Diaspora Peoples: Preface to the Paperback Edition of *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy*

A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy (hereafter, *PTSDA*) was originally published in 1994 by Praeger Publishers, an imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group. It is the first book in a trilogy of books on Judaism. The second book is *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (MacDonald 1998; hereafter *SAID*), and the third is *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (MacDonald 1998/2002; hereafter *CofC*).

PTSDA develops the idea of a group evolutionary strategy—what one might term an evolutionarily significant way for a group of people to get on in the world. The book documents several theoretically interesting aspects of group evolutionary strategies using Judaism as a case study. These topics include the theory of group evolutionary strategies, the genetic cohesion of Judaism, how Jews managed to erect and enforce barriers to gene flow between themselves and other peoples, resource competition between Jews and non-Jews, how Jews solved the free-rider problem, how some groups of Jews came to have such high IQ's, and how Judaism developed in antiquity. This preface updates several of these topics by discussing recent relevant research. However, the bulk of the preface describes several other groups that, like Judaism, have developed group structures that serve to keep them separate from surrounding peoples. Like Jews, several of these groups have developed as ecological specialists.

RECENT RESEARCH RELEVANT TO *PTSDA*

One issue of *PTSDA* that keeps coming up is the theoretical status of groups and group selection (e.g., Crippen 1997; Hartung 1995; Sanderson 2001). I am continually amazed at the extent to

which evolutionists have been indoctrinated—mainly by Richard Dawkins—against supposing that groups have any important role to play in human evolution. The problem comes about for two reasons: Failure to comprehend cultural group selection, and failure to appreciate the extent to which selection between groups has shaped the human mind. Regarding cultural group selection, I have very little to add beyond the material in Chapter 1 of *PTSDA*. Formal models of cultural group selection continue to be elaborated (e.g., Richerson & Boyd 1998), but it has always seemed to me that the basic principle was so obvious and easy to understand that formal models were not really necessary.

There is a critical difference between humans and other animals that renders all of the arguments against group selection moot. It is simply this: **Humans are able to solve the free-rider problem by monitoring and enforcing compliance to group goals. So far as we know, animals can't do this.** As a result, although there may well be limits on the extent to which natural selection can build stable cohesive groups, much less altruistic groups, in the absence of massive genetic overlap, these limits do not apply to humans.

Humans are able to solve the free-rider problem—the problem that organisms would tend to take advantages of group membership without paying the costs. For example, soldiers in virtually all modern armies serve because they are conscripted. If they attempt to evade dangerous duty, they are shot. Consider the practices of the Soviet Army in W.W.II. Following the German invasion in 1941, the Soviet Army relied on "the infliction of the greatest possible compulsion and terror, combined with an endless propaganda campaign intended to ensure political sway" (Hoffman 2001). Disobedience of even minor orders could result in immediate execution. The result was a cohesive group where individual interests and individual goals mattered little.

Judaism and the other group strategies discussed here did not, of course, use such draconian methods, but at a theoretical level it is no different. As discussed in Chapter 6 of *PTSDA*, in traditional societies there were a variety of controls on the behavior of individual Jews that ensured that group interests prevailed, including paying communal taxes, guarding against free-loaders,

creating pressures for charitable contributions, and respecting business monopolies held by other Jews.

These phenomena are, of course, by no means restricted to Jews. Boehm (1999) shows that human hunter-gatherer groups have been characterized by an "egalitarian ethic" for an evolutionarily significant period—long enough to have influenced both genetic and cultural evolution. The egalitarian ethic implies that meat and other important resources are shared among the entire group, the power of leaders is circumscribed, free-riders are punished, and virtually all important decisions are made by a consensus process. The egalitarian ethic thus makes it difficult for individuals to increase their fitness at the expense of other individuals in the same group, resulting in relative behavioral uniformity and relatively weak selection pressures within groups. Mild forms of social control, such as gossip and withholding social benefits, are usually sufficient to control would-be dominators, but more extreme measures, such as ostracism and execution, are recorded in the ethnographic literature. By controlling behavioral differences within groups and increasing behavioral differences between groups, Boehm cogently argues that the egalitarian ethic shifted the balance between levels of selection and made selection between groups an important force in human evolution.

Recently, Fehr and Gächter (2002) found that people will altruistically punish defectors in a "one-shot" game—a game in which participants interact only once and are thus not influenced by the reputations of the people they are interacting with. Subjects who made high levels of public goods donations tended to punish people who did not, even though they did not receive any benefit from doing so. Moreover, punished individuals changed their ways and donated more in future games even though they knew that the participants in later rounds were not the same as in previous rounds. Fehr and Gächter suggest that people have an evolved negative emotional reaction to free riding that results in their punishing such people even at a cost to themselves—hence the attribution of altruism.

These results are of great importance for thinking about situations where people help strangers in situations where future

interactions are not anticipated. Essentially Fehr and Gächter model the evolution of cooperation among individualistic peoples. Their results are therefore least applicable to groups such as Jews which in traditional societies were based on extended kinship relationships, known kinship linkages, and repeated interactions among members. In such situations, actors know the people with whom they are cooperating and anticipate future cooperation because they are enmeshed in extended kinship networks, or, as in the case of Jews, they are in the same group. The results are most applicable to individualistic groups because such groups are not based similarly on extended kinship relationships and are much more prone to defection. In general, high levels of altruistic punishment are more likely to be found among individualistic, hunter-gather societies than in kinship based societies based on the extended family.

Similarly, in the ultimatum game, one subject (the 'proposer') is assigned a sum of money equal to two days' wages and required to propose an offer to a second person (the 'respondent'). The respondent may then accept the offer or reject the offer, and if the offer is rejected neither player wins anything. The game is intended to model economic interactions between strangers, so players are anonymous. Henrich et al. (2001) found that two variables—payoffs to cooperation and the extent of market exchange—predicted offers and rejections in the game. Societies with an emphasis on cooperation and on market exchange had the highest offers—results interpreted as reflecting the fact that they have extensive experience with the principle of cooperation and sharing with strangers. On the other hand, subjects from societies where all interactions are among family members made low offers in the ultimatum game and contributed low amounts to public goods in similarly anonymous conditions.

The contrast between individualistic groups derived from hunter-gatherers and groups derived from societies based on extended kinship is important in the following, particularly in the discussion of the Puritans. In *CofC* (2002 edition) I cited evidence showing that European culture derives from North Eurasian and Circumpolar hunter-gather populations that survived the Ice Age in Europe. Groups of Europeans are thus exactly the sort

of groups modeled by Fehr and Gächter: They are groups with high levels of cooperation with strangers. They are thus prone to market relations and individualism. On the other hand, Jewish culture and Chinese culture derive from the Middle Old World culture area characterized by extended kinship networks and the extended family. They derive from cultures prone to ingroup-outgroup relationships in which cooperation is with the ingroup composed of extended family members.

Together these results predict that group strategies deriving from populations of North Eurasian and Circumpolar hunter-gatherers (Hutterites and Amish, Puritans) will be more prone to altruistic punishment than those from Middle Old World culture area (Jews, Gypsies, Chinese). As indicated below, Puritan groups seem particularly prone to bouts of moralistic outrage directed at those of their own people seen as free riders and morally blameworthy.

In Chapter 8 of *PTSDA* I discussed how selection between groups appears to have been particularly important in Jewish evolution. This discussion was expanded in *SAID* and in the preface to the first paperback edition of *CofC* (MacDonald 1998/2002). None of this material contradicts a fundamental evolutionary dictum that selection at the individual level is of paramount importance. Indeed, selection at the individual level is axiomatic. A common thread of these discussions is that in general people monitor the costs of group membership and abandon groups when individual needs are not met. However, I also argue that there is a critical mass of Jews and others who do not appear to have an algorithm that calculates individual fitness payoffs by balancing the tendency to desert the group with anticipated benefits of continued group membership. These people are at the extreme collectivist end of the individualism-collectivism continuum, so extreme that they are prone to martyrdom rather than abandoning the group. These people are obligated to remain in the group no matter what—even to the point of killing themselves and their own family members to prevent the possibility of becoming a member of the outgroup.

The classic example is the response of groups of Ashkenazi Jews to demands to convert during the pogroms surrounding the First

Crusade in several areas of Germany in 1096. When given the choice of conversion to Christianity or death, a contemporary Jewish chronicler noted, that Jews "stretched forth their necks, so that their heads might be cut off in the Name of their Creator. . . . Indeed fathers also fell with their children, for they were slaughtered together. They slaughtered brethren, relatives, wives, and children. Bridegrooms [slaughtered] their intended and merciful mothers their only children" (in Chazan 1987, 245). The many examples of Jewish martyrdom throughout history suggest that there are no conceivable circumstances that would cause such people to abandon the group, go their own way, and become assimilated to the outgroup.

I do not suppose that such an extreme level of self-sacrifice is a pan-human psychological adaptation. As is the case for many other psychological adaptations, there are important individual differences (MacDonald 1991, 1995; Wilson 1994). Conceptually, this range of individual differences in personality systems and mechanisms related to social identity and individualism/collectivism may be seen as representing a continuous distribution of phenotypes that matches a continuous distribution of viable strategies. At one extreme end of this variation, it appears that there are a significant number of humans who are so highly prone to developing a sense of shared fate with other members of their ingroup that they do not calculate individual payoffs of group membership and readily suffer martyrdom rather than defect from the group.

This implies that between-group selection must be presumed to have occurred among humans. It is likely that enduring, bounded discrete groups of people have been a common feature of the social environment for many humans (Levine & Campbell, 1972). This implies that a great many humans have in fact lived in group-structured populations where the status of ingroup and outgroup was highly salient psychologically. Jews are of course a prime example, and several other examples will be discussed in this preface.

It is noteworthy that Middle Eastern societies are characterized by anthropologists as "segmentary societies" organized into relatively impermeable groups (e.g., Coon 1958, 153; Eickelman 1981,

157–174). Individuals in these societies have a strong sense of group identity and group boundaries, often accompanied by external markers such as hair style or clothing, and different groups settle in different areas were they retain their distinctiveness. Jews originate in the Middle Old World cultural area (Burton et al. 1996), and they retain several of the key cultural features of their ancestral population, including a proneness toward between-group conflict. The Middle Old World culture group is characterized by extended kinship groups based on relatedness through the male line (i.e., they are patrilineal). These male-dominated groups functioned as military units to protect herds, and between-group conflict is a critically important component of their evolutionary history. There is a great deal of pressure to form larger groups in order to increase military strength (Barfield 1993).

Cultures from the Middle Old World culture area are not only highly collectivist and ethnocentric, marriage tends to be endogamous (i.e., marriage occurs within the kinship group) and consanguineous (i.e., marriage with blood relatives, including the uncle-niece marriage sanctioned in the Old Testament, is common). This suggests that groups from this area should tend to retain their genetic integrity even if they become diaspora peoples dispersed in other lands. Recent genetic studies have confirmed the genetic integrity of Jewish groups discussed in Chapter 2 of *PTSDA.*. These studies confirm the Middle Eastern origins of Jews and show that Jewish groups remained genetically separate from the peoples they lived among over the last 2000 years.

Based on Y-chromosome data, Hammer et al. (2000) found, that various Jewish populations (Ashkenazi, North African, Kurdish, Yemenite, and Near Eastern) were not only closely related to each other, but also closely related to other Middle Eastern groups (Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians) and quite separate from European groups. On the assumption that there have been 80 generations since the founding of the Ashkenazi population, the rate of genetic admixture with Europeans has been less than half a percent per generation. This level of genetic admixture is consistent with supposing that there has been essentially no conversion of Europeans to become mating members of the

Ashkenazi gene pool. The very low levels of genetic admixture with Europeans may well have come from clandestine matings and rape.

Two other recent Y-chromosome studies also found that Israeli Jews derive from the Middle Eastern gene pool (Nebel et al. 2000, 2001). Nebel (2000) found that 70% of the Y chromosomes of Jews and 82% of the Y chromosomes of Palestinians belong to the same chromosome pool, suggesting a common ancestry. However, Nebel et al. (2001) found evidence that Jews are even more closely related to the Kurds. Muslim Kurds were located near Kurdish Jews and between Sephardic Jews and Ashkenazi Jews. When compared with European populations, Ashkenazi Jews were more genetically distant from European populations than they were from Sephardic Jews, and they were also closer to Arab populations (e.g., Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese). Sephardic Jews were genetically distant from both Spaniards and North Africans despite having lived among them for centuries. Indeed, they remain very close to Kurdish Jews, a finding the authors attribute to genetic continuity with Jews exiled by the Assyrians in 723 B.C. and the Babylonians in 586 B.C. Kurdish Jews remained closer genetically to Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews than to Kurdish Muslims, a truly remarkable finding, since it indicates no detectable genetic admixture between Kurdish Jews and their hosts over approximately 2700 years. Finally, despite some differences, there is a great deal of genetic affinity between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jewish groups, confirming the findings of Hammer et al. (2000).

SOME OTHER EVOLUTIONARILY INTERESTING GROUPS

The area of group relations remains a fairly untapped field in the area of evolutionary perspectives on human behavior. All of the groups discussed here live within a larger culture, often as a minority group. In some cases, they have a specialized ecological niche within the larger society, and their interactions with the surrounding society have ranged from peaceful cooperation to

animosity and competition. Not uncommonly there have been eruptions of violence.

Roma (Gypsies)

Based on linguistic and genetic evidence, the Roma (Gypsies) derive from India. Based on vocabulary of basic words, grammatical structure and sound correspondence, the Romani language has been found to be of Indian origin (Fraser 1992/1995). Romani is similar to Sanskrit but developed after it. It shows close affinity with several modern Indian languages, but assignment to any one modern Indian language group remains controversial. Based on linguistic evidence, Fraser suggests that the Romani originate as an Indian low-caste of wandering musicians, but the issue of the origins of the Romani within India remains controversial.

The genetic evidence is consistent with the origins of the Roma as a small founding population splitting from a single ethnic group in India. Genetic data on neutral polymorphisms and mutations have showed a great deal of divergence among Romani groups resulting from genetic drift and different degrees of admixture with surrounding populations (Kalaydjieva, Gresham, & Calafell 2001). Roma populations are more genetically heterogeneous than are indigenous European populations, presumably indicating an older history. They stem from "a conglomerate of founder populations which extend across Europe but at the same time differ within individual countries, and whose demographic history, internal structure and relationships are poorly understood" (Kalaydjieva, Gresham, & Calafell 2001). The authors suggest two "equally plausible scenarios": original founder populations being highly genetically segregated via strict endogamy; a small founder population that undergoes genetic drift.

In any case, the Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA data indicate a great deal of genetic commonality and common ethnic origins (Gresham et al., 2001). The Asian mitochondrial DNA haplotype M was present in 27% of Romani women. The Asian Y-chromosome haplotype VI-68 was present in all 14 Romani populations sampled and constituted 45% of the Romani Y chro-

mosomes. The authors note that one subset of this Y chromosome was present in 33% of the men, indicating the preservation of a particular male lineage on a par with that found for Jewish priests (Kohenim) (see Skorecki et al. 1998; Hammer et al. 2000). The mitochondrial data and the chromosomal data indicated that diversity arose within Roma lineages from mutation rather than intermarriage. The most likely origin of Roma males was "a profound bottleneck event" (Gresham et al. 2001, 1328), i.e., that Roma males originate from a very small population with limited genetic diversity. The data indicate greater female diversity in the founding Roma population. Geography was not correlated with genetic distance among Romani populations. However, genetic distance was associated with using a different Romani dialect and a different history of migration, especially for females. The authors attribute this to strict endogamy for females by Romanian-speaking Roma. However, some admixture is indicated by the results for two haplotypes whose frequency among the Romani reflected the clinal distribution pattern in Europe for these two haplotypes. These two haplotypes accounted for 29% of Romani Y chromosomes.

Presently there are 8–10 million Roma in Europe, with the densest concentrations in Eastern Europe and the lowest concentrations in Scandinavia (Kalaydjieva, Gresham, & Calafell 2001). The first records of the Gypsies in Europe west of the Balkans date from the early 15th century. Gypsies appeared rather suddenly in the historical record, posing as Christian pilgrims under leaders with impressive titles. "In the entire chronicle of Gypsy history, the greatest trick of all was the one played on western Europe in the early 15th century" (Fraser 1992/1995, 62). Since it was a Christian obligation to aid pilgrims, especially pilgrims with documents of recommendation from rulers, Gypsies began their sojourn by taking advantage of the Christian piety of the age. The Gypsies produced letters of passage from high government officials such as King Sigismund of Hungary, representing themselves as penitents for the sins of their ancestors who had rejected Christian teachings. As a result of the sins of their ancestors, they were required to wander the earth as pilgrims seeking charity from others.

At first treated with respect, Gypsies soon acquired a reputation as thieves, fortune tellers, and horse traders of dubious honesty. An early 15th-century German chronicle stated, "they were . . . great thieves, especially their women, and several of them were seized and put to death" (in Fraser 1992/1995, 67). Similarly, an early 15th-century Italian chronicle noted, "the women of the band wandered about the town, six or eight together; they entered the houses of citizens and told idle tales, during which some of them laid hold of whatever could be taken. In the same way they visited the shops under the pretext of buying something, but one of them would steal. . . . for they were the most cunning thieves in the world" (in Fraser 1992/1995, 72). In the following century, the status of the Gypsies deteriorated from being subsidized as pilgrims to being persecuted and expelled because of their thieving ways.

In later centuries, descriptions of Gypsies as thieves derive from multiple independent sources throughout Western Europe, from Scandinavia to Italy and Spain. The stereotype of Gypsies included exotic, colorful dress and being of a different ethnic group distinguished by dark skin and other physiognomic features. Another motif was the Gypsy woman as fortune teller along with her child who would steal from the customer. The most common Gypsy occupations were seen as that of beggar or fortune-teller, but Gypsies were also seen as horse dealers, metal workers and musicians. The general picture associated them with "theft, lock-picking, purse-cutting, horse-stealing, casting of spells, and general witchcraft and trickery" (Fraser 1992/1995, 124). Typically there would be sporadic resistance to Gypsies soon after their arrival in an area "as some villagers and townspeople tire of alms-giving" (Fraser 1992/1995, 126); within 10–20 years there were widespread conflicts, and these tended to be followed by edicts of expulsion in later decades, although the latter were often not enforced.

