Anime Aesthetics

Japanese Animation and the
'Post-Cinematic' Imagination

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

Japanese animation has been more broadly recognised and given fulsome academic commentary over the last two decades. However, there is arguably a need for a more philosophically consistent and theoretically integrated engagement with animation in terms of aesthetic philosophy.[1] Of course, there are some notable exceptions which, as is acknowledged in more detail in the ensuing chapters, are certainly important to return to. Thomas Lamarre's work, for example, has set an important agenda for discussing significant issues pertaining to animation as a medium in general as well as *anime* in particular. He has developed a distinctive theory of the composition of visual space and movement in Japanese cinematic animation works through his analysis of the "multiplanar image", itself also rooted to a significant extent in an acknowledgement of the craft's debt to 2D graphic imaging and cel animation (Lamarre, 2009: 3–44). In addition to Lamarre, Paul Wells has made an invaluable contribution to the analysis of animation in a more general sense and is accordingly referred to at a number of junctures. And of course there are key thinkers of contemporary aesthetic theory often invoked in relation to contemporary media, – Deleuze, Ranciere, Massumi, Shaviro and Žižek, to name the most obvious figures – who will also be discussed as appropriate.[2] Ultimately, however, this work aims to reground reflection on *anime* within a more specific aesthetic philosophical tradition, particularly drawing on recent scholarship on the art theory of R. G. Collingwood.

"Anime" serves as a convenient sobriquet for Japanese animation, but it should be acknowledged that for some commentators there would be some resistance to the notion of granting the term

equivalence (Tsugata, 2010: 20–23). The term *anime* is, rightly or wrongly, now caught up with the pop culture phenomenon which invites associations with the relatively lurid variants of the art form – large super-reflective eyes, accentuated physical features to ramp up the eroticism and the image of an obsessive fandom that demonstrates an intense, almost religious devotion to forms of homage such as "cosplay". However, Thomas Lamarre did the scholarship of Japanese animation a great service in rescuing "anime" from the more vacuous associations and positing it as a distinctive art form with a highly idiosyncratic dynamic of image construction and expression (Lamarre, 2009: ix–x). Nevertheless, in this work we will be taking a rather different approach to the anime aesthetic and seek to consider its broader significance in relation to understanding the recent transformation of cinema beyond the constraints of the camera and the frame through digital design. A key premise is that anime has the potential to exemplify the implications of this transformation due to its still pronounced grounding in pre-cinematic graphic traditions – traditions which ironically lend themselves to the skilful manipulation of the non-camera generated image and lead to the development of techniques which engender "post-cinematic" traits with regard to aspects of character design and narrative conventions.

The significance of anime in this broader context has been discussed by Lamarre in his landmark essay on the newly emergent symbiosis between cinema and anime in "The First Time as Farce: Digital Animation and the Repetition of Cinema" which appears in the collection of essays in *Cinema Anime* (New York: Palgrave, 2006) edited by Steven Brown. As a whole this is an invaluable contribution to the field, and within it Lamarre's contribution stands out as particularly cogent and timely. In essence, Lamarre argues that at a key point (he identifies it as the release of *Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within*) the capacity for animation to replicate the "look" and "feel" of cinema became spectacularly apparent, and what it ushered in was a fundamental reworking of the relation between animation, the goofy adolescent, and cinema, the mature and serious "older sibling". The key insight of Lamarre's analysis is to highlight that this did not mean a "demise" of cinema but a fundamental re-start; cinema would be "repeated" and it would not be cinema quite as we know it. Animation would no longer be quite as we know it either – and certainly not cinema's poor cousin (Lamarre, 2006: 176–177).

This contribution to our understanding of the place of anime in the evolution of audio-visual culture will be returned to in the ensuing chapters, yet there are certain points where the analysis within this work departs from Lamarre's approach to the aesthetics of animation, and it might be just as well to make those points explicit at the outset.

Lamarre's analysis has a particular strength in dealing with the centrality of 2D graphic imaging within anime production, and of course should be duly acknowledged. Even so, questions can be raised regarding the extent to which it can be harnessed to an analysis of the aesthetics of anime more generally. His media theory is grounded to a large extent on an engagement with Deleuze, Guattari and Lacan, but there are problems with this approach (Lamarre, 2009: xxix–xxxvi). Deleuze had a notorious "blind spot" for animation, and did not write at any length on it as technically distinct from cinema. Lacan presents alternate difficulties, not least of all because his grounding in psychoanalysis has significant potential to chaff with the broader implications of Guattari's, and arguably Deleuze's, distancing of themselves from Freudian psychoanalysis. Also, there is some issue that might be taken with the constraints of a post-structuralist premise of the "anime machine". While it provides a nuanced understanding of the complexity of an assemblage that is in a condition of perpetual becoming, it drifts, consciously or unconsciously, toward a privileging of the technical peculiarities of the artistic medium and the distinctive affordances particular to that technology.[3]

One of the key tenets of Collingwood's aesthetics is to question the capacity of any "technical theory of art" to be sustainable in the face of what he considers to be considerable practical difficulties. The detail of his philosophical position will be covered in the next chapter, and the essence of how this leads to a rejection of a conception of "art as craft" is discussed thereafter in the next. The core of that objection is that there are many instances of aesthetic expression where a particular technique as a craft is impossible to identify, and, more importantly, the process itself does not fit that which is typical of craft: having a predetermined end and employing technical means to arrive there (Collingwood, 1938: 15–17). Collingwood's favoured example is the instantaneous "hitting upon" the phrases of a poem within one's head and then working them into a poem – there is nothing in this process that is analogous to taking material and

converting it into something else, much less a process where the artist knows what they will have before they are finished. Or let us say that when Mr Miyazaki creates an animated feature, there may well be a process of manipulating sheets of acetate and sequencing them in a particular order to create an impression of movement, and that this will in turn be subject to a process of compositing through the adroit integration of these figures into a digitally constructed background. Our point here is that that process of fabrication in itself is not the heart of the artistic process – it is an artistic process of imaginative expression first before it is a technical process, and any theory of art that puts the technical "cart" before the imaginative "horse" runs the risk of doing mischief to an understanding of the "art proper".[4]

Objections may well arise in the minds of readers already on the basis of this very general statement of the position, but I would request that those who want to debate the premises engage with the full detail of the position in the next chapter. The reader may hopefully accept that this attempt to reinvigorate an engagement with the animated image as an aesthetic phenomenon, rather than as a psychoanalytical symptom, or as the awkward cousin to the cinematic image, leads us to a more nuanced and expansive appreciation of the affordances of the medium. It also leads, I argue, to the prospect of identifying aesthetic propensities born from the intersection of anime with 3D enhanced cinema that enable us to understand aspects of our currently emergent conceptions of the *post-cinematic*.

The term "post-cinematic" is highly problematic; it needs careful definition and, as I would candidly admit, it is adopted here with a certain amount of trepidation. Perhaps the first association that needs to be explicitly denied here at the outset is one of regarding cinema as "having had its day" or, in other words, as existing as a medium now eclipsed through the emergence of new modes of image construction and image experiencing. For the record, the notion that cinema in some classical sense is now obsolete is one I would refute, and yet there is little doubt that cinema is now subtly becoming transformed, with the main drivers identifiable as being the integration of film making with digital modes of image creation, new modes of post-production and data sharing.

Steven Shaviro is arguably one of the most eloquent advocates of a conception of the "post-cinematic". He does so by accommodating

the persistence of cinema in a more conventional sense while none-theless recognizing its being subject to fundamentally transformative conditions of production and distribution, with new modes of consciousness, both social and artistic, forming new possibilities of affect. As Shaviro himself has stated, if there was ever a classical epoch for the classical film it was in the early twentieth century, the advent of TV ensuring an instant complication of cinema's status as the "cultural dominant" and ushering in a protracted battle between the big screen and the small screen (the former initially assumed to be the more serious platform culturally speaking but eventually giving way to television as a profoundly enriching medium in its own right). So cinema is not made obsolete, but rather re-contextualised and "re-purposed" (Shaviro, 1993: 33–38).

The question that arises that is immediately more thorny and difficult to frame, let alone answer, is that of what the "+ α" of the digital image, and its appended technologies, might imply for cinema in more specific terms. For Shaviro it is the loss of the indexicality of the image that is the key catalyst for new modes of non-signifying image making, concomitant with a "flat ontology" that denies the Bazinesque pure image. This he diagnoses as part of the process of capital adapting the coinage of culture to one of constant meaninglessness and intense affective response generation, hence his work on "Post-Cinematic" affect (Shaviro, 2010: 75–78).

One can identify much in contemporary audio-visual culture that would incline one to agree with Shaviro's characterization of an emergent cinema of affect, and certainly there are other commentators who provide commentary and analysis that supports that broad depiction. Elsaesser and Hagener's work also explores the notion of reconstructing film theory through an appreciation of the impact of the physical senses. Their analysis leads to the enumeration of several key transformative traits that seem to be emerging through the marriage of 3D design and advanced animation techniques. Perhaps their most important insight is the identification of the impact of this transformation on our understanding of "virtual reality" and our conception of the screen. The pivotal "movement" lies in the transformation of the screen from a *window*, an avenue of witnessing to that which is presented beyond, to a *portal*, an avenue for subverting visual perception in more radical ways that evokes a world of becoming and flux (Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010: 179–180).

Kristen Daly in "Cinema 3.0: The Interactive-Image" (2010) has further augmented such commentary by identifying, in both film and television, the emergence of new modes of narrative, characterization and episodic spectacle that reflect the expectation of the "viewser" – the image viewer who expects something more resonant with their interactive experiences on other media platforms such as video games (Daly, 2010: p. 88–94). The degree to which the experience of the video game has contributed to the restructuring of such elements as narrative, character and spectacle is perhaps hard to quantify, and there is a point at which the notion that somehow viewers have become more proactive or "interactive" also runs into difficulties. Nonetheless, Daly's highlighting of transformations in the spheres of narrative, character (or "persona" as I would rather put it) and spectacle resonate profoundly with Elsaesser and Hagener's analysis.

All of these commentaries are accurate in identifying the symptoms of the impact of digital technology, but there is no clear consensus on precisely how it engenders the transformations that they identify. Shaviro is inclined to explore highly suggestive case studies to explore their value for understanding the transformation, – yet he ultimately returns to the paradigm of identifying how the phenomena aid capital in new and, for the most part, dis-empowering ways. Elsaesser and Hagener also explore intriguing and thought provoking case studies, – from *Toy Story* to *Terminator II*, – yet we still do not seem to get to the nub of what makes the digital image and digital technology capable of having such a profound impact on narrative, character and spectacle, even though we may well agree with the accuracy of their observations (Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010: 172–179). Daly, as already mentioned, identifies key drivers for the transformation of "viewser" expectations in alternate media practices and experiences.

Let it suffice then, to acknowledge that there is a rich field of enquiry that pertains to the examination of the "post-cinematic" – it is a legitimate signifier of a realm of investigation, although the parameters and particular nuances of interpretation might be highly contested.

This book takes perhaps a novel approach to the post-cinematic, by employing animation, and a particular aesthetic theory, that of R. G. Collingwood, as the foil for exploring this field in an alternative way. A focus on digital images in and of itself does not seem to

provide an altogether convincing mode of analysis, if not for cinema then certainly not for anime. The Lacanian approach to culture also raises problems of methodological constraint, and in the hands of Žižek arguably resolves down to its most generalized form of "symptomology" (Dean, 2002: 21; Flisfeder, 2012: 141, 158–159). In addition to these, the more "anthropological" or "culturalist" approaches to both cinema and anime seem to sail rather precipitously close to attempts to "essentialize" Japanese culture.[5] Some scholarship has on occasion dipped into the repository of classical literary aesthetic categories from "pre-cinematic" arts (literature, puppetry, poetry) and attempted to transpose them into aesthetic categories for "cinematic" arts and animation, – and to some extent this has had some success. Yet there is arguably a point where aesthetic ideals from classical literature, for example "mono no aware" or "wabi and sabi", from classical literature, engenders a certain awkwardness; it is something of a struggle to employ such concepts usefully in relation to cinema without drifting into a certain pastiche of cultural references.[6] I agree with Shaviro that we are living in an epoch which requires us to confront the reality of film and television having enjoyed a spectacular epoch of hegemony, – and we are seeing that hegemonic position fundamentally become reconfigured. We are confronted with a transformation of aesthetic that very much springs from this particular milieu, and it requires a focused set of concepts that emerge from an engagement with that context.

Even so, I should of course concede that there has always been something that we might identify as being "distinctive" about the oeuvre of modern Japanese cinema and animation. The Japanese film industry sprang up with remarkable speed in the early twentieth century and developed a particular set of stylistic and thematic preoccupations. Much the same can be said for the early evolution of animation in Japan as well, although research on that development, especially as concerns the pre-World War Two era, is recently being more fully fleshed out. Yamaguchi Katsunori and Watanabe Yasushi's volume on the history of animated film (日本アニメーション映画史, Yūbunsha, 1978) has been a mainstay for some time, but more recently Tsugata Nobuyuki's *The Power of Japanese Animation* (日本アニメーションの力：85年を貫く2つの軸、NTT出版、2010), alongwith his other voluminous output, provides some of the most up-to-date scholarly commentary on the history of Japanese animation in Japanese. It is

joined by the recent work of Jonathan Clements, *Anime: A History* (British Film Institute, 2013) which provides an extraordinarily detailed account of the evolution of "anime" from its earliest roots.

Animation in Japan emerged from a broadly intersecting source of traditions and practices, from the "flip-book" style animation techniques that stem from the Edo period, to the "trick photography" that was an element within the emergent cinematographic technology and essentially became the prototype of stop motion animation, to the adaptation of popular *manga* titles into more conventionally understood "animations" that retained the speech bubbles of the original graphic texts. Tsugata suggests that there was a profound inter-relation between the artistic and commercial practice of *manga* authors, and in particular he highlights the instances of Kabashima Katsuichi (1888–1965) *Shōchan no Bōken* (「正ちゃんの冒険) and Asō Yutaka (1898–1961) *Nonki na Otōsan* (「のんきな父さん」) whose serialized cartoons were eventually transformed into full animation productions. He also notes that out of the three of the generally acknowledged foundational figures of Japanese animation, – Shimokawa Ōten (1892–1973), Kōuchi Junichi (1886–1970) and Kitayama Seitarō (1888–1945) – two of them had a background in *manga*.[7] Two figures that left a lasting mark on the evolution of animation in Japan amongst the next wave of professional animators were Ōfuji Noburō, (1900–1961) and Masaoka Kenzō (1898–1988).

Ōfuji Noburō was distinctive in that he retained an interest in monochrome silhouette animation employing traditional Japanese *washi* paper (和紙). One of his finest achievements is the film *Kujira* which won acclaim at the Cannes film festival in 1952.

Masaoka Kenzō produced the first "talkie" animation, *Chikara to Onna no Yo no Naka* (1933) and became the mentor several significant animators thereafter. He was instrumental in developing links with Shochiku Films and thereby promoting a symbiosis between the increasingly technologically advanced cinema industry and animation (Tsugata, 2010: 98–108).

The salient characteristics of the early animation industry evident from the foregoing brief outline are as follows: a proclivity for "mining" traditional folk stories and artistic styles for inspiration; a relative comfort with animation of flat figures; and a substantial overlap in the experience of training between *manga*, animation and cutting edge motion picture techniques. Consequently, there has

always been a significant degree of overlap in how the moving image, both in the context of cinema and animation, has come to express a rather idiosyncratic logic and style.

Some of the idiosyncratic elements of Japanese animation have been attributed to either cultural influences or logistical constraints. The relatively limited number of frames per second typical of Japanese animation could reasonably be attributed to a shortage of availability of celluloid before and after World War II or the fact that characters speaking Japanese require fewer frames to render "realistically" with the relative absence of complex pronunciations as are more evident in European languages (see Lamarre, 2009: 86–87; Tsugata, 2010: 22). However persuasive such accounts are, some broader, non-medium-specific perspective needs to be retained. Put in its simplest terms, we should pause to consider the fact that so much of what seems to have been stylistically idiosyncratic to animation has actually held a great deal in common with Japanese film as well. Moreover, as we consider animation in the present day, we may well be tempted to laud anime for its capacity to exemplify "post-modern" tropes through the combination of 2D and 3D digital imaging, but such observations should be tempered by an acknowledgement that certain of these "post-modern" tropes have been evident well before the advent of post-modernist commentaries and the wholesale adoption of 3D digital imaging technologies.[8]

On a deeper level, then, it becomes apparent that at some point the analysis of the "image" in Japanese animation needs to be developed in such a way that it is not constrained to a perspective that construes it as either having been "appropriated" by cinema, as in some sense the dominant "über-media", or appropriated by "anime" as an alternative new media that has supplanted cinema. While valuing Lamarre's insights into the genuinely complex renegotiation of the relation between the two media, we do not want necessarily to reproduce a new theory of this hybrid medium: what we need is an aesthetic theory.

One of the few contemporary theorists of aesthetics and contemporary media to accommodate a broader understanding of the image beyond the cinematic is Jacques Ranciere, who articulates this perspective through the series of essays contained in *The Future of the Image*. Ranciere's utility with regard to re-assessing the significance of animation in relation to contemporary media is to provide us

with an avenue to avoid over-accentuation of the cinematic image as the dominant mode of audio-visual expression and, more importantly, to provide a broader context of the image that is both philosophically and historically nuanced. Ranciere directly challenges a technocentric perspective and embraces the notion that the image is something that can be analysed, and ought to be analysed, in its universal aspect – the nature of imaginative engagement with the image does not differ whether it is a painting, a photograph or a film, although there are of course obvious differences in the nature of spectatorship and the mode of reproduction and dissemination. Overall, then, our concern should not commence with the cinematic image, despite its seeming triumph and domination of the popular imagination, but with the image in a more generic sense. This implies that we should also expand our understanding of the nature of human engagement with images – all images, cinematic or otherwise (Ranciere, 2007: 137).

The philosophical platform for these observations is Ranciere's interpretation of classical aesthetic theory, particularly Aristotle's *Poetics*, which he engages with as a basis for distinguishing between several "regimes" of aesthetics (Ranciere, 2007: 11–14). Aristotle was writing at a time of rapidly consolidating traditions of poetry (epic and dithyrambic) as well as drama (tragedy and comedy) and so it may seem that his commentary might have only a passing relevance to the contemporary. Even so, the philosophical framework that Aristotle erects for the contemplation of art proves to be remarkably incisive and applicable beyond his own age. For Aristotle, the essence of art is imitation (mimesis), and not necessarily representation of the world in some literal sense. According to the *Poetics*, there can be varying degrees and qualities of representation according to the genre of expression and the purpose of the author. In comedy, for example, men [sic] are depicted worse than they actually are, while in tragedy they are depicted as better than actual persons. Moreover, the forms of expression, the devices employed and the mode of delivery can vary depending on each work (Apostle, 1990: xi–xiv).

Aristotle held tragedy to be the highest order of art, and it is to this genre that he devoted the greater part of his attention. According to Aristotle, there are six key dimensions of expression in tragedy, – narrative (*muthos*), thought (*dianoia*), character (*ethos*), diction (*lexis*), melody (*melos*) and spectacle (*opsis*). The first three are characterized

as the "objects" of tragedy, with narrative given priority over thought and character (the attributing of primacy to narrative is somewhat controversial, but part of the justification of this is that, as Aristotle argues, you can have plot without character, but not the reverse). Diction and melody pertain to the means of expression, while spectacle pertains to the "mode" of expression (Aristotle, 1990: 6–9).

Aristotle's vision of the ideal relation of the disparate elements of artistic expression finds a reflection in the structure of aesthetic thought in the late eighteenth century – an epoch where representation is dominated by narrative concerns in both painting and literature and comes to its apogee. This in turn gives way to a radical reordering of aesthetic understanding in the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, primarily through the impact of the technology of photography. Ranciere highlights these developments as the basis for distinguishing between several "regimes" of aesthetic thought that emerge in the early modern to contemporary era. Ranciere describes the "representative regime" as the product of a classically informed but nonetheless highly aspirational conception of the relation of *muthos* to the other elements that emerged in the late eighteenth century and it was arguably the pinnacle of the aspiration to nail the essence of art in the rationalist spirit. This gives way, indeed is obliterated, through the emergence of the "aesthetic regime" which owes its impetus to the hugely cataclysmic impact of the photographic image, and by extension the cinematic image (Ranciere, 2006: 9). Under this regime, *opsis* is the upstart that utterly confounds the previously stable notion of representation dominated by *muthos*; through instantaneous similitude, and a mute capacity to make statements without explicit narratives, the earlier regime is thrown into disarray.

But this is no simple victory, – and here lies the sophistication of Ranciere's approach. This is a victory of sorts, but the very means by which the photographic/cinematic image instantaneously obliterates the former regime contains the essence of a contradiction – a capacity to present immanent truths that, if anything, do not subsume the need for narrative but rather provide a new set of constraints and conundrums for developing *muthos* – hence the "thwarted fable".[9] For the spectator, the same applies, – we need to relearn how to engage with the image, how to interpret and in turn communicate that understanding in some new coinage of discourse.

Ranciere's *The Future of the Image*, as much as it is an adept exploration of the relevance of Aristotelian philosophy in early-modern to modern history, also provides a pivotal diagnosis of some of the intellectual pitfalls that the emergence of the "aesthetic regime" has garnered. In essence, Ranciere argues that the seeming triumph of the cinematic image gave rise to a level of hubris that would lead to aspirations of abolishing the mediation of the image – and that this would mean not only the denial of the power of the image to resemble but also the power of operations of decoding and suspension. The impact of the instant artefact produced by the photographic image fostered the embracing of the notion of an identity of act and form – indeed a new mode of complete art that would subsume all earlier art forms.

Through reference to a number of seminal cinema works that retain clear narrative imperatives (for example Bresson's *Au Hazard Balthazar*) in tandem with a discussion of several epoch-defining novels that display an acutely cinematic imagination combined with novelistic narrative (such as Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*), Ranciere argues, convincingly in my view, for the persistence of a tripartite set of relations: the production of resemblances, the artistic operations of dissemblance and the capacity to engage in discourse on various symptomatic elements of any given piece of artistic expression (Ranciere, 2007: 2–8).

But Ranciere does not provide us with a practical methodology for analysing the image, and certainly has no significant commentary on animation. Ranciere's intellectual agenda is also structured by political concerns that, while broadly sympathized with, do not enable the practical distinguishing between the image as art and other dimensions that coalesce within art (the political, the commercial, etc.). Joseph Tanke's work on Ranciere provides something of a corroborating commentary for this assessment. In his chapter entitled "Beyond Ranciere", in *Jacques Ranciere: An Introduction* (New York: Continuum, 2011), he highlights two dimensions that require further consideration and elaboration, even from the point of view of a sympathetic reading, if we are to retrieve some deeper impact from Ranciere's vision.

The first is to re-examine the manner in which Ranciere integrates political concerns with aesthetic ones. Tanke highlights how Ranciere's profound egalitarianism impinges on aesthetic

considerations, specifically to (perhaps unintentionally) complicate the business of making qualitative distinctions in both the production and reception of art. For example, how are we to accommodate a seeming indifference to matters of subject matter and stylistic form that a radical egalitarian evaluation of artistic expression implies (Tanke, 2011: 143–148)?

The second is more problematic: Ranciere relies on what, by any measure, must be referred to as imagination, the faculty that is the key catalyst for disrupting the status quo (the established distribution of the sensible) and emancipating us from our political cages. Yet he seems to shy away from acknowledging this function of the artist or art too explicitly. Tanke suggests that this is partly due to an aversion to a subjectivist account of artistic experience (an understandable aversion), and a concomitant desire to distance himself from the relatively simplistic Enlightenment aspirations (embodied in various ways by Kant, Schiller and Hegel) to embed the essential function of art as one of pursuing "freedom" (Tanke, 2011: 148–155).

The aesthetic philosopher who, par excellence, has done the most to theorize the role of imagination in art and aesthetic experience is R. G. Collingwood. He is perhaps an arcane choice of theoretical approach given that he was, at one time, the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford, and is most noted for his status as a philosopher of history as exemplified by the *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946). Yet he is also the author of *The Principles of Art*, a work attracting a degree of controversy due to its seemingly "idealist" premises, yet retaining a solid level of critical academic commentary in recent years.

Accordingly the art theory of R. G. Collingwood is employed to facilitate an engagement with anime that aligns with Ranciere's general position with regard to the image and our imaginative engagement with it, while providing a philosophically grounded methodology for analysing the distinctive composite elements within this particular art form. An extensive outline and discussion of the key elements of Collingwood's broader philosophical system is necessary before approaching his aesthetic philosophy. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next chapter, it is quite impossible to dissociate his concept of "re-enactment" in the theory of history from the understanding of "total imaginative experience" in the theory of art.[10] Moreover, there are key methodological premises that need to be taken into account

so that we can better understand why Collingwood places so much emphasis on human experience rather than abstract absolute categories or thoroughly confined materialist premises.

The book, from Chapter 2 onwards, is laid out in a clear order that follows the progression of Collingwood's *Principles of Art* more or less in the same sequence. Chapter 2 examines Collingwood's treatment of the "technical theory of art", which is very much the cornerstone of his critique of aesthetic philosophy as it has been developed from the ideas of the ancient to modern times. Collingwood's criticism of the ancients and their legacy will be raised and discussed in the ensuing pages, but the main contention is that a theory of art that treats art as a species of craft – something where the objective and the means can be known from the outset – is inimical to what we might apprehend as "art proper" (Collingwood, 1938: 26). The ensuing chapter examines "representation" – a field that Collingwood actually also characterizes as just another species of craft, and therefore also not the business of "art proper". It might well be taken from this that Collingwood had no time for considerations of craft and representation, but that is not exactly the case; he discusses them both at some length and acknowledges that a scholar can certainly gain insights from an understanding of them. It is when we regard that as the final business of art that a problem arises.

The next two chapters deal with "amusement" and "magic" (in chapters 4 and 5 respectively). Collingwood defines both of these terms in slightly idiosyncratic ways; they are both instrumental modes of expression that have the arousal of emotion as their aim, except that in the case of amusement, it is with a view to instantaneous catharsis, and with "magic" it is with a view to arousing emotions that will persist and have some manner of impact on practical life. Neither of them are to be misidentified as "art proper", as art does not permit predetermined ends, yet they have such a resonance with contemporary understanding of art that some discussion of them is unavoidable. In this book, however, I have in fact reversed the order that they appear in *The Principles of Art*. The main reason for doing this is that there was clearly a sense in Collingwood's own commentary that amusement, by and large, was an inferior mode of expression to "magic". Indeed Collingwood suggests that it is closest amongst the instrumental conceptions of art to realising the condition of "art proper".

Chapter 6 is where Collingwood's theory of imagination is outlined in detail and we explore how it underpins his conception of art and how that might relate to the specific instance of anime. A key contention is that cinematic anime in particular has revealed new modes of imaginative expression with traits that exemplify what we have discussed earlier as contributing to an emergent realm of the "post-cinematic". Key examples from recent anime films and auteur cinema are contrasted here to illustrate how these art forms in fact contribute to each other's processes of self-clarification.

This brings us to making explicit some caveats about what readers might expect from this book. The first thing not to expect is a universal history of anime, – this is not a comprehensive primer or encyclo-paedic reference work (other works that fulfil this role are already available and should be consulted accordingly). Readers should also be prepared for a focus on cinematic anime rather than an indiscriminate engagement with a profusion of OVA (original video animation) and televised titles that could easily fill several books. Reference is made to such works where it is felt that a particular title exemplifies a point in a way that the cinematic oeuvre doesn't illustrate adequately. By and large, there are more than adequate illustrative instances from the cinematic creations of the major auteur directors and writers, and so the purview has tended to remain there.

Another point to accentuate is that this work aims to steer somewhere between the twin pillars of contemporary film theory, the paradigm variously aligned with cultural studies, post-modernism and gender theory on the one hand, and the "post-theory" paradigm of "cognitivism" or "neo-formalism" on the other. I would hope that readers aligned with either one of these inclinations will find something constructive in what has been written in the following pages: past experience makes me aware nonetheless that I may be perceived to have not adequately cast my lot in with one side or the other. The Deleuzian conception of philosophy and his application of it in his seminal exploration of cinema is broadly admired, but unfortunately does not sit well with certain premises that aim to revisit the significance of cinema, and the emergence of a "post-cinematic imagination". Furthermore, the fairly critical commentary on the well-intentioned but nonetheless unwittingly constrained purview of media scholarship grounded in Lacanianism will perhaps generate some ire: I would simply reiterate that such criticisms as are expressed

in this book are based on aesthetic concerns and not an attempt to reject psychoanalysis altogether.

At the same time, it may well be imagined that this work aims to reinforce the tenets of Cognitivism. The one point where this work and that of cognitivists probably cannot concur, however, is an abiding concern for exploring the significance of the ontology of the image and a concomitant need to explore the more nebulous aspects of "affect" within the context of experiencing not just film but any form of art.[11] And although I indicate certain misgivings regarding the attempt to pack too much significance into the culturally particular traditions that inform artistic expression, I certainly do not embrace the notion that art is experienced by all persons alike in all places at all times. I also suspect that much of cognitivist theory prioritizes the technical craft and the conscious mental activity that is evident in the production and experiencing of audio-visual media. There may be some scope to accommodate the "theory of imagination" within the compass of cognitivist concerns, but my own reading and understanding of Collingwood's work makes me suspect that I would not be regarded as "rationalist" enough in my approach.

In any event, it is hoped that this excursus on the aesthetic philosophy of Collingwood, and its utility in analysing a currently evolving revisioning of our understanding of audio-visual media, will be accepted as a useful contribution to our appreciation of anime and the role of imagination in art.

1

R. G. Collingwood and a "Philosophical Methodology" of Aesthetics

R. G. Collingwood's *The Principles of Art* has enjoyed something of a resurgence in interest thanks to the endeavours of scholars such as Aaron Ridley who have proposed a reading that refutes the charge of ontological Idealism as articulated by Richard Wollheim and engages with the dimensions of Collingwood's aesthetic philosophy that deal with expression and imagination. David Davies has endorsed Ridley's argument and taken this "revisionism" one step further by proposing a "performative" interpretation of Collingwood's theory of art based on Collingwood's conception of the work of art as an activity rather than the product of an activity.[1] Nevertheless, he also highlights a series of puzzles that Collingwood cannot fail but generate when he attempts to reconcile the conception of art as activity with the art/craft distinction. He concludes by suggesting that, despite these ambiguities, it is Collingwood's novel conception of art as a "language" that enables us to better understand the structure of *The Principles of Art* and Collingwood's significance as a commentator on the role of imagination in the experience of art.

This chapter aims to reinforce the key assertions of Davies' commentary by contextualizing Collingwood's conception of art as expression, and his employment of *imagination* as the primary vehicle for engaging with such expression. This is undertaken by positing Collingwood's art theory within the broader compass of his intellectual concerns, including the philosophy of history and questions of philosophical method. Initially, it will be argued that the seeming

"ontological Idealism" apparent in Book I of *The Principles of* Art is in fact a misreading of a methodological approach first enunciated in *An Essay on Philosophical Method* and given important subsequent clarification in *The Idea of History*, which was published posthumously.[2] This material will also be employed to address some of the lingering "puzzles" put forward by Davies, in particular the questions of (i) how Collingwood conceived of the relation between art as activity and art as expressive artefact, and (ii) how the "re-experiencing" of art might plausibly be defended as an exercise of imagination.

The perception of Collingwood's theory of art being grounded in ontological Idealism remains persistent, largely due to the abiding influence of Richard Wollheim's critique of the "Collingwood-Croce theory" expressed in *Art and Its Objects* in 1968.[3] The critique characterized Collingwood and Croce as the twentieth century torch-bearers of continental Idealism, and, accordingly, Collingwood's conception of artistic practice was depicted as being purely "imaginary" with no externalized dimension. Wollheim's view did not go unchallenged at the time, and perhaps the most forthright counter from this period is that of Richard Sclafani who faulted Wollheim's critique on two key points: the first being that Wollheim misread Collingwood's definition of "imagination", preferring to interpret all references to it in Collingwood's *The Principles of Art* as thought with no basis in physical activity.[4] This, Sclafani argues, neglects the passages that explicitly relate inner experiences to outward behaviour. The other point he makes is that Collingwood should not be regarded as being indistinguishable from Croce but should be understood in relation to the British Empiricist tradition, particularly the Hobbesian dictum that "mind is a function of language" which is a theme that can be traced in both *The Principles of Art* and *The New Leviathan* (Sclafani, 1976: 353–359).

Despite such counter arguments, there would seem to be no altering the fact that, when attempting to re-evaluate Collingwood's aesthetic philosophy, one is nonetheless obliged to deal with the Wollheimian interpretation in the first instance. Even as there have been a number of incremental steps taken to establish a space for re-evaluating Collingwood's aesthetic philosophy, the Wollheimian critique remains acutely contested.

Within the last decade Aaron Ridley has made one of the most strident attempts to retrieve the essence of Collingwood's continued

relevance to the theory of art in "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory" (Ridley, 1997: 263–272). In this article Ridley has the fundamental aim of questioning Wollheim's characterization of Collingwood as an ontological Idealist. Ridley acknowledges that Wollheim's interpretation of *The Principles of Art* is understandable to a point, given an admittedly rather loose depiction of artistic experience in Book I of *The Principles of Art*. For example, when Collingwood focuses on the example of music he asserts that the artistic experience of a musical performance is not to be understood as a process of listening to sounds, but an act of *imagination* whereby we hear those sounds *as music*. This could be taken to imply that the essence of music is in the mind, but Ridley argues that we should resist the temptation to construe such passages as an endorsement of the position that art "only exists in the head" and nowhere else. By referring to the more detailed discussions of the processes of creating works of art in Part III (as in the case of a tactile art such as painting), Ridley argues persuasively (and in common with Sclafani) that we should engage in an interpretation of Collingwood that acknowledges the fact that he was, after all, not indifferent to the material or physical dimensions of both creative practices and the resultant artistic artefacts. In fact, Ridley suggests that Collingwood had anything but an Idealist position in his theory:

> Collingwood, whatever his apparent commitments, really operates as a kind of fifth columnist against the Ideal theory: as we have seen, he claims that the ideas in the artist's and the spectator's heads should be the same; he acknowledges the artist's relationship to the real, public materials of his or her art; and he pays homage to the imaginative activity of the spectator while affirming the constraints placed on that activity by what the artist has actually done. Surely…Collingwood cannot really have espoused the theory that Wollheim and others have attacked at all. (Ridley, 1997: 269)

The ultimate strength of Ridley's article, however, is that he brings the focus more clearly on Collingwood's own preoccupations, particularly the relationship between expression and imagination. Based on the premise in Book III that, for the artist, there can be no distinction between means and ends, Ridley deftly unpacks the significance of this in relation to Collingwood's conception of artistic expression,

particularly the insistence that the artist doesn't know what they have created until it is done, as the process of exploring the medium is itself part and parcel with the process of becoming conscious of what it is one wants to say or present.

> the work of art proper, is a success not if it matches up with something independently specifiable (a plan) – not, that is, through being "a thing of a certain kind" – but if it counts as an expression, if it counts as "a certain thing". (Ridley, 1997: 271)

Art, conceived in this sense, is an activity, one that incidentally produces artefacts ("works of art") which emerge through a combination of physical and psychological operations. These works are contingent on artistic expression, not independent of it, but it is imagination which is posited as the primary vehicle for consciously engaging with that process, whether as artist or as a member of the artist's "audience".

