suggest that anti-Semitism is a method for fighting the Opposition.¹⁴⁸

The accusation of anti-Semitism, according to Yaroslavsky, was the poisoned weapon of dishonest slander. When Yaroslavsky accused the opposition of provoking anti-Semitism, Riutin shouted from his place: "Correct!" Yaroslavsky referred to a forged Program of the Communist Workers' Party in which Stalin was accused of "unbinding the hands" of the "Jewish bourgeoisie" who, according to this forgery, provoked "country-wide hatred of all Jews."

Everything said by Yaroslavsky looked like deliberate provocation since he publicly stressed the predominantly Jewish character of the opposition. He was himself a Jew, which was very convenient for Stalin. The mass of the population was hardly aware of this fact (his real name was Minel Gubelman), so he could be regarded widely as a Russian spokesman against anti-Semitism.

As one can judge from the national composition of the left-wing oppositionists arrested after the Fifteenth Party Congress, the majority of them were indeed Jews, although we are speaking only about the strongest activists. In the Ural political prison at the beginning of the 1930s, 43 percent of the Trotskyites were Jews and 27 percent, Caucasians. According to Anton Ciliga, the Jewish oppositionists, as a rule, were young Jewish intellectuals from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, and those most inclined to become left-wing Communists were former left-wing members of the Jewish Bund.¹⁴⁹ This observation means that the young Jewish intellectuals belonged to the non-Russified part of the Jewish socialists while the Russified Jews easily and sometimes enthusiastically supported Stalin.

The political defeat of the opposition was widely regarded as a Russian victory par excellence. A Russian professor who left Russia in 1927 explained: "Do you know what Stalin's victory over the opposition means? This is

the victory of the majority of the Russian population over international communism—in the face of the Comintern. Without the support of this majority, Stalin would never have won.”¹⁵⁰

There was a great deal of enthusiasm among right-wing Russian emigrants who welcomed this victory as a Russian triumph, but the most conspicuous nationalist interpretation of the victory belongs to Dmitrievsky. As mentioned earlier, Dmitrievsky was a former SR member who had been hostile to the Bolsheviks in 1917 but had then joined the Bolshevik party and become a senior Soviet diplomat. The circumstances of his sudden break are quite mysterious, and it is not excluded that he was an agent of Stalin, as the Nazis later suspected. In his writings on Soviet Russia, published after 1930, Dmitrievsky was a consistent National Bolshevik.

“The time will come,” he declared, “when the Russian revolution, after having settled within a natural national framework, will have not only negative, but also positive results. . . . Soviet power . . . is, to all intents and purposes, national power that stems from the requirements of the people’s life.”¹⁵¹ To Dmitrievsky, Lenin was not only a revolutionary but also a Russian national leader; he would seem to have bequeathed “the programmatic outlines of Russian national socialism with its total rejection of Marxism,” and “Russia has taken the national socialist path.” “Lenin was a great Russian patriot. He loved Russia passionately.” Dmitrievsky basically saw the growth of Russian nationalism as an elemental tendency: Thus, the young Communists who “sing the International enthusiastically, are nationalists to a far greater extent than many others—even if they themselves are not aware of it.” An organic source of this nationalism, Dmitrievsky stressed, was hatred of the West: “The Russian people have for many years been impregnated with the dreadful venom of hatred and mistrust of all things Western.” On the one hand, Dmitrievsky remarked, anticommunism was constantly increasing in the USSR; on the other hand, this anticommunism presaged no good for the West. The USSR “is now anti-communist,” Dmitrievsky claimed, “As are the majority of members of the communist party; the country is permeated with the spirit of ever-increasing nationalism; the party too is permeated with nationalism.” Although, in Dmitrievsky’s view, the people detested the Soviet regime, “it is nonetheless their own—Russian—regime. . . . And our people are not defeatists and never were. . . . I repeat, they detest the present regime. But at this moment, they detest the outside world even more.”

“Those who made the revolution,” said Dmitrievsky, “even those at the summit of power, are beginning more and more, under pressure from the people and the people’s life, to feel themselves Russians and nationalists.” To Dmitrievsky, it was certain that the “Kremlin, the cradle and shrine of our land, will become once again the center of the great empire of the Russian world.”

Dmitrievsky proceeded to praise Stalin, contrasting him unambiguously as a Russian nationalist with Trotsky: “Stalin is more formidable than all his rivals in the struggle for power. Stalin was, and is, stronger than Trotsky—

in both will and intellect. . . . He is said to be personally a very decent man." Dmitrievsky attributed to Stalin exceptional modesty, claiming that the Bolshevik leader always preferred to remain in the background. "Stalin sincerely strives for the people's welfare," he noted.

Dmitrievsky acknowledged a considerable growth in anti-Semitism in the USSR—where "party members are predominantly anti-Semites." On the other hand, whereas Stalin was, in Dmitrievsky's words, a "great nationalist," Trotsky was simultaneously described as a "man alien to Russia"—both today's Russia and the future Russia: "For today's Russia he is too European, and for the future Russia—too much of a communist and a lumpen-proletariat." "Just as Russia and the Russian people are only an object, only cannon fodder for Trotsky, so are Europe and the European masses exactly the same for Stalin." Dmitrievsky gives the impression of criticizing Stalin on this count, but his criticism seems highly ambiguous. Thus, in his words, "the fundamental and principal error of Stalin's policies lies precisely in his contrasting Russia's special spiritual and physical world with that of the West." That this accusation sounded something like a compliment to a Russian nationalist, Dmitrievsky was very well aware. He was creating an aura of tragedy around Stalin who, we are told, was surrounded by rapacious enemies, was a man doomed, and "will die, together with his cause"; he was "fated not to enter the future. He will fall at its threshold. . . . He is doomed, as Robespierre was doomed." "The Stalinist system is a transitory stage . . . a complete preparation for Caesarism."

Dmitrievsky claimed that the caricature of Stalin as a depraved monster and ideological nonentity was basically Trotsky's creation: In fact, Stalin was an outstanding statesman, a staunch and courageous champion of the Russian national cause. Dmitrievsky said that Stalin had even before the revolution led that section of the Bolshevik party that always retained contact with the native soil—as opposed to the emigrant section of the party, which was not even Russian in national composition! "The dispute between the movement's aristocrats and rank-and-file," said Dmitrievsky, "began long before the revolution." Lenin, we are assured, thought more highly of Stalin than of anyone else—indeed, Stalin was his faithful pupil, although by no means a blind follower. Stalin's involvement in the Civil War received high praise. Interestingly, Dmitrievsky sought by whatever means he could to emphasize the Russian origins of Leninism, whose traditions, he said, derived from Tkatchev and Netchaev: The Marxist content of Leninism is limited to what he calls "methodology." Dmitrievsky laid stress on Stalin's "Russian-Asiatic messianism."

Another of Dmitrievsky's heroes in the struggle against Jewish domination was Viatcheslav Molotov (b. 1890), head of government in 1930–1941 and the people's commissar for foreign affairs (later foreign minister) in 1939–1947 and 1953–1955. Molotov, we are told, thought "in a Russian way" and was slandered by the Trotskyites as an "assiduous mediocrity." Dmitrievsky followed this comment with an interesting rationalization of the bureaucratization of party life in the USSR. It was essential, in Dmitrievsky's

view, for power to be concentrated in the hands of the Central Committee secretariat in order to combat the aliens. Molotov, according to Dmitrievsky, had rallied round Stalin "people who . . . sought instinctively to eliminate Marxism both in their own minds and in practice [they saw its embodiment in Trotsky and the riffraff around him] and to replace [Marxism's] anti-national attitudes with the interests of the Russian nation and Russian state." It was, according to Dmitrievsky, Molotov who

made the party apparatus the awesome power it is even now. This had to be done, for the old Marxist internationalist clique against whom they were struggling occupied all the major state posts and dominated even the highest collective organs of the party. They could be beaten only by subjecting the state to the party apparatus—and by destroying "democratism" in the party itself; by giving precedence to the will of the General Secretary and the circles closest to him over the will of the collective organs, i.e., the oligarchy of internationalists. This succeeded because it was an historical necessity. This was the beginning of the process of shifting the revolution on to national lines.

Dmitrievsky also had kind words for Andrei Andreev (1895-1971, a Politburo member in 1932-1952), Voroshilov, Menzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze, and other, non-Jewish, party leaders.

Waging bitter attacks on Trotsky, Dmitrievsky claimed that around that leader was "grouped neither the Russian nor the Asiatic section of the party." "Trotsky did not care a fig about Russia as such . . . [he] was, and has remained, a Western imperialist from head to toe." The section grouped around Trotsky "clung to the body of the new regime like flies around sweetbreads. They did not believe in it, they detested it—and yet they served it. For the detested revolution of the *detested* people offered them rich pickings and positions of honor."

Dmitrievsky's view of the Russian revolution assumed a sinister anti-Semitic character. We are given a description of the difficult conditions of prerevolutionary Russian workers who, we read, lived in

wretched rooms lit by a flickering candle or kerosene lamp; wan, emaciated people with stern, ascetic faces, sat without sleep night after night, poring over books piled high to the ceiling. . . . They manufactured diabolical bombs in those rooms. And each morning these very same people could be seen leaving their rooms, as though on their way out for a stroll, and standing around for hours on end with heavy packages under their arms, waiting for a state carriage to come clattering along the hollow paving-stones. . . . They would fling their bombs, murder and die.

And the golden serpent of the capitalist international crept through those roomlets too. And shady *foreigners* and international adventurers and hired agents of capital, all having donned the mask of popular and revolutionary ideals, made their way here, worked themselves in and took over. With them they brought alien ideas, they brought Marxism—this new gospel of capitalist thralldom—and in place of the slogans of the national and universal liberation struggle they substituted slogans of the class and anti-national struggle. They

began running the revolution as a capitalist concern, as if it were a factory, investing vast resources, introducing the division of labor and rationalizing the destruction-work. Thus it was that the golden international was able to bend to its will even the movers of the Russian people's revolution, and poison their minds with lies and mold them into an instrument of its own. And when the revolution occurred, it was difficult to distinguish among this motley crew dominating Russia's body, the Russian people's revolutionary from the hireling of anti-national capital, the creator of the new Russia from the destroyer of everything Russian.