There were also attempts at forced assimilation, as in 1767 when Empress Maria Theresa of Austria forbade Gypsies to set themselves apart in language, dress, or occupation. In 1773 Gypsies were forbidden to marry each other, and children older than 5 were to be taken away and raised in non-Gypsy homes. A

similar policy of forced assimilation was introduced in Spain in the 17^{h} century and persisted for 150 years with varying levels of severity and success. For example, in 1746 Gypsies were restricted only to certain towns, with the stated goal of having one Gypsy family per 100 residents of the town. There were severe penalties for engaging in a wandering lifestyle, culminating the imprisonment of between 9000–12,000 Gypsy men at hard labor from 1749–1765 (Fraser 1992/1995, 157–164). The general tendency throughout Europe was to either banish Gypsies or force them to settle down in one area rather than persist in a traveling lifestyle.

Gypsies who settled down tended to gravitate to certain occupations, such as metal-workers, musicians, wood working, and construction—all occupations where they were self-employed but did not require education. (Fortune telling has remained a Gypsy niche throughout their history into the present.) In 19th-century England Gypsies offered inexpensive goods and services to rural populations (e.g., day laborers, repairing household items). With urbanization, "they moved from village to town where necessary and abandoned old trades in favour of new activities more suited to the times, but without compromising their freedom, their ethnic identity or their occupational and residential flexibility" (Fraser 1992/1995, 222). In Bulgaria, men repaired metal utensils, sold pottery and trained animals for performances, while women engaged in fortune telling (Marushiakova & Popov 1997, 108). A general trend down to the present is for Gypsies to avoid wage labor, such as work in factories. Another common trend is for Gypsy children not to be enrolled in school or to be enrolled at much lower rates than the surrounding populations. For example, in the 1980s in the European Community, only 30–40% of Gypsy children attended schools regularly and half had never been to school. The illiteracy rate among adults was typically over 50% and in some areas over 80% (Fraser 1992/1995, 289).

The Roma have a fairly elaborate social structure based entirely on kinship in which kinship relationships become ever more diluted as one moves from the immediate family to the Rom nation. In the Romany groups living in the U.S. studied by Sutherland (1975), the basic household consisted of a three-generation

extended family, often including more than one married child and their children. At the next level Romany families are organized in *familia* consisting of several related families typically under the leadership of one individual, usually a male (the *rom baro*—'big man') who has exhibited leadership and negotiating abilities. Closely related households constituting a *familia* tend to live in nearby areas. The next level of organization is the *vitsa* or tribe. The *vitsa*, sometimes translated as 'clan' (Fraser 1992/1995, 238), is not a face-to-face social grouping but rather a set of *familia* descended from a common ancestor. Families from different *vitsas* avoid living near each other, but do regard each other as Rom. In addition, the *kumpania* is a social grouping of households and *familiyi*. It is not based on kinship but rather serves to regulate interactions of diverse Rom who are working in a particular area. A *kumpania* may consist of only one *familia* that actively prevents non-relatives from being members, or it may include *familiyi* of different *vitsas* who live in an area and are subject to the economic, political, and moral regulation embodied in the Rom legal system. The highest level of social organization is the *natsia* or nation. In Sutherland's (1975) study there were four *natsia* operating in the U.S., the Machwaya, Lowara, Kalderasha, and Churara. These groups have different dialects, customs, and appearance but acknowledge the others as Rom.

The *kris Romani* is the main Romany legal institution. It serves as a mechanism for resolving economic (e.g., infringement of fortune telling territory, stealing from another Rom) and social disputes and contracts (e.g., marriage and divorce) among the Rom. Members of the same *vitsa* regard themselves as relatives with obligations to help in time of need. In general, helping and obligations for ritual events such as funerals are at the level of the *vitsa*, which, as we have seen, is a kinship group (Fraser 1992/1995, 239). Finally, the *wortacha* is a work group formed to accomplish an immediate task, such as cooperating in an auto repair business.

Conflicts within Rom society generally occur on the fault lines created by kinship relationships. Close relatives generally cooperate with each other in conflicts, while non-relatives are viewed

as untrustworthy. “It can be concluded from the alignment of sides that closeness of kin relationship is the single most important factor in determining political alliance (Sutherland 1975, 123). Allegiance to other Rom is a direct function of kinship distance in a hierarchically branching social organization: People have most allegiance to their *familia*, then to their *vitsa*, and to the *kumpania*, and finally to the *natsia*.

Marriage. The Rom derive from India where the endogamous sub-caste or *jatis*, typically defined by profession, is the primary unit. Marriage among the Rom is endogamous. Endogamous wandering groups based on profession remain common in India, and, like the Rom, these groups typically have ideologies of purity and cleanness that serve to separate themselves from other groups (Fraser 1992/1995, 43). Sutherland (1975) found that endogamy had increased among the Rom in the U.S., since marriages occurred more commonly among closely related *vitsi* rather than among unrelated *vitsi*. Fraser (1992/1995, 239) also finds increasing tendencies toward endogamy as well as consanguinity (marriage of blood relatives), although marriage between first cousins is not approved. However, marriages with people from other *vitsas* in the same *Kumpania* may be made in order to create closer kinship ties within working groups. Traditional Rom marriage occurred with bridewealth, but the practice has died out in many groups.

For the Rom, high fertility is something of a social obligation. Having large numbers of children gives prestige to a family, while a woman who cannot have children is a failure. Fertility in Sutherland’s (1975) sample was high, averaging 7 children per family at a time when the total fertility rate in the United States as a whole was approximately 1.9. The household size was correspondingly large, averaging 8 and with many comprised of more than 10 people.

Rom fertility has been a source of friction with surrounding populations. During the 1960s, the Communist government of Czechoslovakia embarked on a policy of forced assimilation involving spreading Gypsies throughout the population, requiring full employment, and ending illiteracy and “parasitism” (Fraser 1992/1995, 278). The 1965 census revealed that one out of 11

births was a Gypsy. The Gypsies had a young population with a very high birth rate, and by 1980 the population had increased over 30% since the 1965 census. During this period, the government pressed women into sterilization after having several children. Conflict between Rom and non-Rom were exacerbated in Eastern Europe after the downfall of Communism (Fraser 1992/1995, 289).

Whereas the Jews, especially the Ashkenazim, have tended toward a high-investment reproductive style characterized by high intelligence and an emphasis on education, the Gypsies tend toward a low-investment reproductive style (see Chapter 7). Bereczkei (1993) found a very low sex ratio among Hungarian gypsies associated with a variety of other traits characteristic of a low-investment style of reproduction compared to Hungarians: higher fertility, longer reproductive period, earlier onset of sexual behavior and reproduction, more unstable pair bonds, higher rate of single parenting, shorter interval of birth spacing, higher infant mortality rate, and higher rate of survival of low-birth-weight infants. The gypsies would appear to be a low-investment group evolutionary strategy.

Social Identity Processes and the Policing of Group Boundaries. The Rom think of themselves as morally superior, and this self-appraisal is not threatened by the oftentimes negative attitudes held by the *gadje* (i.e., non-Rom) (Sutherland 1975, 8). They enjoy deceiving the *gadje* and do their best to prevent outsiders from getting information about them, so much so that obtaining information about them is difficult and much of what they tell anthropologists must be taken with a grain of salt (Sutherland 1975, 21).

> For the Rom, the maintenance of boundaries between themselves and the *gadje* . . . is a continuous, almost daily concern. It is based on two factors: (a) social contact with *gadje* is limited to specific kinds of relationships, namely economic exploitation and political manipulation for advantage. Purely social relations and genuine friendship are virtually impossible because of the second factor; (b) a whole symbolic system and set

> of rules for behaviour (*romania*) which place the *gadje* outside social, moral, and religious boundaries in a multiplicity of ways, the most important being their *marime* [ritually unclean] status. (Sutherland 1975, 8)

Because of their uncleanness, the houses of the *gadje* must be cleaned with powerful detergents before a Rom family may move in. "*Gadžé* are by definition unclean, being ignorant of the rules of the system and lacking in a proper sense of 'shame': they exist outside the social boundaries, and their places and their prepared food present a constant danger of pollution" (Fraser 1992/1995, 246). *Marime* is a pervasive feature of life, doubtless serving to provide a constant consciousness of group boundaries. *Marime* applies to various functions of the body, food, and topics of conversation. It especially applies to the female body, including sexual organs, bodily functions, clothing in contact with the sexual organs, and discussions of sex and pregnancy.

This strong sense of we/they is reinforced by the intensely social nature of Rom society. The numerous social gatherings as well as day-to-day visits are occasions where the Rom talk about each other—gossip if you will. In small face-to-face social groups with the intensive sociality of the Rom, the major topics of conversation revolve around talking about each other. As is typical of collectivist groups, reputation within the group is extremely important: "No individual can afford to ignore anyone's statements concerning his reputation no matter how unfounded in fact they may be. Gossip can make or break a person's reputation, and when it occurs it must be fought immediately. To ignore gossip would be tantamount to admitting guilt" (Sutherland 1975, 100). Gossip is thus a feature of the social solidarity of the Rom but it is also a mechanism of social control.

Ingroup Cooperation and Altruism. As is the case among historic Jewish groups (see ch. 6), the Rom exhibit an ingroup-outgroup morality in which lying to the *gadje* and being secretive and elusive toward them are socially expected forms of behavior (Sutherland 1975, 30). Charity to needy Rom is a social obligation. Families have an obligation to take in homeless relatives for at least several months (p. 54) and even non-relatives expect to

help out. A woman who took in large numbers of homeless Rom stated "Gypsies must always help one another," and "I could never deny food or shelter to Gypsies who need it if I can possibly provide it" (p. 55). If a member of the *Kumpania* is arrested, there is a concerted effort by all to secure the person's release, including especially collections to pay fines and legal fees.

On the other hand, attitudes toward the non-Rom world are amoral. The legality of an activity is a consideration only because engaging in it might result in penalties such as being arrested (p. 72). Stealing from a *gadje* is not considered immoral, and in fact the Rom have a myth in which God allows them to steal food and other necessities because a Gypsy had swallowed a nail intended for the crucifixion of Jesus (p. 73). Mitigating this sense of ingroup morality, Gypsy criminal activities tend to be minor. In Sutherland's study, Gypsies were typically not involved in felonies like murder, rape or robbery, but tended to be cited for shoplifting, traffic violations, and violations of the garbage laws. Welfare payments were a way of life for many in Sutherland's sample.

There is a pervasive sense of caring for ingroup members:

> Generosity is a virtue and a form of insurance, for who knows when he also will need economic assistance from the *kumpania*? Generosity, mutual aid, and daily economic cooperation are normal patterns of behaviour between relatives and are ideals of behaviour between all Rom; however, these ideals do not extend outside this social boundary. Economic relations with *gadje* are based on extraction, not cooperation and are governed by ideals entirely different from those expected between Rom. These ideals include cleverness and effectiveness in extracting money combined with freedom from *gadje* influence and values. (Sutherland 1975, 96)

Mechanisms Regulating Conflicts of Interest within the Group. Romany groups are notoriously contentious while nevertheless exhibiting a great deal of solidarity. Early accounts dating from the 15th century describe the Gypsies as organized under leaders

who exact obedience from their subjects (Fraser 1992/1995, 71). Rom who violate group norms may be judged to be *marime* (unclean) and denied social intercourse, including commensality, with other Rom. Commensality is important because Rom social life centers around the numerous community gatherings such as parties, baptisms, weddings and funerals—all of the major social occasions that provide the positive sense of groupness characteristic of the Rom. "For a people for whom communal life is of major importance, and where marriages, baptisms, parties, feasts and funerals are frequent social occasions, such a sentence is a much feared and very effective punishment" (Fraser 1992/1995, 245). As in historic Jewish groups (see ch. 6), a sentence of *marime* is leveled not only against the violator but his or her family as well, thus rendering it all the more effective as a deterrent against violating group norms. Associating with *gadje* is one means of becoming *marime*, as in the case of a young woman who accepted employment with a *gadje* firm. After being found and returned to her family by relatives, this woman and her family were sentenced to *marime* for a specified period of time (Sutherland 1975, 99). *Marime* decisions are handed down by the *kris romani*.

Rom political power is not egalitarian. Success for a man within the Rom community is predicated on possessing certain qualities: wealth, an aggressive wife, a large family, a reputation for being able to manipulate the *gadje*, a willingness to help other Rom, and the ability to speak well in assemblies. Such a person may become a rom baro ('big man') able to wield considerable power within the group by, e.g., settling disputes among other Rom.

Ecological Specialization and Resource and Reproductive Competition. The Roma are territorial in the sense that newcomers must get permission from existing families and sometimes pay fees to them in order settle in an area (Sutherland 1975, 32). Such practices are similar to those in traditional Jewish communities where other Jews could not underbid families with trading monopolies, and the local Jewish *kehilla* regulated migration of other Jews into the community (see ch. 6). Rom families attempting to discourage other families from invading their territory

would report the illegal activities of the immigrant families to the authorities—itself an indication of the extent to which Rom ecology involves activities perceived as exploitative by the wider society. One of the main functions of Rom leaders was to develop good relations with the welfare agencies and the police department, the two agencies of the *gadja* that most impact the life of the Rom. There is competition among Rom males to be recognized as an official leader with standing to negotiate disputes between the Rom and the authorities. However, the main source of financial support of the family is the wife (Sutherland 1975, 71). For both sexes, economic activities are typically carried on in the company of other gypsies, while working with non-gypsies is avoided, especially situations where a *gadja* would have a supervisory role over the gypsy.

The resources important in Sutherland's study were fortune telling licenses and welfare payments. When resources are strictly limited, as is often the case with fortune telling licenses, one family tends to monopolize an area. However, if licenses are unlimited, as is the case if fortune telling is unregulated or if the main source of income is welfare, then the social structure shifts to loose associations in which no one family has a monopoly.

The Rom value being able to obtain money from the *gadja* by outwitting them. Apart from deception and illegal activities, common tactics include making a loud commotion to embarrass the target, alternating flattery and hostility, and begging and pleading. These activities require an extraverted personality type, and the Rom regard shyness as a severe liability (Sutherland 1975, 71).

Adjusting to the Assimilative Pressures of Contemporary Western Societies. Sutherland (1975, 4) finds that American Rom are aware of gradual changes toward a more sedentary life style, but notes that they still traveled a remarkable percentage of the time. Her survey indicated that families traveled during the summer months and on average spent 42% of their time on the road, with the percentage rising to 50% for young families. The size of traveling groups ranged from nuclear families to groups composed of closely related extended families. A common strategy was to stay in one place long enough to obtain welfare and then

obtain further money while traveling, returning to the original area long enough to maintain their welfare payments and hiding their assets while doing so (Sutherland 1975, 48).

However the importance of traveling extends far beyond economic necessity. “Traveling is socially imperative and is incorporated into the whole structure of law, social control, morality, and religious beliefs” (Sutherland 1975, 49). Traveling is associated in the Rom mind with all things good. It is a remedy for illness or bad luck, and now that many Rom are settled in urban areas, traveling is romantically linked with earlier times when there were fewer conflicts among the Rom. Traveling is also an integral part of social life. Families travel long distances to be with relatives for extended periods of illness or to mark milestones such as weddings or funerals. (There is a six-week long funeral *pomana*, an aspect of the intense social life of the Rom.) Similarly, in Bulgaria the traditional traveling ways of some groups of Gypsies soon re-emerged after the forced sedentarization of the Communist period (Marushiakova & Popov 1997, 110–111). However, there are also permanently settled Gypsy villages, described as “poor and wretched, with jerrybuilt houses or dugouts. Their inhabitants were engaged mostly in dirty, unskilled labour, or as servants or musicians” (p. 118), but there were also some artisans.

Fraser (1992/1995, 294ff) mentions several other itinerant groups that have appeared in Europe, some of which do not appear to have any relationships to Gypsies or are derived at least partly from non-Gypsy populations. These include the Irish Tinkers (sometimes called Travelers) and the *Quinquis* of Spain and Portugal. These groups share a similar traveling lifestyle, similar occupations such as metalworking and peddling wares, similar preference for early marriage within the group, similar cleanness rituals, and similar de-emphasis on education. These groups are relatively little studied.

Amish and Hutterites

The Amish and Hutterites originated in the religious upheavals of 16th-century German-speaking Europe (Hilton & Obermeyer 1999).[1] They along with the Mennonites (not considered here) are collectively grouped together as Anabaptists. These groups developed not only as a reaction to Catholicism but also in opposition to the strong linkages between princes and the Lutheran Church. They developed an ideology of simple communal living based on their image of Christ's original teachings. A major aspect of socialization is to combat tendencies for hedonism and selfish, prideful behavior in favor of a high level of collectivism.

The Hutterites emerged in 1533 when Jacob Hutter united them into "one cohesive, communal religious sect, whose members played down family ties and shared their wealth and goods" (Flint 1975, 49). They developed the belief that only strong group pressure could blunt human tendencies toward material acquisitiveness, pride, and vanity, and thereby restore the Christian life. Peter Riedemann (1506–1556) solved the free rider problem for the Hutterites by requiring that consumption and production both be shared (Flint 1975, 50). Originating as small communities, the Hutterites flourished as a result of proselytism and high fertility, especially in Moravia (now part of the Czech Republic).