This re-interpretation has not met with an altogether sympathetic response. John Dilworth, for example, redeployed the essence of the Wollheimian critique, and went further to suggest that Ridley's apologia actually gets Collingwood into deeper trouble by transposing the problem from art as an ideal construct to art as an ephemeral performative expression (hence Dilworth's suggestion that Ridley was being "uncharitable"). Ridley's response was, naturally enough, to reject the suggestion that he had performed such a "disservice" and he reasserted his original plea for an interpretation that was more accommodating of the acknowledged flaws and shortcomings in *The Principles of Art*.[5]

This debate has been taken up afresh more recently by David Davies who has endorsed Ridley's rejection of the Wollheimian view, particularly the interpretation of Collingwood based on the problematic passages in Book I. Davies argues that this interpretation misconstrues the expository purpose of Book I, which was explicitly to conduct a prolegomena discussing the relation of art to other "imposter" definitions based on contingent aspects of the production and experiencing of art: "craft", "representation", "magic" and "amusement". Davies highlights that "art proper" does not get addressed in detail until Book III and, again in a manner consonant with Ridley's interpretation, reasserts the basic premise of Collingwood's theory that art is an *activity*, albeit one that incidentally produces a variety of tangible

outputs and artefacts (Davies, 2008, p. 164) . Moreover he emphatically embraces a "performative" conception of the Collingwood's theory of art and rejects the critique offered by Dilworth.

Davies retrieves, at the very least, a great deal that is positive in Ridley's "revisionist" reading of Collingwood, although I do not propose to engage directly with the "performative" conception of art as put forward by him in this chapter. The point of more immediate interest in Davies' article is the manner in which he raises three "puzzles" that linger when one considers the relative differences between varying forms of artistic expression (music, literature, visual arts, etc.) and what they imply for our understanding of the relationship between the activity of creating a work of art, and the experiencing of the subsequent artefact. At root, there are a number of questions that arise when we examine the complex inter-relation of the ontology of artistic artefacts, the nature of the experience of creating and/or receiving them and the role of imagination in each stage of that process. For Davies these are inter-related issues that persist regardless of whether one considers that Ridley has, on balance, made a convincing argument to refute the Wollheimian critique or not.

The first puzzle can be summarized as the problem of the lack of generalizability of arts:

> It is not clear how … the treatment of one art is supposed to generalise to the others. How, in the absence of a notation, can I create a painting through imaginative activity alone? And what plays the role, in music and literature, of the physical manipulations of the medium that … provide the psycho-physical basis for expression in painting. (Davies, 2008: 164)

More particularly, Davies seems to be questioning the relationship between imagination and the physical act of creating art relative to each art form. If it is not the same for each art form and if it is not generalizable how are we to account for the differences?

The second "puzzle" is the problem of what tangible aspect of art there might be that provides the means for the "audience" to engage with the imaginative experience of the artist:

> where the tactile aspects of the "total imaginative experience" enjoyed by the artist are associated with the elements presented to the receiver in the artistic product, it is not difficult to see how

> the reader might come to have the same kind of "total imagina-
> tive experience" as the artist … On the other hand, if, in the case
> of a work like Eliot's *The Waste Land* or Vaughan Williams's *The
> Lark Ascending*, we take the "total imaginative experience" identi-
> fied with the work to be the expressive dimension of the artist's
> manipulation of the medium, it is unclear how this can be made
> accessible to us through our engagement, however imaginative,
> with the product of that manipulation. (Davies, 2008: 166)

In other words, how universal or "sharable" is the "total imaginative
experience" of art; can the experience of the artist be literally shared
by the audience or viewer?

Finally, Davies raises a closely related issue – even if we assume that
a "total imaginative experience" could be shared, we still need clarifi-
cation of precisely what this "re-experiencing" entails:

> if Collingwood is claiming, as Ridley suggests, that to appreciate
> the musical work is to hear the noises produced by the performers
> as music, where this requires that we ourselves have the "total
> imaginative experience" that is the imaginative counterpart of
> the psycho-physical activity of the composer, and if that activity
> draws on the artistic tradition in which the composer was working
> and her conception of the audience, how is this feat of "re-experi-
> encing" to be accomplished? (Davies, 2008: 167)

In the absence of any tangible trace of the creative artistic process
beyond notation or symbols, how is a "re-experiencing" of the orig-
inal total imaginative experience even possible?

To summarize, then, the first issue relates to a discussion of the
possibility of generalizing the artistic experience across a number of
art forms. The second relates more specifically to how we might plau-
sibly link what the artist thinks, feels and expresses at the moment
of producing an artefact of art, with what a viewer or listener of that
artefact might sense or feel when encountering the work of art *post
factum*. The third relates to the mechanics of the "total imaginative
experience" – if it does work, how does it work?

In the ensuing discussion within his article Davies reviews a number
of specific instances of art form and examines the nature of how we
might understand the particular difficulties of accounting for a "total

imaginative experience" of art for each one. One key example is T. S. Elliot's *Wasteland*, and it is evident that, for Davies, it is literature that would seem to present most clearly the nub of the "puzzles" enumerated at the outset. Davies concludes that there is one particular and overwhelmingly obvious "lacuna" in Collingwood's theory:

> What Collingwood lacks, it seems, is a distinction between the work of art, as expressive process, and the artistic vehicle through which the artist comes to express something for herself and for the audience. (Davies, 2008: 171)

The reason for this lacuna, Davies suggests, is that Collingwood remained averse to a "technical theory" of art where the "work of art" was the product of a craft rather than part of a process of expression. A person who became the recipient of some form of artistic expression might share in the expressive process of the artist via an imaginative engagement with the product (however substantial, tangible or otherwise that might be), but Collingwood would naturally be resistant to giving too much license to the notion that the "expressive charge" of the work was somehow embedded in the product given his earlier rejection of art as craft in the first Book of *The Principles of Art* (Davies, 2008: 171). This is the core of Davies' concern: how is an "expressive charge" embedded in a work of art and what it is it that enables us to conceive of a means to bridge that between the artist and the audience when they engage with it?

The solution Davies raises to resolve this seeming lacuna is to consider more closely the implications of Collingwood's radical definition of art as "language" and how it fits within his broader definition of expression. As Davies explains:

> Collingwood uses the term "language" in a broad sense that incorporates not only natural language but also gesture insofar as it performs what he takes to be the original primary function of language: "it is an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion", something which is modified to permit the expression of thought. (Davies, 2008: 225)

Here we see that imagination is integral to expression, and that expression itself is capable of more than what we might consider to be

the simple communicative function – it encompasses both emotion and thought as well. Again, to quote Davies' account of the role of emotion in expression:

> expression, for Collingwood, is most accurately viewed as the bringing to consciousness of experience, rather than as the expression of emotion in a more standard sense, because, for Collingwood, all experience has an emotional charge – all sensing and perceiving is *ipso facto* feeling. (Davies, 2008: 172)

If we accept these parameters to art as "language" and take account of Collingwood's distinctive conception of expression, then we can perhaps concede that the "art" in *The Principles of Art* is not art as conventionally conceived, but art in the foregoing rather distinctive sense, one that entails a coalescence of thought and feeling with some form of tangible trace left behind. Imagination as well takes on a rather different nuance – it is not an exercise of a cerebral faculty but enmeshed in psycho-physical activity.

This interpretation of Collingwood certainly seems to resonate more directly with Collingwood's own premises. On the basis of this, we can see that Collingwood's theory, such as it is depicted here, has a particular consistency and cogency. And we can perhaps accept Davies' assertion that the core utility of Collingwood's theory of art lies in its significance as a pragmatic exploration of the role of imagination in the production and experiencing of art, rather than as a discussion of art in its more conventional sense (Davies, 2008: 163–164).

But how far can we accept the proposition that Collingwood was not intending to deal with art in its more conventional association with "works of art" and the creative process of producing artistic artefacts? It may seem that Collingwood doesn't have a plausible or defensible distinction between creative artistic processes and expressive "works of art", but I am persuaded that Collingwood did aim to discuss art in its more conventional sense of artistic practice producing "works of art". To substantiate this, I propose a staged response that, while not completely exonerating Collingwood from such infelicities of expression with regard to divergent art forms, nonetheless assists us in developing a reading that it is not merely "charitable", but more consonant with Collingwood's overall philosophical approach.

On one level, *The Principles of Art* should not be considered as a discrete and self-contained treatise, but as part of a broader body of work that employs a parallel methodology. Most obviously relevant in this regard is Collingwood's conception of "re-enactment" in *The Idea of History* which is invoked in relation to the historian's method of dealing with historical evidence. The discussion of imagination in both works is profoundly consonant and I argue that there is a fundamental clarification of Collingwood's intent in *The Principles of Art* that can be attained through a consideration of the role of imagination in a broader philosophical and methodological context. The work that underpins both of these intellectual undertakings (one historical and one aesthetic) is *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, an early work that clarifies Collingwood's working premises of philosophy and its scope of application in relation to a variety of analytical objects.

Accordingly, the step to be taken prior to making this comparison is to engage with Collingwood's discussion of philosophical method, in particular to consider the implications of his conception of "philosophical" and "empirical" modes of analysis which can be used to suggest ways to plausibly resolve some of the lingering perceptions of a disjunct between objects and imaginative experience. The "philosophical" mode of analysis is characterized by Collingwood as necessitating a particular exercise of imagination, while the "empirical" mode is characterized as an exercise in exact scientific quantification. I suggest that it is a more accurate understanding of this difference in methodological approach that enables us to clarify the subtle distinctions between the act of observing artistic artefacts empirically and the experience of art as an artist (or someone who "appreciates" that art, or the experience of art as academics who engage with art "philosophically").

The aim is to do so by placing the account of artistic imagination within the context of his broader philosophical system, and thereby (hopefully) presenting an account that is both unified and plausible. This is assisted in some degree by reference to some of the final writings of Collingwood, including *The New Leviathan*, a work which restates and clarifies key premises that bear on the arguments to hand.

Philosophical method

The distinguishing characteristic of *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (hereafter referred to as the *Essay*) is the manner in which it deals

with the variety of orders of thought, in other words, analytical approaches that employ concepts and use them according to differing operational premises. As Connelly (2005) has discussed in perhaps one of the most effective explorations of this aspect of Collingwood's philosophical method (albeit with an emphasis on the political), the philosophical approach to any order of subject matter entails the utilization of concepts which refine the core elements of not only the object of study but also the nature of the engagement with that object.[6]

In the *Essay*, Collingwood often uses the case of "scientific" analysis to make a rather emphatic distinction between how one might pursue an empirical analysis of the world, as opposed to the method pertaining to a fundamentally distinctive *philosophical* order of investigation (such as pure philosophy, philosophy of history or the philosophy of art). The key premise, which is crucial to our understanding of Collingwood's methodology, is that concepts operate differently in "philosophical" as opposed to "scientific" modes of analysis. In the section dealing with "The Overlap of Classes", Collingwood argues at some length how we must understand the practical difference in the applicability of concepts between science and philosophy:

> The traditional theory of classification and division, however true it may be as an account of the logical structure of all concepts belonging to science, exact or empirical, must be modified in at least one important way before it can be applied to the concepts of philosophy. The specific classes of a philosophical genus do not exclude one another, they overlap one another. This overlap is not exceptional, it is normal; and it is not negligible in extent, it may reach formidable dimensions. (Collingwood, 2005: 31)

Even so, Collingwood doesn't argue that concepts figuring in one approach cannot be relevant in another – he introduces a "scale of forms" which is intended to bring into clear relief the operational coalescence of concepts. To use Collingwood's words:

> There are words which are used in two different ways, a philosophical and a scientific; but the words undergo a regular and uniform change in meaning when they pass from one sphere into the other, and this change leaves something in their meaning un-altered, so

that it is more appropriate to speak of two phases of a concept than two senses of a word. (Collingwood, 2005: 33)

Or, as Connelly and D'Oro put it in their introduction to the recently republished *Essay*, concepts are both *extensive* (in terms of their fluid overlap) and *intensive* (in terms of their polysemic potential).[7]

A further point of contrast between science ("exact or empirical") and philosophy, is the distinction between orders of judgement: the "hypothetical" and the "categorical". Scientific method allows for a clear definition of core concepts that permit hypothesis formulation and, ultimately, empirical testing. Collingwood argues that in philosophy, however, all judgement tends to be "categorical" rather than "hypothetical". This is an extremely idiosyncratic use of the term "categorical", but suffice it to indicate (as it is not feasible to discuss it in too great detail here) that it is employed by Collingwood to articulate his notion that the act of engaging with an object philosophically entails a species of judgement that cannot be dissociated from a distinct categorical premise of analysis, one that is not absolute but relative. As Collingwood himself explains:

> Categorical and hypothetical are two species of judgement; according to the hypothesis, therefore, in non-philosophical judgements they will constitute separate classes, so that the universal judgements forming the body of science can be purely hypothetical; in philosophical judgements they will overlap, so that those forming the body of philosophy cannot be merely hypothetical but must be at the same time categorical. (Collingwood, 2005: 134)

Again, Collingwood does not regard the "hypothetical" as inimical to philosophy (or the "categorical" inimical to science); what distinguishes them is the nature of their operational relation to each other. This conception of "categorical" judgement is also integrated into a broader conception of understanding where Collingwood remains with the avowedly Socratic conception of philosophy as having the aim of enabling us to articulate that which, in a sense, "we already knew" (a motif that re-emerges emphatically in *The Principles of Art* as well):

> Establishing a proposition in philosophy, then, means not transferring it from the class of things unknown to the class of things

known, but making it known in a different and better way.
(Collingwood, 2005: 161)

Accordingly, knowledge generated through philosophy is not verifiable in the same manner as scientific knowledge, but rather is subject to some measure of "verification" in the sense that we seek to confirm that we know something "better".

Finally, there needs to be some comment on the nature of Collingwood's conception of the relations between distinctive branches of philosophy (particularly as we hope to treat the philosophy of art more particularly). The ontological premise referred to above indicates a generic conception of philosophy that ultimately pertains to one "system of philosophy". Collingwood acknowledges the controversy that such a stance invites, but insists that it is *methodologically* necessary to work on the premise of such a system in order to correctly conceive of the possibility of distinct human philosophical endeavours revealing more fully the nature of human experience (in the Socratic sense mentioned above).

The "system", as Collingwood conceives it, is not an amorphous or static entity but a highly integrated whole with a dynamic yet nonetheless discoverable set of relations:

From this point of view of the conception of different philosophical sciences as treating distinct aspects of the same subject-matter, or expressing distinct attributes of one substance, will be modified by conceiving them as terms in a scale, each penetrating more deeply than the last into the essence of its subject-matter and expressing the nature of the one substance more adequately. (Collingwood, 2005: 189)

And so we see that Collingwood transposes the conception of the "scale of forms" onto philosophy as a whole, as literally a "scale of philosophies", each with "an appropriate and therefore specifically distinct method" albeit overlapping to some degree.

Fortunately we are provided with some indication of how Collingwood conceives of the philosophy of art in relation to other branches of philosophical investigation through one of the rare examples of a direct reference to art in the *Essay* where he contrasts the approach of the empiricist with the artist. In the following we see

that there is no *a priori* denial of the validity of either approach in any absolute sense – it is the "intension" of the engagement and the appropriateness of the concepts employed that is the key difference:

> Even in concepts that have no strictly scientific phase, a similar distinction can often be traced between a philosophical phase and a non-philosophical. Thus art, for the critic, is a highly specialized thing, limited to a small and select body of works outside which lie all the pot-boilers and failures of artists, and the inartistic expressions of everyday life; *for the aesthetic philosopher, these too are art, which becomes a thread running all through the fabric of the mind's activity.* (Collingwood, 2005: 189, my italics)

This is a distinction with fundamental significance to our understanding of *The Principles of Art*, and it is itself "a thread running all through the fabric" of that work as well. The aesthetic philosopher has a particular domain of concern that constitutes a lens for engaging not only in the obviously relevant material (such as you might find in museums or galleries), but in fact something fundamental to human experience. The objects of contemplation are not discrete but situated on a continuum of possible expressions of the aesthetic faculty – some fulfilling the criteria of aesthetic action better than others, *and some enabling the kind of imaginative engagement more fully than others*.

The foregoing highlights how Collingwood's method, regardless of the diversity of the disciplines, was consistent at root in its "criteriological" character (to use Connelly and D'Oro's turn of phrase). And when we compare the methodological approach in both *The Idea of History* and *The Principles of Art*, we can observe that as they commence very much on the same terms, they provide instructively contrasting perspectives of the role of imagination in their respective fields.

The Idea of History and The Principles of Art

Before proceeding directly from the foregoing to discuss *The Principles of Art*, it is valuable to detour briefly to make some comparative remarks regarding *The Idea of History*. This is a work that presents a broader sense of context and reveals in some detail the application of

the earlier methodology in a specific case. Though published posthumously under the editorship of T. M. Knox, it had its gestation during the early to mid-thirties and was initially produced in 1936 as a series of 36 lectures. The aim, apparently, was to issue a book based on this material under the title of *The Principles of History*. The book manuscript was never finalized and, ironically perhaps, it was *The Principles of Art* that first came into print. Even so, it is a key partner text for *The Principles of Art* in that it goes into detail about how the frame of the earlier *Essay on Philosophical Method* could be applied to a specific philosophical project, in this case the question of the philosophy of history, (albeit with a degree of refining some of the key terms from the earlier work).

As with the earlier *Essay on Philosophical Method*, Collingwood devoted considerable space in *The Idea of History* to the clarification of differing orders of mental reflection, primarily between formal philosophy, on the one hand, and science ("empirical and exact") on the other.[8] The key point of the contrast was to highlight the dialectical character of conceptual overlap in non-empirical philosophy and to argue that it operated in a manner fundamentally distinct from empirical scientific analysis. Accordingly *The Idea of History* provides one of the first complete demonstrations of how that method could be applied in a specific discipline.

At the outset of *The Idea of History*, Collingwood revisits the definition of philosophical thought as follows:

> Philosophy is reflective. The philosophizing mind never simply thinks about an object [as in an empirical or exact science], it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object. Philosophy may thus be called thought of the second degree, thought about thought. For example, to discover the distance of the earth from the sun is a task for thought of the first degree, in this case astronomy; to discover what it is exactly that we are doing when we discover the distance of the earth from the sun is a task for thought of the second degree, in this instance for logic or the theory of science. (Collingwood, 1946: 1)

As with the *Essay*, the indexicality of terms and concepts in science are contrasted with a more reflexive array of terms and concepts employed in "philosophical" thought proper.

When addressing the particular question of defining *the philosophy of history*, Collingwood emphatically distinguishes his own sense of the term from what might be understood in terms of the "grand traditions" of either Voltaire (engaging in historiography with recourse to the rigour of rationalist philosophical enquiry) or Hegel (history as, in essence, a history of thought). To establish what he *does* mean by a philosophy of history he contrasts divergent approaches to "the past" by reference to, in the first case, the professional historian, and then, in the second, the psychiatrist. The historian, according to Collingwood's account, will seek to establish and verify the detail of what has happened in the past; the psychiatrist, by contrast, will seek to establish what people have thought in the past, often extrapolating from observations or theories based on what is believed to be the character of thought in the present (Collingwood, 1946: 2–3). While not rejecting these approaches outright, Collingwood distinguishes his conception of "philosophical" historiography as entailing a primary concern for how we might philosophically reflect on the past as history, and somehow do this by "bringing to life" the thought of the past on its own terms.

When we compare the opening of *The Principles of Art* to this foregoing opening in *The Idea of History*, we see that Collingwood takes an identical approach in the sense of initially "clearing the ground". Collingwood distinguishes between two types of expertise in relation to art, that of the artist, and that of the academic philosopher. In a similar fashion, he depicts a situation where both of these perspectives have tended to fail to meet in the commentary of art: the artist will know more about art, and the process of making art, but will often be unable to express it with philosophical rigour, while the academic will certainly excel at developing an account of art that holds water philosophically, albeit at the cost of doing some mischief to the conception of art (Collingwood, 1938: 3–4). Collingwood states that the aim of his work is to marry the two together more completely – to explore how we might come to understand the experience of art and its significance as a socially shared form of expression. Or, to use other words, bring *philosophy* to the *experience of art* and do so in a way that acknowledges an imaginative engagement with artistic artefacts (Collingwood, 1938: 224).

Consequently, *The Idea of History* evokes an exercise of imaginative faculties not altogether dissimilar to the cognitive processes depicted

in Collingwood's discussion of art, and so we might argue that the philosophical approach to both history and art could be summarized as consisting in an imaginative engagement with the past. In the case of historical methodology, however, Collingwood invokes a rather distinctive concept of "re-enactment" to describe what the philosophical historian does when engaging with historical materials. He refers to the example of a speech of Julius Caesar, and suggests that the philosophical historian will not seek to analyse his words as merely linguistic statements, or statements of verifiable facts, but attempt to understand the speech as Julius Caesar himself would have understood it. It would be tempting to suggest, and certainly the argument has been made, that Collingwood believed it was possible to have Julius Caesar's thoughts in some original sense. But the point is very much in the attempt to *re-enact* rather than *reproduce*.

Fortunately, we can secure a degree of clarity about what Collingwood intended by his concept of re-enactment through a consideration of his discussion of the "historical imagination" within *The Idea of History*, where he relates his view of the relationship between history and literature (as imaginative exercises) as follows:

> As works of imagination, the historian's work and the novelist's do not differ. Where they differ is that the historian's picture is meant to be true. (Collingwood, 1946: 10)

Collingwood is clearly stating that he regards the nature of the exercise of imagination as being, in essence, identical. There are, nonetheless, three crucial aspects of difference that Collingwood enumerates following this statement which distinguish the exercise of the historical imagination from the artistic one: the first, for the historian, is the localization of the imaginative picture in space and time; the second is that all history must be consistent with itself; and the third is that the historian's picture "stands in a peculiar relation to something called evidence". The nature of "evidence" is examined at some length, with a consideration of the practical constraints on what we might legitimately select as evidence, and what we must avoid.

In summary, then, despite these differences, the exercise of imagination, *as the primary methodological tool for engaging with the object of study*, remains a key unifying aspect of both philosophical projects. It also provides support for the notion that the discussion

of "re-enactment" in relation to history might in certain essential elements parallel the invocation of the "imaginative experience" in relation to art within *The Principles of Art*.[9] Yet it still remains necessary to clarify how Collingwood conceived of the distinction between what people may have actually thought or felt in particular historical circumstances, and how we might legitimately begin to understand the character of that thought from the vantage of the present; this is a problem common to both the philosopher of history and the philosopher of art (who, incidentally, may well be one and the same person).

Philosophical method and the "total imaginative experience"

The foregoing discussion of philosophical method followed by the comparison of *The Idea of History* and *The Principles of Art* adumbrates our understanding of "imagination" and does so on a broader *methodological* level. On this basis it is more emphatically persuasive that Collingwood not only regarded Books I and II as a prefatory exercise in conceptual clarification, but also part of a rather distinctive order of methodological praxis. Both Ridley and Davies have been correct in their assertions that the text of the first two books cannot be taken as the core texts of *The Principles of Art*, and Davies has been astute in highlighting Collingwood's conception of art as language to be the cornerstone of his theory of art. And, after all, Collingwood makes this explicit himself in the following:

> § I. *Skeleton of a Theory*
>
> The *empirical or descriptive work* [my italics] of Book I left us with the conclusion that art proper, as distinct from amusement or magic, was (i) expressive (ii) imaginative. Both these terms, however, awaited definition: we might know how to apply them…, but we did know to what theory concerning the thing so designated this application might commit us. It was to fill this gap in our knowledge that we went on to *the analytical work* of Book II. The result of that book is that we now have a theory of art. We can answer the question: "What kind of thing must art be, if it is to have the two characteristics of being expressive and imaginative?" The answer is: "Art must be language". (Collingwood, 1938: 273)

This clarifies that the "work" of the earlier sections was "empirical", "descriptive" and "analytical", which indicates, especially in relation to the earlier works that I have referred to here (particularly *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, but also *The Idea of History*), that Collingwood was pursuing his customarily rigorous demarcation between empirical analysis and philosophical investigation – a process that would involve distinctive procedural and methodological premises which needed to be fully acknowledged before undertaking a philosophical treatment in detail.

Even so, the manner in which this exposition unfolds is not without its problems and, as we saw in Davies' account of Collingwood's theory of the imaginative experience, there are two very precise difficulties that remain: the essence of the communal experience of art, and the nature of its transmission. It has to be conceded that *The Principles of Art*, as it stands, does not make unequivocal statements on the matter. Assistance with resolving these issues comes, as foreshadowed earlier, from the consideration of the *Essay*, particularly in terms of clarifying the *methodological* reasons for making a two-step approach to the theory, the first an exploratory analysis premised on exploring the limits of one method, the *empirical*, the second being a more nuanced exploration of the possibility of a *philosophical* treatment of the subject. As we saw in the earlier discussion, within the *Essay*, Collingwood employed a "scale of forms" to take account of the variable applicability of each and every concept he brought to bear on the problems at hand – this implied an acknowledgement of the fluidity and flexibility of a concept's applicability in terms of its *extensiveness* and *intensiveness*.

Transferring this to our consideration of *The Principles of Art*, we should treat every aspect of Collingwood's discussion of the artistic experience as entailing a fluidity of application – to wit, when he suggests that a receiver of an artist's expression is able to engage with the artist's "total imaginative experience", this will necessarily vary according to the degree to which the experience of that art makes it possible to so do. Davies is right to address a range of examples where this might apply to varying degrees. My argument here is that they are not an array of examples which present contradictions, but part of a continuum of potential imaginative engagement. Tactile art is at one end, and affords the easiest realization of the communal connection between the artist and the viewer in the most complete sense.

Elliot's *Wasteland* affords the least degree of capacity for sharing the "total imaginative experience", although it is arguably still possible to engage with resonant aspects of that expression well after the author has put down their pen and consigned the manuscript to the press. Music has a somewhat intermediate capacity for enabling the sharing of the artist's compositional experience given the use of musical notation, including cues on tempo and mood.

But what of the relation of the act of creating art and the experience of whatever we are given to respond to following that process of producing the work of art? There is the intensity of the original artistic act of creating art, which entails an amalgam of physical and psychological self-clarification through engagement with a particular medium; it entails the expression of emotion and thought and the "bringing to consciousness" of experience. The artist, as a sentient being, is aware of physical *sensa*, emotions and a host of expressions (linguistic or otherwise) that are already extant. The act of creating art is putting into some tangible expression both the consciously apprehended thought and feeling, and unconscious feeling. The artistic process is "complete" when the artist has fully articulated the store of conscious and/or unconscious stimuli.[10] But did Collingwood actually believe that we would somehow re-experience the emotional dimension of that act of expression, either as artists or as the "audience"?

This is a pivotal question (and indeed Davies' pivotal problem with Collingwood's theory as I understand it), and the answer comes from perhaps an unexpected source in *The New Leviathan*, in particular the discussion of feeling and emotion. In chapter 5, "The Ambiguity of Feeling", Collingwood reprises some of his earlier observations on feeling, including physical sensations and the emotional charge that can accompany them. The section of most interest to the preceding problem, however, resides in the discussion of the "evanescence" of feelings, which he characterizes as "things that begin to perish as soon as they begin to exist" (Collingwood, 1992: 33). We may deceive ourselves that feelings remembered are the same as originally felt, but the fact of the matter is that "the only feeling actually present to you is what you now feel". Even so, Collingwood indicates the following possibility:

> By reflecting upon this and asking questions about it you may for a time "evoke" ... not the feeling itself (that is dead long before

questions about it can be asked) but some ghost or caricature or abstract of it; but only for a time. (Collingwood, 1992: 33–34)

Applying this discussion to *The Principles of Art* tends to suggest that Collingwood would not believe that we are able to re-experience the sentient dimension of art created in the past directly. As defined earlier, artistic expression consists of putting into some tangible expression both consciously apprehended thought and feeling, and unconscious feeling. Feeling, for Collingwood, can be physical sensations (*sensa*) that contain an "emotional charge", but the intensity of that emotional charge is necessarily diminished after the point of experiencing it, so that the artist is, in a sense, racing against time to articulate the force of that feeling before it evaporates. The resulting artefact (whether it be painting, music or poem) is not the essence of the artistic event but its consequence – more importantly it is the means by which the artist may themselves imaginatively re-engage with the original artistic moment. In other words, there is no emotional charge embedded in an artefact to re-engage with – there is, however, the possibility of emotions being activated through the imaginative engagement with that artefact, and there is, theoretically at least, some possibility of at least understanding something of the original creative event on that basis.

Conclusion

Davies' article rightly highlights the problematic nature of how Collingwood discusses art in its communal dimension – and he is correct to suggest that Collingwood himself was caught to some extent on the horns of a dilemma. Given the foregoing account of the artistic process from the artist's point of view, there is a fundamentally ambiguous relation between the original artistic experience that led to the creation of the product *per se* and the "total imaginative experience" entailed in experiencing the artistic product. Davies, despite a broadly sympathetic reading, remains concerned that Collingwood has created a bind for himself by failing to "grasp properly the relationship between the work of art as *expression* – as an activity – and the work of art as *expressive* – as an activity productive of an expressive artistic vehicle" (Davies, 2008: 173).

Collingwood himself highlights the nature of this conundrum by suggesting that once an artistic artefact becomes the object of contemplation in its own right, or the focus falls on its utility in engendering a particular emotional or sensory effect, it is no longer an object of art proper, but of art as "craft" (Collingwood, 1938: 276–277). Moreover, he suggests that the artist, either though aiming to be "better understood" or by attempting to promote the results of their own artistic experience, is in fact closer to acting as a missionary or a salesman of the aesthetic experience rather than as an artist (Collingwood, 1938: 300–301).

The key to resolving this conundrum does very much lie, as Davies suggests, in our understanding of imagination. Yet it is perhaps not quite as he conceives it. The term "expressive charge" is employed to signify the power or impact of an artistic artefact, either as that imbued by the artist in the process of creating it, or the audience in the process of being exposed to it (Davies, 2008: 169–170). As a point of detail, the term "expressive charge" is not used by Collingwood himself – it is "emotional charge", and it is this which colours feeling, which in turn is part of the psychic and sensual that produces an "impression", which consciousness then converts into an artistic "idea". This will of course find expression as part of the creative process, but as was outlined above, the emotional charge must of necessity evaporate, even for the artist. There is the possibility of reconstructing something of the original experience, but the "glue" to this is imagination which is the means by which the audience can engage with the artefact. None of this suggests that the audience re-experiences the artistic experience of the creator, but it does suggest that they share an imaginative experience. Collingwood is emphatic that there is no guarantee that the audience's experience will be identical:

> How is one to know that the imaginative experience which the spectator, by the work of his [sic] consciousness, makes out of the sensations he receives from a painting "repeats", or is "identical" with, the experience which the artist had in painting it? That question has already been raised about language in general (Ch. XI, § 5) and answered by saying that there is no possibility of an absolute assurance; the only assurance we can have "is an empirical and relative assurance, becoming progressively stronger

as conversation proceeds, and based on the fact that neither party seems to the other to be talking nonsense". The same answer holds good here. We can never absolutely know that the imaginative experience we obtain from a work of art is identical with that of the artist. In proportion as the artist is a great one, we can be pretty certain that we have only caught his [sic] meaning partially and imperfectly. (Collingwood, 1938: 309)

In sum, Collingwood's argument is that other sentient beings are able to engage with art and get a sense of the "total imaginative experience" that prompted it. There is a process of recognition that occurs which, if the art has succeeded in communicating on more than a purely idiosyncratic level, leads to enhanced self-knowledge and by extension an enhanced collective self-knowledge. Given the fundamental formulation of the artistic process, and especially given the unavoidable loss of intensity of feeling even for the artist, then clearly the engagement of the fellow sentient being is not one of equivalence with that of the artist, but an imaginative engagement based on the stimulus to hand, be it poem, sound or tactile art.

Consequently, if we return to Davies' problematic characterization of the communal experience of art, we are indeed looking at a situation where the mode of engagement is imaginative, a form of "re-enactment" which may well include the provision of tactile or tangible stimuli as a prompt (the brush work of a painting, or the sound of a musical score being performed). I have argued that this does not imply an attempt to understand an almost mystically perpetuated emotional resonance that is somehow embodied in the artefact. And, if we consider the essential elements of the artistic process as outlined above, we are able to assert that the artistic process for Collingwood does indeed take account of physical *sensa* and the possibility of the articulation of art in a tangible (empirical) form; indeed, he does not conceive of imaginative experience as being possible but by some sensuous experience: "nihil est in imaginatone quod non fuerit in sensu".[11] But when it comes to our capacity to re-engage with works of art *philosophically*, Collingwood's position is that, based on methodological considerations, we are constrained to do so primarily through *imagination*.

2
Anime as Craft

Anime provokes a number of fundamental questions with regard to technique. The overwhelming majority of Japanese-based productions maintain an attachment to 2D or hand-drawn character design within a backdrop and texturing that is aided by 3D design and digital imaging. This is a markedly distinct trajectory from North American production houses such as Pixar which have opted for an entirely immersive adoption of 3D design (Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010: 180–181). Clearly, animation in general is becoming more deeply integrated with what we might describe as the "cinematic vision", but the question that arises here is whether these present two distinct instances of digital design in cinema or two instances of practice on a continuum of interface between cinematic imaging and animation as a separate art. Collingwood's characterization of "art proper" suggests that art always transcends technique and can be embedded in a highly fluid inter-relation amongst potentially several disparate media simultaneously. The answer that seems unavoidable, then, is that the aforementioned seemingly divergent approaches to the moving image are indeed part of a continuum of practice.

Even so, the question of how cinema and anime have "grown towards each other" over the last two decades is pertinent, and in particular the role of 3D digital imaging in facilitating that inter-relation needs to be carefully considered. I would suggest that the role of 3D digital design has been reified to some extent, and although it might seem tempting to conclude that it is the immersive model of animation that has done the most to facilitate this relation, I would suggest that it is in fact the aesthetic of anime that has clarified more emphatically the implications

of the impact of digital design in cinematic production. This may seem deeply counter-intuitive, but hopefully through the contrasting of several film cases from both the anime and cinematic oeuvres the degree to which art transcends technique will be more apparent.

It is impossible to dispute that a transformation in technology will have a significant impact on artistic production and the forms of art that emerge. Even so, there are some caveats with regard to the understanding of craft in relation to art that need to be highlighted based on Collingwood's discussion of that very particular point. One of Collingwood's most emphatic propositions is that "art proper" cannot be understood as a species of "craft". He traces the origin of this "technical theory of art" to the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, in particular the notion held by Plato and later developed further by Aristotle that, just as there is a hierarchy of crafts for various artisan professions, there must be a hierarchy of arts as well (Collingwood, 1938: 18). Collingwood's objection to this thesis is grounded in a definition of craft as being the business of fulfilling preconceived ends through evident means – the thing produced is not in any way accidental but calculated to meet a specific aim. When applied to art, the technical theory has a variety of incarnations, some more explicit than others, but they rest on an assumption that when an artist creates something, it is with a preconceived end in mind – to produce a particular emotional response in the audience, to evince pleasure, or to create an object of beauty. Collingwood argues that what actually distinguishes the genuine artistic process from the misidentified one is the fact that an artist does not create art by knowing where they will go prior to engaging in the creative process – it must of necessity be open-ended, and the means of its ultimate resolution will not be clear until the act of expression has come to some point of resolution (Collingwood, 1938: 17–20).

Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of objections to the technical theory of art as applied to anime, it would be useful to highlight six specific characteristics of craft that Collingwood presents as being individually or combined to distinguish craft from art (they are paraphrased here as follows):

1. Craft always involves a distinction between means and end.
2. Craft always involves a distinction between planning and execution.

3. Means and end are related in one way in the process of planning (end precedes means); in the opposite way in the process of execution (means precede ends).
4. There is a distinction between raw material and finished product.
5. There is a distinction between form and matter (form is generated through the transformation of "raw" material).
6. There is a hierarchical relation between various crafts, one supplying what another needs, one using what another provides.

The implications of these characteristics for a consideration of animation perhaps do not present themselves as immediately obvious, but let's start by making clear the distinction between craft and art using Collingwood's own examples (Collingwood, 1938: 20–26).

The gist of what Collingwood had to say regarding point 1 above has already been covered to some extent, but to reiterate the point, a proper work of art cannot be produced by having a preconceived end with self-evident means. The artist does not know how the work will turn out until it is finished, and there is in fact no guarantee that when the best efforts have been exercised that the project has been a success. What holds for point 1 holds for point 2 as well: it is highly unlikely that either a major auteur like Miyazaki Hayao or Kon Satoshi create their works with both the end and means clear from the outset. Anyone who has been involved in creative practice knows that art involves plans of a kind but they are not plans or ends that correspond to building a house or constructing a table.[1]

Moving to point 3, the documentary accounts of the production process available to us through several excellent documentaries, for example the NHK documentary entitled *Miyazaki Hayao at Work* (2009) covering the process of production for *Ponyo*, and later on *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* (2013) which covers the creation of *The Wind Rises* (2013) and *The Tale of Princess Kaguya* (2013), attest to the very real transition from the phase of planning to execution – and so they should, because they deal with what is after all a genuinely sophisticated and complex process of crafting.[2] Yet that is not the essence of what lies at the heart of the artistic merits of these works: it is not enough that they have been well crafted and produced (and if there is one thing that probably can always be said about a Studio Ghibli production, there is often little to fault in the execution); the question of how they work as art always remains, and indeed will be contested.

With reference to point 4 Collingwood provides the illustrative case of the poet who, while going about some mundane task, is spontaneously struck by a set of words that are then worked into a poem. The words might seem to be the "raw material" here, but the process, Collingwood argues, is a very different one from fabricating horseshoes out of iron, or making pasta out of flour (Collingwood, 1938: 22–23). The same could be said of animation – it would be a misidentification of the artistic process to suggest that when an animation director works with cel animation techniques he is converting the raw materials employed in his production into something else. The essence is the artistic vision, all else follows after that. It is worth noting here that Collingwood explicitly avoids the suggestion that art can have no plan or that no raw material can be involved – his point is that in some cases art can be generated on that basis, and if that is the case, the technical theory of art must be jettisoned as inadequate.

In other regards, it would be salutary to bear in mind, particularly with regard to point 5, that the matter employed by the artist also does not necessarily constrain form. In the case of animation (or cinema for that matter) it is always tempting to analyse form as somehow arising from the "matter": cel sheets or celluloid film. As we shall go on to discuss in relation to Thomas Lamarre's media theory of anime, there is a point at which the analysis of the materials involved in creative production must not be thought of as generating particular forms of creative expression, tempting though that prospect may be.

And as concerns point 6, there are clear and quite obvious pitfalls in over-accentuating the relation of one craft *vis a vis* another – again Lamarre's discussion of the relation of anime to cinema comes to mind, and makes several important observations regarding the changing status of the respective crafts, but as I shall also go on to argue, the transformation in that relationship was, if anything, driven by a freeing of constraints, by an obliterating of the apparent specific affordances of the two media.

To make the implication of the foregoing outline of Collingwood's critique abundantly clear, there is no suggestion here that the materials used, or the quality of the technique, have no bearing on what eventually emerges as a work of art, in this case a feature-length animation. Indeed Collingwood is adamant that a high level of art is almost invariably combined with such a high level of technique (and

he is scathing about the romantic notion that "anybody can produce great art", so long as their heart is in the right place). Even so, he is emphatic that while technique may well be integral to a higher form of art, it is not the element which makes art distinctive in and of itself. Put in its simplest terms, we may well identify aspects of the process of technical production that seem to fundamentally structure the nature of artistic expression – we may well do so, but they are always "red-herrings" when it comes to identifying the distinctively aesthetic aspects of the work in question (Collingwood, 1938: 33).

Over the remainder of this chapter there are three areas where Collingwood's critique of the "technical theory of art" might be applied to the analysis of anime. The first concerns the contention that technique somehow structures and determines the "art" of anime. This brings us into direct contradiction with certain aspects of Lamarre's media theory of anime – to be sure Lamarre's analysis is carefully nuanced and makes very clear his awareness of the potential pitfalls of technological determinism. Ultimately, however, Collingwood's critique of the technical theory of art will be employed to establish whether there is a point where the theory of "machinic assemblage" as espoused by Lamarre nudges into a position where a certain instrumentality predominates.

The second area for applying the critique centres on the role of 3D digital design and brings us into some disagreement with certain strands of commentary, for example that of Lev Manovich, which ground the analysis of aesthetics firmly in the impact of digital technology and its capacity to supplant human agency. Consequently, some discussion of the degree to which 3D digital design can in fact have less impact than we imagine will be presented.

The third area for discussion concerns the notion that the technique of a particular artistic medium can be analysed in terms of its capacity to engender certain psychological states. Again, this brings us into dispute with a considerable array of media theorists who discuss art in terms of its psychological effects, and that would include the Lacanian school of analysis referred to in the opening introduction. Lamarre again has a carefully nuanced approach to this issue, describing himself as "post-Lacanian". His discussion of the psychological dimension of the "animetic" image (to use his term) will be examined to explore how he has dealt with this problem (Lamarre, 2009: xxxvi).

Thomas Lamarre's account of anime straddles a number of concerns related to the ontology of the image and attempts to synthesize them under the rubric of a "machinic" assemblage. His starting point is the fundamental technique of animation used to generate animated images, including a very detailed examination of the history of the practice of cel animation and the practice of compositing using the animation stand. There is, of course, much to value in Lamarre's account, particularly the ingenious analysis of physical motion in cel animation where he distinguishes between a phase of "decoding" movement, and then "recoding" it into a set of simplified and symptomatic representations of the original movement, without the precision of 25 to 30 frames per second gradations of representation (Lamarre, 2002: 331–332). Also, as already indicated in the introduction, Lamarre commendably steers clear of a "culturalist" explanation for the direction that animation technology has been taken in Japan.

And yet there is an uneasy link between 2D cel animation and 3D design in his commentary that is more difficult to resolve. Most of what Lamarre has to say about the "animetic" image is grounded in the technical constraints of the layering of planes in traditional animation. This morphs into a full-blown exegesis of animation in general as the "multiplanar image". His commentary on the relation between the "animetic" image and cinema or pure 3D design acknowledges that there is an aspect of "underdetermination" to the "anime machine", so that there can be a free play of expression beyond the constraints of the material basis for the production process (Lamarre, 2009: 33). But the material elements of the process are, one might suggest, accentuated to such a point that the invocation of a "machinic assemblage" seems rather over-extensive. Here the "limitedness" of traditional cel animation, both in terms of the use of superimposed planes to generate a sense of space and the use of simplified elements of physical movement, does not for some reason lead to an examination of what imaginative exercises have been engaged in by the artist, and by extension demanded of the viewer. The "operational relations", to use Ranciere's phrase, are limited to a discussion of the technology rather than to their aesthetic effect.

We might approach this problem from the other side of the equation, by examining how we might account for cases where distinctive elements of the "anime aesthetic" can, ironically enough, be found

in the earlier precedents of Japanese cinema itself. In Darrell Davis'
Monumental Style, National Identity and Japanese Film (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996) we can find an exegesis of some of
the key characteristics of pre-war cinematic style in Japan that should
give us pause for reflection. Davis highlights the work of Mizoguchi
Kenji in *Genroku Chushingura* (1941), for example, to consider the
distinctive manipulation of perspective and *mise en scene* through the
use of static camera set-ups juxtaposed with the geometric shapes
accentuated by long corridors and sliding panels of Japanese archi-
tecture. In particular there is the scene where a Daimyo is captured
in a long shot sequence that has him gliding slowly along the long
"colonnade" that skirts the inner garden, at first following a diagonal
line from the distance toward the left of centre before then turning
the corner and turning towards the centre from whence the main
camera shot is being taken. It highlights a certain lack of anxiety
about the absence of pace, and the itch to follow the actor rather
than let the action unfold in a distinctive environment. There are
no facial close-ups interspersed to "relieve" the lack of psychological
narrative by revealing the emotions of the protagonist. We might
also note how the actor's movement in the traditional *hakama* totally
obscures the feet, rendering the movement as one of sliding rather
than ambulating.

The merit of considering this scene in relation to anime is to
acknowledge that there are aspects that resonate profoundly with the
grammar of graphic representation that was supposed to have been
the consequence of technical constraints engendered by cel anima-
tion. Firstly, there is a juxtaposition of movement within planes to
accentuate depth of perspective – the strong geometric frames of the
action present a set of planes that the actor moves past or through,
accentuating space rather than movement alone. The other aspect
is the abrogation of an attempt to represent movement "naturalisti-
cally" – when your *hakama* is longer than your legs a very different
form of ambulation is required, and it happens to correspond to a form
of "limited animation". Naturally, *hakama* are a cultural convention
of the time and not aesthetic apparatuses in and of themselves – but
they do have aesthetic consequences in this sequence nonetheless.

It is not the aim here to trace the anime aesthetic to a pre-war or
pre-modern aesthetic tradition, and somehow explain the aesthetic
as having some historically transcendent essence (although it might

be tempting to attempt this); the simple point here is that it should give us cause to reconsider an account of the anime aesthetic as being derived from a distinctive technological apparatus such as cel animation.

A further example that may in some sense "close the circle" in terms of highlighting the ways in which the distinctive aesthetic of the 2D image can be successfully incorporated into the cinematic vision emerges in the form of Wes Anderson's *Grand Budapest Hotel* (2014). In this case, the deliberate embracing of patently "low tech" panoramas in the opening sequence depicting the hotel and its funicular invite more than mere acknowledgement of the director's "idiosyncratic" or "quirky" vision – it states most emphatically that a form of cinema not obsessed with the demands of photorealism can still engage, entrance and transport with almost "reckless" indifference to what otherwise might have been possible if the masters of 3D special effects had been let loose to "work their magic". And in this film we see a concomitant indifference to the requirements of an "authentic" acting style, a totally plausible and consistent persona for the key protagonists, as well as even a (I would suggest) refreshingly cavalier attitude to the realms of physical constraints. In the scene where M. Gustave and Zero are pitched off their make-shift toboggan at the end of their pursuit of the villain Jopling, Zero's legs are seen comically protruding from the snow next to the upturned vehicle. If ever there was a deliberate flagging of a debt to *comic* sensibilities, there you have it.

To consider another manner in which aesthetics can transcend a medium we may also examine how continuities of a coherent aesthetic style have been able to traverse across several distinct media platforms in the last two decades. Perhaps one of the most instructive sources for illustrating this can be found in a relatively recent development in the design of video games which have a remarkably swift turn-around compared to television anime, feature length animations and even graphic novels. *Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within* has already been discussed, but another arguably more instructive case is provided by the *Silent Hill* (Konami, 1999) franchise.

The significance of *Silent Hill* lies in certain aspects of design which in turn facilitate a distinctive capacity for integrating key aspects of audio-visual experience amongst various screens and in turn enabling a proliferation across disparate media platforms. The

achievement of *Silent Hill* was not simply to look like a film (and this could not be achieved merely through high-resolution 3D graphics or by using subtle camera-esque flourishes such as lens flashes) but to establish the possibility of a *cinematic experience of the game*. As one commentator has noted, *Silent Hill* was a pivotal video game product that enabled players to feel like they were controlling a film as they played (Perron, 2011: 78–86). Typically there are cinema-esque bridging sequences that establish key elements of the narrative and provide continuity to the "next stage". *Silent Hill* seemed to achieve something beyond this.

How this was achieved in detail is difficult to outline in simple terms. On the one hand, there was an explicit and self-conscious aspiration of the designers to bring certain cinematic elements into the game design. But it was a selective set of cinematic reference points that they focused on – for example, the films of David Cronenberg, David Lynch and Stanley Kubrick stand out in particular (Perron, 2011: 68). There is no one thing that you could identify in each of these directors' work that could be distilled into some "definitive influence". There are, nonetheless, several traits in the game itself that would seem to register as highly suggestive.

The first is a pre-occupation with the visual over the narrative. This is not to say that there is not a detailed and strongly articulated undercurrent to the visual action – in a sense it is the strength of this narrative detail that enables ventures into visual indulgence and the sublime. A correlate of this is the employment of visual textures such as mist or smoke to bury or embed iconic visual elements in an open-ended environment. It could be suggested that this was a convenient technical ploy to reduce the requirements of render time in game play. It also releases the game design from the implicit tyranny of 3D design where every aspect of 360 degree space has to be in some sense "accounted for" even if it is not seen. Mist and other textures counteract and actually liberate the designer from this constraint to some extent. The second is the distinctive use of sound – as discussed by Bernard Perron, anxiety in the game can be generated by the occurrence of unfamiliar sounds out of view. Finally there are distinctively cinematic perspectives that are employed to create the "filmic" ambience. Perron again accentuates the considerable thought and care devoted to creating novel and "cinematic" episodes in the game (for example the shot of the protagonist standing beyond an overturned

wheelchair in silhouette). At the same time, he also highlights how the eerily disembodied camera perspective obtained in *The Shining* finds an application in *Silent Hill* (Perron, 2011: 67–70). The use of steadycam shots and "unnaturally" low angles to track movement along corridors is acknowledged as intrinsic to the film's distinctly horrific ambience – *Silent Hill* replicates this and arguably even accentuates it. It should also be acknowledged that multiple point of view options during game play help to enhance the sense that there is always an alternative to the first person view that "follows" from a fixed distance.

Overall, the point of raising the persistence of certain stylistic traits across so many disparate media modalities is to accentuate the highly contingent character of what we might be tempted to regard as specific to a particular medium. At the most fundamental level, artistic expression transcends the constraints; indeed, it would seem to be part of the imperative of mastering a medium in the first place.

Despite certain misgivings that were articulated earlier in this chapter dealing with Lamarre's discussion of the animetic image in *The Anime Machine*, it would be salutary to acknowledge that he has nonetheless written one of the most cogent discussions relevant to Collingwood's second problematic aspect of craft – the question of the impact of technology. As discussed briefly in the introduction, Lamarre's contribution to *Cinema Anime*, "The First Time as Farce: Digital Animation and the Repetition of Cinema", argues persuasively that while animation was initially seemingly destined to remain as the slightly "ridiculous" junior partner to the more serious cinema, this relationship had been fundamentally revised through recent technological developments. In particular, he focuses on the arrival of the feature-length *Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within* (2001) which heralded the achievement of a cinematic animation generated entirely through 3D design (Lamarre, 2006: 166–167). What was the particular impact of this? To announce, in effect, that 3D animation was able to "do" cinema – create a digital artefact that, for all intents and purposes, didn't rely on any cinematic filming technologies (the use of a camera) but was visually indistinguishable from something that might have been produced through that medium. Lamarre suggests that this achievement matches what Lev Manovich regarded as the crucial tipping point in the relation between cinema and 3D

design – an epitomization of the capacity of the computer to triumph over the lens (Lamarre, 2006: 168). However, he also astutely notes that if replacement of cinematic technologies with animation techniques through precise replication of the cinematic vision was in itself the end-point for the evolution of the relation between the two, then this would be a very constrained view of how they would interact in the future indeed. He suggests that what would really happen would be a "repetition" of cinema – cinema transformed in a fundamental sense – with the relation between the two also revised from the former hierarchy of cinematic "seniority" to, if anything, the reverse situation where animation would at least be an equal partner if not more dominant. The real question, then, was how cinema would be transformed through the fundamental revision of the hierarchy between these two technologies (Lamarre, 2006:173–177).

The impact of a technological innovation is never simple to detect and define, but let us bear in mind the caveats and consider whether there have been any signs of "convergence" or hybridity between anime and conventional cinema. What we have seen in the last two decades is the emergence of a new cinematic vision that is clearly and emphatically informed by a vision found initially in Japanese animation, although it cannot be detailed and identified in some linear or instrumental sense. The relation (for example) of *Ghost in the Shell* (1995) to *The Matrix* (1999) is informative in this regard (Ruh, 2004: 139). On one level, certain visual motifs of *The Matrix* owe something to the enthusiasm of the directors for the earlier *anime* "text". And regardless of whether this might be construed as appropriation, emulation or even "homage", what stands out most deeply is the arrival of an emphatic ripping away of the constraints of the "movement image" and the supplanting them with an embracing of the "time image" and doing so, arguably, with unprecedented intensity. To be more specific, the visual effects of certain iconic scenes in *The Matrix*, (Neo leaping into a fighting stance and then visually rotated around as he remains in perfect stasis, or the scene where bullets are instantaneously stopped in mid-air and then subject to the physically impossible condition of "dead-weight") were technically possible before *The Matrix* (and examples may well be found in less well-known works). It is the "mainstreaming" of these effects that catches the attention here. And, to a point, with these examples we are actually still within the confines of finding instances of where the

technology generates an "epitome" of the "time image" as defined in the work of Deleuze (Colebrook, 2001: 46–47).

The added dimension that becomes apparent in *The Matrix* is on the level of "imaginative space" – a fluidity of events, character and spectacle where the world itself is torn apart into any number of parallel existences and possibilities. The offer of the red and the blue pill by Morpheus to the as yet uninitiated "Neo" is a pivotal indicator that we ourselves as audience are being offered a new alternative – between a world that is physically and existentially "closed" and one that is no longer subject to a closed system of physics and a stable definition of identity (Constable, 2009: 80–85). To return to Lamarre's thesis regarding the reversal of the relationship between animation and cinema, we see in *The Matrix* the kernel of what could be described as the logic of the cartoon, albeit rendered in a much more "serious" form: in *The Matrix* the climax is where Neo discovers he can be shot repeatedly and not die, he can ignore the hitherto ineluctable laws of physics and career through the air at will. Here the invincibility of the Roadrunner character, Wiley Coyote and the physics-defying superhero of the Marvel comic has found a fresh and more emphatic cinematic expression.

Cinema has evolved in new directions since *The Matrix*, to the point that referring to *The Matrix* (yet again) may even seem passé. Yet we can identify lines of continuity from this watershed film in later developments. Again, at the risk of over-emphasizing one particular text, we might examine the case of Christopher Nolan's *Inception* (2010) which arguably takes the kind of spatial and temporal ruptures implicit in *The Matrix* and then takes them to an even more sophisticated level. *Inception* literally stretches time and identity across several layers all at once and poses existential questions about the reliability of human consciousness with remarkable forcefulness. We might note that the precariousness of consciousness, memory and identity was explored by the same director in his earlier work, *Memento* (2001), but in the later case, both the handling of the narrative line and the question of identity are developed in more sophisticated ways. In *Memento* we have one character inhabiting an anonymous backwater for the entirety of the film with the narrative line hanging on the cinematic ruse of revealing the sequence in events in reverse order from the conclusion in almost uniform "episodes". In *Inception* the hero does not "inhabit" any particular space exclusively or for very long. The

narrative is composed of several episodic layers that collapse (potentially) endlessly within themselves, with the very notion of what constitutes the passing of time placed into utter question (McGowan, 2012: 147–155).

Intriguingly, *Inception*, like *The Matrix*, has a correlating anime feature that also explores highly resonant themes of computer technology enabling people to enter the realm of the subconscious and experience time on multiple levels, *Paprika* (2006) by Kon Satoshi. If considered from the viewpoint of anime and the "repetition of cinema", *Paprika* in its opening sequence makes an emphatic nod to the comedic possibilities of the cartoon: a miniature toy car squeaks into the compass of a stage light and out of it pops, limb by limb, a full sized clown who proudly announces the beginning of "The Greatest Show on Earth". What follows is an emphatic denial of the cartoon as Kon, over a five-minute sequence, engages in a truly extraordinary panoply of shape-shifting, scene-changing and identity-fragmenting that is unified through a montage of physics-defying transitions. The scene with particular resonance with *Inception* is the scene where the hero walks down a corridor that buckles and warps and all the elements in the space suddenly become weightless (in *Inception* this is used to signify the point where the frame for remaining in the current level of the subject's subconscious is coming to an end).

This is not to suggest that Nolan has appropriated elements of *Paprika* directly, or that he was in some sense engaged in an exercise of using 3D design to create the hyper-cinematic that would in some sense trump animation through cinematic techniques. In this connection it is worth noting that he did not rely exclusively on the technology of 3D design to actualize this vision – there is in fact a deeply nuanced interweaving of analogue and digital effects which, nonetheless, coalesce into a seamless whole.[3] This, if anything, reinforces the proposition initially raised with regard to the likely impact of a new mode of visual imagination on cinema through 3D technology – the key consequences would not be the subsuming of filming techniques in the digital but a profoundly restructured relation between the analogue and the digital, its most distinctive feature being, if anything, a particular exercise of imaginative faculty rather a technical facility. The more important point, however, is that in *Inception* it is not so much the question of tropes from an anime text

that matters rather than the aspect of cinema appropriating some aspect of anime's mode of imagination.

As ever, there are those who suggest that our current experience of the moving image in general is essentially new, constrained and reconstituted through new digital technologies whose affordances (apparently) subsume even human agency. Chief of the proponents of this perspective would arguably be Lev Manovich, whose characterization of a "velvet revolution" in moving-image creation through the emergence of 3D design technologies (such as Adobe After Effects) would seem to usher in a new raft of sensibilities and strategies for communication (Manovich, 2006: 5–7). To some extent we might agree that this is correct in some broad sense – indeed who would decline to agree that the emergence of such technologies are indeed revolutionary. But there is a distinction between the significance of the impact and the notion that somehow the technology subverts human agency and, by extension, makes possible an aesthetics generated out of digital data itself.

There are several caveats I would like to propose with regard to the reading of too much into the impact of 3D design. Some of these caveats stem from the commentary on interactivity and immersion in video game experiences. Aaron Smuts has admirably detailed how much of what is accepted as an adequate definition of interactivity actually fails to convince on critical reflection. To summarize, he presents a series of case studies all of which seem to fall into one common misperception – namely, the notion that anything from being able to select content or manipulate the order of its presentation, to being able to engage in the more advanced possibility of experiencing a randomized set of scenarios in a rhizomatic fashion through the sophisticated use of procedural code in game design, all imply some kind of meaningful two-way interface between the computer and the user. Smuts is correct to assert, in my view, that all we are talking about here, even in the most advanced 3D video game platforms, is an elaborately orchestrated set of preordered and prefabricated outcomes (Smuts, 2009: 53–73). The crucial litmus, he asserts, can be found through a reflection on R. G. Collingwood's notion of "con-creativity", which, as the word makes clear, entails a genuine possibility that something that wasn't technically possible previously somehow becomes viable through the joint creative process of two actors (human and machine in this case).

The main reason why we might like to reflect on the implications of this conclusion for the purposes of analysing 3D design in animation is to emphasize that 3D design is always a closed system, only capable of rendering the data that is put into the animation rig. There is, technically, no room for gaps or image lapses – unless of course one chooses to adopt the same techniques of 2D animation; the expansive vista, the immersion of action in limited light sources or the employment of gaseous effects to "smudge" the lines between what has been made explicit and that which has been merely left to resonate in some inchoate sense. Lamarre is certainly correct to highlight the possibility of "interval spaces" in the "multiplanar" image, but his discussion of this still seems to be preoccupied with the technical affordances of the apparatus.[4] By contrast I would still prefer to accentuate what I regard as being the more significant aspect – their capacity to leave space for imagination and, as will later be developed in Chapter 6, the possibilities of "morphogenesis".

"Immersion" provides another avenue to discuss the apparent affordances of 3D design and its capacity to transform the human experience of the image. In Ermi and Mayra's landmark discussion of immersion in relation to the video game, we are presented with carefully gradated distinctions amongst various immersive experiences of audio-visual technology. The first, based on the notion of "flow", refers simply to the relatively cerebral immersion entailed in problem solving – in simpler, relatively "closed" video games, there are clear achievement markers and objectives in order to "succeed" in the game, and all players need is the requisite mental application to muddle or struggle through them. The second is the level of "imaginative" immersion, which stems from the transposition of the player's sense of self into the game world, either through a self-selected avatar or the selection of a culturally resonant "side" in a strategy game. Finally, there is the level of "sensory" immersion which, in a sense paralleling with Smuts notion of the ultimate fulfilment of what we perhaps ought to mean by "interactivity", signifies the epitome of the immersive paradigm; a situation where sense and computer processing are integrated (Ermi and Mayra, 2005: 1–14). Again, the reason why this commentary has some relevance here to the discussion of 3D technology in the production and experience of the image is in the emphatic denial that a 3D image, or a world

constructed out of 3D images, is somehow more "immersive" than other audio-visual platforms. The one instance that possibly challenges this is the stereoscopic cinema platform which, through the impact of the "negative parallax" becomes capable of engendering certain sensory responses that could not be experienced by any other means (Ross, 2012: 381–397).

So we come back to the assertion that the technology of the animated image has facilitated and encouraged certain kinds of imaginative expression which, ironically enough, have found a new life through the infusion of high-definition 3D design in cinema. It also qualifies the tempting assumption that animators, the Japanese practitioners in particular, might have abandoned the constraints of 2D cell at the "drop of a hat" once they knew what computer-driven marvels were possible through the latest technology.[5] Miyazaki Hayao is famous for being resolutely indifferent to the prospect of a digital "nirvana" made possible by 3D design. And in a sense we need to see this as not mere sentimentality about doing things "the old way", but as having a persistent aesthetic priority – Miyazaki wants to say certain things, and feels they are best expressed through the techniques that he favours (Cavallaro, 2006: 126–127).

The final aspect of Collingwood's discussion of "craft" that would seem to be most relevant to a reconsideration of recent commentary on animation, or indeed media in general, is to review the notion of art as a psychological stimulus. Collingwood expounds at considerable length on a "modern" attempt to habilitate a technical theory of art through the application of psychological method or at least the adoption of some of its terminology. Within this conception of art, the aim of art is conceived as producing various psychological states in the audience. The character of that psychological state might vary, but the analysis of what the artist achieves through their art is framed predominantly in such terms. Collingwood notes that this is not a new conception of art; indeed, it stems from precisely the same classical roots alluded to earlier in this chapter. Artistic production is likened to either the satisfying of a target mental response in the audience or the satisfaction of some more utilitarian notion of desire – "giving people what they want". Collingwood criticizes this as the perpetuation of the ancient fallacy albeit in modern guise. It is erroneous, in his view, because it is, in essentials, a replication of the misperception

that art is about having the capacity to conceive and find the right materials in the right proportions in such a manner as will satisfy a preordained, and in a sense "verifiable" objective (Collingwood, 1938: 34–35).

The problem that Collingwood alights on is complicated by the fact that artists themselves can become preoccupied with the utilitarian constraints that simply making a living as an artist might entail. The comedian must make people laugh and adopt whatever means to do so. The artist who works on commission for an advertisement agency must satisfy both the client and demonstrate a capacity to engage with the target audience. Overall, Collingwood describes this as "the peculiar tragedy of the artist's position in the modern world"; a condition where the artist's living is guaranteed only on the condition that the artist uses art "in a way that negates its fundamental nature" (Collingwood, 1938: 33). In a broadly constructed framework Collingwood outlines six readily identifiable motivations that typify the psychological objectives of contemporary "pseudo-art": under the notion of arousing emotions for pleasure ("amusement"), for practical value ("magic"); under the notion of exercising intellect there is the "puzzle", especially when it is done simply to exercise the faculties and no more, and "instruction" when it is for the sake of enhancing knowledge; and then there are certain practical activities that are stimulated toward merely expedient ends, such as "advertisement", or "exhortation" which pertains to promoting conduct that is considered right (see Collingwood, 1938: 31–32).

Even by Collingwood's own admission this is a rather broadly construed catalogue of motivations or conceptions of typically instrumental psychological states, and, in any case, he distances himself from the notion that artists "create" emotional states in their audience. The problem is that it is nonetheless a dominant frame of commentary on the arts, and it is one he hopes to expose as fundamentally unhelpful to our understanding of art proper and aesthetics. If art only exists to promote certain emotional states or reactions, it is tantamount to being a section of the "Pharmacopoeia" – this, Collinwood claims, is not a theory of art but an "anti-aesthetic" treatment of art. He does, of course, acknowledge that there is a second variant on this approach where the stimulation of psychological reactions could be conceived "not as the essence of art but as a consequence arising in certain conditions out of the nature of that essence"

(Colingwood, 1938: 34). Even so, this approach, by acknowledging the separation, does not succeed any more by continuing to proceed on the basis of analysing psychological effects.

Overall, Collingwood laments that while a great deal can be expounded to perpetuate a psychological theory of art in the form of art criticism, he rejects the ultimate value of such undertakings as being devoid of aesthetic standards. As Collingwood brusquely sums up:

> Psychological science has in fact done nothing towards explaining the nature of art, however much it has done towards explaining the nature of certain elements of human experience with which it may from time to time be associated or confused. (Collingwood, 1938: 36)

So although Collingwood does not altogether reject the value of psychology, he discounts its value in developing an account of art and the artistic experience.

There are some clear parallels that can be drawn from the foregoing with regard to contemporary academic commentary on animation, and indeed media and culture in general. A great deal of scholarship situated in the cultural studies paradigm draws on a variation of postmodernist exegesis that in turn draws either on the "psychoanalytical tradition" commencing with Freud and culminating in the work of Lacan, or Derrida and Guattari's "schizoanalysis". The presence of Lacanian elements in Lamarre's work has already been noted, and a review of the scholarship of the last two decades makes it abundantly apparent that a very great deal of commentary on gender and sexuality related to animation draws heavily on this tradition as well.

In the first place, it is not possible to characterize these approaches as conceiving of their target texts as the result of largely instrumental objectives such as "amusement", "instruction" or "advertisement" – if anything both the artist and the audience are conceived as partaking of a deeper structuring of identity and consciousness based on the structure of the human psyche, the very heart of that being grounded in issues related to sexuality. So while we do not have a simple instrumental account of how culture (and by extension art) articulates psychological states, we do having a working

assumption that what we experience as culture (including art in all its forms) partakes in the working out of contradictions and tensions embedded in this deep structure of psychology. As such, then, it implies an approach to art that is closer to the more nuanced variation mentioned above – art has its own sphere, but it is examined primarily, almost exclusively, in terms of what we understand the psychology affords us.

Such approaches already have their detractors, for example the critique developed by Bordwell and Carrroll in *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* has had a clear impact and developed a now-influential following. Even so, there are dimensions to "cognitivism" itself that at times seem susceptible to Collingwood's critique of the psychologically focused approach to art, particularly with regard to the attempts to develop a "mentalistic" account of how a film works.

Steven Shaviro also stands out as relatively rare example of an exponent of cultural studies who has nonetheless expressed a profound disquiet about the utility of Lacanian psychoanalysis in our understanding of contemporary culture. In *The Cinematic Body* he abandons the obsession with the phallus, castration anxiety and the structure of the signifier to nonetheless proceed with a highly eclectic foray into a variety of texts that entail everything from zombie apocalypse to the humour of Jerry Lewis to articulate the significance of the body in our experience of film.

But there are signs even among practitioners of cultural studies devoted to the employment of Lacanian psychoanalysis that limitations or a revised compass of applicability could be countenanced. In his 2002 article "Art as Symptom: Žižek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism" Tim Dean made the bold but nonetheless salutary observation that the Lacanian framework in the hands of Žižek had developed into a "symptomology" of culture which engenders a frenzy of eclectic hermeneutical exegesis on how nearly every aspect of culture reveals the pathology of the contemporary political order. Dean has no interest in jettisoning Lacan, but he at least appreciates something of the sort of objection that could be raised based on Collingwood's critique of psychologism in art criticism.

So, the psychologistic approach to art, as a variant of what we might describe as a "technical theory of art" albeit in a less obvious guise, remains a significant dimension of contemporary scholarship and analysis of art. Various examples will be discussed in the next three chapters, and we will be examining how the critique developed by Collingwood in a general sense might also be applied to the more specific fields of "representation", "amusement" and "magic".

3
Anime as Representation

As we have attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter, the avenue by which we understand anime as art is, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, not through craft, or even technique. Naturally, there has been no attempt to deny that technical, or technological, elements in the creative process will have some capacity to constrain or shape artistic expression. But so far as "art proper" itself is concerned, the focus of our consideration should be the imaginative dimension of both the creative process and the viewers' engagement, and it is by keeping the focus on this that we avoid mistaking the essence of the art in the externalities of the process, rather than where it properly resides. As Collingwood himself acknowledges at the end of the chapter on art and craft, it is the desire to ground aesthetics with the "real" or the "tangible" that drives the attention to these quantifiable and identifiable elements in creative practice, but we would do well to avoid reifying this dimension (Collingwood, 1938: 40–41).

The chapter that follows on from "art and craft" in *The Principles of Art* deals with "art and representation" and starts with the rather bald assertion that just as art proper should not be misidentified with craft, neither should it be misidentified with representation, and this is for essentially the same reason: the faculty of imitating or creating resemblances is itself a species of craft and should be rejected on that basis. Yet Collingwood also acknowledges that a very great deal of aesthetic commentary relies on an assumption that art is about representation, and even if such a view is increasingly challenged within academia, it is an assumption that many carry into their understanding of art.[1] On one level, the evaluation of anime as an art form

in terms of its capacity to be "realistic" or not is one that finds a surprising degree of currency amongst viewers of animation, even at times amongst animation practitioners themselves. The notion that the epitome of the animator's art should be to capture with perfect photo-real clarity the motion and luminance of a tear rolling down a cheek has clear appeal – and it actually is extremely difficult and ought to command respect when it is achieved thoroughly well. But if that were an adequate measure for the epitome of the animator's art, then the business of anime as an art would amount to no more than achieving photo-realism in new and profoundly difficult ways.

Collingwood argues the point regarding resemblance and its inherent irrelevance to the essence of art by referring to portraiture painting. While accepting that the business of a portrait artist is to produce a likeness, the artistic merit actually lies in what the artist adds beyond mere likeness. In other words, the aim is to evoke the persona of the subject, and often this is done not by explicit and literal representations of the physical characteristics, but through the manipulation of stylistic elements, or at times even utterly "unrealistic" contrivances. To be sure, the object of the exercise in portraiture can be to satisfy a relatively instrumental objective – in some cases merely the obtaining of a "good likeness". But in providing this to a client, an artist is in a certain sense subordinating their art to an objective that is not strictly speaking artistic. The greater the artist, the more likely that they will produce something of artistic merit beyond the instrumental function (Collingwood, 1938: 44–46).