Dmitrievsky was welcomed by emigrants, and the polemics between Dmitrievsky and Ustrialov were characteristic in this respect. Ustrialov criticized Dmitrievsky's ideas on the grounds that the "Russian revolutionary process can and must be destroyed only by an organic, internal process." At the same time, he described Dmitrievsky as "a man . . . who had successfully demonstrated . . . that the Soviet revolution was profoundly organic, of universal historical import and nationally justifiable."¹⁵²

Trotsky's reaction to Dmitrievsky is of some interest. Although three extracts from the latter's books were discovered in Trotsky's notebooks, it is not certain whether he intended to use them either to confirm or to reject their contents.¹⁵³ However, in various sections of his book on Stalin, Trotsky directly confirms the veracity of information given by Dmitrievsky. Thus, Trotsky himself characterized Dmitrievsky as "a former Soviet diplomat, a chauvinist and anti-Semite, who temporarily joined Stalin's faction during its struggle against Trotskyism and later, while abroad, deserted to the camp of the right wing of White emigration. It is significant that even as a functioning outright Fascist, Dmitrievsky continues to regard Stalin highly, to detest all of his opponents, and to repeat all the legends of the Kremlin."¹⁵⁴

The elimination of Jews from the leadership was widely welcomed abroad; international anti-Semitism was strong, and the support of the Protocols by figures such as Henry Ford (1863-1947) and sometimes even by the *London Times* and *Morning Post* was quite conspicuous.¹⁵⁵ The Soviet system was widely regarded as essentially Jewish dominated, and the majority of Western politicians regarded Stalin's victory as a very positive Soviet isolationist development. But Stalin's victory was especially welcomed by left-wing Nazis.

Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), who until 1926 was a leader of the Nazi left wing, claimed that the Bolshevik internationalism of Moscow was in fact clearly and distinctly Pan-Slavism. "No tsar," Goebbels said, "understood the Russian people in its depth, in its passion, in its national instincts as did Lenin."¹⁵⁶

Many German Nazis accorded Stalin the same standing as Lenin. It was said, for example, that Stalin, that "silent and active Russian, moved the center of gravity from the idea of internationalism to the Russian national idea. . . . This does not mean that Stalin is not a revolutionary, but he is a Russian revolutionary and not an international one."¹⁵⁷ Reventlow, Gregor Strasser (1892-1934), Otto Strasser (1897-1974), Goebbels, and others were

jubilant at this view. Otto Strasser came to the conclusion that Stalin's real objective was to finish the revolution and liquidate communism.¹⁵⁸

However, Hitler did not think so. He was persuaded that the Jews still constituted the backbone of Soviet state power and that the Russians could not run their country without them. For him, the end of Jewish domination would mean the end of the Russian state.¹⁵⁹ That was exactly the traditional German view, which regarded Russians as an inferior race that could manage its affairs only with foreign support. Hitler paid dearly for this view.

Epilogue

On November 7, 1927, on the day Uglanov's boys dispersed the oppositionist demonstration by shouting anti-Semitic insults, *Pravda*, under the editorship of Bukharin, published a sensational article by Gorky that summed up the ten years since the Bolshevik revolution. Therefore, the defeat of the opposition meant the final reconciliation with Gorky, who was still in Italy. Indeed, his archenemy Zinoviev, with the bulk of the other leading Jewish Bolsheviks, was defeated and humiliated. The leadership became massively Russian.

Gorky's article openly and sincerely regarded Russian national interests as having priority over Soviet international obligations. Russian cultural continuity was secured; Russian peasants were under control. Gorky stressed Lenin's old point, verbalized by him in 1918: *The Bolshevik revolution saved Russia's independence*. Gorky said:

The Civil War would probably have continued to this day, if Vladimir Lenin and his comrades, at the risk of completely destroying the Party of Bolshevik workers by dissolving it in the mass of peasants, whom the war had turned into anarchists, had not pushed the Party into the most advanced posts and set it at the head of the peasantry. By doing this Lenin saved Russia from being utterly shattered and enslaved by the European capitalists—and history cannot but give him credit for it.

It is well known that the Russian bourgeoisie did its best to hand over the country to England and France; and to this very day it has not lost all hope of provoking a foreign invasion of Russia.¹⁶⁰

Gorky also welcomed the deep transformation of the Russian people, his old Forwardist dream: "My joy and my pride is the new Russian man, the builder of the new state."

In March 1928, Gorky returned to Soviet Russia after more than six years in emigration, and jubilant Soviet masses welcomed him as a spiritual father of the Bolshevik revolution, second only to Lenin. Gorky's return did not promise new Soviet humanism, as some people expected. As always, he had commitments only to Russian totalitarian democracy, which excluded any personalism. This fact is why he later, for example, enthusiastically welcomed Soviet forced labor in concentration camps as a brilliant way of reeducating people,¹⁶¹ and he was certainly jubilant when Stalin brutally

crushed the Russian peasants in 1928-1933—not without Gorky's encouragement.

In 1934, Gorky was eventually able to mold Soviet literature to his wishes via the uniform Union of Soviet Writers—he was its principal founder. The administrative secretary of the union was a young party watchdog, Alexander Shcherbakov, who was regarded as Gorky's right hand. Gorky died (most probably not a natural death) in 1936, but he had succeeded in educating his young party apprentice. Shcherbakov had a dizzy career, and at the beginning of the war with Germany, in 1941, he became for a while one of Stalin's main political advisers, in the capacity of an alternate Politburo member and a party secretary. Beginning in 1940, Shcherbakov used to deliver the second most important annual Soviet political report on January 21, the anniversary of Lenin's death. On that day in 1944, he repeated the gist of what had been said by Gorky seventeen years earlier: "The country was treading a path that would inevitably bring her to the loss of her state independence. The Bolshevik party saved our country from such a disgrace."¹⁶²

On the same day, Boris Ponomarev, then only a senior party official, published an article in *Pravda*, in which he wrote: "Our motherland, which was brought by the old regime to the brink of downfall, met her salvation in the Soviet state founded by Lenin. . . . Leninism secured the combination of the glorious age-long patriotic traditions of the Russian people and of the other peoples of the USSR."¹⁶³

Shcherbakov died soon afterward in suspicious circumstances, and Ponomarev achieved prominence—he was a powerful Soviet leader, head of the International Department of the Central Party Committee and de facto head of the world Communist movement, as late as March 1986. Thus, the tradition of interpreting the Bolshevik revolution as a national revolution was not interrupted. It was inherited by the Soviet system as its most important national political philosophy, theoretically directed to world domination.

In 1926, another man returned to Russia, a man of a different caliber and from a different culture. He was David Hofshstein (1889-1952), a Russian-Yiddish poet who had emigrated to Palestine and was disappointed in Zionism. He left Palestine for Bolshevik Moscow. Coming to Moscow, he pathetically exclaimed: "*The city of Moscow—the Third Rome!*"¹⁶⁴ Twenty-five years later, Hofshstein was executed with other Jewish writers and public personalities for an alleged Jewish conspiracy. The Third Rome, which had by then consolidated its power enough to crush its eternal enemy, Germany, no longer needed the support of its Jewish proxies, whom it now regarded as the next important world enemy, barring its way to world domination.

Notes

Notes to Chapter 1

1. N. Oren, ed., *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Relations* (New York and Jerusalem, 1984), p. 145. Cf. J. Daniloff, *Russland im Weltkrieg* (Jena, 1925), p. 1; W. Laquer, *Russia and Germany* (London, 1965); and R. Pipes, *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente* (Boulder, Colo., 1981).
2. See H. Rollin, *L'Apocalypse de notre temps* (Paris, 1939), and O. Subtelny, "Peter I's Testament," *Slavic Review*, no. 4 (1974).
3. See, for example, D. Groh, *Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas* (Neuwied Rhein, 1961).
4. See, for example, F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London, 1967), p. 33.
5. L. Pollakov, *The History of Anti-Semitism* (London, 1975), 3:380.
6. G. Alexinsky, *Modern Russia* (London, 1913), p. 32.
7. M. Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs* (London, 1923), 1:75.
8. M. Gorev, *Izvestia*, August 28, 1928.
9. A. Kosarev, *Pravda*, June 19, 1929.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Werke* (Berlin, 1958-1968), 38:160.
11. E. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia* (London, 1918), p. 34. Cf. Y. Soloviev, *Vospominania diplomata* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 263-264.
12. L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1977), p. 78.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-80.
14. N. Berdiaev, *Filosofia neravenstva* (Paris, 1971), p. 19.
15. F. Nesterov, *Sviaz' vremen* (Moscow, 1980), p. 60.
16. Quoted from M. B. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism* (New York, 1956), p. 6. See also I. Kirillov, *Tretii Rim* (Moscow, 1914).
17. Quoted from T. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1955), 1:230.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
19. Plamenatz, in E. Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism* (Canberra, 1976), p. 27. Cf. D. Likhatchev, "Natsional'noe edinobrazie i natsional'noe raznoobrazie," *Russkaia literatura*, no. 1 (1968); H. Seton-Watson, *Nationalism and Communism* (London, 1964); and B. Shaffer, *Nationalism* (London, 1955).
20. Plamenatz, in Kamenka, *Nationalism*, p. 27.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
23. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, p. 28.
24. B. Nolde, *Yuri Samarin i ego vremia* (Paris, 1926), p. 45.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48. The references to December 14 allude to an unsuccessful coup d'état on December 14, 1825.

26. I. Berlin, *Russian Thinkers* (London, 1978), p. 186. For Herzen's influence in Russia, see also V. Meshchersky, *Moi vospominania* (St. Petersburg, 1897-1912), I: 67-69.
27. D. Pasmanik, *Russkaia revoliutsia i evreiskii vopros* (Berlin, 1923), p. 65.
28. F. Nesterov, *Pravda*, March 24, 1980.
29. M. Malia, *Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 336.
30. Groh, *Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas*, p. 279, and A. Herzen, "S togo berega," in Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1954-1966), 6:135.
31. Quoted from T. Szarmely, *The Russian Tradition* (London, 1974), p. 201.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
33. Herzen, "S togo berega," p. 13.
34. A. Herzen, "O razvitii revoliutsionnykh idei v Rossii," in Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 7:240, 248.
35. N. Berdiaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), p. 147.
36. Herzen, "O razvitii revoliutsionnykh idei."
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 15.
38. A. Herzen, "Russkie nemtsy i nemetskie russkie," in Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 14:151.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.
42. Herzen, "O razvitii revoliutsionnykh idei," p. 145.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
46. A. Haxthausen, *The Russian Empire* (London, 1968); cf. Groh, *Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas*, p. 202.
47. M. Hess, *Briefwechsel* (The Hague, 1959), pp. 244-246.
48. W. Baczkowsky, *Towards an Understanding of Russia* (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 44.
49. A. Herzen, "K staromu tovarishchu," in Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 20, pt. 2, p. 590.
50. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works* (New York, 1975-), 6:495.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 502-503.
52. M. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français et allemand et la problème de la guerre* (Geneva, 1953), p. 221.
53. Cf. U. Melotti, *Marx and the Third World* (London, 1977).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
55. Cf. Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français*, p. 223.
56. J. Daniel, *Ha-leumiut she gavra al Marx* (Ramat Gan, 1977), p. 53.
57. D. Riazanov, *Otcherki po istorii marksizma* (Moscow, 1923), p. 222.
58. Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, 2:277.
59. *Ibid.*, 3:515.
60. *Ibid.*, 12:167.
61. *Ibid.*, 12:371.
62. *Ibid.*, 12:386. Henry Palmerston (1784-1865), a British statesman, served frequently as foreign minister and then as prime minister from 1830 to 1865.
63. *Ibid.*, 12:476.
64. *Ibid.*, 14:156-157.

65. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 106. Karamsin refers to Nikolai Karamsin (1766-1826).
66. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
68. M. Bakunin, *Izbrannye sochinenia* (Moscow, 1920-1922), 2:95; L. Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress of 1848* (Boulder, Colo., 1978), pp. 94-96.
69. *Deviaryi (IX) s'ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1960), p. 198.
70. Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, 39:523.
71. Marx and Engels, *Russian Menace to Europe*, pp. 236-237.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
73. Bakunin, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, 3:60.
74. E.g., A. Lehning, *M. Bakounine et les autres* (Paris, 1976), pp. 134-137.
75. M. Bakunin, *The Confession of Mikhail Bakunin*, ed. R. Howes and D. Orton (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), pp. 89, 98, 99.
76. M. Bakunin, *Pis'ma Herzenu i Ogarevu* (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp. 111-188.
77. Bakunin, *Confession*, p. 89.
78. E.g., Bakunin, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, 2:95.
79. Szamuely, *Russian Tradition*, p. 373; Y. Steklov, *History of the First International* (Leningrad, 1928), p. 166.
80. E.g., Steklov, *History of the First International*, and Riazanov, *Ocherki po istorii marksizma*, p. 222.
81. E.g., M. Bakunin, "Knuto-Germanskaia imperia i sotsial'naiia revoliutsia," in Bakunin, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, vol. 2, and Bakunin, "Gosudarstvennost' i anarkhia," in *ibid.*, vol. 1.
82. Bakunin, "Knuto-Germanskaia imperia," p. 83.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.
89. Bakunin, "Gosudarstvennost' i anarkhia."
90. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
95. J. Teller, *Scapegoat of Revolution* (New York, 1954), pp. 58-60.
96. E.g., Drachkovitch, *Les socialismes français*, p. 220.
97. Petrovich, *Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism*, p. 31.
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Notes to Chapter 2

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212. Gorky, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 29:305-306.

213. M. Gorky, *Materialy i issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1934-1951), 1:56-57.
214. A. Bogdanov, *O proletarskoi kul'ture* (Leningrad and Moscow, 1924).
215. *Arkhiv Gorkogo* 14 (1976), p. 17.
216. Pokrovsky, *Russkaia istoria*, p. 304.
217. Rolland, *Journal des années de guerre*, p. 1139.
218. Witte, *Vospominania*, 2:213.
219. *Piaryi s'ezd RSDRP*, pp. 223, 656.
220. G. Haupt and M. Jean-Jacque, *Makers of the Russian Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974), pp. 95-108.
221. *Ibid.*, pp. 415-417.
222. *Ibid.*, pp. 418-420.
223. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York and London, 1970-1978), 21:195.
224. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-120.
225. Y. Sverdlov, *Izbrannnye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1959), 2:11-12, letter to L. Egon-Besser, June 23, 1917.
226. Haupt and Jean-Jacque, *Makers of the Russian Revolution*, pp. 245-258.
227. S. Dmitrievsky, *Sovetskie portrety* (Berlin, 1932), p. 289.
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229. Not only Jews manifested ardent Russian nationalism among the Bolsheviks; other minority Bolsheviks did also, for example, Bolshevik Armenians. Stepan Shaumian (1878-1918), a leader of Caucasian Bolsheviks, tried to persuade Lenin to introduce Russian as a compulsory language in the Caucasus (see S. Shaumian, Letter to Lenin, in Shaumian, "Pis'ma," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no.2 [1957], p. 52).
230. Haupt and Jean-Jacque, *Makers of the Russian Revolution*, pp. 41-47; also *Narod* (Petrograd), December 8, 1917.
231. J. Nedava, *Trotsky and the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 133.
232. M. Gorky, "V. Lenin," *Russkii sovremennik* (Berlin), no. 1 (1924), p. 241.
233. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 7:99.
234. *Ibid.*, 4:335-336. Cf. Plekhanov, *Sotchineniia*, 13:168.
235. Plekhanov, *Sotchineniia*, 12:367-370; Nedava, *Trotsky and the Jews*, p. 194.
236. F. Dzerzhinsky, *Izbrannnye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1967), 1:35.
237. M. Agursky and M. Shklovskaiia, *Gorky: Iz literaturnogo nasledia* (Jerusalem, 1986), and M. Agursky, *The Zionist Controversy in the Soviet Establishment*, World Zionist Organization, Department of Information (Jerusalem, 1984).
238. *Arkhiv Gorkogo* 9 (1966), p. 101. Gorky referred to "Tchuzhbina" (1908).
239. M. Gorky, "Russkii evreiu," *Evreiskaia nedelia*, no. 6 (1916), pp. 5-7.
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242. See B. Knei-Paz, *The Social and Political Thought of Trotsky* (Oxford, 1978).
243. *Vechernii tchas*, December 14, 1917. Quoted from D. Segal, "Sumerki svobody: O nekotorykh temakh russkoi ezhdnevnoi petchati 1917-1918 gg.," in *Russian Literature* (forthcoming).
244. See Z. Zeman and W. Scharlau, *The Merchant of Revolution* (London, 1965).
245. D. Pasmanik, *Russkaia revoliutsiia i evreiskii vopros* (Berlin, 1923), p. 159.
246. W. Biehahn, "Marxismus und Russentum im Bolschevismus," *Osteuropa* 10 (1934-1935); cf. W. Markert, "Marxismus und die russische Erbe im Sowjetsystem," *Tübinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik* 8 (1957); G. Stöckl, "Entstehung und Entwicklung des Sowjetimperiums," *Sowjetstudien*, no. 8 (1960); and R. Wittram, *Das Nationale als europäische Problem* (Göttingen, 1954).

247. Trotzky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, pp. 249-250.
248. A. Vasiliev, *The Ochrana* (London, 1930), p. 69.
249. A. Gerasimov, *Tsarisme et terrorisme* (Paris, 1934), p. 93.
250. Wolfe, *Three Who Made Revolution*, p. 270.
251. L. Villari, *Fire and Sword in the Caucasus* (London, 1906), pp. 73-74; italics added. Prince Golitsyn refers to Grigory Golitsyn (1838-1907), the chief administrator of the Caucasus in 1897-1904.
252. Padenie tsarskogo rezhima (Moscow, 1924-1927), 2:118.
253. Gerasimov, *Tsarisme et terrorisme*, p. 158.
254. Wolfe, *Three Who Made Revolution*, p. 129.
255. Cf. V. Agafonov, *Zagranichnaia okhranka* (Petrograd, 1918), pp. 332-333; G. Gapon, *Istoria moei zhizni* (Berlin, 1925), p. 54; P. Zavarzin, *Zhandarmy i revoliutsionery* (Paris, 1930), p. 61; L. Kleinbrot, "M. Gurovitch," *Byloe*, no. 16 (1921), pp. 86-107; L. Menshchikov, *Okhrana i revoliutsia* (Moscow, 1929), II/2:43; V. Pesse, *Vospominania* (Petrograd, 1923), p. 75; Gerasimov, *Tsarisme et terrorisme*, p. 23; interrogation of Klimovitch in Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, 1:81; and S. Alliluev, *Pridennyi put'* (Moscow, 1946), p. 154.
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398. *Ibid.*, 22:347.

399. *Ibid.*, 21:105.
400. Because of the wrong translation in Lenin, *Collected Works*, 35:85, I have provided my own translation from Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 48:163; italics added.
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Notes to Chapter 3

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67. *Ibid.*
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78. David, *Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg*, p. 79.
79. *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima* (Moscow, 1924-1927).
80. See, for example, Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 3:49; 1:137; 2:33, 193, 267; 3:49, 63-64, 115; see also B. Nikitin, *The Fatal Years* (Westport, Conn., 1977), and Buchanan, *My Mission to Russia*, 1:245.
81. Buchanan, *My Mission to Russia*, 1:183, 220. Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 3:12, 79 and 1:183; Katkov, *Russia, 1917*, pp. 65-66.
82. *Kolokol*, August 19, 1916.
83. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1916.
84. Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 2:44.
85. See R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution* (New York, 1962); E. H. Carr, *The History of Soviet Russia* (London, 1975); and M. Ferro, *La révolution de 1917* (Paris, 1967).
86. See Katkov, *Russia, 1917*.
87. Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 3:65-66. Cf. Wilcox, *Russia's Ruin*, pp. 146-147.
88. M. Gorky i V. Korolenko (Moscow, 1957), p. 81.
89. Interrogation of Klimovitch, *Padenie tsarskogo rezhima*, 1:91.
90. Paleologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 2:224.
91. L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1977), p. 585.
92. Nikitin, *The Fatal Years*, p. 278.
93. N. Markov, "Popytki spaseniia tsarskol' sem'i," *Vyshii monarkhicheskii sovet*, April 28, 1920.
94. V. Shklovsky, *A Sentimental Journey* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), p. 66.
95. D. Paamanik, *Russkaia revoliutsia i evreiskii vopros* (Berlin, 1923), p. 23.
96. Shklovsky, *A Sentimental Journey*, p. 60.
97. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, p. 330.
98. J. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow, 1952-1955; Stanford, Calif., 1967), 3:2; italics added.
99. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:111.
100. *Pervyi (I) kongress Komintern* (Moscow, 1933), p. 19.
101. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 25:429.
102. For example, Sergei Bagdatiev; see *Sed'maia (VII) (aprel'skaia) vserossiiskaia konferentsia RSDRP(b)* (Moscow, 1958), p. 90.
103. See, for example, Nikitin, *The Fatal Years*, p. 25.
104. M. Agursky, "Existait-il une infiltration de droite dans le système politique soviétique?" *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* (21:3-4 (1980), pp. 279-280.
105. *Petrogradskaia vetcherniaia gazeta*, December 1, 1917.