The Moravian Hutterite communities were dissolved in 1622 but later re-emerged in Russia. Approximately 400 Hutterites moved to the U.S. in 1874 and grew to over 20,000 in the following hundred years solely as a result of high fertility. Anabaptists view high fertility as a religious obligation and eschew any means of birth control. Birth rates averaged around 4% per year for much of that time (implying more than 10 children per woman), a rate nearly unique and approaching the biological limits for humans (Peter 1987). Indeed, it is common for demographers to use Hutterite fertility as a yardstick against which the fertility of other groups is measured.

In recent years the demographic picture among the Hutterites has been changing (Peter 1980). The Hutterite reproductive rate, which hovered around 4%/year in the decades following their arrival in North America began to decline in the 35–39 age group

in the late 1940s. By the mid-1960s the overall fertility rate was down to between 2% and 3%—still a high rate compared to the U.S. as a whole, but considerably less than a biological maximum. A 1971 census found many Hutterites over age 30 who had not married, and the average age of marriage was over 25 years of age (Peter 1980). A later study by Ingoldsby & Stanton (1988) found that approximately one-third of Hutterite women in Alberta were using birth control. Interview data suggested that birth control was initiated by women attempting to assert their individuality in a male-dominated society. These results suggest a role of cultural diffusion from the surrounding culture in contemporary Hutterite society—an explanation which, if true, implies that Hutterites are not completely cut off from the influences of the surrounding society as is a common tendency among religious fundamentalists. The role of cultural diffusion in influencing fertility decisions, especially diffusion from elite to non-elite classes, has been noted by several scholars (e.g., Bock 1999; MacDonald 1999).

The Amish in the U.S. derive from small Swiss groups that began emigrating in the 17th century (Hilton & Obermeyer 1999). (The European Amish died out as a result of assimilation and lack of large contiguous areas for settlement.) The group was founded in the 16th century by Jacob Ammann, a charismatic and dictatorial leader who emphasized separation from surrounding peoples by insisting on different styles of dress, grooming, and personal appearance.

Like the Hutterites, they have a very high fertility rate of 3.3%, implying 6–7 children per woman, so that the several hundred immigrants have become a population of over 140,000 today.[2] As an indication of their expansion, the Amish expanded in Lancaster County (Pennsylvania) from 150 square miles in 1940 to 525 square miles in 1980 (Hostetler 1993, 102). Birth rates have continued at a very high level in recent years. The Amish rate per year for the period 1981 to 1991 was unusually high at 4.6%, (85,000 to 140,000). Commitment to the Amish community clearly influences fertility. Formerly Old Amish families had significantly reduced fertility compared to those who remained in the community (4.0 vs. 7.2 children per woman).

Cultural Separatism. Amish and Hutterite communities are noticeably different from surrounding populations in the contemporary world. They speak an ingroup language (a dialect of German) among themselves, but are able to communicate in English with outsiders. The Amish have a well-developed ideology of "separation from the world" to the point of being relatively unconcerned about whether other Amish communities have the same rules they have (Hostetler 1993, 83). They think of themselves as "a chosen people" or "a peculiar people." They wear distinctive clothing—mainly black—and use distinctive implements, such as horse-drawn carriages. They avoid modern technology—no telephones, electricity, central heating or automobiles. Men wear beards but no mustaches. Amish are forbidden to marry a non-Amish person or to enter into business with a non-Amish person (Hostetler 1993, 74).

Ingroup cooperation and altruism. The Amish and Hutterites are intensely social, cooperative, and even altruistic within their groups. A defining event in the Amish community is the barn-raising in which the entire community aids a family in erecting a new barn, an unpaid effort that requires many days' labor. The community also has a powerful obligation to help people who are sick or infirm (Kraybill & Olshan 1994). The Amish seek to live close to each other, which also reinforces the sense of being part of a community. While the Amish have a sense of private property, the Hutterites hold nearly all goods in common.

This high level of intra-group support and cooperation goes along with a high degree of genetic relatedness among members. Typically Amish groups are related at the level of 3rd or 4th cousins, and marriage, with few exceptions, is endogamous within the local community rather than between more widely separated Amish groups (McKusick 1978). Hutterites practice a similar or even greater level of endogamy, with some colonies reaching an average relatedness closer than that of 2nd cousins (Hostetler (1974, 265). Although proselytism was common during the early expansion of these groups in the 16th century, there are no attempts to recruit outsiders since that time, so these groups are likely to remain highly inbred.

Such a high degree of genetic relatedness would be expected to trigger mechanisms of genetic similarity, making colony members more altruistic and cooperative as well as making them compatible in personality, intelligence physical appearance, and other traits that people tend to assort on (Rushton 1989, 1999). Indeed, there are several physiognomic profiles that have been found repeatedly in Hutterite families (Peter 1987). In addition to the very high degree of genetic relatedness, both Hutterites and Amish have a high degree of cultural conformity in clothing, hair styles, language, and religious beliefs which tend to set them off from their neighbors. These cultural markers would tend to trigger social identity mechanisms (Hogg & Abrams 1987) that mark these groups off as ingroups from their neighbors as outgroups even though their neighbors shared a similar European ethnic heritage.

Highly cohesive groups like the Anabaptists are on the collectivist end of the individualism/collectivist continuum (Triandis 1995). It is therefore not surprising to find that these groups idealize traits such as conscientiousness, loyalty to the ingroup, obedience, and conformity to group norms. However, no formal personality studies are available. Like the Gypsies but unlike the Jews, there is little emphasis on education in Anabaptist communities. Schooling typically ends with the eighth grade, and there is no cultural importance attached to intellectual activities so that, unlike traditional Jewish communities, there would be no selection for intelligence. Far more likely, but unverified, would be selection maintaining the high level of collectivism found in Anabaptist groups. A high tendency toward collectivism was presumably a common tendency among the founders of these movements.

In any case, non-conformists are shunned or ejected from the community, so there is likely to have been a continuing tendency for more individualistic Hutterites and Amish to defect, as is the case with Jewish groups (*SAID*, ch. 1). The defection rate for Hutterites is 1.3% per year (Peter 1987, 226. Defections rates among the Amish vary from 5% to 43% of adult offspring having left the congregation of origin in modern times, with more conservative groups having a lesser tendency for defection. Hostetler

(1993) resports that the Old Amish of Lancaster County Pennsylvania had a defection rate of approximately 22% in the period from 1880 to 1939. Defections in the more "progressive" groups of Amish are often to other Anabaptist groups, such as the Mennonites who are relatively assimilated to the wider culture (Kraybill & Olshan 1994, 72–74). This parallels a similar Jewish tendency for intermarriage and eventual defection to be more common in the more liberal forms of Judaism, such as Reform Judaism (*CofC*, ch. 8). It is interesting that the more conservative Amish defect least, but when they do defect they become further removed from Amish society. I know of no similar data for Judaism.

Research on social identity has found that external threats result in group cohesion (Hogg & Abrams 1987). Peter (1987) finds that the high point of Hutterite collectivism was during the 17th-century religious persecutions and that following this period there was a lessened emphasis on the community of goods policy. Nevertheless, by any standard, the Hutterites remain highly collectivist in their orientation even in the midst of the powerful trend toward individualism in modern Western societies. The Amish and Hutterites avoid the influence of the media and even minimize traveling in order to avoid the contaminating influences of the surrounding culture (Peters 1965, 181).

Ecological Specialization and Resource and Reproductive Competition. Both the Amish and Hutterites seek to carve out a niche in agriculture or small scale craftsmanship. Neither of these niches is a high-status niche in the society as a whole in the contemporary world—leading to the expectation that Anabaptists will tend to have a low cultural profile and not generate widespread hostility, but, as with any niche, there may be competition with others in that particular niche. The Anabaptists are also pacifists who prefer to avoid conflict. This may cause resentment in time of war because the wider society may see them as free riders.

Peters (1965, 181) finds that relationships between Hutterite communities and surrounding farmers range from excellent to peaceful co-existence; no colony is subjected to intense hostility. These positive relations are attributed partly to the warm hospi-

tality with which Hutterites welcome outsides and because Hutterites aid non-Hutterites in times of emergency. Indeed, their helpfulness in times of emergency is legendary: "Send out ten men or five Hutterites," as one Manitoba civil defense official put it (Peters 1965, 181).

Hutterites and other Anabaptists have certainly been persecuted, but the vast majority of the persecution was caused by their religious unorthodoxy and their stance as pacifists (Flint 1975). During the period of religious wars in Europe, the Hapsburgs viewed Protestant ideas on the separation of Church and state as treasonous, and they had a similar view of the Anabaptist refusal to fight in the military or pay war taxes, with the result that thousands of Anabaptists were imprisoned and executed. Local residents often resented Amish refusal to bear arms, as, for example, in the Alsace were they were expelled from the Markirch Valley in 1712. More recently, Hutterite pacifism resulted in considerable hostility during World War I, especially since they spoke German. Conscientious objectors were tortured and two died of their treatment by the U.S. army. As a result, the Dakota Hutterites moved to Canada.

Economic competition has figured in hostility toward Anabaptists. Anabaptist craftsmen refused to join guilds, and undercut local craftsmen by charging less for their labor. In the contemporary world, the Amish refusal to join labor unions has resulted in hostility from union members (Kraybill & Olshan 1994). However, the main source of economic competition involving Anabaptists today comes from Hutterite farmers who, because of efficiencies related to their cooperative lifestyle and low level of personal consumption, have been able to buy land and put other farmers out of business. During the 1940s and 1950s the state of South Dakota and the province of Alberta restricted Hutterite land purchases (Hostetler 1974, 132ff). While the Amish have continued to use old methods that make them less competitive, the Hutterites have embraced modern agricultural technology and have become very efficient. Individual farmers are often unable to compete with the high-cooperation, low consumption lifestyle of the Hutterites, and when the go bankrupt, the Hutterites are

able to buy their land. This process is continuing in Canada (Hilton 2000).

As Hilton and Obermeyer (1999) note, the restriction of Hutterite land acquisition in the 1940s and 1950s recalls the prohibition of Jewish land ownership under Czar Alexander III in the late 19th century. However, they point out that the Hutterites have probably never been accused of purchasing land in an exploitative manner. When land became available, the Hutterites simply paid what the seller asked if they could afford it. Although competition with Hutterites may have driven the other farmer out of business, Hutterites would not have had a direct hand in forcing a former owner into bankruptcy. The stereotype of Jewish economic behavior toward the Russians, however, was that Jewish moneylenders drove Russian peasants to ruin when they were unable to repay loans with high interest rates. Prohibitions on Jewish land ownership were intended by the Russian government to protect the peasants against Jewish economic practices (*SAID*, ch. 2). Nevertheless, as with all the groups reviewed here, Hutterite economic behavior been regarded by outsiders as constituting "unfair" or "illegitimate" competition.

There are several factors that have ameliorated the hatred directed at the Anabaptists (Hilton 2000). Anabaptists are pacifists who have simply fled in the face of persecution. Their peaceful ways extend to interpersonal behavior: Outsiders need not fear violence or other criminal actions, such as theft, from Anabaptists. Anabaptists avoid occupations where they might be tempted to take advantage of others' financial situation. Peter Riedemann, in one of the earliest lists of Hutterite rules for living dating from 1565, stipulated that "We allow none of our number to do the work of a trader or merchant, since this is a sinful business; . . . we allow no one to buy to sell again, as merchants and traders do. But to buy what is necessary for the needs of one's house or craft, to use it and then to sell what one by means of his craft hath made therefrom, we consider to be right and not wrong. . . . [It is wrong] when one buyeth a ware and selleth the same again . . . taking to himself a profit, making the ware dearer thereby for the poor, taking bread from their very mouths and thus making the poor man nothing but the bondman of the rich. Paul sayeth like-

wise, 'Let him who defrauded, defraud no more' " (Riedemann 1506–1556/1999). Hostetler (1974, 34) mentions a somewhat later instruction, from the "Discipline of 1599", not to "fall into the tricks of the traders, butchers, or Jews."

While acknowledging that religious precepts may be a poor guide for actual behavior, Hilton and Obermeyer (1999) note the contrast between the 1599 text enjoining behavior likely to lead to charges of exploitation with "the remarkably different instructions of the Talmud and related codes that have influenced, if not totally governed, the actions of Orthodox Jews toward gentiles over the centuries." Jewish religious law delineates a double standard that condemns exploitation and defrauding of Jews but allows these activities in dealings with non-Jews except in cases where it might tarnish the reputation of the Jewish community (see chs. 5 and 6; see also Shahak 1994, 88–90). The result is that the Anabaptists, unlike Jews and the Overseas Chinese, have never been a "middleman minority" poised in a dominant or exploitative relationship between a dominant elite and a native population.

The Anabaptist lifestyle as self-sufficient agriculturists is doubtless a factor in their being generally perceived as a non-exploitative minority. Even the recent trend among the Amish to engage in small scale businesses (Kraybill & Nolte 1995) is unlikely to result in high levels of hostility in the contemporary world where massive multi-national corporations hold sway.

Anabaptists avoid contact with the outside world, but unlike Jews and Gypsies, they do not regard outgroups as suffering from ritual uncleanness. Hilton and Obermeyer (1999) suggest that they do have a feeling of being a special group—analogous if not homologous to the Jewish idea of "the chosen people." Social identity theory (e.g., Hogg & Abrams 1987) would suggest that the barriers between Anabaptists and other groups would tend to result in some negative attitudes toward outsiders. However, given their pacifism and non-exploitative relations with the surrounding society, these attitudes by themselves are unlikely to lead to high levels of conflict. Moreover, although the Hutterites and Amish are genetically segregated groups, they do not oppose recruitment and intermarriage in principle. Hostetler (1993)

describes them as relatively non-ethnocentric. Hilton and Obermeyer (1999) suggest that the main opposition of the Amish and the Hutterites to modern society is the fear of being overcome with corrupting cultural and religious values.

Although Anabaptist pacifism has sometimes led to free-rider type conflict with the rest of society, Anabaptists do not use public services, such as welfare. Indeed, they might even be seen as being exploited because they pay taxes without attending regular schools. The Mennonites, who are much more assimilated than the Amish and the Hutterites, have a strong tradition of charity to outgroups along with missionary work among other ethnic groups. Nineteenth-century Mennonite homes typically had a "beggar's room" especially for transients to whom hospitality was to be extended as a Christian principle, suggesting relatively benign attitudes toward outgroup members (Epp 1974, 8). These traits would also tend to minimize conflict with other groups. Indeed, the Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, are the object of the curiosity and admiration of five million tourists a year (Hege & Weibe 1996). There is a long history of governments inviting Anabaptists to settle because of their industry and craftsmanship and expertise in agriculture (Hostetler 1974, 120). The conclusion is that although the presence of Amish and Hutterites in modern society would undoubtedly trigger ingroup/outgroup mechanisms and thus lead to some negative attributions, the general lack of resource competition with the surrounding society has not triggered any large outbursts of hostility in the modern world.

Calvinists and Puritans

Calvinism was conceived and developed by John Calvin, a 16th-century religious reformer based in Geneva. Wilson (2002) notes that Calvin was a scholar who was not only conversant in Christian writings, he impressed people with his ability to discuss these writings from memory as well as with his general skills as a writer. These traits are indicative of a high general intelligence, a set of mechanisms that is critical for adapting to novel, complex

environments (MacDonald 1991; MacDonald & Chiappe 2002). In other words, Calvin, like Moses and the Jewish priests who invented Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, was an intelligent person attempting to design a strategy for living in a complicated world. Calvin and his colleagues talked a great deal among themselves on how to hold a community together. They developed a belief system that, as Wilson (2002) notes, was "user-friendly" in the sense that they appeal to a wide range of people, not just the well-educated or intelligent. And of course belief systems need not be true or realistic to motivate adaptive behavior, witness a belief that in the Book of Genesis God enjoins the Israelites to reproduce and multiply.

Calvin compared his church to an organism with many parts working together for the good of the whole. "All God's elect are so united and conjoined together in Christ that as they are dependent on one Head, they also grow together into one body, being joined and knit together as are the limbs of one body. . . . Just as the members of one body share among themselves by some sort of community, each nonetheless has his special gift and distinct ministry (in Wilson 2002). Every person has a role to play in the group; therefore all occupations from farmer to minister are worthy and sanctified.

The free-rider problem or other problems caused by cheating are a central issue for any group strategy. Punishment is always an effective mechanism, and is undoubtedly critical to the long-term success of any group strategy. But, as Wilson notes, there are obvious benefits to a group strategy if rule abiding behavior is internally motivated, and Calvinist theology is designed to do just that. The internal motivation for not violating group norms is that violators have offended God and must seek his forgiveness. They must repent for their sins. Forgiveness and repentance are basic to all human relationships—part of our evolved psychology. However, believing that one's actions have not just wronged another human but have wronged a powerful and just God capable of the severe punishment of eternal damnation produces a powerful motivation to abide by the rules of the group.

A great deal of attention was paid to making sure that pastors were paragons of moral rectitude and not prone to ideological

deviation which would lead to schism and a breakdown of the organic, collectivist spirit of the group. Pastors were to "admonish amicably those whom they see to be erring or to be living a disordered life." Those who violated the religious norms were subjected to an escalating set of penalties ranging from a private "brotherly admonition" from the pastor, to public forms of shaming, and finally to excommunication which would mean expulsion from the city.

A high level of commitment was required of group members—indeed, a very high of commitment, since the original Calvinist congregation was the entire city of Geneva rather than a self-selected group of people who voluntarily joined as converts. Church attendance was required, and each family was visited once a year in order to assess the state of their spiritual commitment. In order to maintain the organic nature of the group, punishment was directed at rich and poor alike. Many of Calvin's greatest battles centered around enforcing the puritanical moral code on the wealthy and powerful who, as expected on the basis of evolutionary theory, are more likely than the less prosperous to be able to translate their wealth and power into reproductive success.