The question of how we might address the matter of evaluating differing modes of representation is in fact a classical one, and Collingwood does not hesitate to return to an engagement with the traditions of aesthetic discourse regarding representation that emerge from Plato and Aristotle. Plato has been famous for his passages in *The Republic* where poets are deemed to be only fit for exile from the ideal city-state. Collingwood argues that this interpretation of Plato is based on a misreading of the relevant passages, which he insists hinges on an inaccurate understanding of what was meant by "representative poetry". What Plato clearly deplored in certain kinds of poetry was their simplistic aim to merely represent certain kinds of low and vulgar conduct for amusement, while in another crucial passage in the latter part of *The Republic* there is an acknowledgement of a legitimate place for those poets who sought to "represent the discourse of

a good man". Aristotle inherited this fundamental concern; however, his conclusions were somewhat different. For example, in response to Plato's assertion that tragic drama possessed the capacity to evoke and stimulate strong and pitiful emotions – an essentially negative consequence in Plato's view – Aristotle accepted the basis of fact but asserted that it was actually capable of generating beneficial consequences due to the cathartic dimension of experiencing such drama (Collingwood, 1938: 47–52).

Inherent in this classical discussion of representation is a distinction between literal representation and emotional representation, and it is indeed this aspect that Collingwood highlights as being its most useful contribution to the consideration of representation in art. It distinguishes between mere imitation through artistic technique and the affective power of artistic techniques to produce emotional states and associations. Much of this argument can be applied to animation as well. Japanese animation has demonstrated a relative indifference to concerns of "literal" representation – auteur animators such as Miyazaki Hayao and Kon Satoshi steadfastly maintain the 2D cel look despite the employment of advanced 3D digital techniques in certain aspects of production. This has made it perhaps easy for some segments of the viewing public to discount cinematic anime as simply inferior to photo-real cinema, which of course stems from an assumption that art should be about visual replication. The other aspect of anime design that tends to be highlighted as indicative of some alleged "inferiority" is the high degree of derivative character design that is current in a great deal of anime. There is a "manga" or "anime" look – disproportionately large heads with disproportionately large eyes, with manes of hair that are often totally unnatural in hue, and a proclivity for skimpy clothing – all of which has become sufficiently identifiable so as to reach the point where the "look" is sometimes treated as a "genre" of graphic design.[2] It has to be acknowledged that in the work of Miyazaki Hayao, for example, there is a stock of certain likenesses and characterizations that can be tweaked and re-emerge in different films, for example the facial characteristics of the Yubaba character in *Spirited Away* can be found in the character design of the leader of the sky pirates in *Laputa*. In any case, the extent to which anime characters seem generic or mutually derivative is as irrelevant to assessing the artistic merits of a particular animated film as the extent to which the images presented are

naturalistic or photo-real – they are distractions so far as a considera-
tion of "art proper" is concerned.

Overall, then, the degree to which something resembles or fails to
resemble something else in an animated film has nothing to do with
the artistic merits of the work. This also flies in the face of the fallacy
that "good" art ought to be unlike anything that has preceded it in
order to be both "original" and note-worthy. As Collingwood argues,
this is simply the resemblance measure of representation turned on
its head – the aim of not resembling something else is also a technical
criterion, and has a little relevance to a work's capacity to represent
in some sense "accurately" (Collingwood, 1938: 43). This point is
especially worth noting in relation to Japanese animation – viewers
are, and will continue to be, presented with tropes and stylistic flour-
ishes that seem to come from a common stock of inspiration. This
is arguably what all artists do, but in the case of anime it is perhaps
somewhat more accentuated – no more, no less.

Putting aside the degree to which animation succeeds (or fails)
to simulate the photo-real image, there are nonetheless distinctive
dimensions to the nature of representation in animation, and these
stem from considerations of how the animated image represents in a
manner that is distinct from the cinematic image. By acknowledging
these distinctive dimensions, we do not necessarily return to a tech-
nical definition of anime as an art – we simply acknowledge aspects of
the medium of expression that will have some bearing on our under-
standing of how they work as artefacts (much as it would be useful
to acknowledge the difference in the nature of how painting differs
from sculpture). In a sense, this is a recapitulation of Collingwood's
approach to representation – it isn't at the heart of what constitutes
"art proper" in animation, but it is something that has attracted a
very great deal of commentary, and it would be salutary to consider
it and take on the insights that it affords, on the understanding that
we are examining issues of technique.

In a succinct overview of how animation can be defined as a
"text" bearing distinctive representational traits *vis a vis* cinema,
Raz Greenberg outlines the genesis of a commentary on animation
that has homed in on some of the essential elements of animation's
distinctive representational capacities and rescued it from being cine-
ma's "poor cousin". Two figures serve as the starting point for this
discussion, Ralph Stephenson and Paul Wells (Greenberg, 2011: 4).

Stephenson argues that animation was distinct from cinema because it was made "frame by frame" – i.e. it had to be redrawn for each instance of the sequence. It was not produced though the capturing of an image before a lens. This is a broadly acknowledged distinction as has been covered in the introductory chapter as well – what is interesting about Stephenson's account, however, is the manner in which he seems to exclude certain kinds of image production from the compass of animation that in fact can be legitimately incorporated. The primary example is the use of marionettes, and prefabricated sets that contextualize their movement. Stephenson seems to suggest that the use of the sets in particular is somehow a rather weak attempt to emulate cinematic production. Greenberg's response is incisive, in that he recognizes that the essence of moving images produced through marionettes with their prefabricated sets is deeply analogous to the work of animation proper. Paul Wells is also incorporated into the discussion at this point to highlight a further significant point of distinction – this definition of animation is carefully worded:

> A film made by hand, frame by frame, *providing an illusion of movement* which has not been directly recorded in the conventional photographic sense. (Wells, quoted in Greenberg, 2011: 4, my italics).

And here we hit at the nub of what is commonly held as a deeply distinctive aspect of the animated image – illusion versus "reality". Greenberg counters Stephenson's limited definition based on "frame by frame" representation and also Wells' notion of the "illusion of movement" by producing a provocative example: a sequence that has a row of buttons moving randomly is not animation in the same sense that a row of buttons being manipulated to produce a smiling face would. Again, the implications here are quite profound – Greenberg insists that it is not simply the "illusion of movement" that fulfils animation's criteria for a definition but that the animated image becomes a "text", one producing a meaning that transcends the literal.[3]

Greenberg then focuses on Wells' discussion of Halas and Batchelor who propose the notion of a "metaphysical" representation in animation. As Greenberg deftly clarifies:

> what unites the works commonly referred to as "animation" is not their contents or style (as in genre), or the way they are consumed

by the audience (as in medium), or even the method in which they are made (or coded) – it is their basic meaning, *their ability to convey concepts, rather than objects*. (Greenberg, 2011: 5, my italics).

It is this last phrase which highlights the crucial affordance of animation – the capacity to present purely semantic figures and to tolerate at the same time an "absence" of verifiable objects. The difference between what a cinematographer captures through the lens and the animator conjures within the frame is also usefully articulated through Goodman's distinction between two dimensions of representation: "representation of" and "representation as" (Goodman,1968: 6–9, 27–30). And here we see that Greenberg is coming back closely to the same categories of representation that we were acquainted with through his discussion of Aristotle's poetics – literal representation vs "representation of emotion". The point of difference here, though, is that, for Greenberg, the representation of emotion aspect seems to be framed in terms of the "conceptual" (Greenberg, 2011: 6).

There are some good reasons why we might want to push the scope of the second category closer towards "emotion" rather than the "conceptual". Primary of these is the acknowledgement that the audience's engagement with an animated image is not a cerebral event but an affective event. And one doesn't need to adhere or subscribe to more recent articulations of affect *à la* Massumi or Shaviro to identify this terrain – Collingwood readily incorporates the overlap of intellect, emotion and physical *sensa* in the experience of art and does so in a manner that was, perhaps to a surprising degree, prescient of precisely such an insight.[4]

Overall, what Greenberg's discussion suggests for our understanding of animation as a distinct art form is its inherent facility for engaging with the "metaphysical" – and if it is articulated in a particularly effective way, it will accentuate *affective* responses, not through literal representation but through the evocation of ideas, emotions and *sensa* that circumvent a more directly representational avenue of communication. I have added *sensa* here to signify physical sensations that can be evoked imaginatively (Collingwood, 1938: 194). There are scenes in anime cinema productions that incorporate surprising flourishes of attention to the details of symptomatic moments of physical experience that, in themselves, have no great narrative significance, but clearly serve some deeper aesthetic function. I'm brought to mind

of the scene in *Ghost in the Shell* where the heroine's hair billows in an otherwise imperceptible wind, or a scene where a rain drop rolls down the pane of a window: these might have only a minor narrative function, but they have a profoundly affective resonance. This doesn't make the scene "real" – it provides a deftly turned cue to enable the audience to connect between the metaphysical realm and the realm of human sensitivity – without it, an animated feature would be, relatively speaking, "stone cold".

Ultimately, Greenberg modifies Wells' definition of animation away from the notion of an "illusion of movement". His definition is modified in a subtle way as "the process of movement or change, performed by an artificially-created, text-specific object" (Greenberg, 2011: 6). In so doing he distances himself from the notion of "illusion" and centres the discussion, more appropriately in my view, on a process of change, one that is not adequately covered by the notion of "illusion" vs "reality". As Greenberg explains:

> An illusion…is not a necessary component of an animated text – at least not an "illusion of movement." A movement generated by a mechanical or hand-operated puppet is still "animation" according to this article's suggested definition, but it is not an illusion – the movement is performed by a physical object in a physical space. (Greenberg, 2011: 9)

Greenberg acknowledges that for Wells the movement of objects is a key area for distinguishing attempts to represent reality and alternatively transcend it. This is indeed a key characteristic of representation through the animated image. However, the identification of the metaphysical movement as "illusory" is problematic. There is an organic link between the "real" and that which transcends it which makes "illusion" perhaps too exclusive.

The question of how the literal dimension of representation in animation relates to the metaphysical dimension is pivotal, and from the perspective of aesthetics is actually perhaps more resonant with a broader range of artistic media than might at first seem to be the case. There are frequent references to animation's proclivity for fantasy and the supernatural, and it is a contention here that this is far from accidental. Susan Napier, by contrast, has chosen to use both the Bakhtinian notion of the "carnivalesque" (Napier, 2005: 13), along

with an extended analysis of the "defamiliarization of the familiar", to underpin her exegesis of the fantastic in the works produced by Studio Ghibli (see Napier, 2001: 478–484). This is not an approach without utility, but as I have argued in other contexts (particularly with regard to tropes of nostalgia in Miyazaki Hayao's work), the evocation of the fantastic in such terms does not adequately address the fact that in a very substantial proportion of anime cinema texts the fantastic is embedded in deeply familiarizing rather than defamiliarizing contexts. *Spirited Away* is a prime example. From the deeply resonant depiction of the rural highway of the modern Japanese countryside at the outset of the film, to the Ryokan-esque design of the bath-house, to the supremely evocative train station platform within the train journey sequence that appears toward the end of the film, we see that the fantastic has a profound, and perhaps paradoxical, relation to the mundane within such a text.

This relation between the mundane and the fantastic in animation is significant and at times problematic, to say the least. Yet we can find some pertinent points of reference to elucidate the relationship between the "real" and "fantastical" by looking more broadly at the scholarship that deals with "magical realism". To be clear, "magical realism" has easily a more profound resonance with literature than with film. And yet there are increasingly a significant number of cinematic examples that indicate a pronounced overlap with some of the artistic themes and stratagems of these print-media texts.

The question of how one might apply categories of "magical realism" to animation has been thoroughly addressed in Mishra and Mishra's article "Animated Worlds of Magical Realism: An Exploration of Satoshi Kon's *Millennium Actress* and *Paprika*" (in *Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 9(3), Sage, 2014, 299–316). This article very emphatically distinguishes between "magical realism" as it relates to literature, and "magic realism" as it relates to art. It builds on Wendy Faris' five characteristics of "magical realism" to produce the following characteristics:

- non-linearity of time and space
- non-sequiturs
- entangled identities
- observers as actors
- integration of alternative realities

They also refer to one of the relatively rare cases of academic commentary employing the referential of "magic realism" in relation to Japanese animation – an article penned by Paul Wells in a special issue of *Cinephile* entitled "Playing the Kon Trick: Between Dates, Dimensions and Daring in the Films of Satoshi Kon" (Wells, 2011: 4–8).

Overall, the article provides a useful overview of some of the key scholars of "magical realism", particularly Bowers (2004) and Faris (2004), and the case for applying the term to animated cinema is indeed well made. However, although "magical realism" remains eminently applicable, there are refinements that could be made to the definition, and the question of the ontology of the real and the magical, and how more precisely they coalesce in the animated image remains a persistent difficulty. Paul Wells' article deals with aspects of these issues and perhaps should have formed a greater part within Mishra and Mishra's analysis. But before examining Wells' approach in greater detail, it would be useful to consider the commentary provided by Eva Aldea in her 2010 work *Magical Realism and Deleuze: The Indiscernibility of Difference in Postcolonial Literature* (Continuum, 2010) – this is a work quoted within the Mishra and Mishra article and also merits further examination.

In the introductory chapter to *Magical Realism and Deleuze* Aldea has produced a highly incisive overview of the typologies and (attempted) definitions of "magical realism". To be sure, her ultimate focus is literature, but her grasp of the key currents and trends in the evolution of the term's use is perhaps unparalleled – and she incorporates the most significant commentators on magical realism in relation to cinema as well. Her key contribution is to highlight the utility of William Spindler's pivotal distinctions between three varieties of magical realism. The first, "metaphysical magical realism" is preoccupied with the uncanny and disturbing, but with no particular debt to the supernatural. The second, "anthropological magical realism" correlates to perhaps the most common understanding of the term – a preoccupation with the rational and "real" vs the magical or supernatural, which in turn is transposed onto a post-colonialist framework of subjugation and resistance against the colonizing power (with the rationalist trope most commonly associated with the dominant West, and the magical elements attributed to the prerogative of the indigenous). According to Spindler, the antinomy between the two

is mediated by a transcendent "Weltanschauung". Finally, the third category is "ontological magical realism", where the supernatural and real coexist but are not resolved through a "Weltanschauung" but a perhaps surprisingly mundane and matter-of fact "realism" of everyday life – "the unreal has an objective, ontological presence in the text" (Aldea, 2011: 2–3).

As Aldea notes "The vast majority of current Anglophone literary criticism of the genre is concerned with what Spindler calls anthropological realism, which he links ostensibly to postcolonial literature" (Aldea, 2011: 3). I would suggest that most of what is currently available regarding magical realism or the fantastic in anime is in this same vein. A working assumption seems to be that magical realism (with fantastical/carnivalesque elements) is there precisely as the default means to articulate an intrinsic sense of cultural dislocation, primarily that of a subjugated Japan within a West-dominated, globalized world. In certain cases, this is not an unconvincing line of interpretation to take; however, it has difficulties when it comes to substantiating this interpretation within the mechanics of the aesthetic itself. Aldea notes (rather bravely) that the tendency to accentuate the binary association of the real with the hegemon and the magical with the subjugated simply reaffirms a dynamic of relative powerlessness, something which she does not accept as being the ultimate purport of either magical realism as a genre or the intent of writers working within that framework. She is even critical (rightly in my view) of Fredric Jameson's tendency to replicate this logic in his commentary on magical realism in film – there are two contradictory elements, the magical and the real, which are as irreconcilable as the Western hegemon and the subject colonial culture. Even so, she acknowledges that certain adherents to Jameson's take on magical realism have nonetheless produced important insights on the hybridity at the heart of magical realism (see Jameson, 1986: 310–311). For example Brenda Cooper is commended for her insight that "thematic and stylistic hybridity allows the magical realist writer to 'see with a third eye' or to create a 'third space'". (Aldea, 2011: 5) Furthermore, Aldea notes that Cooper emphatically embraces the Bakhtinian themes of the carnivalesque, the polyvocal and narrative irony to underpin an accommodation of the devices of the "postmodern". The relationship between the postcolonial and the postmodern is something that might be considered further here, and certainly Aldea discusses

a series of relevant commentaries, D'Haen, Hutcheon and Faris chief among them, to illustrate how the field has been discussed to date.

Ultimately, however, Aldea sees the integration of the "postcolonial" within the "postmodern" as being problematic, and perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that she ultimately rejects the "anthropological" definition of magical realism as being a misleading basis for approaching a definition of magical realism in the first place. Certainly she builds from aspects of Wendy Faris' attempts to define magical realism – particularly the insight that it "combines realism and the fantastic in such a way that magical elements grow organically out of the reality portrayed" (see Faris, 1995: 163). Even so, Aldea identifies something of a lacuna in the way that magical realism is approached, not just by Faris but also by a number of other scholars. As she states:

> In the end, Faris' definition conforms to those already considered: narrative characteristics allow the coexistence of the real and the magic to be "organic" or "imperceptible", that is, without the appearance of any disparity between them. Definitions of the genre remain vague and unsatisfactory if they concern themselves only with contexts or list characteristics without giving their specific function in the text, whether these be "anthropological" postcolonial contexts or "ontological" postmodern characteristics. (Aldea, 2011: 10)

In other words, the tendency in much scholarship on magical realism has been to identify symptomatic characteristics, but not to concentrate on how the text itself resolves the antinomy of the natural and supernatural within itself. Aldea commends Chanady precisely because she relocates the concern away from the antinomy itself to the characteristic of the text that resolves that antinomy. As Spindler also noted, "characteristics of the text itself resolve the conflict between the natural and the supernatural" (Aldea, 2011: 11).

Chanady highlights two key devices of the text that facilitate this resolution of antinomy, the first is the use of "authorial reticence", the second is the use of "focalizers". The instance used by Chanady to depict the former comes from literature (specifically the scene in García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* where Remedios the Beauty ascends into the air enveloped in swirling sheets), and it is

the total absence of explanation for this occurrence that forms the basis for this "authorial reticence". The "focalizer" is the device that establishes narrative perspective – which can be simply the narrative viewpoint of the novel which continues to relate the unfolding of events without qualm, or some other character that fulfils the same function of presenting the event in a more or less unproblematic manner (Aldea, 2011: 11–12).

The relevance of this insight to animation is not immediately obvious but hopefully is more apparent upon reflection; Japanese animation has been frequently identified as an art that marries the fantastic with the mundane, and while the temptation may well be there to identify this as a typically postcolonial attempt to overcome the "hegemon", there is much in Aldea's commentary on magical realism via Chanady which resonates. In the first instance, "authorial reticence" could be said to be in fact inherent to animation – the liberation of the animated image from the cinematic lens' burden of documenting (or "mummifying") a photo-real index facilitates an unburdening of the function to represent literally or "plausibly". A series of examples are provided by the flying machines in Miyazaki Hayao's *Laputa*: whether it be the small attack vehicles used by the pirates with their furiously flapping "bumblebee" wings, or the massive expeditionary flying ship that docks with Laputa later in the film, one thing is sure – there is nothing plausible about their capacity to function as actual flying machines according to the rules of physics. They are tropes that emphatically declare "authorial reticence" in quite the way that Chanady intends it, a clear indifference to the obligation to keep things rational and scientific. Correspondingly, we also see in Miyazaki's films the use of a "focalizer" that enables entry into the realm of a world where the antinomy of the real and the magical is resolved; more often than not the perspective of a young girl. It is hard to pinpoint exactly why a young female heroine should provide precisely such a vehicle for facilitating such a "focalization". It could be suggested that there is an inherent naivety and innocence implied by such a heroine – a somewhat hackneyed one at that. I would prefer to think that a child's perspective (or at least pre-adult stage protagonist) fulfils this function, and it would just seem to be Miyazaki's preference to opt for a female character. I would also note that the use of female heroines does not imply weakness in and of itself. Whether it be San in *Princess Mononoke* or Chihiro in *Spirited Away*, their function

to act as intermediary "focalizers" between a world that we more or less can accept as contingent with our own and another parallel world that is governed by the spiritual and supernatural is undeniable.[5]

The rubric of "magical realism" clearly does have applicability to animation, and the precedents within existing scholarship on anime have done much to transpose those insights effectively. However, it could be argued that while Mishra and Mishra's work addresses the characteristics of *Millennium Actress* (2001) and *Paprika* as postmodern texts, the conclusion that it functions to articulate a distinctive Asian identity nudges it towards the "anthropological" (or "postcolonial") approach, and that is something that can be critiqued much in the same terms as Aldea highlights towards the end of her introduction. She explains her rationale for having a certain ambivalence about postcolonial readings as follows:

> we would look at the ontological properties of the real and the magic, rather than their anthropological connections, in order to define magical realism. Once this definition is established we can move on to reconsider magical realism in the context that it most prominently features in, that is, the postcolonial. (Aldea, 2011: 17)

Prioritizing an examination of the ontology of the real and the magic within the image before proceeding to the context obviously does not necessarily imply a denial of the kinds of "anthropological" insights and critiques offered by postcolonialism – these are clearly valid and even ethically necessary. What I share with Aldea is a concern to ensure that neither the symptomatic characteristics of the genre nor particulars of the postcolonial context subsume or overwhelm our understanding of the ontology and aesthetic character of a particular animated "text".

As already mentioned, Paul Wells has made an extremely important contribution to the analysis of anime grounded in a consideration of the relevance of magic realism. In his 2011 article alluded to earlier he latches on to an eminently useful perspective for unpacking the wildly fantastic and at times chaotic visual spectacle combined with extraordinarily inventive narrative in Kon's oeuvre. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the framework of Fredric Jameson's discussion of magical realism in film that is employed to structure the discussion of Kon's work. Jameson was notably reticent about attempting too

prescriptive a list of characteristics for defining magical realism in film, although he did venture the following (which I have aimed to simplify to some extent): a certain *historicity*, the distinctive employment of *coloration* for aesthetic effect, along with a *concentrated narrative.* All of which facilitate an intensification of the impact of the image in its "present of time" (Wells, 2011: 5–6).

As Wells concedes, "Jameson's refinement of the 'magic realist' principle could arguably be recognized in a great deal of cinema" (Wells, 2011: 5), but he continues to argue that the prescribed characteristics hold good, particularly in the case of Kon's work. To this he adds his own insight:

> The multiple layers of Kon's universe – dreams and nightmares; memories; fantasies; solipsistic scenarios; theatrical performances; social role-playing; mediated constructions; references to other visual sources, etc. – *are readily facilitated by the ontological equivalence of the animated image.* (Wells, 2011: 6, my italics)

Wells' pivotal insight, here as elsewhere, is to acknowledge that all animated imagery "foregrounds its constructed-ness and illusionism" which in turn enables Kon to create magic realist "epiphanies" for his characters. As the discussion of *Millennium Actress* illustrates, one register is as "real" as the other; hence we find that there is a broad equivalence with the conclusion that Aldea arrives at in her definition of the ontology of the magic realist text.

In this regard there is a quite remarkable confluence in their perspectives; and yet it is also possible to detect perhaps an occasional over-investment in the "postcolonial" framework. Having defined the ontology of the animated image as it functions in Kon's oeuvre there does seem to be a tendency to conclude that the cultural significance of his work lies in how it "represents the emergence of a modern Japanese identity, no longer bound by its religious or insular culture, or the post-war impact of American occupation or Western intervention" (Wells, 2011: 6). That it is aesthetically emancipatory cannot be denied – that it breaks free from such historical and political constraints as Wells enumerates is perhaps more problematic, and the basis for this difficulty lies with the nature of "illusion" in animation, something we will recall was at the core of Wells' fundamental definition of animation. Again, to transpose some of Aldea's insights

regarding magical realism onto Wells' discussion of animation, we remain intrigued by the question of how the fantastic facilitates a political outcome in society or enables a concrete critique of the real. To answer this we need to reconsider the nature of the "illusory" in the animated image.

As Greenberg's discussion of Wells makes clear (Greenberg, 2011: 9), illusionism and the capacity to transcend reality stems from the manner in which animation deals with movement, and this is a movement that is engendered through an artificially created object. The tension between illusion and reality persists in Wells' analysis of the animated image, and although broadly consonant with Aldea's insights, does not integrate the two into quite the sense of a "third space" as Aldea and other theorists of magical realism have. And we must concede that Aldea is not addressing the animated image when she is developing her definition of magic realism. What we have established through a comparison of her analysis with Wells is that the animated image has a particular "edge" over the cinematic image in terms of the facility with which it facilitates magic realist impulses. But we still need some sharper definition of the relation of the illusion to some kind of substantive representation of human experience.

An attempt to find a more thoroughly philosophical treatment of this conundrum has appeared more recently in a significant collection of essays on animation produced through the AFI series, *Pervasive Animation* (edited by Susan Buchan through Routledge, 2013) . Within it, Thomas Lamarre introduced his latest thoughts on the ontology of the animetic image and the persistently significant relation between the "non-localised" planar image and "localised" full animation. His question was to consider the ontological status of movement in animation as evidence of "life". In a novel departure, he invokes a tradition of "natural philosophy" to question the notion that there is a duality between real movement and illusory movement and, by extension, a "substantivist" concept of what is represented when movement is created (Lamarre, 2013: 122–124).

There is much to applaud in this move, principally in that Lamarre highlights two extremely significant characteristics of the animetic image: they are neither "alive" or "dead" (they traverse both conditions); they also neither actively represent or fail to represent. In other words, the "life" evident in an animated sequence is neither that

which corresponds to life as we know it or a realm of utter fiction. This is an important insight. However, we might demur with regard to the account of how this distinctive form of life is evoked, with reference to the structuring of the image. Lamarre, as is consistent with his earlier account of the animetic image in *The Anime Machine*, identifies the origins of the distinctive quality of life in the tension between the "localised" and "non-localised" image manipulation through *compositing*. As Lamarre explains:

> Consequently, compositing entails both a weak or passive synthesis and a strong or active synthesis. It traverses the forces of cel animation, providing an overall coordination. As such, *the potentiality of cel animation – its "life" – is not simply a matter of the vitality of its animated characters. The life of animation lies in the reservoir of non-localised movement.* [my italics] (Lamarre, 2013: 133)

As such, this may well be a perfectly serviceable account of a significant technical tension between two modes of depicting movement in animation. However, the ontological difficulty of pressing this distinction beyond a technical one becomes apparent when we see towards the end of the essay that Lamarre adopts two words for life, *zoe* and *bios*, and attempts to make them correspond to the two distinct modes of movement representation outlined above. *Zoe* refers to a technically achieved representation of life (or perhaps "life-likeness") whereas *bios* refers to the organic condition of being "alive". The way they are integrated together in Lamarre's account is evident from the following:

> Compositing (non-localised movement) troubles the distinction between zoe and bios, evoking bio-affective technicity rather than sacralizing it. (Lamarre, 2013: 137)

The problem here is that since the animetic image neither represents nor fails to represent an (empirically verifiable) authentic substance, there must surely be difficulties in introducing a mediation between an organic substantiality and a technically generated effect. It is clear why Lamarre wants to establish an account for how these two are integrated technically through a distinctive application of a technique of compositing, but in the end it places technique at the centre of the

account and attempts to bridge a contradiction that can't be bridged. The faculty that makes this marriage of the impossible possible is not so much a synthesis of techniques as a distinctive exercise of imagination. The manner in which imagination facilitates the integration of such incompatible elements will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6 – at this juncture I would refer to Collingwood's characterization of imagination as the level of consciousness prior to being directed through "attention" to be organized and verified through "intellect". Imagination is the realm where the distinction between real and unreal simply does not exist, and it is also the sphere of consciousness from whence we can follow artistic impulses to express ourselves retaining contradictions that could not hold if we were to subject them to purely intellectual or empirical criteria (Collingwood, 1938: 137).

At this juncture we might also make a brief detour to consider one of the other trajectories of commentary on "the real" which draws on the Lacanian frame of analysis. Slavoj Žižek's discussion of the Lacanian triad of the "imaginary, the symbolic and the real", as deployed in his commentary on fantasy in "The Cyberspace Real", can be introduced to initiate a critical contrast between the psychoanalytical approach to art and the "philosophical aesthetics" of Collingwood. Žižek discourses at length on the emergence of a hyper-reality in cyberspace, as particularly evidenced by the rhizomatic interactive video game, which presents a world that facilitates a tantalizing "refusal of closure" – there are the symbolic conventions of the game world, but there is always the opportunity to restart, repeat ad infinitum, to escape consequences. He also refers to the logic of the cartoon to underscore his conception of "a universe in which…a human being can survive any catastrophe; in which adult sexuality is reduced to a childish game; in which one is not forced to die or to choose one of the two sexes" (Žižek, 1999). The female cyborg is presented as just such a product of this logic, one that relates to the articulation of a "psychic reality" that could not exist in the "real world".

There is considerable resonance between what anime makes possible representationally and Žižek's characterization of cyberspace: "with [its] capacity to externalize our innermost fantasies in all their inconsistency, [it] opens up to artistic practice a unique possibility to stage, to 'act out', the fantasmatic support of our existence" (Žižek, 1999). But it would seem that the prospect that the artistic imagination, as

conceived by Collingwood, enables us to appreciate that it has more to offer than merely the expression of pathologically self-contradictory symptoms. In fact it would seem that the anime aesthetic just as easily facilitates emancipatory expressions that embody the "futur antérieur" that Žižek identifies in other contexts in relation to precinematic literature.

A parallel example of how the Lacanian framework facilitates a degree of acknowledgement of internal contradiction within the image but does not assist us to get at the nub of its grounding in imagination can be found in Lamarre's treatment of the female gynoid in *Chobits* (Lamarre, 2009: 221–233). As Lamarre himself accentuates, the gynoid figure in this "text" presents a conundrum, and the scene that he aptly highlights as presenting a profoundly disturbing conflict of emotional (and even visceral) resonances is the one where the male protagonist seeks to "activate" the female robot that he has found mysteriously discarded in his neighbourhood. After searching for an activation switch on every part of the anatomy except the one region where he would associate with a sexual encounter, the boy goes where he dares not go; and the gynoid is activated.

There is much that is problematic about the nature of this narrative device as a means of providing titillation without it actually being, strictly speaking, a sexual encounter. But what intrigues more is the manner in which, for example, attempts could be made to account for the sexual status of the gynoid in Lacanian terms. Clearly Lamarre is not entirely enamoured with the Lacanian approach in terms of either its utility as an account of technology or the moving image, but he runs the scenario through the Lacanian filter in any case. The robot is not an organic woman, neither could the implications of the activation sequence be interpreted as anything other than a "sexual" act. To resolve the antinomy, à la Lacan, there is an elaborate dance around the mediation of a binary, one half of which implies a feminine trope construed in terms of "lack", that, in certain regards, can be construed as total negation (Lamarre, 2009: 237–238). As Lamarre acknowledges, the fact is that the gynoid doesn't "really" exist, yet the encounter depicted is a sexual act by any measure. The core problem is that a sexual encounter with a robot is (literally) impossible. What this drives us to conclude is that the cyborg in this case is in fact a creature of "third space" or "imaginative space"; and aesthetically what should concern us is not the problematic of "getting to

the essence" of whether the figure is an organic human or robot, but accepting the premise of its imaginative ontology.

As already discussed in relation to Lamarre's article on cartoon animals and natural philosophy in *Pervasive Animation*, we might well wish to construct a theoretical avenue around the problem of animated life through the integration of *zoe* and *bios*; however, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, there is another alternative presented by Collingwood through his theory of imagination. In Book II of *The Principles of Art* Collingwood he develops a theory of imagination that accounts for an indifference to "reality" and "unreality" and does it in such a way that we can trace its emergence through creative expression rather than as a proposition of natural philosophy.[6] This enables us to locate Japanese animation as a medium that continues to accentuate a distinctive range imaginative expression, producing its characteristic propensity to embrace fantasy worlds and creative tropes (including dystopic future societies, the supernatural and cyborg identities), as well as maintaining a distinctive stock in trade in metaphor and allegory.

Overall, then, the "third space" highlighted through both the "hauntological" aspects of the cinematic image and the profoundly ambiguous hybridity of the magic realist trope resolve to an imaginative space – one that mediates a "reality" that is neither empirically verifiable nor even necessarily logically consistent with human experience. To the extent that certain uncanny or fantastic elements within animation do not correlate to such resolvable categories, we find that this must pertain to an aesthetic "truth" that transcends mere realism. The trope that perhaps epitomizes a vehicle that articulates this distinctive space is the cyborg; part human, part machine, and profoundly ambiguous in terms of its role in an otherwise "conventional world". This will be returned to in Chapter 6 and discussed in greater detail as part of the examination of anime as art proper.

4
Anime as Amusement

Though not explicitly articulated as "amusement" within animation, Thomas Lamarre's discussion of the traditional propensity of animation to be associated with a form of comedic "play" fits well with anime's inherent tendency to evoke tropes of visual amusement (Lamarre, 2006: 161–163). Drawing on some of the seminal commentary on animation from Paul Wells, we can suggest that this proclivity arguably stems from the pure "novelty" of animated figures – shapes and forms that metamorphosize and defy the conventions of mass and velocity on a routine basis (for a particularly detailed discussion of this see for example Wells, 2009: 69–76). As discussed earlier, Lamarre is correct to identify the infusion of 3D design in anime production as transforming the potential of this hybrid "cinema anime" to in fact subvert and subsume cinema as we know it, presenting on occasion works that are worthy of association with the epitome of tragic expression as opposed to the comedic.

Yet it remains a fact that anime, as it is consumed as a global cultural "product" is almost overwhelmingly in the televisual format, serialized and preoccupied with amusement rather than "deep" thematics. This fact in itself gives grounds to some commentators to characterize anime as inherently frivolous, or at least deeply ambivalent about the extent to which anime could treat "weighty" topics in a powerful and serious manner. We have already noted animation's capacity to be deeply affecting through instances such as *Grave of the Fireflies* (1988) and (from a non-Japanese source) *Waltz With Bashir* (2008). But there are also arguably grounds for suggesting that the repackaging of *anime* texts for non-Japanese audiences and fandoms has

had a subtle but overbearing impact on how the anime aesthetic, even within the context of televised serials, has been re-coded in unanticipated ways.

Antonia Levi has analysed the dynamics of inter-cultural decoding and recoding in a number of contexts, and she notes that the embracing of anime by overseas fandoms, including the production of fan fiction, can display a rather surprising degree of indifference to the original text and its cultural purport.[1] Certainly there are major differences, as there are indeed some truly excellent instances of highly sensitive translation and contextualization that occur. Even so, the very possibility that these texts lend themselves to such a divergent process of re-orientation toward the ends of amusement within another culture is in itself highly suggestive of a distinctive aspect of anime's place within global culture.

The question that comes into play here is how we might usefully define the parameters of amusement and do so in such a way that takes account of this highly integral aspect of human culture and social communication. It is also a key dimension of art in general, particularly so when we consider that there is an unspoken imperative that art must in some sense promote a sense of pleasure in its audience if it is to have some chance of widespread acceptance. And there is no denying that even in the work of serious animation film-makers there is always a propensity for the comic and visually amusing trope to come into play as a matter of routine.

Collingwood devoted an entire chapter to the topic of amusement in *The Principles of Art*, and did so for several reasons. The first is to distinguish his own theory of art from another, one where art is identified intrinsically with its capacity to evince pleasure. This conception of art Collingwood attributes to a nineteenth century aberration in the evolution of the Western understanding of art – and he argues at some length to lambast the protagonists of this interpretation (Collingwood, 1938: 82–84). The problem for Collingwood is not only that "art proper" cannot be adequately defined in such instrumental terms, but that this aberrant theory of art reflects a deeper cultural malaise that he identifies as potentially one of the most culturally significant symptoms of a civilization in crisis. To understand how he might wish to argue along these lines, we must turn to his initial definition of amusement – from which also stems a framework for analysing the cultural role of popular animation in contemporary

society, both in Japan and overseas, and to distinguish the manner in which more "serious" cinematic instances of anime counteract that and indeed supersede it.