106. Agursky, "Existait-il une infiltration de droite," p. 285.
107. I. Oseniev, "Bolsheviks i tchernosotentsy," *Vetcher* (Petrograd), November 17 (30), 1917. Cf. P. Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie* (Geneva, 1975-1982), 1:175.
108. Y. Nevitch, *Novoe vremia*, October 15 (28), 1917.
109. Agursky, "Existait-il une infiltration de droite," p. 284.
110. *Ibid.*
111. V. Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past* (Stanford, Calif., 1939), p. 436.
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286; for more on Purishkevitch, see S. Liuboah, *Russkii fashist Purishkevitch* (Leningrad, 1925), and B. Pares, *My Russian Memoirs* (London, 1931), p. 136.
113. Essad-Bey, *Histoire du Guépéou* (Paris, 1934), p. 101.
114. Agursky, "Existait-il une infiltration de droite," p. 285, and Oseniev, "Bolsheviks i tchernosotentsy."
115. A. Lunatcharsky, "Sretenie," *Izvestia*, November 17, 1917; Oseniev, "Bolsheviks i tchernosotentsy"; I. Yasinaky, "O bol'shevikakh, o sverkhcheloveke i o zhabakh," *Petrogradskaia vetcherniaia gazeta*, November 27, 1917; I. Yasinaky, "B'iu," *Petrogradskaia vetcherniaia gazeta*, December 7 1917; L. Donitch, "Sud pri zakrytykh dveriakh," *Petrogradskaia vetcherniaia gazeta*, December 6, 1917. See also I. Yasinaky, *Roman moei zhizni* (Moscow, 1926), pp. 329-330.
116. I. Getzler, *Kronstadt, 1917-1921* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 166, 206.
117. *Iz glubiny* (Paris, 1967), pp. 124-129.
118. Quoted from Lunatcharsky's letter to Lenin, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 80 (1971), p. 258.
119. A. Zalontchkovskiy, *Mirovaia voina 1914-1918* (Moscow, 1931), p. 11.
120. See D. Lang, *A Modern History of Georgia* (London, 1962), p. 155; J. Davrichev, *Ce qu'on rigolait bien avec mon copain Stalin* (Paris, 1979), p. 216; A. Levitin-Krasnov, *Ruk tvoikh zhar* (Tel Aviv, 1979), p. 101; and Manuil (Lemelevskij), metropolitan, *Die Russische orthodoxen Bischöfe von 1893 bis 1965* (Erlangen, 1979-1981), 2:67-70.
121. Agursky, "Existait-il une infiltration de droite," pp. 291-292.
122. *Ibid.*
123. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 31:276; italics added.
124. S. Liberman, *Dela i liudi* (New York, 1944), p. 39.
125. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:74.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.
127. *Ibid.*; "It would be . . . revolution begins?"—the official Soviet translation is wrong. Here the translation is from Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1959-1970), 34:281.
128. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:140-141.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
130. *Ibid.*; italics added.
131. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 188; italics added.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 190; cf. S. Cohen, *Bukharin* (New York, 1973), and R. Medvedev, *Bukharin* (New York, 1980). Gen. Lavr Kornilov (1870-1918) had tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Provisional government in September 1917.
134. F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 368.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 447.
137. Stalin, *Works*, 3:199-200.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

139. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:472; italics added.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 481.
141. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP(b)* (Moscow, 1929), January 24 (11), 1918, p. 206.
142. *Protokoly VTsIK vtorogo sozyua* (Moscow, 1918), p. 68.
143. Trotaky, *My Life*, p. 341.
144. S. Kirov, *Izbrannye stat'i i rechi* (Moscow, 1957), p. 11.
145. Trotaky, *My Life*, p. 339.
146. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York, 1977), p. 54.
147. See, for example, A. Balabanoff, *Impressions on Lenin* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968), p. 129.
148. Trotaky, *My Life*, p. 449.
149. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 32:19-42, 70-107.
150. M. Gorky, *Untimely Thoughts* (New York, 1968), pp. 106-107.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
152. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 223; cf. G. Nivat, "La révolution Russe vue par Gorki et par P. Pascal," *Journal de Genève*, January 3, 1976.
154. Cf. M. Gorky, *Culture and the People* (New York, 1939), p. 35.
155. L. Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* (New York, 1965), p. 149. A leader of the left-wing SR claimed that in Petrograd alone there were 45,000 left-wing SR (see I. Steinberg, *In the Workshop of the Revolution* [New York, 1953], p. 49; cf. V. Khoros, *Narodnitscheskaia ideologia i marksizm* [Moscow, 1972], p. 196).
156. *Protokoly pervogo s'ezda partii levyykh sotsialistov-revolutsionerov* (Moscow, 1918), p. 53.
157. *Protokoly VTsIK*, p. 66.
158. *Protokoly pervogo s'ezda*, p. 53.
159. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
160. Quoted from Gorky, *Untimely Thoughts*, p. 132.
161. Schapiro, *Origin of the Communist Autocracy*, pp. 180-181.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 127. The Tcheka later changed its name to State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, GPU), People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del, NKVD), Ministry of State Security (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, MGB), and Committee of State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, KGB).
163. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
164. K. Gusev, *Krakh partii levyykh eserov* (Moscow, 1963), p. 237.
165. See "Obshchestvo moltchit," *Zapretnoe slovo*, November 25, 1917; also M. Agursky, "Dmitrievsky and the Origins of National Bolshevism," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, no. 2 (1977).
166. Agursky, "Dmitrievsky"; V. Lenin, *Biograficheskaya khronika* (Moscow, 1970-1982), 10:274; *Leninskii sbornik* 37 (Moscow, 1973), pp. 286-287; and *Rul'*, April 13, 1930.
167. *Gosudarstvennoe soveshchanie, 1917* (Moscow, 1930), p. 91.
168. See B. Kerblay, "A. Čajanov," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 5:4 (1964).
169. A. Chayanov (Tchajanov), "The Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of Peasant Utopia," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 4:1 (1976).
170. A. Peshekhonov, *Potchemu ia ne emigriroual?* (Berlin, 1923), p. 34. See also O. Gruzenberg, *Vichera* (Paris, 1938), pp. 222-227.
171. *Prorotcheskaia kharakteristika liudei pered kontsom mira* (N.p., 1974), p. 53.
172. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

173. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
174. F. Stepun, *Byvshee i nestbyvsheesia* (New York, 1956), 2:221.
175. "Venī, creator," *Russkaia volia*, September 15, 1917.
176. "Evropa v opasnosti," *Skorb' zemli russkoi* (New York, 1919), p. 5.
177. *Iz glubiny* (Paris, 1967), p. 289.
178. I. Bunin, *Okaiannye dni* (London, Can., 1977), pp. 57-58, 172.
179. R. Vipper, *Krugovorot istorii* (Berlin, 1923), p. 63.
180. I. Rodionov, *Nashe prestuplenie* (Berlin, 1922), p. 7.
181. F. Vinberg, *V plenu u oberian* (Kiev, 1918), p. 11.
182. R. Ivnev, *U podnozhia Mtatsmindy* (Moscow, 1973).
183. R. Ivnev, *Izbrannye stikhi* (Moscow, 1965), p. 35. Cf. R. Ivnev, "Roessia," *Nakanune*, September 3, 1922.
184. See Ivanov-Razumnik, *Pisatel'skie sud'by* (New York, 1951), and Ivanov-Razumnik, *Tiur'my i slylki* (New York, 1953).
185. *Skify* (Moscow, 1917-1918), 1:212.
186. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
187. E. Lundberg, *Zapiski pisatel'ia* (Berlin, 1922), p. 119.
188. *Ibid.*, p. 22; see also O. Forsk (*Sobranie sochinenii* [Moscow, 1962-1964]) of this period.
189. See P. Brang, "Les destinées de la Russie vues par les poètes russe de XVII au XX siècle," *Revue des études slaves*, no. 3 (1979); J. Michaut, "Blok, le peuple et l'intelligentsia," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 10:3-4 (1968); R. Triomphe, "Le mysticisme d'A. Blok," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 1:3 (1960); and Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie*, 1:276-280.
190. A. Blok, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1932-1936), 8:45, 49. A troika is a vehicle drawn by a team of horses harnessed abreast.
191. The translation is taken from S. Hackel, *The Poet and the Revolution* (Oxford, 1975), p. 229.
192. A. Blok, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1960-1963), 7:316.
193. A. Besançon, *Le tsarévitch immolé* (Paris, 1967), p. 232.
194. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
195. The translation is taken from O. Carlisle, *Poets on Streets Corners* (New York, 1968), pp. 33-34.
196. K. Tchukovsky, *Alexander Blok, Man and Poet* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1982), pp. 132, 135. See also A. Tolstol, "Padshii angel," *Poslednie novosti*, August 28, 1921.
197. Blok, *Sobranie sochinenii* (1932-1936), 8:238.
198. *Ibid.*, p. 117. See also N. Primotchikina, "Blok i problema mekhanizatsii kul'tury," *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR: Seria literatury i iazyka*, no. 2 (1978).
199. Blok, *Sobranie sochinenii* (1932-1936), 8:138.
200. "Grazhdanskie motivy v poezii Bloka," *Literaturnye zapiski*, no. 3 (1922), p. 2; cf. S. Kuniaev, *Svobodnaia stikhiia* (Moscow, 1979), p. 57.
201. V. Khodasevitch, *Nekropol'* (Paris, 1976), p. 66.
202. A. Bely, *Revolutsia i kul'tura* (Moscow, 1917), p. 14.
203. A. Bely, *Khristos vskrese* (Berlin, 1923).
204. "O Dukhe Rossii i 'dukhe' v Rossii," *Novaia Rossia*, no. 1 (1922).
205. M. Voloshin, *Puti Rossii* (Paris, 1969), p. 44.
206. The translation is taken from C. Marsh, *Voloshin* (Birmingham, 1982), p. 145.
207. Bunin, *Okaiannye dni*, p. 82; see also I. Kuprianov, *Sud'ba poeta (Litchnost' i poezia M. Voloshina)* (Kiev, 1978), and M. Avinov, *Pilgrimage Through Hell* (New York, 1968), p. 102.

208. V. Briusov, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1973-1975), 1:354-355.
209. Quoted from Stepun, *Byvshee i nesbyvsheesia*, 2:225.
210. Briusov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 3:48.
211. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
212. *Ibid.*, p. 50. Ivan Kalita was a Moscow tsar of the fourteenth century.
213. L. Trotaky, *Literature and Revolution* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), p. 95.
214. Trotaky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, p. 883.
215. E. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia* (London, 1918), pp. 88-89.
216. Cf. M. Agursky, "Caught in a Cross Fire: The Russian Church Between Holy Synod and Radical Right," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, no. 1 (1984).
217. Ilidor, *Velikaia Stalingradskaia Marfa* (New York, 1943), p. 35.
218. *Letopis' zhizni i tvorchestva Gorkogo* (Moscow, 1959-1960), 2:447.
219. Ilidor, *Velikaia Stalingradskaia Marfa*.
220. "Perekrasivshisia Ilidor," *Izvestia*, March 30, 1919.
221. *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, vol. 27 (Moscow, 1933) p. 756. See also Johannes Chrysostomus, *Kirchengeschichte Russlands der neusten Zeit* (Munich, 1965), 1:220.
222. Ilidor, *Velikaia Stalingradskaia Marfa*.
223. H. Massis, *Défense de l'Occident* (Paris, 1927), p. 126.
224. N. Kliuev, *Sotchinienia* (Munich, 1969), 1:463-465.
225. *Ibid.*, p. 477. In Russian legend, Kitez' was the city that decided to sink into a lake when the Tatars conquered Russia, to emerge when times would improve.
226. Trotaky, *Literature and Revolution*, p. 65.
227. Kliuev, *Sotchinienia*, 1:494-495. Kerzhenetz was a famous sectarian area in the north; Pomor answers was an important Old Believers' document.
228. *Ibid.*, p. 470.
229. See B. Filippov, Introduction to Kliuev, *Sotchinienia*, 1:147.
230. See G. McVay, *Esenin: A Life* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1976), and V. Bazanov, "Druzia-nedruzi (Kliuev i Esenin)," *Sever*, no. 9 (1981).
231. Khodasevitch, *Nekropol'*, pp. 182-183, 203.
232. M. Niqueaux, "Klyčkov et Esenin entre le symbolisme et l'aggelisme," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 7:3 (1966).
233. S. Esenin, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1966-1968), 2:33-41.
234. *Ibid.*, 5:107, 11, 88; 2:193-252.
235. *Gorky v epokhu revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 22-23.
236. *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 2 (1959), p. 14.
237. N. Ustrialov, *Problemy velikoi Rossii*, no. 15 (1916), pp. 1-15.
238. N. Ustrialov, *Problemy velikoi Rossii*, no. 18 (1916), pp. 10-12.
239. N. Ustrialov, *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 10 (1916).
240. N. Ustrialov, *Otvetstvennost' ministrov* (Moscow, 1917).
241. N. Ustrialov, *Tchto takoe uchreditel'noe sobranie* (Moscow, 1917).
242. For example, Y. Kliuchnikov, *Problemy velikoi Rossii*, nos. 9, 10 (1916).
243. N. Ustrialov, "Russkaia kul'tura," *Nakanune*, April 1918.
244. F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 500.
245. See J. Wheeler-Bennet, *Brest-Litovsk* (New York, 1966).
246. Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie*, 1:317.
247. Shub, *Lenin*, pp. 414-415.
248. *Ibid.*, p. 296; italics added.
249. *Ibid.*, p. 415.
250. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 27:24.
251. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 35:369.

252. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:443.
253. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 30.
254. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, pp. 202, 243; *Sed'moi (VII) ekstremnyi s'ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1962), p. 73. See also N. Bukharin, B. Volin, A. Lomov, and N. Osnaky, *Tcherez gornilo imperialisticheskoi voiny* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 11-12.
255. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, p. 205.
256. *Ibid.*, p. 204; *Sed'moi ekstremnyi s'ezd*, p. 89.
257. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, pp. 203, 245.
258. M. Vasiliev, "Oshibotchnyi shag," *Izvestia Saratovskogo soveta*, March 19, 1918.
259. *Sed'moi ekstremnyi s'ezd*, p. 73.
260. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-85. See also Bukharin, Volin, Lomov, and Osnaky, *Tcherez gornila*, p. 22.
261. F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 502.
262. Wheeler-Bennet, *Brest-Litovsk*, p. 231.
263. G. Tchitcherin, *Star'i i retchi* (Moscow, 1961), p. 260.
264. For example, Erich von Lüdendorff; see F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 502.
265. O. Czernin, *In the World War* (London, 1919), pp. 231, 245, 250.
266. E. von Lüdendorff, *Meine Kriegserinnerungen* (Berlin, 1919), p. 443.
267. Tchitcherin, *Star'i i retchi*, p. 260.
268. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 27:160.
269. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
270. Y. Steklov, *Vospominania i publitsistika* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 90-91.
271. G. Zinoviev, *Khleb, mir i partia* (Petrograd, 1918), p. 10.
272. V. Kerzhentsev, *Soiuzniki i Rossia* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 16-17, 39.
273. S. Shaumian, *Star'i i retchi* (Baku, 1924), p. 210.
274. M. Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History*, ed. R. Szporluk (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970), p. 210.
275. Gorky, *Culture and the People*, p. 35.
276. See R. Medvedev and S. Starikov, *Philip Moronov and the Russian Civil War* (New York, 1978); see also F. Biriukov, *Khudozhestvennye otkrytia Sholokhova* (Moscow, 1976); A. Khvatov, *Khudozhestvennyi mir Sholokhova* (Moscow, 1978); V. Petelin, *Sholokhov* (Moscow, 1974); and S. Semanov, *Tikhii Don* (Moscow, 1977).
277. Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 436.
278. K. Radek, *Portrety i pamflety* (Moscow, 1927), p. 33.
279. S. Fediukin, *Velikii Oktiabr' i intelligentsia* (Moscow, 1972), p. 123.
280. N. Potapov, "Zapiaki o pervykh shagakh voennogo stroitel'stva," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (1968), pp. 61-66.
281. Fediukin, *Velikii Oktiabr' i intelligentsia*.
282. P. Milliukov, *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (New York, 1922), pp. 39-40. Cf. Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie*, 1:238, 304.
283. Radek, *Portrety i pamflety*, p. 33.
284. A. Brustlov, *A Soldier's Notebook* (Westport, Conn., 1971), pp. 304-305.
285. A. Ignatiev, *50 let v stroiu* (Moscow, 1939-1950), 2:283.
286. *The Trotsky Papers* (The Hague, 1964-1972), 2:280.
287. *Pravda*, November 21, 1921; V. Lenin, *Biograficheskaja khronika*, 11:446.
288. N. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (Harbin, 1925), July 12, 1923. See also *Bolshaja sovetskaja entsiklopedia*, vol. 19 (Moscow, 1975), p. 338.
289. Trotsky, *My Life*, pp. 447, 449.
290. Balabanoff, *Impressions on Lenin*, p. 135.
291. *Pravda*, July 17, 1920.

292. S. Semanov, "U kolybels Krasnot Armii," Moskva, no. 2 (1980), and S. Semanov, "Staryi general," *Sovetskaia Rossia*, December 30, 1979.
293. Page, *The Geopolitics of Leninism*, pp. 151-152.
294. R. Pethybridge, *The Social Prelude to Stalinism* (London, 1974), p. 98; also P. Berlin, "Prusskie utchitelia russkogo bolshevizma," *Na rubezhe* (Paris), no. 5 (1952).
295. J. Frankel, *V. Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian Marxism* (Cambridge, 1969), p. 74.
296. P. Roberts, "War Communism," *Slavic Review*, no. 1 (1970). See also H. Haumann, "Kriegskomunismus oder unmittelbare Aufbau des Sozialismus," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 1 (1975).
297. *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1928), pp. 376-377.
298. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 44:290.
299. Page, *The Geopolitics of Leninism*, pp. 151-152.
300. F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 509.
301. G. Freund, *Unholy Alliance* (London, 1957), p. 25; *italics added*.
302. L. Trotaky, *Sotchinienia* (Moscow, 1925-1927), 17:14.
303. Shub, *Lenin*, p. 415.
304. Scheidemann, *Memoirs of a Social-Democrat*, 2:534.
305. Page, *The Geopolitics of Leninism*, p. 157.
306. F. Fisher, *Germany's Aims*, p. 636.
307. *Pervyi kongress Komintern*, pp. 41, 44.
308. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
309. See J. Netti, *Rosa Luxemburg* (Oxford, 1966); R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); W. Lerner, *K. Radek* (Stanford, Calif., 1970); and Freund, *Unholy Alliance*.
310. R. Luxemburg, "The Russian Revolution," in *Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962).
311. Freund, *Unholy Alliance*, p. 35.
312. Netti, *Rosa Luxemburg*, 2:772.
313. Lerner, *K. Radek*, p. 82.
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316. M. Laserson, *Russia and the Western World* (New York, 1945), p. 162.
317. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 28:187-188.
318. *Ibid.*, 28:211.
319. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.
320. Stalin, *Works*, 4:186.
321. *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.
322. *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.
323. M. Kalinin, *Izbranye proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1960), 1:390; also M. Kalinin, *Retchi i besedy* (Moscow, 1919), 1:14.
324. G. Zinoviev, *Armia i narod* (Petrograd, 1920), p. 23.
325. G. Zinoviev, *Dvenadtsat' dnei v Germanii* (Petrograd, 1920), p. 102; G. Zinoviev, *Parteiitag nezavisimykh* (Moscow, 1920), p. 67.
326. Tchitcherin, *Stat'i i retchi*, p. 85.
327. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
328. Quoted from V. Petelin, "L. Tolstoi i sovremennost'," *Molodaia Guardia*, no. 12 (1969), p. 272.
329. A. Lunatcharsky, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Moscow, 1963-1968), 1:31.
330. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
331. This and the following quotation are from *ibid.*, 7:305-306.

332. *Ibid.*, p. 483.
 333. Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History*, p. 89.
 334. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
 335. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
 336. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 337. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
 338. L. Krasin, *Voprosy vneshnei torgovli* (Moscow, 1928), pp. 254, 264.
 339. L. Reiser, *Izbrannoe* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 39, 53, 55, 56.
 340. Kraisky quoted from O. Mikhailov, *Vernost'* (Moscow, 1974), p. 18; the others are quoted from L. Farber, *Sovetskaia literatura pervykh let revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 80-81.
 341. Trotaky, *Sotchinienia*, 17:113-114.
 342. Trotaky, *Literature and Revolution*, p. 73.
 343. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
 344. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
 345. *Ibid.*, p. 96. Semen Buddeny (1883-1973) was commander of the First Cavalry army.
 346. Kalinin, *Izbrannye proizvedenia*, p. 98; Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History*, p. 31.
 347. Trotaky, *Literature and Revolution*, p. 96.
 348. See, for example, H. Rogger and E. Weber, *European Rights* (London, 1965), and C. Z. Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, 1939).
 349. M. Gorky, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Moscow, 1949-1955), 24:189. Cf. H. Fenner, *M. Gorky's politische Gesinnung und seine Stellungnahme zu der Sowjetregierung* (Berlin, 1919).
 350. Gorky, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, p. 188.
 351. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
 352. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
 353. *Desiatsyi (X) s'ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 202-203.
 354. *Vos'maia (VIII) konferentsia RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1961), p. 106.
 355. *Dvenadtsyi (XII) s'ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1961), p. 612.
 356. *Ibid.*, p. 596.
 357. *Desiatsyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, pp. 606-607.
 358. For example, R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); G. Semenoff, "Die nationale Frage in der russischen Revolution," *Zeitschrift für Politik* 14 (1924-1925); V. Stankevitch, *Sud'by narodov Rossii* (Berlin, 1921). Cf. P. Rogatchev and M. Sverdlin, *Patriotizm i obshchestvennyi progress* (Moscow, 1974), and M. Kultichenko, *Natsional'nye otnosheniia v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiia* (Moscow, 1972).
 359. *Dvenadtsyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, p. 578.
 360. *Desiatsyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, p. 607.
 361. *S'ezd narodov Vostoka* (Petrograd, 1920), p. 90.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. V. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1960-1971), 31:21.
2. See A. Balabanoff, *Impressions on Lenin* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968).
3. See Y. Steklov, *History of the First International* (Leningrad, 1928).
4. *Pervyi (I) kongress Kominterna* (Moscow, 1933), p. 59.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