Calvinism was a success in Geneva and spread rapidly elsewhere in Europe. Geneva had been politically fractionated and in constant danger in its conflict with the Duchy of Savoy. Notwithstanding the repressive discipline, harsh laws, and paternalistic controls, the positive and constructive elements of Calvin's system became increasingly effective. The people of Geneva listened to preaching several times weekly. They were trained in Calvin's Sunday School, instructed by his sermons, able to recite his catechism, to sing the Psalter, and to read the Bible with understanding. This was a high level of discipline and indoctrination indeed (McNeill 1954, 100).

Calvin had taken a city wracked with dissension and molded it into a power far out of proportion to its economic importance. The same can be said for an offshoot of Calvinism, the Puritans of England and later the United States. Puritans wished to 'purify' the established Church of England from any remnants of the Catholic Church. Puritanism originated in East Anglia in Eng-

land, spread to New England, and became the most important cultural influence in the United States beginning in the 18th century down to the mid-20th century. East Anglian Puritans "became the breeding stock for America's Yankee population" and "multiplied at a rapid rate, doubling every generation for two centuries. Their numbers increased to 100,000 by 1700, to at least one million by 1800, six million by 1900, and more than sixteen million by 1988—all descended from 21,000 English emigrants who came to Massachusetts in the period from 1629 to 1640" (Fischer 1989, 17).

The great majority of the Puritan founders of Massachusetts arrived with their families (Fischer 1989, 25). Most were middle-class or above, but only a few were true aristocrats. Even fewer were poor: "Less than five percent were identified as laborers—a smaller proportion than in other colonies. Only a small minority came as servants—less than 25 percent, compared with 75 percent for Virginia," and "nearly three-quarters of Massachusetts immigrants paid their own passage—no small sum in 1630" (p. 38).

By comparison with other colonies, "households throughout Massachusetts and Connecticut included large numbers of children, small numbers of servants and high proportions of intact marital unions. In Waltham, Massachusetts, for example, completed marriages formed in the 1730s produced 9.7 children on the average. These Waltham families were the largest that demographic historians have found anywhere in the Western world, except for a few Christian communes which regarded reproduction as a form of worship" (Fischer 1989, 71).

The high percentage of intact families in the Puritan migration to America meant that they engaged in a much lower incidence of exogamy with the native Amerindian population (as was the case in the Spanish and especially the Portuguese colonies in the Americas), or with Black slaves (as in the Southern states), or even other European ethnic and religious groups (as in the Mid-Atlantic states). The leading Puritan families of East Anglia "intermarried with such frequency" that one historian dubbed them "a prosopograher's dream" (Fischer 1989, 39). A century and half later their descendant, Anti-Federalist James Winthrop,

urged his fellow New Englanders not to ratify the Constitution, instead exhorting them to "keep their blood pure" as it was only "by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures" that they had "acquired their present greatness . . . [and] preserved their religion and morals" (in Fischer 1989, 845). Puritans thought of themselves as "a Chosen People", presumably a product of their immersion in the Bible.

Puritans sought to convert others to their ways, so that Puritanism was not a genetically closed strategy, at least in theory. Puritans in Massachusetts thought that the heathens living among them, including the Native Americans, "must be converted to Reformed Protestantism; they must also take on the social and political habits of the true Christian. . . . the conversion of the Indian neighbors was a cherished Puritan project, and one that reveals much about the objectives and outlook of Puritan society" (Vaughn 1997, 261–262). In comments on Africans who were held mainly as bond servants in the Massachusetts colony, Cotton Mather wrote, "The considerations that would move you to teach your Negroes the truths of the glorious gospel as far as you can, and bring them, if it may be, to live according to those truths a sober, and a righteous, and a godly life; they are innumerable" (in Vaughn 1997, 268). Nevertheless, very few Blacks or Indians joined Puritan churches, and Vaughn (1997, 271) comments that while a few Puritans like Cotton Mather attempted to convert Indians and Blacks, "their fellow New Englanders increasingly turned Puritanism into a tribalistic ritual for the descendants of the founding fathers."

The English Puritans preserved Calvin's original emphasis on moral rectitude and internally motivated adherence to group norms. Puritan ideology deplored "drunkenness, indolence, debauchery, and revels." Puritans "worried constantly about losing God's favor through some shortcoming, especially failure to promote moral reformation"; they "looked to the Bible for daily guidance, which made sermons and the interpretative abilities of ministers all-important" (Fischer 1989, 27).

Puritan child rearing practices were strict and involved rigorous supervision, yet emphasized maintaining warm family bonds throughout life. The importance of a well-ordered family life was

surely not unique to the Puritans in colonial American, but the Puritans continuously and vigorously "harped on the subject in sermons, pamphlets, laws, and governmental pronouncements" (Vaughn 1997, xv). While mothers cared for infants, fathers played a major role in rearing both sons and daughters, often teaching them to read and write, instructing them in religion, and even in adulthood advising them in their decisions about work and marriage. Puritan sexual mores emphasized sexual love within marriage but strongly forbade fornication and adultery. Courtship occurred under family supervision. An illustrative custom was the use of the 'courting stick', "a hollow pole six or eight feet long, with an earpiece at one end and a mouthpiece at the other. The courting couple whispered quietly to one another through this tube, while members of the family remained in the room nearby." The stick had a dual purpose—"to combine close supervision by elders with free choice by the young" (Fischer 1989, 70, 81). The courting stick illustrates the community's commitment to high-investment parenting: Courtship was aimed at the possibility of marriage, not sexual experimentation.

Another indication of high-investment parenting strategy characteristic of the Puritans is that education was prized as the key to insuring the survival of their community. Two Puritan East Anglian counties had the highest rates of literacy in England during the 17th century—around 50 percent. Puritans also distinguished themselves by their strong support of public libraries and public schools (Phillips 1989, 27). Massachusetts law required every town of 50 families to hire a schoolmaster, and every town of 100 to maintain a grammar school that taught Latin and Greek (Fischer 1989, 133). Even illiterate New England farmers voluntarily contributed some of their harvest to support university faculty and students. Educational institutions developed by Puritans in New England were much more widespread and sophisticated than in other colonies during the same period (Vaughn 1997, xiv) At least 130 of the original settlers had attended universities in Europe. Harvard University was founded within 6 years of the founding of the Massachusetts Bay colony. Those admitted to Harvard were required to be able to read and speak classical Latin and know the declensions of Greek nouns and

verbs. “Everyone shall consider the main end of his life and studies to know God and Jesus Christ which is Eternal Life” (in Vaughn 1997, 248).

Puritan family names indicate a disproportionate number of tradesmen and craftsmen—names such as “Chandler, Cooper, Courier, Cutler, Draper, Fletcher, Gardiner, Glover, Mason, Mercer, Miller, Sawyer, Saddler, Sherman, Thatcher, Tinker, Turner, Waterman, Webster, and Wheelwright” (Fischer 1989, 26). Puritans were also especially prominent in law and commerce. East Anglian historian R. W. Cretton-Cremer described them as “dour, stubborn, fond of argument and litigation” (in Fischer 1989, 49). Interestingly, Havelock Ellis’s *A Study of British Genius* found East Anglia to have the highest average intelligence in Britain and “a larger proportion of scholars, scientists, and artists came from East Anglia than from any other part of England” (in Fischer 1989, 49).

Distinctive given names not only to reinforced group values, but also served as in-group markers. While many Puritans gave their children Biblical names from the New and especially the Old Testament, they avoided names such as Emmanuel, Jesus, Angel, Gabriel, Michael, or Christopher commonly used by Catholics. Most indicative of the values Puritans instilled in their children are what Fischer terms hortatory names—Be-courteous Cole, Safely-on-high Snat, Fight-the-good-fight-of-faith White, Small-hope Biggs, Humiliation Scratcher, Kill-sin Pemble, and Mortifie Hicks. In some areas, almost half the children received such names, including “an unfortunate young woman named Fly Fornication Bull . . . who was made pregnant in the shop of a yeoman improbably named Goodman Goodman.” (Fischer 1989, 97). Another distinguishing mark were the “sadd colors,” a drab way of dressing that set Puritans off from others during the colonial period.

As with Calvin’s original doctrine, there was a great deal of supervision of individual behavior. Fischer (1989, 202) describes Puritan New England’s ideology of ‘Ordered Liberty’ as “the freedom to order one’s acts in a godly way—but not in any other.” This ‘freedom as public obligation’ implied strong social control of morals. Puritans forbade the worship of Christmas,

both in England and Massachusetts, and whipped, burned, and exiled those they found to be heretics, all the while believing themselves to be the beleaguered defenders of liberty.

Puritan collectivist ideology can be seen by the analogy of a Christian community to a body, as in Calvin's original formulation (see above) and in this comment by John Winthrop:

> All true Christians are of one body in Christ. . . All parts of this body being thus united are made so contiguous in a special relation as they must needs partake of each other's strength and infirmity, joy, sorrow, weal and woe. 1 Corinthians 12:26 *If one member suffers, all suffer with it; if one be in honor, all rejoice with it.* . . . For the work we have in hand, it is by a mutual consent through a special overruling providence, and a more than ordinary approbation of the churches of Christ, to seek out a place of cohabitation and consortship under a due form of government both civil and ecclesiastical. In such cases as this the care of the public must oversway all private respects, by which not only conscience, but mere civil policy doth bind us; for it is a true rule that particular estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the public. (John Winthrop, on the eve of settlement in Massachusetts, 1630; in Vaughn 1997, 143–144; italics in text)

Puritan settlements attempted to keep others out, but their failure to do so was an important contributing factor to their demise as a closed group strategy. An early regulation from Springfield required that sale of property be only to those approved by town magistrates—an attempt to prevent the "sundry evils that may befall this township through ill-disposed persons that may thrust themselves in amongst us against the liking and consent of the generality of the inhabitants, or select townsmen by purchasing a lot or place of habitation, etc." (in Vaughn 1997, 194). As John Winthrop noted in 1637, "If we heere be a corporation established by free consent, if the place of our co-habitation be our owne, then no man hath a right to come into us . . . without our consent" (in Vaughn 1997, 199). But by 1647, "nonfreemen"

were allowed to participate in town politics and had the right to vote in local elections. Only 17 years after founding the colony, the Puritans had given up the concept of controlling a particular territory. However, at that time certain religious non-conformists, especially Anabaptists and Quakers, were still prevented from settling in New England and imprisoned, tortured, and even executed if they returned there. Four Quakers were executed in 1659–1661 when they returned after being banished from the colony, but within a generation even these dissenting religions were tolerated in Boston.

Puritans saw themselves as a chosen people—an ideology that they found articulated clearly in the Old Testament: "So He tells the people of Israel: *you only have I known of all the families of the earth, therefore will I punish you for your transgressions*" (in Vaughn 1997, 144–145; italics in text). Chosenness was also implied by the theory of predestination, a doctrine that was justified by passages in the New Testament. William Ames wrote, "Predestination has existed from eternity. Eph. 1:4, *He has chosen us before the foundations of the world were laid; . . .* Hence it depends upon no cause, reason, or outward condition, but proceeds purely from the will of him who predestines" (in Vaughn 1997, 15).

The Old Testament had a major impact on Puritan thinking. In an early legal codification of the Massachusetts Bay colony, there are repeated citations of Old Testament sources as justifying the laws. Capital crimes included worshipping other gods, witchcraft, engaging in "direct, express, presumptious, or high-handed blasphemy," and adultery. Outsiders were excluded: "No person being a member of any church which shall be gathered without the approbation of the Magistrates and the said churches shall be admitted to the freedom of this commonwealth" (in Vaughn 1997, 166, 168). Economic relationships were predicated on fairness within the group, not maximizing individual profit. There were elaborate rules on what merchants could charge: "Some false principles are these: 1. That a man might sell as dear as he can, and buy as cheap as he can. 2. If a man lose by casualty of sea, etc., in some of his commodities, he may raise the price of the rest. 3. That he may sell as he bought, though he paid

too dear, etc., and though the commodity be fallen, etc., 4. That, as a man may take the advantage of his own skill or ability, so he may of another's ignorance or necessity" (in Vaughn 1997, 174–175). These principles violate basic economic rationality, putting the risk much more heavily on the merchant. However, they indicate the extent to which group rather than individual interests were the critical consideration.

As in the Old Testament, God's wrath would be leveled at entire communities, not only individuals. Each member was therefore responsible for the purity of the whole, since transgressions of others would result in God's wrath being leveled at the entire community (Vaughn 1997, 179). Puritans were therefore highly motivated to control the behavior of others that they thought might offend God. This included, of course, the sexual behavior of other community members.

Both East Anglia and New England had the lowest relative rates of private crime (murder, theft, mayhem), but the highest rates of public violence—"the burning of rebellious servants, the maiming of political dissenters, the hanging of Quakers, the execution of witches" (Fischer 1989, 189). This record is entirely in keeping with Calvinist tendencies in Geneva (Wilson 2002).

Phillips (1999) traces the egalitarian, anti-hierarchical spirit of Yankee republicanism back to the fact that East Anglia was settled by Angles and Jutes in pre-historic times. They produced "a civic culture of high literacy, town meetings, and a tradition of freedom," distinguished from other British groups by their "comparatively large ratios of freemen and small numbers of *servi* and *villani*" (Phillips 1999, 26). East Anglia continued to produce "insurrections against arbitrary power"—the risings and rebellions of 1381 led by Jack Straw, Wat Tyler, and John Ball, Clarence's in 1477, Robert Kett's rebellion of 1548, which predated the rise of Puritanism. President John Adams, cherished the East Anglian heritage of "self-determination, free male suffrage, and a consensual social contract" (Phillips 1999, 27).

This emphasis on relative egalitarianism and consensual, democratic government are tendencies characteristic of Northern European peoples as a result of a prolonged evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers in the north of Europe (*CofC*: MacDonald

1998/2002). At the same time, there was a high degree of cohesion within the group made possible by a powerful emphasis on cultural conformity (e.g., punishment of religious heresy) and public regulation of personal behavior related to sex (fornication, adultery), public drunkenness, etc. These anti-individualist tendencies would be expected to strengthen not only the cohesion of the community but also strengthen the tendencies for cooperation and high-investment parenting within the community without compromising the tendencies toward political and a large (albeit limited) measure of economic individualism. One might say that Puritanism was an individualistic group strategy—individualistic in economic tendencies and political tendencies, but collectivist in the areas of religion and sexual behavior.

Indeed, the intensity of public violence directed at defectors may be an example of altruistic punishment discussed by Fehr and Gächter (2002). That is, a highly collectivist, cooperative culture derived from hunter-gathers would be expected to be characterized by high levels of altruistic punishment directed at free-riders. An interesting feature of Puritanism is the tendency to pursue utopian causes framed as moral issues—their susceptibility to utopian appeals to a 'higher law' and the belief that the principal purpose of government is moral. New England was the most fertile ground for "the perfectability of man creed," and the "father of a dozen 'isms' " (Fischer 1989, 357). There was a tendency to paint political alternatives as starkly contrasting moral imperatives, with one side portrayed as evil incarnate—inspired by the devil. Puritan moral intensity can also be seen in their "profound personal piety" (Vaughn 1997, 20)—their intensity of commitment to live not only a holy life, but also a sober and industrious life.

Puritans waged holy war on behalf of moral righteousness even against their own cousins, perhaps a form of altruistic punishment described by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and found more often among cooperative hunter-gatherer groups than among groups, such as Judaism, based on extended kinship. Whatever the political and economic complexities that led to the Civil War, it was the Yankee moral condemnation of slavery that inspired the rhetoric and rendered the massive carnage of closely related Anglo-Americans on behalf of slaves from Africa justifiable in the minds of Puritans. Militarily, the war with the Confederacy rendered the heaviest sacrifice in lives and property ever made by Americans (Phillips 1989, 477). Puritan moral fervor and its tendency to justify draconian punishment of evil doers can also be seen in the comments of "the Congregationalist minister at Henry Ward Beecher's Old Plymouth

Church in New York [who] went so far as to call for 'exterminating the German people . . . the sterilization of 10,000,000 German soldiers and the segregation of the woman" (in Phillips 1999, 556).

In England, Puritanism never really developed into a group evolutionary strategy but remained a loosely bordered faction among other Protestant sects. In New England, however, it developed as a hegemonic religious and political movement in control of a particular territory. Membership in the church required a vote of the congregation. "The principal criterion, besides an upright behavior, was evidence that God had chosen the candidate for eternal salvation, that he was a regenerate spirit rather than merely a man or woman who wanted to be picked for salvation" (Vaughn 1997, 93). Because of their doctrine of Predestination, the Puritans were literally a Chosen People—chosen by God for salvation before the world was even created, according to William Ames, the central Puritan theologian; "*The Lord knows who are his*" (in Vaughn 1997, 15; emphasis in text). Prospective members had to convince the congregation that they had indeed been chosen by God by relating "the workings of Christ" on their soul (Vaughn 1997, 93).

From its founding in 1630 to around 1660 Puritans created a tribalistic, insular society in New England that regularly excluded heretics and intruders and retained strong control over group members. Puritans in New England viewed themselves as a separate group whose attitudes required them to transform their entire lives. "Puritanism asked them to look with new eyes at the nature and structure of government, at the role of communities, at the obligations of families; to have new attitudes toward work, toward leisure, toward witches and the wonders of the world" (Vaughn 1997, xiii).

The Puritan colony retained a great deal of independence from England: "Neither foreign powers nor the English crown had much influence on the small cluster of colonies" (Vaughn 1997, 297). However, after the Restoration of 1660 and the decline of Puritan political power in England, the ability of Puritans to retain control over their territory began to decline, resulting in a more heterodox, materialistic, and cosmopolitan society. Puritans ceased being a religious group with a common ethnic origin and clear boundaries between themselves and the outside world. As

Mommsen said of the Romans, they were no longer a people, but a population (see Miele 2000).