As has already been discussed in the preceding chapter, artistic expression entails the expression of emotion, and the potential for the recipient of that expression to have, in turn, certain emotions provoked or energized within themselves. Collingwood distinguishes between two broad instances of how this representation of emotion resonates with the audience, one pertaining to "magic" and another to "amusement". The key difference, according to Collingwood, is how the transmitted emotion works itself out in the process of experiencing the work to hand. In the case of "magic" it galvanizes the recipient to further action, further emotional exertion, even after the experience of the expression has ceased (Collingwood, 1938: 78–82). The realm of "magic" will be discussed at further length in the following chapter; suffice it to say here that this is a category of artistic expression that pertains to the promotion of communal consciousness and "heroic" conduct. This is in stark distinction from what we encounter in the case of "amusement", a case where engagement with the work in question engenders emotions which, by contrast, have a limited shelf-life – they are for the moment, and they are (to use Collingwood's phrase) "earthed" more or less instantaneously in the experience of the moment (Collingwood, 1938: 79). A corollary of this is that amusement almost invariably revolves around a world that is not rooted in the practical life of the audience but a world that is either so patently absurd as to not be a plausible correlate to their own experience, or (as is more telling) so patently outside the bounds of what any ordinary person would consider as part of the compass of "normal" conduct as to be automatically dismissible as a guide to daily life.

Instances where animation fits this framework are easy enough to come by. From the Wile E. Coyote and the Roadrunner scenario where the coyote is routinely pummelled, blasted and bedraggled, all with mind-numbing regularity and predictability, to *Dragon Ball Z*'s seemingly interminable stand-offs that last for several episodes and progress through a series of implausible (and often un-survivable) twists and developments climaxing, usually, in a heroic, against-all-the-odds victory. There can clearly be no suggestion here that these are representations of a world that we could by any means inhabit

or that this is something from which a person watching it would (normally) seek lessons for practical life.

This sheds fresh light on the nature of what we are dealing with in the case of the young protagonist in *Chobits* activating the gynoid robot through an act of sexual intimacy that Lamarre highlights in *The Anime Machine* (Lamarre, 2009: 234–251). There are indeed a number of contradictory avenues of interpretation that are presented here – is the gynoid robot actually a figure for a young woman whose sexual subjugation is "masked" behind the cyborg trope, or is this another order of transcendental gender that mediates the inherent contradictions of simplistic binary definitions of gender? It was suggested in the previous chapter that these are valid questions, but they cannot be resolved on the basis of analysing the representational function of the image. But if we are to surmise what end the trope might serve in terms of the likely emotions aroused, it could be suggested that the point of this gynoid figure in this context is not simply to conjure a nonsensical entity but to present a figure more precisely consonant with Collingwood's definition of modes of expression that aim to amuse. Clearly there is an aspect of "masking" of the sexual act that occurs in the scene by recasting the young woman in the role of a gynoid robot. But the ultimate function of the image is to depict a sexual episode that a very great number of young men might indeed fantasize about but would have a very realistic estimation of its lack of plausibility and unlikelihood in their day-to-day lives. There is a "bulkhead" of sorts between whatever pleasure they derive from the scene in the moment and the notion of what this might imply for their actual conduct or expectations of the "real" world (Collingwood, 1938: 83). In other words, it is the very implausibility at the heart of the scene that enables it to become a vehicle for arousing emotions that, on balance, ought to be kept then and there, and usually are. The content may very well be in bad taste and in some sense transgressive, but it would seem that in Japan the viewing public by and large are fully aware of the difference between viewing something for amusement and acting out what they see in "real life".

Consequently, Collingwood introduces an approach to "amusement" in art that, perhaps to an astonishing degree, resonates with the dynamic of anime's capacity to engage in certain kinds of expression that in themselves have potentially even troubling implications but nonetheless are cocooned in a realm of impracticality. The

utility of this definition should be clear particularly when considered in relation to one other side of what is considered to constitute the heart of the global perception of "typical" anime tropes, which revolves around highly transgressive depictions of sexuality and social conduct. The question that almost invariably arises is how an otherwise seemingly orderly and obedient populace in Japan could consume such astoundingly alarming depictions of violence and rape often within publications that include relatively innocuous slapstick and banter. It is a species of amusement, never intended to mediate life experience or spill over beyond the bulwark between imagination and action. Consequently, amusement (or the capacity to evince pleasure) can be discussed in broader terms than a sense of visual novelty – indeed Collingwood recognizes the capacity for amusement to be conceived of in terms that are negative, or even detrimental to "art".[2] A case in point, particularly in relation to anime, is the burgeoning of "hentai poruno", which has arguably one of the most explicit imperatives to provide visual amusement of a particular kind, to the point that terms such as "fan service" evoke the essence of an essentially utilitarian engagement between creators and the fandom, male and female.

The value of Collingwood's account is further evident when we consider how it might be applied to the understanding of the conduct of those members of the fandom who do not maintain the "bulkhead" between the two worlds – persons who, for want of a better way of expressing it, permit their practical life to be governed by such tropes of artistic amusement. Indeed, although this may be a rather controversial suggestion, the *Otaku* might well be explained as persons who in certain contexts actively embrace the demise of that divide. In the most extreme cases, the more ardent exponents of this conduct exhibit proclivities such as displaying more emotional and erotic attachment to their anime idol figures (or figurines) than to an actual woman. At the less intense end of the spectrum "cosplay" may be seen as an exercise in dabbling with the overlap between what they see and identify in their favourite *manga* or *anime* hero and a performative exercise in "re-enactment" with their own persons.[3]

The transmission of the emotion through tropes of amusement into conduct "after the fact" might seem to contradict Collingwood's earlier dictum that the emotion is "earthed" in the process. What we might say here is that in the average instance this is arguably indeed

what happens – there are nonetheless other instances where this is not the case, and we might note that there is certainly a tendency for such conduct in extreme cases to evince deep dismay. Moving outside the realm of *manga* and *anime* fandoms, a more general case could also be made, for example, that sexually explicit pornography can indeed translate into a person's conduct after the immediate experience of the "amusement" is over. This is potentially damaging to Collingwood's definition, if we assume that it actually is an experience limited to amusement and nothing else. It remains a key aspect of this example that the viewer does not necessarily equate what they experience through pornographic material as a simulacra of their life, and if they do we might well be, to some degree, rather surprised. Even so, we must also accept that pornography, in some cases, is employed quite consciously as a spur to practical life – in which case it has a substantial overlap with "magic" as defined previously.

If we were to consider the implications of the foregoing for the consumption of popular culture for amusement in general, the reality is that very few viewers deliberately conflate what they see as amusing or escapist as an integral guide to their lives, although there is certainly evidence that instances of an indirect influence in some diffused sense are detectable in certain circumstances. Even so, the proliferation of amusement at the expense of other modes of expression is perhaps not a matter of indifference. The swamping of popular culture through the proliferation of "amusement" in place of art proper is something that Collingwood does in fact identify as part of a broader cultural malaise of his times (Collingwood, 1938: 94–99). This may seem somewhat overstated from today's perspective, but it is certainly tempting to draw parallels with the present as well. In any case, Collingwood was also aware that the proliferation of amusement was not a "done" thing and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the potential for a positive role for "magic" was something he envisaged as having the capacity to counteract this trend.

Anime itself can be seen as being, in part, a victim of the proliferation of content that is generated almost solely for the purpose of amusement and not much else. Ultimately, of course, not all anime revolves around such a constrained compass of interest – very often elements of amusement are combined with other tropes that may well have greater resonance with themes that transcend the basic definition of amusement. The capacity for overlap between amusement

and magic is acknowledged by Collingwood, and he suggests that the key point of distinction for evaluating whether a particular work is ensconced in amusement, magic or art proper is the degree to which the artistic creator remains clear about their intentionality. In some cases, he suggests, it is this very incapacity to decide whether one is aiming to amuse or evoke some other more elevated emotion that leads to imperfect and inherently contradictory and flawed modes of artistic expression (Collingwood, 1938: 82–83).

One of the key avenues for the facilitation of considerable overlap from amusement to magic to art proper is the realm of fantasy. A common understanding of "fantasy" is some notion of "make-believe", and it is perhaps fair to say that the connotation of fantasy in the sense of "make-believe" is a rather negative one. A person who indulges in "make-believe" is either a child playing with toys or a daydreamer who invests in unrealistic imaginary scenarios about their life to no practical end. Then there is the psychoanalytical concept of fantasy wherein all fantastic acts of imagination are a species of "make-believe" that have as their ultimate aim the conjuring of a sense of gratification for a desire that cannot be assuaged by any other means.[4] As is apparent from the proliferation of certain genres of *anime*, the proclivity with "make-believe" in these negative senses is hard to avoid. Yet fantasy, as act of imagination, can have a role in evoking magic or in proper artistic expression as well.

Susan Napier made an important contribution to rescuing fantasy from the notion of mere absurdity by invoking Bakhtin's notion of the "carnivalesque" – a term that acknowledges the role of fantasy as the avenue for articulating a deeply resonant social and cultural drive toward catharsis. In many ways, Napier's use of the "carnival" (Napier, 2005: 13, 261-263) parallels certain aspects of Collingwood's definition of amusement, although it would seem that certain aspects of the "carnivalesque" would also have relevance to the definition of "magic" as well. Prioritizing imagination before considering the direction of its expression (towards amusement, magic, or art proper) enables us to acknowledge that insight and, at the same time, develop clear differentiations in how fantasy is worked out in particular circumstances.

The distinction between imagination and "make-believe" complements our understanding of the distinction between genuinely artistic acts of fantasy and other delusional or perhaps even

pathological instances of expression. As Peter Lewis elucidates in his perceptive discussion of the relation of imagination to amusement in "Collingwood on Art and Fantasy", the person who employs imagination to conjure something that "does not really exist", may yet be approaching at a level of perception of truth and revelation that might be possible by other means.[5] In a manner consonant with the earlier discussion of a "third eye" in the preceding chapter, Collingwood explicitly embraces the notion that imagination is indifferent to "reality vs unreality", whereas "make-believe" is merely about fantasizing to attain a momentary sense of gratification for a particular emotion. Imagining a large spread of delicious food when one is hungry is perhaps quite an amusing exercise to engage in for the moment, but only providing a momentary sense of satisfaction and, if anything, leaving one more sharply dissatisfied later. The genuinely artistic employment of imagination neither toys with make-believe for a crude and fleeting sense of pseudo-gratification, neither does it (one hopes at least) leave one feeling at a loss or in some sense cheated.

Furthermore, the contrast between make-believe and imagination so-defined provides, as Lewis argues convincingly in my view, an antidote to the essentially Freudian thesis that all artistic exercising of imagination is simply a device for conjuring gratifications for deep emotional desires – in other words, the thesis that all artistic exercising of imagination is on a par with "make-believe" as discussed above. To be clear, some acts of artistic expression do exhibit precisely such functions, but Collingwood's insight is to delineate them as inherently inferior to other modes of imagination that have quite distinctive instrumental aims (Lewis, 1989: 552–553).

Cinematic anime, fortunately, presents us with cases where the tropes of amusement are combined with more profound emotional and intellectual experiences, and this happens with the focus on art proper rather than amusement per se. It is hard not to start with Miyazaki Hayao's work in connection with this topic and the contrast with, for example, Takahata Isao's work provides some clearer notion of why Miyazaki merits particular attention. In a work such as *Grave of the Fireflies* Takahata maintains a focus on the deeply visceral cruelty of war, interspersed with scenes of juvenile exuberance (despite the circumstances) that present, if anything, actually a more acute sense of impending doom and tragedy (see also Danno, 2008: 156–157).

Miyazaki is at times equally capable of depicting a visceral episode (for example the chase sequence in *Princess Mononoke* where Ashitaka lets fly with an arrow that decapitates a pursuing samurai horseman) but he all too often cannot resist flourishes of amusement that, if they were pushed any further might derail the internal coherence of his work (just in terms of the indeterminate fusion of contradictory artistic aims that Collingwood discusses). The forest deities (*kodama*) evince mirth due to the disproportionately small bodies and twirling heads that rattle each time they go around. In the sequence leading up to the fight scene between Princess Mononoke and Lady Eboshi, there is an element of pure slapstick as the Princess leaps into the air, steps on the face of Lady Eboshi's bodyguard and jumps over to the other side of the assembled attackers.

Overall, it is rare for Miyazaki to exceed the carefully calibrated boundary between tropes of amusement and a more profound strand of narrative and commentary. In some cases he is downright audacious, as we see in *Porco Rosso* (1992) where the main character is the only one to be fully transformed into the condition of being an anthropomorphized animal. As Paul Wells discusses at length in the introduction to *The Animated Bestiary: Animals, Cartoons and Culture*, the animal trope in animation is subject to a profound representational ambivalence: "At one and the same time, such characters can be beasts or humans, or neither; can prompt issues about gender, race and ethnicity, generation, and identity, or not; and can operate innocently or subversively, or as something else entirely" (Wells, 2009: 3). I would argue that it has a deep proclivity with "amusement" but, as Wells also notes, it can be employed to startlingly good effect toward even political or philosophical ends (e.g., Halas and Batchelor's *Animal Farm* (1954)). To achieve this level of impact there needs to be some anchor of authenticity, either in terms of attention to some aspect of persona that resonates well beyond the mask of the animated figure, an aspect of the context that is stronger than the seeming absurdity of animals behaving as humans, or at least some sense that the world which is created has a coherent logic and deploys the figures within that world in such a way that makes the animation engrossing and persuasive.

Certainly when we consider *Porco Rosso* in this regard, there are several subtle embellishments that work to integrate the potentially "disconsonant" pig into the world of the film. The first is a subtle

one, but one that in my view is indispensable – the main character almost always wears gloves and sun glasses, thereby minimizing the appearance of physical features that would almost certainly accentuate the contrast (this is perhaps an unusual observation to venture forth with, but given the amount of fine art commentary on the significance of the treatment of hands, apart from the face, I believe it is justified). The next is much more obvious – the attention to detail with the aircraft. Unlike almost every other Miyazaki animation, *Porco Rosso* has an aircraft within the frame that is lovingly evoked with every rivet, shining panel and snort of the engine (Moist and Bartholow, 2007: 33). The scene where the aircraft has to be almost reconstructed from scratch after a crash only aids in highlighting the aircraft as a highly authentic mechanical trope that acts as the prosthetic to the main character; they become one and are inseparable. Finally, there is the extremely evocative Mediterranean locale where the majority of the action is set. It too is lavish with minor detail and attention to capturing a distinctive quality of shimmering sunlight on an expansive azure sea. And Miyazaki almost never employs any aspect of the pig's physiognomy for an absurd or comical effect. The voice is well suited to the gruff and burly character, and the persona never wavers.

   Let us contrast this with certain elements within *Spirited Away*, where the porcine trope re-emerges, albeit more subtly. The parents are transformed into pigs, and they become pigs in some visually authentic sense rather than a stylized anthropomorphized creature. Apart from this, the frog, for example, can talk and wears clothes, and many of the deities exhibit highly hybridized physiognomies. This all holds together because the spiritual world is evoked so effectively at the outset – the scene where Chihiro begins to fade and vanish until she consumes something from the netherworld she has entered underlines the ephemerality of the body and indeed one's identity. At the same time however, there is one flourish that would seem to operate on different terms, and that is when Boh is transformed by Zeniba into a plump rodent that is borne about by an overtaxed fly which is in fact one of Yubaba's pet birds. There is a visual absurdity in this sequence that has a weak allegorical and narratological significance – although doubtless somebody may well find some deeper meaning – it is there simply to amuse. To a point, it seems somewhat contrived and perhaps even distracting. Compared with the earlier

scene where the black coal creatures engage in humorous antics in Kamaji's boiler-room, the effect is quite different (Osmond, 2009: 8).

Even so, it seems to be Miyazaki's wont to employ purely amusing tropes even when they might destabilize the balance of elements. Indeed, in *The Wind Rises* the recurring theme of a hat or paper plane being lost in the wind and then being caught through some rather comical (and potentially physically harmful) exertions seems to have precisely no major function but to provide either visual amusement or, at the very least, some transposed figure for the courtship of the two main characters. These flourishes also perhaps were not convincing because they were physically too close to slapstick rather than the otherwise steady evocation of potential romance and blossoming affection that is more evident in the remainder of the film.

By contrast, Oshii Mamoru is an auteur who distinguishes himself through the skilful deployment of the cyborg trope. But there is one scene in *Ghost in the Shell* where he does introduce an animal figure, and it is a rare case indeed. In the stunning evocation of the Hong Kong-esque city-scape replete with double decker buses and monsoon rains, he has a pivotal moment where Kusanagi sees someone who is an exact replica of herself sitting in an upper story of a building as she coasts past on a ferry boat. It is a climactic moment in the entire film, and then Oshii interposes a shot of a very forlorn looking beagle that has a wagging tail and droopy ears.[6] It is clearly unlikely that Oshii intended this to be a comic diversion, but it does come unnervingly close to becoming one, given the dog's almost cartoonish character design. It arguably does not resonate with the remainder of the sequence that is otherwise seamless, astoundingly detailed in its attention to light in the surreal urban environment. This is only mentioned as a potential instance of how animation can fall into propensities that are not altogether intended – it comes with the terrain, so to speak, and has to be handled with extraordinary judiciousness. Though not perfect, Miyazaki makes the management of that propensity look relatively effortless.

One further point of contrast with Miyazaki might be introduced to good effect, and that is in relation to Kon Satoshi's use of fantastic elements that, *prima facie*, might seem to have clear associations with tropes of amusement and yet function to a quite distinctive end. *Paprika* is arguably Kon's most surreal and carnivalesque work, taking the metamorphic and ludic possibilities of the animated image to the

outer bounds of imaginative possibilities (Osmond, 2009: 101–102). As if to acknowledge this potentiality of the animated image to amuse and beguile, the opening has a toy vehicle out of which emerges, inflating in size as it does, a clown figure who welcomes the viewer to the circus. This cues the entrance of a parade of circus performers and animals in lurid costumes accompanied by the cliché of parade music. Within a short span, however, the tone is subverted through the appearance of a detective in the audience conversing with an invisible colleague about the impending appearance of a criminal fugitive, and then the detective finds himself bound up in a horrific sequence of entrapment and helplessness in a world where the ground seems to be literally giving way beneath him.

Through this opening sequence Kon emphatically undermines the ludic or comedic potentiality of animated transformation, substituting it with an undercurrent of deep unease and fear which resurfaces every time the panoply of visual spectacle is presented. The scene later in the film where there is yet another parade presents animate and inanimate figures (including everything from refrigerators and umbrellas to pigs and politicians) bobbing and bouncing in a cacophonous throng – the seeming gaiety is a loose veneer for what the viewer can justifiably take as a portent of some impending rupture or cataclysm. Clearly Kon is letting his imagination run riot, and the sequence is a visual treat – but he doesn't let the tropes of amusement escape from the iron casing of this psychological thriller (Osmond, 2009: 112).

In sum, then, it can be argued that anime has an inherent proclivity with tropes of "amusement" due to the profoundly metamorphic capacity of design elements within the medium – it is perpetually on the cusp of expression, even when the overall tenor of the production is dark or tragic. The minute forest deities conjured up in *Princess Mononoke* exemplify this, as do the transformed figures of Yubaba's baby and crow-like "familiar" in *Spirited Away*.

It should also be remembered, of course, that almost all of the major "auteur" animators we have come to deal with in the course of examining the collective oeuvre of "cinema anime" have, at one time or another, been found to engage in projects that have, for want of a better way of putting it, a preoccupation with amusement. The Oshii Mamoru who crafted the dark cityscape/mindscape of *Ghost in the Shell* started out establishing a name for himself as an animation

director in the first 162 episodes of *Urusei Yatsura* (1981–1986) (Ruh, 2004: 11–12). Kon Satoshi's *Tokyo Godfathers* (2003) also presents a relatively upfront drama comedy, albeit with a touch of underclass grittiness (Osmond, 2009: 72). And even Miyazaki Hayao can count within his production history a particularly well-crafted comic slapstick as exemplified by *Lupin III: The Castle of Cagliostro*, and there is perhaps an argument to made that *Porco Rosso* is, on balance, a film for amusement rather than for any other more elevated artistic aim (Cavallaro, 2006: 36–39).

As Brian Ruh thoroughly outlines and discusses in *Stray Dog of Anime: The Films of Mamoru Oshii*, (2004), Oshii's involvement with Studio Pierrot and the *Urusei Yatsura* animations based on Takahashi Rumiko's original manga was his first major engagement in the industry as a director (Ruh, 2004: 11). The title of the series does not lend itself easily to translation – "urusei" being a colloquial variant on "urusai" which basically is an adjective describing something as "noisy" but also has nuances in some cases that indicate that something or someone is being annoying. The term "yatsura" is simply a colloquial reference to a plurality of people, so the loose translation could be "an annoying bunch of people". In any case, the original storyline centres on a fantasy scenario where a group of aliens from the planet Oniboshi invade Earth, but give one random and feckless young high school kid, Moroboshi Ataru, the chance to save the world from invasion if he can successfully complete the task of touching the horns on the head of the lead alien, Lum, within an allotted period of ten days. As it turns out, Lum is a voluptuous bikini-clad girl and Ataru is an unambiguously lecherous teenager, who manages to succeed in his objective. Lum becomes fixated with the notion that she and Ataru are destined to be together even though her feelings do not seem to be reciprocated – Ataru having plenty of other objects of sexual fantasy to keep him occupied (Ruh, 2004: 13–15). As an early 1980s escapist work, there are many typical tropes that stand out – the "magical girlfriend" along with the erotic fantasy of the "harem" to name the two obvious ones (Napier, 2005: 197–198).

The *Urusei Yatsura* series generated two feature-length productions, *Urusei Yatsura: Only You* (うる星やつらオンリー・ユー) and *Urusei Yatsura: Beautiful Dreamer* (うる星やつら２ビューティフル・ドリーマー), and the contrast between the two is in certain ways instructive. The former

instalment is straight up comedy with the usual erotic embellishments while the latter film, as Ruh persuasively suggests, is evidence of a growing self-awareness of an emergent style, both in terms of visual elements and thematic preoccupations (Ruh, 2004: 37–39). *Beautiful Dreamer* has eventually earned plaudits for its visual style and innovation, but at the time it reaped deeply felt opprobrium from the contemporary fan-base (in some cases razors being sent as a threat to do physical harm to Oshii for departing from the spirit of the manga).

The set of works produced through the *Urusei Yatsura* "franchise" have also garnered academic commentary from other sources as well, including Susan Napier's chapter on "Carnival and Conservatism in Romantic Comedy" in *Anime from Akira to Howl's Moving Castle* (2005) and the *Mechademia* series. Clearly the works have provided a useful prototype for certain conventions as already noted, but at base the series needs to be acknowledged for precisely what it is – entertaining slapstick and farce. It may well be tempting to read deeper anthropological or even psychoanalytical dimensions into them but, on the whole, the franchise remains true to the definition of amusement that Collingwood puts forward – the engendering of emotions that are "earthed" almost instantaneously with little implication for practical life. Napier has discussed how "defamiliarization" in a number of anime texts, including *Urusei Yatsura*, works to facilitate transgressive or socially subversive characterizations, for example sexually and emotionally assertive women or seemingly indifferent parents (Napier, 2001: 145–146). While these may well be readings that one might plausibly articulate, there is equally a raft of familiar tropes that arguably anchor the work firmly in the camp of amusement rather than social commentary. At base, the work provides an outlet for adolescent male erotic fantasies – it is unlikely that a male reader would regard the plot development as even remotely attainable in practical life. Also there is a familiar escapism – a vicarious hero who can goof off and yet remain immune to the censure of his parents, whose coolness towards the main character in the series would in fact be entirely expected under the circumstances.

As Ruh suggests, a case such as *Beautiful Dreamer* may well present itself as having a deeper artistic significance when considered outside the immediate scope of its consumption as a comedic text (Ruh, 2004: 37–40). Collingwood does not suggest that the two cannot coalesce but, as already noted, confusion over what one is trying to achieve

through a creative production, amusement or art proper, can generate uneasy consequences. In the case of Oshii, he was clearly chafing within the constraints of the franchise and wanted to channel his artistic impulses more overtly – this had the rather shocking outcome of him receiving threats from the fandom (they were not amused).

Just as *Beautiful Dreamer* could be seen as being indicative of an emergent artistic practice, Dani Cavallaro has made much the same argument with regard to Miyazaki's contribution to the *Lupin III* franchise. In particular she highlights the "meticulous attention to detail and the elegant design" which are found in the elaborate evocation of an "old Europe" principality. There is the attention to aerial sequences that remerges in following films and, much as is found in later works, the female heroine emerges as an important and proactive foil in her own right (although it seems that her main preoccupation is to negotiate the web of machinations around who she will or won't marry). And in the end the treasure of the principality is not riches in the conventional sense, but the Roman ruins – the cultural legacy – that is revealed when the elaborate water system disintegrates in the final sequence of the film where the rings are re-united and used to activate a secret mechanism in the clock tower (Cavallaro, 2006: 36–39). Here Miyazaki's preoccupation with tradition and culture is accentuated with loving detail. Certainly, Thomas Lamarre has dismissed this preoccupation as part of an aesthetic of "pan-Bourgeois neopastoralism" (Lamarre, 2009: 98); perhaps this characterization is justified to some extent, and certainly that would be accurate in the context of this *Lupin III* piece. But as will be discussed in the next chapter, there is a pivotal point where Miyazaki manages to keep this at least in check, and develop tropes and themes that transform his work to more than just that.

Kon Satoshi also had an extended apprenticeship in mainstream anime production from the early 1990s onwards, working in various auxiliary capacities on titles such as *Rojin Z* for Studio APPP (1991) and *Hashire Melos!* for Toei (1992). He even worked on Oshii Mamoru's *Patlabor 2: The Movie* (Bandai, 1993).[7] There is, nonetheless, no particular production that can be identified at this stage of his career that broadly equates to the foregoing works of either Oshii or Miyazaki. *Tokyo Godfathers* (2003) is his third feature length production following on from *Perfect Blue* (1997) and *Millennium Actress* (2001). It would again be tempting to excavate some "heavy" themes from

this work given that it deals with homelessness, an abandoned child and lost family connections, yet the unlikelihood of the ensemble of characters, the almost bewilderingly farcical twists and turns in the plot and the "miraculous" happy ending (it is, as Osmond suggests, a Christmas story after all) combine to take the edge off some of the grimmer elements (Osmond, 2009: 59–62). Having said that, it is technically an excellent production and achieves much of what it ostensibly aims to achieve – the sense of some sort of consolation being viable even in the face of a harsh world (and even though it might take a miracle for it to happen).

The question of how the more arcane elements function might be explored through notions of "defamiliarization", although, as I have discussed elsewhere, it is precisely the familiar in humour that makes us laugh, not the unfamiliar or disorienting elements per se. It is a melodrama that reactivates in the viewer an intense sense of the value of friendship, family and, incidentally, the value of kindness. As it turns out, Napier has discussed *Tokyo Godfathers* directly in her contribution to *Imagined Families, Lived Families: Culture and Kinship in Contemporary Japan* (Napier, 2008: 45–49), accentuating the social commentary – clearly that is there, but artistically it still seems more stridently fanciful than critical. She has also referred to the evolution of the "gaze" from Kon's earlier works to *Tokyo Godfathers* in her contribution to *Cinema Anime* (Napier, 2006: 23–42), suggesting that the patriarchal male gaze evident in films such as *Perfect Blue* or *Millennium Actress* gives way to ambiguity and illusion through the infusion of the transgender figure of Hana who acts as a "mother" to the group of misfits. In concert with Napier I would indeed endorse *Tokyo Godfathers* as the work of an auteur of the highest order – but again I would accentuate the dimensions of amusement and farce as needing to be acknowledged for what they are. In *Paprika* we find Kon going back to what is more intrinsic to his art – and yes, there is a persistent male "gaze", but Kon's voice is more emphatically expressed in the female heroine.[8]

Having reviewed a fair number of cinematic animations in the foregoing, it could strike one that a considerable proportion of feature-length animations do not indulge in the dimensions of humour that could be regarded as the staple of anime humour – the slapstick, the double entendre and at times the sheer "looneyness" of anime as produced for television or released as OVAs. We perhaps get some clue

as to why this might be by going back to the very earliest stages of the anime crossover from being a domestic cultural product in Japan to becoming a global cultural commodity. Ian Condry's *The Soul of Anime: Collaborative Creativity and Japan's Media Success Story* (Duke University Press, 2013) provides a comprehensive overview of this process, backed by first-hand interviews and inside knowledge. One comment that stands out is a remark regarding a workshop meeting where some of the Japanese participants voiced a certain nostalgia for particular "gag manga"; one was Toriyama Akira's *Dr Slump* and the other was *Urusei Yatsura* (Condry, 2013: 119).

Dr Slump was later to become an extremely successful television series based closely on the original, - the humour rests on the daily antics of a robot girl, Arale, who has been invented by her "father" Senbei Norimaki. The "ideal" girl that he thinks he might have created has unusual foibles: despite being an android she is near sighted, so needs to wear glasses; she has no sense of physical embarrassment and asks "difficult questions"; at times she displays an absurd curiosity about "poop". Compared with *Urusei Yatsura*, the difficulty of translating some of this content to an international audience becomes apparent. A similar issue arose with the other Toriyama Akira masterpiece of comedy, *Dragon Ball*. In the opening episode when Go-Kuu meets Bulma for the first time, there is an instance where Go-Kuu's unfamiliarity with girls leads him to nonchalantly reject Bulma's offer to show him a glimpse of her panties; he also exposes himself at another point based on a deliberate pun about male genitalia and the series title. Other titles also come to mind, but it is indicative of "difficulties" that arose when Japanese anime series began to translated directly into children's viewing time slots. The emergence of *Dragon Ball Z* takes the fight elements of the earlier incarnation of the series and leaves the risqué material well alone.[9]

It is intriguing how Toriyama's early works deal with content that, in another context, may well have been worked into a grander scale with a serious narrative. The robot girl in *Dr Slump* is a deliberate subverting of *mecha* and *cyborg* tropes already apparent in "serious" anime productions, and world of *Dragon Ball* is a riotous upending of the Chinese classic *Journey to the West* which also has been given serious treatment in other contexts. This deeply subversive streak finds expression in a variety of genres. Another worth examining in this context is *Samurai Champloo*.

Samurai Champloo is a reworking of the samurai and sword-fighting genre but with a rather clever infusion of an urban hip-hop aesthetic. The opening credits are accompanied by a DJ turntable "scratching" with a low key rap monologue interspersed amongst a series of sampled instrument clips; before you know it you are being transported into Edo Japan (Condry, 2013; 78–81). The story revolves around the plight of Fū, a 15-year-old girl who recruits the services of Jin, an old school samurai and master swordsman, and Mugen, a rough and uncouth swordsman from the Ryūkū Islands (present day Okinawa) who demonstrates devastating, if unconventional, prowess with the sword as well. The episodes contain much that can be "authenticated" within the milieu of Edo Japan, but it is also routinely subverted through the insertion of elements that have very contemporary resonances – a food eating contest, and a figure who mysteriously has a penchant for "beat boxing" a cappella. As the *Samurai Champloo* English homepage stated, anyone who wanted to raise issue with the historical veracity of the series should just "get over it"; this is a delightfully playful romp through the clichés of samurai *jidaigeki* (period dramas) that is at once urbane and intelligent as well (Condry, 2013: 169–171).

And then there are animation series which are simply "out of left field" and defy most modes of conventional framing. One such case is *Kore wa Zombie Desu Ka?* (Is This a Zombie?) which follows the predicament of a young high school student, Aikawa Ayumu, who is awakened by a necromancer, Eucliwood Hellscythe, to discover that he is now a zombie after having been murdered by an unknown serial killer. For all intents and purposes Ayumu looks like a typical teenager and takes on none of the clichés of the "walking dead" lurch or decomposed facial features. As a zombie he can be subjected to all manner of physical trauma but somehow he regenerates back to his original form. Being a creature of the netherworld, he also comes into contact with all manner of fantastic entities, one of them a "Masō Shōjo" (魔装少女) named Haruna whose quest is to obliterate evil monsters referred to as "Megalos" with her chainsaw named Mystletainn. The complication is that Ayumu mysteriously has the capacity to absorb the power from Haruna, to the point that in order to defeat the Megalos when they appear he goes through a *Sailor Moon*-like transformation that effectively cross-dresses him into the costume of Haruna. A certain amount of the humour revolves

around the slapstick of Ayumu having his body subject to normally cataclysmic damage, only for him to "walk it off". There is clearly a great deal of parody aimed at the cliché of the "magical girlfriend", the science fiction fantasy of the likes of *Final Fantasy*, and perhaps even the high school romance. One of the more unusual elements in the series stems from episodes where Ayumu by some contrivance has an "accident" that leaves him penetrated from behind, which triggers a highly - parodic depiction of ecstasy such as might be found in *The Rose of Versailles*, *Toma's Heart*, or some more recent *shōjo manga* title. Overall, it is a startlingly inventive and in places deeply parodic mirror on the tropes of amusement that currently form the staple of contemporary anime.[10]

So there is certainly no shortage of highly developed and well-crafted anime that have as their primary aim precisely the kind of "cathartic" experience as defined in terms of Collingwood's definition of amusement. It is noteworthy that, since many of these cases involve a high degree of intra-cultural referencing and linguistic puns that sometimes only make sense in the original Japanese, there would understandably be a certain barrier for global audiences to access them. Humour, it turns out, is one of the more difficult features of human communication to transmit across cultural boundaries. Fortunately, however, a great deal does translate, but it also requires one to abandon certain assumptions about what kinds of motif are appropriate to an animated production.[11]

5
Anime as Magic

"Magic" for Collingwood takes on a special meaning and needs to be understood as a correlate to amusement which was treated in the previous chapter. While amusement is the relatively benighted and problematic mode of artistic expression that comes in for some extended analysis in relation to "pathological" instances of pseudo-art and cultural malaise, magic enjoys a status that places it closer to the mode of expression and experience that approximates the character of art proper, while not fulfilling the definition quite as it ought (Collingwood, 1938: 68–69). As with amusement, magic is a craft, a technique which can be honed down and employed to great effect – but Collingwood continues to insist that an artist's capacity to produce it is not the same as being an artist per se. Some definitions and examples help to clarify why this might be the case.

As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, an artefact of artistic expression can be said to exhibit "magic" when it has the capacity to not merely energize or evoke emotion in the moment, but galvanize the recipient of the expression toward action or at the very least an energized emotional condition. Unlike amusement, the process is intended to have consequences for practical life, and is also likely to entail a sharing of common sentiments and a coordinated awareness of sharing that sentiment or emotion. Collingwood's initial example is a war dance – easily dismissed as "unscientific" though it may be, it still has the power to fortify the warrior (or collectivity of warriors) and instil fear in their adversaries should they witness it (Collingwood, 1938: 66–67). A more common contemporary experience would be the singing of a national anthem prior

to a major international sporting fixture. Both the players and their supporters do not (one would expect) sing the anthem simply for their own amusement – it is an indispensable ritual that initiates a heightened sense of engagement and participation in a contest that is all the keener for having done it in the first place. The anthem is a ritual that all participate in with the tacit expectation that it will have some significance in relation to shoring up the team's capacity to win.