7. See M. L. Goldbach, *K. Radek und die deutsche-sowietsichen Beziehungen* (Bonn, 1975), and W. Lerner, *K. Radek* (Stanford, Calif., 1970).
8. See G. Freund, *Unholy Alliance* (London, 1957); Lerner, *K. Radek*; O. Schueddekopf, *Linke Leute von Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1960); and R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).
9. E. von Reventlow, *Völkisch-kommunistische Einigung?* (Leipzig, 1924), p. 8.
10. Lerner, *K. Radek*, p. 89.
11. K. Radek, *Die auswärtige Politik des deutschen Kommunismus und der Hamburger nationale Bolschewismus* (Vienna, 1919), p. 2.
12. E. Troeltsch, *Spektator Briefe* (Tübingen, 1924), pp. 269-270.
13. Radek, *Die auswärtige Politik*, pp. 9-10.
14. V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1959-1970), 41:458-459.
15. K. Kautsky, *Terrorism and Communism* (London, 1920), p. 156; cf. W. Leonhard, *Am Vorabend einer neuen Revolution?* (Munich, 1977), pp. 18-19.
16. V. Lenin, *Biograficheskaja khronika* (Moscow, 1970-1982), 11:105 (July 27, 1921).
17. L. Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961), p. 12.
18. Ustami Buninykh (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), p. 219.
19. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 51:425; Lenin, *Biograficheskaja khronika*, 8:518, 527.
20. K. Radek, *Voina pol'skikh belogardeitsev protiv Sovetskoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1920), p. 14.
21. *Pravda*, May 28, 1920.
22. L. Trotsky, "Pol'skii front," in Trotsky, *Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsia* (Moscow, 1923-1925), vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 103-104.
23. M. Pavlovitch, *Voina s pol'skimi panami* (Moscow, 1920), pp. 7, 27.
24. M. Gorky, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1949-1955), 24:218.
25. *Izvestia, Pravda*. A few weeks before, Brusilov had suggested that the lands populated by Russian Orthodox people be liberated (see *Izvestia*, May 7, 1920).
26. *Pravda*, June 3, 1920.
27. Quoted from Z. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav," *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii* (Paris, 1922-1938), 12:13.
28. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 32:173.
29. *Pravda*, September 12, 1920.
30. A. Solzhenitsyn, M. Agursky, I. Shafarevich, and others, *From Under the Rubble* (Boston, 1975), p. 132.
31. A. Miasnikov, "O kharaktere pol'skoi voiny," *Zvezda* (Minsk), June 9, 1920.
32. N. Bukharin, "Tekushchii moment i problemy otetchestva," *Pravda*, July 10, 1920.
33. L. Trotsky, *My Life* (New York, 1970), p. 457.
34. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 31.
35. A. Balabanoff, *Lenin* (Hannover, 1961), p. 97.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-103.
37. *Vtoroi (II) kongress Komintern* (Moscow, 1934), p. 224.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
39. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 31:247-248.
40. See P. Samus, *Edward Próchniak* (Warsaw, 1983), p. 152, and *Deviataia (IX) vserossiiskaia konferentsia RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1972), p. 227. Henrik Kamensky was also known as Krakus.
41. *Deviataia vserossiiskaia konferentsia*, pp. 244, 252.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 256-260, 252.

43. R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism*, pp. 205, 267, and Troeltsch, *Spektator Briefe*, p. 269.
44. *Deviataia vserossiiskaia konferentsia*, pp. 241-243.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 258; italics added.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
50. Freund, *Unholy Alliance*, p. 65.
51. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 32:180.
52. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 44:180-181.
53. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 32:437.
54. P. Parfenov, *Grazhdanskaia voina v Sibiri* (Moscow, 1924), p. 166.
55. J. Berger, *Shipwreck of a Generation* (London, 1971), pp. 39-43.
56. R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism*, p. 178.
57. *Vtoroi kongress Komintern*, p. 696.
58. A. Berkman, *The Bolshevik Myth* (New York, 1925), p. 226.
59. E. Goldman, *My Disillusionment in Russia* (London, 1925), p. 34; cf. W. Leonhard, *Am Vorabend einer neuen Revolution?* p. 20.
60. *The Trotsky Papers* (The Hague, 1964-1972), 1:621-625.
61. G. Tchitcherin, *Star'i i retchi* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 97, 239.
62. L. Kamenev, *Lloyd George, Wrangel, i Pilsudsky* (Moscow, 1920), p. 12.
63. *S'ezd narodov Vostoka* (Petrograd, 1920), p. 72.
64. J. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow, 1952-1955; Stanford, Calif., 1967), 4:406.
65. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 23:477.
66. *Ibid.*, 35:500.
67. *Arkhiv Gorkogo* 8 (1960), p. 70. See also A. Ovtcharenko, *Publististika Gorkogo* (Moscow, 1961), p. 460.
68. P. Miliukov, *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (New York, 1922), p. 108.
69. A. Sutton, *Wall-Street and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1974). Cf. D. Pasmanik, "Primirentchestvo prof. Ustrialova," *Obshchee delo*, July 6, 1921.
70. S. White, *Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution* (London, 1979), pp. 3-8, and *Izvestia*, March 22, 1921.
71. F. Stepun, *Byushee i nesbyusheesia* (New York, 1956), 2:279.
72. Lenin in Gorky (Moscow, 1969), p. 172. Cf. W. Leonhard, *Am Vorabend einer neuen Revolution?* pp. 21-22.
73. A. Lunatcharsky, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1963-1968), 1:488-489.
74. M. Berdichevsky, *Rasskazy* (Berlin, 1922), p. 220.
75. S. Aguraky, *Evreiskii rabotchii v kommunisticheskom dvizhenii* (Minak, 1926), p. 10; *Vetcherniaia pochta* (Petrograd), November 6, 1917.
76. *Tserkovnye vedomosti* (Moscow), nos. 17-18 (1918).
77. V. Vitukhin, *Zoloty berega* (N.p., 1923), introduction.
78. F. Vinberg, *V plenu u obezian* (Kiev, 1918), p. 86.
79. Y. Odinzgoev, *Sumerki khristianstva* (N.p., 1922), p. 95.
80. N. Zhevakhov, *Vospominania* (Munich and Novi Sad, 1923-1928), 1:442.
81. N. Markov, *Istoria evreiskogo shturma Rassii* (Harbin, 1937); N. Markov, *Voiny temnykh sil* (Paris, 1928).
82. G. Bostunitch, *Masonstvo i russkaia revoliutsia* (Novi Sad, 1921).
83. I. Ehrenburg, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1966), 8:408, or *Memoirs, 1921-1941* (New York, 1966), pp. 18, 89.

84. V. Vladimirov, *Novaia Judeia* (N.p., 1920), p. 6.
85. A. Karabchevsky, *Tchto glaza moi videli* (Berlin, 1921).
86. "Kto oni i kak byt'," *Evreiskaia tribuna*, October 19, 1922.
87. "Beslavnoe prozlabanie," *Narod*, December 8, 1917.
88. *Pravda*, July 3, 1919. See also P. Sorokin, *Leaves from a Russian Diary* (London, 1925), pp. 248, 267.
89. *Pravda*, July 3, 1919.
90. S. Agursky, *Die kommunistische welt* (Yiddish), no. 5 (1919); information from Professor E. Goldhagen.
91. G. Alexinsky, *Du tsarisme au communisme* (Paris, 1923), p. 147.
92. S. Esenin, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1966-1968), 2:193-252; italics added.
93. See G. Alexinsky, *Souvenirs d'une condamné à mort* (Paris, 1923), and G. Zinoviev, *Pervyi kongress Kominterna*, p. 24.
94. Alexinsky, *Du tsarisme au communisme*, p. 147.
95. See Lenin, *Collected Works*, 26:538.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
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- The tricolor flag was the Russian imperial flag.
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99. A. Arosev, "Zapiski Terentia Zabytogo," in *Opal'nye povesti*, ed. V. Alexandrova (New York, 1955), pp. 42-43.
100. J. Nedava, *Trotsky and the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 252.
101. A. Barmine, *One Who Survived* (New York, 1945), p. 21.
102. E. Dumbadze, *Na sluzhbe Tcheka i Kominterna* (Paris, 1930), p. 25.
103. I. Bunin, *Okaiannye dni* (London, Can., 1977), p. 171.
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105. P. Avrich, *Kronstadt, 1921* (Princeton, N.J., 1970), pp. 177-180.
106. M. Gorky, *O evreikh* (Moscow, 1919).
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108. *Jewish Chronicle*, July 2, 1920; *Bolshaiia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1972), p. 534.
109. *Deviataia vserossiiskaia konferentsia*, p. 98.
110. Goldman, *My Disillusionment in Russia*, p. 130.
111. "Tchekist o Tcheka," *Na tchuzhoi storone* 9 (1925).
112. Berkman, *The Bolshevik Myth*, pp. 228, 223.
113. *Vos'maia (VIII) konferentsia RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1961), p. 106; italics added.
114. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 30:270-271.
115. M. Dzozev, *Kozni mirovogo evreistva* (Berlin, 1933), p. 5.
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118. A. Semenov, *Tchetynadsatyi (XIV) s'ezd VKP(b)* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 509-512.
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130. P. Struve, *Russkaia mysl'*, nos. 5-6 (1921).
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132. N. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (Harbin, 1925), p. 64.
133. Ustrialov, *V bor'be za Rossiiu*, p. 5.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
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136. S. Melgunov, *Tragedia admirala Kolchaka* (Belgrade, 1930), 4:181; L. Krol', *Za tri goda* (Vladivostok, 1922), p. 46; G. Gina, *Sibir', soiuzniki, Kolchak* (Peking, 1921), 2:332, 336-337.
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138. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii*, p. 279.
139. *Vestnik Manchurii*, nos. 1-2 (1926), p. 90.
140. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii*, p. 250.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
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162. See, for example, E. Oberländer, "Nationalbolshewistische Tendenzen in der russischen Intelligenz: Die Smena Vekh Discussion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 2 (1968), and E. Mindlin, "V dvadtsatye gody," *Znamia*, no. 1 (1968).

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192. Y. Soloviev, *Vospominania diplomata* (Moscow, 1959), p. 409.
193. *Ustrialov archive* (Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution), *Perepliska s raznymi litsami*, nos. 37-39.
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196. "Smena Vekh," *Izvestia*, November 1, 1921.
197. "Sud'by tret'ego Rima," in *O Smene vekh* (Petrograd, 1921), p. 68.
198. I. Trifonov, *Lenin i bor'ba s burzhuaznoi ideologii v nachale NEPa* (Moscow, 1969).
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201. *Pravda*, October 27, 1921; cf. A. Naglovsky, "Vospominania," *Novy zhurnal*, no. 90 (1968), p. 159.
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203. This and the following quotations from Lunatcharsky are from "Smena Vekh intelligentskoi obshchestvennosti," *Kul'tura i zhizn'*, no. 1 (1922). Quoted from *Ob intelligentsii* (Moscow, 1923), pp. 49-51.
204. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii*, p. 49.
205. One of the first criticisms of official tolerance of Russian nationalism is quoted by A. Menshutina and A. Siniavsky, *Poezia pervykh let revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1964), p. 72. When Tchaianov's book was published in 1920, Yaroslavsky submitted a memorandum complaining of the very fact of its publication, since according to him, Tchaianov appealed to Slavophilism and nationalism.
206. *Zhizn' natsional'nosti*, November 26, 1921.
207. This and the first quotation in the following paragraph are from *Zhizn' natsional'nosti*, December 23, 1921; italics added.
208. *Ibid.*, March 22, 1922.
209. M. Pokrovsky, "Kaiushchaisia intelligentsia," in *Intelligentsia i revoliutsia* (Moscow, 1922), p. 88.
210. *Letopis' zhizni i tvorchestva M. Gorkogo* (Moscow, 1959-1960), 4:252.
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213. *Letopis' zhizni i tvorchestva M. Gorkogo*, 3:311.
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219. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-74; italics added. See also B. Darotchetche, "Skrypnik et la politique d'ukrainisation," *Chaiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 12:1-2 (1971).
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222. Dmitrievsky, "Puti revoliutsionnogo natsionalizma."
223. *Lenin, Collected Works*, 45:249 (August 8, 1921).
224. See Fleishman, Hughes, and Raevsky-Hughes, *Russkii Berlin*, pp. 339-350; N. Berberova, *Kursiv moi* (New York, 1983); and N. Berberova, "Tri goda zhizni Gorkogo," *Masy*, no. 8 (1961).
225. Cf. M. Agursky, "Der misslungene Versuch zur Vernichtung der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche in den Jahren 1922-1923 und die Niederlage des linken Kommunismus," *Ostkirchliche Studien*, nos. 2-3 (1973); Johannes Chrysostomus, Kir-

chengeschichte Russlands der neusten Zeit (Munich, 1965); and L. Regelson, *Tragedia russkoi tserkvi* (Paris, 1977).