The main source of Puritan decline was that the British government denied them the right to police their borders and expel heretics. In 1664 the British government ruled that an Englishman need not be a member of the Congregationalist Church to qualify as a freeman in Massachusetts. The Charter of 1691 prescribed freedom of Christian religious conscience (except to Papists!); it also ended the colony's right to select its own governor, limit voting to church members, and expel heretics. And as political control waned, it became increasingly difficult to impose Puritan religious and moral orthodoxy on the inhabitants of New England. After 1650, the colony was inundated by waves of immigration by people who were not committed to the Puritan way of life—more inclined to commercialism and materialism (Vaughn 1997, 298). There was also a diminution of Puritan militancy, perhaps because of its extraordinary demands for conformity, emotional intensity, and self-denial. For all practical purposes, the dream (i.e., the group evolutionary strategy) had ended within 70 years after its beginning.

More significant perhaps than the gradual erosion of political monopoly and the growth of materialism was the feeling that after the Restoration New Englanders were less determined than their predecessors to fashion a Zion in the wilderness, to make of their society a vigorous example of piety and right-walking. . . . To their credit, the men and women of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries may have been more tolerant, more practical, more humane . . . than their predecessors, but with the exception of the Mathers and a few other clergymen they were certainly less militant in their attachment to Puritan principles (Vaughn 1997, 298).

As in the Old Testament, harbingers of decline were greeted by claims that Puritans had strayed from the path of righteousness and would be destroyed by the wrath of God. After 1660 preachers wrote Jeremiads with the message that New England must repent for having strayed from God's path and from the high achievements of the founding fathers. God will not long tolerate

so profligate a people. “What shall I do with such a stiff-necked race?”

Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia

The ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, traditionally termed the Overseas Chinese, are interesting because they have often been compared to Jews as a middleman minority. In 1914 the future king of Siam wrote a pamphlet that was highly critical of the overseas Chinese titled, *The Jews of the Orient*. The Chinese resemble Jews in two very important ways. First, they are highly intelligent and prone to a K-selected reproductive strategy. Rushton (1994) shows that East Asians (Chinese and Japanese) have higher IQ, relatively delayed physical maturation, and stronger inhibitory control than Caucasian populations. Relevant to this discussion, data compiled by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) show that Southeast Asian IQ are the range of 90, well below the average IQ of around 105 found for the Chinese.

Secondly, the Chinese are strongly predisposed toward collectivism. Traditional Chinese social life is highly collectivist, and much of this collectivism has been transferred to overseas Chinese communities. Traditional social life centered around clans of individuals with a common biological ancestor (*tsu*). The tsu acted as a self-sufficient body with economic, social welfare, mutual aid, and juridical functions. In effect, such clans might be considered group evolutionary strategies in their own right. Overseas Chinese social life reflects this ancestral collectivism, and clan membership continues to be an important aspect of the economic behavior of the Overseas Chinese (Suryadinata 1988; 1992, 214). However, in general Overseas Chinese organizations are not based on clan membership. For example, in Thailand, overseas Chinese associations function as islands of Chinese culture and as a welfare system for poor Chinese. They also serve economic functions such as regulating prices in areas of the economy controlled by the Chinese and dealing with government officials (Coughlin 1960, 33–34).

Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia are strongly patriarchal, while the indigenous peoples tend to have bilateral kinship relations (Gungwu 1997, 297), the latter a marker of individualism (*CofC*: MacDonald 1998/2002). Overseas Chinese family and organizational life reflects the patterns of China, especially the south China peasantry who are the main constituents of the Overseas Chinese community. In China, family life is based on the patriarchal extended family embedded in the wider clan, and extended family relationships are the rule among the Overseas Chinese. For example, in Thailand in 1960, the typical newly wed ethnic Chinese couple lived in the home of the bridegroom's parents (Coughlin 1960, 67). Ideally, the father's family, grandparents, all married sons, and even some distant relatives would live in one household. Because of space limitations, this was rarely possible in Thailand, but it was common for one or two married sons to live at home. Chinese women had almost no public presence (Coughlin 1960, 73). They live a life of obedience centered on the home, usually beginning their married life under the thumb of their mother in law. This family system has powerful economic overtones. Businesses are run by the entire family, including wives and children. When the owner dies, the business is passed to a son and the cycle is repeated.

Another aspect of Chinese collectivism is that marriage is arranged by the parents and is restricted to other Chinese. As a general rule, intermarriage with indigenous peoples was common in the early stages of Chinese immigration because of the lack of immigrant women. However, intermarriage largely ceased with the arrival of significant numbers of Chinese women. For example, Coughlin (1960, 75) found that marriage with Thais was openly discouraged after the arrival of large numbers of Chinese women. In a survey of 145 marriages from all social classes, not one Chinese woman had married a non-Chinese man, and only two Chinese men had married Thai women. One of the Chinese men who married a Thai woman had tuberculosis and therefore had a very low value on the marriage market. Intermarriage is a sign that the person is cutting ties with traditional Chinese culture: Intermarried couples do not live with the bridegroom's father (Coughlin 1960, 78).

The overseas Chinese were therefore highly predisposed to the type of collectivism that underlies successful group evolutionary strategies. When they went overseas, they quickly developed highly cooperative ethnic networks and social support services for other Chinese, and they tended to shed the regional and clan divisions of their homeland to become a self-conscious national minority in their adopted country. As in the case of the Jews in Europe, the combination of high intelligence and powerful ethnic collectivist tendencies has resulted in a very successful group strategy.

Suryadinata (1997, 6) notes that with the exception of Sinapore, all of the nations of southeast Asia are ethnostates in the making defined by the dominant indigenous ethnic group. The Chinese, as a non-indigenous ethnic minority, have tended to have fewer political rights in these societies. Chinese assimilation to the indigenous society has long been an issue, at least partly because for much of their history in Southeast Asia the great majority of overseas Chinese remained non-citizen aliens in their adopted countries, their identity focused mainly on China. Complicating issues of identity has been the fact that the overseas Chinese were economically successful throughout southeast Asia and assumed a dominant economic position in several southeast Asian countries. In the following, I will consider the overseas Chinese as a group strategy in Indonesia and Thailand.

Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Chinese traders first settled in Indonesia before the Dutch. When the Dutch obtained control, they used the Chinese traders as middlemen between themselves and the indigenous Indonesians—as buyers and sellers between the Dutch and the indigenes, and as administrators, tax farmers, and farmers of commodity monopolies granted by the Dutch (Surydinata 1988, 262). In addition, there were a large number of Chinese immigrants recruited as laborers from 1860–1890 (Mackie & Coppel 1976, 4). By 1990 there were nearly 5.5 million Chinese in Indonesia, constituting 3% of the population (Suryadinata 1997, 21).

Since early in the 20th century there have been two classes of the Chinese in Indonesia, the totok and peranakan. The totok are

ethnic Chinese who derive from the more recent period of immigration which included large numbers of women. They have tended to marry among themselves and have continued Chinese cultural patterns. The peranakan are a more assimilated group, both culturally and genetically. The peranakan originated from unions between male Chinese workers and native women. They gradually became a self-contained ethnic group, marrying among themselves rather than with indigenous women (Suryadinata 1992, 86).The totok community reflected the fact that beginning in 1900 immigrants increasingly included large numbers of Chinese women. Marriage among the totok was endogamous, with the result that the totok community became increasingly separate from the peranakan community, while the peranakan community remained separate from both the pribumi (indigenous Indonesians) and the tokok Chinese. "Many immigrants no longer needed (or wished) to assimilate to peranakan society and their numbers grew to a size which could support a separate totok community, of which their Indies-born children were also members" (Mackie & Coppel 1976, 8). There has been chronic friction between the totok and peranakan communities, including complaints by peranakans of economic domination by the totoks (Suryadinata 1998, 94). Pribumis do not consider either peranakans or totoks to be full members of the Indonesian nation (Suryadinata 1992, 190).

In 1909, the Chinese government promulgated a *jus sanguinis* law declaring that children of an ethnic Chinese father or mother were Chinese citizens no matter where they were born; later Chinese governments specifically refused to abandon this law. Partly because of this, there have been doubts about Chinese loyalty in Indonesia, as has occurred repeatedly in Jewish history. For example, after the victory of communism in China many ethnic Chinese rejected Indonesian citizenship. The government later forced the Chinese to choose between Indonesian and Chinese citizenship. According to government figures, around two-thirds of the Chinese chose Indonesian citizenship (Mackie & Coppel 1976, 11). After 1965 and the end of Indonesia's pro-China policy, there were suspicions that the Chinese would side with China in any conflict between Indonesia and China—they

were seen as "Trojan horses serving Peking's supposedly devious purposes" (Mackie & Coppel 1976, 17). This distrust because of doubts about loyalty applies not only to the totoks but also to the much more highly assimilated peranakans (Suryadinata 1992, 191).

The totok Chinese have consistently been less assimilative, less involved in Indonesian politics, and more oriented to China than the peranakan (Coppel 1976, 28). As a result there have been chronic tensions between the two communities. Within the peranakan community there have been divergent tendencies with swings back and forth between greater or lesser assimilation. Some peranakan have opted for Indonesian nationalist positions and complete biological and cultural assimilation, while others attempted to create a unique peranakan culture with a strong emphasis on Chinese cultural traditions, Chinese language, and government-supported Chinese schools (Coppel 1976, 33ff). The relative strength of these positions changed over historical time depending on other events. For example, the Baperki party was set up in 1954 to oppose discrimination against people of Chinese ancestry (Coppel 1976, 45ff). This movement generally opposed "exclusivism" in the peranakan community, leading to the abandonment of Chinese names for newspapers and associations, opening associations to indigenous Indonesians, and excluding "alien" Chinese—those who had not become Indonesian citizens. Nevertheless, these associations remained exclusivist in spirit if not by regulation, leading to continued criticism by more radical assimilationists. Some Baperki leaders advocated cultural pluralism—a model in which each ethnic group would remain separate. Others advocated complete assimilation, including biological assimilation. Assimilationists criticized the mainstream Chinese community for demanding the end to racial prejudice while themselves remaining exclusivist and separate from indigenous Indonesians. However, even radical assimilationists stopped short of advocating conversion to Islam. By 1963, the less radical forms of assimilation—cultural pluralism—won out within Baperki until the party was banned in the wake of the Communist coup of 1965. More recently, the peranakans continue to seek greater acceptance as an indigenous minority but they are seen by

the primumis as separate and as non-indigenous (Suryadinata 1992, 190ff).

Like the Jews in early modern Eastern Europe, the Chinese began during the Dutch colonial period as tax farmers and pawn brokers, and then expanded into money lending, estate managing, wholesale trade for the export market, and eventually distributive trade. Chinese traders displaced the nascent indigenous traders and small businessmen by the early 20th century (Mackie 1988, 237). The end of Dutch colonialism in 1946 resulted in an increase in the social status of Chinese. By 1950 the Chinese dominated retail trade, trade in agricultural produce, and many areas of wholesale trade, industry, transport services and finance. Their main competitors in these latter areas were the Dutch who retained the top positions in banking, the plantation economy, and import-export businesses. After the Dutch were expelled in 1957–1958, the ethnic Chinese took advantage of educational opportunities and the economic vacuum left by the departing Dutch to increase their economic domination. The natives dominated the government but otherwise remained at the bottom of the economic hierarchy.

Indonesian governments dominated by the indigenous ethnic groups enacted various measures in an attempt to promote native participation in the economy. Various enterprises were nationalized, and natives were given preference in granting of import-export licenses and in receiving bank credits. However, this had little effect in producing a class of native businessmen because of lack of capital. Many natives simply sold their licenses to Chinese businessmen or created so-called Ali-Baba partnerships in which Ali, the native Indonesian, received the license, and Baba, the Chinese businessman, ran the business.

The ineffectiveness of these attempts to promote native businessmen led to increasing hostility and demands for even greater discrimination against the Chinese. Aliens were banned from trading and from residing in rural areas. Chinese newspapers were banned, and, although the government prevented outright violence, there were "covert and unofficial forms of harassment and discrimination" in the 1960–1965 period (Mackie & Coppel 1976, 15). In 1960, 136,000 Chinese aliens were repatriated at

the expense of the Chinese government amid charges of mistreatment by Indonesian customs officials (Mackie 1976, 97). In 1963 there were popular riots in West Java mainly resulting from the economic gap between the wealthy Chinese and the poor Indonesians, exacerbated by "quasi-signeurial" social arrangements resulting from Chinese takeover of formerly Dutch-owned plantations (Mackie 1976, 96). The government opposed these riots, albeit ineffectually, and issued a statement that "the nation must be built on the unity of the Chinese citizens and the asli [indigenous] Indonesians" (Mackie 1976, 107).

However, the tension continued. In 1966, Chinese language schools were closed and the only Chinese language newspaper allowed to remain was run by the government. The government urged Chinese to change their names to Indonesian-like names, and 230,000 did so. Between 1965–1968 there were overt attacks against the Chinese in the wake of a failed communist coup in which Chinese students played a high-profile role. By far the greatest number of casualties in the ensuing violence were Indonesian communists, but Chinese were targeted as Chinese. Mackie notes that estimates of Chinese dead in the first stage of violence beginning in 1965 range up to 1000, but 300,000 to 500,000 Indonesians died in the violence as well. Even in the absence of rioting, there was an atmosphere of harassment, intimidation, and extortion. Chinese communal associations and educational institutions were closed, and a great many Chinese left Indonesia for China.

This was followed by a period of relative calm with the advent of the Suharto government, albeit in a "potentially explosive political atmosphere" because none of the underlying issues resulting in violence had changed (Mackie 1976, 138). In the 1970s the government attempted to repress expressions of Chinese communal solidarity, with the hope that in the long run it would break down Chinese communal solidarity, even among the alien totok Chinese. The following assessment reflects the mood of the 1970s:

> Both the nationalist [mainly totok] and integrationist [mainly peranakan] patterns of Chinese political activity

> have been communal in inspiration. They have depended for their vigour upon a separate press (Chinese or Indonesian) a separate educational system (Chinese, Dutch or Indonesian) and separate associations representing Chinese interests in various fields. They have also required tolerance for their existence from governments in power. In present-day Indonesia, none of these conditions are met. . . . Most of those who had been prominent before the coup attempt in political fields were unwilling or unable to participate now. Some from frustration or fear, left the country. Others chafed at home (or in jail) in a political environment which, for the Chinese at least, had become less open than before. (Coppel 1976, 65)

The Overseas Chinese in Indonesia have a reputation of being relatively uninterested in politics despite the fact that political trends have often had major effects on their businesses. There is some truth to this stereotype. Many businessmen are "very careful to avoid open political activity or commitments"; as one businessman noted, "Politics is a risky business here, above all for a Chinese; I prefer to play safe looking after my business and my family" (in Coppel 1976, 20). Chinese political participation has been characterized by "fits and starts" (Coppel 1976, 72), with a decline in the 1970s since the repression inaugurated after the failed Communist coup curtailed Chinese communal associations, media, and education. Even during the rioting of the 1960s, Chinese responses were muted. However, in 1967 the Chinese engaged in "massive protest demonstrations"—"an unprecedented gesture of defiance verging on provocation on the part of the Chinese . . . It was as if the Chinese there had become desperate in the face of the harassment and victimisation to which they had been subjected and had decided to abandon their traditional low posture of acquiescence, restraints, and patience in order to stand up openly at last against their persecutors" (Mackie 1976, 121).

Indonesia has a reputation of being the most anti-Chinese of the Southeast Asian countries, a result that may be due to relative

inefficiency of the government in suppressing ethnic conflict and/or the Muslim religion of the indigenous people (Mackie 1976, 77). Anti-Chinese sentiment has been particularly common among the more devout Muslim sectors of Indonesian society—associated with the political right, while the left has been relatively pro-Chinese (and often pro-China). However, the devout Muslims on the political right also tended to be businessmen and shopkeepers who viewed the Chinese as competitors, their Muslim religion leading them to take a negative view of the Chinese as heathens and "pork-eaters" (Mackie 1976, 78–79). As of 1988, ethnic Chinese were excluded from certain industries altogether (oil and minerals, plantations, some areas of export-import trade). They were also discriminated against in government employment, the professions, and university admissions. The result of these discriminatory patterns was to exacerbate the occupational specialization, with the Chinese "virtually forced into the 'trading' and 'financial' sectors of the economy because of their exclusion from other sectors. But those spheres are precisely where the biggest profits have been in recent years" (Mackie 1988, 243).

Mackie's (1976, 129ff) analysis of the causes of Indonesian-Chinese conflict fit well with the social identity perspective on anti-Semitism (*SAID*, ch. 1). Chinese racial difference and "socio-cultural separateness" produce negative feelings on the part of the Indonesians that were exacerbated by differences in social status and even more so among those in direct competition with Chinese. Negative attitudes were also exacerbated by Chinese disdain for the Indonesians and by nationalist movements on both sides during the course of the 20th century. After World War II the Chinese were less enthusiastic about Indonesian independence and nationalism than the indigenous Indonesians, and there were worries that Indonesian Chinese would side with China in any conflict—the loyalty issue that has so often been a component of anti-Semitism. Another point of conflict was Chinese economic success—the issue of Chinese "'economic domination' of their country through a tight and allegedly impenetrable network of credit and personal ties, which give them enormous advantages over Indonesians in such matters as access to capital,

trading contacts and market information" (Mackie 1976, 130). There was a feed-forward process in which these complaints reinforced group separateness and "distrust, envy, fear, and hostility" on the part of the Indonesians, and "cultural arrogance, contempt or condescension towards Indonesians" on the part of the Chinese (Mackie 1976, 131).

Mitigating the anti-Chinese attitudes, at least on the part of indigenous elites, was a perceived need to utilize the talents of the Chinese, a belief that anti-Chinese violence would discourage foreign investment, and a desire not to offend China. Also mitigating anti-Chinese sentiments were the close economic ties that had developed between Chinese businessmen and indigenous political and administrative elites—the so-called *cukong* relationships (see below). The ties between the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and the Chinese government are real. Indonesian politicians often opposed actions against the ethnic Chinese in their country because they feared that such actions would antagonize China. The Chinese government often condemned anti-Chinese actions—an understandable reaction since many Indonesian Chinese remained non-citizen aliens and were Chinese nationals in the eyes of the Peking government. The situation has been complicated by the fact that China has had a communist government since 1949, so that anti-communism among the Indonesians often coincided with hostility to Indonesian Chinese, many of whom were sympathetic to communism, at least partly because of their psychological ties to China. The Overseas Chinese in the various countries of Southeast Asia maintain ties with each other (Gungwu 1976, 200; Suryadinata 1988, 277), a situation that would also lead to perceptions that they function as an international group with different interests than indigenous Indonesians.