The other example that Collingwood cites is the instance of a religious work of art that aims to engender and consolidate, for example, a particular sense of piety and devotion. Indeed such works of art are often evaluated on their capacity to promote precisely such emotional responses. Collingwood would suggest that, much as in the case of amusement, the artist's capacity to efficiently "deliver" this response is not in and of itself adequate to endorse or define the specifically artistic merit of the work. It makes people feel pious, and may do so with the consummate skill of employing a combination of advanced techniques with profoundly evocative and beautiful tropes that transport the hearer or viewer into a state of religious euphoria (Collingwood, 1938: 72–73). The artist that can do this is almost certainly an artist of great sensitivity and skill, yet Collingwood suggests that since the engendering of magic is in the last analysis a skill or craft, it cannot be accepted as supplanting that which Collingwood counts as pertaining to art's essence. The sphere of anime cinema's capacity to be considered within the realm of "art proper" is something that will be addressed more directly in the ensuing chapter. Here the concern with identifying distinctive instances and case studies from Japanese animation that exhibit a capacity to engender "magic" and, furthermore, elucidate the distinctive techniques and strategies that are employed to achieve it.

In the chapter on representation, some extensive discussion was entered into regarding the relevance of "magical realism" to our consideration of *anime's* distinctive affordances. It should be clear that that discussion was conducted to open up an awareness of how anime represents, rather than a discussion of "magic" as defined above. Consequently, we need to focus on the above definition of "magic" and proceed from there (we may indeed arrive at some of the instances discussed in the earlier chapter, but it will be by way of this new avenue rather than through the former one).

There are two dominant tendencies within the cinematic *anime* oeuvre to date that can be highlighted as having particular relevance to "magic" so defined. The first is grounded in tropes of religion, sometimes taken from indigenous folkloric traditions, but just as often taken from Christian theology or spiritual folklore from outside of Japan. The other is grounded in an attempt to engage with the past through various tropes of history, more often than not in a transposed setting that cannot be regarded as "authentic", although there are some notable exceptions. In many cases, the cinematic work often entails the construction of a parallel world based on a premise that determines a particular dystopia, either one that is utterly fictional (as in science fiction) or one that recasts scenarios of human history. What unifies both of these tendencies is that in the vast majority of cases there is not an attempt to replicate an "authentic" or academically verifiable tradition of either religion or history – the tropes are used almost "amuletically".[1] This invites interpretations that might suggest that the employment of these tropes cannot be taken seriously, given that they might not be considered as genuine attempts to grapple with religion or history. This is arguably not necessarily the case. In some cases they are employed seriously, but we need to understand them not as attempts to replicate a verifiable world or tradition but as having an aesthetic capacity to function as bearers of "magic".

Amongst the Studio Ghibli oeuvre, *Princess Mononoke* presents some of the best examples of religious tropes employed to "magical" effect. On the face of it, the story of Ashitaka is one of a man with a curse who seeks to be reconciled with the spiritual world and freed from his uncleanness. This ostensibly resonates with a classic biblical scenario of the Fall and redemption, or the grand redemptive odyssey of Parsifal, yet there are specifics to this story that invite further reflection. Ashitaka is cursed in the act of killing a forest deity that has fallen into an all-consuming hatred for humanity and become literally a violently pulsating mass of tendrils – and heading straight for his village (Ichiyanagi, 2008: 171–173). The curse is communicated to Ashitaka when his arm becomes entwined with tendrils and they leave a burn-like scar. Upon the death of the deity it becomes apparent that the cause of his rage was having been shot with a firearm, the shot-ball still embedded in his body. The warriors of Ashitaka's village do not use firearms, just the more rudimentary weapons such as bows

and arrows or swords and spears. This technology belongs to another people who have established a town of artisans and craft-workers.

Though not stated explicitly, the village of Ashitaka represents the earliest tribal culture of Japan, that of the Emishi, who historically were driven out of their lands by the technologically more advanced peoples who migrated into the archipelago from elsewhere. The ritual conducted by the "Shaman" priestess to placate the forest deity as it lies dying would seem to evoke some notion of early Emishi religious practice and the concept of *kegare* or uncleanness. The outcome for Ashitaka is that, even though his acts were heroic in saving his fellow villagers, the village has no alternative but to be banish him from their midst due to his contamination.[2] This doesn't parallel the biblical scenario of the Fall altogether, but transposes the origin of the uncleanness to the emergence of a way of life that creates instruments of death that the makers are not afraid to use on deities. It is Ashitaka's fate to become the bearer of the curse that ensues.

So what is it that we as an audience might take from the presentation of this character's particular predicament? It might be tempting to suggest that it is a predominantly Judaeo-Christian resonance that comes to the fore and provides the dynamic for audience engagement, but to suggest this is to assume, in part at least, that Miyazaki Hayao has a Judaeo-Christian world view and, furthermore, anticipates that his viewers, including the Japanese ones, would find some affinity with it. While not denying that there is a capacity to identify a Judaeo-Christian eschatology in the grand narrative of *Princess Mononoke*, we might, so far as Ashitaka himself is concerned, suggest that the aesthetic function is to present us with the predicament of the heroic person who is confronted with a fate that is larger than himself.[3] In this sense it is closer to Parsifal than to the Fall – and sets up a dramatic frame of tragedy for the hero that in fact mirrors much of what Aristotle held up as one of the laudable branches of poetics – the tragic drama that presents us with lessons about the conduct of the "good man" (so to speak) in the face of impossible circumstances. This is not that we see ourselves in Ashitaka's predicament *per se* – it is the transposed predicament of the modern global citizen who must somehow come to terms with the impact of industrial instrumentalism, a persistent anxiety that something of the "spiritual" has been lost. Indirectly, the hero Ashitaka holds up a mirror to our own situation and, as the film progresses, hopefully leaves us some notion

that we might have the courage to act boldly and uprightly in the face of what the modern world presents us with (Ichiyanagi, 2008: 179–181).

Ultimately, Miyazaki does not provide us with any glib answer to this predicament; the supreme deity of the forest is reconciled through Ashitaka and San's act of atonement (returning the severed head that was taken by Lady Eboshi), but it no longer maintains the overt form and presence encountered previously. Lady Eboshi survives to become somewhat wiser, but she doesn't forsake her commune of artisans, or its future. And Ashitaka does not ride off into the sunset with San; she will never put her lot in with the community of humans and all that it stands for. This uneasy reconciliation is closer to things as they actually stand for us in the present, and what remains is an enhanced awareness of this contradiction and a more acute sense that it is one that concerns us all (Ichiyanagi, 2008: 196–198).

It may seem something of a stretch to associate the foregoing structure of expression with the magical characteristics outlined at the outset, and to be fair, Collingwood devotes rather short space to examples of what might constitute examples of magical art in a literary sense (there are references to social dances and fox hunts before there are any extensive references to either fine art or literature). Even so, he does develop an instructive discussion on the re-emergence of the magical impulse in English literature since the end of the nineteenth century, particularly alighting on Rudyard Kipling's colonial enthusiasms and the emergence of more socially urgent literature produced by writers influenced by communist sympathies. These are not put forward as personal preferences, but a nascent re-assertion of concerns, despite the best efforts of the aesthetes that preceded them, that reopen avenues towards magical expression in art (Collingwood, 1938: 70–71). Certainly the preoccupations of writers in the early twentieth century are highly contextualized and do not hold for contemporary concerns. What is interesting, however, is that in the wake of the Second World War it certainly became rather gauche to espouse enthusiasm for a "mother country" as Kipling had done, and as the depths of Stalinist repression became too notorious and exposed for even the most fervent advocates of the proletarian revolution to engage in a naive culture lionizing the working class, we find ourselves with new concerns and proclivities that match our contemporary milieu. Grand social and historical commentary is

not completely out but must be framed carefully, and often in covert ways. The foregoing thematic device of *Princess Mononoke* is perhaps precisely an example of such a covert device.

The other anime classic that merits particular attention in so far as it employs a quasi-religious frame for considering grand human questions is *Ghost in the Shell* (Ruh, 2004: 135–136). Certainly *Ghost in the Shell* is not an unmixed or monothematic treatise on the human condition – there are abundant tropes of pure action and visual spectacle that we are, one could say with some confidence, expected to view for their amusement, if not exclusively so then in some more complex overlap of artistic aims. The action scenes are some of the best that you will ever witness in the medium, and the sheer visual spectacle of the Hong Kong urban scene has already been alluded to. It would also seem unavoidable to acknowledge that the at times extended sequences depicting Kusanagi with minimal or no clothing on lend themselves to the interpretation that they cannot help but provide an avenue for erotic pleasure. Yet the fundamental premise of *Ghost in the Shell* is so powerful, and the sequences just mentioned are calibrated so well as to not push the axis of the film out of a firmly "magical" orbit. The trope of the cyborg that is anatomically almost indistinguishable from a biological human but apparently retains "just enough" of what makes them a human presents us with an emphatic question of what constitutes the essence of our humanity – whither the mind, and whither the soul? The Puppet Master is also framed as a gradually emergent consciousness that makes the eventual "marriage" with Kusanagi unnervingly plausible (Ruh, 2004: 134).

As if to make *Ghost in the Shell*'s grand designs more overt than at any other part of the film, the final fight sequence between Kusanagi and a robot controlled by the Puppet Master takes place in a paleontological exhibit hall within a museum. Along the wall that depicts the "tree of life", bullets impact and ricochet, as Kusanagi marshals every fibre of her cyborg strength in the struggle; in the end she loses, and the tree of life, the suggestion might go, is rewritten (Ruh, 2004: 130). The religious symbolism in *Ghost in the Shell* is nowhere near as overt as in *Princess Mononoke* (or other films), but its concerns are unmistakeable; and the viewer is left with a profound sense of anxiety, if not on-going concern, to ponder the essence of humanity and its possible fate in the age of super-intelligent computers. As an

exercise in generating "magic", albeit through cyborg tropes and a dystopic future world, it is perhaps an unrivalled exemplar.

Apart from these grand existential musings, it was also noted at the outset of this chapter that a great deal of contemporary cinematic anime concerns itself with conceptions of the past and historicity. These attempts to engage with the past we might broadly describe as "nostalgic", although some qualification is perhaps required. We also noted at the outset that in some cases a parallel world, either utopic or dystopic, could be evoked as a means to depict a particular historicity. In some cases, these parallel worlds are in some sense "apocalyptic" and, as Susan Napier has very convincingly demonstrated, the apocalyptic remains a cornerstone of the anime oeuvre and thematic approach (Napier, 2005: 29–48). First, however, let us focus on nostalgia in a simple sense.

Nostalgia presents one of the richest veins of discussion with regard to the evocation of "magic" in anime. Paul Grainge's distinction between "nostalgia as mood" and "nostalgia as mode" reflects a neat dichotomy between a stylistic impulse towards the elegiac on the one hand and a discursive strategy to overcome the predicament of not being able to reconnect with the past in any genuine sense (See Jameson, 1991; Grainge, 2000: 33). Collingwood presents an alternative approach in terms of positively evaluating the potential of art to enable positive engagements with the past through a form of imaginative "re-enactment". This is potentially at the core of, for example, Miyazaki's impact on both the Japanese and non-Japanese audiences where he succeeds in facilitating precisely such an imaginative engagement. It only seems less than successful or futile if one assumes that nostalgia is an attempt to regain an authentic experience of the past. Its merit lies precisely in the fact that, although direct engagement with an authentic past is not possible in itself, we can aesthetically come very close to re-enacting a sense of the past by somehow creating a powerful sense of plausibility.

The utopian vision has much in common with the nostalgic re-enactment, except it is a projection ahead rather than into the past. *Akira* (1988), for example, is not simply concerned with a fictitious future – it is a reflection on the experience of war and the utterly dehumanizing implications of a nuclear apocalypse. It is not an authentic world, but one that aesthetically resonates with a particular plausibility that makes it capable of such powerful impacts both in

terms of social criticism and, at times, profound philosophical reflection on the past as well as the future of the human condition (Napier, 2005: 260–263).

Two films from Miyazaki Hayao allow us to consider divergent stratagems of using nostalgia to evoke a warm resonance of a past, close but no longer here, and thereby engage in the process of communicating "magic". *Spirited Away* exemplifies the indirect approach – it is set in a spirit world that contains an abundance of cultural and historical signifiers, but does not display a particular concern to integrate them "authentically". There is a pastiche of traditional Japanese, "Western" and occasionally even Chinese elements. The abundance of "bakemono" characters at times includes close approximations of classic motifs; for example the one-legged creature that bounces up the path at Swampy Bottom is resonant of the one-legged umbrella "obake" with a single eye that is more commonly recognized in Japanese folklore. By contrast the obese "giant radish" creature that accompanies Chihiro up the elevator on her way to meet Yubaba for the first time does not readily bring to mind any such associations. The restaurant precinct where Chihiro and her parents first encounter the spirit world looks generally Japanese from a distance, but the actual food on offer is more reminiscent of Chinese cuisine, and there are occasional Chinese touches with some elements such as lanterns. The mask apparition that is revealed after the cleansing of the heavily polluted river god has clear resonance with the traditions of Noh theatre, while the mask of the No-face character does not accurately resemble any particular mask tradition.[4]

Naturally, some of these observations may be open to a degree of contestation, but the point that I would like to underscore is that Miyazaki's film doesn't aim to replicate an authentic past world in order to say something about the past. It is enough to deftly insert some highly evocative signifiers that will resonate for a Japanese audience but perhaps not for a non-Japanese audience. The scene where Chihiro is sitting on edge of a balcony momentarily evokes a summer vacation at a traditional inn, the "yu" sign for the bath-house will be instantly familiar and evoke the once common public *sento*, and the scenes of the rural railway platforms toward the end of the film cannot fail to evoke experiences of travel on remote railway lines in the countryside in summer. These will "work" for the domestic audience, and produce precisely the kind of "magical" effect that I would

associate with more conventional notions of nostalgia. But that is not Miyazaki's only goal – he is aiming at an international audience, and it is masterful how he weaves together so many disparate elements to conjure a world that produces a sort of pan-cultural nostalgia, or cosmopolitan sentiment.

This interpretation of nostalgic elements in *Spirited Away* overlaps to some extent with some of the existing commentary on the film, particularly the work of Susan Napier who highlights the combination of elegiac and carnivalesque elements in several of Miyazaki's works (Napier, 2005: 287–310). Elsewhere I have discussed the limitations of how far we might take an anthropological or "culturalist" approach to a work such as *Spirited Away*. The simple point is that it is not quite accurate in my view to regard the film's aim as an attempt to reclaim an authentic past or distil for an international audience something of Japan's cultural "essence". Nostalgia is also not always something that entails the elegiac – sentiments of loss – it can include an emotional re-appropriation of a lost past, imaginatively but nonetheless intensely and at times with a degree of wistful pleasure.

Miyazaki transposes his musings on the modern predicament of maintaining one's identity into a spirit world, and employs the markedly allegorical device of a witch who gives you a place in society but takes your name in return. The notion implicit here is that the "successful" incorporation of oneself into working society entails loss of self, and an on-going battle to retain one's true name. This is arguably not merely a Japanese predicament but one that any member of a "modern society" can acutely identify with. Moreover, the employment of a distinctly amorphous No-face as the harbinger of a regime where people will be promised and given whatever they desire, albeit at the cost of losing themselves, resonates profoundly with the contemporary cult of consumerism – something which surely the Japanese have no monopoly over for being appalled by.

So *Spirited Away* succeeds rather spectacularly in creating a "magic" that transcends a specific culture – and this is perhaps evidenced most emphatically by its overwhelming success outside of Japan. By contrast, *The Wind Rises* presents a rather different order of artistic undertaking.

Unlike almost all of Miyazaki Hayao's other works, *The Wind Rises* is distinct in terms of its commitment to giving attention to a very specific historical period, a very particular historical figure, and some

indication of his own personal views and sentiments regarding such material. *Princess Mononoke* can be said to represent a historical world that is largely heuristic – some elements can be traced to a particular historical milieu, but they are integrated with features that are difficult or impossible to historically verify (particularly as concerns the culture of the Emishi). *My Neighbor Totoro* (1988) also contains some keenly observed historical detail in terms of the landscape of the pre-World War II countryside, the architecture and the scope of public amenities. Yet, just as with *Princess Mononoke*, this is integrated with the children's fantasy world, which after all is the main anchor of the film's plot and theme.[5]

By contrast, *The Wind Rises* maintains a fairly strict adherence to the chronology of the 1920s, commencing with the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923, and tracing Japan's re-entry into the race amongst the powers to re-arm that gained momentum as the decade progressed. There is a more emphatic love story at the heart of this film as well, one that is arguably more openly erotic than could be said for any other of Miyazaki's works (the couple marry so as not to be seen to be "living in sin"). Having said this, *The Wind Rises* is not entirely immune from some of the predilections evident in other films as well. Although the greater part of the film deals with the career of Horikoshi Jirō and his quest to design Japan's first world-class fighter aircraft, the narrative is occasionally interrupted by fantasy sequences that have the hero meeting the Italian aeronautical designer Giovanni Caproni (Osmond, 2014: 93). In these sequences the hitherto rigid adherence to design fidelity gives way to Miyazaki's more characteristic visual flourishes.

If viewers were hoping for a quasi-documentary account of the period concerned, along with a thorough indictment of Japan's drift towards militarism from the late 1920s into the 1930s, this is not a film that gives much in this vein. It is understated and mute on such matters. This is not to say that the film is an apology for the forthcoming war either – Miyazaki clearly has other priorities. My own best estimation of what Miyazaki was trying to achieve through the film was the evocation of a particular epoch, and a particular emotional world that pertained to that epoch before the years of conflagration. To be more precise, the Japan depicted in the film is not yet the Japan ruled by a military oligarchy and guilty of war crimes and atrocities – it was an age, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, of quiet determination

and a degree of cautious optimism that hard work and a dedication to the greater good was still a noble aspiration. The personal sacrifices of Horikoshi are underlined by those of his wife who, perhaps rather too quietly and unobtrusively, absents herself to go to the mountains to await the final stages of her terminal illness. Finally Horikoshi succeeds in his quest to design the aircraft that he has always known was in him to create but needed time and resources to fulfil.

As an exercise in generating nostalgic "magic", or even a highly evocative romance, there is perhaps much that would challenge an international audience. But in the end this has been a very personal essay on the past by this great director, and it perhaps behoves us to respect that it was ultimately intended not for the many but for the few. As is well known, this would appear to be Miyazaki's last feature-length production, and as such the tenor of its concerns is not altogether surprising.

We have observed that as cinematic anime features aim to engender nostalgic emotions in their audiences they do so with varying degrees of attention to the authenticity of the world they aim to evoke – and I have presented some arguments as to why it could be that it could be achieved by such means in some cases. By contrast, a sub-genre of the nostalgic film in anime actually embraces, visually at least, the world as we actually experience it, and seeks to imbue it with a deep resonance of common experience and feeling that lingers long after the final frame. Two films particularly stand out – *The Girl Who Leapt Through Time* (2006) and *Five Centimetres Per Second* (2007). The former work, directed by Hosoda Mamoru, admittedly has a science fiction premise (time can be manipulated through the intervention of an extraneous technology), but so much of the action occurs within that staple of Japanese nostalgic melodrama, the high school, that it can be adequately treated as an engagement with a world commonly experienced with deeply evocative associations, particularly for Japanese audiences.

Five Centimetres Per Second, directed by Makoto Shinkai, depicts the life of a young man, Takaki Tōno, who has a childhood sweetheart in the person of a schoolmate Akari Shinohara. As they get older, she has to leave Tōno's town to live far away, so he must come to terms with reality of losing the one that he feels is the love of his life. In a sense it is much more deeply nostalgic in that it has a broader time stretching from childhood into adulthood and doesn't include the

intervention of occult powers. The opening sequence is gorgeously rendered with meticulous attention to detail – the gentle voice-over introduces a montage of the idyllic town scene in Spring; there is something about the blossoms, the scooter, the yellow and black safety barriers along the edge of the road and of course the railway crossing that captures the warm intensity of complete familiarity. In the ensuing sequence there is another montage of boys sleeping on the train, the dining room interior with school books sitting on the table and even a lingering shot on the facia of the home washing machine. It is veritably thick with nostalgia-inducing tropes.

Films such as *The Girl Who Leapt Through Time* and *Five Centimetres Per Second* exemplify a gentle and wistful approach to nostalgia which cannot help but be perhaps less accessible to the non-Japanese audience. A Japanese school classroom, with all the subtle nostalgic flourishes of familiar minutiae, cannot be expected to resonate deeply with an audience whose experience is entirely different. In the case of *The Girl Who Leapt Through Time* (2006) there are elements of romantic comedy that might well capture a more universal sensitivity; however, in *Five Centimetres Per Second* (2007) there is arguably not so much to appeal to a universal audience (if such a thing exists anyhow). In this second film there is even something of the gentle warmth of Ozu Yasujiro's domestic dramas – replete with a sense of a larger flow of life that subsumes the individuals that inhabit their particular spaces – spaces that are nonetheless all too recognizable as being resonant with the experience of a great number of people (Noletti and Desser, 1992: 112–125). In *Five Centimetres Per Second*, however, the lovingly captured traditional domestic interiors are substituted with the schoolyard, bicycles by the river and the train stations. These elements give the film a distinctive resonance.[6]

In sharp contrast to these gentler nostalgic works, we have an altogether more volatile approach to historicity and historical consciousness. We might group these together under the theme of the "apocalyptic", although there clearly is a great deal of difference in the degree to which they accentuate that scenario – also there is the need to define the "apocalyptic" carefully.

Susan Napier defined the "apocalyptic" as one of the three dominant thematics of anime, along with the "carnivalesque" and the "elegiac". We have dealt with the carnivalesque in relation to fantasy in the previous chapter and noted the overlap with the evocation

of magic in certain cases as well. The elegiac has also been covered in the foregoing discussion of "nostalgia". "Apocalypse" is initially discussed by Napier as the familiar scenario of "worldwide destruction" a theme which certainly Japanese film and animation has developed in common with a broad array of instances internationally. Nevertheless, she refines the definition as follows:

> the apocalyptic can range beyond material catastrophe (although this is well represented in an enormous number of Japanese anime), to include more intimate forms of apocalypse, such as spiritual or even pathological ones. (Napier, 2005: 13)

Here Napier highlights an essential fluidity to the theme's applicability, and indeed she develops, for example, her analysis of the anti-hero Tetsuo in *Akira* as an "abjected body". In many cases, however, an apocalyptic world does emerge as the result of some global catastrophe – *Akira* (1988) and *Appleseed* (2004) are two explicit and representative examples. In other cases, the world depicted shows no explicit sign of catastrophe, although a catastrophe may have caused a new social condition to emerge nonetheless. And then there are cases where the world as we know it is more or less "intact" but technological advances have altered the balance between technology and humanity – films such as *Ghost in the Shell* and *Paprika* exemplify this.

It is, of course, impossible to avoid mental associations of apocalypse with Japan's experience of the devastating fire-bombing during World War II and the atomic bombings on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in this context (Lamarre, 2009: 131–156). Yet one salient feature that is noteworthy from the titles mentioned above is that none of the directors or writers were alive when the bombings occurred. Miyazaki Hayao was born in 1941 so was definitely alive at that time, but he is notable, if anything, for his reticence about addressing such material directly – with the obvious recent exception of *The Wind Rises*; but even this depicts the devastation of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake but not the bombing of Tokyo. This is not to suggest that such historical experiences form no part of their imagination, either as the heirs of a generation that did experience this horror or simply by being deeply aware of their own history. It could be suggested that perhaps that is why they have chosen these dystopian tropes to articulate such

perceptions and sentiments rather than opt for a direct similitude. It could be just as likely that the atmosphere of anxiety about the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union was a factor as well.

In any case, the term apocalypse itself affords an alternative perspective when viewed from the original etymology of the word. Coming from the ancient Greek, it is a compound of two words that quite literally mean the lifting or removing of a cover. There is no intrinsic reason why the Greek term should be so resonant in relation to this theme, especially given that we are discussing Japanese cultural artefacts, but the etymology does in fact suggest a fresh way of understanding apocalypse in its aesthetic rather than theological guise (Napier, 2005: 252). The particular catastrophe at the heart of an apocalypse, be it global or technological, is a catalyst for revealing something that otherwise could not be revealed. The utter obliteration of human civilization through nuclear holocaust has (thankfully) not occurred, but a consideration of what kind of world would ensue, and the kinds biological and psychological mayhem that would follow given such an event, can give genuine pause for deep reflection. The mutant humans that often emerge in such contexts function, on the one hand, as a source of horror, and on the other as a source of fascination. To the degree that the horrific potentialities are accentuated, then we have a narrative line that underpins an interpretation of such an apocalypse that, for the greater part, can be considered as having a more didactic social implication (Napier, 2005: 222). *Akira* exemplifies something of this scenario. If the mutants are characterized as super-human, then we potentially have some attempt at exploring post-human scenarios. In the case that the "catastrophe" is the potential subsuming of humanity in the machine, the less graphic the chaos of the world, the more keenly the impact of that "catastrophe" can be felt. *Ghost in the Shell* works so effectively precisely because it is a future world, yet it has considerable resonance with the pan-Asian urban space that is already coming into being, and yet the precariousness of the human within that world is excruciatingly obvious.

In each of the foregoing scenarios the dystopic world is a vehicle for revealing an aspect of the human condition that sits in precarious vulnerability in the face of technological advance, either in terms of a destructive military capacity or the subsuming of the essence of the

human in the machines that have been created by humans. The aim of such apocalyptic dystopias is certainly not merely to amuse, but to engender, at the very least, reflection on a calamitous past (or future) and, at the grander end of the spectrum, engender a deeper consideration of what human reliance on technology might ultimately imply. We might take from these observations that a certain aspect of the "magic" involved here, if magic is in large part a communal aesthetic experience, is channelling of disquiet, a particular kind of collective anxiety about technology and an uncertain future.

Two films that also merit further comment in relation to the foregoing discussion are *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind* (1984) and *Evangelion* (2007). They exemplify two ends of a spectrum between an apocalypse that leads to rebirth and reconciliation as contrasted with a scenario where there is a rebirth of sorts but no particularly positive prospect of redemption.

Nausicaä is the clearly foundational work within Miyazaki Hayao's oeuvre; it has an environmental theme, a female protagonist as the central heroine and a panoply of machines and grotesque creatures that provide an intense level of spectacle.[7] The apocalypse of this world is partly due to a conventional catastrophic global war, but there is the added dimension of how the world has been poisoned as a result of the "Ceramic Wars", so that even the atmosphere cannot be breathed without special auxiliary equipment. Nausicaä is the beatific and almost androgynous Princess whose prowess in science and compassion for all creatures place her in a position to change the world for good. As ever, there are war-mongers, and the presence of the God Warriors, relics from the earlier apocalyptic battles, accentuates the on-going threat. Then there are the Ohmu, giant insects that threaten to over-run and destroy humanity. In a climactic final scene, Nausicaä intervenes to save her people from the enraged Ohmu who are stampeding towards the human army and look as though nothing can stop them. She spots an infant Ohmu creature lying in the path of the stampede and flies over to protect it, but is over-run by the Ohmu just as she gets there. After a moment the stampede slows and the red of the Ohmu "eyes" dissipates to blue – gradually the Ohmu gather around Nausicaä and lift her skyward with their tentacle-like feelers. She is revived, and restored to her people – the threat subsides and a reconciliation has been effected (Napier, 2005: 258–259).

Contrasting this with *Evangelion*, in this apocalyptic scenario the world has been invaded by an alien force whose main weapon is giant marauding creatures known as "angels". An advanced scientific laboratory NERV has developed a weapon of similar scale, Evangelions (or EVAs), which have the capacity to combat the Angels and potentially save the planet. The catch is that the EVAs require compatible operators and it turns out that the head of NERV designed them in such a way that it would require his own offspring to operate them. Enter Shinji, an adolescent boy and a very reluctant participant in this heroic cause. A great deal of the film's internal development revolves around Shinji's angst about his own inadequacy and deep resentment towards his father. This is compounded by an even deeper sense of inadequacy in terms of an intense attraction towards his female comrades, particularly Asuka, that he seems incapable of acting upon. In a famous scene where Shinji is attending Asuka, who is unconscious in hospital, he notices that she is naked and masturbates. In the "final showdown" of the film version, NERV has not only the angels to contend with but a pack of EVA-like machines that have been developed by a rival organization, SEELE, whose aim is to destroy NERV and bring about the "third impact", i.e. total annihilation. Shinji has an opportunity to "save the day" by entering his machine and joining the battle, but he turns out be completely ineffectual. As the "third impact" plays out, he alone is left behind drifting in space; he then awakens to find just himself and Asuka together. His response is to attack her and almost throttle her to death. Not exactly a moment of redemption (Napier, 2005: 266–269).

Ostensibly both of these films work on an apocalyptic scenario, but they entail very different treatments of the scenario's potential and arrive at very different depictions of the human capacity to respond to catastrophe. In a sense, Miyazaki's work is fundamentally more positive and relies a great deal more on some classic tropes of a redemptive scenario – a "messianic" character whose ultimate role is to die and effect reconciliation. It has a more overt appeal to themes and motifs that are more immediately able to be associated with a particular iconography and grand ritual. *Evangelion* has some of those elements but is more deeply rooted in the individual predicament of one individual. So far as assessing how these films work in relation to "magic" is concerned, it would be fair to say that it is the former that exemplifies a capacity to engage with a communality of sentiment and symbol, and exhort the audience toward an awareness of not just humanity's folly but also

the redemptive potential of compassion. *Evangelion*'s communality of sentiment and symbol is clearly more problematic – there is a community that Anno is speaking to, and it could be described as an *otaku* audience, but it is unclear what impact on practical life can be anticipated from *Evangelion*'s message. (see Napier, 2005: 210–218; Lamarre, 2009: 146–154) It may simply be the confirmation of a common anxiety peculiar to a particular generation – a common predicament of feeling overwhelmed by expectations from society about "succeeding in life" and "finding the right girl". In that rather particular and constrained sense we might regard that as a "magical" function.

The notion of "magic" mediating anxiety in relation to technology finds another avenue of expression under the genres of "cyberpunk" and "steampunk". As was briefly foreshadowed in the introduction, some amount of discussion must inevitably arise in relation to these genres when discussing anime. They have been reintroduced here under the compass of magic for several reasons; they both stem from genres of literature that, while clearly capable of being enjoyed for their amusement value, nonetheless have a deep relation with ostensibly "serious" literary traditions. They both can be seen as part of a long-evolving response to positivism and the cult of progress that emerged in the early nineteenth century and found the first thoughtful and thought-provoking expressions in the literature of figures such as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells.[8]

Upon close examination of certain themes and stylistic motifs of both movements respectively, it is not difficult to find correlates between the literary oeuvre and the oeuvre of anime. Indeed it is at times astonishing just how deeply they resonate with each other, and it is not at all difficult to find even conscious acknowledgement of the literary traditions in certain anime films. In the case of "cyberpunk" Oshii Mamoru evokes clear parallels – both of his *Ghost in the Shell* films combine the hard-boiled noir of a crime thriller with an intricate evocation of the moral minefield that is embedded in our relationship with cyber-technology (Ruh, 2004: 126). With regard to steampunk, Miyazaki Hayao's fascination for the mechanical, devotion to the romance of flying and idealization of the "old world" are abundantly evident. *Laputa* is a primary example, replete with late Victorian/Edwardian fashion elements, antiquated weapons and even a zeppelin-like airship! And there are other examples readily identifiable in films such as *Porco Rosso* and *Spirited Away* as well.

Even so, there is remarkably limited scholarship that deals with these connections across the divergent media of literature and animated film, and it would seem that even until quite recently the scholarship that deals with the respective genres of cyberpunk and steampunk in relation to these media has evolved in relative isolation. Amongst the respective fandoms, the proliferation of fantasy-themed popular culture/science fiction conventions has done a great deal to break down boundaries, as anime "cosplayers" increasingly find themselves in the company of avid devotees to steampunk fashion. It would seem that the scholarly interest is beginning to overlap more.

To get an idea of how long the legacy of cyberpunk is in literature, we might note that the opening contribution in *Beyond Cyberpunk: New Critical Perspectives* is the excellent essay by Brian McHale entitled "Towards a Poetics of Cyberpunk" which is a reprint of the original from 1992.[9] McHale develops a rough taxonomy of essential traits in the cyberpunk genre, although he acknowledges that a single definition is elusive. The key features are as follows:

The evocation of "microworlds": artificially contrived spaces that enable us to pose basic questions about both the nature of the world and the nature of the existence of the beings within it. Typical examples are either a "war zone" or an "urban zone".

- "Microworlds" are often in the form of a "heterotopia"; they are zones where disparate discursive orders are merely juxtaposed without resolution.
- Often this heterotopic "microworld" exists in parallel with another plane of existence, for example cyberspace. There can be multiple private "para-spaces" as well.
- The "para-space" world functions to enable "metafictional" reflection on the ontological premises of original world.
- The disintegration and dispersal of the self which typically in post-modern fiction tends to be figurative is almost invariably literal. Moreover, there is a propensity to blur the distinction between human and technology through forms of prosthesis (either mechanical or biological).

There are some obvious applications here to *Ghost in the Shell*. In *Ghost in the Shell* the primary "microworld" is New Port City, and the para-space is, quite literally, cyberspace. It is the activity of a sentient

artificial intelligence in cyberspace that provides the spur to questioning the nature of existence in the primary world, particularly for one character whose predicament is to be the epitome of the cyborg: the ghost in one all-encasing prosthesis. What this indicates is that *Ghost in the Shell* does indeed partake of a fairly clearly definable genre of fiction, although, as stated elsewhere, the appearance or absence of recognizable elements from other contexts should not be taken as any reflection on the artistic power of a work: in the case of *Ghost in the Shell*, that power is palpable.

Just how we might evaluate a film such as *Ghost in the Shell* in artistic terms will be returned to in the next chapter. Suffice it to suggest that what we are seeing here is the transferral of a particular mode of imagination from the literary context to the medium of animation. Ranciere's analysis of the emergence of the "aesthetic regime", it may be recalled, included references to instances of literature (such as Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*) that exhibited a cinematic imagination: yes, it is literature, but the grammar of imagery seems eerily close what was increasingly being actualized through cinematographic technology at the time (Ranciere, 2007: 3–8). In a similar way, we might suggest that the mode of artistic imagination cultivated to a very high level in the works of William Gibson, Bruce Sterling or Thomas Pynchon finds its correlate (for example) in the work of Oshii Mamoru (Ruh, 2004: 126–128). Yet this mode of imagination must of course work itself out in subtly distinct ways as the medium affords, and as the individual expression of the artist leads it. How that has worked is what will be examined in greater detail later.

Steampunk has a more explicit link to the traditions of fantasy and science fiction that have emerged since the late nineteenth century, although its modern form has been condensed into a more coherent shape since the 1980s through an increasing awareness of a new trend amongst writers such as K.W. Jeter (who is credited with coining the phrase), Tim Powers and James Blaylock to construct H.G. Wells-like science fiction stories set in the late nineteenth century (Vandermeer and Chambers, 2011: 48–49). It is the pastiche of late-Victorian/Edwardian clothing with fantastically contrived accessories that evoke the technology of the era (anything from flying goggles to whimsically conceived clockwork devices) that seems to constitute the heart of the genre's aesthetic, but there would seem to be far less agreement on what would constitute a typical trait in terms

of narrative or character. Steampunk is occasionally regarded as an "offshoot" of cyberpunk and indeed Bruce Sterling has become more overtly associated with the "movement" (Vandermeer and Chambers, 2011: 12–13).