226. *The Trotsky Papers*, 2:670, 688, 740; Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 476. See also Lenin's letter in *Vestnik russkogo khristianskogo dvizhenia* (Paris), no. 97 (1970), pp. 54-57, and Regelson, *Tragedia russkoi tserkvi*, pp. 280-284.

227. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York, 1977), p. 54.

228. Quoted from *Evreiskaia tribuna*, July 6, 1922. See also M. Frumkina *Doloi ravinov* (Moscow, 1923), p. 40; cf. M. Altahuler, *Ha-ievseksia be-brit ha-moatsot* (1918-1930) (Tel Aviv, 1980), and Z. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1972).

229. I. Klinov, "Predosterezhenie," *Rassvet*, May 28, 1922.

230. *Freiheit*, May 10, 1922; see also V. Ipatieff, *The Life of a Chemist* (Stanford, Calif., 1940), p. 377.

231. See L. Gerson, *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia* (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 60.

232. B. Katz, *Zikhronot* (Tel Aviv, 1963), p. 257. Trotsky had a clash over Gorky with Dzerzhinsky.

233. "Ob antisemitizme v Rossii," *Rassvet*, June 10, 1922.

234. *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, June 23, 1922.

235. Abraham Vysotsky and Saul Tchernikhovsky, *Beseda*, no. 5 (1925). See also Gorky's letters to Khodasevitch, *Novyi zhurnal*, no. 30 (1952), pp. 189, 199; M. Aguraky, *The Zionist Controversy in the Soviet Establishment* (Jerusalem, 1984); and Y. Maze, *Zikhronot* (Tel Aviv, 1936), 4:20.

236. Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, p. 56.

237. V. Petelin, "L Tolstoi i sovremennost'," *Molodaia Guardia*, no. 12 (1969), pp. 272-273.

238. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 32:335.

239. O. Mikhailov, *Vernost'* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 11, 17. See also V. Piskunov, *Tema o Rossii* (Moscow, 1983), and I. Kuzmitchev, "My zanovo poznali svoi narod," *Volga*, no. 5 (1979).

240. See, for example, O. Radkey, *The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia* (Stanford, Calif., 1956).

241. Fleishman, Hughes, and Raevsky-Hughes, *Russkii Berlin*, p. 115.

242. B. Pil'niak, *The Naked Year* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1975), p. 73 (this part of the translation is quite far from the original).

243. *Ibid.*

244. *Ibid.*

245. *Ibid.*

246. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

247. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

248. "Rossia, rodina, mat'," *Nakanune*, April 30, 1922.

249. Fleishman, Hughes, and Raevsky-Hughes, *Russkii Berlin*, pp. 195-196.

250. "Otryvki iz dnevnika," in *Pisateli ob iskusstve i sebe* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 83-84.

251. V. Ivanov, *Armored Train 14-69* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1978), pp. 59-62.

252. For an English translation, see L. Leonov, *The Badgers* (London, 1947).

253. L. Leonov, *The Thief* (London, 1931), p. 436. Cf. M. Lobanov, *Nadezhda iskanii* (Moscow, 1978), p. 103.

254. See, for example, K. Fedin, *Gorky sredi nas* (Moscow, 1967); also their correspondence in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 70 (1963).

255. K. Fedin, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1969-1971), 1:359.

256. K. Fedin, *Cities and Years* (New York, 1962), pp. 285, 288.
257. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
258. Fedin, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 3:221.
259. *Ibid.*, pp. 479, 489.
260. See, for example, N. Groznova, "Povsiashchatu rodine," *Nash Sovremennik*, no. 2 (1977).
261. *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 70 (1963), p. 495.
262. M. Shaginian, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Moscow, 1971-1973), 1:20-31.
263. M. Shaginian, *Literaturnyi dnevniki* (Moscow, 1923), pp. 155-156.
264. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
265. Shaginian, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 1:769-770.
266. Along with Sergeev-Tsienaky and Tchapygin; see, for example, "O Prishvine," in Gorky, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 24:266-267.
267. M. Prishvin, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Moscow, 1957), 1:330, 332.
268. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
269. See, for example, S. Semenova, "Serdetchnaia mysl' Prishvina," *Volga*, no. 3 (1980), and L. Yuldasheva, "Traditsii Prishvina v sovremennoi sovetkol literature," *Vestnik MGU, Filologia*, no. 2 (1979).
270. *Kontekst*, 1974, p. 311; italics added.
271. Quoted from V. Maiakovsky, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Moscow, 1955-1961), 1:318-319. See also V. Khlebnikov, *Sobranie sotchinenii* (Munich, 1971-1972), 4:353, and V. Markov, *Russian Futurism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), p. 193.
272. This and the following three quotations are from Maiakovsky, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 1:319-320, 329, 337, 355.
273. Quoted from Menashutin and Sintlavsky, *Poetia pervykh let revoliutsii*, p. 178. See also Markov, *Russian Futurism*, p. 327.
274. Maiakovsky, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 2:115-166.
275. Mikhailov, *Vernost'*, p. 21.
276. A. Rodtchenko, "V Parizhe," *Novyi Lef*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 14-15, 19-20. See also Maiakovsky, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 12:335.
277. L. Reisner, *Izbrannoe* (Moscow, 1965), p. 553.
278. Esenin, *Sobranie sotchinenii*, 5:107.
279. It is very curious that Alfred Rosenberg was extremely eager to get Sergeev-Tsienaky's letters to Gorky (see *Archive Rosenberg, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris, CXL-94*).
280. *Letopis' zhizni i tvortchestva M. Gorkogo*, 3:265.
281. *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 70 (1963), p. 178.
282. See, for example, his conversation with Berl Katznelson in B. Katznelson, *Igerot (1921-1930)* (Tel Aviv, 1973), pp. 289-290; also "Ob antisemitakh," *Pravda*, June 24, 1931.
283. *Arkhiv Gorkogo*, 9 (1966), pp. 209-210.
284. Quoted from Lenin's letter in *Lenin i Gorky*, p. 154.
285. M. Gorky, "On the Russian Peasantry," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 4:1 (1967), p. 13.
286. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
287. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.
288. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
289. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
290. G. Zinoviev, *Litsom k derevne* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925), p. 100.
291. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *The Time of Stalin* (New York, 1981), p. 55.

292. R. Szporluk, "The Pokrovsky-Trotsky Debate," in I. Banac, J. Ackerman, and R. Szporluk, eds., *Nation and Ideology* (New York, 1981), p. 380.
293. See, for example, M. Heller, "Premier avertissement: Un coup de fouet. L'histoire de l'expulsion des personnalités culturelles hors de l'Union Soviétique en 1922," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 20:2 (1979).
294. Spengler i zakat Evropy (Moscow, 1922), and Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 54:198.
295. See, for example, N. Berdiaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960).
296. *Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledie* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 251-252.
297. *Novaia russkaia kniga*, no. 2 (1922), p. 32.
298. *Vestnik Manchurii*, nos. 1-2 (1926), p. 85.
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300. See, for example, Regelson, *Tragedia russkoi tserkvi*, p. 299.
301. Quoted from Bubnov, *Pravda*, July 27, 1922.
302. M. Aguraky, "Perepiaka Lezhneva i Ustrialova," *Slavica Hierosolymitana* 5-6 (1980).
303. I. Lezhnev, *Zapiski sovremennika* (Moscow, 1934).
304. *Russkaia volia*, August 5, 8, 1917.
305. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1917.
306. "Pogromnaia volna," *ibid.*, September 16, 1917.
307. Y. Lin, "K zapadnomy frontu," *Krasnyi ofitser*, no. 5 (1919), p. 16.
308. N. Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope* (New York, 1970), pp. 242-243.
309. I. Lezhnev, "O Bismarke i meshchanine," *Rossia*, no. 1 (1922), p. 10.
310. "Ob utchreditel'nom sobranii i o NEPE," *Rossia*, no. 4 (1922), p. 14.
311. "Zhivaia i mertvaia voda," *Rossia*, no. 8 (1923), p. 7.
312. Lezhnev, "O Bismarke," p. 10.
313. "Dni nashet zhizni," *Novaia Rossia*, no. 1 (1922), p. 51.
314. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
315. "Zhivaia i mertvaia voda," p. 6.
316. "Dni nashet zhizni," p. 49.
317. See, for example, V. Polonaky, *Otcherki literaturnogo dvizhenia revoliutsionnoi epokhi* (Moscow, 1929), pp. 138-140.
318. Aguraky, "Perepiaka Lezhneva i Ustrialova," pp. 551-553.
319. "Pis'mo prof. Ustrialovu," *Rossia*, no. 9 (1923), p. 10.
320. *Ibid.*
321. Usretalov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii*, pp. 144-146.
322. "Pis'mo prof. Ustrialovu," p. 10.
323. G. Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York, 1974), pp. 78-141.
324. "Politicheskie kormivolazhery," *Russkaia volia*, July 14, 1917.
325. "Poslednee deistvo," *Ekha*, December 27, 1917; "S novym godom," *Ekha*, January 2, 1918.
326. "Neistovyi bog revoliutsii," *Novaia Rossia*, no. 1 (1922), pp. 77-79.
327. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
328. "Tiazhelaiia industria," *Rossia*, no. 4 (1922), p. 11.
329. V. Tan-Bogoraz, *Einstein i religia* (Moscow, 1923), p. 116.
330. *Smena vekh*, no. 12, January 14, 1922.
331. This and the following quotation are from "Zhizn' tcheloveka," *Rossia*, no. 3 (1922), p. 15.
332. "Amerika po-russki," *Rossia*, no. 9 (1923), p. 14.
333. "Tiazhelaiia industria," p. 12.