Ties between Chinese businessmen and native elites are important in Indonesia. During the disturbances of the 1960s, indigenous Indonesian elites had little sympathy with the rioters, at least partly because they wished to portray their country as enlightened and anti-racist in conformity with international norms. During this period it became common for wealthy Chinese individuals and firms to establish connections with military officers or high-level bureaucrats among the indigenous Indone-

sians. These cukong relationships essentially purchased protection as well as exclusive access to government contracts and investment credits, etc. (Mackie 1976, 138; Mackie 1988, 244)—obviously a form of corruption benefiting the Chinese businessman and his elite indigenous Indonesian patrons, but compromising the interests of the great majority of indigenous Indonesians.

These cukong relationships between Chinese businessmen and elite indigenous government officials and military officers are a common source of complaint among lower status indigenous people (Dahana 1997). These people are prone to blaming the collusion between the government and the Chinese for their woes. Because of their status as economically dominant ethnic outsiders, the Chinese are always susceptible to bouts of economic nationalism spearheaded by the indigenous Indonesians, and some firms have begun recruiting genuine indigenous Indonesian partners in order to protect themselves from this sort of ethnic conflict. In addition to the disturbances described above, there was an anti-cukong campaign in 1971 led by "less successful businessmen" and supported by Islamic groups and political opponents of the government (Suryadinata 1988, 267). Accusations included claims that the cukongs had preferential treatment in obtaining government contracts and investment credits. In general, the cukongs become wealthy only after establishing a partnership with members of the indigenous elite, not before. Cukongs take advantage of their Chinese business contacts and the advantages obtained from their elite indigenous patrons to obtain great wealth for themselves and their patrons.

A unique feature of the Indonesian situation is the presence of a strong, ethnically mixed peranakan community that became increasingly active politically and culturally. Because of the strong assimilationist trends—their relative lack of interest in China and their status as a partially genetically assimilated group, the peranakans may have functioned to ameliorate the hostility directed at the Chinese by the indigenous Indonesians. However, the peranakans never really supported indigenous nationalism, and during the 1960s came to be seen as on a par with the totok Chinese. The decline of the peranakan community was also hastened by competition with the totoks who displaced them in

key industries and established cukong relationships with the indigenous Indonesian elites. The totoks also had the advantage of being able to communicate with other Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, and they were better able to utilize ethnic networks, including clan networks derived from mainland Chinese clans (Suryadinata 1988, 277).

This latter point is a stark reminder for the continued importance of Chinese collectivism and ethnocentrism in understanding the economic behavior of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Chinese firms remain family enterprises rather than public companies (Suryadinata 1988, 276). There is a great deal of cooperation not only between other Chinese, but relationships between fellow-clan members in different countries continue to occur throughout Southeast Asia. This fits well with Landa's (1994) analysis of Chinese ethnic business networks (see below).

Dahana (1997, 66ff) sees little change in attitudes or assimilation by the Chinese in Indonesia since the 1950s and 1960s (see also Surydinata 1992, 197–198). The Chinese community—both peranakan and totok—is seen by the indigenous Indonesians as a unified group. They maintain full economic rights but their political participation and rights are limited. The country remains divided between a Chinese community that dominates business and commerce and the *pribumi* indigenous class that dominates the government. The Chinese are still seen as "rich, economic animals, an exclusive group, unpatriotic, oriented towards China, having double loyalty, and so forth" (Dahana 1997, 67). The government fears that the peranakan Chinese are becoming more Chinese—more like the totok, as indicated for example in the popularity of learning Mandarin among young Indonesian Chinese. Learning Mandarin is strongly discouraged by the government because it is seen as opposing assimilation. The government retains a ban on Chinese characters in public originating in the 1960s, and Chinese religious observances are confined to temples. There are indeed some signs of greater integration (e.g., some Chinese becoming Muslim; see Tan 1997; hiring indigenous Indonesians for lower and mid-level positions in Chinese companies; see Suryadinata 1988, 276). However, "the process of integration of the Indonesian Chinese has still a long way to go"

(Dahana 1997, 68). There are strong suspicions of an alliance between elite bureaucrats and wealthy Chinese businessmen based on financial payoffs (cukong relationships), while the economic fortunes of most Indonesians languish. There is chronic ethnic tension due not only to the dominant economic position held by the Chinese, but also because of issues related to access to education. State universities favor indigenous students on the theory that the Chinese would dominate in the absence of such favoritism and because, being rich, they are perceived as being able to afford education overseas or in private universities. Obviously these fears reflect the reality that the Chinese as a highly intelligent group would indeed outcompete the indigenous Indonesians.

Suryadinata (1992, 202) notes, "the New Order economic policy has created a class of rich people who are not only Chinese but also indigenous Indonesians as well, many of them with political connections. As a result, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened and the tendency for social conflict is much greater than before. The Chinese are becoming conspicuous and as in the past have become the target of pribumi's resentment." In the area of politics, Chinese political associations are banned, "and the small number of Chinese who were interested in getting involved in politics had to join 'assimilated organizations'" (p. 205). Chinese political interests are handled through wealthy Chinese power brokers with close ties to indigenous elites.

Ethnic Chinese in Thailand

> While the Chinese problem has many dimensions, it is first of all an economic problem, and it is precisely this aspect which looms largest for the Thai. As they see it, the Chinese, welcomed into the Kingdom years ago by a generous government, have since that time subtly undermined the livelihood of the Thai people themselves. They have driven the latter from various skilled crafts, monopolized new occupations, and through a combination of commercial know-how and chicanery have gained a stranglehold over the trade and commerce of

> the entire kingdom. The Thai see the Chinese as exploiting unmercifully their advantageous economic position: the Thai are obliged to pay high prices to the Chinese for the very necessities of life, and on the other hand are forced to accept the lowest price for the rice they grow. Through deliberate profiteering, according to standard Thai thinking, this minority has driven up living costs, hitting especially hard government employees on fixed salaries. It is also charged that profits made by the Chinese go out of the country in the form of remittances to China, which means a continuous and gigantic draining away of the Kingdom's wealth. To protect their favoured economic position, one hears, the Chinese have not hesitated to bribe officials, which in turn has undermined the efficiency and morale of the public service. Efforts to protect the economic interests of the Thai people through legislation have been only partially effective, again because of Chinese adeptness at evasion and dissimulation. (Coughlin 1960, 2)

In 1990, the population of 4,813,00 Chinese constituted 8.6% of the Thai population, predominantly centered in urban areas (Suryadinata 1997, 21). As in other Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese immigrated to Thailand before there was more than a rudimentary development of an indigenous commercial and trading class (Coughlin 1960, 17). Another common trend is that the original immigration to Thailand was almost exclusively male, leading to intermarriage with Thai women. However, as more Chinese women immigrated, marriage came to be exclusively within the Chinese community and there was an upsurge of emphasis on Chinese culture and education, in turn leading to the perception that the Chinese were a "separatist minority actively resisting integration" (Coughlin 1960, 24).

As in other Southeast Asian societies, the Chinese community in Thailand is highly organized. The Overseas Chinese communities are

> remarkably self-sufficient and to many observers seem to form alien societies within the host society. They have proved unusually effective, on the one hand, for encouraging mutual aid and co-operation among heterogeneous linguistic and socio-economic groups and, on the other, for providing protection from hostile or competitive individuals and governments. Better than most people the Chinese have learned the dictum that 'in unity there is strength'. Their organizational cohesion furnishes much of the answer not only to the economic well-being of the Chinese as a group but also to the persistence of their cultural patterns and values in an alien and sometimes unfriendly social environment. (Coughlin 1960, 32)

I noted above that traditional Chinese social organization is centered around the tsu, or clan. As indicated above, tsu relationships continue to have a role in business transactions (Suryadinata 1988, 17). In Thailand these organizations comprised Chinese who have the same surname and originate from the same dialect region of China. Whereas in China the tsu would be headed by tribal elders, the Overseas Chinese dialect association is headed by a successful businessman. In the 1950s in Thailand, the dialect associations served some of the same functions as the tsu in mainland China, including business contacts, funding schools and medical facilities, and providing loans and some social welfare functions directed at members from the same dialect group, especially recent immigrants (Coughlin 1960, 32).

However, in general the main educational, medical, and religious organizations of the Overseas Chinese are directed at the entire Overseas Chinese community rather than specific dialect groups. Unlike other Overseas Chinese communities, since the 1930, Chinese schools in Thailand were conducted in Mandarin—the national language of China—rather than specific dialects, and hospitals provided medical services to all Chinese. Chinese immigrants enjoy a comprehensive social welfare system ensuring them against unemployment, sickness, death, hassles with government officials, etc. "The individual never stands

alone; even when he has no formal membership in the associations which furnish assistance, he is still entitled to receive their help" (Coughlin 1960, 62).

The main Chinese charitable group, the Poh Tek Association, served all poor Chinese but also provides some funds for non-Chinese. As in traditional Jewish communities (see ch. 6), Coughlin (1960, 63) reports a great deal of prestige accorded to benefactors of charitable organizations, including in this case, wealthy Chinese who have been recognized by the Thai government for contributions to general charity. It is the wealthy, public-spirited individual who achieves influence within the community. The great bulk of Chinese charity goes to Chinese causes. The meetings and publications of Chinese charitable organizations are conducted in the Chinese language—an effective barrier to outsiders.

Coughlin (1960, 49–50) reports that the Chinese developed trade guilds that serve to exclude Thais and others by regulating access to apprenticeships in a wide variety of occupations, ranging from printers to vegetable merchants. The Chinese also dominate the Bangkok Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the main association of businesses. The meetings and publications of this organization are in the Chinese language which serves to exclude indigenous Thais from participation. It also champions Chinese education and organizes charitable services for Chinese. The organization intercedes with the government, both on the part of Chinese as individuals (e.g., with tax problems), but especially on behalf of businesses. Techniques for intervention on behalf of business include financial payoffs to government officials aimed at influencing legislation related to the interests of member businesses. This in turn produces resentment among Thais alarmed at Chinese economic power. At times, the Chamber acts on behalf of the entire Chinese community, as when the Thai government sought to close Chinese language schools.

Coughlin (1960, 62) notes that Chinese associations "stimulate ethnocentric sentiments among the Chinese." The vibrant Chinese organizational life acts to prevent assimilation. Group solidarity is also enhanced when the Thai government promulgates regulations, such as restrictions on immigration, special taxes,

prohibitions on Chinese language schools, and favoritism toward Thais in government employment that target the Chinese as a group (Coughlin 1960, 65, 85). Emerging nationalism beginning in the 1930s was aimed at supplanting allegiance to the king with allegiance to the nation, and from the nationalist perspective, Chinese schools were seen as a threat to national unity (Coughlin 1960, 149). Various regulations were enacted to lessen Chinese language and curriculum in schools, with the long term effect of acculturating the Chinese more to Thailand and less to China. Nevertheless, as of 1960 the Chinese were emotionally committed to retaining some emphasis on Chinese in the curriculum, although the content had declined to the point where the vast majority of students would be unable to attend universities in China because of language deficiencies.

Because of Chinese domination of the economy, there is chronic conflict over economic issues among the Chinese and the government which is dominated by indigenous Thais. Beginning in the 1930s, the Thai government has sought to remove the Chinese from some commercial fields, such as rice processing, food hawking, and meat slaughtering (Coughlin 1960, 129ff). A law of 1942 restricted several professions to Thai citizens, measures directed against the large alien Chinese population. Similar laws favoring Thai nationals were enacted in subsequent years, but were relatively ineffective because the alien Chinese were able to circumvent the laws by using Thai names, bribing officials, using Thai as dummy business partners (reminiscent of the "Ali-Baba" practices in Indonesia), and becoming Thai citizens. This phenomenon is perhaps a testimony to the extent to which laws explicitly directed against a particular ethnic group (rather than non-citizens) are viewed as unacceptable in the post-World War II environment. However, there are also an array of tacit practices by which the government favors indigenous Thai over ethnic Chinese, including ethnic Chinese who have become citizens of Thailand. Moreover, in some areas buyers of land had to prove they were of Thai nationality for three generations, and applicants for public housing had to prove that their grandfather lived in Thailand—requirements that effectively excluded the vast majority of ethnic Chinese, including citizens (Coughlin

1960, 140–141). "All these measures point to the fact that in the eyes of some officials there are two classes of citizens, only one of which, the 'pure' Thai, is accorded full citizenship rights" (Coughlin 1960, 141).

Like Jews in traditional societies, it is interesting that the early Chinese immigrants managed to marry into the Thai elite. "Many public figures and every Thai monarch since the middle of the 19th century, were partly Chinese" (Coughlin 1960, 75). There is a tradition were a subset of wealthy Chinese make alliances with the Thai governmental elite. They adopt Thai names, marry Thai women, and move in Thai circles while nevertheless retaining their status in the Chinese community as well (Coughlin 1960, 88). Like the tradition of the Court Jew who often converted to Christianity, they serve as intermediaries between the Chinese and the Thai community. However, there is no separate, self-conscious group of mixed race Thai-Chinese as seen in the Indonesian peranakans (Coughlin 1960, 90). Coughlin describes one Thai-Chinese family as having two branches, one well-connected in the Thai elite and one well-connected in the Chinese elite. Some individuals have high positions in both communities and maintain both Thai and Chinese names. Mackie (1988, 247) suggests that the high rate of intermarriage between Chinese and the Thai elite is a critical factor in mitigating Thai anti-Chinese sentiment.

The Thai are much more individualistic than the Chinese. While the Chinese have a strong tendency toward the extended family extending backward for many generations, the Thai "have little sense of lineage, no feeling for ancestry, and little interest in or knowledge of kin beyond immediate living relatives" (Coughlin 1960, 78). The Thai even lacked surnames in their traditional culture and only came to use them as a result of government decree. While the Chinese family is strongly patricentric, the Thai family is strongly matricentric, with the husband going to live with his wife's family.

Family life is much more loosely structured among the Thai. Arranged marriages are the rule among both groups, but among the Thai the custom is not as rigidly enforced; elopement is accepted and common. Romantic love and courtship are not the

norm in either group, especially among the Chinese, but the fact that elopement is commonplace among the Thai suggests that courtship and romantic love—hallmarks of the individualistic family (*CofC*: MacDonald 1998/2002)—are more common among the Thai.

Divorce—another marker of individualism—is also much more acceptable among the Thai than among the Chinese. Women have much greater freedom and status in individualistic cultures, and Thai women have much more freedom than Chinese women (Coughlin 1960, 73, 79). Thai women own property, run businesses, and are more likely to be educated than Chinese women. Thai individualism is also indicated by the finding that the Thai attach no particular importance to communal charity or welfare (Coughlin 1960,60). Another reflection of Chinese collectivism is that there is little class resentment within the overseas Chinese community (Coughlin 1960, 62); despite great differences in wealth Chinese see themselves as an ingroup among the Thai as an outgroup.

The Chinese became middlemen between elite Western economic interests and the native Thai elite on one hand, and the Thai peasantry on the other (Coughlin 1960, 117). The response of the Chinese to increasing restrictions and discrimination against them in the period after 1932 was to reinforce alliances with the Thai elite (Coughlin 1960, 138). "Hundreds of government officials and other members of the Thai élite were either fully 'cut in' on Chinese businesses or serving on the boards of Chinese firms in a 'protective' capacity [and] the majority of the most influential Chinese leaders had formed business connections with government officials and other members of the new Thai élite" (Skinner 1958, 187). Like the cukong relationships in Indonesia, in effect the native Thai elite acquiesced to a situation in which a non-Thai ethnic group retained their economic domination but in which they individually benefited—another indication of Thai individualism.

During the 19th century the Chinese dominated all retail trade, rice marketing and processing, and the construction trades, while the Thai were mainly small peasant farmers dominated by a numerically small aristocratic political and military elite. The

Chinese virtual monopoly on trade and commerce has made it difficult for Thais to gain a foothold. The close ethnic bonds among Chinese businessmen lower the costs of doing business because there is greater trust within the ethnic group than between ethnic groups (Landa 1994). "The average Chinese business man is sure of other Chinese business men; he is not quite so sure of the Thai" (Coughlin 1960, 123). Thai retailers receive poorer terms from Chinese wholesalers than do Chinese retailers—higher prices and tighter credit. Because there are relatively few Thai businessmen, they do not have a financial support system when economic times are difficult.

Landa (1994) notes that in general ethnic Chinese traders demand cash in business transactions with indigenous people but accept credit terms from fellow Chinese. Prospective traders were implicitly ranked in terms of trustworthiness, ranging from near kinsmen, distant kinsmen, clansmen, fellow-villagers, fellow dialect speakers (e.g., Hokkien), non-Hokkien Chinese, and non-Chinese. "The higher transaction costs of outsiders constitute an entry barrier into personalistic markets" (Landa 1994, 108). Obviously, the increasing trust associated with greater genetic overlap reflects evolutionary expectations (see Alexander 1979).