Returning to the concept of magic, there is one point in common that both cyberpunk and steampunk share, and that is a concern to address a certain interest in humanity's relation to science and technology, perhaps generated out of a growing sense of precariousness as the capacity for machines to out-perform and out-think humans becomes increasingly evident. In the case of cyberpunk, the emphasis is arguably more on anxiety and forthcoming crisis, whereas in the case of steampunk it is in some sense nuanced with a certain optimism and nostalgia. Either way, it is arguable that the role of artistic expression consistent with these characteristics is to either reassure ourselves that we know what the problem is and will therefore know what to do about it, or that our anxieties of the present are simply modern versions of the anxieties felt and exhibited in rather imaginative ways at the turn of the twentieth century.

Given that *Ghost in the Shell* will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter, a brief aside to acknowledge some modern exemplars of the cyborg genre from among OVA releases might be in order. In the previous chapter on amusement we mentioned several examples that in a sense needed to be referred to in order to "fill out the picture". That might have left the impression that anime released on television and direct to DVD are perhaps more likely to be frivolous or light (amongst these I would include titles that are prone to violent spectacle and epic confrontations in outer space). To some extent that might be true, but of course that is not completely the case. Two titles that stand out as very much fitting the kind of typical profile for a "cyberpunk" world detailed by McHale, and also being exceptionally good at plumbing dystopic themes are *Texhnolyze* (2003) and *Ergo Proxy* (2006).

The protagonist of *Texhnolyze* is a young street fighter, Ichise, who lives in the underground city of Lux which is subject to constant struggle amongst several factions, the Organo, a gangster organization, the Rakan, an association of violent street thugs, the Salvation Union which opposes texhnolyzation and the Class, which is a mysterious group that inhabits the city but remains apart. Texhnolyzation

is the process of reconstructing humans with cyborg parts – Ichise becomes part texhnolyzed when a fight promoter has his arm and leg amputated as a "punishment". In the midst of all this chaos there is a girl prophet, Ran, who regularly appears to make pronouncements to Ichise. This is a highly allegorical piece that explores themes of salvation and evolution, while depicting a slow descent into human decline brought about by a regime that exists simply to produce the substance that makes texhnolyzation possible (Olsson, 2010: 20–23).

Ergo Proxy is set in another dystopia, the city of Romdeau, where the citizens are watched over by a paternalistic totalitarian regime. Each citizen has an android (AutoReiv) assigned to them, and the population is supplemented by "immigrants" who are brought in as labourers. The distinctive element of *Ergo Proxy* is the introduction of a "theological" element: the cities have a mysterious link to "Proxies", deities in human form who nonetheless are capable of capricious action. One in particular, Ergo Proxy, is the god of death and destruction. The heroine, Re-l, becomes involved in the investigation of a series of rogue acts by AutoReivs, apparently brought on by the "cogito virus". In the midst of all this, Re-l has what she believes is a brief encounter with a Proxy, who does not harm her, and at the same time she develops a relationship with Vincent Law, an immigrant who has a mysterious connection to the Proxy (Olsson, 2010: 26–28). As a mediation on quite weighty religious themes, and the nature of our contradictory notions of selfhood, along with the usual anxiety about the potential for disaster through the advance of AI, this series has much to offer in the way of offering an avenue for reflection and channelling of broad social anxiety.

Both of these cases are hard to categorize – it is hard to describe them as "amusing", and they do in fact have a kernel of serious reflection on the potentially perplexing implications of human existence overwhelmed by cyborg engineering and/or artificial intelligence. Yet ultimately they belong in the realm of "magic" given their clear relevance (albeit it very allegorically) to issues of concern for practical life.

To finish this chapter on perhaps a less apocalyptic note, we might profitably return to Kon Satoshi's *Tokyo Godfathers*. There is something deeply idiosyncratic and transcendent about many of Kon's works, to the point that no simple angle or approach suffices. In the

previous chapter this film was discussed within the compass of amusement, and certainly there was much in this work which supported such an engagement. Yet the "A Christmas Tale" in the second part of the title in Osmond's commentary provides something of a key to unlocking a deeper dimension to this work (Osmond, 2009: 59). It is Dickens' *A Christmas Carol* which itself stands out amongst the Dickensian oeuvre as being at once unusual in the treatment of the subject matter and broadly resonant in an imaginative sense beyond the actually grim premise of the story. Certainly there is nothing unusual about Dickens addressing the issue of poverty and depicting the cruel, grasping character of a spendthrift, but it is his embracing of an imaginative scenario that transports Scrooge through space and time to witness past, present and future that stands out as innovative and effective. It is a modern day parable, and one that doesn't require us to accept the sequence of action as "real" – the aim is to highlight a deep moral dilemma and, as the story plays out, we are encouraged to believe that even the hardest of hearts might be brought to a point of redemption.

This is also very much at the heart of *Tokyo Godfathers* as well. While there is no play out of past, present and future, there is a sense that all the characters have had a troubled past, currently exist in a miserably precarious present, and by dint of happenstance are presented with opportunities to exhibit compassion and care, and thereby fortuitously gain the opportunity to recover something of at least the prospect of a redemptive and happy future. It is in a sense a parable of sorts, and it does not stretch things to take from this film the notion that there was indeed an element of the "magical" – it takes life as it can be even in its grimmest aspect and offers a vignette that, if not altogether plausible, convinces us that this is a world we would rather live in than the one where compassion does not exist.

The capacity of anime to evoke "magic" (or what might be more generically termed as communally "ritualistic aesthetic experiences"), is perhaps one of the most distinctive tendencies of anime as a medium of creative expression. This can include very powerful imaginative evocations of a collective sense of the past and present, as well as an imagined future. The pervasiveness of nostalgic tropes in Miyazaki's animations, along with the utopic and dystopic visions that figure

from *Akira* to *Ghost in the Shell* can be regarded as not simply a matter of the animator's idiosyncratic choice of them, but also a reflection of the medium's utility in dealing with such themes. When considered in the light of the proclivities identified in relation to representation and amusement, we can see that anime has a propensity to enable metaphor and allegory to be employed in more emphatic ways than would be typical of classical cinematic production.

6
Anime as Art: Digital Cinema and the Anime Aesthetic

In the introduction we considered the anime aesthetic more broadly in the context of current discussions of "digital cinema". Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener's *Film Theory: An Introduction Through the Sense*s was briefly discussed as having one of the most accessible overviews of the key symptomatic features of a post-photographic, or "post-cinematic" experience of the moving image. They highlight the inherent paradox within the very term "digital cinema" and explore the significance of another expression that has now become accepted within the language of contemporary film studies, but warrants greater contemplation for its ineffability nonetheless: "virtual reality". Through a discussion of several film texts (both conventional cinema texts with extensive digital design elements and 3D cinematic animations from Pixar) they persuasively illustrate how the infusion of digital imaging has led to the transformation of the screen from "window" to "portal". Furthermore, they highlight the transformation of narrative conventions, character physiology and persona, along with the increasingly innovative exploration of space and time that seem to have become increasingly *de rigeur* features of the new media form (Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010: 170–185).

If we can accept these as a taxonomy of key symptoms of contemporary digital cinema, and indeed a basis for identifying key elements of a "post-cinematic" vision, then we can perhaps proceed to consider how anime has, somewhat ironically, anticipated such characteristics and placed itself in the role of acting as a foil to these latest developments in audio-visual media. It has been suggested that the foregoing discussion of anime based on Collingwood's theory of art might

facilitate a more particular explanation of how this art form has come to emerge at the core of cinematic developments rather than merely a sideshow. In other words, having reviewed anime in relation to the concepts of craft, representation, amusement and magic, we emerge at a point of being able to make some more generalized comments regarding the distinguishing features of that art form and the kind of aesthetic it has produced.

In brief, it is clear that *anime* is not an art form that prioritizes photo-real representation nor embraces the possibilities of 3D design at the expense of pre-cinematic graphic techniques. Instead, the leading practitioners of cinema anime embrace the synthesis of the two – and clearly they do so while being fully conscious of whatever constraints or limitations this might imply. We have seen that it is the embracing of the metamorphic image, with all the refutation of the physical world and its laws of space and motion, that provides the impetus toward exploring a world of possibilities that transcend the confines of the camera-generated cinematic image.[1] This in turn is profoundly related to the proclivity with distinctive forms of "magic" as discussed in the previous chapter, with the now familiar tropes of nostalgia, cyberpunk dystopia and other forms of communal allegory.

We must of course remind ourselves that what Collingwood discussed under the headings of craft, representation, amusement and magic was not intended to be the final word in the business of discussing art proper – it was intended to highlight facets of artistic expression that are often present in art but inadequate to define it. Accordingly, while it is hoped that the foregoing discussion of certain tendencies and proclivities evident in cinematic anime under each of those headings has highlighted some of the distinctive characteristics of the aesthetic practice, that has not been the sole object of the exercise; in this chapter we hope to arrive at some clearer articulation of what makes anime a distinctive art form in its own right.

The ultimate litmus for identifying the genuinely artistic aspects of the work of anime lies in the capacity to identify a process of expression that is not a slave to the instrumental aims of its constituent parts, i.e. craft, representation, amusement or magic. As discussed in the first chapter, Collingwood saw the artistic process of art proper as pertaining to something whose end was not predefined. More specifically this was a process of bringing to expression, often through some

degree of struggle and uncertainty, elements of the pre-conscious, the as yet vaguely sensed but unarticulated, and bringing them to some kind of resolution through conscious appropriation (Collingwood, 1938: 273–275). This inevitably requires the exercise of some degree of technical competence on the part of the artist, but it is this moment of bringing into expression and consciousness something that hitherto was only vaguely sensed that would seem to constitute a key feature of "successful" artistic expression (for the record, and somewhat controversially, Collingwood regarded the rendering of artistic expression in some partial, unsatisfactory or fractured form as evidence of a failed artistic enterprise).[2]

Transposing this onto our consideration of the anime aesthetic's contribution to the emergence of a "post-cinematic" imagination, the question now becomes one of how exactly anime has brought into artistic expression new modes of imagination and experience. This is not entirely inimical to a Deleuzian conception of the role of a medium as an instrument of thought (Deleuze, 1995b: 262–280; Colebrook, 2001: 69–70). While Deleuze focused on cinema and explored its capacity to enable us to realize concepts, we, in turn, can focus on animation and consider how it enables "philosophy". This requires us to visit the core of Collingwood's theory of art which commences in Book III of *The Principles of Art* which deals with the essence of art as an act of expressive imagination.

Collingwood's theory of imagination provides the key to identifying more precisely where and how the animated image facilitates a distinctive aesthetic experience. To explain this first requires some elaboration on his account of human cognition, emotion and intellect.

His account commences with the notion that the ground of human experience is the multitude of *sensa* – the raw input of the senses and their accompanying "emotional charge", whether that be something as overt, immediate and directly tied together to action such as pain upon hitting one's hand with a hammer or the emotional charge, less emphatic but nonetheless just as deeply integrated, that comes when we see the colour red (Collingwood, 1938: 192–194). This generates a realm of "feeling" which we can become cognizant of through "thought" – something which is divided into two orders; the first order being at that level of merely acknowledging or registering the existence of the feeling ("I feel pain", "I see red", etc.), the

second being thought which aims to organize or rationalize those perceptions.

A key difference between experience of *sensa* and thought is that *sensa* are not negotiable – they occur in the moment and simply "are" – the negotiable, or potentially variable, element emerges at the level of thought. The intriguing thing, however, is that *sensa* are not permanent experiences – they occur and then their imprint remains – not as the original experience but as its echo. Through thought we may identify that experience and in a sense perpetuate it, sometimes over great periods of time, sometimes for as long as the conscious effort can be sustained, which may be relatively brief or relatively long. Collingwood, referring primarily to Hume's distinction between the "impression" and the "idea", emphatically challenges the notion that the impact of sense remains in our consciousness more or less in tact as a kind of "datum" – it is mediated at another level of consciousness (Collingwood, 1938: 183–184).

Here imagination comes into play and is posited as something which deals with the pre-conscious and the process of making things explicit through thought – it bears the imprint of the *sensa* but is not conscious thought as such. Following from Kant, Collingwood understands imagination as the glue that makes thought of various kinds possible – Collingwood's example is the matchbox; we see it as a matchbox precisely because we do not see it as an assemblage of colours and shapes, but can construe it as having the forward surfaces facing one and the expectation that they are connected to the as yet invisible sides out of view which nonetheless constitute the structure of the box. Without imagination, the matchbox is just a set of shapes and colours (Collingwood, 1938: 192).

Imagination can lead to more than one conclusion – it can lead through various stages of thought from the primary ("I see a box") to the secondary ("It's a matchbox, sitting on the table near the fire") and be consistent with empirically verifiable experiences and expectations. Or, as Collingwood illustrates with the instance of a rainbow, it can be apprehended with imaginative perceptions that are neither empirically verifiable ("they seem like strands of colour stretched across the sky") nor perhaps even actually occurring ("they lead to a pot of gold").[3]

What I propose here is that imagination can be conceived as fostering distinctive phases of operation which we can identify

when we compare what happens in the case of the cinematic image to what happens in the case of an animated image. In brief, the exercise of imagination we use when we view a film that presents persons conducting themselves, in most aspects such as clothing and demeanour, much as we would normally expect to encounter them in day-to-day life, along with objects that present no major indication that they will exist in form and physics any differently from our own day-to-day world, is one that approximates most closely the exercise of imagination depicted in relation to the matchbox. It is a relatively closed circle of expectation.

Of course, a film can be created where such expectations are subverted, and this may well be achieved through the employment of computer graphic images modified to produce "convincing" special effects. However, it is hopefully not overstating matters to suggest that when computer graphic effects are employed in an otherwise mundane world or environment, the emphasis tends toward demanding a high level of "photo-realism". A good example is perhaps the *Transformers* franchise; the object of the truly impressive battery of computer-generated effects is to persuade us that this is what we would see if the Transformers came to our town. They move and conduct themselves according to the physics of this world and no other. That is not to say, of course, that an alternative physics could not be evoked nor that an experience not consonant with our experience of this world could not be generated in this kind of scenario – but this usually necessitates the creation of a fictional world such as is typical in the genres of utopian science fiction or fantasy.

We might usefully contrast this case with what happens in the case of an animated image. The first example that springs to mind is the opening of *Paprika* where the toy truck squeaks out into the spotlight and an oversized clown does the physically impossible act of emerging from the small toy as if being inflated to full size as it happens. As a 2D cel animation it is not subject to any of the constraints of a "photo-real" depiction – it happens simply because the artist imagined it as a sequence and then actualized it. There may be technical constraints, but these are overcome through the deeply "morphogenetic" propensities of imagination in such contexts.

On one level this is an emphatic expansion beyond the exercise of imagination typified by the "filling in" the missing details of the matchbox that we perceive on the table. It is as if we are primed, subtly

but nonetheless emphatically, to expect a different order of expression and thought – a different quality of imaginative engagement. Cel animation actually enhances this mode of engagement, precisely because it prioritizes the *sensa* that relate to pure forms of colour and the possibility of a distinctive range of emotional charges that relate to them. At one and the same time they arrest through their visual impact but do not facilitate any easy "discharge" or consignment through thought into the compartments of routine experience.

A corollary of the foregoing discussion of imagination is to highlight the "affective" dimension of what is entailed in this distinctive level of operation. As mentioned above, cel animation prioritizes a certain kind of expression in terms of shape and colour which, if we follow Collingwood's account of *sensa*, will have a distinctive emotional charge as well. Here we might fruitfully refer to Brian Massumi's discussion of affect, bearing in mind of course that he asserted that "there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect" (Massumi, 2002: 27). The case study that Massumi introduces at the beginning of *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* would seem to have relevance to this discussion as well. In brief, there was a study conducted in Germany that subjected nine-year-old children to three versions of a short film that depicted a man who builds a snowman on the roof of his house, then shifts it to the mountains to stop it from melting and bids farewell. Three versions were shown, a silent one, an "emotional" one which offered simple verbal cues related to the emotion of the scene at certain points, and then a fully "factual" narrated version. The results were surprising in that the silent version was the regarded as most pleasant, the factual as least pleasant, while the "emotional" version was the one best remembered. Quite apart from what one might make of the relationship of different modes of presentation and retention, it was clear from this study that there was a divide in the explicit content and its effect. Massumi builds this into his now well-known thesis of differentiating between the determinate *qualities* of an image as distinct from the strength and duration of the effect which he terms *intensity* (Massumi, 2002: 23–24).

There is clearly an aspect of the distinction in the different exercise of imagination that would seem to resonate with this account. If we extrapolate on how it might apply to the opening of *Paprika*, we might say that there is a set of indexical "qualities" evident in the

sequence, but this is also accompanied by a distinct set of "intensities" that are generated through elements such as colour and shape that are not there simply to confirm the conventional perception of the image but supplement it with other affective stimuli. Consequently, I would suggest a further affordance of Japanese animation is to not only articulate and foster a particular exercise of imagination, but also to facilitate concomitant dimension of "affect" that it seems particularly adept at doing.

There are a number of factors that have led to this being the case – social and historical factors combined with the individual predilections of practitioners – but let us accept that this distinctive affordance is in some sense inherent in the practice and in human experience. The practice was being pursued in relative independence of the world of cinematic film-making and under a different scenario might well have continued to flourish separately. However, the position of animation has been transformed much as Thomas Lamarre depicts in his discussion of the "repetition of cinema" (Lamarre, 2006: 161–186). The irony is that it probably was the moment that animation was seen to be capable of generating the cinematic look without the camera that made some commentators take animation more seriously. What was more important, however, was not that animation "graduated" to cinema but that it was now apparent that it was no longer necessary to use a camera anymore, and if that were to be the case, there would be a fundamental question of what that would imply for preconceptions of filmic representation.

I have suggested that it is on the level of imagination that Japanese animation has contributed to the emergence of a "post-cinematic" oeuvre. Clearly Japanese animators have led the way in exploring some of these possibilities, but also certain film-makers have demonstrated a capacity to explore the implications of "post-cinematic" representation. Let us be clear – the "post-cinematic" I refer to does not entail an obliteration of cinematic production as we know it – simply the emancipation of the imagination to transcend it. Part of what has facilitated this emancipation has in some sense has been technical, but the one sense I have attempted to accentuate here is that the anime aesthetic was already pushing artistic consciousness toward this emancipation, at first by simply refusing to "play ball" (maintaining a steadfast devotion to the cel technique despite its seeming "inferiority"), but then by demonstrating that rather

different aspects of human imagination could be expressed, and to a level that they would be "emulated" within contemporary cinematic creative practice.

Let us consider a few instances to identify how this might be conceived as having worked itself out. I have already used the example from the opening of Kon's *Paprika* to illustrate how imaginative expression works itself in a highly distinctive way – in the following we will see whether similar traits can be discovered in cinematic works and how they display an affinity with such an aesthetic possibility.

I have already referred to the scene in *The Matrix* where the hero, Neo, is captured in a moment of time with the perspective panning around him in a semi-circle with mathematical precision. This is a scene that had enormous impact at the time and quite rightly so. However, careful reflection suggests that this is not in itself a "post-cinematic" moment, if for no other reason that we can still slot this sequence within the frame of Deleuze's discussion of that purely cinematic facility to produce a new kind of movement – one where the camera moves through space independent of movements depicted accentuating its transcendental viewpoint (Marrati, 2008: 9). The capturing of Neo in a moment, if anything, is the epitome of this cinematic quality of vision. To suggest an element within *The Matrix* that is closer to the kind of imagination that I have described above in relation to Japanese animation, I would point to the scene where Neo is being fired at by Agent Smith and dodging bullets that fly past him as he leans back at what would seem to be a physically unsustainable angle. Apart from the "unreality" of either the pose or the successful avoiding of bullets, the flourish that intrigues here is the generation of wave-like pulses in the wake of the bullets, reminiscent more of travelling through water than travelling through air. The key is the transposition of physics, subtly but unmistakably, toward another possibility of physical operation on another plane; here we see an instance of a particular kind of morphogenesis that doesn't belong to the world as we would expect to experience it. The kind of operation of imagination that is at work here is not the same as the one that we might use to "fill out" the details when viewing a matchbox; here imagination is not given leave to automatically infer that the matchbox has corresponding surfaces on the invisible side. Another scene is where Neo is being interrogated for the first time, not realizing who he is dealing with; Agent Smith invites his ward to scream,

only for the young man to find that his mouth is strangely fused shut and all attempts to open it simply reveal streaks of stretched rubber-like sinews. It is not that this is realistic – it is the translation of facial matter into rubber that is most striking (and the fact is that it is so strikingly effective because it takes our minds away from a conventional imaginative engagement to one that utterly subverts our understanding of biological matter).

The interrogation scene in *The Matrix* brings to mind a similarly visceral and surreal episode within *Ghost in the Shell*. In the climactic scene where Kusanagi battles the Puppet Master's robot, she finally attempts to rip the cover off the top of the robot's main body with her "bare hands". The force and strain of this exertion leads her cyborg body to partially disintegrate, the outer sinews giving way (in a rather grotesque turn) to reveal the cyborg underneath. It has very much the same impact as the scene in *The Matrix*, if for no other reason that it utterly subverts our understanding of human flesh and blood, converting it into a malleable and unstable elastic substance (an actual occurrence of such a physical rupture would have been far more gruesome and utterly unwatchable – it has a horrific impact nonetheless). We are, on the one hand, presented with a scenario that would in a cinematic context be profoundly disturbing – it is in a sense just so here, but we can handle it better for it being an explicit evocation of a distinct exercise of imagination.

This is not to suggest that such effects could not have been attempted successfully at some stage prior to *The Matrix* or the earlier emergence of a quasi-cinematic animation; nevertheless, there is a distinctive exercise of imagination that seems to be at work here, and we can note that it has a deep resonance with the kinds of exercise of imagination more typical of *anime*. One further aspect of the character design to accentuate here is the distinctive costuming and coloration. The quintessential Matrix look is a large great coat with emphatic geometric flares hanging to the side, jet black (of course) with dark glasses. The de-saturation enhances and almost twin-tone colour palette. Is there a distinctive aesthetic at work in *The Matrix*? Yes there is. Does it bear more than a superficial debt to the look and feel of *manga* and *anime*? Yes, to that too – and I am not the first to suggest this.[4] What I hope to add, however, is the observation that this aesthetic is tied up in a distinctive exercise of imagination with certain stylistic tropes which accentuate its affordance.

Another contrasting example of how this dimension of imaginative expression has been expressed in recent film-making can be found in Chris Nolan's *Inception*. Like *The Matrix*, this film treats a world in parallel with the one we would regard as the norm – unlike *The Matrix*, however, it evokes several worlds at once, any one of which "looks and feels" like a plausible world, except it is bound together within a hierarchy of different levels of consciousness. An intriguing narrative device to be sure, but also highly significant in terms of the way in which it is "held together". Nolan employs the device of fundamental ruptures in the laws of physics (e.g. gravity) to signal a transition from one world to another. In doing so he signals that each and every world is one that is only tenuously in place – waiting to fly apart at a moment's notice. However, it is the scene where he introduces the technique of inception to his disciple that we get to see the full exercising of the kind of imagination that we have been addressing above. Leonardo DiCaprio's character, Cobb, wanders through a Parisian street which instantaneously is overshadowed by the extended cityscape folding back above the skyline toward where they are standing. Everything is, more or less, routine and mundane – but it behaves in ways that could only be possible if you imagined the city was like a sheet of paper rather than what we otherwise know it to be. Aesthetically, *Inception* does not play with colour or fashion in a manner that resonates with *The Matrix*, yet each world that is evoked at each stage of the inception sequence has a clear tone and coloration that is accentuated and contrasted markedly from the predecessor. In any case, it remains an important example of how cinema is transformed to embrace a dimension of imaginative expression that resonates more with the proclivities of animation than the cinematic image.

It may be tempting to infer that by discussing specific operations of imagination tied to particular instances of artistic expression in cinema that I am simply reproducing the very fallacy of a technical definition of art that Collingwood so assiduously rejects and I have followed in this discussion of the anime aesthetic. To this I would simply reply that the point here is not that animation creates these affordances, but the artist and the audience through the exercise of imagination find meaningful expressions along these lines. The focus is on a particular form of experience and process of creative expression that is contingent on imagination, not the technology.

To bring this back to Elsaesser and Hagener's outline of the impli-
cations of the digital for a deeper understanding of the fate of the
contemporary moving image, we can revisit their key terms through
Collingwood's frame of analysis and emerge with an alternative set of
nuances that are specific to the post-cinematic image and the anime
aesthetic's potential to foster it. When they speak of "portal" rather
than "window", what we might be describing is the field of imagina-
tive expression that is closer to the exercise of imagination described
above where the image is not subject to the routinized accommo-
dation of the mundane understanding of the world but freed from
such expectation. When they speak of "virtual reality", it is precisely
the world produced through this free play – it is a world that is not
obliged to reproduce this world with some "plausible" modifications
through special effects, but an alternative to this world, full stop. And
"media convergence" could be termed as the freeing of the imagina-
tion from the tyranny to follow the dictates of the cinematic tradition
(which I would suggest inherently has had some very real constraints
on imagination) and enabled a free play across platforms that is both
salutary and regenerative.[5]

Having established some of the distinctive traits of imagination,
identified some instances of how they are expressed in both cinema
and anime, and then reformulated the taxonomy of "post-cinematic"
traits alluded to at the outset, it is perhaps timely to return to the
three main auteur animators that we have repeatedly been drawn
to throughout this book, Miyazaki, Oshii and Kon, and consider the
degree to which the relevant aspects of the "post-cinematic" have
been expressed through their work.

In the chapter on amusement I made something of the fact that
Miyazaki can be regarded as indulging in a number of technical flour-
ishes that, while exemplary in themselves, do not qualify as great art.
His attention to the engendering of amusement is prominent (and
masterful), but is not the basis for his "claim to fame". His capacity
to evoke profound sentiments of nostalgia and a highly sophisticated
skill in generating "magic" also attest to a great talent (although we
do not necessarily need to regard these as the sum of his abilities and
contribution to art). If we are to identify something of his distinc-
tive contribution to the "post-cinematic" imagination, then it might
be articulated in the following two aspects. Firstly, Miyazaki has
demonstrated a tenacious dedication to promoting a precise species

of imagination that has struggled to survive in a world dominated by the cinematic image – to a point he has done this self-consciously, always being aware that any major departure from the 2D cel technique might imply some diminution of his art. As it turned out he needn't have worried – his powers of expressive imagination were intact, as was the imaginative capacity of his audience. Secondly, he has found distinctive images to engage with his audience that are not indexical or explicit, but exemplify the drive to explore the more lateral possibilities of imagination along with the distinctive affective affordances of the anime aesthetic.

A primary example from *Spirited Away* which exemplifies both of the foregoing points is the creation of the No-face character. There are some clearly allegorical aspects to what Miyazaki has undertaken to achieve through No-face, but what also intrigues here is the degree to which Miyazaki emphatically minimalizes even some of the most rudimentary imperatives of graphic representation; the No-face is a minimally wrought character, to say the least, who has no corporeal features for movement, a minimal outline of form and a mask for a face which itself provides rather minimal cues for explicit expression. And yet with his voice that is not a voice, and a body that seems set to go translucent and even disappear at the outset of the movie, he has a particular affective resonance that is hard to deny (it also accentuates the horror of his transformation when he becomes a rowdy and gluttonous loud-mouth).

Oshii's work has been the subject of considerable analysis and commentary, and much of it reveals some of the genuinely diverse sources of inspiration for his work. Undoubtedly it is his focus on the cyborg as a vehicle for exploring human consciousness and perception that forms a core part of his oeuvre. In one sense, I would suggest that Oshii is an auteur who has used the cyborg trope to create malleable bodies that transcend physiology and a concept of fluid consciousness that affords new possibilities of affect.

Sharalyn Orbaugh, in "Emotional Infectivity: Cyborg Affect and the Limits of the Human" has produced one of the most thorough explorations of Oshii's oeuvre precisely as it might relate to such terms. She has also illuminated some of the intriguing literary influences that have impacted on Oshii's film-making. As Orbaugh explains, Oshii's work owes some debt to the work of Villiers de l'Isle-Adam (1838–1889) who in a highly prescient novel, *L'Ève Future*, explores

the proposition that love as we understand it could be replicated between a man and a mechanical woman.[6] The plot is based on the fictional scenario of Thomas Alva Edison constructing a mechanical female replica to replace the flawed mistress of a friend, Lord Ewald. The "andreid" as it is referred to is named "Hadaly" and functions as a dutiful consort in all regards, bearing the beauty of his mistress without the disappointments. The resonance between this story and the *Ghost in the Shell* films is most evident on two points – the unrequited love of Batou for a cyborg woman in the first film, and the production of the perfect "mate" in the form of the Hadaly 2052 gynoid in the second film.

As the title of Orbaugh's essay indicates, there is an intriguing conundrum presented by the nature of "affect", particularly for the cyborgs who have no corpus and thereby subvert assumptions that affect must stem from a bodily housed sense of selfhood. *Ghost in the Shell*, according to Orbaugh, consequently explores affect in a manner more consonant with recent concepts of affect that transcend the individual's physical body, (for example in the work of Teresa Brennan; see Orbaugh, 2008: 165–166). Kusanagi is defined, therefore, as a posthuman entity able to "infect" divergent realms, from the digital to the temporal, on precisely such a basis.

Whether this was quite the intention of Oshii or not may well be debated, but it is a useful example of how the cyborg trope, deftly manipulated through imaginative expression, enables him to prise the conception of human identity and feeling away from the confines of an organic body. Of course, if we follow Collingwood's conception of "feeling" which, as I have suggested earlier, entails virtually all the essential components of what we currently understand as "affect", then it would not be plausible, on his terms, to consider affect as possible without a sentient being, an organic body; *sensa* are combined with emotion which lead to "feeling". Yet the fact that we can *imagine* "feeling" without a body is testament to Oshii's distinctive reworking of what we might conceive as human beyond what is already here.

In the second film, *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, Oshii demonstrates that there is even further mileage in the cyborg trope; if anything the creative act of thinking through imaginative expression is further accentuated. With regard to the academic analysis of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, Livia Monnet has produced an important

series of papers published in the Mechademia series, "Anatomy of Permutational Desire: Perversion in Hans Bellmer and Oshii Mamoru", and "Anatomy of Permutational Desire II: Bellmer's Dolls and Oshii's Gynoids".[7] The first paper is particularly useful in unpacking the links between Oshii's reprise of *Ghost in the Shell* and the work of Hans Bellmer, a somewhat controversial surrealist German artist whose work displayed a capacity to explore a kind of visceral sexual mayhem through the use of dismembered dolls or occasional gruesome representations of women whose anatomies had been subjected to rather grotesque disruptions. The link between Oshii and Bellmer is not incidental – as Monnet points out, Oshii has been the curator of an exhibition at the Tokyo Museum of Contemporary Art that featured the work of Bellmer and the Japanese art of ball-jointed dolls in 2004 (Monnet, 2010: 286). Monnet is careful to distance what Oshii achieves through *Innocence* from Bellmer's experiment with transgressive eroticism, an experiment that, in her words,

> ultimately proved very limited, producing an often inspired, yet violently misogynistic, pornographic, and oppressive art of "illusion" and "useless jouissance", rather than producing the radical "revolution" envisioned by Bretonian surrealism. (Monnet, 2010: 304)

In her second essay she goes on to explore how Oshii's project in *Innocence* develops a resonance with Bellmer's conception of "hysteria as perversion", noting the at times balletic and then frenzied moments of self-obliteration that occur when the renegade Hadaly 2052 gynoid engages in battle and is defeated. She also discusses how the radical and at times grotesque deformations that are presented in the film invoke Bataille's concept of *alteration* – deformations that are symptomatic of primal sadistic urges. In conclusion she draws her analysis into an interpretation of *Innocence* as oscillating between "two modalities of perversion" – one pertaining to the Big Other of state, family and the police, and one pertaining to "alterity", the "disappearing other". Kusanagi, she proposes, is therefore an agent of "active involuntarism" in the model of the Deleuzian response to the contemporary political order (Monnet, 2011: 163–164).

   As a discussion of how certain thematics of perversion play out within the second film, there is much to be gained, and as a proposition of how we might interpretively situate the role of Kusanagi in

relation to the Deleuzian conception of political conduct there is also some plausibility. Even so, the particular merit of Monnet's commentary that emerges in relation to the aesthetics of the second film is arguably located in the first essay which focuses at some length on Bellmer's own writings in *The Doll* (London: Atlas Press, 2005: an English translation of earlier collected essays published in German as *Die Puppe* in 1963). Monnet highlights passages where Bellmer describes certain images that arise from the "marriage of perception and imagination", images that have a special intensity that emerges from "the violence involved in establishing the equivalence of two merely similar, perhaps dissimilar, or even extremely different images". Moreover, this image can assume the role of a "doppelganger…that saves me from contorting my own self, for it does so in my stead" (Bellmer quoted in Monnet, 2010: 300).

In the foregoing we see something that resonates, perhaps surprisingly, with Collingwood's understanding of the operation of the imagination and how we may at times produce images through creative processes that are perfectly indifferent to real vs unreal; they have a particular expressive capacity which can also be picked up by a viewer, without assuming them to be "actually there" or even physically feasible. What Bellmer does is push the boundary of what we might conceive imaginatively based on admittedly "perverse" impulses toward finding bodily expressions that are at once shocking and grotesque. The assumption is that they mediate a deep-seated sexual contradiction, the confrontation of which must, for some reason, always entail some form of violence. Collingwood's account enables us to recognize the possibility of some intense contradiction within the image, its inherent unreality and the capacity for doing this without assumptions of psychological violence. This is an interpretation of Oshii's treatment of the cyborg that I would prefer to embrace. The cyborg, as Oshii develops it in his films, is probably impossible to encounter in this world as we know it, however tantalizingly close that possibility may seem; but it is still a "doppelganger" that creates possibilities of contortion that we might imaginatively explore, ourselves not needing to undergo that contortion.

The critical response to *Innocence* has been less enthusiastic compared with its predecessor, and perhaps this is not altogether fair given the genuinely sophisticated thematics and tropes of expression that Oshii employs to communicate his process of engagement.

Yet it is also perhaps precisely because the "thinking" in the film is more explicitly marked – so much burdened with overt "philosophy" in comparison with the former film that it is destined to intrigue academic commentators more than general film viewers. In one sense, it could said to exemplify a species of "corruption of conscious-ness", the situation where the force of intellect has become over-ac-commodated in the process of creative expression.[8] Even so, it would be difficult to overstate the significance of Oshii's contribution to the exploration of "post-cinematic" imagination in audio-visual media.