334. "Neistovyi bog revoliutsii," p. 75.
335. See, for example, his newspaper *Ekho* in 1917 and 1918.
336. "Talant fanatika," *Nakanune* (Literary supplement), no. 18, September 17, 1922, pp. 6-8.
337. I. Ehrenburg, *Russia at War* (London, 1943).
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339. I. Ehrenburg, *Zolotoe serdse*, *Veter* (Moscow, 1922), pp. 106-118.
340. I. Ehrenburg, *Stikhotvorenia* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 15-16.
341. I. Ehrenburg, *A vse-taki ona vertitsia* (Moscow, 1922), pp. 131-132.
342. Ehrenburg, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1:167.
343. See, for example, N. Tereshchenko, *Sovremennyi nihilist* (Leningrad, 1925).
344. See, for example, I. Ehrenburg, *The Stormy Life of Lasik Roitschwantz* (New York, 1960).
345. *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 70 (1963), p. 480.
346. Katznelson, *Igerot*, pp. 289-290.
347. P. Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie* (Geneva, 1975-1982), 1:245-247; A. Kratov (I. Knizhnik), *Novaia Rossia i evrei* (Petrograd, 1917).
348. Lenin, *Biograficheskaia khronika*, 5:157, 197.
349. I. Knizhnik-Vetrov, P. Lavrov (Leningrad, 1925), p. 6.
350. *Novaia russkaia kniga*, no. 6 (1922), p. 43.
351. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 45:555-556.
352. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 54:648-649.
353. *Pravda*, July 27, 1922.
354. M. Kantor, "O 'druz'akh' sprava," *Bolshevik*, no. 15 (1925).
355. *Pravda*, August 8, 9, 1922; italics added.
356. KPSS v rezolutsiakh (Moscow, 1970-1972), 1:671.
357. *Petrogradskaia pravda*, no. 180 (1922).
358. "Rossia N 2½," *Pravda*, August 27, 1922.
359. "O zorkosti odnoglazoi i dvuglazoi," *Rossia*, no. 3 (1922), p. 10.
360. Lenin, *Biograficheskaia khronika*, 12:476.
361. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 33:478.
362. *Ibid.*, 33:349-350.
363. *Ibid.*, 36:605-611.
364. Stalin, *Works*, 5:249-250.
365. *Ibid.*
366. *Dvenadtsatyi s'ezd (XII) RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1961), p. 614; italics added.
367. The quotations that follow are from *ibid.*, pp. 53, 228, 607.
368. *Ibid.*, pp. 595-596.
369. *Ibid.*, pp. 693-695.
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371. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
372. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
373. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-69.
374. See, for example, Polonaky, *Otcherki literaturnogo dvizhenia revoliutsionnoi epokhi*, pp. 175-176, 203-215, 237-238.
375. Ustrialov archive, *Perepiaska s raznymi litsami*, no. 49, letter of Ukhromaky. See also Dmitrievsky, "Puti revoliutsionnogo natsionalizma."
376. M. Kolesnikov, *Bez strakha i upreka* (Moscow, 1971), p. 335.
377. "Obmirshchenie," *Rossia*, no. 9 (1923); also reprinted in Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii*.
378. A. Bubnov, "Tri lozunga," *Pravda*, July 15, 1923.

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380. N. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (Harbin, 1927), p. 174.
381. M. Skripnik, *Stat'i i promovy* (Munich, 1974), p. 43.
382. Cf. R. Bertoni, *Trionfo del Fascismo nell'URSS* (Rome, 1934), and L. Luka, *Entstehung der kommunistischen Faschismustheorie* (Stuttgart, 1985), pp. 47-48.
383. Cf. Balabanoff, *Impressions on Lenin*, and Luka, *Entstehung*, pp. 25-32.
384. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 45:540.
385. Luka, *Entstehung*, pp. 44-45.
386. This and the following quotations are from Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (1927), pp. 409-410.
387. R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism*, p. 199.
388. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
389. *Dvenadtsaty i s'ezd RKP(b)*, p. 273.
390. Quotations that follow are from K. Radek, *Portrety i pamflety* (Moscow, 1927), pp. 16-120.
391. See, for example, Schueddekopf, *Linke Leute von Rechts*, pp. 445-446; also R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution* (New York, 1962), p. 259.
392. Reventlow, *Völkisch-kommunistische Einigung?*
393. K. Radek, *Der Kampf der Kommunistische Internationale gegen Versaille und gegen die Offensive des Kapitals* (Hamburg, 1923), p. 117.
394. Luka, *Entstehung*, pp. 64, 65, 67.
395. R. Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism*, pp. 301-305.
396. Agursky, "Perepiska Lezhneva i Ustrialova," pp. 566-568.
397. Freund, *Unholy Alliance*, p. 184.
398. J. Humbert-Droz, *Memoires: De Lenine à Staline* (Neuchâtel, 1971), p. 298.
399. A. Barmin, *Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat* (London, 1938), p. 207.
400. Humbert-Droz, *Memoires*.
401. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1945), p. 467; cf. E. Gnedin, *Iz istorii otnoshenii mezhdru SSSR i fashistskoi Germaniei* (New York, 1977), and W. Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London, 1940).

Notes to Chapter 5

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2. L. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (Oxford, 1978), 3:2, 5.
3. A. Balabanoff, *Lenin* (Hannover, 1961), pp. 169, 178.
4. A. Hein, *Be-malkhut ha-yahadut* (Jerusalem, 1959-1965), 2:83.
5. "Vovletchenie rabotchikh v partiu," *Bolshevik*, nos. 21-22 (1926), p. 48. Cf. N. Vakar, *The Taproot of Soviet Society* (New York, 1961).
6. A. Balabanoff, *Impressions on Lenin* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968), p. 127.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
8. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, 3:9, and S. Hook, *Reason, Social Myth, and Democracy* (New York, 1970), p. 144. Cf. K. Albrecht, *Das verrätene Sozialismus* (Berlin, 1939), pp. 183, 187.

9. See, for example, L. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1977), p. 302.
10. Cf. Aleksandrov, *Diktator li Stalin?* (Paris, 1932), and A. Zinoviev, *Communism as Reality* (London, 1983).
11. S. Liberman, *Dela i liudi* (New York, 1944), p. 133.
12. L. Shatunovskaya, *Zhizn' v Kremle* (New York, 1982), p. 51.
13. R. Szporluk, "The Pokrovsky-Trotsky Debate," in I. Banac, J. Ackerman, and R. Szporluk, eds., *Nation and Ideology* (New York, 1981).
14. M. Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History*, ed. R. Szporluk (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970).
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16. Shatunovskaya, *Zhizn' v Kremle*, p. 51.
17. See B. Knei-Paz, *The Social and Political Thought of Trotsky* (Oxford, 1978).
18. V. Polonsky, *Otcherki literaturnogo dvizhenia revoliutsionnoi epokhi* (Moscow, 1929), p. 174.
19. A. Lunatcharsky, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1963-1968), 2:280.
20. "Tezisy o politike RKP v oblasti literatury," *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, 74 (1965), p. 32.
21. Polonsky, *Otcherki literaturnogo dvizhenia revoliutsionnoi epokhi*, pp. 273-277; also L. Idir Spindler, "La résolution de 1925 à l'épreuve de la pratique," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique* 21:3-4 (1980).
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23. M. Agursky, "Perepiaska Lezhneva i Ustrialova," *Slavica Hierosolymitana* 5-6 (1980), p. 551.
24. "Filosofia epokhi," *Pravda*, September 19-20.
25. N. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (Harbin, 1925), p. 153.
26. "Tsezarism pod maskoi revoliutsii," *Pravda*, November 13-15, 1925. The quotation in following paragraph is from this source.
27. See *Novaia Rossia*, no. 2 (1926), pp. 29-30.
28. J. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow, 1952-1955; Stanford, Calif., 1967), 7:350.
29. *Tchetymadtsaryi (XIV) s'ezd VKP(b)* (Moscow, 1925), p. 238.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
33. Quoted from Postyshev's speech on the congress, *ibid.*, p. 158.
34. N. Ustrialov, *Pod znakom revoliutsii* (Harbin, 1927), p. 232.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.
36. S. Cohen, *Bukharin* (New York, 1973), p. 188; cf. R. Medvedev, *Bukharin* (New York, 1980).
37. "Posle Lenina," *Rossia*, no. 1 (1924), pp. 87-89.
38. "Ot parlamentarizma k diktature," *ibid.*, pp. 149-153.
39. "Moi pokazania," *Rossia*, no. 3 (1924), p. 110.
40. "Na stydnuiu temu," *Rossia*, no. 4 (1925), p. 225.
41. "Vosstanie kul'tury," *Rossia*, no. 5 (1925), p. 149.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
44. "Na stydnuiu temu," p. 214.
45. "14 s'ezd," *Novaia Rossia*, no. 1 (1926), pp. 6-14.
46. N. Ustrialov, "U okna vagona," *Novaia Rossia*, no. 2 (1926), pp. 31-47.

47. Augursky, "Perepiaska Lezhneva i Ustrialova," p. 588.
48. "Litsermerie ili pokaianie," *Pravda*, April 16, 1926.
49. Augursky, "Perepiaska Lezhneva i Ustrialova," p. 553.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 588.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Pravda*, January 25, 1937.
53. Translation is taken from F. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* (New York, 1955), p. 267.
54. V. Ermilov, "O lozhnom ponimanii traditsii," *Pravda*, October 24, 1946.
55. *Rossia*, no. 5 (1925).
56. "Teatral'nyi roman," in M. Bulgakov, *Izbrannaia proza* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 518-541. See also M. Tchudakova, "Arkhiv Bulgakova," *Gosudarstvennaia biblioteka imeni Lenina, Zapiski otdela rukopisei* (Moscow), no. 37 (1976), pp. 52-55.
57. Lakshin's preface to Bulgakov, *Izbrannaia proza*, p. 18.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
59. M. Bulgakov, *The Early Plays* (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), pp. 86-88. Petyura refers to Simon Petliura (1879-1926), head of the short-lived Ukrainian national government.
60. Lunatcharsky, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 3:325-331.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 413. Cf. P. Pascal, *Mon journal de Russie* (Geneva, 1975-1982), 3:204, 215.
62. V. Petelin, *Rossia-liubov' moia* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 52-53, and V. Petelin, *Rodnye sud'by* (Moscow, 1976), p. 147.
63. M. Bulgakov, *Dramy i komedii* (Moscow, 1965), p. 583.
64. V. Lakshin, preface to Bulgakov, *Izbrannaia proza*, p. 30.
65. Stalin, *Works*, 11:343.
66. Bulgakov, *The Early Plays*, pp. 159-240.
67. Stalin, *Works*, 11:341.
68. R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 278.
69. *Odinnadtsyati (XI) s'ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 520, 716.
70. Y. Larin, *Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR* (Moscow, 1929), p. 102.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
73. Y. Sandomirsky, *Puti antisemitizma v Rossii* (Moscow, 1928).
74. Larin, *Evrei i antisemitizm v SSSR*, pp. 99, 111.
75. Cf. *ibid.* and Sandomirsky, *Puti antisemitizma v Rossii*.
76. V. Lenin, *O evreiskom voprose* (Moscow, 1924), p. 18.
77. See, for example, S. Page, *The Geopolitics of Leninism* (New York, 1982), pp. 139-161.
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