> First, the Chinese middlemen are able to appropriate profit expectations as intangible assets with a high degree of certainty, thereby facilitating middleman-entrepreneurship. Second, Chinese middlemen are able to reduce out-of-pocket costs of private protection of contracts; this shifts the total transaction-cost curve of a middleman firm downward. Third middlemen are able to economize on the holding of commodity inventories and money by the creation of an efficient forward market in goods and money within the boundaries of the Chinese middleman economy. The result is the creation of "dual markets": the existence of forward markets and credit transactions within the Chinese middleman economy side by side with spot markets and cash transactions within the indigenous economy. (Landa 1994, 108)

This suggests that once in place, ethnic networks are difficult to dislodge for purely economic reasons. Mackie (1988), contra Lim (1983, 22) suggests that it is unrealistic to suppose that ethnicity will decline in importance in Thailand and Indonesia as a result of market forces, lack of government interference, and modernization. Chinese communities have a strong sense of ethnic solidarity, and Chinese businessmen have made their way in a Chinese ethnic world of family firms ranging from small businesses to huge international conglomerates.

The issue of loyalty is a chronic one among the Overseas Chinese. In Thailand, the Chinese make a great show of Thai patriotism on patriotic holidays but more often they hoisted the Chinese flag (Chantavanich 1997, 247), and they went to great lengths to avoid the military draft (Coughlin 1960, 71, 172ff). During Wold War II Chinese businessmen overtly aided the Thai government, an ally of Japan, but secretly aided the government of China which was at war with Japan (Chantavanich 1997, 249). Assimilation increased after World War II. For the most part, the Chinese became Thai citizens with a Thai national identity and a Chinese ethnic identity, including public observance of traditional Chinese customs (Chantavanich 1997, 254).

For their part, the Thai have desired greater identification with Thailand and its institutions on the part of the Overseas Chinese, including willingness to participate in military and government service, and a thoroughgoing Thai education (Coughlin 1960, 198). During an upsurge of Chinese nationalism during the 1930s, overt Chinese nationalists were deported, and the vast majority of the remainder increasingly downplayed their Chinese identity (Chantavanich 1997, 248). However, until quite recently, the vast majority of ethnic Chinese had little interest in even becoming Thai citizens. Between 1935 and 1958 a total of 4652 Chinese were naturalized as Thai citizens, approximately 0.5% of the ethnic Chinese in the country, and the great majority of these naturalizations were opportunistic—reminiscent of Court Jews in traditional societies. Naturalized citizens had to fulfill a variety of requirements in order to vote or hold office, practices intended to ensure that the Chinese had become thoroughly enculturated but in effect disenfranchising virtually the entire ethnically Chinese

population. In part this reflected the orientation of the Chinese at a time when the Overseas Chinese had elected representation in the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist government in Peking included a provision in its constitution vowing to protect the rights of Overseas Chinese (Coughlin 1960, 183). As in Indonesia, this orientation to China resulted in chronic friction with the government and periodic attempts to suppress Chinese culture by, e.g., closing Chinese language schools and newspapers (Chantavanich 1997, 240).

Writing in 1960, Coughlin summed up his impression that "the assimilation found is dictated by the demands of public life and one's livelihood—what might be called 'assimilation for convenience'; a voluntary desire for more thorough integration is lacking" (p. 193). The Chinese maintain a self-sufficient ethnic life, including Chinese schools, ethnic organizations, publications, and social welfare system, that effectively set them apart from Thai society. "Drawn into the Chinese community by basic economic considerations, the typical Chinese becomes part of its institutions, accepts its values, and in so doing is removed from the institutions and values of Thai society" (p. 195).

As has often been the case with anti-Jewish attitudes (*SAID*, ch. 1), there is outgroup stereotyping on both sides of the ethnic divide. The Thai regard the Chinese as excessively materialistic, economically aggressive, and concerned mainly with making money. They are also charged with pushing the Thais out of various trades, corrupting government officials, and monopolistic price fixing. The Chinese stereotype the Thai as lazy, dishonest, prone to corruption, and prone to extorting money from Chinese businessmen. (Coughlin [1960, 137] notes that in fact the Chinese are "more diligent, more careful workers than the Thai"—a comment that fits Rushton's [1994] r-K theory of the Chinese as a highly K-selected group.) Thai women are seen as morally loose.

Negative stereotypes of the Chinese are perpetuated in the Thai media (Coughlin 1960, 81)—an indication of the negative consequences to a minority group of not controlling the media. By playing up instances where Chinese are involved in violent crime, the media give a false impression of the Chinese as prone

to crime. The Thai media are also highly nationalistic. In the words of one newspaper editor: "This newspaper has the objective of promoting the good living conditions of the Thai people. It has the duty to relieve the Thai people from the economic yoke caused by foreigners. This newspaper considers the interests and safety of the Thai people and Thai nation above other things" (Coughlin 1960, 81).

Unlike Jews in Western societies, there is no tradition of the intellectual among the Overseas Chinese. In mid-20th century Thailand, the Chinese community did not value education but concentrated completely on commercial success, with training coming from experience in the firm rather than from formal education. The Chinese college graduates "have no intellectual effect on the Chinese community. They do not write for the press or lecture, nor do they ordinarily become leaders of any associations. In the Chinese community, wealth rather than scholarship is the spur" (Coughlin 1960, 89).

Also in contrast to Jews, the Chinese have remained relatively aloof from politics despite laws and practices directed against them as a group. The Chinese tend to avoid politics, although Chinese businessmen acknowledge bribing public officials to attain economic goals. Chinese organizations tend to be reactive rather than proactive (Coughlin 1960, 35); i.e., they react to problems as they arise but do not seek to transform the society to serve their interests by, e.g., controlling media messages directed to the Thai.

> The average Chinese in Thailand is well aware of economic, occupational, and educational limitations imposed by the Thai government—probably one or another of these has pinched him personally. But few seem to know or indeed to care about the restrictions on citizenship, nationality rights, and political activities in general, nor are these restrictions given much publicity in the Chinese press. This merely points up the fact, recognized by all observers, that the overseas Chinese are primarily concerned with making a living, or amassing a fortune, and thus take only a passive interest in the for-

> mal political life of the country in which they live. (Coughlin 1960, 169)

Common trends among Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Throughout Southeast Asia, the Chinese are seen as culturally separate and as dominating the economy "by dubious means and unfair advantage" (Gungwu 1976, 206). They are also seen as allied with the great power in the region, China, and therefore at least potentially disloyal to the countries where they reside. This factor interacts with perceptions of China as an expansionist communist state, at least before the end of the Cold War. Other common sources of hostility identified by Gungwu are Chinese flaunting ethnic differences and their conspicuous consumption. On the other hand, the perceived need to retain the Chinese because of their economic usefulness is a common factor restraining anti-Chinese sentiment, especially among elite indigenous peoples. Gungwu suggests that in general there is a perception throughout the region that "the Chinese are manageable and can be made useful to the nation even when they have not assimilated" (p. 209). Their role throughout the region "is principally one of being an instrument of economic growth without either political ambition or social respectability and will retain their role until they are totally assimilated and, therefore, no longer Chinese" (p. 209).

Suryadinata (1997, 6–11) notes that, with the exception of Singapore which has a Chinese majority, all of the nations of Southeast Asia are "indigenous state nations," i.e., nations defined in terms of its indigenous ethnic group, "including its national language, national symbols, national education, and national institutions." Within these states, the Chinese are a non-indigenous minority with fewer rights than indigenous peoples, including indigenous minorities. While Thailand has adopted a cultural model of citizenship congruent with its individualistic tendencies, in Indonesia "an ethnic Chinese is not *fully* accepted as a member of the nation" even when a citizen. And even in Thailand, the nation is defined in terms of the indigenous Thais. Chinese can become part of the Thai nation in the third generation while remaining ethnically Chinese. While many of the

Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese are gradually losing elements of Chinese culture, such as familiarity with the Chinese language, they remain an ethnic group. And because of their very high level of economic success, they are a high-profile ethnic group. In all Southeast Asian nations the governments dominated by indigenous people have attempted to minimize the numbers of ethnic Chinese.

Both the Thai and the Indonesian government have adopted assimilationist policies toward the ethnic Chinese, albeit of differing intensities (Suryadinata 1997, 12ff). In neither case is there an attempt to insist on genetic assimilation. In Thailand, assimilation can be seen in changing names to Thai-sounding names, speaking the Thai language, and acceptance of national symbols. It is normative for the ethnic Chinese to at least display public forms of identifying with the Thai nation, although several commentators have called attention to a remaining "dual identity" among ethnic Chinese in Thailand. In Indonesia, the attitude toward Chinese assimilation has been much more radical, forbidding Chinese schools, Chinese media, and Chinese associations. In general, "many argue that indigenous leaders in Southeast Asia still doubt the loyalty of their Chinese population. And it is uncertain to what extent the Chinese have been accepted by the indigenous population. It is also questionable if the Chinese want to identify themselves with their adopted country" (Suryadinata 1997, 18).

Mackie (1988), seeking to explain the relatively benign attitudes toward ethnic Chinese in Thailand compared to Indonesia, rejects economic explanations because the Chinese form a larger percentage of the population in Thailand and dominate the economy even more than in Indonesia. He attributes the difference to the fact that the ethnic Chinese have assimilated to a greater degree in Thailand, and explains the greater assimilation by differences in the two host societies—the relatively greater sense of economic nationalism among the Indonesians compared to the Thais. In Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese "are unlikely to identify fully as Indonesians so long as they fear that they will suffer economic or political discrimination and not be fully accepted as Indonesians. They will in those circumstances hedge their bets in

various ways, continue to maintain their Chineseness and retain their familial or cultural ties with other Chinese throughout Southeast Asia" (Mackie 1988, 229). As long as the boundaries remain so salient, there is unlikely to be much rapprochement between the two communities (Mackie 1988, 244).

This is analogous to the situation with Jews: Jews have tended to assimilate in relatively individualistic Western societies when assimilation did not have any costs in terms of group continuity. However, in Eastern Europe and Muslim societies with stronger ingroup-outgroup barriers and high levels of anti-Semitism resulting from centuries of conflict, the vast majority of Jews did not assimilate, so that even on the eve of World War II, the majority of Jews in Poland could not speak the Polish language. The point is that in either case, the group maintains its ethnic integrity: Even when there is greater assimilation, the assimilation is cultural, not genetic.

As indicated above, Mackie (1988, 247) suggests that the high rate of intermarriage between Chinese and the Thai elite is a critical factor in mitigating Thai anti-Chinese sentiment compared to the situation in Indonesia. Even in the absence of intermarriage, there has been a very close relationship between the Thai elite and Chinese businessmen. "The process of corporatization of big business has given so many elite-level ethnic Thais a direct stake through shareholdings or directorships in the prosperity of the Sino-Thai business enterprises [without becoming businessmen themselves] that the latter can no longer be regarded as of mere 'pariah' status (Mackie 1988, 249). This has not happened to a similar extent in Indonesia. Mackie is pessimistic of the future in the absence of ethnic Indonesians developing a large stake in Chinese corporations: "If [ethnic Indonesians] do not develop a "substantial stake in the large-scale business sector . . ., the prognosis is not a cheerful one, for the Chinese will be more than ever type-cast by their economic roles and probably subjected to discrimination as second-class citizens; they will be resented for their economic power and forced back into a ghetto mentality, which will further retard any tendencies towards increased social and business interaction, let alone intermarriage." As indicated above, there are some signs of greater integration,

such as hiring indigenous Indonesians for lower and mid-level positions in Chinese companies (Suryadinata 1988, 276), but the commanding heights of the economy remain in the hands of the ethnic Chinese. "The process of integration of the Indonesian Chinese has still a long way to go" (Dahana 1997, 68).

CONCLUSION AND INTEGRATION

The groups described here are similar in having mechanisms that police group boundaries and regulate cooperation within the group. (In the case of the Puritans, this applies only to their period of sovereignty—before about 1690.) All of the groups practiced endogamy but in the case of the Puritans, the Hutterites and the Amish there was no well developed ideology of endogamy. Puritan ideology allowed anyone to be a member of the group if they convinced the congregation that they were among the saved, and there was a half-hearted effort to convert the native Americans. Because their experiment was short-lived, it is impossible to know to what extent they would have retained their genetic integrity if they had succeeded in retaining control over a territory of their own. The Hutterites and Amish have no rules against outsiders joining, but they do not proselytize, and their extreme form of cultural isolation has in fact not resulted in converts.

There is also no well-developed ideology of endogamy among the Overseas Chinese. However, their status as an ethnic minority physically demarcated from the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia and their own sense of collectivism, ethnic networking, and ethnic and cultural identity has resulted in high levels of endogamy. The Overseas Chinese do not have a clearly defined ideology of a closed group evolutionary strategy. There is no Old Testament or Talmud, no corpus of religious or secular writings prescribing the rules for the group. The Overseas Chinese are a sort of happenstance group evolutionary strategy. Originating from independent migrations from different regions of China and mainly as economic refugees, they retain their kinship ties from their home regions but have also developed a sense of themselves as a community with a common ethnic identity. I suggest that this

strong sense of community derives from the continuation of Chinese collectivist cultural forms in the new environment. Their strong sense of kinship ties and groupness was easily transferred to the diaspora situation.

The same might be said for the Gypsies, but they arrived in Europe as a clearly demarcated group—different from the natives both in clothing and physical features, and with a strong sense of group identity. Like the Overseas Chinese, this apparently derived from their ancestral cultural forms—in their case their prehistory as a wandering, occupationally specialized endogamous group deriving from a part of the world, India, where such groups are the norm.

The groups reviewed here differ in their tendency to become economically and politically dominant. The Gypsies, the Amish, the Hutterites, and the Puritans have never sought to dominate the people they have lived among. For the Gypsies, this results from their specialization in low-status occupations and in extracting fairly low amounts of resources often via various forms of chicanery practiced on the majority population. Unless there is a very large increase in their numbers, they are unlikely to be seen as a major threat to the peoples they live among, although low-level hostility is expected on the basis of psychological mechanisms of group identity.

The Amish and Hutterites have a clearly articulated and practiced policy of avoiding relationships with outsiders that might be construed as exploitative. This also applies to the Puritans during their period of isolation. The Puritans, like the Amish and Hutterites, sought to build their own society and exclude outsiders rather than dominate non-Puritans. But the very success of the Puritan enterprise—its size, its wealth, and its control over a large area of land comprising the Massachusetts Bay Company—made it the target of the British colonialists seeking to control their possessions and a goal for immigrants seeking economic advantage. The Amish and Hutterites, on the other hand, because of their very low economic and political profile, would never have excited the sort of attempts at control which the British exercised on the Massachusetts Bay Company. But in the absence of control over their own territory, the group strategy

quickly unraveled. The Puritans lost the abilities to govern their territory, control the behavior of its inhabitants, and control immigration. And in the absence of these prerogatives, the Puritans gradually ceased being a well-defined group strategy. These trends were well in place by the end of the 17th century, less than 75 years after the origins of the colony. Today the only remnants are Congregationalist Churches with little if any genetic connection to the Puritans of the 17th century. They do not constitute a well-defined endogamous group. Without control of a specific territory, the Puritans succumbed to their own individualistic tendencies and those of the surrounding culture.

One wonders what might have happened if the British colonial authorities had allowed the colony complete sovereignty and if it had ultimately become a nation-state. Such a state, based on a clearly articulated exclusivist group strategy, might have been extremely successful. Composed of a highly intelligent, educated, and industrious citizenry, and with a proneness to high fertility and strong controls promoting high-investment parenting, it might have become a world power. One can imagine that as the 19th century wore on, Puritan intellectuals would have begun to see themselves as an ethnic-racial group and that Darwinism would have replaced Christianity as the ideological basis of the state, at least among the well-educated. The demise of Puritanism is likely a major event in the history of European peoples.

On the other hand, the Jews and the Overseas Chinese have often been seen as minority ethnic groups dominating the people they live among. Both the Overseas Chinese and the Jews are highly intelligent and prone to high-investment parenting. Both have been utilized by alien or indigenous elites as economic middlemen under essentially oppressive conditions. Regarding Jews, beginning in the ancient world and extending down to the 20th century in Eastern Europe, the role of Jews as willing agents of princely exploitation was a common theme of anti-Semitism (see ch. 5 and *SAID*, ch. 2). In a work that appeared after the publication of *PTSDA*, this tendency is summarized as follows:

> It was primarily because of the functions of the Jews as the king's revenue gatherers in the urban areas that the

> cities saw the Jews as the monarch's agents, who treated them as objects of massive exploitation. By serving as they did the interests of the kings, the Jews seemed to be working against the interests of the cities; and thus we touch again on the phenomenon we have referred to: the fundamental conflict between the kings and their people—a conflict not limited to financial matters, but one that embraced all spheres of government that had a bearing on the people's life. It was in part thanks to this conflict of interests that the Jews could survive the harsh climate of the Middle Ages, and it is hard to believe that they did not discern it when they came to resettle in Christian Europe. Indeed, their requests, since the days of the Carolingians, for assurances of protection before they settled in a place show (a) that they realized that the kings' positions on many issues differed from those of the common people and (b) that the kings were prepared, for the sake of their interests, to make common cause with the "alien" Jews against the clear wishes of their Christian subjects. In a sense, therefore, the Jews' agreements with the kings in the Middle Ages resembled the understandings they had reached with foreign conquerors in the ancient world. (Netanyahu 1995, 71–72)

In *PTSDA* (ch. 5) I stress the Jewish role as tax farmer and money lender in collusion with non-Jewish elites. In Eastern Europe a common source of hatred against Jews was the *arenda* system in which a Jewish agent would lease an estate from a nobleman. In return for a set fee, the leaseholder would have the right to all the economic production of the estate and would also retain control of the feudal rights (including onerous forced labor requirements) over its inhabitants:

> In this way, the Jewish arendator became the master of life and death over the population of entire districts, and having nothing but a short-term and purely financial interest in the relationship, was faced with the irresistible temptation to pare his temporary subjects to the bone.