By contrast, Kon Satoshi has perhaps developed a more eclectic set of themes and narratives for his films. He is also arguably the animator who has made certain possibilities of the post-cinematic imagination in relation to anime most explicit. As William Gardner notes in his analysis of Kon's "cyber sublime" (see Gardner, 2009), there is an identifiable trajectory from *Perfect Blue* through *Millennium Actress* and on to *Paprika* of a tendency to subvert our understanding of three-dimensional space. In *Perfect Blue*, a window can display an image of Mima with an alternate self "reflected back". The metaphor-ical intent is evident enough, but the significance of the gesture as a visual contrivance is most apparent when we consider that there can be no "reflection" in this case; it is an alternative existence that, despite the exact tracing of the movement of the figure in the fore-ground, is not the same figure. In this capacity we see the emergence of Kon's incipient use of a reflective surface as a *portal* as opposed to a window (or mirror for that matter). A variation on this handling of space is presented in *Millennium Actress*: in a scene set on a train in Manchuria where the heroine is being pursued by bandits, and she is shown in alternate shots on one side of a door while the bandits attempt to open it from the other side, the visual expectation is completely subverted by a situation where both the heroine and the bandits emerge onto the balcony of a medieval Japanese castle. The door functions as a surface beyond which we expect certain kinds of physical "extension"; what we get instead is the transition to a completely different realm of physicality. In essence, the door is not a simple mediator between two continuous spaces but is, in a more profound sense, a portal between different realms of existence. Consciously or unconsciously, Kon is exploring a grammar of engage-ment with space that subverts the indexical topography of building interiors or the structure of a train wagon.

Even so, the imaginative flourishes of the earlier films arguably pale in the face of the *savoir faire* and sheer ingenuity of *Paprika*. It remains, in part, a "psychological thriller", as we have a part of the sub-plot the immanent threat of a mysterious villain, the Chairman, who is known to the heroine but not revealed until toward the end of the film. However, the device of transposing the narrative into and out of a parallel world of psychosis facilitated by an advanced neuro-technology transforms the means of "delivering" the story profoundly. The visual device used to interlace the two worlds is the use of reflective surfaces to reveal the existence of parallel worlds and the interpellation of a parallel "avatar", Paprika, who is the *alter ego* of the heroine (Osmond, 2009: 112–114; Gardner, 2009: 54–64).

In *Paprika* Kon takes the multi-dimensional possibilities of space and embellishes them with the multiplicity of persona. In a further sense, even time is multiplied as we can never know for certain whether the "action" of the dream world happens in a parallel chronology within the present of the dreamer or in the blinking of an eye. Accordingly, the possibility of an integrated narrative becomes radically disrupted; action and thought belong increasingly to the moment of the scene, and we won't know what to make of them until some kind of resolution is introduced.

Paprika is not necessarily a tale that warns us of the dangers of technology in and of itself – the technology is there to facilitate a multiplicity of consciousness, which in itself is not regarded as an evil unless placed in the wrong hands – which is precisely the problem that occurs at the start of the film. That gives the film its grand premise of plot. But as the film develops it also emerges as something that could be construed as a visual "essay" on the ambiguity of consciousness and animation's capacity to capture it. In fact it is that and more – it is a work that explores many of the "post-cinematic" characteristics that were tentatively identified through an engagement with Elsaesser and Hagener's work, along with Kristen Daly.[9] It is a "virtual reality" qualitatively distinct from what we might expect if we were watching a blockbuster that merely makes the implausible seem "real": this is another conception of existence; we are taken through a series of portals rather than given mirrors or windows to gaze at.

Kon's work also presents forms of imaginative expression that exemplify Daly's conceptions of a radically redefined structure of narrative, a multiplicity of persona, and a distinctive form of spectacle

that subverts our understanding of space. To be sure, it not a film completely free of some tangible reference point – in certain scenes it is an unambiguously riotous evocation of untrammelled imagination and fantasy, in the next scenes we return to the "mundane". There is also the "thriller" premise of a villain who has to be "defeated". But in any case the manner in which this film exemplifies "post-cinematic" possibilities is remarkable.

There remains the question of what, if anything, remains distinctive about the anime aesthetic and its contribution to "art proper". It should be emphasized that the aforementioned aesthetic is not itself an active agent but an identifiable tendency in certain kinds of artistic expression – yet we might venture to suggest what has been achieved by the exponents of animation in terms of what Collingwood described as art's capacity (and indeed obligation) to express "truth". In other words, what it is about the human condition that anime demonstrates a distinctive capacity to articulate effectively and, debatable and contestable though it may be, offer as part of the artist's capacity to "bring to consciousness" not only matters of significance for oneself, but also for one's fellow human beings. Given that I have laid a great deal of emphasis on the works of Miyazaki, Kon and Oshii, let us consider their various contributions in this light.

Miyazaki has found ways to articulate concerns about the human condition (whether they be existential or environmental) in ways that were beyond the particular circumstances of Japan and fundamental to contemporary experience. The Japanese are certainly not the only people to have sensed loss in the face of globalization, or affront at the possibility of a loss of the fundament sense of identity that exists beyond the frame of definition as "worker" or "consumer" that seems increasingly at the heart of what contemporary society demands. Miyazaki has deftly taken a variety of tropes and worked them into an art form that transcends these particular interests and awakens a consciousness that might not otherwise have been identified.

As already discussed, Oshii through *Ghost in the Shell* (and its sequel) brings into sharp relief the conundrum of humanity's relation to technology and "artificial intelligence". Yet what he provokes is not a conclusive response to this question but an enhanced awareness that the problem exists in the first place. Like Miyazaki he also manages to transcend his own particular cultural circumstances – this is a global

message, which enhances its power and significance. The vehicle *par excellence* that enables him to do this is the cyborg, and arguably nobody has devoted as much energy to exploring the cyborg as an imaginative trope as Oshii. In *Ghost in the Shell*, he demonstrates that the predicament of a cyborg is actually our predicament, and by the end of the film we are left in no doubt that anime is a vehicle for thinking through, in the Deleuzian sense, the potentialities of human manipulations of perception of space and time to arrive at innovative ideas, i.e. new forms of philosophy.

Kon Satoshi presents a different prospect of evaluation – compared to Miyazaki and Oshii there are not quite the readily identifiable qualities that can be characterized as a pursuit of a "truth" in the sense of a "bringing to consciousness" of something hitherto unexpressed. *Millennium Actress* stands out as a particularly deft exploration of individual memory on the one hand, and the interlacing of the "big screen" with collective memory on the other. As is often the case there is the psychological thriller at the heart of the film which binds the narrative into some degree of coherence despite the at times bewilderingly swift changes in scene and action.

Perfect Blue is the film perhaps most explicitly crafted with an almost Hitchcock-like attention to psychological intensity, cinematic pacing and an intensifying menace that remains latent right until the end. As an exploration of the nature of celebrity and the losing of one's identity as the cost of pursuing and obtaining fame, the film makes for a solid psychological thriller/exercise in social commentary. It is also a film that begins to develop some visual flourishes that are accentuated and taken to new levels in later work.

Overall, then, we see that the three "auteur" animators treated above distinguish themselves as artists by exemplifying the capacity of art to "bring to consciousness" not simply "self-knowledge", but a consciousness of "truths" that, abstract as they may seem, in fact plumb the extremities of human consciousness and imagination. Their work is thematically highly relevant to contemporary social and cultural concerns, and deals with the deeper issues of human existence in the twenty-first century and how the relationship with the environment, technology and issues of "self-hood" face profound challenges (Collingwood, 1938: 286–289).

In partial support of such grand endorsements for the artistic significance of these films there are several developments that underscore

them. The first is the capacity for these "texts" to transcend their cultural specificity. Almost all of the films referred to above indicate a pronounced attachment to their Japanese or pan-Asian origins – yet they have riveted international audiences to a quite extraordinary degree. Of course, it could be argued that international audiences misunderstand them, or twist them to their own interpretative ends – and perhaps that does occur to a certain extent. But given that we have a tradition of Japanese literature developing a fervent (and discerning) readership outside of Japan based on translation, it should not surprise us that anime has benefitted from an interest based on its inherent capacity to resonate beyond the home culture, and the service of an at times astonishingly devoted and skilled coterie of translators. Japanese literature, ironically, benefitted from the service of a corps of highly trained linguists produced during World War II. Since then, the proliferation of tertiary courses in Japanese culture and language along with international travel has ensured that anime has both a well-informed and competent body of aficionados who engage in a remarkably cogent and critical level of mutual encouragement and criticism.

The fact is that anime is a "language" in terms of it being expressive and imaginative prior to its being indexical or referential, and this perspective enables us to grasp some of its capacity to engage with an audience that does not share the same cultural and linguistic background. Although the difficulties with Collingwood's conception of the "total imaginative experience", particularly the problematic issue of suggesting "identity" between artist and audience, has been canvassed in Chapter 1, there is some patent utility in conceiving of the aesthetics of anime as working at the level of imagination and being "understood" remarkably well across cultural boundaries.

The other "circumstantial" support for the significance of these works stems from their rather startling role as precursors to cinematic productions that were noted for their spectacular expansion of cinematic possibilities. Clearly *The Matrix* and *Inception* are original productions and cannot be regarded as "remakes" of any of the consonant anime works previously mentioned – but what I would suggest is that it was in anime that the exercise of a distinctive form of imagination revealed itself initially, and it is the genius of the Wachowskis and Christopher Nolan to give them cinematic expression.

At this point, perhaps the most fitting way to conclude the chapter is to acknowledge the manner in which film and anime came together

and found a new level of shared imagination in *The Animatrix* (2003). As a collection of nine disparate pieces, with rather divergent technical approaches, substantially idiosyncratic visual styles and, in some cases, a rather oblique link with the Matrix base story, *The Animatrix* attests to a marriage of minds and outlooks. Of all the pieces, I was personally drawn to *Matriculated* for its exploration of the Matrix thematic in a manner that was consonant with the philosophical concerns of the original Matrix, without attempting to replicate the look and feel of the film. The layering of worlds of consciousness, the multiplication of persona and space were all extremely deftly woven together. Overall, what ultimately impressed most was the manner in which characters (such as Neo and Trinity), space, and consciousness could be explored in such divergent ways with nonetheless a clear unity of aesthetic concern.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of a book it is to be expected that the questions posed at the outset have been roundly addressed and all the outstanding issues resolved. In certain respects it is hoped that at least some degree of clarity has been achieved with regard to two objectives that were outlined at the beginning: on one level we have arrived at an illustration of what could be achieved if we attempted to thoroughly review anime cinema on the basis of a particular kind of aesthetic philosophy. Considerable space has been devoted to developing an exposition of Collingwood's theory of art, and despite some perhaps seemingly "obsolete" observations and examples being raised directly from Collingwood's own analysis, it is hopefully clear that Collingwood, for all of his at times arcane and even dogmatic polemics, provides a framework that works well for animation. It is perhaps even possible to suggest that in certain regards he was ahead of his time.

As has been stressed throughout this work, there has been a need to develop an aesthetic theory of the image that isn't rooted in either the technology or the distinct representative affordances of cinematic art. The advent of 3D digital technologies has been discussed as a problematic addition to the broad panorama of potential trajectories – problematic because the technology has had an undeniably emphatic impact on how moving images are created, but at the same time there is a point at which this focus has added more "heat than light" to the analysis. Lamarre's commentary with regard to cinematic anime, along with Elsaesser and Hagener's observations about the transformative potential of 3D CGI in film, put forward important insights; a

certain tyranny of the lens and the frame has been obliterated. The question that remained is what would take its place. Lamarre has been enthusiastically commended for the insight that the emergence of a purely digital form of animation would not supplant cinema – cinema would be repeated; it is just the tyranny that ended.

Having lost one tyrant, it is not like there were no others lining up to take its place, and I have attempted to argue against any attempt to reify the role of 3D computer graphic design as heralding a new hegemony of the *digital* image. Ranciere, in my view, was completely correct to raise the notion of aesthetic "regimes" as a motif for under- standing broad transitions in artistic thought and culture; he was also correct in identifying the "aesthetic regime" that came to its height in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century as being an excep- tional phase in the evolution of human culture based on a (temporary) reworking of the hierarchy between *opsis* and *muthos.* In a manner that may even seem "retrospective" he argued for a re-appropriation of the "image" in a sense that transcends a particular medium and can be approached and interpreted in terms of fundamental "opera- tional relations".

To the extent that Ranciere diagnoses the contemporary aesthetic "malaise" and foregrounds the sphere of conceptual engagement that enables us to re-appropriate the image in a more liberated sense, we have had no complaint. But, as was outlined in the introduction, there are two aspects to this system of thought that require a fuller development – the expansion of the interpretive engagement with art to incorporate a broader array of concerns (to expand beyond the political and incorporate other concerns as well) and a more detailed treatment of the function and character of imagination in art.

And so Collingwood presents himself as an eminently appropriate thinker to bridge these concerns. As was detailed in the first chapter, Collingwood's purview is broadly encompassing, facilitating political commentary but at the same facilitating an understanding of the commercial and the ethical. This is particularly well evidenced in the way that his theory of art could be applied to anime to bridge content that could in one instance be deeply visceral and historically reso- nant, and in another instance utterly frivolous and "disposable".

But it is his theory of imagination that is perhaps his most construc- tive and perhaps even prescient contribution to our understanding of the process of creating art and experiencing it. In the preceding

chapter some considerable attention was given to the notion that Collingwood's conception of the inter-relation of *sensa*, emotion and consciousness, mediated by imagination, would give us a frame for engaging with the terrain of "affect". At the risk of over-stating what seems to be the "truism" of discussions of affect, there is no agreed definition of it, and the dimensions of its operation and application are, if anything, avoided for fear of attempting to quantify an unquantifiable dimension of human experience (or the nature of the cosmos if that scale is preferred).

Collingwood contributes, (unwittingly as it must seem since he could not have imagined how aesthetic theory would have evolved from his era to this), to frame a set of intellectual concerns that, as happens to be the case, have deep relevance to the art of anime. Anime emerges as an art form with a distinctive facility for imaginative expression – at the same time as it makes particular "demands" on both the creator and the spectator, it enables modes of expression that are, by virtue of its indifference to an obligation to integrate perception with the exercise of imagination that correlates to our experience of the physical world, liberating in profound ways.

We have also seen that certain aspects of this process of imaginative expression are consonant with distinctive *affective* capacities. In one sense, this is "necessitated" by its estrangement from an ability to present the "actual", unlike the situation with a camera, lens and a receptacle of data (celluloid or SD card). On the other hand, the "pay back" in terms of following the allure of emotional charges that are attached to specific instances of coloration or visual spectacle (an embracing of the metamorphic possibilities of a purely emergent space) is immense.

It is also clear that this facility of imagination is not limited anime – we see it replicated increasingly across a broad spectrum of media platforms, from cinema to video games to fan culture. It is as if a veritable "white rabbit" has been released into global culture and there is no shortage of those who will follow it.

This is, in one sense, the contribution of an "anime aesthetic" to the emergence of a post-cinematic culture. This sense is relatively constrained – it suggests that all we mean by it is the facilitation of a new alternative to the former hegemony of the cinematic image. And it is tied up profoundly with deeper reflections on the human condition. Not for a moment discounting the relevance of Deleuze's

conception of philosophy and cinema, I have embraced precisely the same conception of the capacity of the anime aesthetic to facilitate philosophy. For whatever reason, anime has afforded some of the most impactful musings on identity, the relation of technology to humans and our capacity to speak to each other in new narrative forms with new structures of space and time.

Part of the sense of unease with the scholarly projects that retain the Deleuzian or Deleuze/Guattari frame of analysis is that it is becoming increasingly necessary to modify or abandon it. If Lamarre is an exemplar of a scholar marshalling this intellectual edifice toward the development of a fresh understanding of a post-cinematic future (and anime's part in it), I would say that he is refreshingly open in his acknowledgement of the potential limitations of apparatus theory and the utility of Heideggerian or Lacanian modes of exegesis to capture what is happening in terms of our relationship with technology or the compass of artistic expression. Of course, the political aims that have informed the adoption of the Deleuzian/Lacanian paradigm remain pertinent and ethically imperative – but the apparent inefficacy of the discourse emanating from the leading intellectual centres of the world to stem the creep of illiberalism (in the name of neo-liberalism) and military interventionism (in the name of security and national self-determination), and a deep-seated apathy about the political, should give us pause to take stock. It is not enough to have a strident critic with razor wit such as Žižek tell us amusingly how bad things have really become.

Notions of machinic assemblage and affect are accurate attempts to grasp the genuine complexity of the human experience, but at a particular point they resolve into a merely descriptive framework that helps us grasp the nature of the prison without securing a key to escape. The factor that changes that is imagination – and the figure who takes that and turns it into something else by finding the way to express the world more clearly is the artist. What I would suggest is that animation has, for a number of conscious and unconscious reasons, emerged as an important vehicle for articulating political, cultural and philosophical concerns.

Collingwood, as it turns out, was no stranger to these sorts of cultural and political concerns. By the time he had become established as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen in Oxford in 1935, Europe had just begun a fitful exit from a global financial crisis only to be beset by international crises and a highly

divisive ideological struggle at home which was rooted in a polit-
ical dispensation that was either fey and "establishment" or aligned
with a brand of Stalinist Communism that would ultimately become
a demonstrable ethical liability. On top of this he had been diag-
nosed with a life-threatening medical condition following complica-
tions from chicken pox in the early 1930s. He was someone who was
acutely aware of the dire implications of the developments of his
time and increasingly began to adjust his agenda of writing to address
issues that he felt could "make a difference".

As already mentioned in the introduction, he had a strong concern
for two strands of philosophical reflection; one was history and the
other was art. In the end it was in fact *The Principles of Art* that was
published first. We get important clues about why he prioritized art
from certain of his observations about the role of art in culture and
civilization. In a manner that might surprise contemporary sensitivi-
ties, he was stridently critical of the emergent culture of wall-to-wall
amusement and the demise of art that could have an impact on the
practical life of ordinary people – "magic". In the end, his residual
energies were focused on a work that had ostensibly more to do with
the concerns of his epoch than a more abstract philosophical ques-
tion – *The New Leviathan: or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism*
was an avowedly impassioned and polemical work which sought to
resurrect some of the best elements of British political thought and
restate the case for a civilized society. It was published in 1942, when
the fate of the Allied struggle against Nazism was still up in the air,
and he passed away the following year.

Fortunately we do not live in quite so dramatic times, but we can
take some notion of the significance of art in a world in crisis and the
manner in which anime can be evaluated as a new mode of artistic
expression that has distinctive affordances and proclivities with
certain content that makes it a perhaps surprisingly effective tool in
the armoury of contemporary mass communication. Just as Orwell
set upon the unlikely fictive device of a farm populated by talking
animals, so we might give credit to some of Japan's contemporary
animators for developing a surprisingly resonant and effectual means
of encouraging us to talk about identity, the environment and the
likely trajectory of our future if we do not think more deeply as a
species about the implications of the kinds of technologies we now
have at our disposal.

There are, of course, some unresolved or open-ended implications of the analysis and commentary contained in this book. As noted in the discussion of Lamarre's commentary on the relation between cinema and anime, it was certainly going to be the case that cinema would never be the same again once the camera, for most visual intents and purposes, was appearing to be completely substitutable with digital imaging technology. We know that it is not likely that cameras will be substituted any time soon, just as the demise of vinyl in the face of the CD was prematurely overstated. What we also know is that animation would never be the same again either. And then there's more.

As audio-visual content of every kind becomes increasingly mashed-up, re-mixed and integrated across multiple media platforms, it must have some bearing on the nature of how anime, as one art form amongst many, evolves and adapts. There is also the potential emergence of thoroughly unanticipated applications of technology to the creative process of animation (remembering that the concept of animation is not just about using image frames in sequence to create the appearance of movement, but can be applied to marionettes and other installations that employ manipulable assets as well). The arrival of Hatsune Miku heralds one such extraordinary development in the evolution of anime art (Condry, 2013: 63), and there will be other equally extraordinary instances as the capacity to integrate the experienced world with interactive interfaces that facilitate virtual kinds of performativity emerge.

Overall, however, this book has been an exploration of how the art of Japanese animation has impacted on audio-visual screen art – how it is evolving in the here and now. It has been argued that cinema in its classical sense is now at a fundamental turning point, although not by any means obliterated or eclipsed. A techno-centric account of that transition has been rejected. It is certainly true that the demise of classical cinema can be traced from the point where digital animation demonstrated that it could replicate the visuality of cinema without the constraint of the camera lens. But this in itself could never indicate which direction imaginative expression would go as a result – there was nothing inherent in the technology of 3D computer image design that suggested a new aesthetic or new thematic in itself. The turning point was in fact a call to go out and

explore a realm beyond that which had hitherto tacitly been under the hegemony of cinema. Hence we have directed particular attention at the aesthetics of Japanese animation and sought to identify how it has subtly given direction to a movement away from camera-centred audio-visual image construction.

Notes

Introduction

1. See, for example, Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto's review article "Anime from Akira to Princess Mononoke: Experiencing Contemporary Japanese Animation. By Susan J. Napier" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 61(2), 2002, pp. 727–729.
2. Key texts relevant to these thinkers are as follows: Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema I* and *Cinema II* (London: Athlone Press, 1989); Jacques Ranciere, *The Future of the Image* (London and New York: Verso, 2007); Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London and New York: Verso, 1989); Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
3. This is a recurrent theme in *The Anime Machine* – and although Lamarre has a carefully nuanced approach to the significance of technology, he ultimately favours an engagement with the specificity of the technology as the primary starting point for an analysis of the "animetic" image: see Lamarre, 2009: xxi–xxiii.
4. For a concise summing up of this point and a discussion of the distinction between creation and "fabrication" see Collingwood, 1938: pp. 128–131.
5. Lamarre is strident critic of such tendencies – see *The Anime Machine*, p. xxviii & p. 89.
6. "Culturalism" is used here to denote approaches to artistic products and artefacts that prioritize indigenous traditions and practices as a means to explain the artistic rationale of the content. While it is a valuable exercise in contextualization, there are limits to how it can account for creative processes themselves.
7. Shimokawa Ōten produced *Imokawa Mukuzo Genkanban no Maki* (*The Tale of Imokawa Mukuzo the Concierge*) which was the first animated work to be shown publicly – the images were retouched on the celluloid. Kōuchi Junichi produced *Namakura Gatana* (*Blunt-edged Sword*) which is generally regarded as the first animation production, though not released publicly. Kitayama Seitarō is credited with producing another notable pioneering animated work, *Sarukani Gassen* (*The Battle Between the Monkey and the Crab*), but there is no surviving footage. All of these animations were produced in 1917.
8. The association of anime with "post-modern" tropes is in fact partly due to anime's increasing figuring in films that accentuate cultural pastiche and rhizomatic narrative conventions.
9. The idea of the "thwarted fable" is developed more fully in Ranciere's *Film Fables*, trans. Emiliano Battista, Oxford: Berg, 2006.

10. This possibility of overlap is explored to some extent by Giussepina D'Oro in "Collingwood on Re-enactment and the Identity of Thought" in *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 38(1), Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, pp. 87–101.

11. Cognitivism is clearly a broad school of thought and is difficult to define. Obviously David Bordwell and Noel Carroll's *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996) is the seminal work. For a more recent outline of "the state of play" for cognitivism see the excellent collection edited by Ted Nannicelli and Paul Taberham, *Cognitive Media Theory (AFI Film Readers)*, New York and London: Routledge, 2014.

1   R. G. Collingwood and a "Philosophical Methodology" of Aesthetics

1. Davies, David. "Collingwood's 'Performance' Theory of Art" in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 48(2), 2008, pp. 162–174. Ridley, Aaron, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory" in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 55(3), pp. 263–272.

2. Collingwood, R. G., *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (revised edition), James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro (eds), Oxford University Press, 2008, and *The Idea of History*, Clarendon Press, 1946.

3. For Wollheim's interpretation of Collingwood see Wollheim, R., *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 36–43, and "On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood's Aesthetic", in *Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, M. Krausz (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

4. Sclafani, Richard, "Wollheim on Collingwood" in *Philosophy* 51(197), 1976, pp. 353–359.

5. John Dilworth's response is in "Is Ridley Charitable to Collingwood?", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 56(4), 1998, pp. 393–396. For Ridley's response see Ridley, A., "Collingwood's Commitments: A Reply to Hausman and Dilworth", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 56(4), 1998, pp. 396–398.

6. Connelly, James, "Patrolling the Boundaries of Politics: Collingwood, Political Analysis and Political Action" in *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7(1), pp. 67–80.

7. See also p. 18 of the Editors' Introduction in the same edition for comments regarding "extension" and "intension".

8. As Collingwood himself states: "The reader will find that, in order to bring into relief the special characteristics of philosophy, it is constantly compared with science, and in particular two kinds of science, empirical and exact" (Collingwood, 2005: 8–9).

9. Dray's seminal exposition of "re-enactment" in Collingwood accentuates, in line with Mink and Donagan before him the inter-related character

of Collingwood's system of thought. Donagan in particular emphasized the consonant aspects of *The Idea of History* and *The Principles of Art*. For parallel references see Collingwood, (1946: 10; 1938: 291). Also see Donagan, A., "Collingwood and Philosophical Method" in *Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood*, M. Krausz (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 1–19.

10. Collingwood reiterates this across several passages within *The Principles of Art*, (1938): see pp. 115–117, 275–280 & 292.

11. "Nothing is in the imagination that was not first felt in the senses", see Collingwood, 1938: 307.

2   Anime as Craft

1. Dani Cavallaro has highlighted Miyazaki Hayao's penchant for suggesting that he is in some sense merely a slave to his art, not knowing where it will take him. This is not mere posturing, and it can be suggested that serious art, even when it is as technically collaborative as an animated feature, necessitates this dimension of indeterminacy if it aspires to be genuinely artistic. See Cavallaro, *The Animé Art of Hayao Miyazaki*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 2006: 134.

2. The Japanese title for *Miyazaki Hayao at Work* is『宮崎駿の仕事』(NHK, 2009), while the Japanese title for *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* is『夢と狂気の王国』(Dwango and Ennet Co., 2013).

3. Nolan was adamant that CGI would not be the mainstay of this film, as is apparent in his remarks released as part of the official *Production Notes*, Warner Brothers, 2010, p. 12.

4. Lamarre is clear that Miyazaki is not trying to compete against cinema – he has a separate artistic agenda. He also grasps that Miyazaki has a distinct pre-cinematic vision. Nonetheless, he persists in framing this as an attempt "to open a different relation to technology from within technology": see Lamarre 2009: 44.

5. Again, Lamarre is to be commended for emphasizing that the technical choices of Japanese animators have not been due to merely material constraints or relative lack of expertise, but due to other motivations (see Lamarre, 2009: 24–25).

3   Anime as Representation

1. For a practical discussion of issues around avoiding an obsession with photo-realism see Gregory Garvey's "Life Drawing and 3-D Modelling with MAYA: Developing Alternatives to Photorealistic Modeling" in *Leonardo*, 35(3), 2002, pp. 303–310.

2. For an outline of some of the more pejorative perceptions of anime see Drazen, *Anime Explosion: the What? Why? and Wow! of Japanese Animation*, Berkley CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2003: 16–26.

3. Greenberg's reading of Wells is perhaps contentious – readers should review Wells' full treatment of animation in *Understanding Animation*, Routledge, 1998, pp. 10–35.
4. Both Brian Massumi and Steven Shaviro stand out as having explored the significance of affect in its broadest aspect, Massumi focusing on the integratedness of affect in relation to cognition and feeling (see Massumi, Brian, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, *Sensation*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), while Shaviro has accentuated the corporeal dimension (see Shaviro, Steven, *The Cinematic Body,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). The possibility of bridging these concerns and integrating them within the compass of Collingwood's theory of imagination is explored in detail in Chapter 6.
5. Susan Napier analyses the role of female protagonists across several of Miyazaki's films, albeit not with the sense of them being focalizers but rather vehicles of "defamiliarization": Napier, *Anime from* Akira *to* Howl's Moving Castle, Palgrave, 2005: 152–156.
6. An interesting contrast can be made between Lamarre's view and Collingwood's view of "illusory sensa" in relation to imagination. See Collingwood, 1938: 188–192.

4 Anime as Amusement

1. Of particular note is Antonia Levi, "The Americanization of Anime and Manga: Negotiating Popular Culture" in *Cinema Anime*, Brown (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 43–63.
2. Collingwood also makes passing reference in this context to Bergson's notion of an "aphrodisiac civilization". See Collingwood, 1938: 85.
3. For a recent and more fully wrought discussion of Otaku culture, see Azuma Hiroki's *Otaku: Japan's Database Animals*, University of Minnesota Press, 2009, a translation of the 2001 Japanese original entitled 『動物化する ポストモダン』.
4. The most crucial section dealing with the arguments around distinguishing between "imagination" and "make-believe" can be found in Collingwood, 1938: 135–138.
5. Peter Lewis, "Collingwood on Art and Fantasy", *Philosophy*, 64(250), Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 547–555.
6. Brian Ruh discusses Oshii's affection for Bassett hounds in several films: Ruh, 2004: 8, 111, 132 & 181.
7. Discussion of Kon Satoshi's biographical background can be found in Napier's discussion of *Tokyo Godfathers*: "From Spiritual Fathers to Tokyo Godfathers: Depictions of the Family in Japanese Animation" in Hashimoto and Traphagan (eds), *Imagined Families, Lived Families: Culture and Kinship in Contemporary Japan*, SUNY Press, 2008, pp. 45–49 and her discussion of "Performance, the Gaze and the Female" in Brown (ed.) *Cinema Anime*, Palgrave 2006, pp. 23–42. There is also the excellent overview of Kon's life work in Andrew Osmond's *Satoshi Kon: The Illusionist*, Stone Bridge, 2009.

8. Osmond's view is that the female heroine in *Paprika* reflects a more adult and streetwise take on the shōjo in *Spirited Away*. See Osmond, 2009: 114.

9. Dr Slump was originally published in *Jump Comics* by the Shueisha Publishing Company in 1980, Dragon Ball from 1984–1995; *Dragon Ball* was aired as an animation from 1986–1989, Dragon Ball Z from 1989–1996 (produced by Toei Motion Pictures).

10. *Kore wa Zombie desu ka?* was originally written by Kimura Shinichi and published by Fujimi Shobō in 2010, the anime series running from 2011 and produced by Studio Deen. It must also be emphasized that a great deal of televised animations and OVA are also capable of developing serious thematics and powerful artistic expression. Two series that stand out are *Ergo Proxy* (Manglobe, 2006) and *Texhnolyze* (Fuji TV, 2003).

11. For an up-to-date overview of the global industry of international collaboration and distribution, including the anime fandom phenomena of "fansubbing" see Condry, 2013: 161–180.

5   Anime as Magic

1. The use of the term "amuletic" here is inspired to some extent by Peter Dale who coins the phrase in his work, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (St Martin's Press, 1986); however, I am employing the term in a more neutral sense.

2. Ichiyanagi on the themes of blood in *Princess Mononoke*. Ichiyanagi Hirotaka, "Kyōkaisha-tachi no Yukue" in Yonemura Miyuki (ed.), *Jiburi no Mori e: Takahata Isao to Miyazaki Hayao wo Yomu*, Shinwasha, 2008: 176–179.

3. See Jolyon Baraka Thomas, "Shūkyō Asobi and Miyazaki Hayao's Anime" in *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions*, 10(3), 2007, pp. 73–95.

4. Osmond, 2008: 72; Kim, 2008: 113–116.

5. This has been dealt with in a paper by the author currently pending publication with the *Asian Studies Review* entitled "Nostalgia and Memory in the Anime Creations of Miyazaki Hayao".

6. For a detailed discussion of the background to Hosoda Mamoru's adaptation of the Tsutsui Yasutaka original and issues of character development, see Condry, 2013: 35–40.

7. Indeed Ichiyanagi notes that one of the domestic criticisms of *Princess Mononoke* was that it was a "remake" of *Nausicaä*. See Ichiyanagi, 2008: 170–171.

8. Readers will find Jeff Vandermeer and S. J. Chambers *Steampunk Bible*, a suitably broadly comprehensive, accessible, yet authoritative resource. There is a Japanese section (which is admittedly brief) as well: see Vandermeer and Chambers, 2011: 181–188.

9. See Graham J. Murphy and Sherryl Vint (eds), *Beyond Cyberpunk: New Critical Perspectives*, Routledge, 2010; McHale, *Constructing Postmodernism*, Routledge, 1992.

6   Anime as Art: Digital Cinema and the Anime Aesthetic

1. Wells discusses the significance of metamorphic capacities in general terms, i.e. not specifically in relation to anime; Napier explores particular instances, including the "frenzy of metamorphosis" as instanced in *Akira*. See Wells, 1998: 69–75 and Napier, 2005: 45 & 75.
2. Lewis (1989) expands on this problematic aspect of Collingwood's notion of "corrupt consciousness", which Lewis interprets as a consciousness that fails to "grasp its own emotions"; see Lewis, 1989: 554–555; Collingwood, 1938: 285.
3. It is important to note that Collingwood implies that there is no difference in the exercise of imagination *per se* here, although it can take a variety of trajectories. See Collingwood, 1938: 192–194.
4. Apparently Watanabe Shinichiro felt that watching *The Matrix* was like watching a Japanese animated film (see Silvio, "Animated Bodies and Cybernetic Selves: The *Animatrix* and the Question of Posthumanity" in *Cinema Anime: Critical Engagements With Japanese Animation*, Steven Brown (ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006: 113).
5. Indeed it would seem to be the distinct strength of Kristen Daly's "Cinema 3.0" that she draws on Rodowick's theory and then clearly demonstrates how porous the boundaries of media experience are becoming as we note the transformation of certain fundamental aspects of narrative, persona and spectacle (Daly, 2010: 82).
6. Orbaugh,'s essay appears in *Mechademia 3: Limits of the Human*, Frenchy Lunning (ed.), University of Minnesota Press, 2008, pp. 150–172.
7. Monnet's analysis of Oshii through the lens of Bellmer was published in two separate issues of *Mechademia*: "Anatomy of Permutational Desire: Perversion in Hans Bellmer and Oshii Mamoru" appears in *Mechademia 5: Fanthropologies*, Frenchy Lunning (ed.), 2010, pp. 285–309, and "Anatomy of Permutational Desire II: Bellmer's Dolls and Oshii's Gynoids" appears in *Mechademia 6: User Enhanced*, Frenchy Lunning (ed.), 2011, pp. 153–169.
8. This is somewhat different from the instance of corruption of consciousness raised by Lewis in his article on art and fantasy in Collingwood's work (1989); it is more akin to the admixture of disparate elements that Collingwood laments within the section on amusement. See Collingwood, 1938: 82–84, 282–285.
9. Elsaesser and Hagener's discussion of "Virtual Reality" in *Film Theory: An Introduction Through the Senses*, (New York: Routledge, 2010) and Daly's discussion of the transformation of narrative, character, and spectacle in "Cinema 3.0: The Interactive-Image" in *Cinema Journal*, 50(1), (University of Texas Press, 2010).

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The Animatrix, (Andy and Lana Wachowski, USA, 2003)
Appleseed, (Aramaki Shinji, Japan, 2004)
Avalon, (Oshii Mamoru, Japan, 2001)
Avatar, (James Cameron, USA, 2009)
Blade Runner, (Ridley Scott, UK, 1982)
Chikara to Onna no Yo no Naka (Masaoka Kenzō, 1933)
Chobits (CLAMP, Japan, 2002)
Dr Slump (Tōei, Japan, 1981–1986)
Dragon Ball (Tōei, Japan, 1986–1989)
Dragonball Z (Tōei, Japan, 1989–1996)
Ergo Proxy (Manglobe, Japan, 2006)
Evangelion: 1.0 You Are (Not) Alone, (Anno Hideaki, Japan, 2007)
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Samurai Champloo (Manglobe, Japan, 2004–2005)
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