> On the noble estates he tended to put his relatives and co-religionists in charge of the flour-mill, the brewery, and in particular of the lord's taverns where by custom the peasants were obliged to drink. On the church estates, he became the collector of all ecclesiastical dues, standing by the church door for his payment from tithepayers, baptized infants, newly-weds, and mourners. On the [royal] estates . . . , he became in effect the Crown Agent, farming out the tolls, taxes, and courts, and adorning his oppressions with all the dignity of royal authority. (Davies 1982, 444; see also Subtleny 1988, 124)

We have seen that the Overseas Chinese were originally brought in as economic middlemen and laborers by the Dutch in Indonesia. However, Thailand was not colonized by the Western powers; Chinese immigration occurred with the cooperation of the native Thai elites, analogous to the situation in Eastern Europe where native elites welcomed the Jews as middlemen. The result in both countries has been chronic conflict between the great mass of indigenous people with the ethnic middlemen who came to dominate the economies of these nations. In this conflict, indigenous elites have tended to side with the ethnic Chinese because they have benefited individually, via cukong relationships in Indonesia and similar relationships in Thailand. These arrangements are politically unstable because they breed resentment in the vast majority of the indigenous population. There are recurrent bouts of economic nationalism, affirmative action policies of ethnic favoritism aimed at benefiting the indigenous population, and resentment at manifestations of ethnic Chinese cultural separatism. These tendencies have been stronger in Indonesia, quite possibly because of the individualistic tendencies of indigenous Thai culture and because the Muslim religion of the indigenous Indonesians exacerbates tendencies to have negative attitudes toward non-Muslims.

Similarly, in Eastern and Central Europe Jews had achieved a remarkable domination of the economy in the early modern period stemming from their role as a successful economic middleman group. As in Thailand and Indonesia, Jews were the

targets of recurrent bouts of economic nationalism, affirmative action policies aimed at benefiting the indigenous population, concern about Jewish loyalties, and resentment at manifestations of Jewish cultural separatism. As with the Overseas Chinese, Jews made alliances with indigenous elites while resentment and hostility welled up from the lower classes. However, the difficult situation that Jews found themselves in at the beginning of the 20th century has been altered because the Jewish population was dramatically lowered as a result of large-scale emigration elsewhere and because of the events of World War II. Beginning in the late 19th century, large numbers of Jewish emigrants went to Western societies—mainly the United States—which already had a strong middle class and no long term history of conflict between Jews and non-Jews. Anti-Semitism itself virtually disappeared after World War II. It remains to be seen what the fate of the Overseas Chinese will be.

Powerful and competitive middleman minority groups in developing countries suppress nascent middle class traders, entrepreneurs, and artisans. We have seen that the development of these classes was suppressed in Thailand and Indonesia by the Overseas Chinese. Similarly, in Poland when Jews won the economic competition in early modern Poland, the result was that the vast majority of Poles had been reduced to the status of agricultural laborer supervised by Jewish estate managers in an economy where virtually all of the trade, manufacturing, and artisanry were controlled by Jews (see ch. 5). On the other hand, in most of Western Europe Jews were expelled in the Middle Ages. As a result, when modernization occurred, it was accomplished with an indigenous middle class. Indeed, the Puritans are a prototypical middle class group. I have noted that the Puritans derived mainly from tradesmen and craftsmen, and they were intelligent and very concerned with education. If, as in Poland, Jews had won the economic competition in most of these professions, there would have not have been a non-Jewish middle class in England. Whatever one might suppose would have been the fortunes and character of England with predominantly Jewish artisans, merchants, and manufacturers, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Christian taxpayers of England made a good investment in

their own future when they agreed to pay King Edward I a massive tax of £116,346 in return for expelling 2000 Jews in 1290 (Mundill 1998, 249ff).

This suggests that an important contrast between Eastern and Western Europe was that exploitative economic systems involving the collaboration between Jews and non-Jewish elites continued far longer in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe popular hostility toward money lending was an important factor in the expulsion of Jews, and eventually the rulers acquiesced to popular and ecclesiastical pressure to end this practice. In England, Spain, France, Germany, Austria, and Bohemia there was a pattern: Jews were expelled because of the ruinous effects of money lending but then allowed to return because the nobility's desire to increase revenue. Although in some cases the proximate cause of the expulsion involved other issues, in all cases expulsion was accompanied by seething popular discontent.[3]

Another reason for the development of liberal economic and political institutions in Western Europe rather than Eastern Europe may have been that ethnic conflict between Jews and non-Jews loomed large in the latter but not the former. Individualism is far more conducive to optimal (individual) utility maximization, but is unlikely to occur if people from one ethnic group fear losing in competition with those from another ethnic group. Late-19th-century Zionists commonly believed that an important source of opposition to liberalism among non-Jews in central Europe stemmed from the perception that liberalism benefited Jews in competition with non-Jews (See *SAID*, ch. 5). It is also noteworthy that the 19th-century liberal critics of Judaism typically assumed that Judaism would disappear as a result of complete cultural and genetic assimilation—a sort of tacit understanding that a liberal society required a fairly high degree of cultural uniformity. The suggestion is that Jewish economic activity, because it resulted in intense competition with native populations and especially with the nascent middle classes, had negative effects on the society as a whole because it prevented the emergence of economic individualism.

Similarly, in Southeast Asia the alliance between ethnic Chinese businessmen and indigenous elites has resulted in a variety

of non-market economic phenomena—corruption by any other name. Because of their politically insecure status as ethnic outsiders, the Chinese have essentially paid indigenous elites for protection from the great masses of people who resent Chinese economic domination and view it as restricting their own prospects for upward mobility. Again, it would appear that a liberal economic culture cannot develop in a society wracked by ethnic conflict. From an evolutionary perspective this is because evolved psychological mechanisms of between-group conflict result in people viewing their situations in terms of their group status (see *CofC*, ch. 8). It is not far fetched to fear the re-emergence of illiberal economic policies as ethnic competition escalates in contemporary Western multi-cultural societies. Affirmative action policies are definitely a step in that direction.

In *PTSDA* (ch. 5, note 4) I made the following comment:

> Although these data suggest resource competition between overseas Chinese and host populations, Zenner (1991, 78ff) also notes that the Chinese did not maintain rigid cultural or reproductive barriers between themselves and the host society. There are other indications that the overseas Chinese did not really constitute a closed group strategy. Thus, the evidence that Chinese merchants favored friends and relatives (Zenner 1991, 80), is compatible with essentially individual/family strategies where the Chinese businessman conceptualizes his relationships in terms of kinship and reciprocity, rather than in an ingroup/outgroup manner where the ingroup includes all diaspora Chinese. Also compatible with this interpretation is Zenner's (1991, 81; see also Yee 1993) comment that the locus of ethnocentrism and group identification among the Chinese was the extended family unit (as indicated, e.g., by ancestor worship as the primary religious manifestation). Jews, on the other hand, developed a highly elaborated diaspora ideology in which the locus of group identification included all members of the dispersed group, no matter how distantly related. One's family was simply a part of

> this much larger group. Reflecting this group, rather than a familial sense of identification, Jews typically communicated regularly and often engaged in altruistic behavior toward co-religionists in distant parts of the world (see ch. 6). This did not occur with the Chinese.

This perhaps overstates the case. Chinese economic networks are indeed based on a series of ever widening concentric circles based on genetic distance. Their networks continue to reflect clan relationships stemming from China, whereas among Jews the importance of tribal affiliation, with the exception of the priestly clans—the kohenim and levites, ceased in the ancient world. Nevertheless, the Overseas Chinese have organized at the supra-clan level within all the societies of Southeast Asia, and business relationships among Chinese in different countries and from different clans remain important.

However, one does see international political cooperation among Overseas Chinese groups at anywhere near the same level that Jewish groups from different countries cooperate. Beginning in the 19th century Jews developed a variety of organizations that attempted to influence policy in other countries, and these organizations remain a powerful force on the world scene. Thus foreign Jewish organizations strove mightily to topple the Czar beginning in the late 19th century, and the ADL and Simon Weisenthal Center sponsor programs in foreign countries and comment on the internal affairs of other countries. For example, the ADL sponsors diversity training programs in European countries and lobbies for Jewish issues in those countries. There are very strong links between Israel and Jewish organizations in the diaspora, with the latter generally acting to promote Israel's interests.

There is much less international political cooperation among the Overseas Chinese. In fact, we have seen that, unlike the Jews, Overseas Chinese have adopted a low profile political posture and have generally stayed out of local politics. Whereas Jews in the United States and elsewhere tend to have economic, political and cultural influence far out of proportion to their numbers, the Chinese are similar only in their economic influence.

There has been a strong trend for Jews to have a very large influence on the media, on the creation of culture, on information in the social sciences and humanities, and on the political process (see *CofC*). This has not happened with the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Chinese have not formed a hostile cultural elite in Southeast Asian countries, and have not been concentrated in media ownership or in the construction of culture. We do not read of Chinese cultural movements disseminated in the major universities and media outlets that subject the traditional culture of Southeast Asians and anti-Chinese sentiment to radical critique.

This probably stems from several factors. First, Jews are much more inclined toward verbal intelligence than the Chinese. This pattern can be seen in the results of IQ tests, where Chinese superiority is on performance IQ while Jews have an extraordinarily high verbal IQ (see ch. 7). As a result, beginning with the Enlightenment, Jews have had a huge influence on culture (*CofC*). As Peter Novick (1999, 12) notes regarding the importance of the Holocaust in contemporary American life,

> We are not just "the people of the book," but the people of the Hollywood film and the television miniseries, of the magazine article and the newspaper column, of the comic book and the academic symposium. When a high level of concern with the Holocaust became widespread in American Jewry, it was, given the important role that Jews play in American media and opinion-making elites, not only natural, but virtually inevitable that it would spread throughout the culture at large.

Secondly, Jews react differently to anti-Jewish attitudes because of their very long history of persecution and because of the centrality of anti-Semitism to their own self-concept. The Chinese are a very recent group strategy, created by happenstance and with relatively little international cohesion at the organizational level. But for Jews there is a long memory of oppression by Babylonians, Romans, Crusaders, the Catholic Church, the Inquisition, the Russian Czar, American conservatives, and the

Nazis—the lachrymose history of the Jewish people. Jews see themselves as quintessential victims living among eternally oppressive cultures. As an exemplar, Holocaust activist Simon Wiesenthal compiled a calendar showing when, where and by whom Jews were persecuted on every day of the year. Among contemporary Jews, Holocaust consciousness is the ultimate expression of a victim mentality (Novick 1999, 194). Because of this long history, since the Enlightenment, Jews have energetically attempted to re-engineer Western societies to conform to their interest in ending anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior (see *CofC*). This has not happened among the Chinese.

The following passage, also quoted above, describing the political attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand could never have applied to Jews in Western societies since the Enlightenment: "But few seem to know or indeed to care about the restrictions on citizenship, nationality rights, and political activities in general, nor are these restrictions given much publicity in the Chinese press. This merely points up the fact, recognized by all observers, that the overseas Chinese are primarily concerned with making a living, or amassing a fortune, and thus take only a passive interest in the formal political life of the country in which they live" (Coughlin 1960, 169). On the contrary, for Jews, any manifestation of anti-Jewish attitudes or behavior is to be met with an all out effort at eradication: "There is no such thing as overreaction to an anti-Semitic incident, no such thing as exaggerating the omnipresent danger. Anyone who scoffed at the idea that there were dangerous portents in American society hadn't learned 'the lesson of the Holocaust' " (Novick 1999, 178). In reading Henry Ford's *The International Jew* dating from 1920 one is struck by the intense activism Jewish immigrants exerted in an effort to assert economic and political rights, as well as shape the wider culture (e.g., removing public displays of Christianity). This compares to the situation in Indonesia where not only have the Chinese not attempted to remove public displays of symbols of Indonesian nationalism and religion, they have not seriously attempted to change laws in place since the 1960s mandating that there be no public displays of Chinese culture.

This conclusion highlights an important theoretical point about group evolutionary strategies. There is no theoretical reason to suppose that there will be "laws of group evolutionary strategies" to be gleaned by examining a number of them and comparing them. My view is that the nature of these groups is theoretically underdetermined because humans, using domain general mechanisms, are able to invent different ways of group living. Unlike animals, our social structures are not rigidly programmed by our genes. There are a whole lot of group strategies with a variety of similarities and differences, and there are a great many humans who don't have much allegiance to groups. I do argue that people who are deeply involved in highly cohesive, ethnocentric groups are (quantitatively) different psychologically from the rest of us on the dimension of individualism/collectivism—a psychological measure related to ethnocentrism (see ch. 8 and SAID, ch.1). And the discussion here suggests that pre-existing differences in psychological traits, such as IQ differences, affect the types of strategies that it would be viable for a group to develop. I have suggested that the verbal/performance IQ distinction between the Jews and the Chinese has an important influence on the type of behavior they engage in within the host society. Similar considerations may well constrain Gypsies, as a low-investment parenting/low education group, in the type of strategies they use to obtain resources. But in any case, the most important thing is to describe the group accurately in all its uniqueness—see how it regulates behavior within the group and between itself and other groups and manages to get in the world and ultimately reproduce itself over historical time.

Nevertheless, the present results show that it is important to pay attention to the evolutionary history of different groups in trying to understand them. The Chinese, the Jews, and the Gypsies all maintain the powerful collectivism typical of the culture areas from which they derive. Such peoples are prone to a suite of traits that predispose them to form cohesive, evolutionarily interesting group strategies: Extended kinship groups, patricentric social organization, endogamous marriage, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and moral particularism (Burton et al. 1996).

On the other hand, group strategies are expected to be relatively difficult to develop for individualistic peoples such as Europeans who derive from northern hunter-gatherer peoples. Such peoples tend toward the opposite set traits: simply family structure, exogamous marriage, relative lack of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, and moral universalism. This general difference is compatible with individual differences among Europeans in proneness to joining collectivist groups and with the general finding that people are more inclined toward collectivism in times of personal threat (see *SAID*, ch. 1). Nevertheless, it is perhaps for this reason that group strategies such as Puritanism relied on powerful centralized social controls on group members: Without such controls, there was relatively little psychological propensity to submerge oneself in a highly collectivist group. As the possibility of centralized control declined for political reasons, the strategy itself quickly ceased being a group evolutionary strategy. Similarly, Western anti-Jewish movements have tended to be in response to intense competition with Jews and have relied on powerful social controls for their maintenance (*SAID*, chs.3–5). When the threat ceases, such movements have been unstable.

Also, as indicated above, individualistic peoples are expected to show higher levels of cooperation with strangers and higher levels of altruistic punishment than are groups deriving from collectivist societies based on the extended family (Henrich et al. 2001; see above). The Puritans, with strong overtones of individualism and market behavior embedded in a highly cooperative group, are an exemplar of such a strategy, and we have seen that the Puritans were highly prone to altruistic punishment directed at their own people.

The key therefore for a group intending to turn the Puritans and other Europeans derived from hunter-gatherers against themselves is to convince them of the evil of their own people. Because they are individualists at heart, Europeans readily rise up in moral anger against their own people once they are seen as morally blameworthy—a manifestation of their much stronger tendency toward altruistic punishment deriving from their evolutionary past as hunter gatherers. Relative genetic distance is

irrelevant: morally blameworthy "free-riders" must be subjected to the sternest discipline. Free-riders are seen as strangers in a market situation; i.e., they have no familial or tribal connection. Thus the current altruistic punishment so characteristic of contemporary Western civilization: Once Europeans were convinced that their own people were morally bankrupt, any and all means should be used against their own people. Rather than see other Europeans as part of an encompassing ethnic and tribal community, fellow Europeans were seen as morally blameworthy and the appropriate target of altruistic punishment. For Westerners, morality is individualistic and universalist—violations of communal norms by free-riders are punished by altruistic aggression regardless of their ethnic status.

On the other hand, group strategies deriving from collectivist cultures, such as the Jews, the Gypsies, and the Chinese are immune to such a maneuver because kinship and group ties comes first. Morality is particularistic—whatever is good for the group.

And the best strategy for a collectivist group like the Jews for destroying Europeans therefore is to convince the Europeans of their own moral bankruptcy. As described in *CofC*, this is exactly what Jewish intellectual movements have done. They have presented Judaism as morally superior to European civilization and European civilization as morally bankrupt and the proper target of altruistic punishment. The consequence is that once Europeans are convinced of their own moral depravity, they will, like the Puritans, destroy their own people in a fit of altruistic punishment. The general dismantling of the culture of the West and eventually its demise as anything resembling an ethnic entity will occur as a result of a moral onslaught triggering a paroxysm of altruistic punishment. And thus the intense effort among Jewish intellectuals to continue the ideology of the moral superiority of Judaism and its role as undeserving historical victim while at the same time continuing the onslaught on the moral legitimacy of the West (*CofC*: MacDonald 1998/2002).

NOTES

1. The following is based on Hilton and Ubermeyer (1999). There is considerable research on the history of Anabaptists and their cultural ways, including Hostetler (1974), Peter (1987), Kraybill & Nolte (1995), Kraybill & Olshan (1994), Flint (1975), Epp (1994), Clasen (1972).

2. The standard formula used is: rate/year = ln (n2/n1)/T where ln is the natural log ; n2 = population at the later time; n1 = population at the earlier time; T= time in years.

3. In France, this cycle continued for 250 years until the final expulsion of Jews in 1394 (Parkes 1976, 361ff). Of the five expulsions, two were primarily because of the ruinous effects of usury on the population (1182 and 1394), one because of greed for Jewish wealth (1306), one because of superstition (1321), and one due to the religious convictions of Louis IX (1254). In England, the expulsion of 1290 occurred in a complex context involving popular hostility, a hardening attitude on the part of the Church, the very large levies granted King Edward I by Parliament and by the Church in return for expelling the Jews, recent precedents in France and elsewhere (especially the expulsions from Maine and Anjou by Charles II in 1289 in return for a payment), and the personal piety of Edward (Mundill 1998, 249ff). Edward had given up hope of converting Jews to Christianity and was much influenced by the militant Christianity of the mendicant friars. It says a great deal about Edward and the perceived morality of money lending that Edward expelled Jews from his French possession of Gascony in 1289 in gratitude to God for surviving a serious illness, the proceeds going to charity.

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